What Were the Effects of Decolonization?

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Abstract

Considerable scholarship has argued that most varieties of European colonial rule negatively affected many social and political outcomes. Did these outcomes improve after colonial rule ended? We examine the effects of internal autonomy and of gaining independence on democracy, internal conflict, government revenues, and economic development using a fixed effects panel design. Democracy levels increased sharply during the internal autonomy period immediately before independence. However, conflict, state revenue, and income levels exhibit no systematic differences before or after independence. The results are similar when taking into account varieties of colonial institutions and the endogenous timing of independence. Except for democratic gains, the overall findings—juxtaposed with existing research—suggest that decolonization was less politically consequential than the heterogeneous long-term effects of colonial rule on institutions and social patterns.

Keywords: Colonialism, Civil war, Democracy, Economic development, Fiscal capacity, State capacity

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1 Introduction

Vast Western European empires covered the globe for considerable portions of the 19th and 20th centuries before a massive wave of decolonization following World War II. "The sheer scope of imperial collapse and new-state formation has no precedent in history ... Almost 40 percent of the world's population—2.2 billion people in the year 2000—inhabits states that made the transition from colonial to independent status between 1940 and 1980" (Abernethy, 2000, 133). The United Nations (n.d.) proudly proclaims that "The wave of decolonization, which changed the face of the planet ... represents the world body's first great success," and four of the 20 most influential political figures of the 20th century were decolonization leaders (TIME Magazine, 1999).

Despite the broad importance of and attention paid to post-World War II decolonization, we have scant knowledge about a basic question: Did the wave of decolonization from European empires between the 1940s and 1960s actually change political and economic outcomes? More broadly, what is the effect of political independence relative to the counterfactual of rule by an external state? This paper examines variation *within* countries over time between the colonial and post-colonial eras to assess the macro-level consequences of one of the most impactful international policy decisions of the 20th century. We compare four key outcomes within countries before and after gaining independence: democracy, internal conflict, government revenue, and economic development. To do this, we compiled a cross-national panel dataset of outcomes and colonial status between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, the period during which formal colonialism declined from its historical peak to virtual nonexistence. To account for confounding influences of heterogeneity across territories and of global historical changes, the main models include both country and year fixed effects.

Democracy levels increased sharply during the period of internal autonomy that preceded independence in most countries. Although the colonial era as a whole was authoritarian (Mamdani, 1996; Young, 1994), colonizers appear to have made a concerted effort to promote elections and democratic rule in their colonies immediately prior to granting independence. This is, to our knowledge, a new finding about the timing of democratic gains, as only recently have democracy data become available that enable systematic comparisons involving the colonial era (Coppedge and Zimmerman., 2016). This result provides insight into the timing of the "second wave" of democracy that followed World War II.

By contrast, gaining independence does not exhibit a systematic relationship with internal war, revenue, or development. Economic growth was no slower after independence than before, and state revenue per capita did not grow any faster. Internal conflict onset is prevalent in the years immediately around independence, but soon returns to levels similar to the late colonial period.

Although the main models implicitly assume that gaining independence exerted the same effect across colonial institutions, we show that the core patterns are remarkably similar across many varieties of colonial institutions found to be significant in the existing literature—Africa and non-Africa, British and non-British colonies, length of colonial rule, state antiquity, colonial European population size, and disrupted colonial rule during World War II or not. Furthermore, despite inherent difficulties of addressing the endogeneity of independence timing in an observational design, we also show that the results are similar in subsets of colonies in which the timing of independence was largely unrelated to local considerations: French Sub-Saharan countries pushed out of the French empire simultaneously in 1960, and "minor" colonies whose independence timing was largely determined by events in neighboring "major" colonies, measured by comparing the size of colonies' total population and European population. Finally, we also examine more suggestive comparisons between post-independence years and the "high" colonial era (1919 to 1945), finding that although this earlier colonial period was more peaceful, it was also highly authoritarian.

These findings contribute to a vibrant political economy literature on effects of European colonialism. This research examines long-term effects of European colonialism by comparing post-colonial outcomes across countries that experienced varied colonial "treatments." Many have examined the effects of different colonial policies and institutions on economic development (Nunn, 2014; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005), democracy (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2017; Lindberg and Smith, 2014; Weiner, 1987; Lankina and Getachew, 2012), internal warfare (Reid, 2012; Mukherjee, Forthcoming) and fiscal capacity (Herbst, 2014). Although colonial rule is often thought to have exerted positive long-term effects in a few European settler colonies, these persistent effects are posited to be negative for many common types of colonial institutions and policies. These empirical patterns have provided the basis for broad arguments about the negative features of colonial and post-colonial states, particularly in Africa (Herbst, 2014; Young, 1994; Mamdani, 1996).

However, arguments focused on long-term effects have not analyzed the short-term political and economic consequences of a crucial intervening change: gaining political independence. It therefore cannot answer

whether changes in political arrangements at the top affected key political and economic outcomes, or instead whether continuities between the colonial and post-independence eras have been sufficiently strong to outweigh changes in who rules. Not only at present is there wide acceptance of the importance of post-World War II decolonization, but the effect of gaining independence on political and economic outcomes was of great importance to contemporaries of the decolonization process. Most observers were certain that independence would have profound effects. Anti-colonial activists advocated independence because they thought that it would bring increased levels of political freedom and economic development (Naoroji, 1901), whereas defenders of colonialism predicted that independent states would be institutionally weak and politically unstable (Lugard, 1922). Furthermore, the assumption that decolonization was significant is implicit in literatures on causes of decolonization (Pepinsky, 2015; Gartzke and Rohner, 2011) and on consequences of state-building projects beyond the European colonial context.

Overall, although policy variation across colonies may have generated durable long-term legacies—as established in existing research—the short-term effects of gaining independence and of changing leadership only systematically affected democratic gains. The null results for most outcomes contrast with arguments that ending colonial rule would either solve the problems caused by colonialism or trigger chaos, but support arguments that stress continuities in social conditions between colonial and post-colonial rule (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2014). By examining within-country comparisons in the 20th century, we compare colonial rule to post-colonial rule, but cannot compare colonial rule to *non*-colonial rule—implying that we do not observe what countries would have been like had never been colonized or had the global phenomenon of colonialism not occurred. However, combining our findings with existing research on long-term colonial legacies suggests that, in many countries, the effects of colonial rule on social and institutional structure were so strong that simply changing leadership could not erase negative effects of external rule.

2   Effects of Gaining Independence: Existing Arguments

Despite the large volume of research on colonial legacies and a general consensus that colonialism exerted profound and mostly negative effects, few theoretical accounts focus primarily on decolonization effects. The existing literature tends to instead focus on long-term divergence stemming from differences *across* colonial territories. Furthermore, although some existing theories generate implications for the impact of

decolonization, they often disagree with each other. Below, we show that existing arguments can be interpreted to support negative, positive, or null relationships between decolonization and our four outcome variables.

Democracy. European colonial rule was, almost axiomatically, undemocratic. Outside a handful of self-governing settler colonies, European rulers were not politically accountable to the colonial population because this population did not share their political goals or desire their presence (Mamdani, 1996; Furnivall, 2014). In many colonies, these governance patterns created despotic local leaders (Mamdani, 1996; Lange, 2009) and the colonial state relied heavily on coercion (Young, 1994).

However, this observation leaves open the question of whether democracy levels would increase in the lead-up to independence, as some research indicates. European colonizers granted expanded political representation to natives, and Britain in particular attempted to achieve an "honourable exit" from its colonies via democracy promotion (Young, 1970, 482). For example, in India, Britain began introducing elections at increasingly higher levels of government between the 1920s and 1930s, in part in reaction to local demands. This required developing political parties, such as the Congress Party, to contest elections. France also introduced electoral reforms in its Sub-Saharan African colonies after World War II, culminating with granting full legal suffrage in 1956. If these arguments are correct and these examples are representative, then we should expect democratic gains in the late decolonization period.

