

her paintings represented her own pain and suffering. The paintings—many of them self-portraits—display fractured and broken human bodies. Kahlo's work rejected traditional notions of gender in challenging the idea that women (following the lead of the Virgin Mary) must bear their suffering silently.

Fulfilling revolutionary promises became ever more difficult during the Great Depression, which followed "Black Friday" on October 29, 1929. This unprecedented stock market crash led to the implosion of the U.S. and European economies and caused mass bankruptcies and layoffs. It also drastically decreased demand for raw materials from Latin America. The Great Depression added to Mexico's existing economic woes caused by the decline of the silver price in 1926. It also led to the forced repatriation of more than 100,000 Mexicans and Chicanos, including thousands of U.S. citizens of Mexican descent. In 1930 alone, the Mexican economy contracted by 4 percent. The depression challenged elected leaders worldwide, contributing to Franklin D. Roosevelt's defeat of U.S. President Herbert Hoover in the 1932 presidential elections as well as the triumph of Adolf Hitler's Nazi party in Germany the following year. In Mexico, the crisis aggravated an already dire fiscal situation. Between 1930 and 1932, federal revenue dropped 25 percent in real terms. Real wages fell as well, producing hundreds of wildcat strikes in a country in which the Sonorans had long managed to quell labor discontent.

In Mexico, the Great Depression coincided with a low point of the revolution, as Calles and his allies confronted the crisis by means of heavy-handed repression, while flaunting their own increasing fortunes. The great heroes of the revolution were dead, and those who had survived appeared hopelessly corrupt, as they had used the years of revolution to amass great personal wealth. By the early 1930s, several leaders, including President Rodríguez, who held a significant stake in a posh casino in Tijuana, had become multimillionaires. Calles himself bought a swanky mansion and steadily moved toward the political right. In 1931, he announced that land reform had failed and that the party needed to embrace commercial agriculture rather than collective farming. He also increasingly clashed with workers' organizations, and particularly those independent of the CROM under Morones, such as the powerful railroad workers' union. Only in the area of the Church did Calles remain steadfast in his views. Although Morrow had helped Calles and President Portes Gil find a negotiated solution to the Cristero conflict in 1929, five years later, Calles incited his allies to another campaign against the Church. In 1934, he announced in Guadalajara: "The revolution is not over.... It is necessary to enter into a new period, one I would call the period of the psychological revolution. We have to enter and take possession of the conscience of children and youths,

because they belong and should belong to the revolution.... [The revolution must] uproot the prejudices and form the new national soul."

But the Calles who attempted to rekindle the embers of the Church-state conflict in 1934 was but a shadow of his former self. His health had declined, and the Jefe Máximo spent more and more time in distant locales far away from Mexico City. As a result of this trend, President Rodríguez enjoyed far greater leeway than had his two predecessors, and the PNR leadership gradually began to distance itself from Calles. During the Rodríguez administration, the party recognized the degree to which it had abandoned the goals for which countless Mexicans had lost their lives. In 1933, the party adopted a progressive Six-Year Plan promising to bring greater benefits to campesinos and workers. At the same convention where the PNR delegates approved this plan, they also picked a presidential candidate for the period 1934–40: Calles's friend and protégé Lázaro Cárdenas del Río. Most Mexicans thought that this nomination represented business as usual, and few observers expected Cárdenas, who had always remained loyal to the Jefe Máximo, to break from the mold of his predecessors.

THE CÁRDENAS ERA AND BEYOND, 1934–1946

Cárdenas, however, was to prove far more independent than any one could have expected. Born in 1895 in the town of Jiquilpan, Michoacán, Cárdenas was part of a younger generation of revolutionaries, a generation dubbed the "cubs of the revolution." His cohort had come of age during the fiesta of bullets, but they had not served in leading roles during the 1910s. As mid-ranking officers, they had first-hand experiences with the rank and file of the revolution, and they knew why ordinary Mexicans had risked their lives during the fighting. Cárdenas' first significant political position came as governor of his native state from 1928 to 1932. Here he demonstrated that he differed in many ways from the Jefe Máximo. Cárdenas showed himself to be a good listener, making decisions only after soliciting input from all parties. He pursued an aggressive campaign for rural education, opening more than a hundred new schools in remote areas, and he also redistributed some land to campesinos.

Once installed in the presidency, Cárdenas demonstrated that he would direct a much more progressive administration than had his predecessors. He refused to live in Chapultepec Castle and remained in his house in nearby Los Pinos, a house that Calles had once occupied as a member of Obregón's cabinet. When Calles embarked on a six-month trip to Los Angeles to tend to his ailing health, Cárdenas seized the opportunity to build a power base of

his own. He supported the workers' right to strike, and within six months of his inauguration, hundreds of workers' organizations had taken advantage of this opportunity. In June 1935, Calles returned from Los Angeles and openly criticized the demonstrations, implying in a message printed in all Mexican newspapers that Cárdenas had lost control of the situation. The president responded by purging his cabinet of all Calles supporters, including the Jefe Máximo's own son, Rodolfo, moves that enjoyed the support of most of Congress. It had become evident that Calles' days at the helm of the revolution were over. On April 9, 1936, Cárdenas gave the Jefe Máximo the choice between prison and exile. His political career finished, Calles took up residence in San Diego.

