# What Were the Consequences of Decolonization?*

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August 11, 2018

**Abstract**

Considerable scholarship argues that most varieties of Western European colonial rule negatively affected many political and economic outcomes. Did these outcomes improve after colonial rule ended? Studying post-World War II independence cases, we statistically examine consequences of decolonization (both gaining independence and colonial autonomy) for democracy, internal conflict, government revenue growth, and economic growth using two-way fixed effects models. Democracy levels increased sharply during the internal autonomy period immediately before independence, providing a new finding about democratic gains during the "second wave." However, conflict, revenue growth, and economic growth did not systematically differ before and after independence. Accounting for varieties of colonial institutions or for endogenous independence timing produces similar results. Except for democratic gains, the overall findings—juxtaposed with existing research—suggest that decolonization exhibited less pronounced political consequences than the often deleterious long-term effects of colonial rule on institutions and social patterns.

**Keywords:** Colonialism, Civil war, Democracy, Economic development, Fiscal capacity, State capacity

*We thank Anderson Frey, Hein Goemans, Justin Nicholson, Tom Pepinsky, and Jan Pierskalla for helpful comments on previous drafts.

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Western European empires covered the globe for considerable portions of the 19th and 20th centuries. A vibrant political economy literature examines long-term effects of European colonialism by comparing post-colonial outcomes—often measured in recent decades—across countries with varied colonial experiences. Many examine effects of different colonial policies and institutions on economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005), democracy (Weiner, 1987; Mamdani, 1996; Lankina and Getachew, 2012; Owolabi, 2015; De Juan and Pierskalla, 2017; Lee and Paine, 2018*a*), internal warfare (Reid, 2012; Mukherjee, Forthcoming) and state capacity (Young, 1994; Herbst, 2014). These scholars generally conclude that most types of colonial institutions and policies negatively affected long-term outcomes.

Most of this research overlooks a major change between colonial rule and the present: gaining political independence. For the majority of colonies, this change occurred during a massive decolonization wave following World War II. Historians and policy organizations routinely emphasize the importance of decolonization. "The sheer scope of imperial collapse and new-state formation has no precedent in history ... Almost 40 percent of the world's population—2.2 billion people in the year 2000—inhabits states that made the transition from colonial to independent status between 1940 and 1980" (Abernethy, 2000, 133). The United Nations (n.d.) proudly proclaims, "The wave of decolonization, which changed the face of the planet ... represents the world body's first great success," and four of the 20 most influential political figures of the 20th century were decolonization leaders (TIME Magazine, 1999). Historians and political scientists comprehensively analyze *causes* of the post-World War II decolonization wave, including weakened European powers, the rise of superpowers opposed to European colonization, and increased mobilization ability among colonial subjects (Young, 1994).[1]

However, researchers devote less systematic attention to decolonization *consequences*. We lack systematic evidence about a basic question: did the decolonization wave from Western European empires between the 1940s and 1960s fundamentally change political and economic outcomes? Existing theories and historical accounts provide conflicting expectations that require concerted empirical assessment. Contemporary anti-colonial activists believed that independence would improve political freedom and economic development

[1]Strang (1991), Gartzke and Rohner (2011), Pepinsky (2015), and Paine (Forthcoming) provide quantitative evidence on causes of decolonization. Young (1970) and Abernethy (2000) provide comprehensive historical accounts of the events surrounding independence.

(Naoroji, 1901; Furnivall, 2014). Later scholars emphasize democratic reforms leading up to independence (Young, 1970), and how local actors controlled their own public goods investments after independence—which often produced beneficial outcomes in the colonial era when they occurred (Booth, 2007; Huillery, 2009; Donaldson, 2018).

By contrast, defenders of colonialism such as Lugard (1922) predicted that losing the European connection would produce institutionally weak and politically unstable independent states devoid of bureaucratic expertise and pacifying capacity. Furthermore, other scholars that do not sympathize with colonial rule highlight perverse incentives that post-colonial rulers faced given revenue shortfalls (Bates, 1981) and coup risks (Roessler, 2011).

Yet another perspective anticipates minimal differences before and after independence. Herbst (2014) stresses broader impediments to state-building in much of the non-European world that independence did not fundamentally alter. Gaining independence did not change post-colonial nations' dependent position in the international economy (Wallerstein, 2004) or in the broader international hierarchy of states (Lake, 2009), nor did independence fundamentally alter deeper institutions that affected prospects for economic development and democracy (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011; Lankina and Getachew, 2012).

This research note advances knowledge about the consequences of decolonization by examining variation *within* countries over time between the colonial and post-colonial eras. We examine four key outcomes: democracy, internal conflict, government revenue growth, and economic growth. We compiled a cross-national panel dataset of outcomes and European colonial status between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, the period during which formal Western European colonialism declined from its historical peak to virtual nonexistence. The statistical models account for confounding influences of heterogeneity across territories and of global historical changes by including both unit and year fixed effects. The main models implicitly assume that gaining independence exerted the same effect across colonial institutions, but additional models condition on varieties of colonial institutions studied in the existing literature: Africa and non-Africa, ex-British and non-British colonies, length of colonial rule, state antiquity, colonial European population size, and disrupted rule during World War II. Furthermore, despite inherent difficulties of addressing endogenous independence timing in an observational design, we also analyze subsets of colonies for which local considerations only minimally affect the timing of independence and of internal autonomy.

These include French Sub-Saharan countries pushed out of the French empire simultaneously in 1960, and "minor" colonies for which events in neighboring "major" colonies largely determined independence timing, measured by comparing the size of colonies' total population and European population. This setup provides an informative first-cut for learning about several key political and economic consequences of decolonization, given competing theoretical expectations for how decolonization affected these outcomes and minimal extant quantitative evidence.

The analysis yields two main findings. First, democracy levels increased sharply during the period of internal autonomy that preceded independence in most countries. Although the colonial era as a whole was authoritarian (Mamdani, 1996; Young, 1994), colonizers (especially Britain) promoted elections and democratic rule in their colonies immediately before granting independence. This provides, to our knowledge, a new finding about the timing of democratic gains. Scholars only recently have compiled democracy data that enable systematic comparisons involving the colonial era (Coppedge et al., 2018). This result provides insight into the timing of the "second wave" of democracy that followed World War II. The conclusion elaborates upon the importance of this finding and possible theoretical explanations.

Second, the main models and numerous robustness checks show that gaining independence does not systematically correlate with internal war, revenue growth, or economic growth. For fear that others could misinterpret these results, we add a strong disclaimer: our many null findings *do not* imply that colonial domination was inconsequential. Among the political and economic outcomes we examine, given data limitations and inherent impediments to inferring causal relationships, we only examine within-country comparisons after World War II. Specifically, we compare late colonial rule to post-colonial rule, which provides insight into some important questions about the consequences of ending colonial rule. However, we cannot compare colonial rule to *non*-colonial rule because we do not observe countries under a counterfactual world in which European colonization did not occur.[2] If the thrust of existing colonialism research is correct, then a natural interpretation of the present findings—although one we cannot directly verify—is that colonial rule in many countries altered social and institutional structures so fundamentally that simply eliminating the subordinate legal relationship to the metropole could not erase the deep (and, in many cases, negative)

[2]Appendix Section A.8 examines more suggestive comparisons between post-independence years and the "high" colonial era (1919 to 1945), finding that although this earlier colonial period exhibited greater peace than the post-independence period, it was also highly authoritarian and less fiscally effective.

impact of external rule. Colonialism often created or reinforced social structures that impeded political and economic progress, and fixed colonies into a dependent position in the world economy and hierarchy of states. The conclusion elaborates upon these takeaways and implications for broader international relations phenomena.

# 1 Consequences of Gaining Independence: Existing Arguments

Despite considerable historical research on *causes* of the post-World War II decolonization wave, existing arguments about decolonization *consequences* provide divergent expectations: negative, positive, or null decolonization effects. This highlights the need for empirical tests that evaluate these various accounts.

## 1.1 Democracy

Almost axiomatically, European colonial rule inhibited democratic representation. Besides several self-governing settler colonies, European rulers lacked political accountability to the colonial population (Mamdani, 1996; Furnivall, 2014). Responding to low popular support for colonial policies, colonizers often created despotic local leaders (Mamdani, 1996) and relied heavily on coercion (Young, 1994).

But these general observations do not preclude the possibility that democracy levels increased leading up to independence, as some research indicates. European colonizers expanded political representation for natives, and Britain in particular prioritized "honourable exit" from its colonies by promoting democracy (Young, 1970, 482). For example, in India, Britain began introducing elections at increasingly higher levels of government between the 1920s and 1930s, partly reacting to local demands. This required developing political parties, such as the Indian National Congress, to contest elections. France also introduced electoral reforms in its Sub-Saharan African colonies after World War II, culminating with full legal suffrage in 1956. If these arguments are correct and these examples generalize, then the late decolonization period should produce democratic gains. After independence, perhaps post-colonial actors sustained representative gains by eliminating alien rule, although post-independent nations also faced difficulties sustaining foreign-imposed electoral institutions absent fundamental changes in deeper institutions and in social structure (Lee and Paine, 2018*a*).

However, perhaps attempts to expand rights in the late colonial era did not matter. Recent scholarship on colonial causes of post-independence democracy focuses mostly on factors rooted deeper in the colonial period such as British legal institutions (Weiner, 1987), Protestant missionaries (Woodberry, 2012; Lankina and Getachew, 2012), and colonial-era European settlers (Hariri, 2012; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011). These arguments anticipate minimal change in democracy levels near independence because the deeper cultural and political institutions predicting democracy—such as common law tradition and higher literacy rates from Protestant missionaries—would change little.

## 1.2 Economic Growth

The literature agrees that variation in colonial policies exerted important long-term consequences for economic growth. Many common colonial institutions should reduce economic production by weakening property rights and by increasing inequality, including forced labor institutions (Dell, 2010), institutions regulating land tenure (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005), and "extractive" institutions generally (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Conversely, scholars show that areas with common law legal systems (La Porta et al., 1998) and participatory institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011) exhibit stronger property rights protection and faster economic growth.

However, by focusing solely on long-term persistence, these accounts do not yield clear implications for decolonization consequences. If colonial institutions were rooted deeply enough, then perhaps decolonization would not change outcomes. This perspective mirrors dependency theories. Authors such as Wallerstein (2004) allege that colonial rule imposed harm, but do not expect deleterious effects to fade away at independence because ex-colonies constitute a peripheral role in a global economy dominated by first world countries, a perspective that research on hierarchy in international relations implicitly echoes (Lake, 2009, 39).

Alternatively, shifting power to local rulers could positively affect growth despite minimally altering institutions. When they occurred, colonial economic investments often bolstered development (Booth, 2007; Huillery, 2009; Donaldson, 2018), but colonial governments suspicious of mass literacy often underinvested in human capital and related public goods (Chaudhary, 2010). Therefore, simply pursuing policies more favorable toward the local economy may enable higher economic growth.

But, conversely, removing development benefits of external rule at the end of colonialism could negatively affect economic growth. For example, Ferguson (2012) argues that "the British empire acted as an agency for imposing free markets, the rule of law, investor protection and relatively incorrupt government." This view alleges that independence undermined the state as a neutral arbiter, as post-colonial rulers often favor co-ethnics in public good provision despite causing economic distortions (Bates, 1981). Independence would also reduce protection for foreign investors—no longer investing in their own currency or under their own political and legal system—and perhaps cause capital and expertise outflows.

### 1.3 Government Revenue

Herbst's (2014) influential scholarship on governance in Africa associates colonial rule with weak states. Colonizers faced few incentives to invest in public goods or to collect difficult-to-obtain tax revenues. Instead, they usually constructed bureaucratically minimal states that sought enough revenue intake simply to balance the budget, and local elites provided many core functions (Mamdani, 1996; Gardner, 2012). Conversely, indigenously ruled parts of empires, such as princely states in India, tended to accrue larger tax revenues (Iyer, 2010). After independence, positive demand-side consequences of decolonization caused by broader political participation provided rulers with greater need to provide goods like education. However, perhaps the expertise of European empires with lengthy histories of bureaucratic government (Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002)—i.e., a negative institutional supply-side decolonization effect—combined with the raw coercive power of *bula mutari* (Young, 1994) more effectively raised revenue.

Alternatively, decolonization may have minimally affected fiscal capacity. Despite highlighting many shortcomings of colonial rule, Herbst (2014) and Mamdani (1996) consider the colonial and post-colonial periods in Africa as two episodes in a region in which deeper structural factors impede projecting political power. This suggests that low fiscal capacity should persist after independence, which statistical evidence from Africa supports (Thies, 2009). Similarly, Chaudhary (2013) notes, "By underinvesting . . . colonial rule did constrain the development of primary education in India. But, this does not imply India would have enjoyed better outcomes as an independent state."

