Online Appendix for

Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma

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B. Supporting Information for Main Regressions

B.1 Authoritarian Regime Breakdown (Table 2)

Sensitivity to unobserved covariates. Table B.1 shows that the coefficient estimates are relatively insensitive to unobserved covariates. Therefore, although it is impossible to control for every possible confounder, if the covariates included Table 2 are substantively relevant, then there is less reason to believe that covariates not included in any of the specifications would overturn the results. Specifically, Altonji et al. (2005) present a commonly used metric that estimates how large the bias from unobserved covariates would need to be for the true coefficient to be 0 in a statistical model, given information from how much adding observable covariates changes the estimates. To compute this measure, Table B.1 compares the coefficient estimates for the rebel regimes indicators in specifications with and without covariates. Specifically, it compares the coefficient estimate for all rebel regimes in each of Columns 2-4 to that in Column 1, and the coefficient estimates for colonial liberation regimes and civil war winners in each of Columns 6-8 to those in Column 5. Negative numbers in Table B.1 imply that the coefficient estimate in the specification with covariates exceeds in magnitude the coefficient estimate in the restricted specification. This indicates an estimate highly robust to omitted covariates because the magnitude of the bias of unobserved covariates would need to go in the opposite direction as the bias from omitting observables to drive the coefficient estimate to 0. This is the case for six of the nine estimates in Table B.1. In other specifications, the estimates are positive but large in magnitude. For example, the coefficient estimate in Column 2 is almost identical to that in Column 1 despite adding covariates, and table shows that the bias from unobservables would need to be 129 times larger than the bias from omitting the covariates contained in this specification to overturn the positive coefficient estimate. For comparison, Altonji et al. (2005) calculate a corresponding figure of 3.55 for their own analysis, which they interpret as large in magnitude.

Table B.1: Sensitivity to Unobserved Covariates for Table 2

Column in Table 2:	(2)	(3)	(4)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	129.2	-6.2	-11.2			
Colonial liberation regime				-44.7	-8.1	7.4
Civil war winner				20.6	-4.9	-3.8

Jackknife sample sensitivity analysis. We assessed the robustness of the estimates in Table 2 to jackknife sample alterations. For each column in Table 2, we iteratively dropped each country (that is, every year for that country). In every jackknife regression, either the aggregate rebel regime indicator or both disaggregated regime indicators (colonial liberation and civil war winners) are statistically significant at 1%.

Table B.2: Alternative Samples

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN							
	Panel A. Smaller sample (lower threshold for democracy)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0436***	-0.0423***	-0.0539***	-0.0500***				
	(0.00899)	(0.0114)	(0.0116)	(0.0120)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0406***	-0.0398***	-0.0477***	-0.0372**
					(0.00970)	(0.0124)	(0.0131)	(0.0144)
Civil war winner					-0.0489***	-0.0476***	-0.0639***	-0.0701***
					(0.0109)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)	(0.0139)
Country-years	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203
R-squared	0.011	0.041	0.043	0.046	0.011	0.041	0.043	0.046
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Larger sample (all post-independence years)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0464***	-0.0418***	-0.0517***	-0.0481***				
	(0.00861)	(0.00958)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0430***	-0.0408***	-0.0484***	-0.0354**
					(0.00913)	(0.0113)	(0.0127)	(0.0138)
Civil war winner					-0.0509***	-0.0434***	-0.0557***	-0.0641***
					(0.0106)	(0.0117)	(0.0124)	(0.0139)
Country-years	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614
R-squared	0.016	0.044	0.045	0.049	0.016	0.044	0.045	0.049
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.2 is identical to Table 2 except here we alter the sample. In Panel A, the sample is smaller than our core sample. We continue to exclude all democracies, but use a less stringent standard for coding a country as democratic. Specifically, we use Geddes et al.'s (2014) coding of democracy, which unlike our core measure does not require rotation in office. In Panel B, we expand the sample from our core sample. We include *all* post-independence years, including democracies, transitional regimes, and warlord regimes (all of which are excluded from the core sample). $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.3: Sample without Revolutionary Regimes

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel A. Lachapelle et al. (2020)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no LLWC cases)	-0.0486***	-0.0479***	-0.0599***	-0.0562***
	(0.00924)	(0.0108)	(0.0111)	(0.0107)
Country-years	2,180	2,180	2,180	2,180
R-squared	0.011	0.043	0.043	0.048
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Colgan and Weeks (2015)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no CW cases)	-0.0519***	-0.0512***	-0.0604***	-0.0549***
	(0.00859)	(0.0106)	(0.0113)	(0.0114)
Country-years	2,219	2,219	2,219	2,219
R-squared	0.013	0.045	0.045	0.050
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel C. Roessler and Verhoeven (2016)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no RV cases)	-0.0453***	-0.0427***	-0.0523***	-0.0475***
	(0.0102)	(0.0121)	(0.0139)	(0.0137)
Country-years	2,035	2,035	2,035	2,035
R-squared	0.009	0.044	0.044	0.049
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.3 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we alter the sample by dropping all observations from regimes that we code as REBEL REGIME=1 and that an existing dataset codes as revolutionary. Panel A drops six rebel regimes that Lachapelle et al. (2020) code as revolutionary. Panel B drops five rebel regimes that Colgan and Weeks (2015) code as revolutionary. Panel C drops twelve rebel regimes that Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as violent liberation regimes. Table 1 denotes which regimes are dropped in each panel. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.4: Robustness Checks for Table 2

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN							
	Panel A. Logit models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.399***	-1.430***	-1.551***	-1.477***				
	(0.356)	(0.391)	(0.378)	(0.376)				
Col. liberation					-1.318***	-1.380***	-1.413***	-1.213**
					(0.438)	(0.486)	(0.486)	(0.530)
Civil war winner					-1.542***	-1.525***	-1.770***	-1.834***
					(0.519)	(0.512)	(0.506)	(0.491)
Country-years	2,352	2,172	2,172	2,172	2,352	2,172	2,172	2,172
Pseudo R2	0.0372	0.0873	0.0874	0.0981	0.0373	0.0874	0.0877	0.0987
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0695***	-0.0622***	-0.0703***	-0.0636***				
	(0.0139)	(0.0153)	(0.0186)	(0.0189)				
Col. liberation					-0.0668***	-0.0619***	-0.0728***	-0.0598**
					(0.0151)	(0.0170)	(0.0209)	(0.0231)
Civil war winner					-0.0738***	-0.0630***	-0.0664***	-0.0686***
					(0.0140)	(0.0166)	(0.0222)	(0.0209)
Country-years	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333
R-squared	0.029	0.085	0.088	0.093	0.029	0.085	0.088	0.093
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.4 is identical to Table 2 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4 and 6–8. The missing values are from years in which no regime breakdown occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.2 INSTRUMENTING FOR COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES

Historical background on African colonialism. Following decades of relatively peaceful European rule in Africa, the colonial project fell into crisis after World War II. Greater mobilization ability by Africans, weakened European powers with domestic populations more skeptical of overseas rule, and a shift to a bipolar international system with two superpowers hostile to overseas colonialism forced new choices onto European colonists (Young 1994). In most cases, it was clear to both metropolitan officials and major producers that the economic costs of retaining colonial rule outweighed the benefits (Fieldhouse 1986), especially when factoring in the higher likelihood that Africans (or, in North Africa, Arabs) would revolt without reforms. Consequently, in the two decades following World War II, most of the continent peacefully transitioned to African majority rule and independence.

The main exceptions were territories with sizable European populations. Wherever they settled in large numbers, European settlers usually composed a politically influential interest group—and, in independent South Africa and semi-independent Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), they directly controlled the state. White settlers had considerable vested interests in their domination of the best land, a non-mobile asset they expected to lose under African majority rule. Their control of land also created a cheap and mobile labor supply of Africans that they could exploit (Mosley 1983). Consequently, European settlers fiercely resisted delegating control to the African or Arab majority, which frequently engendered decolonization violence. Data from Paine (2019*b*) shows that:

- Among the seven territories with the largest European population shares around World War II, every one experienced a major colonial liberation war.

- Among the next ten-highest, four did.

- Among the 25 lowest, only one did.

- (The highest category contains cases with colonial European population shares between 2.7% and 20.1%, the middle category between 0.4% and 2.5%, and the lowest category no greater than 0.4%.)

