What Were the Consequences of Decolonization?

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Abstract

Considerable scholarship argues that most varieties of Western European colonial rule negatively affected many political and economic outcomes. Did these outcomes improve after colonial rule ended? Studying post-World War II independence cases, we statistically examine the consequences of decolonization (both gaining independence and colonial autonomy) for democracy, internal conflict, government revenue growth, and economic growth using two-way fixed effects models. Democracy levels increased sharply during the internal autonomy period immediately before independence, providing a new finding about democratic gains during the "second wave." However, conflict, revenue growth, and economic growth exhibited no systematic differences before and after independence. Accounting for varieties of colonial institutions or for endogenous independence timing produces similar results. Except for democratic gains, the overall findings—juxtaposed with existing research—suggest that decolonization was less politically consequential than the often deleterious long-term effects of colonial rule on institutions and social patterns.

Keywords: Colonialism, Civil war, Democracy, Economic development, Fiscal capacity, State capacity

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Western European empires covered the globe for considerable portions of the 19th and 20th centuries. A vibrant political economy literature examines long-term effects of European colonialism by comparing postcolonial outcomes—often measured in recent decades—across countries with varied colonial experiences. Many have examined the effects of different colonial policies and institutions on economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005), democracy (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2017; Weiner, 1987; Lankina and Getachew, 2012; Mamdani, 1996), internal warfare (Reid, 2012; Mukherjee, Forthcoming) and state capacity (Young, 1994; Herbst, 2014). These scholars generally conclude that most types of colonial institutions and policies negatively affected longterm outcomes.

Most of this research overlooks a major change between colonial rule and the present: gaining political independence. For the majority of colonies, this change occurred during a massive wave of decolonization following World War II. Historians and policy organizations routinely emphasize the importance of decolonization. "The sheer scope of imperial collapse and new-state formation has no precedent in historyAlmost 40 percent of the world's population—2.2 billion people in the year 2000—inhabits states that made the transition from colonial to independent status between 1940 and 1980" (Abernethy, 2000, 133). The United Nations (n.d.) proudly proclaims, "The wave of decolonization, which changed the face of the planet ... represents the world body's first great success," and four of the 20 most influential political figures of the 20th century were decolonization leaders (TIME Magazine, 1999). Historians and political scientists have comprehensively analyzed *causes* of the post-World War II decolonization wave, including weakened European powers, the rise of superpowers opposed to the European colonial project, and increased mobilization ability among colonial subjects (Young, 1994).¹

However, researchers have devoted considerably less systematic attention to *consequences* of decolonization. We lack systematic evidence about a basic question: did the wave of decolonization from Western European empires between the 1940s and 1960s fundamentally change political and economic outcomes? Existing theories and historical accounts provide conflicting expectations that require concerted empirical assessment. Contemporary anti-colonial activists believed that independence would improve political free-

¹Strang (1991), Gartzke and Rohner (2011), Pepinsky (2015), and Paine (Forthcoming) provide quantitative evidence on causes of decolonization. Young (1970) and Abernethy (2000) provide comprehensive historical accounts of the events surrounding independence. dom and economic development (Naoroji, 1901; Furnivall, 2014). Later scholars emphasize democratic reforms leading up to independence (Young, 1970), and how independence allowed local actors to control their own public goods investments—which tended to produce beneficial outcomes in the colonial era when they occurred (Booth, 2007; Huillery, 2009; Donaldson, 2018).

By contrast, defenders of colonialism such as Lugard (1922) predicted that losing the European connection would produce institutionally weak and politically unstable independent states devoid of bureaucratic expertise and pacifying capacity. Furthermore, other scholars that do not sympathize with colonial rule highlight perverse incentives that post-colonial rulers faced given revenue shortfalls (Bates, 1981) and coup risks (Roessler, 2011).

Yet another perspective anticipates minimal differences before and after independence. Herbst (2014) stresses broader impediments to state-building in much of the non-European world that independence did not fundamentally alter. Gaining independence did not change post-colonial nations' dependent position in the international economy (Wallerstein, 2004) or in the broader international hierarchy of states (Lake, 2009), nor did independence fundamentally alter deeper institutions that affected prospects for economic development and democracy (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011; Lankina and Getachew, 2012).

This research note advances knowledge about the consequences of decolonization by examining variation *within* countries over time between the colonial and post-colonial eras. We examine four key outcomes: democracy, internal conflict, government revenue growth, and economic growth. To do this, we compiled a cross-national panel dataset of outcomes and European colonial status between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, the period during which formal Western European colonialism declined from its historical peak to virtual nonexistence. To account for confounding influences of heterogeneity across territories and of global historical changes, the main models include both unit and year fixed effects. The main statistical models implicitly assume that gaining independence exerted the same effect across colonial institutions, but additional models condition on varieties of colonial institutions studied in the existing literature: Africa and non-Africa, ex-British and non-British colonies, length of colonial rule, state antiquity, colonial European population size, and disrupted rule during World War II. Furthermore, despite inherent difficulties of addressing endogenous independence and of internal autonomy was largely unrelated

to local considerations: French Sub-Saharan countries pushed out of the French empire simultaneously in 1960; and "minor" colonies whose independence timing was largely determined by events in neighboring "major" colonies, measured by comparing the size of colonies' total population and European population. This setup provides an informative first-cut for learning about several key political and economic consequences of decolonization, given competing theoretical expectations for how decolonization affected these outcomes and a lack of extant quantitative evidence.

The analysis yields two main findings. First, democracy levels increased sharply during the period of internal autonomy that preceded independence in most countries. Although the colonial era as a whole was authoritarian (Mamdani, 1996; Young, 1994), colonizers (especially Britain) appear to have conscientiously promoted elections and democratic rule in their colonies immediately prior to granting independence. This provides, to our knowledge, a new finding about the timing of democratic gains, as only recently have democracy data become available that enable systematic comparisons involving the colonial era (Coppedge, 2018). This result provides insight into the timing of the "second wave" of democracy that followed World War II. The conclusion elaborates upon the importance of this result and possible theoretical explanations.

Second, in the main models and in numerous robustness checks, gaining independence does not systematically correlate with internal war, revenue growth, or economic growth. For fear that these results could be misinterpreted, we add a strong disclaimer: our many null findings *do not* imply that colonial domination was inconsequential. Among the political and economic outcomes we examine, given data limitations and inherent impediments to inferring causal relationships, we only examine within-country comparisons after World War II. Specifically, we compare late colonial rule to post-colonial rule, which provides insight into some important questions about the consequences of colonial rule. However, we cannot compare colonial rule to *non*-colonial rule—implying that we do not observe countries had they never been colonized, or had the global phenomenon of colonialism not occurred.² If the thrust of existing colonialism research is correct, then a natural interpretation of the present findings—although one we cannot directly verify—is that colonial rule in many countries altered social and institutional structures so fundamentally that simply eliminating the subordinate legal relationship to the metropole could not erase the deep (and, in many cases, negative)

²Appendix Section A.8 examines more suggestive comparisons between post-independence years and the "high" colonial era (1919 to 1945), finding that although this earlier colonial period was more peaceful than the post-independence period, it was also highly authoritarian and less fiscally effective.

impact of external rule. Colonialism often created or reinforced social structures that impeded political and economic progress, and fixed colonies into a dependent position in the world economy and hierarchy of states. The conclusion elaborates upon these takeaways and implications for broader international relations phenomena.

1 Consequences of Gaining Independence: Existing Arguments

Despite considerable historical research on *causes* of the post-World War II decolonization wave, existing arguments about the *consequences* of decolonization provide divergent expectations—necessitating empirical tests to evaluate these various accounts. For all four of our outcome variables, existing arguments can be interpreted to support either negative, positive, or null effects of decolonization.

1.1 Democracy

European colonial rule was, almost axiomatically, undemocratic. Outside a handful of self-governing settler colonies, European rulers were not politically accountable to the colonial population (Mamdani, 1996; Furnivall, 2014). In response to a lack of popular support for colonial policies, colonial governance patterns often created despotic local leaders (Mamdani, 1996) and the colonial state relied heavily on coercion (Young, 1994).

This observation leaves open the question of whether democracy levels would increase in the lead-up to independence, as some research indicates. European colonizers expanded political representation for natives, and Britain in particular attempted to achieve an "honourable exit" from its colonies by promoting democracy (Young, 1970, 482). For example, in India, Britain began introducing elections at increasingly higher levels of government between the 1920s and 1930s, partly reacting to local demands. This required developing political parties, such as the Indian National Congress, to contest elections. France also introduced electoral reforms in its Sub-Saharan African colonies after World War II, culminating with full legal suffrage in 1956. If these arguments are correct and these are not isolated examples, then the late decolonization period should produce democratic gains. After independence, it is possible that post-colonial actors could sustain representative gains by eliminating alien rule. But it is also possible that foreign-imposed

electoral institutions would be difficult to sustain absent fundamental changes in deeper institutions and in social structure (Lee and Paine, 2018*a*).

However, attempts to expand rights in the late colonial era may not have mattered. Recent scholarship on colonial causes of post-independence democracy focuses mostly on factors rooted deeper in the colonial period such as British legal institutions (Weiner, 1987), Protestant missionaries (Woodberry, 2012; Lankina and Getachew, 2012), and colonial-era European settlers (Hariri, 2012; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011). If these arguments are correct, then we should expect minimal change in democracy levels near independence because the deeper cultural and political institutions predicting democracy—such as common law tradition and higher literacy rates from Protestant missionaries—would change little.

1.2 Economic Growth

The literature produces a strong consensus that variation in colonial policies exerted important long-term consequences for economic growth. Many common colonial institutions should have reduced economic production by weakening property rights and by increasing inequality, including forced labor institutions (Dell, 2010), institutions regulating land tenure (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005), and "extractive" institutions generally (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Conversely, scholars show that areas with common law legal systems (La Porta et al., 1998) and participatory institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011) have stronger property right protection and faster economic growth.

However, by focusing solely on long-term persistence, these accounts do not yield clear implications for consequences of decolonization. If colonial institutions were deeply enough rooted, then perhaps there should be no decolonization effect. This perspective mirrors dependency theories. Authors such as Wallerstein (2004) allege that colonial rule was harmful, but do not expect deleterious effects to fade away at independence because ex-colonies constitute a peripheral role in a global economy dominated by first world countries, a perspective that research on hierarchy in international relations implicitly echoes (Lake, 2009, 39).

Alternatively, shifting power to local rulers could have positively affected growth despite minimally altering institutions. When they occurred, colonial economic investments tended to bolster development (Booth, 2007; Huillery, 2009; Donaldson, 2018), but colonial governments suspicious of mass literacy often un-

derinvested in human capital and related public goods (Chaudhary, 2010). Therefore, simply by pursuing policies more favorable toward the local economy may have enabled post-colonial rulers to boost economic growth.

Finally, ending colonial rule could have negatively affected economic growth by removing development benefits of external rule. For example, Ferguson (2012) argues that "the British empire acted as an agency for imposing free markets, the rule of law, investor protection and relatively incorrupt government." This view alleges that independence undermined the state as a neutral arbiter, as post-colonial rulers often favor co-ethnics in public good provision despite causing economic distortions (Bates, 1981). Independence would also reduce protection for foreign investors—no longer investing in their own currency or under their own political and legal system—and perhaps cause capital and expertise outflows.