### 1.4 Conflict

Although many emphasize that establishing colonial rule caused social disruption and violence (Wimmer and Min, 2006), once consolidated, colonial rule did not necessarily exhibit heightened conflict levels. On the one hand, contemporary Europeans characterized colonial governments as disinterested yet militarily strong regimes that eliminated endemic local violence, such as conflicts during Africa's 19th-century military revolution (Reid, 2012). In these accounts, colonial militaries' superior ability to maintain internal peace engendered a *Pax Colonia*, perhaps because European militaries exhibited superior force capabilities or because European generals' staunch loyalty eliminated coup fears. By contrast, in the post-colonial world, rulers fearful of insider takeover often exclude rival ethnic groups from government—increasing civil war likelihood (Roessler, 2011).

On the other hand, colonial rule also created conflict-inducing conditions such as light European presence on the ground, unpopularity of foreign rule, and coercion-intensive policies. After World War II, enhanced mobilization ability by subject populations (Young, 1970) exacerbated these vulnerabilities. Regarding decolonization, although European powers usually expanded political rights and then granted independence to avoid facing armed rebel groups,[3] power vacuums created by transitioning state authority could trigger war before or shortly after independence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Combining these conflict-enhancing and conflict-suppressing effects also yields the possibility of net null consequences from gaining independence.

## 2 Data and Models

Theoretical ambiguity in existing research highlights the need to systematically evaluate the relationship between decolonization and important outcomes, examining both aggregated and disaggregated patterns. This section describes the main variables and models, and Appendix Table A.1 provides summary statistics. The appendix also provides numerous robustness checks that Table 1 summarizes.

[3]European settler-dominated states that faced strong incentives to hold on provided the main exceptions (Paine, Forthcoming).

## 2.1 Sample

The unit of analysis is territory-years, including years under colonization and after independence. The main results compare independent years to post-World War II colonialism. By only analyzing countries that gained independence from Western European colonial rule between 1945 and 1989, we observe outcomes both before and after independence for every territory in the sample (which models with unit fixed effects require). The panel includes annual data between 1941 and 1989. The starting year allows five years before independence for the earliest independence countries in our sample. We are agnostic regarding when any systematic effects should emerge, which motivates evaluating all outcomes along the same time horizon.

## 2.2 Dependent Variables

V-Dem's electoral democracy index measures democracy level (Coppedge et al., 2018). Unlike other commonly used democracy measures, V-Dem extensively covers territories even under colonial rule. We coded "internal war" onset by combining Correlates of War's intra-state and extra-state war data (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010), and use additional sources for smaller territories. The onset variable equals 1 in the first year of a war and 0 in all subsequent years, and these models also include lagged war incidence. Most extra-state wars involve a colony fighting against a European power, and we matched these wars to the colony where fighting occurred. We measure government revenue growth using growth in logged per capita central government revenue in ounces of gold, taken from Mitchell (1998) and converted to gold by Lee and Paine (2018*b*), who omit territory-years with inconvertible currencies. Maddison (2008) provides data for computing growth in logged income per capita, which exhibits broad global coverage starting in 1950 and scattered coverage before that. Correspondingly, the income growth regressions begin in 1951, as opposed to 1941 for the other dependent variables.

Democracy and income exhibit broad coverage: 66 and 62 countries, respectively, in the main regression table (Table 2). Despite available internal war data for every territory, these regressions exhibit smaller sample sizes (31 countries) because logit models with unit fixed effects drop territories that experienced no conflicts during the sample time period. The revenue variable covers fewer countries (37 countries). However, the previously unused data source that provides the basis for our revenues variable still improves

considerably over existing datasets with poor spatial and/or temporal coverage before 1970, when the widely used International Monetary Fund's (2017) dataset begins.[4]

Appendix Tables A.2 through A.5 present the average value of each dependent variable by territory during the non-autonomous colonial, colonial autonomy, and post-independent periods. These tables therefore also list the sample for each dependent variable.

### 2.3 Independence and Autonomous Colonial Rule

Political independence occurred when the European colonizer granted complete formal sovereignty to a local government, including full control over domestic and foreign policy, and Gleditsch and Ward (1999) provide independence year. In many colonies, formal independence culminated a gradual decolonization process. Prior to granting complete independence, the metropole often delegated control over internal affairs to local leaders (elected or not) while the colonial power dictated foreign and defense policy. Colonial autonomy is theoretically relevant for understanding decolonization consequences because local actors' control over taxation and economic policy could produce divergent outcomes from regular colonial rule, and scholars such as Young (1970) suggest that colonial policies toward popular participation changed fundamentally in the terminal colonial period. In most cases, actors anticipated eventual independence, but usually could not predict its exact timing at the onset of colonial autonomy. In colonies such as Bhutan, subjects enjoyed autonomy throughout the colonial period without concrete plans for independence until after World War II. In French Sub-Saharan Africa, internal autonomy began in 1958 knowing that independence would likely occur at some point, but neither French nor African leaders anticipated France liquidating its empire in 1960. For other colonies, such as Gold Coast/Ghana between 1954 and 1957, colonial autonomy represented a transitional phase with concrete plans for independence.

We capture this important historical consideration by coding an indicator variable for years of colonial autonomy, the first quantitative data we are aware of on this topic.[5] In autonomous colonies, the colony-level government recruited residents from the colony and fully controlled internal affairs. In most cases, the

[4]Lee and Paine (2018*b*) detail challenges involved with converting Mitchell's (1998) source information into data points that facilitate comparison across territories and time.

[5]Our coding sources include Brownlie and Burns (1979), Page and Sonnenburg (2003), and *Encyclopedia Britannica* articles.

metropole retained emergency powers and controlled defense and foreign affairs. By contrast, arrangements that delegated control only to local governments or only to particular policy areas (e.g., education but not the police) do not meet the autonomy criterion. The specific constitutional terminology for colonial autonomy varied across empires: British dominions and self-governing colonies, non-independent states within the French community, and U.S. commonwealths. Elsewhere, although many protectorates and trusteeship arrangements exhibited some degree of autonomy, only territories in which the colonial power played no domestic role meet the autonomy criteria.

### 2.4 Statistical Models

Various possible confounders complicate identifying decolonization effects. Cross-country differences related to the different outcomes could affect independence timing. Each model addresses this issue by including territory fixed effects. Furthermore, secular trends in the outcomes imply that changes in the international environment and other time effects may confound identifying decolonization effects, which we address by including year fixed effects in almost every model. Section 5 details policy choices that affected the decolonization process and addresses concerns about country-specific time trends affecting countries' independence year.

Every model contains a post-independence indicator, lagged one year. For the three continuous outcome variables, we estimate linear models with a lagged dependent variable (Beck and Katz, 2011), and for internal war onset we estimate logit models with lagged internal war incidence, peace years, and cubic splines (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998; McGrath, 2015). The equation is:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta \cdot Independent_{i,t-1} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{i,t}$ is the outcome variable, $\beta$ is coefficient estimate for independent governance, $\gamma_i$ is a vector of territory fixed effects, and $\delta_t$ is a vector of year fixed effects. Some models add a colonial autonomy indicator to assess effects of internal self-rule (as distinct from full independence):

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \cdot Independent_{i,t-1} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \tag{2}$$

which leaves colonized years without internal autonomy as the omitted basis category. Later, we add interactions for various colonial institutions to the models. Every model clusters standard errors by territory.

Finally, we assessed our dependent variables for non-stationarity by running a series of unreported Fisher-type unit-root tests based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. For each dependent variable, we calculated residuals from auxiliary regressions that include the unit and year fixed effects, and for all four residualized variables these tests reject at the 1% significance level the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots.

### 2.5 Robustness Checks

Table 1 lists every robustness check for Table 2 discussed only in the appendix.

**Table 1: Additional Appendix Robustness Checks for Table 2**

| *Alternative Time Periods and Measures* | |
|---|---|
| **Table** | **Description** |
| A.6 | Truncates the time sample to 10 years before and 10 years after independence |
| A.7 | Expands the time sample back to 1919 |
| A.8 | Disaggregates the last five years of colonial rule and first five years of independence |
| A.9 | Uses available alternative measures for the dependent variables |
| A.10 | Uses an independence indicator lagged by 10 years |
| A.25 | Compares post-independence years to the high colonial period (1919–1945) |
| *Alternative Specifications for Statistical Models* | |
| **Table** | **Description** |
| A.11 | Uses the other dependent variables as control variables |
| A.12 | Controls for percentage of independent neighboring countries |
| A.13 | Includes second-order lags for the dependent and explanatory variables |
| A.14 | Aggregates within-treatment time units to address concerns about biased standard error estimates with serially correlated data |
| A.15 | Uses a weighted fixed effects estimator to eliminate possible bias from heterogeneous treatment effects in two-way fixed effects models |

## 3 Main Patterns

The main findings are that colonial autonomy covaries with large and robust democratic gains, but all other relationships between the decolonization indicators and outcomes are null. Figure 1 depicts democracy levels, internal war onset, and growth for revenue and income. The figure maintains a constant basket of countries by including the first decade before and the first decade after independence, and Appendix Figure

A.1 shows trends in democracy and in conflict for the 80-year window around independence, although the regression models include all available data. The panels present local polynomial regressions with 95% confidence intervals and demonstrate heterogeneous patterns. Most striking, democracy levels increased dramatically in the few years before independence before stabilizing and slightly declining after independence. In the first full year of independence, average democracy scores are 89% higher than five years before, but drop by 15% in the decade following independence. Albeit less pronounced, internal warfare onset and revenue growth both increase prior to independence before dropping afterwards, and income growth exhibits the opposite pattern: dropping before independence before rising afterwards.

**Figure 1: Outcomes Before and After Independence**




*Notes*: Figure 1 plots a local polynomial function and 95% confidence interval for each outcome in the decades preceding and following independence.

Table 2 presents the main regression estimates. Panel A provides initial insight into the differences between pre- and post-independence by estimating Equation 1. Despite null correlations between the independence indicator and each outcome, the models are fairly tightly estimated. The estimated standard errors for independence are small relative to the standard deviation of the outcome variable: 3% for democracy, 8%

for conflict, 13% for revenue growth, and 10% for income growth. Unreported models that do not cluster the standard error estimates—therefore assuming independence among the hundreds or thousands of observations in each specification—produce qualitatively similar results, further suggesting that low statistical power does not drive the null correlations.

**Table 2: Decolonization Consequences: Panel Data from 1941 to 1989**

| | **Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.00327 | -0.0438 | 0.0245 | 0.00441 |
| | (0.00471) | (0.640) | (0.0400) | (0.00602) |
| Democracy level$_{t-1}$ | 0.928*** | | | |
| | (0.0177) | | | |
| Internal war incidence$_{t-1}$ | | -1.534** | | |
| | | (0.775) | | |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | -0.0885 | |
| | | | (0.0590) | |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | | 0.106* |
| | | | | (0.0541) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 1,023 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.962 | | 0.371 | 0.116 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Peace years and cubic splines | NO | YES | NO | NO |
| | **Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule** | | | |
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0151*** | -2.104* | 0.0509 | 0.00997 |
| | (0.00481) | (1.159) | (0.0446) | (0.00702) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00303 | -0.590 | 0.0410 | 0.00814 |
| | (0.00555) | (0.703) | (0.0464) | (0.00633) |
| Democracy level$_{t-1}$ | 0.919*** | | | |
| | (0.0190) | | | |
| Internal war incidence$_{t-1}$ | | -1.606** | | |
| | | (0.806) | | |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | -0.0889 | |
| | | | (0.0600) | |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | | 0.106* |
| | | | | (0.0541) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 1,023 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.962 | | 0.372 | 0.117 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Peace years and cubic splines | NO | YES | NO | NO |

*Notes*: Panel A of Table 2 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

The figures and some theories suggest that disaggregating the immediate pre-independence period may produce additional insights. Panel B of Table 2 estimates Equation 2, which distinguishes autonomous colonial rule from other colonial years. The main finding shows that autonomous rule exhibited considerable democratic gains. The estimated long-run effect of the gains during this period relative to the rest of the colonial

era equals 0.19.[6] This estimate exceeds mean democracy level in the sample in 1945 by 1.4 standard deviations, and slightly exceeds differences in democracy levels between Jamaica and Ghana in 1970. Appendix Table A.16 demonstrates robustness to alternative democracy measures by showing that all 10 of V-Dem's aggregate democracy indices besides the electoral democracy index yield similar results as Table 2.