However, it is not clear that attempts to expand rights in the late colonial era should have caused a major transition. Most recent scholarship on colonial causes of post-independence democracy focuses on factors rooted deeper in the colonial period such as British legal institutions (Weiner, 1987), Protestant missionaries (Woodberry, 2012; Lankina and Getachew, 2012), and colonial-era European settlers (Hariri, 2012; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011). If these arguments are correct, then we should expect little change in democracy levels at independence because the deeper cultural and political institutions predicting democracy—such as common law tradition and higher literacy rates from Protestant missionaries—would change little.

Economic growth. There is a strong consensus in the literature that variation in colonial policies had important long-term consequences for economic growth. There are many examples of colonial institutions that should reduce economic production by weakening property rights and by increasing inequality, including forced labor institutions (Dell, 2010), institutions regulating land tenure (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005), or "ex-

tractive" institutions in general (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). Conversely, areas with common law legal systems (Porta et al., 1998) and participatory institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011) are often thought to have stronger property rights and higher levels of growth.

However, by focusing solely on long-term persistence, these accounts do not yield clear implications for the effect of decolonization. If persistence is strong enough, then there should be no decolonization effect because changing rulers would not affect deeply rooted institutions. Alternatively, perhaps shifting power to local rulers positively affected growth despite minimal institutional change. Most colonial governments invested little in public goods, although investments tended to have large beneficial impacts on development where they occurred (Booth, 2007; Huillery, 2009; Donaldson, Forthcoming). Colonial regimes were suspicious of mass literacy and often underinvested in human capital (Chaudhary, 2010). It seems plausible, therefore, that post-colonial rulers facing stronger incentives to provide public goods could generate positive economic effects.

Conversely, colonial rule may have provided alternative development benefits. In extreme circumstances, extractive and brutal colonial regimes can be propitious for economic development, as Mattingly (2017) shows for Japanese colonial rule. More broadly, Ferguson (2012) argues that "the British empire acted as an agency for imposing free markets, the rule of law, investor protection and relatively incorrupt government." In this view, independence may have undermined the state as a neutral arbiter, as post-colonial rulers have often favored co-ethnics in public good provision despite causing economic distortions. Short-term political survival concerns could also encourage fiscally irresponsible policies, like raiding funds from agricultural boards whose stated purpose is to stabilize agricultural income (Bates, 1981). Independence would also tend to reduce protection for foreign investors, who were no longer investing in their own currency and under their own political and legal system, leading to an outflow of capital and expertise.

State revenue. Herbst's (2014) widely influential argument associates colonialism with state weakness, modifying Young's (1994) emphasis on the raw coercive power of the colonial state in Africa. Colonizers faced few incentives to invest in public goods or to collect difficult-to-obtain tax revenues. They instead tended to construct bureaucratically minimal states that sought enough revenue intake simply to balance the budget, and relied on local elites for many core functions (Mamdani, 1996). After independence, states facing greater needs to provide goods like education may be expected raise greater revenues. This hypothesis is supported by results showing that indigenously ruled parts of empires, such as princely states in India,

tended to accrue larger tax revenues (Iyer, 2010).

However, the effect could also go in the other direction. Some Asian colonies were relatively intensively ruled by Japan and, despite considerable brutality, this may have set the stage for successful "developmental states" after independence (Kohli, 2004; Mattingly, 2017). This relates to broader ideas that raw force is often an important component for boosting fiscal capacity, despite adversely affecting subjects at the time.

A third possibility is no effect. Despite shortcomings of colonial rule, Herbst (2014) and Mamdani (1996) consider the colonial and post-colonial periods in Africa as two episodes in a region plagued by deeper structural impediments to projecting political power. This suggests that low fiscal capacity should persist after independence, a point echoed in quantitative work on Africa (Thies, 2009). Chaudhary (2013) similarly notes, "By underinvesting . . . colonial rule did constrain the development of primary education in India. But, this does not imply India would have enjoyed better outcomes as an independent state."

Conflict. Although many authors have emphasized the social disruption and violence involved with creating colonial states, whether colonies were especially conflict-prone is unclear. Contemporary Europeans characterized colonial governments as disinterested yet militarily strong regimes that eliminated endemic local violence, such as conflicts during Africa's 19th century military revolution (Reid, 2012). In these accounts, the superior ability of colonial militaries to maintain internal peace would lead to a *Pax Britannica* or *Pax Francia*. This could have arisen either because of the superior force capacities of European militaries or because the staunch loyalty of European generals eliminated fears of a coup. This contrasts with the post-colonial world, in which fears of insider takeover have frequently encouraged policies that make civil wars more likely (Roessler, 2011).

On the other hand, colonialism could also have induced conflict. The combination of light European presence on the ground, the frequent unpopularity of foreign rule, and coercive-intensive policies would seem to create ripe conditions for rebellion. Establishing colonial rule and decolonization each created upheaval and violence (Wimmer and Min, 2006). Policies such as forced creation of hierarchical political organizations among natives to collect taxes and the migration of millions of European settlers correspond to conflict risk factors such as high grievances (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013) and migration (Fearon and Laitin, 2011) that scholars have studied extensively in the post-colonial period. Furthermore, colonial states often

had minimal administrative presence on the ground and weak control over the societies they ruled (Herbst, 2014), which could create opportunities to attack the colonial government (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

3 Data and Models

This section describes the main variables and models. Appendix Table A.1 provides summary statistics.

3.1 Sample

The unit of analysis is the territory-year, where territories can be either colonized or independent countries. Our main interest is in comparing independent years to post-World War II colonialism, and our estimation strategy incorporates unit fixed effects. Therefore, we focus only on countries that were once colonized by a Western European power and became independent from a European country between 1945 and 1989, implying that we observe colonized and independent years for every territory in the sample. Table A.2 lists the sample. We include all years between 1941 and 1989, with 1941 chosen to allow five years before independence for the first countries in our sample that gained independence. It is appropriate to evaluate all dependent variables along the same time horizon because we are agnostic regarding when any effects should emerge, and Appendix Table A.3 demonstrates similar results when instead restricting the temporal sample to the decade before and after each country's independence year. Table A.4 expands the sample to include 1919 to 1989, during which we have consistent coverage for most of the variables. Table A.5 includes results for 1815 to 1989, although there is considerable missing data.

3.2 Dependent Variables

V-Dem's electoral democracy index measures democracy (Coppedge and Zimmerman., 2016). Unlike other commonly used democracy measures, V-Dem has extensive coverage of territories even under colonial rule. To code "internal war" onset, we combine Correlates of War's intra-state and extra-state war data (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). Extra-state wars usually entail a colony fighting against a European colonizer, and these are coded (by the authors) as occurring in the colony where fighting occurs. To measure fiscal intake,

we use logged per capita central government revenue in ounces of gold, taken from Mitchell (1998) and converted to gold by the authors. Territory-years with inconvertible currencies are excluded. For economic development, we use Maddison's (2008) dataset, which has broad global coverage starting in 1950 and scattered coverage before that, to measure logged income per capita. Correspondingly, the first year in these regressions is 1950, as opposed to 1941 for the other dependent variables. Appendix Table A.7 assesses the robustness of the findings to alternative measures of available dependent variables.