1.3 Government Revenue

Herbst's (2014) influential scholarship on governance in Africa associates colonial rule with weak states. Colonizers faced few incentives to invest in public goods or to collect difficult-to-obtain tax revenues. They instead tended to construct bureaucratically minimal states that sought enough revenue intake simply to balance the budget, and local elites provided many core functions (Mamdani, 1996; Gardner, 2012). Conversely, indigenously ruled parts of empires, such as princely states in India, tended to accrue larger tax revenues (Iyer, 2010). After independence, positive demand-side consequences of decolonization caused by broader political participation provided rulers with greater needs to provide goods like education. However, it is also possible that the expertise of European empires with a lengthier history of bureaucratic government (Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002)—i.e., a negative institutional supply-side effect of decolonization—combined with the raw coercive power of *bula mutari* (Young, 1994) more effectively raised revenue.

Alternatively, decolonization may have minimally affected fiscal capacity. Despite highlighting many shortcomings of colonial rule, Herbst (2014) and Mamdani (1996) consider the colonial and post-colonial periods in Africa as two episodes in a region plagued by deeper structural impediments to projecting political power. This suggests that low fiscal capacity should persist after independence, which statistical evidence from Africa supports (Thies, 2009). Similarly, Chaudhary (2013) notes, "By underinvesting ... colonial rule did constrain the development of primary education in India. But, this does not imply India would have enjoyed better outcomes as an independent state."

1.4 Conflict

Although many emphasize that establishing colonial rule caused social disruption and violence (Wimmer and Min, 2006), once consolidated, colonial rule was not necessarily conflict-prone. On the one hand, contemporary Europeans characterized colonial governments as disinterested yet militarily strong regimes that eliminated endemic local violence, such as conflicts during Africa's 19th century military revolution (Reid, 2012). In these accounts, the superior ability of colonial militaries to maintain internal peace engendered a *Pax Colonia*. This could have arisen either because European militaries exhibited superior force capabilities or because European generals' staunch loyalty eliminated coup fears. By contrast, in the post-colonial world, rulers fearful of insider takeover have often excluded rival ethnic groups from government—increasing civil war likelihood (Roessler, 2011).

On the other hand, colonial rule also created conflict-inducing conditions such as light European presence on the ground, unpopularity of foreign rule, and coercion-intensive policies. After World War II, the enhanced mobilization ability by subject populations (Young, 1970) could have exacerbated these vulnerabilities. Regarding decolonization, although European powers usually attempted to expand political rights and then to grant independence to avoid facing armed rebel groups,³ power vacuums created by transitioning state authority could trigger war before or shortly after independence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Combining these conflict-enhancing and conflict-suppressing effects also yields the possibility of net null consequences from gaining independence.

2 Data and Models

Theoretical ambiguity in existing research highlights the need to systematically evaluate the relationship between decolonization and a range of outcomes, examining both aggregated and disaggregated patterns.

³European settler-dominated states that faced strong incentives to hold on provided the main exceptions (Paine, Forthcoming).

This section describes the main variables and models, and Appendix Table A.1 provides summary statistics. The appendix also provides a battery of robustness checks that Table 1 summarizes.

2.1 Sample

The unit of analysis is territory-year, where territories can be either colonized or independent countries. The main results compare independent years to post-World War II colonialism. By only analyzing countries that gained independence from Western European colonial rule between 1945 and 1989, we observe outcomes both before and after independence for every territory in the sample (which is necessary for a country to be included in models with unit fixed effects). The panel includes annual data between 1941 and 1989. The starting year allows five years before independence for the earliest independence countries in our sample. Evaluating all outcomes along the same time horizon is appropriate because we are agnostic regarding when any systematic effects should emerge.

2.2 Dependent Variables

V-Dem's electoral democracy index measures democracy level (Coppedge, 2018). Unlike other commonly used democracy measures, V-Dem has extensive coverage of territories even under colonial rule. To code "internal war" onset, we combine Correlates of War's intra-state and extra-state war data (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010), and use additional sources for smaller territories. The onset variable equals a 1 in the first year of a war and 0 in all subsequent years, and we also model lagged war incidence. Most extra-state wars involve a colony fighting against a European power, and we matched these wars to the colony where fighting occurred. To measure government revenue growth, we use growth in logged per capita central government revenue in ounces of gold, taken from Mitchell (1998) and converted to gold by Lee and Paine (2018*b*), who omit territory-years with inconvertible currencies. For economic growth, we use growth in logged income per capita from Maddison (2008), which has broad global coverage starting in 1950 and scattered coverage before that. Correspondingly, the first year in these regressions is 1951, as opposed to 1941 for the other dependent variables.

Democracy and income have broad coverage: 66 and 62 countries, respectively, in the main regression table (Table 2). Although we have internal war data for every territory, the sample sizes in these regressions are

smaller (31 countries) because logit models with unit fixed effects drop territories that experienced no conflicts during the sample time period. The revenue variable has sparser coverage (37 countries). However, the previously unused data source that provides the basis for our revenues variable still improves considerably over existing datasets that tend to have poor spatial and/or temporal coverage before 1970, when the widely used International Monetary Fund's (2017) dataset begins.⁴

Appendix Tables A.2 through A.5 present the average value of each dependent variable by territory during the regular colonial, colonial autonomy, and post-independent periods. These tables therefore also show the sample for each dependent variable.

2.3 Independence and Autonomous Colonial Rule

Political independence occurred when the European colonizer granted complete formal sovereignty to a local government, including full control of domestic and foreign policy, and we use Gleditsch and Ward's (1999) data for independence year. In many colonies, formal independence culminated a gradual process of decolonization. Prior to granting complete independence, the metropole often delegated control over internal affairs to local leaders (elected or not) while the colonial power dictated foreign and defense policy. Colonial autonomy is theoretically relevant for understanding consequences of decolonization because local actors' control over taxation and economic policy could have produced divergent outcomes from regular colonial rule, and scholars such as Young (1970) have suggested that colonial policies toward popular participation changed fundamentally in the terminal colonial period. In most cases, actors knew that eventual independence was likely, but usually could not anticipate its exact timing at the onset of colonial autonomy. In colonies such as Bhutan, subjects enjoyed autonomy throughout the colonial period without concrete plans for independence until after World War II. In French Sub-Saharan Africa, internal autonomy began in 1958 knowing that independence would likely occur at some point, but neither French nor African leaders anticipated France liquidating its empire in 1960. For other colonies, such as Gold Coast/Ghana between 1954 and 1957, colonial autonomy represented a transitional phase with concrete plans for independence.

To capture this important historical consideration, we coded an indicator variable for years of colonial au-

⁴Lee and Paine (2018*b*) detail the challenges involved with converting Mitchell's (1998) source information into data points that can be compared across territories and time.

tonomy, the first quantitative data we are aware of on this topic.⁵ Autonomous colonies are those in which the colony-level government recruited residents from the colony and fully controlled the colony's internal affairs. In most cases, the metropole retained emergency powers or control over defense and foreign affairs. By contrast, arrangements with devolution only to local governments or only of particular policy areas (e.g., education but not the police) do not meet the autonomy criterion. The specific constitutional terminology for colonial autonomy varied across empires: British dominions and self-governing colonies, non-independent states within the French community, and U.S. commonwealths. Elsewhere, although many protectorates and trusteeship arrangements exhibited some degree of autonomy, we only coded as autonomous those where the colonial power played no domestic role.

2.4 Statistical Models

Various possible confounders complicate identifying decolonization effects. Cross-country differences related to the different outcomes could affect independence timing. African countries, for instance, generally gained independence later than Asian countries. To address this issue, every model contains territory fixed effects. Furthermore, secular trends in the outcomes imply that changes in the international environment and other time effects may confound identifying decolonization effects, which we address by including year fixed effects in almost every model. Section 5 details policy choices that affected the decolonization process and addresses concerns about country-specific time trends affecting countries' independence year.

Every model contains an post-independence indicator, lagged by one year. For the three continuous outcome variables, we estimate linear models with a lagged dependent variable (Beck and Katz, 2011), and for internal war onset we estimate logit models with lagged internal war incidence, peace years, and cubic splines (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998; McGrath, 2015). The equation is:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta \cdot Independent_{i,t-1} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{i,t}$ is the outcome variable, β is coefficient estimate for independent governance, γ_i is a vector of territory fixed effects, and δ_t is a vector of year fixed effects. To assess effects of internal self-rule (as distinct

⁵Our coding sources include Brownlie and Burns (1979), Page and Sonnenburg (2003), and *Encyclopedia Britannica* articles.

from full independence), some models include a colonial autonomy indicator:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \cdot Independent_{i,t-1} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \tag{2}$$

which leaves colonized years without internal autonomy as the omitted basis category. Later, we add interactions for various colonial institutions to the models. Every model clusters standard errors by territory.

Finally, we assessed our dependent variables for non-stationarity by running a series of Fisher-type unit-root tests based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. For each dependent variable, we calculated residuals from auxiliary regressions that include the unit and year fixed effects, and for all four residualized variables these tests reject at the 1% significance level the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots (results available upon request).

2.5 Robustness Checks

Table 1 lists every robustness check for Table 2 discussed only in the appendix.

Table 1: Additional Appe	ndix Robustness	Checks for	Table 2
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Alternative Time Periods and Measures						
<u>Table</u>	Description					
A.6	Truncates the time sample to 10 years before and 10 years after independence					
A.7	Expands the time sample back to 1919					
A.8	Expands the time sample back to 1815					
A.9	Disaggregates the last five years of colonial rule and first five years of independence					
A.10	Uses available alternative measures for the dependent variables					
A.11	Uses an independence indicator lagged by 10 years					
A.26	Compares post-independence years to the high colonial period (1919–1945)					
	Alternative Specifications for Statistical Models					
Table	Description					
A.12	Uses the other dependent variables as control variables					
A.13	Controls for the percentage of neighboring countries that are independent					
A.14	Includes second-order lags for the dependent and explanatory variables					
A.15	Aggregates within-treatment time units to address concerns about biased standard er-					
	ror estimates with serially correlated data					
A.16	Uses a weighted fixed effects estimator to eliminate possible bias from heterogeneous					
	treatment effects in two-way fixed effects models					

3 Main Patterns

The main findings are that colonial autonomy covaries with large and robust democratic gains, but all other relationships between the decolonization indicators and outcomes are null. Figure 1 depicts democracy levels, internal war onset, and growth for revenue and income. The figure includes the first decade before and the first decade after independence to maintain a constant basket of countries, and Appendix Figure A.1 shows trends in democracy and in conflict for the 80-year window around independence, although the regression models include all available data. The panels present local polynomial regressions with 95% confidence intervals and demonstrate heterogeneous patterns. Most striking, democracy levels increased dramatically in the few years before independence before stabilizing and slightly declining after independence. In the first full year of independence, average democracy scores are 89% higher than five years before, but drop by 15% in the decade following independence. Albeit less pronounced, internal warfare onset and revenue growth both increase prior to independence before dropping afterwards, and income growth exhibits the opposite pattern: dropping before independence before rising afterwards.

Table 2 presents the main regression estimates. Panel A provides initial insight into the differences between pre- and post-independence by estimating Equation 1. Although the correlation is null between the independence indicator and each outcome, the models are fairly tightly estimated. The standard errors we estimate for independence are small relative to the standard deviation of the outcome variable: 3% for democracy, 8% for conflict, 13% for revenue growth, and 10% for income growth. The standard error estimates are also qualitatively similar when running these models without clustering the standard error estimates (results available upon request)—in which case the hundreds or thousands of observations in each specification are assumed to be independent—which further suggests that low statistical power does not drive the null correlations.