Two potential confounding concerns seem unlikely to drive this finding. First, is democracy linked by definition to decolonization? Although it may seem axiomatic that decolonization should coincide with electoral reforms, this was a historically contingent aspect of post-World War II Western European decolonization. Referencing earlier decolonization periods, Spain did not create meaningful representative electoral institutions within its American colonies in the early 19th century, and South Africa retained a very restrictive franchise at independence in 1910. Nor did the Soviet Union promote electoral representation in its constituent states before dissolving in 1991. Furthermore, if native rule inevitably increases democracy scores, then democratic gains should persist after independence—contrary to the null post-independence findings in Model 5.

Appendix Table A.17 demonstrates that the terminal colonial period in our sample associates with broad democratic gains by disaggregating the V-Dem electoral democracy index into its five subcomponents: freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage. The last five colonial years positively and significantly associate with all five measures, and colonial autonomy does for three of the five. The findings provide supportive evidence that decolonization enabled important contestation reforms (freedom of expression, clean elections, freedom of association), although participation aspects of democracy (elected officials, suffrage) generate the largest estimates. However, compared to other decolonization episodes, even this seemingly limited achievement merits note.

Second, did democratic gains result simply from global trends toward increased democratization during the mid-20th century? The changed international climate following World War II—in particular the anti-colonial attitude of the new global superpower (the United States) and growing intellectual distaste for colonialism among first world elites (Young, 1970; Strang, 1991)—influenced imperial powers' decisions to deepen colonial self-rule. However, including year fixed effects in the model ensures that such global trends do not drive the findings. Furthermore, although global trends contributed to decolonization and to

[6]The long-run effect equals the coefficient estimate for independence divided by 1 minus the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable: $\frac{\hat{\beta}}{1-\hat{\alpha}}$.

the broader "second wave" of democratization, this observation does not preclude decolonization itself from affecting democratization. Instead, colonial powers' decolonization decisions provide a plausible *mechanism* through which global trends altered local institutions across the world. Nor did global pressure suffice for democratization, as colonial powers such as Portugal that attempted to perpetuate colonial rule thwarted decolonization and electoral reforms. Existing work on second wave democratization that emphasizes the importance of decolonization supports this argument (Huntington, 1993, 40).

Model 6 in Table 2 also demonstrates a statistically significant negative relationship between colonial autonomy and internal war onset. Unfortunately, we do not believe that any research design would permit interpreting this estimate as causal. Decolonization-related wars undermined the possibility of granting autonomous non-European control over domestic affairs. Instead, these wars either spurred counterinsurgency campaigns by the colonizer, or yielded independence. Furthermore, our subsample below of "exogenous" autonomy cases demonstrates a null relationship between autonomy and internal wars.

# 4 Varieties of Colonialism

Does a subset of colonies drive the findings? Colonial rule varied in many ways across territories that may alter the relationship between gaining independence and the outcome variables, and much existing colonialism research assesses effects of heterogeneous colonial institutions. We analyze six widely debated varieties of colonialism that plausibly conditioned decolonization effects. However, adding interaction terms to the core regression models demonstrate similar findings across most varieties of colonial institutions, with two theoretically relevant exceptions: ex-British colonies exhibited greater democratic gains during colonial autonomy than non-British colonies, and countries with disrupted rule during World War II did not exhibit democratic gains during colonial autonomy. Appendix Section A.5 describes the data.

***Sub-Saharan Africa indicator.*** Many important contributions in the colonialism literature focus mainly on Sub-Saharan Africa (Herbst, 2014; Young, 1994; Mamdani, 1996). Most Sub-Saharan African countries were colonized relatively late and experienced indirect rule. Low population density, few navigable rivers, and tsetse fly prevalence in much of the continent pose stark development challenges that could engender distinct decolonization effects.

***British colonial rule indicator.*** Many analyze how British colonialism affected all four outcomes: democracy (Weiner, 1987; Lee and Paine, 2018*a*), development (Lee and Schultz, 2012), internal warfare (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2016; Paine, 2018), and revenue collection (Gardner, 2012). Distinct attributes of British colonialism include indirect rule through local leaders, and following a more coherent policy than other European powers during post-World War II decolonization.

***Length of colonial rule.*** The amount of time for which Western Europe ruled a territory could also condition the effect of gaining independence (Olsson, 2009). Often, metropolitan centers more directly governed longer-ruled territories and considered them integral to the country. The longest-ruled colonies in the present sample also began colonial rule during a mercantilist global era, which could affect long-term development and democracy trajectories.

***State antiquity index.*** Scholars link pre-colonial political development to economic development (Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002), democracy (Hariri, 2012), and internal warfare (Paine, 2018). Territories with pre-colonial states also provided extant bureaucratic infrastructure through which colonizers could implement indirect rule, and perhaps facilitated organizing for anti-colonial rebellions.

***Colonial European population share.*** Many analyze European settlers and development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001), democracy (Hariri, 2012), and internal warfare (Paine, Forthcoming). Settler colonies often gained greater degrees of self-governance and democratic representation for Europeans, which created frictions between Europeans and non-Europeans leading up to independence and/or majority rule.

***Disrupted colonial rule during WWII indicator.*** The strength of the independence movement could also affect the post-colonial state. Tensions created by European settlers affected the organization of decolonization movements, and therefore serves as one proxy for this concept. Axis powers' disrupted colonial rule during World War II also impacted decolonization movements. Japan occupied European colonies in Asia, and Germany invaded several colonies in Africa, before the original European colonizer attempted to regain control in 1945. Lawrence (2013) argues that disruptions in colonial rule created space for nationalist organization during the war and spurred post-World War II nationalist protests.

***Results.*** Appendix Tables A.18 through A.23 re-run Equation 2 using a series of models with interaction terms corresponding to these conditioning factors (see Appendix Equation A.3). Similar to Table 2, most

subsets of colonies exhibit null correlations with internal wars, revenue growth, and economic growth. Most subsets also exhibited statistically significant democratic gains during the terminal colonial period. The interaction between the conditioning factor and colonial autonomy achieves statistical significance in the democracy regression in only two of the six tables: British colonialism and disrupted rule during World War II. The coefficient estimates from Table A.19 show that the long-term multiplier for the estimated effect of colonial autonomy on democracy is 2.8 times larger among British than among non-British colonies, and the p-value between colonial autonomy and democracy in the latter subsample equals 0.119. Although this estimate indicates reasonable confidence that non-British colonies also exhibited democratic gains under autonomy, the larger British coefficient estimate supports arguments that Britain more coherently promoted electoral competition before independence (Young, 1970; Lee and Paine, 2018*a*).

Additionally, colonial autonomy and democracy do not systematically relate among countries with disrupted rule during World War II (Appendix Table A.23). In cases such as Vietnam and Indonesia, the colonizer faced difficulties regaining control after the war, and the subsequent chaos—and in some cases mass violence—implied that decolonization more closely resembled an exercise in surrendering than in constitutional negotiation, which the null coefficient estimate among guerrilla regimes in Appendix Table A.24 further substantiates. Overall, the findings from Tables A.18 through A.23 show that pooling together colonies indeed reveal meaningful trends, despite some exceptions that correspond with existing theories.

Although these tables primarily assess whether different institutions exhibited distinct decolonization effects, showing that the relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy holds across various colonial institutions also addresses confounding concerns. The disaggregated results show that no particular subsample that might exhibit particularly acute confounding concerns determines the aggregate finding.

# 5 Endogenous Independence Timing

Political processes consisting of concerted policy choices determined the timing of decolonization and achieving independence. Studying such "treatment" effects poses notorious difficulties because omitted factors that may independently affect the outcomes also influenced these policy choices.[7] All the models

[7]However, some authors minimize the importance of internal factors in decolonization decisions relative to external ones (e.g., Strang, 1991).

thus far address these concerns by controlling for unit and year fixed effects, but concerns linger about time-varying country-specific factors that correlate with both independence timing and political outcomes. Colonizers could—and often did—calibrate independence timing to colonies' economic and political development levels, or to military and political pressure within the colony. Table 3 presents additional results that drop colonies for which we are most concerned about endogenous independence timing, showing mostly similar findings when only analyzing "exogenous" independence cases. Appendix Section A.6 lists the countries included in these samples, and Appendix Section A.7 addresses countries that gained independence via guerrilla movements.

We identify two sets of colonies in which internal events within the colonies did not strongly affect the timing of internal autonomy and of independence. France, like all European powers, emerged from World War II in a weaker structural position to maintain colonial rule and faced better-organized populations that rejected colonial rule, most importantly in Vietnam and Algeria. It therefore began implementing political reforms in most colonies throughout the 1940s and 1950s, including mostly uniform electoral reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa (except Djibouti and smaller islands). This process sped up in the mid-1950s in the face of repeated setbacks in Vietnam and Algeria that not only forced France to rethink its colonial policies, but also fundamentally destabilized France's Fourth Republic. In 1958, France granted internal autonomy to 14 Sub-Saharan African colonies that voted to remain within the French empire (only Guinea voted for secession). Continued destabilization of French domestic politics engendered its decision to grant independence to these 14 colonies in 1960—i.e., independent of colony-specific considerations such as levels of economic development or other indicators of independence "readiness." Indeed, all voted to remain as colonies less than two years prior.

The second set of "exogenous" decolonization cases includes colonies situated nearby larger colonies governed by the same European power. "Minor" colonies usually gained independence (and, before independence, autonomy) because the colonizer reacted to events in the "major" colony, rather than to minor colonies' local conditions. For example, internal politics within Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe caused the Central African Federation to break up, and Zambia's and Malawi's resulting independence. Similarly, Britain faced severe geographical impediments to retaining Bhutan after withdrawing from India in 1947. If a colony's population (either total or European) equaled less than half that of another colony in the same geographic region colonized by the same European power, then we code it as minor.

## Table 3: "Exogenous" Independence Colonies

| | **Panel A. Pooled sample** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0250** | -0.438 | 0.0843 | 0.00912 |
| | (0.00916) | (0.941) | (0.0802) | (0.00760) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.00593 | -0.434 | 0.0359 | 0.0119 |
| | (0.00662) | (1.060) | (0.0583) | (0.00728) |
| Democracy level$_{t-1}$ | 0.953*** | | | |
| | (0.0182) | | | |
| Internal war incidence$_{t-1}$ | | 0.237 | | |
| | | (1.330) | | |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.172 | |
| | | | (0.0991) | |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | | 0.0395 |
| | | | | (0.0467) |
| Territory-years | 1,442 | 539 | 228 | 1,104 |
| R-squared | 0.960 | | 0.067 | 0.071 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Time trend | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Peace years and cubic splines | NO | YES | NO | NO |
| | **Panel B. French African colonies with 1960 independence** | | | |
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0143** | | 0.0557 | 0.00666 |
| | (0.00628) | | (0.0414) | (0.00529) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.0122** | -2.329 | 0.0485 | 0.0108 |
| | (0.00527) | (1.430) | (0.0524) | (0.00883) |
| Democracy level$_{t-1}$ | 0.939*** | | | |
| | (0.0119) | | | |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.321** | |
| | | | (0.0956) | |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | | 0.102 |
| | | | | (0.0613) |
| Territory-years | 658 | 127 | 120 | 532 |
| R-squared | 0.931 | | 0.146 | 0.070 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Time trend | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Peace years and cubic splines | NO | YES | NO | NO |
| | **Panel C. Minor colonies** | | | |
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0366** | -0.160 | 0.125 | 0.00732 |
| | (0.0169) | (0.997) | (0.181) | (0.0183) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 1.14e-05 | -0.294 | -0.0590 | 0.0141 |
| | (0.0104) | (1.183) | (0.0923) | (0.0117) |
| Democracy level$_{t-1}$ | 0.953*** | | | |
| | (0.0236) | | | |
| Internal war incidence$_{t-1}$ | | 0.393 | | |
| | | (1.582) | | |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.0191 | |
| | | | (0.181) | |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | | -0.0250 |
| | | | | (0.0617) |
| Territory-years | 784 | 392 | 108 | 572 |
| R-squared | 0.966 | | 0.038 | 0.066 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Time trend | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Peace years and cubic splines | NO | YES | NO | NO |

*Notes*: Every panel of Table 3 estimates Equation 2 on a restricted sample consisting of either French Sub-Saharan African countries that gained independence in 1960 (Panel B), minor colonies (Panel C), or both (Panel A). Every model contains territory fixed effects, a time trend variable that counts the number of years since 1941, and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The model in Column 2 of Panel B does not estimate a coefficient for colonial autonomy because no new wars began during those years in the French Sub-Saharan Africa sample, and separation drops the lagged war incidence. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Whether pooling both sets of colonies (Panel A of Table 3) or analyzing them separately (Panels B and C), the findings largely resemble those in Table 2. A time trend variable that counts the number of years since 1941 replaces the year fixed effects because of small sample sizes and because every colony in Panel B gained independence in the same year (however, unreported results with year fixed effects are similar). The colonial autonomy period exhibits more robust democratic gains than the colonial period, whereas the other outcomes do not systematically differ before and after decolonization.