Table A.2 lists every territory that matches the sample criteria and has data for at least one of the four dependent variables, and also lists which territories have data for each dependent variable. Although we have internal war data for every territory (coded by authors for smaller territories), the sample sizes in these regressions are smaller because logit models with unit fixed effects drop territories that experienced no conflicts during the sample time period. Also notable, the revenues variable is missing for about one-third of territories in the sample. Despite limitations, the previously unused data source that provides the basis for our revenues variable still improves considerably over existing datasets that tend to have poor spatial and/or temporal coverage before 1970, when coverage begins for the widely used International Monetary Fund's (2017) dataset.[1]

3.3 Independence and Autonomous Colonial Rule

Political independence occurred when the European colonizer granted complete formal sovereignty to a local government, and we use Gleditsch and Ward's (1999) data for independence year. Formal independence was often a gradual process. In many colonies, granting complete independence was preceded by a period in which local leaders (elected or not) controlled their internal affairs but the colonial power dictated foreign and defense policy. Generally, there was knowledge that independence was likely in the near future, although the exact timing was usually unanticipated at the onset of colonial autonomy. In some countries, such as Bhutan, subjects had enjoyed autonomy throughout the colonial period, with no concrete plans for independence until after World War II. In French Sub-Saharan Africa, the internal autonomy period starting in 1958 occurred with knowledge that independence would likely occur eventually, but neither French nor African leaders anticipated the liquidation of the French empire in 1960. For other colonies, such as Ghana

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[1]Lee and Paine (2017) detail the challenges involved with converting Mitchell's (1998) source information into data points that can be compared across territories and time.

between 1954 and 1957, colonial autonomy represented a transitional phase with concrete plans for independence. In the British Empire, we code as autonomous "dominions" and "self governing colonies." In the French empire, we code as autonomous non-independent states within the French community. Appendix Table A.6 shows that the results for the terminal colonial period are very similar when dummying out a territories' five years prior to independence.

3.4   Statistical Models

Identifying the effect of becoming independent is complicated by various possible confounding effects. Cross-country differences related to the various outcomes could affect independence timing. African countries, for instance, generally gained independence later than Asian countries. To address this issue, every model contains territory fixed effects. Furthermore, secular trends in the outcomes imply that changes in the international environment and other time effects may confound identifying decolonization effects, which we address by including year fixed effects in almost every model. Section 6 elaborates on the policy choices behind the process of decolonization and addresses concerns about countries' independence year being endogenous to country-specific time trends.

Every model contains an indicator variable for whether the territory is independent or not, and includes lag controls. Following standard practice, for the three continuous outcome variables we estimate linear models with a lagged dependent variable (Beck and Katz, 2011), and for internal war onset we estimate logit models with peace years and cubic splines (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998). The equation is:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta \cdot Independent_{i,t} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{i,t}$ is the outcome variable, β is coefficient estimate for independence, γ_i is a vector of territory fixed effects, and δ_t is a vector of year fixed effects. To assess the effect of internal self-rule (as distinct from full independence) we include a measure of colonial autonomy in some models:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t} + \beta_2 \cdot Independent_{i,t} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \tag{2}$$

which leaves colonized years with no internal autonomy as the omitted basis category. Later in the paper, we

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amend these models to interact colonial rule with various colonial institutions. All models cluster standard errors by territory. Finally, although the relatively long time sample implies that models of this form should yield less bias than Arellano-Bond estimators, Appendix Table A.9 shows the results are largely similar when assessing robustness to possible Nickell bias concerns.

4   Main Patterns

Figure 1 depicts trends in levels for the four outcomes during the last decade of colonial rule and the first decade of independence, and Figure A.1 shows growth rates for these variables. The panels present local polynomial regressions with 95% confidence intervals and demonstrate heterogeneous patterns. Most striking, democracy levels increase dramatically in the few years before independence before stabilizing and slightly declining after independence. Average polyarchy scores nearly double from 0.151 five years before independence to 0.295 at independence, and then decrease slightly to 0.276 in the next decade. Internal warfare onset similarly rises in the decade before independence. It remains relatively high shortly after independence while declining slowly. Revenue per capita and income per capita both grow continuously throughout the period with no break around independence.[2] The confidence intervals, however, suggest relatively imprecise estimates for internal war onset, revenue growth, and income growth.

Panel A of Table 1 provides initial insight into the differences between pre- and post-independence by estimating Equation 1. Only democracy levels differ significantly before and after independence, yielding a negative coefficient estimate for the independence variable. Even this coefficient estimate is small in magnitude. The estimated negative long-run effect of gaining independence is -0.12,[3] which is larger in magnitude than average polyarchy level in our sample in 1945 but within one standard deviation of that level. Appendix Table A.8 lags independence by ten years to examine whether the estimates differ when assuming that effects of independence may not have been immediate. In these regressions, a country that gained independence in 1960, for example, would be coded as colonized until 1970 and independent afterwards, thus treating the first decade of independence as one in which post-colonial effects may have yet to take

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[2]Secular trends such as these motivate including year fixed effects in the statistical models.

[3]The long-run effect equals the coefficient estimate for independence divided by 1 minus the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable: $\frac{\hat{\beta}}{1-\hat{\alpha}}$.

Figure 1: Political Outcomes Before and After Independence

Note: Figure 1 plots a local polynomial function and 95% confidence interval for each outcome in the first decade before and after independence.

hold. However, we continue to find a negative relationship between (lagged) independence and democracy levels.[4]

The figures and some theories suggest that we may gain further insight by disaggregating the period immediately before independence, when actors may have begun to anticipate it. Panel B of Table 1 estimates Equation 2, which distinguishes autonomous colonial rule from the remainder of the colonial period.

The period of autonomy immediately prior to independence exhibited considerable democratic gains. The estimated long-run effect of the gains during this period relative to the rest of the colonial era is 0.33, which is more than three standard deviations greater than mean polyarchy level in 1945. To provide some sense of the invariance of this finding to omitted variables (in addition to the many robustness checks presented below), a common metric is to compare coefficient estimates in models with and without covariates (Altonji, Elder and Taber, 2005). The coefficient estimate for colonial autonomy on democracy is in fact larger in magnitude in the model with country and year fixed effects than when excluding those controls (Appendix Table A.10). This implies that to explain away the result, the bias from unobserved covariates would have

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[4]There is also a systematic negative association between lagged independence and internal warfare, which reflects high levels of conflict in countries' first years of independence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

Table 1: Post-1945 Colonial Rule vs. Post-Independence: Panel Models

	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
Panel A. Colonialism vs. Post-Independence				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.00910*	-0.344	0.0312	0.000590
	(0.00516)	(0.645)	(0.0403)	(0.00677)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
Territories	63	32	42	62
R-squared	0.954		0.954	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0307***	-0.918	0.0192	-0.00614
	(0.00547)	(0.630)	(0.0469)	(0.00939)
Independent	0.00606	-0.829	0.0394	-0.00217
	(0.00545)	(0.786)	(0.0522)	(0.00745)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
Territories	63	32	42	62
R-squared	0.955		0.954	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table 1 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. $***p < 0.01$, $**p < 0.05$, $*p < 0.1$.

to go in the opposite direction of the bias from omitting the unit and time dummies, and be large in magnitude. Additionally, isolating colonial autonomy accounts for the statistically significant negative coefficient estimate for independence in Column 1 of Table 1. Post-independence years exhibit a positive relationship with democracy relative to pre-autonomous colonial years, although the difference is not statistically significant.

The estimated effect of colonial autonomy on democracy is robust to a wide variety of V-Dem measures. Appendix Table A.11 disaggregates the V-Dem electoral democracy index into its five subcomponents: freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage. The table shows that every subcomponent exhibits systematic positive effects during the colonial autonomy period, thus reducing concerns that the results are driven by a single subcomponent that might simply be capturing that natives rather than Europeans governed the territory.[5] Appendix Table A.12 shows that examining all

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[5]Although it may seem axiomatic that decolonization should coincide with electoral reforms, this was a historically contingent aspect of European decolonization. Referencing earlier decolonization periods, Spain did not create representative electoral institutions within its American colonies in the early 19th century. Nor did the Soviet Union promote electoral representation in its constituent states prior to breakup. Furthermore,

10 of V-Dem's aggregate democracy indices besides the electoral democracy index yields similar results as in Table 1.