The figures and some theories suggest that disaggregating the period immediately before independence may produce additional insights. Panel B of Table 2 estimates Equation 2, which distinguishes autonomous colonial rule from the remainder of the colonial period. The main finding is that the period of autonomy immediately prior to independence exhibited considerable democratic gains. The estimated long-run effect of the gains during this period relative to the rest of the colonial era is 0.19.⁶ This estimate is 1.4 standard

⁶The long-run effect equals the coefficient estimate for independence divided by 1 minus the coefficient



Figure 1: Outcomes Before and After Independence

Notes: Figure 1 plots a local polynomial function and 95% confidence interval for each outcome in the decades preceding and following independence.

deviations greater than mean democracy level in the sample in 1945, and slightly exceeds the difference in democracy levels between Jamaica and Ghana in 1970. Demonstrating robustness to alternative democracy measures, Appendix Table A.17 shows that examining all 10 of V-Dem's aggregate democracy indices besides the electoral democracy index yields similar results as in Table 2.

Two potential confounding concerns seem unlikely to drive this finding. First, is democracy linked by definition to decolonization? Although it may seem axiomatic that decolonization should coincide with electoral reforms, this was a historically contingent aspect of post-World War II Western European decolonization. Referencing earlier decolonization periods, Spain did not create meaningful representative electoral institutions within its American colonies in the early 19th century, and South Africa retained a very restrictive franchise at independence in 1910. Nor did the Soviet Union promote electoral representation in its constituent states prior to breakup in 1991. Furthermore, if handing power to natives inevitably increases democracy estimate for the lagged dependent variable: $\frac{\hat{\beta}}{1-\hat{\alpha}}$.

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule					
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)		
			growth	growth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Independent $t-1$	-0.00327	-0.0438	0.0245	0.00441		
	(0.00471)	(0.640)	(0.0400)	(0.00602)		
Democracy level $_{t-1}$	0.928***					
	(0.0177)					
Internal war incidence $t-1$		-1.534**				
		(0.775)				
$\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$			-0.0885			
			(0.0590)			
$\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$				0.106*		
				(0.0541)		
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365		
R-squared	0.962		0.371	0.116		
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Peace years and cubic splines	NO	YES	NO	NO		
	Panel 1	B. Distinguishing aut	onomous coloni	al rule		
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)		
			growth	growth		
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0151***	-2.104*	0.0509	0.00997		
	(0.00481)	(1.159)	(0.0446)	(0.00702)		
Independent $t-1$	0.00303	-0.590	0.0410	0.00814		
	(0.00555)	(0.703)	(0.0464)	(0.00633)		
Democracy $level_{t-1}$	0.919***					
	(0.0190)					
Internal war incidence $t-1$		-1.606**				
		(0.806)				
$\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$			-0.0889			
			(0.0600)			
$\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$				0.106*		
				(0.0541)		
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365		
R-squared	0.962		0.372	0.117		
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Peace years and cubic splines	NO	YES	NO	NO		

Table 2: Consequences of Decolonization: Panel Data from 1941 to 1989

Notes: Panel A of Table 2 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

scores, then democratic gains should persist after independence—contrary to the null post-independence findings in Model 5.

Appendix Table A.18 presents evidence that the terminal colonial period in our sample was associated with broad democratic gains by disaggregating the V-Dem electoral democracy index into its five subcomponents: freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage. The last five colonial years are positively and significantly associated with all five measures, and colonial autonomy is for three of the five. The findings provide supportive evidence that decolonization enabled important contestation reforms (freedom of expression, clean elections, freedom of association), although participation

aspects of democracy (elected officials, suffrage) generate the largest estimates. However, compared to other decolonization episodes, even this seemingly limited achievement is notable.

Second, did democratic gains result simply from global trends toward increased democratization during the mid-20th century? Imperial powers' decisions to grant an increased degree of self-rule to their colonies certainly reacted in part to the changed international climate following World War II, in particular the anticolonial attitude of the new global superpower (the United States) and growing intellectual distaste for colonialism among first world elites (Young, 1970; Strang, 1991). However, we include year fixed effects precisely to prevent such global trends from driving the findings. Furthermore, although global trends contributed to decolonization and to the broader "second wave" of democratization, this observation does not preclude decolonization itself from affecting democratization. Instead, colonial powers' decolonization decisions provide a plausible *mechanism* through which global trends altered local institutions in much of the world. Nor was global pressure sufficient for democratization, as colonial powers such as Portugal that attempted to perpetuate colonial rule thwarted decolonization and electoral reforms. Existing work on second wave democratization that emphasizes the importance of decolonization supports this argument (Huntington, 1993, 40).

Model 6 in Table 2 also demonstrates a statistically significant negative relationship between colonial autonomy and internal war onset. Unfortunately, it is unclear how any research design would permit interpreting this estimate as causal. Decolonization-related wars undermined the possibility of granting autonomous non-European control over domestic affairs. Instead, these wars either spurred counterinsurgency campaigns by the colonizer, or granting independence. Furthermore, our subsample below of "exogenous" autonomy cases demonstrates a null relationship between autonomy and internal wars.

4 Varieties of Colonialism

Does a subset of colonies drive the findings? Colonial rule varied in many ways across territories that may alter the relationship between gaining independence and the outcome variables. In fact, much of the existing colonialism literature assesses effects of heterogeneous colonial institutions. We analyze six widely debated varieties of colonialism that plausibly could have conditioned decolonization effects. However, adding interaction terms to the core regression models demonstrates similar findings across most varieties of colonial institutions, with two theoretically relevant exceptions: ex-British colonies exhibited greater democratic gains during colonial autonomy than non-British colonies, and countries with disrupted rule during World War II did not exhibit democratic gains during colonial autonomy. Appendix Section A.5 describes the data used to measure each variable.

Sub-Saharan Africa indicator. Many important contributions to the colonialism literature focus mainly on Sub-Saharan Africa (Herbst, 2014; Young, 1994; Mamdani, 1996). Most Sub-Saharan African countries were colonized relatively late and were ruled indirectly. Low population density, few navigable rivers, and tsetse fly prevalence in much of the continent have posed stark development challenges that could have engendered distinct decolonization effects.

British colonial rule indicator. Many have analyzed how British colonialism affected all four outcomes: democracy (Weiner, 1987; Lee and Paine, 2018*a*), development (Lee and Schultz, 2012), internal warfare (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2016; Paine, 2018), and revenue collection (Gardner, 2012). Distinct attributes of British colonialism include indirect rule through local leaders, and following a more coherent policy than other European powers during the post-World War II decolonization era.

Length of colonial rule. The amount of time for which Western Europe ruled a territory could also have conditioned the effect of gaining independence (Olsson, 2009). Longer-ruled colonies tended to be more directly governed and were often considered an integral part of the metropolitan country. The longest-ruled colonies in the present sample also became colonized during a mercantilist global era, which could have affected long-term development and democracy trajectories.

State antiquity index. Scholars have linked pre-colonial political development to economic development (Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002), democracy (Hariri, 2012), and internal warfare (Paine, 2018). Territories with pre-colonial states also provided extant bureaucratic infrastructure that could be used to rule indirectly, and also might have better allowed subjects to organize an anti-colonial rebellion.

Colonial European population share. Many have analyzed European settlers and development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001), democracy (Hariri, 2012), and internal warfare (Paine, Forthcoming). Settler colonies tended to gain greater degrees of self-governance and democratic representation for Europeans, which often created frictions between Europeans and non-Europeans in the lead-up to independence and/or majority rule.

Disrupted colonial rule during WWII indicator. The strength of the independence movement could also have affected the post-colonial state. Tensions created by European settlers affected the organization of decolonization movements, and therefore serves as one proxy for this concept. Another factor that impacted decolonization movements was whether Axis powers disrupted colonial rule during World War II. Japan occupied European colonies in Asia, and Germany invaded several colonies in Africa, before the original European colonizer attempted to regain control in 1945. Lawrence (2013) argues that disruptions in colonial rule created space for nationalist organization during the war and spurred post-World War II nationalist protests.

Results. Appendix Tables A.19 through A.24 re-run Equation 2 using a series of models with interaction terms that correspond to these conditioning factors (see Appendix Equation A.3). As in Table 2, correlations for internal wars, revenue growth, and economic growth are null across most subsets of colonies. Most subsets of countries also exhibited statistically significant democratic gains during the terminal colonial period. The interaction between the conditioning factor and colonial autonomy is statistically significant in the democracy regression in only two of the six tables: British colonialism and disrupted rule during World War II. The coefficient estimates from Table A.20 show that the long-term multiplier for the estimated effect of colonial autonomy on democracy is 2.8 times larger among British than among non-British colonies, and the p-value between colonial autonomy and democracy in the latter subsample is 0.119. Although this estimate indicates reasonable confidence that non-British colonies also exhibited democratic gains under autonomy, the larger British coefficient estimate is consistent with arguments that Britain more coherently aimed to promote electoral competition before independence (Young, 1970; Lee and Paine, 2018*a*).

Additionally, colonial autonomy and democracy do not systematically relate among countries with disrupted rule during World War II (Appendix Table A.24). In cases such as Vietnam and Indonesia, the colonizer faced difficulties regaining control over the colony after the war, and the subsequent chaos—and in some cases mass violence—implied that decolonization more closely resembled an exercise in surrendering than in constitutional negotiation, which the null coefficient estimate among guerrilla regimes in Appendix Table A.25 further substantiates. Overall, the findings from Tables A.19 through A.24 show that pooling together colonies indeed reveals a meaningful trend despite some exceptions that correspond with existing theories.

The primary purpose of these tables is to examine varieties of colonialism. However, showing the relation-

ship between colonial autonomy and democracy holds across various colonial institutions also addresses confounding concerns. The disaggregated results show that no particular subsample for which confounding concerns might be especially acute determines the aggregate finding.

5 Endogenous Independence Timing

Political processes consisting of concerted policy choices determined the timing of decolonization and achieving independence. Studying such "treatment" effects poses notorious difficulties because omitted factors that may have independently affected the outcomes influenced these policy choices.⁷ All the models thus far have controlled for unit and year fixed effects to address these concerns, but concerns linger about time-varying country-specific factors that are correlated with both independence timing and political outcomes. Colonizers could—and often did—calibrate the timing of independence to colonies' level of economic and political development or to military and political pressure within the colony. For example, rather than independence causing higher levels of economic development, greater development could cause countries to gain independence. Table 3 presents additional results that drop colonies for which we are most concerned about endogenous independence timing, showing that the findings are mostly similar when restricting attention to "exogenous" independence cases. Appendix Section A.6 lists the countries included in these samples, and Appendix Section A.7 addresses cases that gained independence via guerrilla movements.

We identify two sets of colonies in which the timing of internal autonomy and of independence and was not directly tied to internal events within the colonies. France, like all European powers, emerged from World War II in a weaker structural position to maintain colonial rule and faced better-organized populations that rejected colonial rule, most importantly in Vietnam and Algeria. It therefore began to implement political reforms in most of its colonies throughout the 1940s and 1950s. It introduced mostly uniform electoral reforms throughout this period in its Sub-Saharan African colonies, except Djibouti and smaller islands. This process sped up in the mid-1950s in the face of repeated setbacks in Vietnam and Algeria that not only forced France to rethink its colonial policies, but also fundamentally destabilized France's Fourth Repub-

⁷However, some authors minimize the importance of internal factors in decolonization decisions relative to external ones (e.g., Strang, 1991).