## 6 Conclusion and Broader Implications

This research note provides new insights into the consequences of decolonization by examining four key political and economic outcomes in a panel design. Most directly, our findings inform the political and economic consequences of decolonization from Western Europe rule after World War II. The pattern of democratic improvement in the terminal colonial period provides, to our knowledge, a new finding about the timing of democratic gains, as only recently have scholars compiled democracy data that enable systematic comparisons involving the colonial era (Coppedge et al., 2018). This result provides insight into the timing of the "second democratic wave" after World War II. Following existing research, the most likely theoretical explanation for this pattern is that most colonizers reacted to changing international trends by pushing to expand political representation in their colonies, which produced meaningful gains in electoral competition—especially in the British empire (Young, 1970). However, because foreign powers imposed these elections at the end of the colonial period, post-independent actors faced difficulties consolidating and sustaining these gains (Lee and Paine, 2018*a*)—explaining null effects after independence. This finding also differs from existing quantitative research on colonialism and democracy. This literature focuses mainly on deeper institutional and cultural factors stemming from Protestant missionaries, European settlers, and British legal tradition rather than on policy shifts in the immediate pre-independence period.

Additionally, null results for the other outcomes contrast with arguments that ending colonial rule would either solve the problems caused by colonialism or trigger chaos, but support arguments that stress continuities between colonial and post-colonial rule (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2014), and that discount the importance of "flag independence" by itself (Smith and Jeppesen, 2017). For most countries, gaining independence did not fundamentally alter ex-imperial powers' dominant role relative to their dependent ex-colonies (Wallerstein,

2004; Lake, 2009). However, this does not imply that colonial domination and decolonization were inconsequential. We can only compare colonial rule to post-colonial rule, as opposed to non-colonial rule, and therefore cannot assess a counterfactual in which Europe did not conquer the world. Furthermore, Appendix Section A.8 demonstrates some systematic differences between post-independence and the "high" colonial era (1919 to 1945), although these results are more speculative than findings premised on post-1945 colonial rule because we cannot control for time-varying sources of heterogeneity.

These findings also contribute to broader international relations research. The colonial era provides a useful large-N laboratory for understanding consequences of external rule beyond the European colonial project, which relates to recent policy debates over the efficacy or desirability of "statebuilding" (Krasner, 2004) or "neotrusteeship" (Fearon and Laitin, 2004) by rich countries in failed states. However, instances of foreign rule such as U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq also differ considerably from European colonialism by operating in a quite different international environment, over a shorter time frame, and with a larger role for indigenous elites. Scholars must account for these differences in future research when potentially analyzing, for example, whether gaining independence from other empires exhibits similar patterns as demonstrated here.

Finally, the results inform debates about conceptualizing world politics in terms of hierarchy rather than anarchy (Lake, 2009) and about historical institutional approaches to international relations (Fioretos, 2011). In traditional international relations research, as McConaughey, Musgrave and Nexon (Forthcoming) discuss, scholars scrutinize territorial units as objects of analysis only after gaining independence. This approach implicitly assumes that gaining juridical sovereignty entails a critical juncture from previous institutional arrangements. Our approach unpacks this assumption by explicitly comparing countries before and after independence. Changing the formal relationship with the metropole correlates with democratic gains, but ex-colonies' continued status as lower entities in the international hierarchy of states may help to explain persistent problems with promoting economic growth and fiscal development. Therefore, by entrenching a dependent relationship, European *colonization* of the world likely constituted a more fundamental critical juncture than *decolonization*.

An appendix, code that recreates every table and figure, and the data files are available at `https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jackpaine` and at the International Studies Quarterly data archive.

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# Online Appendix

## A.1 Additional Data Summary

**Table A.1: Summary Statistics**

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Territory-Years |
|---|---|---|---|
| V-Dem electoral democracy index | 0.201 | 0.171 | 3116 |
| Internal war onset | 0.018 | 0.134 | 3234 |
| ln(Revenues/pop.) growth | 0.098 | 0.297 | 830 |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth | 0.015 | 0.062 | 2365 |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.596 | 0.491 | 3234 |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.080 | 0.271 | 3234 |

**Figure A.1: Political Outcomes Within 40 Years of Independence**




*Notes*: Figure 1 plots a local polynomial function and 95% confidence interval for democracy and for internal war onset in the four decades preceding and following independence, starting in 1919. Panel A includes 55 countries, excluding 11 countries with at least a decade of missing democracy data. Panel B contains all 66 countries in the core sample, with no missing data.

For each dependent variable, the columns in Tables A.2 through A.5 present (1) for each country (2) the average value of the variable during non-autonomous colonial years, (3) the average value during colonial autonomy years, (4) the average value during post-independence years, (5) the difference in average values between colonial autonomy years and other colonial years (parentheses present rank among all countries), and (6) the difference in average values between post-independence years and colonial autonomy years (parentheses present rank among all countries). Countries denoted with $^{*}$ were autonomous for all years between 1941 and independence. Countries denoted with $^{**}$ never gained autonomy prior to independence, and Column 6 for these countries equals post-independence average minus pre-independence average. Internal war in Table A.3 equals 1 in the first war year, 0 for peace years, and is set to missing for ongoing conflicts. Therefore, the numbers reflect the percentage of peaceful years in which a new conflict occurred.

## Table A.2: Summary of Democracy Levels

| Country | Colonial avg. | Autonomy avg. | Post-indep. avg. | Autonomy–Colonial (rank) | Post-indep.–Autonomy (rank) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria** | 0.08 | - | 0.16 | - | 0.08 (21) |
| Angola** | 0.01 | - | 0.07 | - | 0.06 (26) |
| Bahrain* | - | 0.02 | 0.06 | - | 0.03 (35) |
| Benin | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.08 (22) | 0.02 (38) |
| Bhutan* | - | 0.03 | 0.04 | - | 0.02 (39) |
| Botswana** | 0.08 | - | 0.67 | - | 0.59 (1) |
| Burkina Faso | 0.16 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.08 (23) | -0.01 (47) |
| Burundi | 0.04 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.09 (21) | -0.01 (48) |
| Cambodia | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.18 | 0.02 (38) | 0.09 (17) |
| Cameroon | - | - | 0.17 | - | - |
| Central African Republic | 0.11 | 0.24 | 0.14 | 0.13 (9) | -0.1 (61) |
| Chad | 0.11 | 0.28 | 0.15 | 0.17 (4) | -0.13 (62) |
| Congo | 0.09 | 0.2 | 0.14 | 0.11 (16) | -0.06 (56) |
| Congo, DR** | 0.02 | - | 0.18 | - | 0.16 (11) |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.05 (29) | 0.04 (33) |
| Cyprus** | 0.09 | - | 0.57 | - | 0.48 (2) |
| Djibouti | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.04 (32) | 0.07 (25) |
| Fiji** | 0.27 | - | 0.56 | - | 0.29 (5) |
| Gabon | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.08 (24) | 0.03 (36) |
| Gambia | 0.14 | 0.31 | 0.47 | 0.16 (5) | 0.16 (12) |
| Ghana | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0.22 | 0.19 (2) | -0.09 (59) |
| Guinea** | 0.09 | - | 0.14 | - | 0.05 (30) |
| Guinea-Bissau** | 0.01 | - | 0.12 | - | 0.1 (14) |
| Guyana | 0.27 | 0.3 | 0.31 | 0.04 (33) | 0 (43) |
| India** | 0.19 | - | 0.61 | - | 0.42 (3) |
| Indonesia | 0.03 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.13 (10) | 0.06 (27) |
| Israel** | - | - | 0.68 | - | - |
| Jamaica | 0.3 | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.23 (1) | 0 (44) |
| Jordan* | - | 0.1 | 0.13 | - | 0.03 (37) |
| Kenya | 0.09 | 0.13 | 0.22 | 0.04 (34) | 0.09 (18) |
| Kuwait* | - | 0.15 | 0.2 | - | 0.06 (28) |
| Laos | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.18 | 0.11 (17) | -0.03 (51) |
| Lesotho | 0.06 | 0.19 | 0.16 | 0.13 (11) | -0.03 (52) |
| Libya** | 0.02 | - | 0.1 | - | 0.08 (22) |
| Madagascar | 0.06 | 0.14 | 0.23 | 0.08 (25) | 0.08 (23) |
| Malawi | 0.03 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.16 (6) | -0.02 (50) |
| Malaysia** | 0.07 | - | 0.27 | - | 0.2 (7) |
| Mali | 0.1 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.08 (26) | 0 (45) |
| Mauritania | 0.11 | 0.27 | 0.18 | 0.16 (7) | -0.09 (60) |
| Mauritius | 0.28 | 0.36 | 0.77 | 0.08 (27) | 0.41 (4) |
| Morocco** | 0.05 | - | 0.15 | - | 0.1 (15) |
| Mozambique** | 0.03 | - | 0.08 | - | 0.05 (31) |
| Myanmar | 0.14 | 0.19 | 0.2 | 0.05 (30) | 0.01 (41) |
| Nepal* | - | 0.01 | 0.11 | - | 0.1 (16) |
| Niger | 0.04 | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.1 (19) | 0.01 (42) |
| Nigeria | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 0.03 (36) | 0.05 (32) |
| Pakistan** | - | - | 0.18 | - | - |
| Philippines* | - | 0.12 | 0.32 | - | 0.2 (8) |
| Rwanda** | 0.03 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.12 (13) | 0.06 (29) |
| Senegal | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.41 | 0.05 (31) | 0.17 (9) |
| Sierra Leone | 0.14 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.12 (14) | -0.01 (49) |
| Singapore | 0.24 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 0.08 (28) | 0.02 (40) |
| Somalia** | 0.1 | - | 0.19 | - | 0.09 (19) |
| Sri Lanka | 0.34 | 0.35 | 0.62 | 0.01 (39) | 0.27 (6) |
| Sudan | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.13 (12) | -0.04 (54) |
| Swaziland | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.12 (15) | -0.05 (55) |
| Syria* | - | 0.13 | 0.17 | - | 0.04 (34) |
| Tanzania | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.26 | 0.11 (18) | 0.08 (24) |
| Togo | 0.07 | 0.22 | 0.14 | 0.15 (8) | -0.08 (58) |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 0.29 | 0.47 | 0.64 | 0.19 (3) | 0.17 (10) |
| Tunisia** | 0.04 | - | 0.18 | - | 0.13 (13) |
| Uganda | 0.08 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.1 (20) | 0 (46) |
| United Arab Emirates* | - | - | 0.03 | - | - |
| Vietnam** | 0.24 | 0.27 | 0.2 | 0.03 (37) | -0.07 (57) |
| Zambia | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 0.04 (35) | 0.09 (20) |
| Zimbabwe* | - | 0.26 | 0.23 | - | -0.03 (53) |

## Table A.3: Summary of Internal War Onset Frequency

| Country | Colonial avg. | Autonomy avg. | Post-indep. avg. | Autonomy–Colonial (rank) | Post-indep.–Autonomy (rank) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria | 7% | - | 0% | - | -7% (59) |
| Angola | 5% | - | 100% | - | 95% (1) |
| Bahrain | - | 0% | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Benin | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Bhutan | - | 0% | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Botswana | 0% | - | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Burkina Faso | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Burundi | 0% | 0% | 4% | 0% (t2) | 4% (14) |
| Cambodia | 0% | 0% | 9% | 0% (t2) | 9% (9) |
| Cameroon | 6% | 0% | 0% | -6% (36) | 0% (t20) |
| Central African Republic | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Chad | 0% | 0% | 14% | 0% (t2) | 14% (4) |
| Congo | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Congo, DR | 0% | - | 8% | - | 8% (11) |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Cyprus | 0% | - | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Djibouti | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Fiji | 0% | - | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Gabon | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Gambia | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Ghana | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Guinea | 0% | - | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0% | - | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Guyana | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| India | 17% | - | 5% | - | -12% (62) |
| Indonesia | 0% | 33% | 22% | 33% (1) | -11% (61) |
| Israel | 14% | - | 0% | - | -14% (64) |
| Jamaica | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Jordan | - | 0% | 2% | - | 2% (18) |
| Kenya | 6% | 0% | 0% | -6% (37) | 0% (t20) |
| Kuwait | - | 0% | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Laos | 0% | 0% | 11% | 0% (t2) | 11% (6) |
| Lesotho | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Libya | 0% | - | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Madagascar | 6% | 0% | 0% | -6% (38) | 0% (t20) |
| Malawi | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Malaysia | 13% | - | 0% | - | -12% (63) |
| Mali | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Mauritania | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Mauritius | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Morocco | 8% | - | 4% | - | -4% (58) |
| Mozambique | 4% | - | 25% | - | 21% (2) |
| Myanmar | 0% | 0% | 21% | 0% (t2) | 21% (3) |
| Nepal | - | 0% | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Niger | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Nigeria | 0% | 0% | 8% | 0% (t2) | 8% (12) |
| Pakistan | 0% | - | 3% | - | 3% (15) |
| Philippines | - | 0% | 9% | - | 9% (10) |
| Rwanda | 5% | - | 4% | - | - |
| Senegal | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Sierra Leone | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Singapore | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Somalia | 0% | - | 3% | - | 3% (16) |
| Sri Lanka | 0% | 0% | 6% | 0% (t2) | 6% (13) |
| Sudan | 0% | 0% | 11% | 0% (t2) | 11% (7) |
| Swaziland | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Syria | - | 0% | 2% | - | 2% (19) |
| Tanzania | 0% | 0% | 3% | 0% (t2) | 3% (17) |
| Togo | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Tunisia | 8% | - | 0% | - | -8% (60) |
| Uganda | 0% | 0% | 10% | 0% (t2) | 10% (8) |
| United Arab Emirates | - | 0% | 0% | - | 0% (t20) |
| Vietnam | 17% | - | 3% | - | - |
| Zambia | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% (t2) | 0% (t20) |
| Zimbabwe | - | 0% | 14% | - | 14% (5) |