5   Varieties of Colonialism

Do these results hold only for a subset of colonies? Colonial rule varied in many ways across territories that may affect the relationship between gaining independence and the outcome variables. In fact, much of the existing colonialism literature focuses on assessing effects of heterogeneous colonial institutions. We focus here on six of the most widely debated varieties of colonialism that plausibly could have conditioned the effect of independence. Appendix Section A.2 describes the data used to measure each variable.

First, many important contributions to the colonialism literature focus mainly on Sub-Saharan Africa (Herbst, 2014; Young, 1994; Mamdani, 1996). Most Sub-Saharan African countries were colonized relatively late and were ruled indirectly. Low population density, few navigable rivers, and tsetse fly prevalence in much of the continent may pose particularly stark development challenges that alter the effect of gaining independence.

Second, British colonialism has also received considerable attention for promoting democracy (Weiner, 1987) and development (Lange, 2009; Lee and Schultz, 2012), perhaps through its greater tolerance for ruling indirectly through local leaders. Many historians agree that Britain followed a more coherent policy than other European powers during the post-World War II decolonization era.

Third, the amount of time for which a territory was colonized by Western Europe could also condition the effect of gaining independence (Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2009). Longer-ruled colonies tended to be more directly governed and were often considered an integral part of the metropolitan country. The longest-ruled colonies in the present sample also became colonized during a mercantilist global era (Mahoney, 2010; Olsson, 2009), which could affect long-term development and democracy trajectories.

Fourth, scholars have linked pre-colonial political development to economic development (Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002) and to democracy (Hariri, 2012). Territories with pre-colonial states also provided ex-

if handing power to natives axiomatically increases democracy scores, then we should expect continued gains after independence.

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tant bureaucratic infrastructure that could be used to rule indirectly (Gerring et al., 2011), and also might have better allowed subjects to organize a rebellion against the colonizer.

Fifth, European settlers have also received considerable attention for affecting development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2016), democracy (Hariri, 2012), and internal warfare. Settler colonies tended to gain greater degrees of self-governance and democratic representation for Europeans, which also often created frictions between Europeans and non-Europeans in the lead-up to independence and/or majority rule.

Finally, the strength of the independence movement could also have affected the post-colonial state. Tensions created by European settlers affected the organization of decolonization movements, and therefore serves as one proxy for this concept. Another was whether or not colonial rule was disrupted during World War II. Japan occupied European colonies in Asia, and Germany invaded several colonies in Africa, before the original European colonizer attempted to regain control in 1945. Lawrence (2013) argues that disruptions in colonial rule created space for nationalist organization during the war and spurred post-World War II nationalist protests.

Appendix Tables A.13 through A.18 re-run Equation 2 using a series of models with interaction terms that correspond to these conditioning factors (see Equation 3). The estimated pro-democratic effect of internal self-rule is remarkably robust. All 12 marginal effect estimates for colonial autonomy that correspond to different values of these six conditioning variables are positive and statistically significant,[6] whereas the other outcomes exhibit no consistent patterns. Thus, to assess democratic gains in the late colonial period, pooling colonies together indeed reveals a meaningful trend. These results are especially intriguing when considering that African countries and non-British colonies tended to be quite undemocratic in the Cold War period. However, despite the inability to create durable democracy, there is evidence of considerable democratic gains in the immediate lead-up to independence in these colonies.

Although the primary purpose of Tables A.13 through A.18 is to examine varieties of colonialism, they also address confounding concerns. Showing the relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy holds across various colonial institutions minimizes concerns that the aggregate result is driven by any particular

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[6]For the non-binary conditioning variables, we compared estimates for territories with the 25th percentile value to those with the 75th percentile value.

subsample for which confounding concerns might be especially acute.

6 Endogeneity of Independence Timing

Decolonization and achieving independence were inherently political processes consisting of concerted policy choices. Studying effects of such "treatments" is notoriously hard given the inherent endogeneity of policy choices. All the models thus far have controlled for unit and year fixed effects to address these concerns, but there still may be lingering concerns about time-varying country-specific factors that are correlated with both independence timing and political outcomes. Colonizers could—and often did—calibrate the timing of independence to colonies' level of economic and political development or to military and political pressure within the colony. For example, rather than independence causing higher levels of economic development, greater development could cause countries to gain independence. This section presents additional results that drop colonies for which we are most concerned about endogenous independence timing, showing that the findings are mostly similar when restricting attention to "exogenous" independence cases.

6.1 "Exogenous" Independence Countries

We identify two sets of colonies in which the timing of independence was not directly tied to internal events within the colonies. France, like all European powers, emerged from World War II in a weaker structural position to maintain colonial rule and in the face of better-organized populations that rejected colonial rule, most importantly in Vietnam and Algeria. It therefore began to implement political reforms in most of its colonies throughout the 1940s and 1950s. It introduced mostly uniform electoral reforms throughout this period in most of its Sub-Saharan colonies, except Djibouti and smaller islands. This process sped up in the mid-1950s in the face of repeated setbacks in Vietnam and Algeria that not only directly forced France to rethink its colonial policies, but also fundamentally destabilized France's Fourth Republic. In 1958, France granted internal autonomy to 13 Sub-Saharan African colonies that voted to remain within the French empire (only Guinea voted to secede). Continued destabilization of French domestic politics led to the decision to grant independence to these 13 colonies in 1960—i.e., for reasons unrelated to considerations within individual territories such as levels of economic development or strength of the anti-colonial movement.

Indeed, less than two years prior all had voted to remain as colonies.[7]

Second, "minor" colonies situated nearby larger colonies governed by the same European power tended to gain independence because the colonizer reacted to events in the "major" colony, rather than to local conditions in the minor colonies. Internal politics within Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe caused the breakup of the Central African Federation and the resulting independence of Zambia and Malawi. Similarly, maintaining Britain's protectorate over Bhutan became geographically impossible after withdrawing from India in 1947. If a colony's population (either total or European) is less than half that of another colony in the same geographic region colonized by the same European power, then we code it as minor.[8]

Whether pooling both sets of colonies (Panel A of Table 2) or analyzing them separately (Panels B and C), the findings are largely similar to those in Table 1. In Panels B and C, a time trend variable that counts the number of years since 1941 replaces the year fixed effects because of the small sample sizes and because every colony in Panel B gained independence in the same year (however, the results are very similar with the year fixed effects, available upon request). Once again, the colonial autonomy period is robustly more democratic than the colonial period, whereas there are no consistent relationships for the other outcomes across the specifications.

6.2   Decolonization Wars and Guerrilla Regimes

Another strategy for addressing endogeneity is to separate out the colonies that generate the starkest concerns about endogenous independence timing: countries in which a guerrilla regime inherited the state at

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[7]The 13 French Sub-Saharan African countries that gained independence in 1960 are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

[8]The regions are North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The 16 minor colonies are as follows, with the major colony in parentheses: Morocco and Tunisia (Algeria), Burundi and Rwanda (DRC), Gambia and Sierra Leone (Ghana/Nigeria), Bhutan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka (India), Cambodia and Laos (Vietnam), and Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia (Zimbabwe). Pakistan is excluded because it did not exist as a separate colony until just prior to independence. We did not separately code which French Sub-Saharan African countries met the minor colony definition, and none of these are included in Panel C.