		Panel A. P	ooled	
DV [.]	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev/non.)	ln(Income/pop.)
51.	Democracy lever	internal war onset	growth	growth
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Colonial autonomy	0.0250**	-0.438	0.08/3	0.00912
Colonial autonomy $t=1$	(0.00250	-0.458	(0.0892)	(0.00760)
Independent	-0.00593	(0.941)	0.0359	0.0110
macpendent _t =1	(0.00575	(1.060)	(0.0583)	(0.00728)
Democracy level	0.053***	(1.000)	(0.0585)	(0.00728)
Democracy level $t=1$	(0.0182)			
Internal war incidence	(0.0182)	0.227		
Internal war incluence $t-1$		(1.220)		
ln(Pay/non) growth		(1.550)	0.172	
$m(\text{Rev./pop.})$ grow $m_t = 1$			(0.0001)	
In (Income/per) growth			(0.0991)	0.0205
$m(mcome/pop.)$ grow m_{t-1}				0.0393
Torritory Moore	1 442	520	220	(0.0407)
Territory-years	1,442	559	228	1,104
R-squared	0.960	MEG	0.067	0.071
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	YES	YES	YES	YES
Peace years and cubic splines	NO	YES	NO	NO
	Panel B. Fi	rench African coloni	es with 1960 ind	ependence
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0143**		0.0557	0.00666
	(0.00628)		(0.0414)	(0.00529)
Independent $_{t-1}$	-0.0122**	-2.329	0.0485	0.0108
	(0.00527)	(1.430)	(0.0524)	(0.00883)
Democracy level $_{t-1}$	0.939***			
	(0.0119)			
$\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$			0.321**	
			(0.0956)	
$\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$				0.102
				(0.0613)
Territory-years	658	127	120	532
R-squared	0.931		0.146	0.070
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	YES	YES	YES	YES
Peace years and cubic splines	NO	YES	NO	NO
		Panel C. Mino	r colonies	
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Colonial autonomy ₄ 1	0.0366**	-0.160	0.125	0.00732
$\sum_{i=1}^{n}$	(0.0169)	(0.997)	(0.181)	(0.0183)
Independent,	1.14e-05	-0.294	-0.0590	0.0141
macpendent _t =1	(0.0104)	(1.183)	(0.0923)	(0.0141)
Democracy level	0.053***	(1.105)	(0.0)23)	(0.0117)
Democracy levelt=1	(0.0236)			
Internal war incidence	(0.0250)	0 303		
Internal war incidence $t-1$		(1.582)		
ln(Pay/non) growth		(1.362)	0.0101	
$m(\text{Kev./pop.})$ grow m_{t-1}			(0.191)	
In(Incomo/non)			(0.181)	0.0250
m(mcome/pop.) growin $_{t-1}$				-0.0250
Touritoury years	704	202	109	(0.0017)
D a second	/84	392	108	5/2
K-squared	0.966	VEC	0.038	0.066
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	YES	YES	YES	YES
Peace years and cubic splines	NO	YES	NO	NO

Table 3: "Exogenous" Independence Colonies

Notes: Every panel of Table 3 estimates Equation 2 on a restricted sample consisting of either French Sub-Saharan African countries that gained independence in 1960 (Panel B), minor colonies (Panel C), or both (Panel A). Every model contains territory fixed effects, a time trend variable that counts the number of years since 1941, and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The model in Column 2 of Panel B does not estimate a coefficient for colonial autonomy because no new wars began during those years in the French Sub-Saharan Africa sample, and lagged war incidence is also dropped because of separation. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

lic. In 1958, France granted internal autonomy to 14 Sub-Saharan African colonies that voted to remain within the French empire (only Guinea voted to secede). Continued destabilization of French domestic politics engendered the decision to grant independence to these 14 colonies in 1960—i.e., independent of colony-specific considerations such as levels of economic development or other indicators of "readiness" for independence. Indeed, less than two years prior all had voted to remain as colonies.

The second set of "exogenous" decolonization cases are colonies situated nearby larger colonies governed by the same European power. "Minor" colonies tended to gain independence (and, before independence, autonomy) because the colonizer reacted to events in the "major" colony, rather than to local conditions in the minor colonies. For example, internal politics within Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe caused the breakup of the Central African Federation and the resulting independence of Zambia and Malawi. Similarly, maintaining Britain's protectorate over Bhutan became geographically impossible after withdrawing from India in 1947. If a colony's population (either total or European) was less than half that of another colony in the same geographic region colonized by the same European power, then we code it as minor.

Whether pooling both sets of colonies (Panel A of Table 3) or analyzing them separately (Panels B and C), the findings are largely similar to those in Table 2. A time trend variable that counts the number of years since 1941 replaces the year fixed effects because of the small sample sizes and because every colony in Panel B gained independence in the same year (however, the results are similar with the year fixed effects, available upon request). The colonial autonomy period is robustly more democratic than the colonial period, whereas the other outcomes do not exhibit systematic differences before and after decolonization.

6 Conclusion and Broader Implications

This research note provides new insights into the consequences of decolonization by examining four key political and economic outcomes in a panel design. The most immediate implications of our findings are to understanding the political and economic consequences of decolonization from Western Europe rule after World War II. The findings for democratic improvement in the terminal colonial period provide, to our knowledge, a new finding about the timing of democratic gains, as only recently have democracy data become available that enable systematic comparisons involving the colonial era (Coppedge, 2018). This result provides insight into the timing of the "second wave" of democracy that followed World War II.

Following existing research, the most likely theoretical explanation for this pattern is that—in reaction to changing international trends—most colonizers made a concerted push to expand political representation in their colonies and produced meaningful gains in electoral competition, especially in the British empire (Young, 1970). However, because foreign powers imposed these elections at the end of the colonial period, post-independent actors faced difficulties in consolidating and sustaining these gains (Lee and Paine, 2018*a*)—explaining the lack of an effect after independence. This finding is also novel even when compared to existing quantitative research on colonialism and democracy. This literature tends to focus on deeper institutional and cultural factors stemming from Protestant missionaries, European settlers, and British legal tradition rather than on policy shifts in the immediate pre-independence period.

Additionally, the null results for the other outcomes contrast with arguments that ending colonial rule would either solve the problems caused by colonialism or trigger chaos, but support arguments that stress continuities between colonial and post-colonial rule (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2014), and that discount the importance of "flag independence" by itself (Smith and Jeppesen, 2017). For most countries, gaining independence did not fundamentally alter the dominant role of ex-imperial powers relative to their dependent ex-colonies (Wallerstein, 2004; Lake, 2009). However, this does not imply that colonial domination and decolonization were inconsequential, as we can only compare colonial rule to post-colonial rule as opposed to non-colonial rule—and therefore cannot assess a counterfactual premised on countries never being colonized. Furthermore, Appendix Section A.8 demonstrates some systematic differences between post-independence and the "high" colonial era (1919 to 1945), although these results are more speculative than findings premised on post-1945 colonial rule because of the inability to control for time-varying sources of heterogeneity.

These findings also contribute to broader international relations research. The colonial era provides a useful large-N laboratory for understanding consequences of external rule beyond the European colonial project, which relates to recent policy debates over the efficacy or desirability of "statebuilding" (Krasner, 2004) or "neotrusteeship" (Fearon and Laitin, 2004) by rich countries in failed states. However, instances of foreign rule such as U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq also differ considerably from European colonialism by operating in a quite different international environment, over shorter time frame, and with a larger role for indigenous elites. Scholars must account for these differences in future research when potentially analyzing, for example, whether gaining independence from other empires exhibits similar patterns as demonstrated

here.

Finally, the results inform debates about conceptualizing world politics in terms of hierarchy rather than anarchy (Lake, 2009) and about historical institutional approaches to international relations (Fioretos, 2011). In traditional international relations research, as McConaughey, Musgrave and Nexon (Forthcoming) discuss, territorial units only become objects of analysis after gaining independence. This approach implicitly assumes that gaining juridical sovereignty entails a critical juncture from previous institutional arrangements. Our approach unpacks this assumption by explicitly comparing countries before and after independence. Changing the formal relationship with the metropole correlates with democratic gains, but excolonies' continued status as lower entities in the international hierarchy of states may help to explain continued problems with promoting economic growth and fiscal development. Therefore, by entrenching a dependent relationship, European *colonization* of the world likely constituted a more fundamental critical juncture than *decolonization*.

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A.1 Additional Data Summary

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Territory-Years
V-Dem electoral democracy index	0.201	0.171	3116
Internal war onset	0.018	0.134	3234
ln(Revenues/pop.) growth	0.098	0.297	830
ln(Income/pop.) growth	0.015	0.062	2365
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.596	0.491	3234
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.080	0.271	3234

Table A.1: Summary Statistics





Notes: Figure 1 plots a local polynomial function and 95% confidence interval for democracy and for internal war onset in the four decades preceding and following independence. Panel A includes 55 countries, excluding 11 countries with at least a decade of missing democracy data. Panel B contains all 66 countries in the core sample, with no missing data.

For each dependent variable, the columns in Tables A.2 through A.5 present (1) for each country (2) the average value of the variable during non-autonomous colonial years, (3) the average value during colonial autonomy years, (4) the average value during post-independence years, (5) the difference in average values between colonial autonomy years and other colonial years (with their rank among all countries in parentheses), and (6) the difference in average values between post-independence years and colonial autonomy years (with their rank among all countries in parentheses). Countries denoted with * were autonomous for all years between 1941 and independence. Countries denoted with ** never gained autonomy prior to independence, and Column 6 for these countries is the post-independence average minus the pre-independence average. The internal war variable in Table A.3 equals 1 in the first year of a war, 0 for peace years, and is set to missing for ongoing conflicts. Therefore, the numbers reflect the percentage of peaceful years in which a new conflict occurred.