Justification for instrumental variable. Climatic factors that influenced prospects for European settlement provide a plausible instrumental variable for colonial liberation regimes. Historians have discussed conditions required for replicating large-scale European agricultural settlements in Africa (Mosley 1983, 5; Lutzelschwab 2013, 145). Temperate climate, found at the northern and southern tips of the continent, enabled large-scale European-style farming settlements. The remainder of the continent contains tropical climate, which obviates most temperate farming practices. However, Europeans could cultivate similar cereal crops as at home in tropical areas that met three conditions. First, they needed high enough rainfall to grow crops. Second, high enough elevation created moderate temperatures. Third, Europeans needed land without the tsetse fly, which causes sleeping sickness in humans.

We use a variable from Paine (2019*b*) that combines GIS data for climate, rainfall, elevation, and tsetse fly prevalence. For each country, the variable measures the logged percentage of its territory that had either:

- Mediterranean climate, or

- All three of:

    - Rainfall of at least 20 inches per year, and

    - 3,000 feet in elevation (Mosley 1983, 5 proposes both of these thresholds), and

    - the lowest quartile on Alsan's (2015) tsetse fly suitability index.

The variable used in Paine (2019*b*) takes the natural log to prevent a handful of cases with extreme values of the instrument from driving the results. Our variable for the area of each country does not include desert and semi-desert area to eliminate territory where very few people, European or not, would settle. See Paine (2019*b*) for a map depicting these conditions.

Three main considerations motivate why this is a reasonable instrument for studying the effects of colonial liberation regimes. First, all components of the instrument are exogenous because they are not caused by political factors that could affect regime durability. Importantly, the tsetse fly data comes from Alsan's (2015) tsetse fly suitability index—which is derived from historical climate data—rather than from colonial or post-colonial maps of tsetse fly prevalence, which may be affected by climate change or by stronger states better able to control the fly (389). We also estimate models with various pre-independence covariates (logged population density in 1800, whether any ethnic groups in the country had a precolonial state, index of rugged terrain, colonizer fixed effects) to account for additional sources of heterogeneity. We use these rather than the more standard (relative to the literature) set of covariates used in Table 2, which are mostly post-independence and therefore inappropriate "post-treatment" controls relative to our instrument. Of course, factors such as historical population density might have also been influenced by the instrument, which is why we also estimate specifications without the covariates.

Second, Panel B of Table B.5 demonstrates that the instrumental variable is strongly correlated with rebel regimes. We prefer estimating 2SLS estimates of colonial liberation regimes directly on land suitability rather than a 3SLS specification with an intermediate stage that controls for European population percentage given the difficulty of satisfying and assessing the additional exclusion restrictions.

Third, the exclusion restriction is plausible. One would have to construct an alternative explanation for how particular climatic conditions affected regime durability independent of their effect on rebel regimes. Paine (2019*b*) examines how these climatic conditions—by affecting the size of the European settler population—generated decolonization violence. However, this is not an independent channel from our main explanatory factor, because this violence generated the colonial liberation regimes. In addition to the lack of existing theory that supports such a connection, Table B.6 demonstrates that fairly large violations of the exclusion restriction would be necessary to make the main coefficient estimates insignificant at conventional levels.

Results. Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table B.5 present findings from two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions that estimate simultaneous equation models composed of Equation 1 (the second stage) and the first-stage regression:

$$R_{it} = \beta_{0,Z} + \beta_Z \ln Z_i + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_{X,Z} + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{Z,it}, \tag{B.1}$$

where Z_i is the instrument. In Columns 3 and 4, the first-stage equation is:

$$CL_{it} = \beta_{0,Z} + \beta_Z \ln Z_i + \beta_{WIN} WIN_{it} + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_{X,Z} + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{Z,it}, \tag{B.2}$$

where CL_{it} indicates colonial liberation regimes and WIN_{it} indicates civil war winners. We use the instrument only for colonial liberation regimes given the theoretical justification that climatic factors affected rebel regimes by triggering decolonization conflicts.

The estimates in Panel A of Table B.5 reaffirm those in Table 2. In fact, the magnitude of the estimates in Table B.5 are more than twice as large as the corresponding estimates in (unreported) OLS models with the sample sample and set of covariates. Panel B presents the first-stage regressions using Equation B.1 only. It shows that in each specification, the partial F-test for the instrument exceeds the conventional standard of 10 for a weak instrument (Staiger and Stock 1997).

Table B.5: Instrumental Variable Regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. 2SLS. DV: REGIME BREAKDOWN				
Rebel regime (IV=land suitability)	-0.0940** (0.0356)	-0.0805** (0.0310)		
Col. liberation regime (IV=land suitability)			-0.0961** (0.0375)	-0.0806** (0.0316)
Civil war winner			-0.0647*** (0.0127)	-0.0782*** (0.0149)
British colony		0.0132 (0.0194)		0.0134 (0.0186)
French colony		0.0206 (0.0187)		0.0206 (0.0185)
Portuguese colony		0.0325 (0.0223)		0.0328 (0.0247)
ln(pop dens. in 1800)		0.00164** (0.000707)		0.00163** (0.000747)
Precolonial state		0.0194 (0.0151)		0.0192 (0.0154)
Rugged terrain		-0.00922* (0.00542)		-0.00918 (0.00557)
Country-years	2,055	2,055	2,055	2,055
R-squared	0.008	0.044	0.009	0.044
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Panel B. First stage. DV: COL. LIBERATION REGIME				
ln(% area suitable for Eu. agri.)	0.0615*** (0.0168)	0.0833*** (0.0190)	0.0581*** (0.0171)	0.0838*** (0.0187)
Civil war winner			-0.191** (0.0782)	-0.0835* (0.0417)
Country-years	2,055	2,055	2,055	2,055
R-squared	0.203	0.359	0.262	0.522
Covariates?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
F-test for IV	13.3	19.2	11.5	20.1
Panel C. Reduced form. DV: REGIME BREAKDOWN				
ln(% area suitable for Eu. agri.)	-0.00575*** (0.00171)	-0.00713*** (0.00171)	-0.00557*** (0.00178)	-0.00716*** (0.00173)
Civil war winner			-0.0447*** (0.00716)	-0.0622*** (0.0109)
Country-years	2,055	2,055	2,055	2,055
R-squared	0.013	0.020	0.016	0.025
Covariates?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table B.5 presents 2SLS estimates with standard errors clustered by country. Equation B.1 is the first stage in Columns 1 and 2, Equation B.2 is the first stage in Columns 3 and 4, and Equation 1 (see the article) is the second stage in all columns. The sample differs from that in Table 2 because island countries (except Madagascar) and countries that did not gain independence from a European country (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia) are missing data on the climate instrument. Panel B presents the first-stage estimates and Panel C presents the reduced-form estimates. ***$p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$.

Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the exclusion restriction. Because the exclusion restriction is unlikely to be perfectly satisfied in any social scientific research, it is important to assess how badly it would have to be violated to invalidate our results. Conley et al. (2012) provide a suitable method with the stated purpose: "Often the instrument exclusion restriction that underlies the validity of the usual IV inference is suspect; that is, instruments are only plausibly exogenous. We present practical methods for performing inference while relaxing the exclusion restriction" (260). They assume that instead of Equation 1 (see the article), the instrument is a covariate in the second-stage regression:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_R R_{it} + \gamma \ln Z_i + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_X + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{B.3}$$

If $\gamma \neq 0$, then the instrument directly affects the outcome, i.e., the exclusion restriction is not perfectly satisfied. Although it is likely that $\gamma \neq 0$ in any applied research situation, this is only problematic for the present 2SLS estimates of the rebel regime coefficients if γ is large in magnitude. Because γ is unobservable, we can examine how the results would change for different hypothetical values of γ. Table B.6 states for each specification in Table B.5 the value of γ for which the p-value of the 2SLS estimated effect of rebel regimes (or the disaggregated indicators) would equal either 0.05 or 0.10. If the true γ is negative and smaller in magnitude than the amount stated in the table, then the coefficient estimate for rebel regimes from the stated column in Table B.5 is statistically significant at the stated threshold. (If instead the true γ is positive, then the magnitude of the coefficient estimate from the regression table is *downwardly* biased.) The numbers in parentheses in Table B.6 state the γ thresholds as a percentage of the reduced form estimated effect of the instrument on regime breakdown.