Table 2: "Exogenous" Independence Colonies

	Panel A. Pooled			
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0420***	-3.057***	0.149	-0.00537
	(0.00960)	(0.806)	(0.0941)	(0.00881)
Independent	-0.00146	-4.018***	0.245**	-0.000148
	(0.0116)	(1.354)	(0.106)	(0.0118)
Territory-years	1,400	199	353	1,132
R-squared	0.959		0.975	0.992
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. French African colonies with 1960 independence			
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0351**		0.344***	0.0116**
	(0.0119)		(0.0943)	(0.00463)
Independent	-0.0168**	-3.900	0.478***	0.0221*
	(0.00701)	(3.169)	(0.105)	(0.0116)
Territory-years	616	131	242	546
R-squared	0.907		0.969	0.992
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel C. Minor colonies			
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0510***	-0.258	0.0268	-0.0104
	(0.0141)	(1.053)	(0.131)	(0.0101)
Independent	0.00277	-1.620	-0.103	0.00997
	(0.00953)	(1.619)	(0.112)	(0.0101)
Territory-years	784	336	111	586
R-squared	0.968		0.920	0.990
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 2 on a restricted sample consisting of either French Sub-Saharan African countries that gained independence in 1960 (Panel B), minor colonies (Panel C), or both (Panel A). Every model contains territory fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Every model in Panel A contains year fixed effects, and every model in Panels B and C contains a time trend variable that counts the number of years since 1941. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. The model in Column 2 of Panel B does not estimate a coefficient for colonial autonomy because no new wars began during those years in the French Sub-Saharan Africa sample. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

independence following a major decolonization war. In these colonies, we are nearly certain that conflict influenced the timing of decolonization, since the colonial regime was forced to cede control to its previous opponents, often after a period of military stalemate or failure. In the eight countries in our sample for which that happened, independence was essentially an exercise in military surrender rather than in constitutional transfer. Appendix Table A.19 shows that the positive relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy remains among non-guerrilla countries. Unsurprisingly, there is no relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy for the guerrilla regimes because colonial autonomy was either exclusive to whites and contributed to decolonization struggles (Zimbabwe) or autonomy was only granted in reaction to major guerrilla movements (Indonesia, Portuguese colonies).

7 Comparing Post-Independence to the "High" Colonial Period

The results thus far have compared independent countries to the counterfactual generated by the post-1945 colonial period. However, some theories suggest the effects of colonialism differed during the "high" colonial period between roughly 1919 and 1945. These decades are widely considered to have provided a brief period of relatively consolidated colonial rule (Abernethy, 2000, 104-132). Unfortunately, during this period, every territory in our sample was under colonial rule. This make it impossible to separate the effect of colonial rule from global trends—e.g., after-effects of World War I, the global depression, and World War II—and therefore we cannot exclude the possibility that international trends unrelated to decolonization influence these results.

Caveats aside, we find suggestive evidence that the high colonial period was both more peaceful and highly authoritarian compared to post-independence in regressions that do not include year fixed effects. Appendix Table A.20 shows two intriguing findings. First, the post-independence period exhibits considerably *larger* democratic gains than the early colonial period. Despite democratic shortcomings in the post-colonial world, Mamdani's (1996) discussion of the despotism of the colonial era finds support when focusing on this earlier colonial period. Second, independent countries have been considerably more likely to fight internal wars than were territories in the high colonial period. Despite the lightness of most colonial militaries, it appears that they were largely successful at keeping the peace in these early years—although after the initial period of coercively establishing colonial rule—before nationalism swept across the globe. Strikingly, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced no internal warfare between 1919 and 1945. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that global trends unrelated to colonialism influenced these results.

8 Conclusion

Considerable scholarship has argued that most varieties of European colonial rule negatively affected many social and political outcomes. Elites of the new countries saw independence as a golden opportunity to rectify the political problems created by colonialism, although many colonial administrators offered the competing argument that independence would subject their territories to chaos and decay. We examine democracy, internal conflict, government revenues, and economic development using a fixed effect design.

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Democracy levels increased sharply during internal autonomy period shortly before independence. However, conflict, revenue, and income levels exhibit no systematic differences before or after independence. The results are similar when taking into account varieties of colonial institutions and the endogenous timing of independence.

These findings yield two main takeaways. First, the main systematic finding about democracy in the late colonial period is, to our knowledge, a new finding about the timing of democratic gains. Only recently have democracy data become available that enable systematic comparisons involving the colonial era (Coppedge and Zimmerman., 2016). This finding provides considerable insight into the so-called "second wave" of democracy that followed World War II. Whereas conventional accounts of democratization after World War II focus on Western Europe and on U.S.-transplanted regimes in occupied Germany and Japan, we show that the period immediately preceding independence was also associated with considerable democratic gains. This result is also novel even when compared to existing quantitative research on colonialism and democracy. This literature tends to focus on deeper institutional and cultural factors stemming from Protestant missionaries, European settlers, and British legal tradition rather than on policy shifts in the immediate pre-independence period. More broadly, the colonial era provides a useful large-N laboratory for understanding the efficacy of external rule and provides evidence that it can contribute to democratization, at least in the short term and when independence is imminent. Understanding the effects of external rule on democratization is relevant even in recent policy debates because of cases such as U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Second, the rest of the results support contentions of scholars who emphasize institutional continuities between colonial and post-colonial states (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2014). Changes in ruling personnel have been largely insufficient to remove legacies of colonialism. One possible reason is that colonial rule was sufficiently pernicious that simply changing leadership could not erase negative impacts, although our research design does not enable answering this specific question definitively. Because we focus on within-country comparisons in the 20th century, we compare colonial rule to post-colonial governance, rather than to pre- or non-colonial rule. Therefore, our research design does not enable examining countries' trajectories had they never been colonized or if the global phenomenon of colonialism had not occurred.

Overall, juxtaposed with the existing literature, these findings suggest that although decolonization switched political control from foreign to indigenous rulers and caused temporary democratic improvement, gaining

independence from European empires tended not to alter the fundamental structure of states and economies.

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A.1 Supporting Information for Main Patterns

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Territory-Years
V-Dem polyarchy	0.217	0.176	2983
Internal war onset	0.022	0.148	3079
ln(Revenues/pop.)	-1.248	1.937	1049
ln(GDP/pop.)	7.187	0.886	2513
Independent	0.593	0.491	3283
Colonial autonomy	0.087	0.281	3283

Figure A.1: Political Outcomes Before and After Independence: Growth Rates

Notes: Figure A.1 plots a local polynomial function and 95% confidence interval for each outcome (using growth rates rather than levels, although Panel B is the same as in Figure 1) in the first decade before and after independence.

Table A.2: Sample by Dependent Variable

Country	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenues	Income
Algeria	YES	YES	YES	YES
Angola	YES	YES	YES	YES
Bahrain	NO	NO*	NO	YES
Benin	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Bhutan	YES	NO*	NO	NO
Botswana	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Burkina Faso	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Burundi	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Cambodia	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Cameroon	YES	YES	YES	YES
Central African Republic	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Chad	YES	YES	YES	YES
Congo	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cote d'Ivoire	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Cyprus	YES	NO*	YES	NO
Djibouti	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Fiji	YES	NO*	YES	NO
Gabon	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Gambia	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Ghana	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Guinea	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Guinea-Bissau	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Guyana	YES	NO*	YES	NO
India	YES	YES	YES	YES
Indonesia	YES	YES	YES	YES
Israel	YES	YES	YES	YES
Jamaica	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Jordan	YES	YES	NO	YES
Kenya	YES	YES	YES	YES
Kuwait	NO	NO*	NO	YES
Laos	YES	YES	NO	YES
Lesotho	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Libya	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Madagascar	YES	YES	YES	YES
Malawi	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Malaysia	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mali	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Mauritania	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Mauritius	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Morocco	YES	YES	NO	YES
Mozambique	YES	YES	YES	YES
Myanmar	YES	YES	NO	YES
Nepal	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Niger	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Nigeria	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pakistan	YES	YES	YES	YES
Papua New Guinea	YES	YES	NO	NO
Philippines	YES	YES	YES	YES
Rwanda	YES	YES	NO	YES
Senegal	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Sierra Leone	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Singapore	NO	NO*	YES	YES
Somalia	YES	YES	NO	YES
Sri Lanka	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sudan	YES	YES	YES	YES
Swaziland	YES	NO*	NO	YES
Syria	YES	YES	YES	YES
Tanzania	YES	YES	YES	YES
Togo	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Trinidad and Tobago	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Tunisia	YES	YES	YES	YES
Uganda	YES	YES	YES	YES
United Arab Emirates	NO	NO*	NO	YES
Vietnam	YES	YES	NO	YES
Zambia	YES	NO*	YES	YES
Zimbabwe	YES	YES	YES	YES

*Data are not missing, but units with 0 variance on the binary dependent variable get dropped by logit models with unit fixed effects.