Table A.2	: Summary	of Democracy 1	Levels
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Country	Colonial avg.	Autonomy avg.	Post-indep. avg.	Autonomy-Colonial (rank)	Post-indepAutonomy (rank)
Algeria ^{**}	0.08	-	0.16	-	0.08 (21)
Angola**	0.01	-	0.07	-	0.06 (26)
Bahrain*	-	0.02	0.06	-	0.03 (35)
Benin	0.07	0.15	0.17	0.08 (22)	0.02 (38)
Bhutan ^{**}	-	0.03	0.04	-	0.02 (39)
Botswana ^{**}	0.08	-	0.67	-	0.59 (1)
Burkina Faso	0.16	0.24	0.23	0.08 (23)	-0.01 (47)
Burundi	0.04	0.14	0.13	0.09 (21)	-0.01 (48)
Cambodia	0.06	0.09	0.18	0.02 (38)	0.09 (17)
Cameroon	-	-	0.17	-	-
Central African Republic	0.11	0.24	0.14	0.13 (9)	-0.1 (61)
Chad	0.11	0.28	0.15	0.17 (4)	-0.13 (62)
Congo	0.09	0.2	0.14	0.11 (16)	-0.06 (56)
Congo, DR**	0.02	-	0.18	-	0.16 (11)
Cote d'Ivoire	0.09	0.14	0.18	0.05 (29)	0.04 (33)
Cyprus**	0.09	-	0.57	-	0.48 (2)
Djibouti	0.07	0.11	0.18	0.04 (32)	0.07 (25)
Fiji**	0.27	-	0.56	-	0.29 (5)
Gabon	0.08	0.16	0.19	0.08 (24)	0.03 (36)
Gambia	0.14	0.31	0.47	0.16 (5)	0.16 (12)
Ghana	0.11	0.31	0.22	0.19 (2)	-0.09 (59)
Guinea**	0.09	-	0.14	-	0.05 (30)
Guinea-Bissau**	0.01	-	0.12	-	0.1 (14)
Guyana	0.27	0.3	0.31	0.04 (33)	0 (43)
India**	0.19	-	0.61	-	0.42 (3)
Indonesia	0.03	0.16	0.21	0.13 (10)	0.06 (27)
Israel**	-	-	0.68	-	-
Jamaica	0.3	0.54	0.54	0.23 (1)	0 (44)
Jordan*	-	0.1	0.13	-	0.03 (37)
Kenya	0.09	0.13	0.22	0.04 (34)	0.09 (18)
Kuwait*	-	0.15	0.2	-	0.06 (28)
Laos	0.1	0.2	0.18	0.11 (17)	-0.03 (51)
Lesotho	0.06	0.19	0.16	0.13 (11)	-0.03 (52)
Libya**	0.02	-	0.1	-	0.08 (22)
Madagascar	0.06	0.14	0.23	0.08 (25)	0.08 (23)
Malawi	0.03	0.19	0.17	0.16 (6)	-0.02 (50)
Malaysia**	0.07	-	0.27	-	0.2 (7)
Mali	0.1	0.17	0.18	0.08 (26)	0 (45)
Mauritania	0.11	0.27	0.18	0.16 (7)	-0.09 (60)
Mauritius	0.28	0.36	0.77	0.08 (27)	0.41 (4)
Morocco**	0.05	-	0.15	-	0.1 (15)
Mozambique**	0.03	-	0.08	-	0.05 (31)
Myanmar	0.14	0.19	0.2	0.05 (30)	0.01 (41)
Nepal*	-	0.01	0.11	-	0.1 (16)
Niger	0.04	0.14	0.15	0.1 (19)	0.01 (42)
Nigeria	0.15	0.18	0.23	0.03 (36)	0.05 (32)
Pakistan**	-	-	0.18	-	-
Philippines*	-	0.12	0.32	-	0.2 (8)
Rwanda**	0.03	0.16	0.21	0.12 (13)	0.06 (29)
Senegal	0.19	0.24	0.41	0.05 (31)	0.17 (9)
Sierra Leone	0.14	0.26	0.25	0.12 (14)	-0.01 (49)
Singapore	0.24	0.32	0.34	0.08 (28)	0.02 (40)
Somalia**	0.1	-	0.19	-	0.09 (19)
Sri Lanka	0.34	0.35	0.62	0.01 (39)	0.27 (6)
Sudan	0.09	0.22	0.19	0.13 (12)	-0.04 (54)
Swaziland	0.07	0.18	0.14	0.12 (15)	-0.05 (55)
Syria*	-	0.13	0.17	-	0.04 (34)
Tanzania	0.07	0.18	0.26	0.11 (18)	0.08 (24)
Togo	0.07	0.22	0.14	0.15 (8)	-0.08 (58)
Trinidad and Tobago	0.29	0.47	0.64	0.19 (3)	0.17 (10)
Tunisia**	0.04	-	0.18	-	0.13 (13)
Uganda	0.08	0.19	0.19	0.1 (20)	0 (46)
United Arab Emirates*	-	-	0.03	-	-
Vietnam ^{**}	0.24	0.27	0.2	0.03 (37)	-0.07 (57)
Zambia	0.11	0.15	0.23	0.04 (35)	0.09 (20)
Zimbabwe*	-	0.26	0.23	-	-0.03 (53)

Country	Colonial avg.	Autonomy avg.	Post-indep. avg.	Autonomy-Colonial	Post-indepAutonomy
Algeria**	7%	-	4%	-	-4% (t59)
Angola**	9%	-	50%	-	41% (1)
Bahrain*	-	0%	0%	-	0% (t20)
Benin	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Bhutan*	-	0%	0%	-	0% (t20)
Botswana**	0%	-	0%	-	0% (t20)
Burkina Faso	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Burundi	0%	0%	4%	0% (t2)	4% (14)
Cambodia	0%	0%	12%	0% (t2)	12% (7)
Cameroon	6%	0%	0%	-6% (t36)	0% (t20)
Central African Republic	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Chad	0%	0%	13%	0% (t2)	13% (4)
Congo	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Congo, DR**	0%	-	11%	-	11% (8)
Cote d'Ivoire	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Cyprus**	0%	-	0%	-	0% (t20)
Diibouti	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Fiji**	0%	_	0%	-	0% (t20)
Gabon	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Gambia	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Ghana	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Guinea**	0%	-	0%	-	0% (t20)
Guinea-Bissau**	0%	-	0%	-	0% (t20)
Guyana	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
India**	17%	-	9%	0 /0 (L2) -	-7% (t61)
Indonesia	0%	25%	23%	25% (1)	-2% (58)
Israel**	14%	2570	0%	2370 (1)	-14% (64)
Iamaica	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	$0\%(t^{2}0)$
Jordan*	070	0%	2%	0 / (12)	2% (t18)
Kenya	6%	0%	0%	-6% (t36)	0% (t20)
Kuwait*	0.10	0%	0%	-070 (150)	0% (t20)
Laos	0%	0%	10%	0%(t2)	10% (120)
Lesotho	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	$0\%(t^{2}0)$
Libye**	0%	070	0%	070 (12)	0% (t20)
Libya Madagaagar	6%	-	0%	- 60/- (+26)	0%(120)
Malawi	0%	0%	0%	-0% (130)	0%(120)
Malawi	120%	070	0%	0%(12)	12% (120)
Mali	13%	-	0%	-	-12%(03)
Manitorio	0%	0%	0%	0% (12)	0% (120)
	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (120)
Mauritius	0%	0%	0%	0% (12)	0% (120)
Morocco **	8%	-	4%	-	-4% (159)
Mozambique	4%	-	20%	-	16% (3)
Myanmar	0%	0%	22%	0% (t2)	22% (2)
Nepal ^{**}	-	0%	0%	-	0% (t20)
Niger	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Nigeria	0%	0%	7%	0% (t2)	7% (12)
Pakistan**	0%	-	3%	-	3% (t15)
Philippines*	-	0%	8%	-	8% (11)
Rwanda**	5%	-	4%	-	-
Senegal	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Sierra Leone	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Singapore	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Somalia**	0%	-	3%	-	3% (t15)
Sri Lanka	0%	0%	6%	0% (t2)	6% (13)
Sudan	0%	0%	10%	0% (t2)	10% (t9)
Swaziland	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Syria*	-	0%	2%	-	2% (t18)
Tanzania	0%	0%	3%	0% (t2)	3% (t15)
Togo	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Trinidad and Tobago	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Tunisia**	7%	-	0%	-	-7% (t62)
Uganda	0%	0%	13%	0% (t2)	13% (t5)
United Arab Emirates*	-	0%	0%	-	0% (t20)
Vietnam**	17%	-	3%	-	-
Zambia	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Zimbabwe*	-	0%	13%	-	13% (t5)

Table A.3: Summary of Internal War Onset Frequency

Country	Colonial ava	Autonomy avg	Post-inden ava	Autonomy_Colonial	Post-inden _Autonomy
Algeria**	21%	-		-	-
Angola**	13%	-	-	-	-
Bahrain*	-	-	-	-	-
Benin	-	-	-	-	-
Bhutan*	-	-	-	-	-
Botswana**	-	-	-	-	-
Burkina Faso	-	-	-	-	-
Burundi	-	-	-	-	-
Cambodia	-	-	-	-	-
Cameroon	-	-	4%	-	-
Central African Republic	16%	23%	4%	7% (1)	-20% (18)
Chad	-2%	-	8%	-	-
Congo	-	-	-	-	-
Congo, DR	11%	-	-	-	-
Cote d'Ivoire	-	-	9% (%	-	-
Diihouti	17%	-	0%	-	-12% (13)
DJIDOUU Fiii**	-	-	-	-	-
Gabon	970 7%	-	33%	-	-
Gambia	-	_	-	_	-
Ghana	18%	12%	16%	-7% (7)	4% (6)
Guinea**	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea-Bissau**	-	-	-	-	-
Guyana	9%	5%	3%	-4% (6)	-2% (9)
India**	19%	-	7%	-	-12% (14)
Indonesia	-	-	10%	-	-
Israel**	20%	-	33%	-	13% (4)
Jamaica	10%	10%	8%	0% (3)	-2% (10)
Jordan*	-	-	-	-	-
Kenya	12%	-	-	-	-
Kuwait*	-	-	-	-	-
Laos	-	-	-	-	-
Lesotho	-	-	-	-	-
Libya Madagascar	-	-	-	- 15% (8)	- 5% (5)
Malawi	13%	-49%	570	-61%(0)	5 % (5)
Malavsia**	21%	-	6%	-	-14% (16)
Mali	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritius	8%	-6%	8%	-15% (9)	15% (3)
Morocco**	-	-	-	-	-
Mozambique**	7%	-	-	-	-
Myanmar	-	-	-	-	-
Nepal*	-	-	-	-	-
Niger	-	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	16%	0%	21%	-16% (10)	21% (2)
Pakistan Dhilinginger*	-	-	3%	-	-
Philippines Pwondo**	-	-	4%	-	-
Senegal	-	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	13%	- 17%	4% 5%	-4%(2)	-12% (15)
Singapore	-	-	5% 6%	-	-
Somalia**	-	-	-	-	-
Sri Lanka	18%	16%	1%	-2% (5)	-14% (17)
Sudan	-	-	-	-	-
Swaziland	-	-	-	-	-
Syria*	-	-	18%	-	-
Tanzania	15%	-	-	-	-
Togo	-	0%	4%	-	4% (7)
Trinidad and Tobago	9%	8%	6%	-1% (4)	-2% (11)
Tunisia**	12%	-	4%	-	-8% (12)
Uganda	17%	-	-	-	-
United Arab Emirates*	-	-	-	-	-
Vietnam ^{***}	-	-	-	-	-
Zaillola Zimbabwe*	12%	-0% 11%	55% 12%	-20% (11)	02%(1) 1%(8)
Liniouowe	-	11/0	1 2 /0	-	1/0 (0)

Table A.4: Summary of Revenue Growth

Table A.5: Summary	of Economic Growth
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Country	Colonial avg.	Autonomy avg.	Post-indep. avg.	Autonomy-Colonial	Post-indepAutonomy
Algeria**	3%	-	2%	-	-1% (24)
Angola**	2%	-	-4%	-	-6% (51)
Bahrain*	-	3%	1%	-	-2% (32)
Benin	-2%	2%	1%	4% (1)	-1% (25)
Bhutan*	-	-	-	-	-
Botswana**	2%	-	9%	-	7% (2)
Burkina Faso	3%	3%	1%	0% (8)	-1% (26)
Burundi	2%	-16%	2%	-18% (34)	19% (1)
Cambodia	-	2%	2%	-	0% (15)
Cameroon	2%	2%	2%	0% (9)	-1% (27)
Central African Republic	2%	2%	-1%	0% (10)	-3% (41)
Chad	2%	2%	0%	0% (11)	-2% (33)
Congo	2%	2%	2%	0% (12)	0% (16)
Congo, DR**	3%	_	-1%	-	-4% (44)
Cote d'Ivoire	2%	1%	1%	0% (13)	0% (17)
Cyprus**		-	-	-	-
Diibouti	1%	2%	-3%	1% (3)	-5% (47)
Fiii**	-	-	-	-	-
Gabon	3%	3%	1%	0% (14)	-2% (34)
Gambia	3%	-1%	1%	-4% (28)	2%(34) 2% (10)
Ghana	1%	2%	0%	1% (20)	_2% (35)
Guinea**	170	270	10%	1 /0 (4)	-2.10(33) -1.02(33)
Guinea Bissou**	3% 50%	-	1 %	-	-170(20) 50% (49)
Gumea-Dissau	5%	-	0%	-	-3% (48)
	-	-	-	-	-
India	-2%	-	2%	-	3% (8)
Indonesia	2%	-	3%	-	-
Israel**	-	-	4%	-	-
Jamaica	8%	6%	1%	-2% (26)	-4% (45)
Jordan*	-	-	3%	-	-
Kenya	1%	2%	2%	1% (5)	0% (18)
Kuwait*	-	1%	-6%	-	-7% (53)
Laos	-	1%	1%	-	0% (19)
Lesotho	4%	0%	3%	-4% (29)	3% (9)
Libya**	-	-	4%	-	-
Madagascar	2%	2%	-1%	0% (15)	-3% (42)
Malawi	2%	-4%	2%	-6% (31)	6% (4)
Malaysia**	6%	-	4%	-	-3% (43)
Mali	2%	2%	1%	0% (16)	0% (20)
Mauritania	3%	2%	2%	0% (17)	0% (21)
Mauritius	3%	-3%	4%	-6% (32)	7% (3)
Morocco**	0%	-	2%	-	1% (13)
Mozambique**	2%	-	-3%	-	-4% (46)
Myanmar	-	-	2%	-	-
Nepal*	-	-	1%	-	-
Niger	2%	2%	-1%	0% (18)	-2% (36)
Nigeria	3%	0%	1%	-4% (30)	2% (11)
Pakistan**	-	-	2%	-	
Philippines*	-	-	3%	-	-
Rwanda**	2%	-5%	2%	-7% (33)	6% (5)
Senegal	2%	1%	0%	0% (19)	-2% (37)
Sierra Leone	2%	2%	1%	-1%(24)	-1% (29)
Singapore	0%	2%	6%	1% (6)	1% (2))
Somalia**	2%	270	0%	170(0)	-2% (38)
Sri Lanka	210	20%	2%	0% (20)	-2%(58)
Sudan	-270	-2 %	2 %	0%(20)	$\frac{1}{20}(7)$
Sudali	270 501	270	0%	$\frac{0\%}{21}$	-2% (39)
Swazinanu Swria*	5%	170	2 % 2 0/-	170 (7)	-370 (49)
Tanania	-	-	5% 10/	-	-
Tanzania	1%	1%	1%	0% (22)	-1% (30)
10g0	2%	1%	1%	0% (23)	0% (22)
Irinidad and Tobago	5%	1%	1%	3% (2)	-6% (52)
Tunisia**	1%	-	3%	-	2% (12)
Uganda	0%	-1%	0%	-1% (25)	1% (14)
United Arab Emirates*	-	2%	-3%	-	-5% (50)
Vietnam**	-	3%	1%	-	-2% (40)
Zambia	3%	0%	-1%	-3% (27)	0% (23)
Zimbabwe*	-	2%	2%	-	-1% (31)