## Table A.4: Summary of Revenue Growth

| Country | Colonial avg. | Autonomy avg. | Post-indep. avg. | Autonomy–Colonial (rank) | Post-indep.–Autonomy (rank) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria** | 21% | - | - | - | - |
| Angola** | 13% | - | - | - | - |
| Bahrain* | - | - | - | - | - |
| Benin | - | - | - | - | - |
| Bhutan* | - | - | - | - | - |
| Botswana** | - | - | - | - | - |
| Burkina Faso | - | - | - | - | - |
| Burundi | - | - | - | - | - |
| Cambodia | - | - | - | - | - |
| Cameroon | - | - | 4% | - | - |
| Central African Republic | 16% | 23% | 4% | 7% (1) | -20% (18) |
| Chad | -2% | - | 8% | - | - |
| Congo | - | - | - | - | - |
| Congo, DR** | 11% | - | - | - | - |
| Cote d'Ivoire | - | - | 9% | - | - |
| Cyprus** | 17% | - | 6% | - | -12% (13) |
| Djibouti | - | - | - | - | - |
| Fiji** | 9% | - | - | - | - |
| Gabon | 7% | - | 33% | - | - |
| Gambia | - | - | - | - | - |
| Ghana | 18% | 12% | 16% | -7% (7) | 4% (6) |
| Guinea** | - | - | - | - | - |
| Guinea-Bissau** | - | - | - | - | - |
| Guyana | 9% | 5% | 3% | -4% (6) | -2% (9) |
| India** | 19% | - | 7% | - | -12% (14) |
| Indonesia | - | - | 10% | - | - |
| Israel** | 20% | - | 33% | - | 13% (4) |
| Jamaica | 10% | 10% | 8% | 0% (3) | -2% (10) |
| Jordan* | - | - | - | - | - |
| Kenya | 12% | - | - | - | - |
| Kuwait* | - | - | - | - | - |
| Laos | - | - | - | - | - |
| Lesotho | - | - | - | - | - |
| Libya** | - | - | - | - | - |
| Madagascar | 15% | 0% | 5% | -15% (8) | 5% (5) |
| Malawi | 13% | -49% | - | -61% (12) | - |
| Malaysia** | 21% | - | 6% | - | -14% (16) |
| Mali | - | - | - | - | - |
| Mauritania | - | - | - | - | - |
| Mauritius | 8% | -6% | 8% | -15% (9) | 15% (3) |
| Morocco** | - | - | - | - | - |
| Mozambique** | 7% | - | - | - | - |
| Myanmar | - | - | - | - | - |
| Nepal* | - | - | - | - | - |
| Niger | - | - | - | - | - |
| Nigeria | 16% | 0% | 21% | -16% (10) | 21% (2) |
| Pakistan** | - | - | 3% | - | - |
| Philippines* | - | - | 4% | - | - |
| Rwanda** | - | - | - | - | - |
| Senegal | - | - | 4% | - | - |
| Sierra Leone | 13% | 17% | 5% | 4% (2) | -12% (15) |
| Singapore | - | - | 6% | - | - |
| Somalia** | - | - | - | - | - |
| Sri Lanka | 18% | 16% | 1% | -2% (5) | -14% (17) |
| Sudan | - | - | - | - | - |
| Swaziland | - | - | - | - | - |
| Syria* | - | - | 18% | - | - |
| Tanzania | 15% | - | - | - | - |
| Togo | - | 0% | 4% | - | 4% (7) |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 9% | 8% | 6% | -1% (4) | -2% (11) |
| Tunisia** | 12% | - | 4% | - | -8% (12) |
| Uganda | 17% | - | - | - | - |
| United Arab Emirates* | - | - | - | - | - |
| Vietnam** | - | - | - | - | - |
| Zambia | 12% | -8% | 55% | -20% (11) | 62% (1) |
| Zimbabwe* | - | 11% | 12% | - | 1% (8) |

## Table A.5: Summary of Economic Growth

| Country | Colonial avg. | Autonomy avg. | Post-indep. avg. | Autonomy–Colonial (rank) | Post-indep.–Autonomy (rank) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria** | 3% | - | 2% | - | -1% (24) |
| Angola** | 2% | - | -4% | - | -6% (51) |
| Bahrain* | - | 3% | 1% | - | -2% (32) |
| Benin | -2% | 2% | 1% | 4% (1) | -1% (25) |
| Bhutan* | - | - | - | - | - |
| Botswana** | 2% | - | 9% | - | 7% (2) |
| Burkina Faso | 3% | 3% | 1% | 0% (8) | -1% (26) |
| Burundi | 2% | -16% | 2% | -18% (34) | 19% (1) |
| Cambodia | - | 2% | 2% | - | 0% (15) |
| Cameroon | 2% | 2% | 2% | 0% (9) | -1% (27) |
| Central African Republic | 2% | 2% | -1% | 0% (10) | -3% (41) |
| Chad | 2% | 2% | 0% | 0% (11) | -2% (33) |
| Congo | 2% | 2% | 2% | 0% (12) | 0% (16) |
| Congo, DR** | 3% | - | -1% | - | -4% (44) |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 2% | 1% | 1% | 0% (13) | 0% (17) |
| Cyprus** | - | - | - | - | - |
| Djibouti | 1% | 2% | -3% | 1% (3) | -5% (47) |
| Fiji** | - | - | - | - | - |
| Gabon | 3% | 3% | 1% | 0% (14) | -2% (34) |
| Gambia | 3% | -1% | 1% | -4% (28) | 2% (10) |
| Ghana | 1% | 2% | 0% | 1% (4) | -2% (35) |
| Guinea** | 3% | - | 1% | - | -1% (28) |
| Guinea-Bissau** | 5% | - | 0% | - | -5% (48) |
| Guyana | - | - | - | - | - |
| India** | -2% | - | 2% | - | 3% (8) |
| Indonesia | 2% | - | 3% | - | - |
| Israel** | - | - | 4% | - | - |
| Jamaica | 8% | 6% | 1% | -2% (26) | -4% (45) |
| Jordan* | - | - | 3% | - | - |
| Kenya | 1% | 2% | 2% | 1% (5) | 0% (18) |
| Kuwait* | - | 1% | -6% | - | -7% (53) |
| Laos | - | 1% | 1% | - | 0% (19) |
| Lesotho | 4% | 0% | 3% | -4% (29) | 3% (9) |
| Libya** | - | - | 4% | - | - |
| Madagascar | 2% | 2% | -1% | 0% (15) | -3% (42) |
| Malawi | 2% | -4% | 2% | -6% (31) | 6% (4) |
| Malaysia** | 6% | - | 4% | - | -3% (43) |
| Mali | 2% | 2% | 1% | 0% (16) | 0% (20) |
| Mauritania | 3% | 2% | 2% | 0% (17) | 0% (21) |
| Mauritius | 3% | -3% | 4% | -6% (32) | 7% (3) |
| Morocco** | 0% | - | 2% | - | 1% (13) |
| Mozambique** | 2% | - | -3% | - | -4% (46) |
| Myanmar | - | - | 2% | - | - |
| Nepal* | - | - | 1% | - | - |
| Niger | 2% | 2% | -1% | 0% (18) | -2% (36) |
| Nigeria | 3% | 0% | 1% | -4% (30) | 2% (11) |
| Pakistan** | - | - | 2% | - | - |
| Philippines* | - | - | 3% | - | - |
| Rwanda** | 2% | -5% | 2% | -7% (33) | 6% (5) |
| Senegal | 2% | 1% | 0% | 0% (19) | -2% (37) |
| Sierra Leone | 3% | 2% | 1% | -1% (24) | -1% (29) |
| Singapore | 0% | 2% | 6% | 1% (6) | 4% (6) |
| Somalia** | 2% | - | 0% | - | -2% (38) |
| Sri Lanka | -2% | -2% | 2% | 0% (20) | 4% (7) |
| Sudan | 2% | 2% | 0% | 0% (21) | -2% (39) |
| Swaziland | 5% | 7% | 2% | 1% (7) | -5% (49) |
| Syria* | - | - | 3% | - | - |
| Tanzania | 1% | 1% | 1% | 0% (22) | -1% (30) |
| Togo | 2% | 1% | 1% | 0% (23) | 0% (22) |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 3% | 7% | 1% | 3% (2) | -6% (52) |
| Tunisia** | 1% | - | 3% | - | 2% (12) |
| Uganda | 0% | -1% | 0% | -1% (25) | 1% (14) |
| United Arab Emirates* | - | 2% | -3% | - | -5% (50) |
| Vietnam** | - | 3% | 1% | - | -2% (40) |
| Zambia | 3% | 0% | -1% | -3% (27) | 0% (23) |
| Zimbabwe* | - | 2% | 2% | - | -1% (31) |

## A.2 Alternative Time Periods and Measures

The first two appendix regression tables alter the time sample used in Table 2. Table A.6 only includes the first 10 years before and after independence for each territory. Table A.7 lengthens the time sample to cover 1919 to 1989. Democracy and internal wars have reasonably good coverage dating back to the end of World War I, and Table A.7 provides estimates over a longer panel than in most comparative political science research.

**Table A.6: Within 10 Years of Independence**

| | **Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.00677 | 0.00330 | 0.0488 | 0.0202** |
| | (0.00844) | (0.0162) | (0.0735) | (0.00996) |
| Territory-years | 1,171 | 1,223 | 330 | 973 |
| R-squared | 0.939 | 0.145 | 0.349 | 0.216 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | **Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule** | | | |
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0190*** | -0.0354** | 0.101 | 0.00654 |
| | (0.00669) | (0.0177) | (0.0673) | (0.00836) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00753 | -0.0205 | 0.124 | 0.0243** |
| | (0.0104) | (0.0181) | (0.104) | (0.0112) |
| Territory-years | 1,171 | 1,223 | 330 | 973 |
| R-squared | 0.940 | 0.148 | 0.354 | 0.217 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |

*Notes*: Panel A of Table A.6 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using a restricted time sample: within a decade either before or after independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a linear link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. A logit model does not converge for the Column 2 specifications because of separation. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## Table A.7: Expanded Time Sample: 1919–1989

| | **Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.00592 | -0.629 | 0.0432 | 0.00319 |
| | (0.00423) | (0.555) | (0.0375) | (0.00612) |
| Territory-years | 4,387 | 1,244 | 1,324 | 2,520 |
| R-squared | 0.968 | | 0.365 | 0.132 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | **Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule** | | | |
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0109*** | -2.043** | 0.0759 | 0.0112 |
| | (0.00363) | (0.886) | (0.0472) | (0.00697) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.00129 | -1.121* | 0.0655 | 0.00738 |
| | (0.00481) | (0.593) | (0.0433) | (0.00644) |
| Territory-years | 4,387 | 1,244 | 1,324 | 2,520 |
| R-squared | 0.969 | | 0.367 | 0.133 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |

*Notes*: Panel A of Table A.7 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using an expanded time sample: 1919 to 1989. Years prior to European colonization are omitted. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.8 disaggregates the data in a different way than in Table 2. It replaces the colonial autonomy variable with the last five years of colonial rule, and also disaggregates the first five years of independence from the remainder of post-independence years. Similar to Table 2, it shows that the last five years of colonial rule (like the closely related colonial autonomy period) are associated with considerable democratic gains, whereas neither of the post-independence periods are.