The first three appendix regression tables alter the time sample used in Table 1. Table A.3 only includes the first 10 years before and after independence for each territory. The next two tables lengthen the time sample, either from 1919 to 1989 (Table A.4) or from 1815 to 1989 (Table A.5). All the variables except development have reasonably good coverage dating back to the end of World War I, and Table A.4 provides estimates over a longer panel than in most comparative political science research. Table A.5 analyzes an even longer time panel dating back to 1815, albeit with considerable missing data during the 19th century.

Table A.3: Within 10 Years of Independence

	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.0264**	1.880	0.0471	0.0175*
	(0.0100)	(2.204)	(0.0483)	(0.00903)
Territory-years	1,093	192	402	1,006
R-squared	0.930		0.987	0.997
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Distinguishing late colonial rule				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0325***	-7.088***	0.0297	-0.00651
	(0.00770)	(1.931)	(0.0632)	(0.0101)
Independent	0.00568	-3.325	0.0763	0.0119
	(0.0122)	(3.888)	(0.0854)	(0.0118)
Territory-years	1,093	192	402	1,006
R-squared	0.932		0.987	0.997
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using a restricted time sample: within a decade either before or after independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. $***p < 0.01$, $**p < 0.05$, $*p < 0.1$.

Table A.4: Expanded Time Sample: 1919-1989

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.0112**	-0.670	0.0171	9.56e-06
	(0.00459)	(0.642)	(0.0286)	(0.00677)
Territory-years	4,216	1,264	1,637	2,582
R-squared	0.962		0.958	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Distinguishing late colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0232***	-0.945	0.0259	-0.00528
	(0.00460)	(0.601)	(0.0348)	(0.00919)
Independent	0.000530	-1.160	0.0266	-0.00237
	(0.00476)	(0.804)	(0.0334)	(0.00758)
Territory-years	4,216	1,264	1,637	2,582
R-squared	0.963		0.958	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using an expanded time sample: 1919 to 1989. Years prior to European colonization are omitted. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.5: Expanded Time Sample: 1815-1989

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.00511**	-0.257	-0.0329	-0.00728
	(0.00212)	(0.612)	(0.0326)	(0.00450)
Territory-years	8,521	1,383	4,157	5,821
R-squared	0.971		0.968	0.995
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Distinguishing late colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0206***	-0.941*	-0.00956	-0.00461
	(0.00427)	(0.562)	(0.0258)	(0.00669)
Independent	-0.000149	-0.730	-0.0356	-0.00911*
	(0.00242)	(0.750)	(0.0373)	(0.00546)
Territory-years	8,521	1,383	4,157	5,821
R-squared	0.972		0.968	0.995
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using an expanded time sample: 1815 to 1989. Years prior to European colonization are omitted. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.6 replaces the colonial autonomy variable with the last five years of colonial rule, showing that this period (like the closely related colonial autonomy period) is associated with considerable democratic gains.

Table A.6: Replacing Colonial Autonomy with Five Years Before Independence

DV:	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Last 5 colonized yrs.	0.0285***	1.022	0.0209	-0.0161**
	(0.00363)	(0.795)	(0.0382)	(0.00632)
Independent	0.00891*	0.500	0.0457	-0.00923
	(0.00446)	(0.909)	(0.0548)	(0.00822)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.956		0.954	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table 1 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table A.7 uses alternative measures for the dependent variables with other data sources that cover the colonial and post-colonial periods. Column 1 replaces Maddison's GDP data with Penn World Table (PWT), which tends to be of higher quality but has relatively scant coverage during the colonial era. Column 2 replaces Correlates of War's internal war data with Brecke (1999). Column 3 replaces the revenue measure with normalized revenues, albeit at the cost of a smaller sample.

Table A.7: Alternate Measures

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule		
DV:	PWT GDP	Brecke war onset	Norm. revenues
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent	0.00854	-0.507	-0.0299
	(0.0106)	(0.454)	(0.0386)
Territory-years	1,887	2,162	710
R-squared	0.992		0.962
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Lag variables	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Distinguishing late colonial rule		
DV:	PWT GDP	Brecke war	Norm. rev.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Colonial autonomy	0.000616	0.834**	-0.00964
	(0.0136)	(0.387)	(0.0517)
Independent	0.00882	-0.0620	-0.0349
	(0.0119)	(0.573)	(0.0551)
Territory-years	1,887	2,162	710
R-squared	0.992		0.962
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Lag variables	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but with different measures of the dependent variables. Column 1 replaces Maddison's GDP per capita variable with Penn World Table data. Column 2 replaces internal war onset measured using Correlates of War with internal war incidence measured using Brecke (1999). Column 3 replaces revenue per capita with revenue per capita normalized by GDP, although this shrinks the sample size considerably. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects, clusters standard errors by territory, uses a linear link, and contains a lagged dependent variable. Columns 1 and 3 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.8 replaces the independence variable from Table 1 with independence lagged 10 years.

Table A.8: Independence Lagged 10 Years

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent (lagged 10 years)	-0.0116***	-2.001***	-0.0933	-0.00259
	(0.00319)	(0.450)	(0.0828)	(0.00739)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.954		0.955	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: These regressions estimate Equation 1 with the "independent" variable replaced by a version lagged by 10 years. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

The econometrics literature provides options for dynamic panel estimators. One concern in models with a lagged dependent variable and unit fixed effects is Nickell bias, although this is a strong concern only for data with a smaller T that ours. An alternative is to use the Arellano-Bond estimator, which uses lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments, but these models are problematic in larger T samples because the number of orthogonality conditions to satisfy increases at a rate of $\frac{T \cdot (T-1)}{2}$ (Alvarez and Arellano 2003). Despite these caveats, Table A.9 presents estimates using Arellano-Bond estimators for the three continuous dependent variables. The main positive finding is unaltered: there is a strong and substantively meaningful correlation between colonial autonomy and democracy level. Although this table produces additional statistically significant findings, the many models presented throughout the paper show that these correlations are not robust to alternative model specifications (which, given the long time sample, are more appropriate than Arellano-Bond models, anyway). Also, in Column 1 of Panel B, the coefficient estimate for colonial autonomy is more than four times larger than that for independence.

Table A.9: Arellano-Bond Models

	Democracy	Revenue	Income
Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent	-0.00301	0.0666*	-0.00121
	(0.00236)	(0.0351)	(0.00771)
Territory-years	2,958	929	2,365
Territories	63	42	62
Panel B. Distinguishing late colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Colonial autonomy	0.0356***	0.0684*	-0.00343
	(0.00624)	(0.0356)	(0.00937)
Independent	0.00864***	0.0869**	-0.00251
	(0.00291)	(0.0443)	(0.00800)
Territory-years	2,958	929	2,365
Territories	63	42	62

Notes: Table A.9 estimates a series of Arellano-Bond models for the continuous dependent variables, with the distinction between Panels A and B following that in Table 1. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table A.10 removes the territory and year fixed effects from Table 1.