A.2 Alternative Time Periods and Measures

The first three appendix regression tables alter the time sample used in Table 2. Table A.6 only includes the first 10 years before and after independence for each territory. The next two tables lengthen the time sample, either from 1919 to 1989 (Table A.7) or from 1815 to 1989 (Table A.8). Democracy and internal wars have reasonably good coverage dating back to the end of World War I, and Table A.7 provides estimates over a longer panel than in most comparative political science research (using the same country sample as in Table 2). Table A.8 analyzes an even longer time panel dating back to 1815 using all countries with available data, albeit with considerable missing data during the 19th century (the results are qualitatively identical when using the 1815-1989 time period but the same country sample as Table 2, available upon request).

	Pan	el A. Post-independe	nce vs. colonial	rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent $_{t-1}$	-0.00677	0.00330	0.0488	0.0202**
	(0.00844)	(0.0162)	(0.0735)	(0.00996)
Territory-years	1,171	1,223	330	973
R-squared	0.939	0.145	0.349	0.216
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel	B. Distinguishing aut	tonomous coloni	al rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0190***	-0.0354**	0.101	0.00654
	(0.00669)	(0.0177)	(0.0673)	(0.00836)
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.00753	-0.0205	0.124	0.0243**
	(0.0104)	(0.0181)	(0.104)	(0.0112)
Territory-years	1,171	1,223	330	973
R-squared	0.940	0.148	0.354	0.217
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A.6: Within 10 Years of Independence

Notes: Panel A of Table A.6 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using a restricted time sample: within a decade either before or after independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a linear link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. A logit model does not converge for the Column 2 specifications because of separation. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

	Pan	el A. Post-independe	nce vs. colonial	rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent $_{t-1}$	-0.00588	-0.307	0.0432	0.00319
	(0.00422)	(0.586)	(0.0375)	(0.00612)
Territory-years	4,389	1,280	1,324	2,520
R-squared	0.968		0.365	0.132
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel 1	B. Distinguishing aut	onomous coloni	al rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0109***	-1.881**	0.0759	0.0112
	(0.00363)	(0.907)	(0.0472)	(0.00697)
Independent $_{t-1}$	-0.00126	-0.749	0.0655	0.00738
_	(0.00480)	(0.634)	(0.0433)	(0.00644)
Territory-years	4,389	1,280	1,324	2,520
R-squared	0.969		0.367	0.133
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A.7: Expanded Time Sample: 1919–1989

Notes: Panel A of Table A.7 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using an expanded time sample: 1919 to 1989. Years prior to European colonization are omitted. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

	Pan	el A. Post-independe	nce vs. colonial	rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent $_{t-1}$	-0.00447**	0.517	0.0436**	-0.000125
	(0.00182)	(0.498)	(0.0212)	(0.00401)
Territory-years	10,946	2,248	3,846	5,707
R-squared	0.975		0.332	0.149
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel I	B. Distinguishing aut	onomous coloni	al rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.00796**	-1.282	0.0621**	0.0138**
	(0.00306)	(0.820)	(0.0286)	(0.00626)
Independent $_{t-1}$	-0.00289	0.309	0.0501**	0.00334
	(0.00197)	(0.534)	(0.0208)	(0.00391)
Territory-years	10,946	2,248	3,846	5,707
R-squared	0.975		0.332	0.150
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A.8: Expanded Time Sample: 1815–1989

Notes: Panel A of Table A.8 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using an expanded time sample: 1815 to 1989. Years prior to European colonization are omitted. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table A.9 disaggregates the data in a different way than in Table 2. It replaces the colonial autonomy variable with the last five years of colonial rule, and also disaggregates the first five years of independence from the remainder of post-independence years. Similar to Table 2, it shows that the last five years of colonial rule (like the closely related colonial autonomy period) are associated with considerable democratic gains, whereas neither of the post-independence periods are.

	Pan	el A. Post-independe	nce vs. colonial	rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Last five colonial years $t-1$	0.0278***	0.670	0.0171	-0.0119*
	(0.00372)	(0.663)	(0.0254)	(0.00640)
First five independence years $_{t-1}$	0.00281	0.0556	0.0571	-0.00514
	(0.00445)	(0.795)	(0.0840)	(0.00684)
Subsequent independence years $_{t-1}$	0.00123	-0.724	0.0207	-0.00730
	(0.00373)	(1.413)	(0.0417)	(0.00983)
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365
R-squared	0.964		0.372	0.117
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A.9: Disaggregating Near-Independence Periods

Notes: Table A.9 estimates Equation 1 with two additional indicators: the last five years of colonial rule, and the first five years of post-independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table A.10 uses alternative measures for internal war, revenues, and income. Column 1 replaces Correlates of War's internal war data with Brecke (1999). Column 2 replaces the revenue measure with normalized revenues, albeit at the cost of a smaller sample. Column 3 replaces Maddison's GDP data with Penn World Table (PWT; Feenstra et al. 2015), which tends to be of higher quality but has relatively scant coverage during the colonial era. Tables A.17 and A.18 present results with alternative democracy measures.

	Panel A.	Post-independence vs	. colonial rule
DV:	Brecke war onset	ln(Norm. rev./pop.)	ln(PWT income/pop.)
		growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent $t-1$	-0.556	0.00366	0.000974
	(0.442)	(0.00469)	(0.00129)
Territory-years	2,116	573	1,824
R-squared		0.298	0.119
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Di	stinguishing autonom	ous colonial rule
DV:	Brecke war onset	ln(Norm. rev./pop.)	ln(PWT income/pop.)
DV:	Brecke war onset	ln(Norm. rev./pop.) growth	ln(PWT income/pop.) growth
DV:	Brecke war onset (1)	ln(Norm. rev./pop.) growth (2)	ln(PWT income/pop.) growth (3)
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	Brecke war onset (1) 0.432	ln(Norm. rev./pop.) growth (2) -0.00150	In(PWT income/pop.) growth (3) 0.00209
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	(1) 0.432 (0.386)	ln(Norm. rev./pop.) growth (2) -0.00150 (0.00519)	ln(PWT income/pop.) growth (3) 0.00209 (0.00196)
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$	(1) (0.432 (0.386) -0.406	In(Norm. rev./pop.) growth (2) -0.00150 (0.00519) 0.00299	In(PWT income/pop.) growth (3) 0.00209 (0.00196) 0.00166
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$	(1) (0.432 (0.386) -0.406 (0.491)	In(Norm. rev./pop.) growth (2) -0.00150 (0.00519) 0.00299 (0.00537)	In(PWT income/pop.) growth (3) 0.00209 (0.00196) 0.00166 (0.00140)
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$ Territory-years	(1) 0.432 (0.386) -0.406 (0.491) 2,116	In(Norm. rev./pop.) growth (2) -0.00150 (0.00519) 0.00299 (0.00537) 573	In(PWT income/pop.) growth (3) 0.00209 (0.00196) 0.00166 (0.00140) 1,824
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$ Territory-years R-squared	(1) 0.432 (0.386) -0.406 (0.491) 2,116	In(Norm. rev./pop.) growth (2) -0.00150 (0.00519) 0.00299 (0.00537) 573 0.298	In(PWT income/pop.) growth (3) 0.00209 (0.00196) 0.00166 (0.00140) 1,824 0.120
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$ Territory-years R-squared Territory FE	Brecke war onset (1) 0.432 (0.386) -0.406 (0.491) 2,116 YES	In(Norm. rev./pop.) growth (2) -0.00150 (0.00519) 0.00299 (0.00537) 573 0.298 YES	In(PWT income/pop.) growth (3) 0.00209 (0.00196) 0.00166 (0.00140) 1,824 0.120 YES
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$ Territory-years R-squared Territory FE Year FE	Brecke war onset (1) 0.432 (0.386) -0.406 (0.491) 2,116 YES YES YES	In(Norm. rev./pop.) growth (2) -0.00150 (0.00519) 0.00299 (0.00537) 573 0.298 YES YES	In(PWT income/pop.) growth (3) 0.00209 (0.00196) 0.00166 (0.00140) 1,824 0.120 YES YES

 Table A.10: Alternative Measures

Notes: Panel A of Table A.10 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but with different measures of the dependent variables, described above. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Column 1 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. Columns 2 and 3 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table A.11 lags independence by ten years to examine whether the estimates differ when assuming that effects of independence may not have been immediate. In these regressions, a country that gained independence in 1960, for example, would be coded as colonized until 1970 and independent afterwards, thus treating the first decade of independence as one in which post-colonial effects may have yet to take hold. The coefficient estimate for independence is negative in the democracy regression in Column 1—as in Panel A of Table 2, but here is statistically significant. There is also a systematic negative association between lagged independence and internal warfare, which results from pooling decolonization wars and frequent conflict in countries' first years of (factual) post-independence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) into the pre-independence category when independence is lagged by 10 years. This result is consistent with Wimmer and Min's (2006) evidence about transitions from colonial rule being particularly conflictual.

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent $_{t-10}$	-0.00975***	-1.676***	-0.0352	-0.00143
	(0.00300)	(0.625)	(0.0482)	(0.00674)
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.371	0.115
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A.11: Independence Lagged 10 Years

Notes: Table A.11 estimates Equation 1 with the post-independence variable replaced by independence lagged by 10 years. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

A.3 Alternative Specifications for Time Series Models

Table A.12 accounts for several sources of time-varying, unit-specific heterogeneity by including every other dependent variable as a covariate, albeit at the cost of smaller samples due to missing data.