Table B.6: Assessing Sensitivity to Exclusion Restriction Violations

Column in Table B.5:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Stat. sig. at 5% if $\gamma \geq$	-.0018	-.0020	-.0016	-.0019
(% of reduced-form estimate)	(31%)	(29%)	(29%)	(28%)
Stat. sig. at 10% if $\gamma \geq$	-.0026	-.0030	-.0024	-.0029
(% of reduced-form estimate)	(45%)	(44%)	(43%)	(42%)

Table B.6 demonstrates that the 2SLS estimates are insensitive to fairly large violations of the exclusion restriction. Approximately 31% of the reduced form effect of the instrument on regime breakdown must occur through channels other than colonial liberation regimes for the liberation regimes coefficient estimate not to be significant at least at the 5% level. The corresponding figure is 45% for the 10% significance level. We lack an alternative hypothesis suggesting an unmodeled channel of this magnitude.

B.3   SUCCESSFUL COUPS (TABLE 3)

Table B.7: Robustness Checks for Table 3

	DV: SUCCESSFUL COUPS
	Panel A. Logit models
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.269***	-1.103**	-1.452***	-1.350***				
	(0.432)	(0.451)	(0.477)	(0.486)				
Col. liberation regime					-1.053**	-0.955*	-1.351**	-1.155**
					(0.460)	(0.488)	(0.535)	(0.588)
Civil war winner					-1.952**	-1.640*	-1.771*	-1.865*
					(0.965)	(0.994)	(0.962)	(0.968)
Country-years	2,352	1,804	1,804	1,804	2,352	1,804	1,804	1,804
Pseudo R2	0.0441	0.0827	0.0815	0.0923	0.0452	0.0833	0.0817	0.0928
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0358***	-0.0288***	-0.0374***	-0.0348***				
	(0.0106)	(0.0101)	(0.0120)	(0.0126)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0332***	-0.0278**	-0.0444***	-0.0403**
					(0.0114)	(0.0109)	(0.0135)	(0.0151)
Civil war winner					-0.0409***	-0.0309**	-0.0272*	-0.0281*
					(0.0111)	(0.0124)	(0.0158)	(0.0155)
Country-years	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333
R-squared	0.019	0.077	0.081	0.084	0.019	0.077	0.081	0.085
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.7 follows the same structure as Table B.4; the present table is identical to Table B.7 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4. The missing values are from years in which no successful coups occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

B.4 MINISTER OF DEFENSE APPOINTMENTS (TABLE 4)

Table B.8: Defense Minister Appointment

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.287***	0.210***	0.146*	0.148*				
	(0.0682)	(0.0710)	(0.0732)	(0.0784)				
Col. liberation regime					0.275***	0.225***	0.182**	0.207*
					(0.0875)	(0.0828)	(0.0868)	(0.105)
Civil war winner					0.311***	0.179**	0.0863	0.0595
					(0.0765)	(0.0849)	(0.0850)	(0.0852)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0143		0.00570		0.0133		-0.0110
		(0.0315)		(0.0460)		(0.0321)		(0.0522)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		0.152		0.193**		0.158		0.220**
		(0.102)		(0.0951)		(0.104)		(0.0996)
ln(oil & gas income p.c.)		-0.00188		-0.00426		-0.00197		-0.00382
		(0.00357)		(0.00343)		(0.00354)		(0.00343)
ln(population)			0.0441	0.0475			0.0419	0.0573
			(0.0340)	(0.0374)			(0.0338)	(0.0384)
Ethnic frac.			0.241	0.245			0.269	0.294
			(0.216)	(0.216)			(0.218)	(0.219)
Religious frac.			0.0374	0.0322			0.0469	0.0292
			(0.185)	(0.167)			(0.185)	(0.170)
British colony			-0.185	-0.200*			-0.196*	-0.214*
			(0.114)	(0.112)			(0.116)	(0.110)
French colony			-0.0229	-0.0135			-0.0328	-0.0335
			(0.112)	(0.105)			(0.113)	(0.104)
Portuguese colony			0.206	0.211*			0.173	0.149
			(0.131)	(0.123)			(0.153)	(0.158)
Country-years	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251
R-squared	0.063	0.127	0.186	0.193	0.063	0.128	0.188	0.196
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.8 is identical to Table 4 except here we change the dependent variable to DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT.
***$p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$.

Table B.9: Robustness Checks for Table 4

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER SAME							
	Panel A. Logit models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	1.305***	1.091***	0.915***	0.910***				
	(0.254)	(0.263)	(0.273)	(0.294)				
Col. liberation regime					1.325***	1.227***	1.203***	1.304***
					(0.313)	(0.299)	(0.283)	(0.356)
Civil war winner					1.267***	0.842**	0.476	0.372
					(0.353)	(0.354)	(0.367)	(0.369)
Country-years	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263
Pseudo R2	0.0540	0.0955	0.124	0.127	0.0540	0.0966	0.128	0.131
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.315***	0.252***	0.206***	0.206***				
	(0.0574)	(0.0599)	(0.0608)	(0.0646)				
Col. liberation regime					0.320***	0.280***	0.259***	0.278***
					(0.0707)	(0.0657)	(0.0631)	(0.0761)
Civil war winner					0.306***	0.200**	0.122	0.0994
					(0.0812)	(0.0826)	(0.0841)	(0.0848)
Country-years	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263
R-squared	0.074	0.124	0.158	0.161	0.074	0.125	0.161	0.165
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.9 follows the same structure as Tables B.4 and B.7; the present table is identical to Table 4 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.10: Minister of Defense Biographical Information

Country	Defense Minister	Important war figure?	Biography
Algeria	Houari Boumedi-ene (1962–65)	Yes	Served as a colonel during the war, the highest rank in the FLN forces. He was also the chief of staff of the ALN, the FLN's military wing. Served as the second president of Algeria after his MoD appointment.
	Khaled Nezzar (1990–92)	No	Went to military school in Algiers and received training in Moscow, but was too young to fight in the independence war. Was appointed within the MoD in 1965 upon finishing his training.
Angola	Iko Carreira (1976–80)	Yes	Served as head of security in the MPLA during the liberation war. Was in charge of transitioning the military wing of the MPLA into the Angola state army.
	Pedro Maria Tonha (1981–95)	Yes	Was a high-level commander within the MPLA during the war. After independence in 1975, he became governor of central Huambo province.
	Pedro Sebastiao (1996–98)	Yes	Was a commander of the FAPLA squadron (armed wing of the MPLA), led the Battle of Ntó—an important operation in the war.
	Kundy Paihama (1999–2010)	No	Kundy Paihama served as governor of Cunene, Benguela, Huila, and Luanda provinces before being MoD.
	Candido van Dunem (2010–14)	No	Officer in the Angolan armed forces. Served as a military advisor to Angola's Permanent Mission to the UN from 2000-2004.
	Joao Manuel Gonalves Lourenco (2015–17)		Fought with the MPLA in the liberation war, including having received training in the Soviet Union. Was appointed as a provincial governor in 1984 before being MoD.
Burundi	Germain Niyoyankana (2005–10)	No	Was a lieutenant general in the army, and before that, he was the army chief of staff. During the 1993-2005 civil war, he was a top army commander in the state military.
	Pontien Gaciyubwenge (2011–14)	No	Was also part of the extant state military. During the war he was promoted from battalion commander, to group commander, military region commander, and finally brigadier general. He was the Director General of Planning and Studies within the MoD before his appointment.
	Emannuel Ntahomvukiye (2015–17)	No	First civilian to hold the MoD position, he has a legal background.
Chad	Mahamat Nouri (2001–04)	No	Was a commander of Habre's forces, led the Northern forces. He held several portfolios under Habre, including Minister of the Interior. After Habre was ousted by Deby, Nouri became a close ally of Deby and held several portfolios, including Minister of the Interior in addition to the Minister of Defense.
	Wadel Abdelkader Kamogue (2008–12)	No	Played a key role in the 1975 coup that overthrew Tombalbaye. Controlled southern Chad during the subsequent Habre regime, was appointed as Minister of Agriculture. After Deby came to power in 1990, he was appointed as the Minister of Civil Service and Labor from 1993-1994. Deby named him the president of the national assembly in 1997, and then MoD in 2008.
	Bichara Issa Djadallah (2013–15)		