Table A.10: Exclude Territory and Year Fixed Effects

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.00943***	0.288	-0.0855***	-0.00681**
	(0.00145)	(0.367)	(0.0282)	(0.00317)
Territory-years	2,969	3,079	982	2,423
R-squared	0.950		0.939	0.995
Country FE	NO	NO	NO	NO
Year FE	NO	NO	NO	NO
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0227***	0.144	-0.00289	-0.00865
	(0.00603)	(0.577)	(0.0253)	(0.00522)
Independent	-0.00442***	0.332	-0.0860***	-0.00955***
	(0.00125)	(0.448)	(0.0291)	(0.00321)
Territory-years	2,969	3,079	982	2,423
R-squared	0.951		0.939	0.995
Country FE	NO	NO	NO	NO
Year FE	NO	NO	NO	NO
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table 1 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2. Every clusters standard errors by territory, but no models include territory or year fixed effects. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Tables A.11 and A.12 examine different subcomponents and aggregate democracy indices from V-Dem. The freedom of association variable answers the following question: "To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?" Clean elections captures: "To what extent are elections free and fair?" Freedom of expression denotes: "To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?" Elected officials expresses: "Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?" Finally, suffrage is "What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?" The V-Dem codebook describes the 10 aggregated democracy indices evaluated in Table A.12.

Table A.11: Disaggregating Democracy

DV:	Freedom of association	Clean elections	Freedom of expression	Elected officials	Suffrage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Colonial autonomy	0.0156*	0.0202*	0.0240***	0.154***	0.0614***
	(0.00793)	(0.0106)	(0.00755)	(0.0201)	(0.0217)
Independent	-0.00821	-0.00224	0.00445	0.108***	0.0361**
	(0.00549)	(0.00994)	(0.00412)	(0.0222)	(0.0176)
Territory-years	3,050	3,029	3,073	3,077	3,070
Territories	64	64	64	64	64
R-squared	0.966	0.892	0.969	0.855	0.939
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 1 estimates Equation 2 using various V-Dem indicators as the dependent variable. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Every column uses a linear link and includes a lagged dependent variable. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table A.12: Alternative V-Dem Aggregate Democracy Indices

DV:	Additive polyarchy	Multiplicative polyarchy	Liberal democracy	Liberal component	Participatory democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Colonial autonomy	0.0369***	0.0185***	0.0168***	0.0247***	0.0126***
	(0.00668)	(0.00515)	(0.00346)	(0.00535)	(0.00252)
Independent	0.00762	0.00554	0.00350	0.0120**	0.00192
	(0.00677)	(0.00348)	(0.00280)	(0.00464)	(0.00208)
Territory-years	3,001	3,001	3,001	3,074	3,001
Territories	64	64	64	64	64
R-squared	0.952	0.959	0.977	0.970	0.975
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A.12, continued

DV:	Participatory component	Deliberative democracy	Deliberative component	Egalitarian democracy	Egalitarian component
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Colonial autonomy	0.0369***	0.0185***	0.0168***	0.0247***	0.0126***
	(0.00668)	(0.00515)	(0.00346)	(0.00535)	(0.00252)
Independent	0.00762	0.00554	0.00350	0.0120**	0.00192
	(0.00677)	(0.00348)	(0.00280)	(0.00464)	(0.00208)
Territory-years	3,001	3,001	3,001	3,074	3,001
Territories	64	64	64	64	64
R-squared	0.952	0.959	0.977	0.970	0.975
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 1 estimates Equation 2 using various V-Dem aggregated democracy indices as the dependent variable. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Every column uses a linear link and includes a lagged dependent variable. $***p < 0.01$, $**p < 0.05$, $*p < 0.1$.

A.2 Supporting Information for Varieties of Colonialism Results

The following details the sources for the different conditioning variables:

- British colonialism: We use a broad definition of British colonies, including territories over which Britain gained control as League of Nations mandates after World War I (e.g., Tanganyika/Tanzania) and exerted minimal internal control (e.g., Kuwait). This is somewhat broader than Lange's (2009) definition of British colonies because he does not include any of Britain's Middle Eastern colonies.

- Length of colonial rule: We use Olsson's (2009) colonial onset and independence data to calculate the length of Western European colonial rule.

- State antiquity: A territory's combined years with government above local level between 0 CE and 1500, with the cutoff year following Hariri (2012). Data from Putterman (2008).

- European settlers: We use logged European population percentage for the closest available data point to the year of independence. Easterly and Levine (2016) provide most of the data points, and unpublished work by the authors describes the settlers variable in more detail.

- Disrupted colonial rule during World War II: Lawrence (2013) provides this data for French colonies and we coded it ourselves for the other empires.

Tables A.13 through A.18 add interaction terms for various conditioning variables to estimate models of the form:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t} + \beta_2 \cdot Indep._{i,t} + \beta_3 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t} \cdot C_i + \beta_2 \cdot Indep._{i,t} \cdot C_i + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (3)$$

where C_i is the country-specific conditioning variable. Because the static conditioning variables are perfectly collinear with the unit fixed effects, the models do not contain the lower-order conditioning term. For the three binary conditioning variables, the corresponding regression table provides marginal effect estimates for each of colonial autonomy and independence for both values of the conditioning variable. For duration of colonial rule, we present marginal effect estimates for the 25% percentile of colonial rule length (64 years) and the 75% percentile (144 years). For state antiquity, we present marginal effect estimates for the 25% percentile of colonial rule length (0) and the 75% percentile (0.56). The values are the weighted number of years with a state between 0 CE and 1500 divided by the maximum possible score (i.e., 0 is no years with a state, and 0.56 is 56% of the highest possible score). For European settlers, we present marginal effect estimates for the range of the settlers variable: 0% and 11% European population share (non-logged). The 25% percentile of the settlers variable is also 0%, and the upper bound of this variable is more meaningful to interpret than the 75% percentile (1% European population share) because it is heavily right-skewed (which is also why we log the variable in the regressions).

Table A.13: Varieties of Colonialism: Sub-Saharan Africa

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0275***	-1.604**	-0.0382	0.0162
	(0.00935)	(0.647)	(0.0582)	(0.0186)
Independent	0.0130	-2.964**	-0.109	0.00949
	(0.00824)	(1.161)	(0.0781)	(0.0170)
Autonomy*SSA	0.00964	-0.265	0.0978	-0.0298
	(0.0131)	(2.048)	(0.0848)	(0.0204)
Independent*SSA	-0.00835	3.008***	0.258*	-0.0141
	(0.00611)	(1.094)	(0.129)	(0.0181)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.956		0.955	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Autonomy | SSA=0	0.0275***	-0.00723	-0.0382	0.0162
	(0.00935)	(0.0140)	(0.0582)	(0.0186)
Autonomy | SSA=1	0.0372***	-0.436	0.0596	-0.0137
	(0.00876)	(0.392)	(0.0675)	(0.00961)
Independent | SSA=0	0.0130	-0.00859	-0.109	0.00949
	(0.00824)	(0.0166)	(0.0781)	(0.0170)
Independent | SSA=1	0.00462	0.00873	0.149*	-0.00459
	(0.00529)	(0.185)	(0.0811)	(0.00804)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table A.14: Varieties of Colonialism: British Colonial Rule

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0242***	-0.730	0.216*	-0.0177
	(0.00671)	(0.861)	(0.112)	(0.0117)
Independent	0.000933	-0.706	0.204*	-0.0105
	(0.00528)	(0.876)	(0.110)	(0.00651)
Autonomous*British col.	0.0167	-0.485	-0.264**	0.0239
	(0.0108)	(1.237)	(0.120)	(0.0165)
Independent*British col.	0.0164***	-0.326	-0.265*	0.0185*
	(0.00469)	(1.029)	(0.133)	(0.0105)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.956		0.955	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Autonomy | British col.=0	0.0242***	-0.00115	0.216*	-0.0177
	(0.00671)	(0.00232)	(0.112)	(0.0117)
Autonomy | British col.=1	0.0408***	-0.167	-0.0475	0.00620
	(0.00848)	(0.273)	(0.0443)	(0.0132)
Independent | British col.=0	0.000933	-0.00113	0.204*	-0.0105
	(0.00528)	(0.00248)	(0.110)	(0.00651)
Independent | British col.=1	0.0173**	-0.133	-0.0606	0.00797
	(0.00706)	(0.207)	(0.0620)	(0.0109)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table A.15: Varieties of Colonialism: Length of Colonial Rule