	Pan	el A. Post-independe	nce vs. colonial	rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent $t-1$	-0.00352	-0.0286	0.00759	0.00938
-	(0.0124)	(0.0337)	(0.0367)	(0.00895)
Democracy level $_{t-1}$	0.916***	-0.0433	0.103	0.0349
	(0.0434)	(0.0870)	(0.0920)	(0.0268)
Internal war incidence $t-1$	-0.00254	0.0115	0.0685**	0.00477
	(0.00850)	(0.0327)	(0.0293)	(0.0121)
$\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$	-0.0124	0.0043	-0.0634	0.0193
	(0.00810)	(0.0336)	(0.0690)	(0.0202)
$\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$	0.0735**	-0.152	1.001***	0.0771
	(0.0348)	(0.137)	(0.258)	(0.0872)
Territory-years	612	613	575	594
R-squared	0.971	0.199	0.624	0.177
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Peace years and cubic splines	NO	YES	NO	NO
	Panel	B. Distinguishing aut	onomous coloni	al rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
DV:	Democracy level (1)	Internal war onset (2)	ln(Rev./pop.) growth (3)	ln(Income/pop.) growth (4)
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	(1) 0.0418***	(2) -0.0296	ln(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791*	ln(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	(1) 0.0418*** (0.0149)	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287)	ln(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453)	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112)
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$	(1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454	ln(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$	(1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148)	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465)	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412)	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124)
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$ Democracy level $_{t-1}$	(1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892***	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$ Democracy level $_{t-1}$	(1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892*** (0.0413)	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946)	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991)	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291)
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$ Democracy level $_{t-1}$ Internal war incidence $_{t-1}$	(1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892*** (0.0413) 0.000458	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946) 0.00817	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991) 0.0737**	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291) 0.00400
DV: Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Independent $_{t-1}$ Democracy level $_{t-1}$ Internal war incidence $_{t-1}$	(1) (0.0418*** (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.892*** (0.0413) (0.000458 (0.00799)	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946) 0.00817 (0.0323)	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991) 0.0737** (0.0308)	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291) 0.00400 (0.0121)
DV: Colonial autonomy _{t-1} Independent _{t-1} Democracy level _{t-1} Internal war incidence _{t-1} ln(Rev./pop.) growth _{t-1}	(1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892*** (0.0413) 0.000458 (0.00799) -0.00984	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946) 0.00817 (0.0323) 0.00266	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991) 0.0737** (0.0308) -0.0610	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291) 0.00400 (0.0121) 0.0185
DV: Colonial autonomy _{t-1} Independent _{t-1} Democracy level _{t-1} Internal war incidence _{t-1} $ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$	(1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892*** (0.0413) 0.000458 (0.00799) -0.00984 (0.00750)	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946) 0.00817 (0.0323) 0.00266 (0.0347)	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991) 0.0737** (0.0308) -0.0610 (0.0691)	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291) 0.00400 (0.0121) 0.0185 (0.0203)
DV: Colonial autonomy _{t-1} Independent _{t-1} Democracy level _{t-1} Internal war incidence _{t-1} $ln(Rev./pop.) growth_{t-1}$ $ln(Income/pop.) growth_{t-1}$	Democracy level (1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892*** (0.0413) 0.000458 (0.00799) -0.00984 (0.00750) 0.0773**	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946) 0.00817 (0.0323) 0.00266 (0.0347) -0.153	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991) 0.0737** (0.0308) -0.0610 (0.0691) 1.010***	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291) 0.00400 (0.0121) 0.0185 (0.0203) 0.0753
DV: Colonial autonomy _{t-1} Independent _{t-1} Democracy level _{t-1} Internal war incidence _{t-1} $ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$	Democracy level (1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892*** (0.0413) 0.000458 (0.007799) -0.00984 (0.00750) 0.0773** (0.0315)	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946) 0.00817 (0.0323) 0.00266 (0.0347) -0.153 (0.138)	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991) 0.0737** (0.0308) -0.0610 (0.0691) 1.010*** (0.258)	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291) 0.00400 (0.0121) 0.0185 (0.0203) 0.0753 (0.0874)
DV: Colonial autonomy _{t-1} Independent _{t-1} Democracy level _{t-1} Internal war incidence _{t-1} $ln(Rev./pop.) growth_{t-1}$ $ln(Income/pop.) growth_{t-1}$ Territory-years	Democracy level (1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892*** (0.0413) 0.000458 (0.007799) -0.00984 (0.0315) 612	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946) 0.00817 (0.0323) 0.00266 (0.0347) -0.153 (0.138) 613	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991) 0.0737** (0.0308) -0.0610 (0.0691) 1.010*** (0.258) 575	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291) 0.00400 (0.0121) 0.0185 (0.0203) 0.0753 (0.0874) 594
DV: Colonial autonomy _{t-1} Independent _{t-1} Democracy level _{t-1} Internal war incidence _{t-1} In(Rev./pop.) growth _{t-1} In(Income/pop.) growth _{t-1} Territory-years R-squared	Democracy level (1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892*** (0.0413) 0.000458 (0.00799) -0.00984 (0.0315) 612 0.972	(2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946) 0.00817 (0.0323) 0.00266 (0.0347) -0.153 (0.138) 613 0.201	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991) 0.0737** (0.0308) -0.0610 (0.0691) 1.010*** (0.258) 575 0.627	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291) 0.00400 (0.0121) 0.0185 (0.0203) 0.0753 (0.0874) 594 0.179
DV: Colonial autonomy _{t-1} Independent _{t-1} Democracy level _{t-1} Internal war incidence _{t-1} In(Rev./pop.) growth _{t-1} In(Income/pop.) growth _{t-1} Territory-years R-squared Territory FE	Democracy level (1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892*** (0.0413) 0.000458 (0.00799) -0.00984 (0.0315) 612 0.972 YES	Internal war onset (2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946) 0.00817 (0.0323) 0.00266 (0.138) 613 0.201 YES	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991) 0.0737** (0.0308) -0.0610 (0.0691) 1.010*** (0.258) 575 0.627 YES	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291) 0.00400 (0.0121) 0.0185 (0.0203) 0.0753 (0.0874) 594 0.179 YES
DV: Colonial autonomy _{t-1} Independent _{t-1} Democracy level _{t-1} Internal war incidence _{t-1} ln(Rev./pop.) growth _{t-1} ln(Income/pop.) growth _{t-1} Territory-years R-squared Territory FE Year FE	Democracy level (1) 0.0418*** (0.0149) 0.0194 (0.0148) 0.892*** (0.0413) 0.000458 (0.00799) -0.00984 (0.0315) 612 0.972 YES YES	Internal war onset (2) -0.0296 (0.0287) -0.0454 (0.0465) -0.0262 (0.0946) 0.00817 (0.0323) 0.00266 (0.0347) -0.153 (0.138) 613 0.201 YES YES	In(Rev./pop.) growth (3) 0.0791* (0.0453) 0.0502 (0.0412) 0.0620 (0.0991) 0.0737** (0.0308) -0.0610 (0.0691) 1.010*** (0.258) 575 0.627 YES YES	In(Income/pop.) growth (4) -0.0121 (0.0112) 0.00274 (0.0124) 0.0421 (0.0291) 0.00400 (0.0121) 0.0185 (0.0203) 0.0753 (0.0874) 594 0.179 YES YES

Table A.12: Time-Varying Covariates

Notes: Panel A of Table A.12 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, in each case adding controls for the other dependent variables. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a linear link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. A logit model does not converge for the Column 2 specifications because of separation. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table A.13 controls for the percentage of each territory's land neighbors that are independent in a given year. Relative to the core sample, adding this control drops all island territories.

	Pan	el A. Post-independe	nce vs. colonial	rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent $_{t-1}$	-5.25e-05	0.129	0.0228	0.00777
	(0.00497)	(0.874)	(0.0472)	(0.00805)
Territory-years	2,637	924	579	2,057
R-squared	0.948		0.334	0.112
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel 1	B. Distinguishing aut	onomous coloni	al rule
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0172***	-1.885	0.0657	0.0118
	(0.00450)	(1.299)	(0.0609)	(0.00856)
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.00754	-0.553	0.0398	0.0120
	(0.00614)	(1.076)	(0.0543)	(0.00775)
Territory-years	2,637	924	579	2,057
R-squared	0.948		0.335	0.113
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A.13: Spatial Dependence: Controlling for Neighbors' Independence

Notes: Panel A of Table A.13 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, in each case adding a control for the percentage of land neighbors with political independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

In an unpublished paper, Achen (2000) shows that lagged dependent variables can induce bias in models if there is serial correlation. Although he advises omitting a lagged dependent variable, subsequent methodological research rejects that conclusion. Beck and Katz (2011, 336) argue: "there is nothing atheoretical about the use of a lagged dependent variable, and there is nothing that should lead anyone to think the use of a lagged dependent variable causes incorrect harm. It may cause 'correct' harm, in that it may keep us from incorrectly concluding that x has a big effect when it does not, but that cannot be a bad thing." Keele and Kelly (2006) conclude on the basis of their Monte Carlo simulations that "if the process was dynamic, OLS with an LDV provided estimates that were superior to the other models or estimators even in the presence of minor residual autocorrelation" (18) because omitting the lagged dependent variable induces omitted variable bias, while also offering the caveat that "If the model residuals are strongly autocorrelated, including a lag will produce biased estimates."⁸ However, Wilkins (2018) rejects even this limited critique of including a lagged dependent variable: "[Keele and Kelly] find that a regression of Y_t on X_t and Y_{t-1} produces estimates with relatively low bias compared with other models (such as just regressing Y_t on X_t), except under high levels of autocorrelation in the error term (high values of ϕ). But the problems in estimating the coefficient of the independent variable, β , arise because neither Achen (2000) nor Keele and Kelly (2006) specify the correct regression model, given the data-generating process." Wilkins shows that adding a second-order lag for the dependent variables and for the explanatory variables produces less biased estimates than specifications without the lagged dependent variable even under high autocorrelation. Table A.14 follows Wilkins' (2018) advice to add second-order lags for the continuous dependent variables, and computes long-run multipliers to interpret the estimated effects of independence and of colonial autonomy.

⁸They also suggest that "many of the problems that LDVs may cause with" the dependent variables that Achen (2000) studies "probably occur because the data are nonstationary," which we address in Section 2.4.