**Table A.8: Disaggregating Near-Independence Periods**

| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Last five colonial years$_{t-1}$ | 0.0278*** | 0.670 | 0.0171 | -0.0119* |
| | (0.00372) | (0.663) | (0.0254) | (0.00640) |
| First five independence years$_{t-1}$ | 0.00281 | 0.0556 | 0.0571 | -0.00514 |
| | (0.00445) | (0.795) | (0.0840) | (0.00684) |
| Subsequent independence years$_{t-1}$ | 0.00123 | -0.724 | 0.0207 | -0.00730 |
| | (0.00373) | (1.413) | (0.0417) | (0.00983) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 1,023 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.964 | | 0.372 | 0.117 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |

*Notes*: Table A.8 estimates Equation 1 with two additional indicators: the last five years of colonial rule, and the first five years of post-independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.9 uses alternative measures for internal war, revenues, and income. Column 1 replaces Correlates of War's internal war data with Brecke (1999). Column 2 replaces the revenue measure with normalized revenues, albeit at the cost of a smaller sample. Column 3 replaces Maddison's GDP data with Penn World Table (PWT; Feenstra et al. 2015), which tends to be of higher quality but has relatively scant coverage during the colonial era. Tables A.16 and A.17 present results with alternative democracy measures.

**Table A.9: Alternative Measures**

| | **Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Brecke war onset | ln(Norm. rev./pop.) growth | ln(PWT income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.556 | 0.00366 | 0.000974 |
| | (0.442) | (0.00469) | (0.00129) |
| Territory-years | 2,116 | 573 | 1,824 |
| R-squared | | 0.298 | 0.119 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES |
| | **Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule** | | |
| DV: | Brecke war onset | ln(Norm. rev./pop.) growth | ln(PWT income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.432 | -0.00150 | 0.00209 |
| | (0.386) | (0.00519) | (0.00196) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.406 | 0.00299 | 0.00166 |
| | (0.491) | (0.00537) | (0.00140) |
| Territory-years | 2,116 | 573 | 1,824 |
| R-squared | | 0.298 | 0.120 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES |

*Notes*: Panel A of Table A.9 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but with different measures of the dependent variables, described above. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Column 1 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. Columns 2 and 3 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.10 lags independence by 10 years to examine whether the estimates differ when assuming that effects of independence may not have been immediate. In these regressions, a country that gained independence in 1960, for example, would be coded as colonized until 1970 and independent afterwards, thus treating the first decade of independence as one in which post-colonial effects may have yet to take hold. The coefficient estimate for independence is negative in the democracy regression in Column 1—as in Panel A of Table 2, but here is statistically significant. There is also a systematic negative association between lagged independence and internal warfare, which results from pooling decolonization wars and frequent conflict in countries' first years of (factual) post-independence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) into the pre-independence category when independence is lagged by 10 years. This result is consistent with Wimmer and Min's (2006) evidence that transitions from colonial rule exhibited particularly high conflict propensity.

**Table A.10: Independence Lagged 10 Years**

| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Independent$_{t-10}$ | -0.00975*** | -1.676*** | -0.0352 | -0.00143 |
| | (0.00300) | (0.625) | (0.0482) | (0.00674) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 1,023 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.962 | | 0.371 | 0.115 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |

*Notes*: Table A.10 estimates Equation 1 with the post-independence variable replaced by independence lagged by 10 years. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## A.3 Alternative Specifications for Time Series Models

Table A.11 accounts for several sources of time-varying, unit-specific heterogeneity by including every other dependent variable as a covariate, albeit at the cost of smaller samples due to missing data.

**Table A.11: Time-Varying Covariates**

| | **Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.00352 | -0.0286 | 0.00759 | 0.00938 |
| | (0.0124) | (0.0337) | (0.0367) | (0.00895) |
| Democracy level$_{t-1}$ | 0.916*** | -0.0433 | 0.103 | 0.0349 |
| | (0.0434) | (0.0870) | (0.0920) | (0.0268) |
| Internal war incidence$_{t-1}$ | -0.00254 | 0.0115 | 0.0685** | 0.00477 |
| | (0.00850) | (0.0327) | (0.0293) | (0.0121) |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | -0.0124 | 0.0043 | -0.0634 | 0.0193 |
| | (0.00810) | (0.0336) | (0.0690) | (0.0202) |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | 0.0735** | -0.152 | 1.001*** | 0.0771 |
| | (0.0348) | (0.137) | (0.258) | (0.0872) |
| Territory-years | 612 | 613 | 575 | 594 |
| R-squared | 0.971 | 0.199 | 0.624 | 0.177 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Peace years and cubic splines | NO | YES | NO | NO |
| | **Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule** | | | |
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0418*** | -0.0296 | 0.0791* | -0.0121 |
| | (0.0149) | (0.0287) | (0.0453) | (0.0112) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.0194 | -0.0454 | 0.0502 | 0.00274 |
| | (0.0148) | (0.0465) | (0.0412) | (0.0124) |
| Democracy level$_{t-1}$ | 0.892*** | -0.0262 | 0.0620 | 0.0421 |
| | (0.0413) | (0.0946) | (0.0991) | (0.0291) |
| Internal war incidence$_{t-1}$ | 0.000458 | 0.00817 | 0.0737** | 0.00400 |
| | (0.00799) | (0.0323) | (0.0308) | (0.0121) |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | -0.00984 | 0.00266 | -0.0610 | 0.0185 |
| | (0.00750) | (0.0347) | (0.0691) | (0.0203) |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | 0.0773** | -0.153 | 1.010*** | 0.0753 |
| | (0.0315) | (0.138) | (0.258) | (0.0874) |
| Territory-years | 612 | 613 | 575 | 594 |
| R-squared | 0.972 | 0.201 | 0.627 | 0.179 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Peace years and cubic splines | NO | YES | NO | NO |

*Notes*: Panel A of Table A.11 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, in each case adding controls for the other dependent variables. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a linear link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. A logit model does not converge for the Column 2 specifications because of separation. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.12 controls for the percentage of each territory's land neighbors that are independent in a given year. Relative to the core sample, adding this control drops all island territories.

**Table A.12: Spatial Dependence: Controlling for Neighbors' Independence**

| | **Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -5.25e-05 | 0.129 | 0.0228 | 0.00777 |
| | (0.00497) | (0.874) | (0.0472) | (0.00805) |
| Territory-years | 2,637 | 924 | 579 | 2,057 |
| R-squared | 0.948 | | 0.334 | 0.112 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | **Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule** | | | |
| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0172*** | -1.885 | 0.0657 | 0.0118 |
| | (0.00450) | (1.299) | (0.0609) | (0.00856) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00754 | -0.553 | 0.0398 | 0.0120 |
| | (0.00614) | (1.076) | (0.0543) | (0.00775) |
| Territory-years | 2,637 | 924 | 579 | 2,057 |
| R-squared | 0.948 | | 0.335 | 0.113 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |

*Notes*: Panel A of Table A.12 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, in each case adding a control for the percentage of land neighbors with political independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

In an unpublished paper, Achen (2000) shows that lagged dependent variables can induce bias in models if there is serial correlation. Although he advises omitting a lagged dependent variable, subsequent methodological research rejects that conclusion. Beck and Katz (2011, 336) argue: "there is nothing atheoretical about the use of a lagged dependent variable, and there is nothing that should lead anyone to think the use of a lagged dependent variable causes incorrect harm. It may cause 'correct' harm, in that it may keep us from incorrectly concluding that $x$ has a big effect when it does not, but that cannot be a bad thing." Keele and Kelly (2006) conclude on the basis of their Monte Carlo simulations that "if the process was dynamic, OLS with an LDV provided estimates that were superior to the other models or estimators even in the presence of minor residual autocorrelation" (18) because omitting the lagged dependent variable induces omitted variable bias, while also offering the caveat that "If the model residuals are strongly autocorrelated, including a lag will produce biased estimates."[8] However, Wilkins (2018) rejects even this limited critique of including a lagged dependent variable: "[Keele and Kelly] find that a regression of $Y_t$ on $X_t$ and $Y_{t-1}$ produces estimates with relatively low bias compared with other models (such as just regressing $Y_t$ on $X_t$), except under high levels of autocorrelation in the error term (high values of $\phi$). But the problems in estimating the coefficient of the independent variable, $\beta$, arise because neither Achen (2000) nor Keele and Kelly (2006) specify the correct regression model, given the data-generating process." Wilkins shows that adding a second-order lag for the dependent variables and for the explanatory variables produces less biased estimates than specifications without the lagged dependent variable even under high autocorrelation. Table A.13 follows Wilkins' (2018) advice to add second-order lags for the continuous dependent variables, and computes long-run multipliers to interpret the estimated effects of independence and of colonial autonomy.

[8]They also suggest that "many of the problems that LDVs may cause with" the dependent variables that Achen (2000) studies "probably occur because the data are nonstationary," which we address in Section 2.4.

## Table A.13: Second-Order Lags

| | **Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Democracy level | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.0232*** | -0.00465 | 0.0121 |
| | (0.00727) | (0.0904) | (0.0107) |
| Independent$_{t-2}$ | -0.0308*** | 0.0375 | -0.00860 |
| | (0.00709) | (0.117) | (0.0107) |
| Democracy level$_{t-1}$ | 1.136*** | | |
| | (0.0242) | | |
| Democracy level$_{t-2}$ | -0.218*** | | |
| | (0.0299) | | |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | -0.0952 | |
| | | (0.0575) | |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-2}$ | | -0.0155 | |
| | | (0.0240) | |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.110** |
| | | | (0.0502) |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-2}$ | | | 0.0239 |
| | | | (0.0372) |
| Territory-years | 3,106 | 791 | 2,307 |
| R-squared | 0.966 | 0.364 | 0.119 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |
| | | Long-run multiplier | |
| Independent | -.0918389 | .0295807 | .0040514 |
| | (.0711658) | (.044642) | .0077799 |
| | **Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule** | | |
| DV: | Democracy level | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0249*** | 0.0403 | -0.00163 |
| | (0.00686) | (0.0644) | (0.0106) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-2}$ | -0.0140* | 0.0102 | 0.0156 |
| | (0.00793) | (0.0848) | (0.0114) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.0392*** | 0.00529 | 0.00355 |
| | (0.0101) | (0.133) | (0.0158) |
| Independent$_{t-2}$ | -0.0408*** | 0.0431 | 0.00392 |
| | (0.00995) | (0.167) | (0.0145) |
| Democracy level$_{t-1}$ | 1.128*** | | |
| | (0.0246) | | |
| Democracy level$_{t-2}$ | -0.218*** | | |
| | (0.0302) | | |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | -0.0960 | |
| | | (0.0594) | |
| ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-2}$ | | -0.0155 | |
| | | (0.0238) | |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$ | | | 0.108** |
| | | | (0.0507) |
| ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-2}$ | | | 0.0228 |
| | | | (0.0375) |
| Territory-years | 3,106 | 791 | 2,307 |
| R-squared | 0.966 | 0.364 | 0.121 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |
| | | Long-run multiplier | |
| Colonial autonomy | .1198398** | .0453713 | .0161139* |
| | (.0500776) | (.0529125) | (.0086798) |
| Independent | -.0174411 | .0435736 | .008595 |
| | (.0608931) | (.0524533) | (.0081141) |

*Notes*: Panel A of Table A.13 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, in each case adding a second-order lag for the explanatory and dependent variables. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects, clusters standard errors by territory, and uses a linear link. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Bertrand et al. (2004) analyze a different possible concern with time series data stemming from serial correlation causing incorrect standard error estimates. Specifically, they allege that standard practice in applied economics research at the time of their publication yielded insufficiently conservative standard error estimates. This concern does not appear to be problematic for our results for two reasons. First, Bertrand et al. (2004, 273) show that unit-clustered standard errors, which we use in every specification, perform well when the number of clusters is as large as in our sample. Second, even if our standard errors are downwardly biased, the direction of the bias would make it less likely to find null results.

**Table A.14: Ignoring Time Series Information**

| | **Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Democracy level (first difference) | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.00339* | -0.00139 | 0.0156 | 0.00183 |
| | (0.00181) | (0.00743) | (0.0233) | (0.00473) |
| Territory-years | 124 | 132 | 38 | 110 |
| R-squared | 0.413 | 0.567 | 0.634 | 0.575 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | **Panel B. Autonomous vs. non-autonomous colonial rule** | | | |
| DV: | Democracy level (first difference) | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0257** | -0.00670 | 0.0482 | -0.00344 |
| | (0.00993) | (0.0198) | (0.0580) | (0.00998) |
| Territory-years | 78 | 80 | 22 | 68 |
| R-squared | 0.536 | 0.500 | 0.558 | 0.482 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

*Notes*: Each panel in Table A.14 uses data from every country with outcome data for both values of the explanatory variable. Each model contains two observations for every country in the regression, and every specification contains territory fixed effects and territory-clustered standard error estimates. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Despite these concerns, Table A.14 presents results from a conservative procedure that Bertrand et al. (2004, 267) show leads to reliable standard error estimates in small samples: ignore the time series information when estimating the standard errors. Rather than analyze individual years, they aggregate the data into one pre-treatment and one post-treatment observation for every unit, although we use three categories to distinguish colonial autonomy from other colonial years (as well as from post-independence). To account for the different times at which units change treatment status and the resultant time-varying heterogeneity, they recommend regressing the dependent variable on year fixed effects and then running models that include two observations for each unit: one pre-treatment residual and one post-treatment residual produced by the auxiliary regression. Panel A of Table A.14 compares the post-independence average with the pre-independence average. Panel B compares the colonial autonomy average with the non-autonomous colonial average. It does not separately estimate a coefficient for post-independence because this technique

is designed for binary treatment variables. There are exactly two observations for each country in each regression, and countries with missing data for all years in either the pre- or the post-period in each specification are dropped. The democracy specifications use the first difference of democracy to account for high autocorrelation of the dependent variable (the main models account for this by including a lagged dependent variable). The results resemble those in Table 2.