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0331***	-0.306	-0.0103	0.00925
	(0.00813)	(0.924)	(0.0696)	(0.0137)
Independent	0.00594	-0.878	0.118	0.00369
	(0.00612)	(1.100)	(0.0743)	(0.0103)
Autonomy*Colonial duration	-1.53e-05	-0.00370	9.05e-05	-0.000107
	(3.10e-05)	(0.00460)	(0.000181)	(9.66e-05)
Independent*Colonial duration	1.30e-06	0.000971	-0.000401	-4.06e-05
	(1.67e-05)	(0.00763)	(0.000340)	(4.93e-05)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.955		0.955	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Autonomy | Colonial rule=64 years	0.0321***	-0.000794	-0.00455	0.00237
	(0.00676)	(0.00183)	(0.0615)	(0.00968)
Autonomy | Colonial rule=144 years	0.0309***	-0.0425	0.00269	-0.00623
	(0.00558)	(0.0414)	(0.0532)	(0.00920)
Independent | Colonial rule=64 years	0.00602	-0.00106	0.0928	0.00109
	(0.00569)	(0.00217)	(0.0604)	(0.00838)
Independent | Colonial rule=144 years	0.00612	-0.0389	0.0608	-0.00216
	(0.00541)	(0.0528)	(0.0514)	(0.00739)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.16: Varieties of Colonialism: State Antiquity

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0362***	-1.593	0.0492	-0.00639
	(0.00791)	(1.488)	(0.0483)	(0.0128)
Independent	0.00594	-0.110	0.123**	-0.00559
	(0.00575)	(0.893)	(0.0582)	(0.00741)
Colonial autonomy*State antiquity	-0.0194	0.596	-0.133	0.00935
	(0.0224)	(2.128)	(0.137)	(0.0289)
Independent*State antiquity	0.00332	-2.643*	-0.286**	0.0258
	(0.00804)	(1.466)	(0.123)	(0.0176)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.956		0.955	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Autonomy | State antiquity=0	0.0362***	-8.66e-06	0.0492	-0.00639
	(0.00791)	(2.64e-05)	(0.0483)	(0.0128)
Autonomy | State antiquity=0.56	0.0253***	-0.281*	-0.0253	-0.00115
	(0.00934)	(0.158)	(0.0754)	(0.0113)
Independent | State antiquity=0	0.00594	-1.13e-06	0.123**	-0.00559
	(0.00575)	(9.87e-06)	(0.0582)	(0.00741)
Independent | State antiquity=0.56	0.00780	-0.363*	-0.0370	0.00883
	(0.00622)	(0.199)	(0.0606)	(0.0114)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.17: Varieties of Colonialism: European Settlers

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0299***	-1.296	0.0396	-0.0146
	(0.00625)	(1.575)	(0.0529)	(0.0128)
Independent	0.00723	-1.042	0.119	-0.00135
	(0.00537)	(0.803)	(0.0770)	(0.00819)
Autonomy*ln(Eu. pop. %)	-0.000198	-0.156	0.0143	-0.00432
	(0.00247)	(0.439)	(0.0178)	(0.00415)
Independent*ln(Eu. pop. %)	0.000865	-0.100	0.0413	0.000910
	(0.00131)	(0.203)	(0.0255)	(0.00278)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.955		0.955	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Autonomy | Eu. pop %=0%	0.0308***	-0.000132	-0.0261	0.00525
	(0.00978)	(0.000380)	(0.0810)	(0.0135)
Autonomy | Eu. pop %=11%	0.0294***	-0.000296	0.0736	-0.0250
	(0.0106)	(0.00168)	(0.0782)	(0.0210)
Independent | Eu. pop %=0%	0.00325	-0.000133	-0.0714	-0.00554
	(0.00742)	(0.000389)	(0.0763)	(0.0122)
Independent | Eu. pop %=11%	0.00930	-0.000179	0.217	0.000826
	(0.00662)	(0.000760)	(0.130)	(0.0124)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table A.18: Varieties of Colonialism: Disrupted Colonial Rule During WWII

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0375***	-0.603	0.0436	-0.00704
	(0.00695)	(1.329)	(0.0531)	(0.0114)
Independent	0.00684	-0.0227	0.0988	-0.00668
	(0.00580)	(0.955)	(0.0644)	(0.00792)
Autonomy*WWII disruption	-0.0249***	-0.889	-0.116*	0.00936
	(0.00900)	(1.452)	(0.0639)	(0.0147)
Independent*WWII disruption	-0.00242	-1.809	-0.427*	0.0269**
	(0.00380)	(1.151)	(0.223)	(0.0133)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Autonomy | WWII disruption=0	0.0375***	-0.143	0.0436	-0.00704
	(0.00695)	(0.297)	(0.0531)	(0.0114)
Autonomy | WWII disruption=1	0.0126**	-0.00186	-0.0727*	0.00232
	(0.00630)	(0.00408)	(0.0425)	(0.00985)
Independent | WWII disruption=0	0.00684	-0.00565	0.0988	-0.00668
	(0.00580)	(0.238)	(0.0644)	(0.00792)
Independent | WWII disruption=1	0.00442	-0.00202	-0.329*	0.0202
	(0.00565)	(0.00456)	(0.186)	(0.0126)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

A.3 Supporting Information for "Exogenous" Independence Results

Table A.19: Guerrilla Takeover at Independence

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0342***	-0.738	0.0194	0.00372
	(0.00594)	(0.776)	(0.0491)	(0.00865)
Independent	0.00672	-0.713	0.0417	0.00249
	(0.00574)	(0.801)	(0.0536)	(0.00788)
Autonomy*Guerrilla regime	-0.0230**	-0.840	-0.0380	-0.0720*
	(0.0106)	(1.378)	(0.0628)	(0.0391)
Independent*Guerrilla regime	-0.00282	-0.773	-0.0598	-0.0241*
	(0.00464)	(1.309)	(0.0511)	(0.0143)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.956		0.954	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Autonomy | Guerrilla=0	0.0342***	-0.00259	0.0194	0.00372
	(0.00594)	(0.00426)	(0.0491)	(0.00865)
Autonomy | Guerrilla=1	0.0112	-0.00579	-0.0186	-0.0682*
	(0.00921)	(0.0190)	(0.0353)	(0.0382)
Independent | Guerrilla=0	0.00672	-0.00253	0.0417	0.00249
	(0.00574)	(0.00450)	(0.0536)	(0.00788)
Independent | Guerrilla=1	0.00390	-0.00516	-0.0181	-0.0216
	(0.00575)	(0.0138)	(0.0344)	(0.0133)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

A.4 Supporting Information for High Colonial Period Results

Table A.20: High Colonial Period vs. Post-Independence

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent	0.00739***	1.519***	-0.00347
	(0.00202)	(0.529)	(0.0269)
Territory-years	4,403	1,629	2,071
R-squared	0.971		0.960
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	NO	NO
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A estimates Equation 1 but uses a different sample that contains (1) colonized years between 1919 and 1945 and (2) post-independence years. Therefore, because the models control for "independent," the omitted basis category is colonized years between 1919 and 1945. Every model contains territory fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1 and 3 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link and contains peace years and cubic splines. The lack of income data prior to 1945 makes it impossible to run the income regressions. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Additional References

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