In control of the revolutionary state and with the economic picture improving in the age of the New Deal in the United States, Cárdenas embarked on an ambitious reform program. He redistributed more than 49 million acres of land to campesinos, or more than twice as much as his revolutionary predecessors combined. His government awarded most of this land to campesinos as ejidos, or communal land, and it organized the campesinos in a new umbrella organization, the Consejo Nacional Campesino (CNC, or National Campesino Council). The ejido structure paid instant dividends in the form of a rapid increase in food production. Cárdenas also took steps to help labor. Under his leadership, the Marxist labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano created a new, nationwide labor movement, the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM, or Confederation of Mexican Workers). Unlike the CROM, which had safeguarded primarily the interests of local labor bosses and its own leader, Morones, the CTM had ideological focus, promising to improve workers' conditions along socialist lines. In many cases, the CTM platform anticipated the later social programs of the Mexican government in the post-World War II period, which featured measures such as subsidized food and housing and nationalization of large businesses. The most significant example of Cárdenas' support for labor came in the case of the foreign-owned oil companies, which had defied labor legislation for many years. Following the companies' refusal to heed a decision of the Mexican Supreme Court favorable to the oil workers, Cárdenas expropriated Standard Oil, Royal Dutch Shell, and fourteen other foreign-owned oil companies on March 18, 1938. This move came only a few weeks after Adolf Hitler's invasion of Austria, when the governments of Great Britain and the United States were more concerned about the Nazi threat than revolutionary nationalism in Mexico. He also took advantage of the friendship of U.S. ambassador Josephus Daniels, who steadfastly defended Mexico's right to make its own laws to his superi-

ors even as the oil companies and Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded harsh measures against the Cárdenas government. The expropriation found widespread acclaim among the lower and middle classes. For the first time, the Mexican government had seized ownership of an export product. The new national oil company—Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX)—was a source of national pride. Finally, Cárdenas became the only president in the Americas to lend assistance to the left-wing Spanish Republicans, locked in a civil war with the Fascist Falange of General Francisco Franco. After Franco's triumph, Cárdenas granted asylum to thousands of Republican refugees from Spain, especially intellectuals and other professionals. These refugees were not only stalwart supporters of Cárdenas, but they also set up Mexico's finest institution of higher learning in the humanities and social sciences, the Colegio de México.

The Cardenista system was a corporatist state in which the president played the role of arbiter of social conflict. Immediately after the oil expropriation, Cárdenas restructured the PNR along corporatist lines. So far, the ruling party had been a confederation of political leaders only. Now the party, renamed Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM, or Party of the Mexican Revolution), included the CNC and the CTM. The new party—and, by extension, President Cárdenas—mediated social conflicts, setting wages and workplace laws and adjudicating conflicts between employers and employees. While workers found many of their goals realized in official policy, they failed to gain the independence in collective bargaining that they wanted. The result of these policies was an increase in the standard of living for many Mexican workers and campesinos at the price of co-opting their organizations into the official party.

Yet the Cárdenas era was not a radical break from the past. Most of the workplace laws came from the Maximato, during which time the government had chosen to ignore the legislation it had approved. Cárdenas' populism also built on the work of his predecessors: the notion that the ruling party represented the revolution, the idea of the revolutionary family, and the rhetoric of economic nationalism. Finally, not all Cardenistas were social revolutionaries, and the president willingly entered into alliances with more conservative political leaders. In Sonora, for instance, Cárdenas had installed a conservative Catholic Mayo Indian in the governor's palace, for the primary reason that the new governor was an archenemy of former Jefe Máximo Calles. Similarly, in Baja California, Nuevo León, and Puebla, governors from wealthy entrepreneur families directed their states. Finally, Cárdenas turned away from reform during his last years in office. After the oil expropriation, the labor leader

Lombardo Toledano lost influence within the national government in favor of Finance Secretary Eduardo Suárez, who advocated capitalist development with safeguards for campesinos and workers. Thus, a significant aspect of the Cárdenas years was the growth of new, privately owned agricultural estates. In Baja California, for example, former president Rodríguez owned newly planted vineyards.

The rise of U.S. influence provided another example of the contradictions of the revolutionary decades in general and the Cárdenas years in particular. To be sure, the oil expropriation had eliminated one particular area of foreign influence in Mexico, and the government had also succeeded in limiting the privileges of foreign residents of Mexico, many of whom had long been able to count on the protection of their embassies in order to obtain preferential treatment by government authorities. In many ways, however, foreign—and particularly United States—influence increased during the 1920s and 1930s. By the end of the Cárdenas administration, foreign investment had actually increased since 1934, especially due to new investments in mining and tourism. In addition, investors discovered the country's growing consumer market as a new opportunity. Industrialization entered a new phase, as Ford Motor Co., Colgate-Palmolive, and many other foreign producers opened plants in Mexico. Even more important was the growth of U.S. cultural influence in an era defined by the coming of mass media, especially radio and motion pictures. Hollywood exported its films south of the border, and Mexicans built cinemas to view them. In turn, Mexico developed its own movie industry, which entered its golden age in the 1940s. Throughout the country, the infrastructural improvements of the preceding decades provided opportunities for the spread of U.S. culture at the same time that they allowed the building of a national one. Thus, consumer culture at last reached many Mexican villages.