Imai and Kim (2016) raise a different concern. Even absent unit-specific time-varying confounders, standard two-way fixed effects models will be biased if treatment effects are heterogeneous. Tables A.18 through A.23 address this concern by disaggregating colonial institutions. Additionally, Table A.15 presents estimates using Imai and Kim's weighted differences-in-differences estimator that corrects for bias from heterogeneous treatment effects. As in Table A.14, analyzing the first difference of democracy levels accounts for high autocorrelation in democracy levels, and Panel B does not provide separate estimates of post-independence because the method is designed for binary treatment variables. Notably, these models produce somewhat more conservative estimates than the original specifications because reweighting the units increases variance. The p-value for colonial autonomy in the democracy regression slightly exceeds conventional levels of statistical significance (p-value=0.1005).

**Table A.15: Weighted Fixed Effects Estimator**

| | **Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Democracy level (first difference) | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Independent | -0.020914 | -0.0018214 | 0.00075485 | 0.024510 |
| | (0.015398) | (0.0227571) | (0.20134641) | (0.017182) |
| Territory-years | 3116 | 2982 | 871 | 2451 |
| Territory-years w/ non-zero weight | 858 | 854 | 173 | 676 |
| | **Panel B. Autonomous vs. non-autonomous colonial rule** | | | |
| DV: | Democracy level (first difference) | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy | 0.0142057 | -0.033057*** | 0.034209 | 0.005583 |
| | (0.0086428) | (0.011566) | (0.058197) | (0.012861) |
| Territory-years | 1191 | 1238 | 460 | 653 |
| Territory-years w/ non-zero weight | 693 | 624 | 212 | 428 |

*Notes*: Table A.15 presents coefficient estimates and standard error estimates (which allow heteroskedasticity across units and arbitrary autocorrelation) estimated using Imai and Kim's (2016) weighted differences-in-differences estimator. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## A.4 Alternative Democracy Subcomponents and Indices

Tables A.16 and A.17 examine different aggregate democracy indices from V-Dem and subcomponents of the electoral democracy index. The V-Dem codebook describes the 10 aggregated democracy indices evaluated in Table A.16. For Table A.17, the freedom of association variable answers the following question: "To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?" Clean elections captures: "To what extent are elections free and fair?" Freedom of expression denotes: "To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?" Elected officials expresses: "Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?" Finally, suffrage is "What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?"

**Table A.16: Alternative V-Dem Aggregate Democracy Indices**

| DV: | Additive polyarchy | Multiplicative polyarchy | Liberal democracy | Liberal component | Participatory democracy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0185*** | 0.0132** | 0.0129*** | 0.0184*** | 0.00960*** |
| | (0.00607) | (0.00541) | (0.00376) | (0.00647) | (0.00258) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00155 | 0.00640 | 0.00247 | 0.00408 | 0.00354 |
| | (0.00733) | (0.00391) | (0.00358) | (0.00516) | (0.00286) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 3,116 | 3,046 | 3,064 | 3,104 |
| R-squared | 0.956 | 0.958 | 0.970 | 0.965 | 0.975 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| LDV | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

**Table A.16, continued**

| DV: | Participatory component | Deliberative democracy | Deliberative component | Egalitarian democracy | Egalitarian component |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0154*** | 0.0131*** | 0.0226** | 0.0118*** | 0.0224*** |
| | (0.00404) | (0.00421) | (0.00875) | (0.00337) | (0.00693) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00937** | 0.000176 | -0.00325 | 0.00278 | 0.00984** |
| | (0.00426) | (0.00386) | (0.00684) | (0.00306) | (0.00479) |
| Territory-years | 3,122 | 3,116 | 3,145 | 3,091 | 3,120 |
| R-squared | 0.968 | 0.968 | 0.957 | 0.978 | 0.978 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| LDV | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

*Notes*: Table A.16 estimates Equation 2 using various V-Dem aggregated democracy indices as the dependent variable. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Every column uses a linear link and includes a lagged dependent variable. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

**Table A.17: Disaggregating Democracy**

| | Panel A. Colonial autonomy | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DV: | Freedom of association | Clean elections | Freedom of expression | Elected officials | Suffrage |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.00288 | 0.0100 | 0.0117** | 0.115*** | 0.0375* |
| | (0.00818) | (0.00737) | (0.00549) | (0.0210) | (0.0212) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.0113* | -0.00505 | -0.00440 | 0.0641*** | 0.0202 |
| | (0.00607) | (0.00965) | (0.00440) | (0.0216) | (0.0151) |
| Territory-years | 3,145 | 3,122 | 3,145 | 3,105 | 3,145 |
| R-squared | 0.959 | 0.893 | 0.967 | 0.846 | 0.941 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| LDV | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | **Panel B. Five years before independence** | | | | |
| DV: | Freedom of association | Clean elections | Freedom of expression | Elected officials | Suffrage |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Last 5 colonial years$_{t-1}$ | 0.0289*** | 0.0347*** | 0.0246*** | 0.131*** | 0.0711*** |
| | (0.00628) | (0.00921) | (0.00510) | (0.0165) | (0.0147) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.000827 | 0.00436 | 0.000894 | 0.0683*** | 0.0349** |
| | (0.00613) | (0.00900) | (0.00441) | (0.0177) | (0.0137) |
| Territory-years | 3,145 | 3,122 | 3,145 | 3,105 | 3,145 |
| R-squared | 0.960 | 0.894 | 0.968 | 0.849 | 0.943 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| LDV | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

*Notes*: Panel A of Table A.17 estimates Equation 2 using each of the five subcomponents of the V-Dem electoral democracy index as the dependent variable, and Panel B replaces colonial autonomy in Equation 2 with the last five years of colonial rule. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Every column uses a linear link and includes a lagged dependent variable. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## A.5 Supporting Information for Varieties of Colonialism

The following details the sources for the different conditioning variables:

- British colonialism: We use a broad definition of British colonies, including territories over which Britain gained control as League of Nations mandates after World War I (e.g., Tanganyika/Tanzania) and exerted minimal internal control (e.g., Kuwait). This is somewhat broader than Lange's (2009) definition of British colonies because he does not include any of Britain's Middle Eastern colonies.
- Length of colonial rule: We use Olsson's (2009) colonial onset and independence data to calculate the length of Western European colonial rule.
- State antiquity: A territory's combined years with government above local level between 0 CE and 1500, with the cutoff year following Hariri (2012). Data from Putterman (2008).
- European settlers: We use logged European population percentage for the closest available data point to the year of independence. Easterly and Levine (2016) provide most of the data points, and Paine (forthcoming) describes the settlers variable in more detail.
- Disrupted colonial rule during World War II: Lawrence (2013) provides this data for French colonies and we coded it ourselves for the other empires.

Tables A.18 through A.23 add interaction terms for various conditioning variables to estimate models of the

form:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \cdot Independence_{i,t-1}$$
$$+ \beta_3 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t-1} \cdot C_i + \beta_2 \cdot Independence_{i,t-1} \cdot C_i + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad \text{(A.3)}$$

where $C_i$ is the country-specific conditioning variable. Because the static conditioning variables are perfectly collinear with the unit fixed effects, the models do not contain the lower-order conditioning term. For the three binary conditioning variables, the corresponding regression table provides marginal effect estimates for each of colonial autonomy and independence for both values of the conditioning variable. For the continuous conditioning variables, the table presents marginal effect estimates for the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of the variable values.

**Table A.18: Varieties of Colonialism: Sub-Saharan Africa**

| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0130* | -2.820*** | 0.0737 | 0.0424** |
| | (0.00733) | (1.074) | (0.0472) | (0.0163) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*SSA | 0.00904 | | -0.0319 | -0.0446** |
| | (0.00974) | | (0.0575) | (0.0173) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00784 | -2.920** | 0.0141 | 0.0263* |
| | (0.00777) | (1.240) | (0.0574) | (0.0146) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$*SSA | -0.00590 | 3.375** | 0.0552 | -0.0206 |
| | (0.00525) | (1.460) | (0.0356) | (0.0151) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 991 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.962 | | 0.373 | 0.120 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | | Marginal effects | | |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| SSA=0 | 0.0130* | 0.330** | 0.0737 | 0.0424** |
| | (0.00733) | (0.163) | (0.0472) | (0.0163) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| SSA=1 | 0.0220*** | | 0.0418 | -0.00223 |
| | (0.00726) | | (0.0535) | (0.00657) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| SSA=0 | 0.00784 | -0.486* | 0.0141 | 0.0263* |
| | (0.00777) | (0.264) | (0.0574) | (0.0146) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| SSA=1 | 0.00195 | 0.00183 | 0.0692 | 0.00576 |
| | (0.00529) | (0.00332) | (0.0431) | (0.00645) |

*Notes*: Table A.18 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and Sub-Saharan Africa because this combination perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## Table A.19: Varieties of Colonialism: British Colonial Rule

| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.00846 | -1.492 | 0.0940** | 0.00170 |
| | (0.00535) | (1.546) | (0.0430) | (0.00568) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*British colony | 0.0156* | | -0.0475 | 0.0167 |
| | (0.00798) | | (0.0445) | (0.0122) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | -0.00120 | -0.591 | 0.0251 | 0.00311 |
| | (0.00531) | (0.759) | (0.0450) | (0.00601) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$*British colony | 0.0132*** | 0.0307 | 0.0208 | 0.0122 |
| | (0.00392) | (1.215) | (0.0438) | (0.00888) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 1,003 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.963 | | 0.372 | 0.118 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | | Marginal effects | | |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| British col.=0 | 0.00846 | | 0.0940** | 0.00170 |
| | (0.00535) | | (0.0430) | (0.00568) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| British col.=1 | 0.0241*** | 0.00842 | 0.0465 | 0.0184 |
| | (0.00684) | (0.0139) | (0.0475) | (0.0112) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| British col.=0 | -0.00120 | -0.0693 | 0.0251 | 0.00311 |
| | (0.00531) | (0.101) | (0.0450) | (0.00601) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| British col.=1 | 0.0120* | -0.00149 | 0.0458 | 0.0153 |
| | (0.00677) | (0.00398) | (0.0510) | (0.00941) |

*Notes*: Table A.19 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and British colonial rule because Autonomy*non-British rule perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. The p-value in Column 1 for colonial autonomy conditional on British colonialism=0 is 0.119. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## Table A.20: Varieties of Colonialism: Length of Colonial Rule

| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0143** | 2.501 | 0.0411 | 0.0123 |
| | (0.00544) | (2.048) | (0.0671) | (0.0114) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*Length of colonial rule | 5.82e-06 | -0.0637** | 3.24e-05 | -1.66e-05 |
| | (3.46e-05) | (0.0290) | (0.000166) | (4.59e-05) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.000955 | -0.771 | 0.0618 | 0.00902 |
| | (0.00582) | (1.228) | (0.0592) | (0.00856) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$*Length of colonial rule | 1.58e-05 | 0.00153 | -0.000101 | -5.82e-06 |
| | (1.63e-05) | (0.00972) | (0.000135) | (3.61e-05) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 1,023 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.962 | | 0.372 | 0.117 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | | Marginal effects | | |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| Colonial rule=64 years | 0.0147*** | -7.76e-10 | 0.0431 | 0.0113 |
| | (0.00454) | (9.24e-09) | (0.0593) | (0.00912) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| Colonial rule=80 years | 0.0148*** | -6.22e-07 | 0.0437 | 0.0110 |
| | (0.00447) | (2.35e-06) | (0.0574) | (0.00860) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| Colonial rule=144 years | 0.0152*** | -0.00525 | 0.0457 | 0.00994 |
| | (0.00482) | (0.00479) | (0.0509) | (0.00695) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| Colonial rule=64 years | 0.00197 | -1.94e-10 | 0.0554 | 0.00865 |
| | (0.00558) | (3.14e-08) | (0.0537) | (0.00721) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| Colonial rule=80 years | 0.00222 | -4.57e-08 | 0.0537 | 0.00855 |
| | (0.00554) | (1.60e-07) | (0.0524) | (0.00695) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| Colonial rule=144 years | 0.00323 | -0.00222 | 0.0473 | 0.00818 |
| | (0.00553) | (0.00431) | (0.0481) | (0.00635) |