Country	Defense Minister	Important war figure?	Biography
Congo - B	Itihi Ossetoumba (1999–2001)	Yes	Founding member of the PCT and was on the five-member executive committee of the National Revolutionary Council. In 1989, he was appointed as the number-two position in the regime, in charge of the PCT Political Bureau.
	Jacques Yvon Ndolou (2002-09)		
	Charles Richard Mondjo (2012–17)	Yes	Served as an army officer during the war, and was the Director of Lessons and Studies at the Military Academy from 1987-1993. Served as the Chief of Staff of the Congolese Armed Forces for ten years before his MoD appointment.
DRC	Charles Mwando Simba (2009–12)	No	Led an anti-Tutsi militia separate from the ADFL.
	Crispin Atama Tabe (2015–17)	No	Background in law and career in civil services. Past posts include the National Intelligence Agency and Minister of the Interior of the Eastern Province.
Eritrea	Petros Solomon (1993)	Yes	During the war he was one of the three members of the front's Military Committee in 1975, and from 1977-1978, he was responsible for all logistics on the Eastern Front around Massawa and headed the EPLF's military intelligence unit. In 1977, he was placed on the Political Bureau of the front's Central Committee and served on the Military Committee and General Staff through liberation.
	Mesfin Hagos (1994)	Yes	One of the original leaders of the EPLF and the EPRP, which controlled the EPLF. Underwent military training in Syria with Isaias Afwerki. Was part of the 5 man EPLF founding leadership, serving on its Central Committee and its political committee. Was appointed as chief of staff of the Eritrean Defense Force in 1992 before becoming MoD.
	Gen. Sebhat Ephrem (1995–2017)	Yes	Had various high-level appointments during the war: In 1977, he was placed on the front's Political Committee and appointment head of the Department of Public Administration. In 1986, he joined the General Staff, and was in charge of leading strategy for the war. In 1992 he was appointed the major of Asmara and later became Eritrea's first full general.
Ethiopia	Siye Abraha (1991–94)	Yes	Abraha was one of the founders of the TPLF and served as a commander during the war.
	Tefera Walwa (1997–2000)		
	Abedula Gemeda (2002–05)	No	Received military training after the war. Reached the rank of Major General of the National Defense Force in 1998.
	Kuma Demekesa (2006–08)	Yes	Was a founding member of the TPLF and spent several years as a prisoner of war during the war. Served as the Minister of Internal Affairs before his MoD appointment.
	Siraj Fergesa (2009–17)	No	Joined the party as a civil servant focused on economic development in the early 1990s.
Guinea Bissau	Joao Bernardo Vieira (1974–78)	Yes	Was a police commissar and military chief in southern Guinea-Bissau in the 1960s. Was named vice president of the War Council in 1965.
	Commandant Umaru Djalo (1979–80)		

Country	Defense Minister	Important war figure?	Biography
Ivory Coast	N'Guessan Michel Amani (2011-2017)	No	Background in teaching and was appointed as the Minister of National Education from 2000-2007.
Liberia	Daniel Chea (1997–2003)		
Morocco	Mahjoubi Aherdane (1961–65)	Yes	Founding member of the Moroccan Liberation Army.
	Abderrahmane Sbai (1997–2009)	No	Background in civil service before MoD appointment.
	Abdellatif Loudiyi (2010–17)	No	Career civil servant who served in the Ministry of Finance before MoD appointment.
Mozambique	Alberto Joachim Chipande (1976–94)	Yes	Served on the Political Bureau and Central Committee of FRELIMO during the war.
	Aguiar Jonassane Reginaldo Real Mazula (1995–99)	No	Was the first civilian Minister of Defense in Mozambique. He was Minister of Labor and Minister of State Administration before he was named Minister of Defense.
	Gen (retd) Tobias Joaquim Dai (2000–08)	Yes	Was Commander of the Army during the war.
	Filipe Nyussi (2008–14)	No	Nyussi was too young to be involved in the war, although both his parent were veterans of the liberation war as FRELIMO members.
	Agostinho Mondlane (2015–17)		
Namibia	Peter Mueshihange (1990–94)	Yes	Was one of the founders of the OPC (which became SWAPO) in 1958. During the war, he was the secretary for foreign affairs of SWAPO.
	Phillemon Malima (1995–97)	Yes	Served as the SWAPO Representative to the USSR from 1987 to 1989 during the war. Before becoming Defense Minister in 1995, he was the Deputy Minister of Defense under Mueshihange.
	Erikki Nghimtina (1998–2004)	Yes	Was the Director of Communications for the armed wing of SWAPO during the war from 1983-1989. Was Deputy Minister of Defense from 1995 to 1997, before he became the head Minister of Defense.
	Charles Namoloh (2007–12)	Yes	Was chief of staff to the second in command of the army during the war from 1979-1989. Was a member of the 18 person SWAPO Politburo.
	Nahas Angula (2013–15)	No	Was in exile during the war.
Rwanda	Paul Kagame (1994–1999)	Yes	Became a top commander of the RPF troops after the first leader (Rwigema) was shot and killed in in 1990.
	Emmanuel Habyarimana (2000–02)	No	Was a former member of the Rwandan Armed Forces under President Juvenal Habyarimana. Following the successful attacks of the RPF, he joined the newly constituted Rwanda Defense Forces as a colonel.
	Marcel Gatsinzi (2003–09)	No	Was a second lieutenant in the Rwanda Army prior to the civil war.
	James Kabarebe (2010–17)	Yes	During the war, he was a high-ranking commander of the RPF. His unit later became the Republican Guard for Kagame.

Country	Defense Minister	Important war figure?	Biography
South Africa	Joe Modise (1994–98)	Yes	Served as high command in Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's armed faction, after the party was banned in 1960. He was asked to take over command of the armed faction from 1965 to 1984 while Mandela was imprisoned. He was elected to the ANC's national executive committee during this time.
	Mosiuoa Patrick Lekota (1999–2008)	Yes	Was an early organizer of the SASO and was jailed for six years on Robben Island. After his release, he became the head of publicity for the UDF. In 1990, he was elected to the ANC's executive committee, and in 1991, he was appointed as the ANC's Chief of Intelligence.
	Charles Nqakula (2008–09)	Yes	Served as commander of the armed wing of the ANC for the Western Cape from 1988 to 1991. Was elected as Deputy General Secretary in 1991 and subsequently as the party's General Secretary in 1993. Was the Minister of Safety and Security before becoming the MoD.
	Lindiwe Sisulu (2009–12)	Yes	Joined the military wing of the ANC in 1977, specialized in Intelligence. In 1990, became a top official of the intelligence wing, along with Jacob Zuma.
	Nosiviwe Mapisa Nqakula (2013–17)	Yes	In the 1980s, she served as the head of the commission that investigated ANC deserters. Before her MoD appointment, she was the Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Correctional Services.
South Sudan	John Kong Nyuon (2011-12)		
Tunisia	Bahi Ladgham (1960–66)	Yes	One of the founders of the rebel army. Was a key member of the Franco-Tunisian negotiations for independence.
	Abdallah Farhat (1977–79)	No	Background in civil service.
	Slaheddine Baly (1981–88)		
	Abdallah Kallel (1989–91)	No	Background in civil service.
	Abdelaziz Ben Dhia (1992–96)		
	Dali Jazi (2002–05)		
	Kamel Morjane (2006–10)	No	Too young to fight in the independence war. Background in civil service.
	Farhat Jorchani (2015–17)	No	Too young to fight in the independence war. Background in law.
Uganda	Amama Mbabazi (2001–06)	Yes	Was a founding member of the NRM. From 1986-1992, he was the head of the External Security Organization.
	Crispus Kiyonga (2007–16)	No	Prior to 1981, Kiyonga competed in elections as a UPM candidate. During the war, he joined the NRM. Was the Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Health before becoming MoD.