The presidential elections of 1940 took place against this backdrop, accompanied by the rumblings of World War II from distant Asia and Europe. In the contest, three generals vied for power, each with a different power base. To Cárdenas' left, Francisco Múgica from Michoacán represented a commitment to ongoing social reform. To his right, Juan Andreu Almazán from Nuevo León enjoyed close ties to the Monterrey industrialists and considerable wealth of his own. Finally, Manuel Avila Camacho from Puebla appeared as the middle-of-the-road candidate. Of the three, Avila Camacho enjoyed the best connections in the form of his brother, Maximino, the strong man of Puebla and one of the wealthiest and most corrupt men in Mexico. On the other hand, Múgica and Almazán found themselves tainted by allegations of

cooperation with communists and fascists, respectively. Avila Camacho used his brother's cash as well as the notion that he represented the political center to his advantage and triumphed in the presidential elections.

The election emphasized the threats of World War II, in particular, that of Nazism and Fascism. Foreign observers were worried that Mexico would follow Spain's path into civil war, and they responded with palpable relief when the elections passed without violent incidents. The victorious Avila Camacho immediately portrayed himself as a moderate who would attempt to mend the political divisions of his country. Just a few days after his election, he proclaimed that he was "a believer" in Roman Catholicism in a clear break from his anticlerical predecessors. At a time when the Hitler-Stalin pact conjured up the specter of an alliance of the extreme right and left, he also made it clear that his sympathies lay with the Western Allies. Avila Camacho deposed Lombardo Toledano, the Marxist leader of the CTM labor union and a close friend of Cárdenas. The new labor leader, Fidel Velásquez, had no use for radical ideologies and advocated gradual improvement of wages and benefits. In response to these signs that the Mexican government was swinging back to the right, the U.S. government commenced negotiations that resulted in a settlement of the oil controversy and other pending matters.



This settlement, as well as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, paved the way for Mexican participation in World War II on the side of the Allies. The day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Avila Camacho severed diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Five months later, German submarines sank two Mexican tankers, and the president responded by declaring war on Germany, Italy, and Japan. In spontaneous demonstrations, many Mexicans manifested their support of their government, and in December 1942 Avila Camacho orchestrated a show of national unity, inviting six ex-presidents, including Calles and Cárdenas, to join him at a rally at the Zócalo in Mexico City. Unlike Brazil, Mexico did not send troops to Europe. However, a squadron still remembered by schoolchildren as Escuadrón 201 participated in the fighting in the Pacific theater, and tens of thousands of Mexican immigrants joined the U.S. army.

The war provided a great boost to the Mexican economy. U.S. demand for Mexican raw materials burgeoned, as did the prices for these commodities. The war provided a significant impetus for industrialization. Not only did German U-boat warfare cut Mexico and the rest of Latin America off from trade with Europe, but the United States focused its own industrial production on meeting the needs of the war. As a result, the early 1940s witnessed

the beginning of import-substitution industrialization (ISI), a state-sponsored effort to build industries that produced large amounts of manufactured items formerly imported from abroad. ISI would constitute the single most important economic development strategy over the next forty years.

Mexico's participation in World War II marked the end of the revolution. On January 18, 1946, the PRM reformed as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, or Institutional Revolutionary Party). The oxymoron was well chosen. The revolution had ended, but it remained alive in the official ideology of the party and its top representative, the president of Mexico. Thus the PRI could point to some real accomplishments of the revolution while deferring the numerous unfinished tasks into the future.

The name change of the party coincided with the passing of the torch to a new generation in the presidential elections of 1946. Carranza, Obregón, Calles, Portes Gil, Rodríguez, Cárdenas, and Avila Camacho had all earned their general's stripes in revolutionary warfare. The new president, Miguel Alemán Valdés, was a college graduate and the son of an army officer who had lost his life in the Escobar Rebellion of 1929. Alemán was just ten years old when Madero raised the specter of revolt against Porfirio Díaz in 1910. His election was uneventful, marking the beginning of a period of more than forty years in which the PRI would govern without a serious electoral challenge. For Alemán, the revolution would remain an official mantra, but the chasm between theory and practice—a familiar theme in Mexican history—became ever more obvious.



The ruins of ancient Chichen Itza. Unless otherwise noted, photographs are by Jürgen Buchenau.



Diego Rivera mural showing image of Tenochtitlán.

Opposite top: The Sun Pyramid of Teotihuacán.

Opposite bottom: The Aztec Sun Calendar in the Museo de Antropología.