*Notes*: Table A.20 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## Table A.21: Varieties of Colonialism: State Antiquity

| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0147** | -8.365*** | 0.0770 | 0.0105 |
| | (0.00623) | (2.005) | (0.0476) | (0.00919) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*State antiquity | 0.00170 | 8.264*** | -0.202* | 0.00108 |
| | (0.0188) | (2.769) | (0.101) | (0.0226) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00305 | 0.0543 | 0.0651 | 0.00443 |
| | (0.00571) | (0.926) | (0.0463) | (0.00662) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$*State antiquity | -0.000173 | -2.161 | -0.0716 | 0.0261* |
| | (0.00710) | (1.722) | (0.0529) | (0.0137) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 1,023 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.962 | | 0.373 | 0.118 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | | Marginal effects | | |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| State antiquity=0 | 0.0147** | -0.00345 | 0.0770 | 0.0105 |
| | (0.00623) | (0.00354) | (0.0476) | (0.00919) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| State antiquity=0.11 | 0.0148*** | -0.00697 | 0.0548 | 0.0106 |
| | (0.00512) | (0.00616) | (0.0435) | (0.00750) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| State antiquity=0.56 | 0.0156* | -0.109 | -0.0364 | 0.0111 |
| | (0.00802) | (0.0690) | (0.0539) | (0.00838) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| State antiquity=0 | 0.00305 | 0.000192 | 0.0651 | 0.00443 |
| | (0.00571) | (0.00319) | (0.0463) | (0.00662) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| State antiquity=0.11 | 0.00303 | -0.00116 | 0.0572 | 0.00731 |
| | (0.00557) | (0.00566) | (0.0459) | (0.00626) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| State antiquity=0.56 | 0.00295 | -0.0740 | 0.0250 | 0.0191** |
| | (0.00610) | (0.0724) | (0.0517) | (0.00820) |

*Notes*: Table A.21 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## Table A.22: Varieties of Colonialism: European Settlers

| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0171** | -39.40*** | 0.0560 | 0.00112 |
| | (0.00690) | (4.724) | (0.0458) | (0.00662) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*ln(Eu. pop. %) | 0.00143 | -8.303*** | 0.00751 | -0.00445* |
| | (0.00211) | (1.195) | (0.0125) | (0.00261) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00553 | -0.938 | 0.0480 | 0.00777 |
| | (0.00566) | (1.057) | (0.0425) | (0.00706) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$*ln(Eu. pop. %) | 0.00154 | -0.131 | 0.00276 | -0.000332 |
| | (0.00119) | (0.303) | (0.00678) | (0.00220) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 1,023 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.962 | | 0.372 | 0.118 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | | Marginal effects | | |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| Eu. pop. %=0.0% | 0.0106 | -0.0620 | 0.0214 | 0.0216* |
| | (0.00681) | (0.0751) | (0.0610) | (0.0115) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| Eu. pop. %=0.1% | 0.0140*** | -0.0331 | 0.0395 | 0.0110 |
| | (0.00484) | (0.0215) | (0.0453) | (0.00704) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| Eu. pop. %=0.9% | 0.0169** | -0.0129 | 0.0549 | 0.00179 |
| | (0.00668) | (0.0119) | (0.0453) | (0.00649) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| Eu. pop. %=0.0% | -0.00156 | -0.0250 | 0.0353 | 0.00930 |
| | (0.00695) | (0.0759) | (0.0562) | (0.00938) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| Eu. pop. %=0.1% | 0.00213 | -0.0155 | 0.0419 | 0.00850 |
| | (0.00569) | (0.0212) | (0.0470) | (0.00652) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| Eu. pop. %=0.9% | 0.00530 | -0.00772 | 0.0475 | 0.00782 |
| | (0.00563) | (0.0120) | (0.0426) | (0.00691) |

*Notes*: Table A.22 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. The p-value in Column 1 for colonial autonomy conditional on Eu. pop. % = 0.0% is 0.126. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## Table A.23: Varieties of Colonialism: Disrupted Colonial Rule During WWII

| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0183*** | -2.276** | 0.0569 | 0.00732 |
| | (0.00575) | (1.081) | (0.0462) | (0.00809) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*WWII disruption | -0.0133* | | -0.0557 | 0.0124 |
| | (0.00756) | | (0.0387) | (0.0115) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00367 | 0.392 | 0.0519 | 0.00361 |
| | (0.00581) | (1.006) | (0.0473) | (0.00662) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$*WWII disruption | -0.00233 | -2.434* | -0.0749** | 0.0251** |
| | (0.00354) | (1.363) | (0.0354) | (0.0105) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 989 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.962 | | 0.372 | 0.120 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | | Marginal effects | | |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| WWII disruption=0 | 0.0183*** | | 0.0569 | 0.00732 |
| | (0.00575) | | (0.0462) | (0.00809) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| WWII disruption=1 | 0.00500 | 0.240 | 0.00119 | 0.0198** |
| | (0.00618) | (0.176) | (0.0332) | (0.00865) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| WWII disruption=0 | 0.00367 | 0.00165 | 0.0519 | 0.00361 |
| | (0.00581) | (0.00355) | (0.0473) | (0.00662) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| WWII disruption=1 | 0.00135 | -0.394* | -0.0229 | 0.0287*** |
| | (0.00579) | (0.226) | (0.0457) | (0.0101) |

*Notes*: Table A.23 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and British colonial rule because Autonomy*non-disruption perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. The p-value in Column 1 for colonial autonomy conditional on WWII disruption=0 is 0.421. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## A.6 Supporting Information for Endogeneity of Independence Timing

***Sample for Panel B of Table 3*:** The 14 French Sub-Saharan African countries that gained independence in 1960 are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

***Sample for Panel C of Table 3*:** The regions are North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The 16 minor colonies are as follows, with the major colony in parentheses: Morocco and Tunisia (Algeria), Burundi and Rwanda (DRC), Gambia and Sierra Leone (Ghana/Nigeria), Bhutan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka (India), Cambodia and Laos (Vietnam), and Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia (Zimbabwe). Pakistan is excluded because it did not exist as a separate colony until just prior to independence. We did not separately code which French Sub-Saharan African countries met the minor colony definition, and none of these are included in Panel C.

## A.7 Decolonization Wars and Guerrilla Regimes

Another strategy for addressing endogeneity is to separate out the colonies that generate the starkest concerns about endogenous independence timing: countries in which a guerrilla regime inherited the state at independence following a major decolonization war. In these colonies, we are nearly certain that conflict influenced the timing of decolonization, since the colonial regime was forced to cede control to its previous opponents, often after a period of military stalemate or failure. In the eight countries in our sample for which that happened, independence was essentially an exercise in military surrender rather than in constitutional transfer. Table A.24 shows that the positive relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy remains among non-guerrilla countries. Unsurprisingly, there is no relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy for the guerrilla regimes. The body of the article discussed how major decolonization wars usually prevented colonizers from granting autonomy. In Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, colonial autonomy preceded the major liberation war, and we would not expect autonomy to promote democracy here because colonial autonomy was exclusive to whites and contributed to the decolonization struggle. Autonomy in Indonesia in the 1940s and in Vietnam in the 1950s represented late attempts to mitigate violence, making

democratic gains unlikely because autonomy reacted to violence.

**Table A.24: Guerrilla Takeover at Independence**

| DV: | Democracy level | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth | ln(Income/pop.) growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | 0.0174*** | -1.307 | 0.0473 | 0.0119 |
| | (0.00522) | (0.900) | (0.0485) | (0.00776) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*Guerrilla regime | -0.0183** | | -0.00201 | -0.0157 |
| | (0.00752) | | (0.0464) | (0.0138) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00367 | -0.452 | 0.0435 | 0.00960 |
| | (0.00585) | (0.754) | (0.0462) | (0.00658) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$*Guerrilla regime | -0.00334 | -1.582 | -0.0627*** | -0.00740 |
| | (0.00465) | (2.049) | (0.0200) | (0.0119) |
| Territory-years | 3,116 | 1,000 | 830 | 2,365 |
| R-squared | 0.962 | | 0.372 | 0.117 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | | Marginal effects | | |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| Guerrilla=0 | 0.0174*** | 0.0422 | 0.0473 | 0.0119 |
| | (0.00522) | (0.0576) | (0.0485) | (0.00776) |
| Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ \| Guerrilla=1 | -0.000886 | | 0.0453* | -0.00372 |
| | (0.00613) | | (0.0233) | (0.0112) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| Guerrilla=0 | 0.00367 | -0.00626 | 0.0435 | 0.00960 |
| | (0.00585) | (0.0131) | (0.0462) | (0.00658) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ \| Guerrilla=1 | 0.000327 | -0.364 | -0.0192 | 0.00220 |
| | (0.00564) | (0.447) | (0.0438) | (0.0119) |

*Notes*: Table A.24 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and guerrilla regimes because this combination perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

## A.8 Comparing Post-Independence to the "High" Colonial Period

The main results compare independent countries to the colonial counterfactual generated by post-1945 colonial rule. However, some theories suggest the effects of colonialism differed during the "high" colonial period between roughly 1919 and 1945. These decades are widely considered to have provided a brief period of relatively consolidated colonial rule (Abernethy, 2000, 104-132). Despite our lack of evidence that independence produced considerably different outcomes than late colonial rule, perhaps post-independence outcomes diverged from those during the high colonial period. For instance, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced no new internal wars between 1919 and 1945, though it was quite conflict-prone before and after.

Unfortunately, we cannot compare post-independence to the high colonial counterfactual using a two-way fixed effects strategy because very few countries gained independence between 1919 and 1945 (only Egypt and Iraq). This makes it impossible to distinguish the effect of high colonial rule from global trends—e.g., after-effects of World War I, the global depression, and World War II—and therefore we cannot exclude the possibility that international trends unrelated to colonialism influenced any differences in outcomes. Econometrically, collinearity disables estimating year fixed effects in models that compare post-independence to pre-1945 colonialism, and even a time trend variable would be uninformative because of the lack of overlap between the pre- and post-periods in these regressions.

Caveats aside, Table A.25 estimates Equation 1 but uses a different sample that contains (1) colonized years between 1919 and 1945 and (2) post-independence years (although uses the same country sample as Table 2). The table presents suggestive evidence that post-independence differences are stronger when comparing to this earlier period. Independent countries have been considerably more likely to fight internal wars than were territories in the high colonial period. Despite the small size of most colonial militaries, it appears that they were largely successful at keeping the peace in these early years before nationalism swept across the globe. Therefore, although colonial transitions may have been particularly violent (Wimmer and Min 2006), the period in between the world wars was not.

By contrast, post-independence outperforms high colonialism when analyzing revenues and democracy. Despite Young's (1994) characterization of strong *bula mutari* colonial fiscal regimes, Table A.25 shows instead that post-independence regimes have more effectively raised revenues. The post-independence pe-

riod has also been more democratic than the high colonial period.[9] Despite democratic shortcomings in the post-colonial world, Mamdani's (1996) discussion of the despotism of the colonial era finds some support when focusing on this earlier colonial period.

However, once again, we cannot exclude the possibility that global trends unrelated to colonialism drive any of these results. Furthermore, sparse income data prior to 1945 makes it impossible to run the income regressions.

**Table A.25: Changing the Counterfactual: Post-Independence vs. High Colonial Period**

| DV: | Democracy level (first difference) | Internal war onset | ln(Rev./pop.) growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Independent$_{t-1}$ | 0.00477** | 1.305** | 0.0619*** |
| | (0.00219) | (0.512) | (0.0202) |
| Territory-years | 3,542 | 1,587 | 996 |
| R-squared | 0.030 | | 0.039 |
| Territory FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | NO | NO | NO |
| Lag controls | YES | YES | YES |

*Notes*: Table A.25 estimates Equation 1 but uses a different sample that contains (1) colonized years between 1919 and 1945 and (2) post-independence years. Therefore, because the models include an indicator for post-independence, the omitted basis category is colonized years between 1919 and 1945. Every model contains territory fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1 and 3 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

[9]Column 1 uses the first-difference in democracy levels rather than democracy level. This is because the unit-root tests failed to reject the null of non-stationarity for level, but did reject this null for the first-difference. The results of the unit root tests differ from those for Table 2 because of the absence of year fixed effects in the Table A.25 regressions, in addition to a different sample.

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