Country	Defense Minister	Important war figure?	Biography
Zimbabwe	Enos Nkala (1988)	Yes	One of the four founders of ZANU, along with Robert Mugabe. Served on ZANU high command during the war.
	Richard Chemist Hove (1990–92)	Yes	From 1971-1973, he was a member of Dare Rechimurenga, the war council of the rebel group. He was the head of broadcasting services in the Department of Information and Publicity in 1973. He then became deputy secretary for external affairs for ZANU in 1978. Before becoming MoD, he was a member of the Politburo and Central Committee of ZANU, in addition to several other cabinet positions.
	Moven Enock Mahachi (1992–2000)		
	Sydney Sekeramayi (2001–08, 13-17)	No	Served as the party's representative to Sweden during the war.
	Emmerson Mnangagwa (2009–13)	Yes	Was a member of ZANU's Central Committee during the war. In 1980 Mugabe named him minister of state in the prime minister's office, with responsibilities for state security. In that position, Mnangagwa was responsible for integrating the two liberation armies, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, with the remnants of the former Rhodesian security forces, into the Zimbabwe National Army.

C. Supporting Information for Alternative Explanations

C.1 Controlling the Countryside

"He who controls the countryside controls the country" (Huntington 1968, 292). This well-known aphorism linking revolutionary regimes to the transformation of society is the leading explanation in the literature for why revolutionary regimes endure. Levitsky and Way (2013) and Lachapelle et al. (2020) argue that gaining power through violence, unleashing a program of social revolution, and defeating counterrevolutionaries eliminates alternative centers of power that underpinned the previous regime. Even if true on average for the broader global sample of revolutionary regimes, this mechanism does not help to explain the durability of African rebel regimes.

Many African countries have inauspicious conditions for rebel regimes to fundamentally transform society, even in cases where they do attempt social revolution. Herbst (2000) discusses the generic problem that rulers in Africa throughout history—precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial—have faced to consolidating territorial control. A high land-to-population ratio has typically created incentives for residents to move rather than to submit to the will of an encroaching state. Before European colonialism began, states typically aimed to control people rather than specific tracts of territory, given the scarcity of the former. Despite superior military technology, European colonizers failed to solve this problem. They usually sought to impose "hegemony on a shoestring" and invested only enough to balance the budgets within the colonies (Berry 1992). In fact, by carving up the continent into territorially delineated spheres of influence—which later engendered the international borders for postcolonial African states—European rule likely exacerbated the problem of establishing effective territorial control. At independence, African rulers typically faced considerable difficulties to broadcasting power across their entire territory. Most countries were large compared to historical African states (Herbst 2000; Green 2012), and European rule failed to develop effective tax systems (Gardner 2012). These conditions have posed daunting challenges for would-be revolutionaries to create an effective state that could transform society.

For these reasons, we do not expect existing hypotheses about rebel regimes—revolutionary or otherwise—controlling the countryside to apply to Africa. This argument is difficult to test systematically, but available evidence suggests that African rebel regimes do not exhibit greater control over society than other regimes. In both panels of Table C.1, rebel regimes are not statistically discernible.

In Panel A, we use the same variable that Lachapelle et al. (2020) use to proxy for the destruction of alternative centers of power. Their study is the most rigorous quantitative assessment of the durability of revolutionary regimes to date, and therefore the data they use provide a relevant benchmark. They examine V-Dem's Civil Society Participation Index (Coppedge 2018). The description from the V-Dem codebook is: *Are major CSOs [civil society organizations] routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?*

In Panel B, the dependent variable draws from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index's (BTI) "stateness" variable, which equals the average of scores on four categories: (1) monopoly on the

use of force, (2) state identity, (3) no interference in religious dogmas, and (4) basic administration. Because the third category is irrelevant for our purposes, we computed the average among the other three. The main drawback of this variable is its limited temporal coverage (begins in 2006). Panel B uses the average value of the adjusted stateness variable for 2006, 2008, and 2010; and each regressor takes its value from 2006.

In Panel C, we assess the empirical relevance of another factor related to the struggle to control the countryside: facing counterrevolutionary threats after a rebel regime take power. Some argue that counterrevolutionary threats engender stable authoritarian regimes because elites need to band together in order to mitigate the counterrevolutionary threat. Slater (2010) develops this logic to explain durable (non-revolutionary) regimes in Southeast Asia, and more recently, Lachapelle et al. (2020) have applied the mechanism as one reason that revolutionary regimes survive so long (see also Paine 2021 for a formal statement of this mechanism). Thus, one possibility is that the challenges faced *after rebel regimes take power* are more important than the challenges they face *during the struggle to gain power*. To assess this, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they faced a major armed challenger within their first five years of gaining power (coded using data from Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Dixon and Sarkees 2015); eleven faced challengers, and ten did not. This is the appropriate operationalization of this mechanism because of the argument that facing an armed challenger early on creates the glue for elite unity, even if the threat diminishes in the future. Both types of rebel regimes (those that faced counterrevolutionary challengers and not) are significantly less likely to break down than non-rebel regimes, and the magnitude of the coefficient estimates is similar. This, of course, does not rule out that facing counterrevolutionary challengers facilitated regime stability in some cases. However, it demonstrates that this alternative mechanism cannot account for why rebel regimes tend to survive for such long periods across the entire sample. Furthermore, in several cases, the armed challengers clearly either weakened the regime (Angola, Chad 90–NA, DRC 97–NA) or overthrew it (Chad 82–90).

Table C.1: Controlling the Countryside

Panel A. DV: V-Dem Civil society participation index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0227	-0.0602	-0.0585	-0.0502				
	(0.0544)	(0.0528)	(0.0511)	(0.0492)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0217	-0.0624	-0.0998	-0.0733
					(0.0653)	(0.0683)	(0.0787)	(0.0782)
Civil war winner					0.106*	-0.0560	0.00878	-0.0154
					(0.0607)	(0.0620)	(0.0549)	(0.0525)
Country-years	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351
R-squared	0.002	0.343	0.456	0.481	0.016	0.343	0.464	0.483
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Panel B. DV: Adjusted BTI stateness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.380	0.430	0.302	0.451				
	(0.619)	(0.579)	(0.618)	(0.488)				
Col. liberation regime					1.285**	1.217*	0.930	0.429
					(0.595)	(0.621)	(0.714)	(0.583)
Civil war winner					-0.654	-0.448	-0.449	0.476
					(0.712)	(0.663)	(0.686)	(0.701)
Countries	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
R-squared	0.013	0.252	0.290	0.578	0.172	0.359	0.347	0.578
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006

Panel C. Counterrevolutions. DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
Rebel (counterrev.)	-0.0481***	-0.0466***	-0.0600***	-0.0600***				
	(0.0113)	(0.0130)	(0.0151)	(0.0164)				
Rebel (none)	-0.0482***	-0.0490***	-0.0551***	-0.0460***				
	(0.00955)	(0.0114)	(0.0120)	(0.0123)				
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352				
R-squared	0.013	0.042	0.043	0.047				
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All				
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES				

Notes: Table C.1 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable or how we disaggregate rebel regimes. In Panel A, the DV is V-Dem's Civil society participation index. Higher values for the coefficient estimates indicate a stronger and more autonomous civil society. In Panel B, the DV is Adjusted BTI stateness. Higher values for the coefficient estimates indicate greater stateness. For reasons stated above, we use a cross-section of countries in 2006 in Panel B. In Panel C, the DV is the same as in Table 2. Rebel regimes are disaggregated depending on whether a civil war occurs within five years of the rebel group coming to power. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

The colonial liberation case of Angola exemplifies a regime that has endured for a long period despite exerting weak control over society. Following a lengthy liberation war with Portugal, the government (MPLA) faced a high-intensity center-seeking challenge from UNITA between 1975 and 2002, which had also participated in the liberation struggle. By the time the post-independence period began, UNITA had become a counterrevolutionary movement funded by South Africa and the United States to counter the Marxist orientation of MPLA, who received military backing from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Angola is a typical rebel regime with regard to the military power-sharing mechanisms: MPLA created the state military out of its armed wing that fought in the liberation struggle, and it has been immune to coups while consistently sharing power with military elites.

The Angolan regime nearly fell in the 1990s due to the collapse of the state in much of the country. "Cumulatively, four decades of fighting have unmade and reshaped Angola, socially and physically. Most of the conflict took place in the countryside, depopulating rural areas and crippling a once vibrant rural economy. The country, which in 1975 was the world's fourth largest exporter of coffee, had few commercial coffee farms at all by 2002. Roads and bridges were systematically destroyed and the soil sown indiscriminately with landmines," and state weakness also created an opening for rebels in Cabinda to attempt to secede (Le Billon 2007, 104-5). UNITA held territory and mined diamonds outside the government's stronghold in Luanda. In 1992, as part of a ceasefire, MPLA participated in elections judged free and fair by the international community, thus creating an alternative channel through which UNITA might have gained power. However, MPLA won and UNITA rejected the results, leading to renewed fighting (Fituni 1995, 152).

The inability of MPLA to gain control over the national territory until twenty-seven years after independence is unsurprising when considering factors stressed by Africanists. Herbst (2000) scores Angola as among the African countries with the most difficult political geographies given its large size and scattered population centers, and specifically asserts that "[t]he large territory of Angola has made it extremely difficult for the government to find a military solution to the civil war that began at independence in 1975" (151). The country's borders are a product of negotiations between Portugal and Britain in the late nineteenth century, and include significant territory beyond the historical Mbundu kingdoms of Kasanje and Matamba. These borders contain several medium-sized and regionally segmented ethnic groups whose historical rivalries ultimately undermined the initial promise in the 1960s that the liberation movement would develop a unified nationalist identity, as opposed to distinct ethnic organizations (Fituni 1995, 149; Le Billon 2007, 102; Reno 2011, 64-78). For MPLA, the main ethnic constituency is the Mbundu, who are primarily located near the capital city of Luanda and comprise 20% of the population. For UNITA, it is the Ovimbundu, located in the central highlands and composing 35% of the population. The third major anti-colonial rebel group (defeated several years after independence) was FNLA, represented by Bakongo in the northwest of the country with 15% of the population. Cabindan Mayombe, of the separatist rebel group FLEC, are 2% of the population. As in many countries with similar histories, members of an ethnic group that was organized as a state prior to colonization (Mbundu in MPLA) gained control of the government at independence and did not share power with members of other ethnic groups (Paine 2019a). Overall, Angola exemplifies that regime durability and state weakness are not mutually exclusive.

C.2 AUTHORITARIAN PARTIES

The following describes the party institution variables used in Table C.2:

- Inherited party: Indicator variable from Geddes et al. (2018) for whether the founders of the regime had established a ruling party prior to gaining power. Existing studies show that such regimes are more durable than authoritarian regimes that found parties after gaining power (Miller 2020).

- Party control of military: Five-point scale from Geddes et al. (2018) that assesses "Does the Party Exercise Control over the Military?" (among regimes that have a support party). This is the *partymilit* variable in their dataset.

- Commissar system. The highest value of the previous variable is: "the party imposes commissars, party advisers, or some kind of party committee on military units or garrisons. The task of these commissars is to insure ideological correctness and loyalty in the officer corps and to report dissenting views."

- Number of paramilitaries: From De Bruin (2020), number of counterbalancing forces operating in each country-year. As she describes, she restricts her count of paramilitaries to those that serve counterbalancing forces against a coup, including that they are officially sanctioned by the regime and are stationed within 60 miles of the capital. Her dataset contains five other measures of counterbalancing as well, and we verified (not reported) that the coefficient estimates are null for almost every combination of these variables and specifications.

Table C.2: Authoritarian Parties

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Sample: Ruling party predates regime			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0247**	-0.0113	-0.0407**	-0.0267*
	(0.0122)	(0.0152)	(0.0157)	(0.0142)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0142*		-0.0318***
		(0.00757)		(0.00924)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0133		0.000449
		(0.0366)		(0.0365)
ln(oil & gas income p.c.)		0.000359		0.000453
		(0.000970)		(0.00111)
ln(population)			0.00135	0.0219***
			(0.00676)	(0.00784)
Ethnic frac.			-0.00150	-0.00831
			(0.0229)	(0.0214)
Religious frac.			-0.0233	-0.0367
			(0.0303)	(0.0322)
British colony			-0.0457**	-0.0356**
			(0.0192)	(0.0162)
French colony			-0.0283	-0.0159
			(0.0181)	(0.0179)
Portuguese colony			-0.0144	-0.0267
			(0.0291)	(0.0317)
Country-years	1,081	1,081	1,081	1,081
R-squared	0.008	0.058	0.059	0.069
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.2 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we alter the sample by dropping all observations from regimes for which a ruling party predated the regime. Given the restricted sample, we do not estimate separate coefficients for colonial liberation regimes and civil war winners. $^{***}p < 0.01,$ $^{**}p < 0.05,$ $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table C.3: Other Party Explanations

		Panel A. DV: Party control of military						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.565	0.706	0.364	0.381				
	(0.405)	(0.422)	(0.359)	(0.348)				
Col. liberation regime					0.907*	1.082**	0.686	0.730
					(0.526)	(0.500)	(0.476)	(0.485)
Civil war winner					-0.224	-0.222	-0.0936	-0.109
					(0.328)	(0.340)	(0.418)	(0.429)
Country-years	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.034	0.081	0.225	0.242	0.072	0.126	0.237	0.254
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
		Panel B. DV: Commissar system						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0601	0.0800	0.0343	0.0373				
	(0.0663)	(0.0748)	(0.0322)	(0.0333)				
Col. liberation regime					0.110	0.122	0.0565	0.0646
					(0.0960)	(0.107)	(0.0478)	(0.0556)
Civil war winner					-0.0336*	0.000474	-0.00190	-0.00362
					(0.0191)	(0.0157)	(0.0230)	(0.0264)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.064	0.183	0.189	0.038	0.079	0.186	0.193
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
		Panel C. DV: Paramilitaries						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.487	0.249	0.0286	0.0370				
	(0.293)	(0.371)	(0.437)	(0.433)				
Col. liberation regime					0.561*	0.196	-0.0758	-0.231
					(0.278)	(0.395)	(0.534)	(0.492)
Civil war winner					0.322	0.354	0.138	0.320
					(0.641)	(0.680)	(0.563)	(0.557)
Country-years	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220
R-squared	0.031	0.128	0.274	0.284	0.034	0.129	0.274	0.290
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.3 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. In Panel A, the DV is Geddes et al.'s (2018) ordinal variable for party control over the military. In Panel B, the DV indicates the presence of a commissar system. In Panel C, the DV is the total number of counterbalancing units. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.3 CIVILIAN AND ETHNIC POWER SHARING

Rebel regimes are not distinct in the extent to which they share power with other civilian actors or ethnic groups. Our theory highlights the importance in rebel regimes of sharing power with military elites. Although these elites pose a grave threat to the ruler, they also tend to be allies of the ruler, and hence can be bought off if offered perks such as the Ministry of Defense. However, we do not expect rulers in rebel regimes to necessarily face heightened incentives to share civilian positions. Any ruler can achieve survival benefits by distributing spoils more widely among civilian elites (Arriola 2009; Francois et al. 2015), but it is unclear why these benefits would systematically differ in rebel regimes—in which *military* elites pose the gravest threat. Thus, we expect that differences in power sharing between rebel regimes and non-rebel regimes are restricted to *coercive dimensions only*.

Two pieces of evidence reject broader power sharing. First, we collected original data on the appointment of a Vice President or Prime Minister—the highest civilian position in the cabinet. Appointing a Vice President/Prime Minister is an important indicator of overall regime institutionalization, and this position is often the constitutional successor to the president (Meng 2020, 2021). The Vice President and Prime Minister are functionally equivalent positions; the countries in our sample have *either* a Vice President or a Prime Minster, but not both. The Vice President/Prime Minister variable is coded similarly as the Defense Minister variable. We create a dummy variable called VP/PM APPOINT that equals 1 if an elite was appointed as the Vice President/Prime Minister, and 0 if the position was left vacant, eliminated from the cabinet, or the president named himself the head of that office. VP/PM SAME equals 1 if an elite was appointed as the Vice President/Prime Minister *and* that elite also held the position in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Appendix Table C.4 shows null coefficient estimates in almost every specification.

Second, in Appendix Table C.5 we examine data on the ethnic makeup of cabinets from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR; Vogt et al. 2015). The first variable is ETHNIC REPRESENTATION. This is the percentage of the country's population with some membership in cabinet or other high-ranking positions in the central government. In the EPR coding scheme, this corresponds to ethnic groups with any of the following power-access statuses: monopoly, dominant, senior partner, or junior partner. The second variable is ETHNOCRACY, which indicates whether a single ethnic group either controls all important political positions. This corresponds with whether any ethnic group in the country has a power-access status of monopoly or dominant. The estimates are null for each outcome. This suggests that rebel regimes also do not rely on a strategy of broad ethnic power sharing for their survival more than other non-rebel regimes, nor do they more narrowly concentrate power among the leading group.

This evidence also rules out an alternative mechanism that rebel regimes—rather than having advantages in military power sharing—are instead proxying for regimes in which one ethnic group successfully marginalizes all others. Appendix Table C.6 demonstrates this point even more clearly by summarizing the ethnic composition of every rebel group and subsequent rebel regime. The *majority* of rebel groups in our sample are multi-ethnic: in only 30% of cases did a single ethnic group organize an insurgency around aims for and recruitment of that ethnic group only. Furthermore, most rebel regimes are multi-ethnic after coming into power: in only 26% of cases did one ethnic group dominate the government within the first five years of the rebel regime's existence. Cases of complete ethnic exclusion are in fact quite rare in our sample. In only 3 of 21 cases were the

foundational rebel group *and* the subsequent rebel regime organized around a single ethnic group. To sum, demonstrating that most rebel groups and most rebel regimes are multi-ethnic suggests that ethnic ties are not the primary factor for explaining the durability of these regimes.

Finally, we also rerun the regressions from Tables 2, 3, and 5 while adding a control for ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, as reported in Appendix Tables C.7. The results are qualitatively unchanged.

Table C.4: Civilian Power Sharing

	Panel A. DV: VP/PM SAME
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0746	-0.0584	-0.0266	-0.0384				
	(0.0800)	(0.0721)	(0.0779)	(0.0754)				
Col. liberation regime					0.0555	-0.0545	-0.0464	-0.102
					(0.0977)	(0.0936)	(0.135)	(0.135)
Civil war winner					0.133	-0.0635	-0.00564	0.0249
					(0.101)	(0.111)	(0.0940)	(0.0950)
Country-years	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,882	1,701	1,701	1,701
R-squared	0.003	0.080	0.127	0.133	0.006	0.080	0.127	0.135
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: VP/PM APPOINT
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0354	-0.165**	-0.143	-0.146*				
	(0.0891)	(0.0688)	(0.0883)	(0.0799)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0421	-0.202*	-0.220	-0.244*
					(0.117)	(0.109)	(0.154)	(0.142)
Civil war winner					0.137	-0.115	-0.0577	-0.0460
					(0.0907)	(0.0742)	(0.0822)	(0.0851)
Country-years	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742
R-squared	0.001	0.199	0.265	0.266	0.007	0.201	0.269	0.271
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.4 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. In Panel A, the DV is the stable appointment of a VP/PM. In Panel B, the DV is the appointment of a VP/PM. These follow the differences between the Minister of Defense variables in Tables 4 and B.8, respectively. ***$p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$.

Table C.5: Ethnic Power Sharing

	Panel A. DV: ETHNIC REPRESENTATION							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.00442	-0.0599	0.0416	0.0218				
	(0.0978)	(0.101)	(0.0997)	(0.0954)				
Col. liberation regime					0.00306	-0.0530	0.119	0.0702
					(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.118)	(0.123)
Civil war winner					-0.0184	-0.0728	-0.0847	-0.0507
					(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.118)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.000	0.027	0.066	0.093	0.000	0.027	0.078	0.097
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: ETHNOCRACY							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0384	-0.0185	-0.129	-0.125				
	(0.134)	(0.125)	(0.104)	(0.104)				
Col. liberation regime					0.0667	0.0412	-0.0493	-0.0194
					(0.175)	(0.165)	(0.146)	(0.148)
Civil war winner					-0.235*	-0.131	-0.258**	-0.284**
					(0.125)	(0.138)	(0.123)	(0.121)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.001	0.077	0.190	0.201	0.022	0.083	0.198	0.211
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.5 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. Data on the ethnic makeup of cabinets is from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR; Vogt et al. 2015). In Panel A, the dependent variable is ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, the percentage of the country's population with some membership in cabinet or other high-ranking positions in the central government (i.e., "junior partner" or higher in the EPR scheme). In Panel B, the dependent variable is ETHNOCRACY, an indicator for whether a single ethnic group has a status of either "monopoly" or "dominant," hence shutting out members of any other ethnic group from influential cabinet positions. ***$p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$.

Table C.6: Ethnic Composition of Rebel Regimes

Case	Main rebel group	First five years of regime
Algeria 62–92	Arabs	Arabs
Angola 75–NA	Mbundu-Mestico	Mbundu-Mestico
Burundi 06–NA	Hutu	Hutu, Tutsi
Chad 82–90	Toubou	Toubou, Hadjerai, Sara, Zaghawa/Bideyat
Chad 90–NA	Hadjerai, Zaghawa/Bideyat	Hadjerai, Zaghawa/Bideyat, Sara, Toubou
Congo-B 97–NA	Mbochi	Mbochi, Batéké, Kouyou
DRC 97–NA	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	Tutsi-Banyamulenge, Luba Shaba, Lunda-Yeke
Eritrea 93–NA	Christian Eritreans, Muslim Eritreans	Christians, Other Muslims
Ethiopia 91–NA	Tigry, Amhara, Oroma	Tigry, Amhara, Oroma
Guinea-Bissau 74–80	Cape Verdean, Balanta	Cape Verdean
Ivory Coast 11–NA	Non-ethnic	Northerners, Baule, Other Akans, Southern Mande
Liberia 97–03	Gio, Mano	Americo-Liberians, Gio, Mano
Morocco 56–NA	Arabs, Berbers	Arabs
Mozambique 75–NA	Makonde-Yao, Tsonga-Chopi	Makonde-Yao, Tsonga-Chopi
Namibia 90–NA	Non-ethnic	Ovambos, 7 others
Rwanda 94–NA	Tutsi	Tutsi
South Africa 94–NA	Africans (esp. Xhosa), Coloreds, Asians	Xhosa, 12 others
South Sudan 11–NA	Dinka, Nuer, others	Dinka, Nuer
Tunisia 56–11	Non-ethnic	Non-ethnic
Uganda 86–NA	South-Westerners, Baganda	South-Westerners, Baganda, Basoga
Zimbabwe 80–NA	Shona, Ndebele	Shona, Whites
% ethnically exclusive	33%	24%

Notes: The column "Main rebel group" lists every ethnic group that participated in the main rebel group that launched each rebel regime (Appendix A.3 states these rebel groups). To code this, we use ACD2EPR for every rebel group contained in their dataset; as the name suggests, this dataset matches rebel groups from the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) with ethnic groups from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR). "Non-ethnic" means that ACD2EPR codes the main rebel group as not proclaiming aims for and recruiting mainly from any particular ethnic groups. For cases that ACD2EPR does not contain (note that every such case is colonial liberation), we used the coding notes from EPR to determine the ethnic composition of the rebel group.

The column "First five years of regime" lists every ethnic group whose power status EPR codes as junior partner or higher within the first five years of the start of the rebel regime, with the group with the highest power status listed first. "Non-ethnic" means that EPR codes ethnicity as not politically relevant in that country at that time.

We highlight in gray every case in which a single ethnic group dominated both the rebellion to gain power and the first five years of the regime. This demonstrates the rarity of ethnocratic regimes.

Table C.7: Controlling for Ethnic Power Sharing

	Panel A. DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0484***	-0.0484***	-0.0561***	-0.0521***				
	(0.00901)	(0.0109)	(0.0116)	(0.0118)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0453***	-0.0468***	-0.0486***	-0.0382**
					(0.00939)	(0.0119)	(0.0136)	(0.0153)
Civil war winner					-0.0540***	-0.0517***	-0.0686***	-0.0738***
					(0.0111)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.0130)
Ethnic representation	-0.0199	-0.0194	-0.0229	-0.0180	-0.0198	-0.0193	-0.0236*	-0.0187
	(0.0146)	(0.0141)	(0.0138)	(0.0139)	(0.0145)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0140)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.043	0.044	0.048	0.014	0.043	0.044	0.048
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: SUCCESSFUL COUPS							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0290***	-0.0226***	-0.0300***	-0.0274***				
	(0.00713)	(0.00719)	(0.00810)	(0.00807)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0264***	-0.0224**	-0.0297***	-0.0235*
					(0.00822)	(0.00897)	(0.0106)	(0.0121)
Civil war winner					-0.0339***	-0.0229***	-0.0305***	-0.0333***
					(0.00757)	(0.00752)	(0.00830)	(0.00908)
Ethnic representation	-0.0193	-0.0194	-0.0210*	-0.0181	-0.0194	-0.0194	-0.0211	-0.0184
	(0.0126)	(0.0129)	(0.0125)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.0129)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.012	0.039	0.039	0.041	0.013	0.039	0.039	0.041
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel C. Sample: Rebel regimes. DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
MoD same (average)	-0.0578*	-0.0703**	-0.0984*	-0.0920				
	(0.0294)	(0.0292)	(0.0482)	(0.0558)				
Ethnic representation	-0.0248*	-0.0266	-0.0245	-0.0201				
	(0.0138)	(0.0216)	(0.0169)	(0.0241)				
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352				
R-squared	0.029	0.122	0.123	0.125				
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All				
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES				

Notes: Table C.7 replicates the main analyses while adding an additional control for ETHNIC REPRESENTATION. Panel A reruns the regression from Table 2; Panel B reruns the regression from Table 3, and Panel C reruns the regression from Table 5. ***$p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$.

C.4 ALTERNATIVE CIVIL WAR FACTORS

Here we engage with alternative explanations suggested by research on civil war termination and changes since the Cold War ended. As we show in Table C.8, none of these alternatives can account for the durability of rebel regimes. In each of the four panels in the table, we consider a distinct way to disaggregate the rebel regime variable, or include alternative control variables; and we assess the same four combinations of additional covariates as in all the other tables.

Toft (2009) connects the mode of civil war termination to prospects for civil war recurrence. More recent research considers related factors such as how the security forces are reconfigured after the war (Berg 2020). Toft provides statistical evidence that civil wars are less likely to recur when they end by outright victory (and the correlation is stronger if it is outright rebel victory) as opposed to a peace settlement. In Panel A, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they gained power via outright victory (seventeen cases) or a negotiated settlement (South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Burundi). Recall that in cases of negotiated settlements, our coding requirement for a rebel regime is that they gain the presidency (in all cases, this was via an election); and in Table 6, we show that in all four cases, the military integration was biased toward leaders of the rebellion. Thus we expect that rebel regimes formed by negotiated settlement should also be significantly more durable than non-rebel regimes, which we demonstrate in Panel A. We also show there that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates are similar in magnitude for outright victory rebel regimes and negotiated settlement rebel regimes.

In Panel B, we assess a related consideration. Rather than distinguish rebel regimes from others, we distinguish each regime-year by the most recent way in which a civil war ended under the incumbent regime: outright rebel victory, outright government victory, and negotiated settlement (as coded by Toft 2009). Given the "most recent" stipulation, for example, Angola 75–NA is coded as outright rebel victory from 1975 through 1994, and then negotiated settlement afterwards because of their peace deal with UNITA (which subsequently failed and led to renewed civil war). The omitted basis category is regimes that have never faced an armed challenger, a civil war is ongoing, or there is no active fighting but the civil war never "ended" in the sense of any of the three aforementioned modes of termination. We show that regime-years in which the most recent civil war ending was outright rebel victory or a negotiated settlement are significantly less likely to experience regime breakdown, whereas the coefficient estimate for government victory is positive and not significant. Importantly, the coefficient estimate for negotiated settlements is driven *entirely* by rebel regimes. In addition to the four cases mentioned above in which a rebel regime was founded by a negotiated settlement, all but one of the additional cases in this category are rebel regimes (established by outright rebel victory) that concluded a peace settlement with an armed challenger (such as the Angola example mentioned above). These findings also demonstrate that our findings for rebel regimes are specific to *rebel* military victory, and do not extend to government military victory (which, despite eliminating an armed challenger, does not engender the conditions for peaceful power sharing described in our theory).

Research on civil war termination also highlights the sharp increase in negotiated settlements to end civil wars after the Cold War ended, and concomitant implication of security-sector reform programs (Toft 2009). To capture this idea, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they have their origins during the Cold War. We do not expect rebel regimes with origins during versus after the Cold War to matter for two reasons. First, as discussed for Panel C, most rebel regimes

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were founded by outright rebel victory. According to Toft's (2009) data, no cases of outright rebel victory underwent security-sector reform, which was confined to the few rebel regimes with negotiated settlements. More broadly, scholars consider post-Cold War security-sector reform interventions to be largely ineffective at securing peace (Sedra 2016, 1). Second, although three of the four rebel regimes founded by negotiated settlement began post-Cold War, we already demonstrated that they have persisted at the same frequency as rebel regimes founded by outright rebel victory. In Panel D, we show that the twelve post-Cold War rebel regimes and the nine Cold War rebel regimes are each significantly less likely to break down than non-rebel regimes (and note that the year fixed effects account for baseline differences in the probability of breakdown at different periods of time). Related, Matanock (2017) argues that post-conflict elections can help enforce peace agreements in rebel regimes. However, we do not include a separate indicator for post-conflict elections because all post-Cold War rebel regimes (except Eritrea) held post-conflict elections.

Finally, in Panel D, we control for other conflict factors that could affect regime stability. Contrary to the core idea about stability engendered by counterrevolutions (see the discussion for Panel A), an ongoing rebellion can destabilize a regime for numerous reasons. Most directly, the rebels can defeat the government militarily—as occurred in the establishment of the rebel regimes in our dataset. An ongoing civil war can also make the ruler more reliant on the military and hence likely to face a coup (Bell and Sudduth 2017). Civil wars are also destabilizing by creating refugee flows (Salehyan 2011), which we directly control for with the logged number of total refugees inside a country. Existing research also debates whether externally imposed democracies (which sometimes occurs via conflict) are more durable, which we address using an indicator for this variable from Enterline and Greig (2005, 2008). Finally, given the specific considerations about the Cold War versus post-Cold War period described above, we replace the year fixed effects with a Cold War fixed effect in every specification.

Table C.8: Alternative Civil War Factors

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel A. Mode of victory for rebel regimes			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (outright victory)	-0.0462***	-0.0452***	-0.0558***	-0.0532***
	(0.00966)	(0.0117)	(0.0122)	(0.0123)
Rebel regime (settlement)	-0.0563***	-0.0592***	-0.0632***	-0.0515***
	(0.0117)	(0.0131)	(0.0147)	(0.0152)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.013	0.042	0.043	0.047
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. General civil war termination			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel victory	-0.0412***	-0.0412***	-0.0499***	-0.0465***
	(0.0107)	(0.0125)	(0.0130)	(0.0130)
Government victory	0.0372	0.0305	0.0241	0.0183
	(0.0317)	(0.0305)	(0.0358)	(0.0353)
Settlement	-0.0514***	-0.0497***	-0.0567***	-0.0527***
	(0.00952)	(0.0114)	(0.0149)	(0.0155)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.043	0.043	0.047
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel C. Origins in Cold War vs. Post			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (Cold War)	-0.0391***	-0.0387***	-0.0410**	-0.0382**
	(0.0104)	(0.0126)	(0.0171)	(0.0182)
Rebel regime (Post-Cold War)	-0.0604***	-0.0629***	-0.0784***	-0.0715***
	(0.00967)	(0.0120)	(0.0145)	(0.0147)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.043	0.043	0.047
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel D. Additional conflict covariates			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0641***	-0.0620***	-0.0673***	-0.0627***
	(0.0143)	(0.0158)	(0.0161)	(0.0162)
Cold War FE	-0.0167	-0.0180	-0.0180	-0.0211
	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0142)	(0.0144)
ln(Refugees)	-0.000763	-0.000725	-0.00149	-0.00179
	(0.00107)	(0.00104)	(0.00120)	(0.00119)
Ongoing civil war	0.0565***	0.0558***	0.0563**	0.0517**
	(0.0204)	(0.0205)	(0.0219)	(0.0218)
Foreign-imposed democracy	-0.0127	-0.0119	-0.0201	-0.0171
	(0.0201)	(0.0194)	(0.0226)	(0.0219)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.021	0.023	0.023	0.027
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	NO	NO	NO

Table C.8 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we either disaggregate the rebel regime variable in various ways, or include alternative control variables. See above for a description of each specification. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

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