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule				
DV:	Democracy level	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)		
	-	growth	growth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.0232***	-0.00465	0.0121		
1 0 1	(0.00727)	(0.0904)	(0.0107)		
Independent, o	-0.0308***	0.0375	-0.00860		
	(0.00709)	(0.117)	(0.0107)		
Democracy level 1	1 136***	(0117)	(010107)		
Democracy $\operatorname{rever}_{l=1}$	(0.0242)				
Democracy level	-0.218***				
Democracy $even_{t=2}$	(0.0200)				
ln(Pay /non) growth	(0.02)))	0.0052			
$m(\text{Rev./pop.})$ grow $m_t=1$		(0.0575)			
ln (Day /non) anowith		(0.0373)			
$m(\text{Rev./pop.})$ grow $m_{t=2}$		-0.0133			
		(0.0240)	0.110**		
$\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \operatorname{growth}_{t-1}$			0.110**		
			(0.0502)		
$\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$			0.0239		
			(0.0372)		
Territory-years	3,106	791	2,307		
R-squared	0.966	0.364	0.119		
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES		
Year FE	YES	YES	YES		
	Le	ong-run multiplie	er		
Independent	0918389	.0295807	.0040514		
1	(.0711658)	(.044642)	.0077799		
	Danel P. Distingu	ishing outonom	and colonial mile		
DV	Patier D. Distiligu	listing autonom	la (In como / non)		
DV.	Democracy level	growth	growth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Colonial autonomy	0.0240***	0.0403	0.00163		
Colonial autonomy $t=1$	(0.0249***	(0.0403)	-0.00103		
Calarial autonomy	(0.00080)	(0.0044)	(0.0100)		
Colonial autonomy $_{t-2}$	-0.0140°	0.0102	0.0130		
T 1 1 /	(0.00793)	(0.0848)	(0.0114)		
$Independent_{t-1}$	0.0392***	0.00529	0.00355		
T 1 1 /	(0.0101)	(1) (33)	(0.0158)		
Independent $t-2$	0.0400****	(0.155)	0.00202		
-	-0.0408***	0.0431	0.00392		
	-0.0408*** (0.00995)	0.0431 (0.167)	0.00392 (0.0145)		
Democracy level $_{t-1}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128***	0.0431 (0.167)	0.00392 (0.0145)		
Democracy level $_{t-1}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246)	(0.155) 0.0431 (0.167)	0.00392 (0.0145)		
Democracy $evel_{t-1}$ Democracy $evel_{t-2}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218***	0.0431 (0.167)	0.00392 (0.0145)		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302)	0.0431 (0.167)	0.00392 (0.0145)		
Democracy $ evel_{t-1} $ Democracy $ evel_{t-2} $ $ln(Rev./pop.) growth_{t-1}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302)	-0.0960	0.00392 (0.0145)		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302)	-0.0960 (0.0594)	0.00392 (0.0145)		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302)	-0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155	0.00392 (0.0145)		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302)	(0.133) 0.0431 (0.167) -0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155 (0.0238)	0.00392 (0.0145)		
Democracy level _{$t-1$} Democracy level _{$t-2$} ln(Rev./pop.) growth _{$t-1$} ln(Rev./pop.) growth _{$t-2$}	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302)	$\begin{array}{c} (0.133)\\ 0.0431\\ (0.167)\\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} -0.0960\\ (0.0594)\\ -0.0155\\ (0.0238) \end{array}$	0.00392 (0.0145)		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302)	$\begin{array}{c} (0.133)\\ 0.0431\\ (0.167)\\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} -0.0960\\ (0.0594)\\ -0.0155\\ (0.0238) \end{array}$	0.00392 (0.0145) 0.108** (0.0507)		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302)	$\begin{array}{c} (0.133)\\ 0.0431\\ (0.167)\\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} -0.0960\\ (0.0594)\\ -0.0155\\ (0.0238) \end{array}$	0.00392 (0.0145) 0.108** (0.0507) 0.0228		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302)	(0.133) (0.0431) (0.167) (0.0960) (0.0594) -0.0155) (0.0238)	0.00392 (0.0145) 0.108** (0.0507) 0.0228 (0.0375)		
Democracy $ evel_{t-1} $ Democracy $ evel_{t-2} $ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1} $ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2} $ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1} $ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2} $ Territory-years	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302)	-0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155 (0.0238)	0.00392 (0.0145) 0.108** (0.0507) 0.0228 (0.0375) 2.307		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$ Territory-years R -sourced	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302) 3,106 0.966	-0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155 (0.0238) 791 0.364	0.00392 (0.0145) 0.108** (0.0507) 0.0228 (0.0375) 2,307 0.121		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $ln(Rev./pop.) growth_{t-1}$ $ln(Rev./pop.) growth_{t-2}$ $ln(Income/pop.) growth_{t-1}$ $ln(Income/pop.) growth_{t-2}$ Territory-years <u>R</u> -squared Theritory EE	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302) 3,106 0.966	-0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155 (0.0238) 791 0.364	0.00392 (0.0145) 0.108** (0.0507) 0.0228 (0.0375) 2,307 0.121 VES		
Democracy $ evel_{t-1} $ Democracy $ evel_{t-2} $ $ln(Rev./pop.) growth_{t-1} $ $ln(Rev./pop.) growth_{t-2} $ $ln(Income/pop.) growth_{t-1} $ $ln(Income/pop.) growth_{t-2} $ Territory-years <u>R-squared</u> Territory FE	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302) 3,106 0.966 YES	(0.133) 0.0431 (0.167) -0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155 (0.0238) 791 0.364 YES	0.00392 (0.0145) 0.108** (0.0507) 0.0228 (0.0375) 2,307 0.121 YES YES		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$ Territory-years <u>R-squared</u> Territory FE Year FE	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302) 3,106 0.966 YES YES	-0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155 (0.0238) 791 0.364 YES YES	0.00392 (0.0145) 0.108** (0.0507) 0.0228 (0.0375) 2,307 0.121 YES YES		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Rev./pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-1}$ $\ln(\text{Income/pop.}) \text{ growth}_{t-2}$ Territory-years <u>R-squared</u> Territory FE Year FE	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302) 3,106 0.966 YES YES YES	0.0431 (0.167) -0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155 (0.0238) 791 0.364 YES YES ong-run multiplic	0.00392 (0.0145) 0.108** (0.0507) 0.0228 (0.0375) 2,307 0.121 YES YES		
Democracy $ eve _{t-1}$ Democracy $ eve _{t-2}$ $ln(Rev./pop.) growth_{t-1}$ $ln(Rev./pop.) growth_{t-2}$ $ln(Income/pop.) growth_{t-1}$ $ln(Income/pop.) growth_{t-2}$ Territory-years <u>R-squared</u> Territory FE Year FE Colonial autonomy	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302) 3,106 0.966 YES YES YES La .1198398**	(0.133) 0.0431 (0.167) -0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155 (0.0238) 791 0.364 YES YES ong-run multiplic .0453713	0.00392 (0.0145) 0.108** (0.0507) 0.0228 (0.0375) 2,307 0.121 YES YES YES		
Democracy $ evel_{t-1} $ Democracy $ evel_{t-2} $ $ln(Rev./pop.)$ growth $_{t-1} $ $ln(Rev./pop.)$ growth $_{t-2} $ $ln(Income/pop.)$ growth $_{t-1} $ $ln(Income/pop.)$ growth $_{t-2} $ Territory-years R-squared Territory FE Year FE Colonial autonomy	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302) 3,106 0.966 YES YES YES Lange Lange La	(0.133) 0.0431 (0.167) -0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155 (0.0238) 791 0.364 YES YES ong-run multiplic .0453713 (.0529125)	0.00392 (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0507) 0.0228 (0.0375) 2,307 0.121 YES YES er .0161139* (.0086798)		
Democracy $ evel_{t-1}$ Democracy $ evel_{t-2}$ ln(Rev./pop.) growth _{t-1} ln(Rev./pop.) growth _{t-2} ln(Income/pop.) growth _{t-1} ln(Income/pop.) growth _{t-2} Territory-years <u>R-squared</u> Territory FE Year FE Colonial autonomy Independent	-0.0408*** (0.00995) 1.128*** (0.0246) -0.218*** (0.0302) 3,106 0.966 YES YES Loss YES Loss (.0500776) 0174411	(0.133) 0.0431 (0.167) -0.0960 (0.0594) -0.0155 (0.0238) 791 0.364 YES yES ong-run multiplic .0453713 (.0529125) .0435736	0.00392 (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0507) 0.0228 (0.0375) 2,307 0.121 YES YES ET .0161139* (.0086798) .008595		

Table A.14: Second-Order Lags

Notes: Panel A of Table A.14 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, in each case adding a second-order lag for the explanatory and dependent variables. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects, clusters standard errors by territory, and uses a linear link. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Bertrand et al. (2004) analyze a different possible concern with time series data stemming from serial correlation causing incorrect standard error estimates. Specifically, they allege that standard practice in applied economics research at the time of their publication yielded insufficiently conservative standard error estimates. This concern does not appear to be problematic for our results for two reasons. First, Bertrand et al. (2004, 273) show that unit-clustered standard errors, which we use in every specification, perform well when the number of clusters is as large as in our sample. Second, even if our standard errors are downwardly biased, the direction of the bias would make it less likely to find null results.

Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule					
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)	
	(first difference)		growth	growth	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Independent $_{t-1}$	-0.00339*	-0.00139	0.0156	0.00183	
	(0.00181)	(0.00743)	(0.0233)	(0.00473)	
Territory-years	124	132	38	110	
R-squared	0.413	0.567	0.634	0.575	
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	
	Panel B. A	Autonomous vs. non-	autonomous col	onial rule	
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)	
	(first difference)		growth	growth	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0257**	-0.00670	0.0482	-0.00344	
-	(0.00993)	(0.0198)	(0.0580)	(0.00998)	
Territory-years	78	80	22	68	
R-squared	0.536	0.500	0.558	0.482	
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	

 Table A.15: Ignoring Time Series Information

Despite these concerns, Table A.15 presents results from a conservative procedure that Bertrand et al. (2004, 267) show leads to reliable standard error estimates in small samples: ignore the time series information when estimating the standard errors. Rather than analyze individual years, they aggregate the data into one pre-treatment and one post-treatment observation for every unit, although we use three categories to distinguish colonial autonomy from other colonial years (as well as from post-independence). To account for the different times at which units change treatment status and the resultant time-varying heterogeneity, they recommend regressing the dependent variable on year fixed effects and then running models that include two observations for each unit: one pre-treatment residual and one post-treatment residual produced by the auxiliary regression. Panel A of Table A.15 compares the post-independence average with the pre-independence average. Panel B compares the colonial autonomy average with the non-autonomous colonial average. It does not separately estimate a coefficient for post-independence because this technique

Notes: Each panel in Table A.15 uses data from every country with outcome data for both values of the explanatory variable. Each model contains two observations for every country in the regression, and every specification contains territory fixed effects and territory-clustered standard error estimates. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

is designed for binary treatment variables. There are exactly two observations for each country in each regression, and countries with missing data for all years in either the pre- or the post-period in each specification are dropped. The democracy specifications use the first difference of democracy to account for high autocorrelation of the dependent variable (the main models account for this by including a lagged dependent variable). The results resemble those in Table 2.

Imai and Kim (2016) raise a different concern. Even absent unit-specific time-varying confounders, standard two-way fixed effects models will be biased if treatment effects are heterogeneous. Tables A.19 through A.24 address this concern by disaggregating colonial institutions. Additionally, Table A.16 presents estimates using Imai and Kim's weighted differences-in-differences estimator that corrects for bias from heterogeneous treatment effects. As in Table A.15, analyzing the first difference of democracy levels accounts for high autocorrelation in democracy levels, and Panel B does not provide separate estimates of postindependence because the method is designed for binary treatment variables. Notably, these models produce somewhat more conservative estimates than the original specifications because reweighting the units increases variance. The p-value for colonial autonomy in the democracy regression slightly exceeds conventional levels of statistical significance (p-value=0.1005).

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule				
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)	
	(first difference)		growth	growth	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Independent	-0.020914	-0.0018214	0.00075485	0.024510	
	(0.015398)	(0.0227571)	(0.20134641)	(0.017182)	
Territory-years	3116	2982	871	2451	
Territory-years w/ non-zero weight	858	854	173	676	
	Panel B. A	Autonomous vs. non-	autonomous col	onial rule	
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)	
	(first difference)		growth	growth	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Colonial autonomy	0.0142057	-0.033057***	0.034209	0.005583	
	(0.0086428)	(0.011566)	(0.058197)	(0.012861)	
Territory-years	1191	1238	460	653	
Territory-years w/ non-zero weight	693	624	212	428	

Notes: Table A.16 presents coefficient estimates and standard error estimates (which allow heteroskedasticity across units and arbitrary autocorrelation) estimated using Imai and Kim's (2016) weighted differences-in-differences estimator. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

A.4 Alternative Democracy Subcomponents and Indices

Tables A.17 and A.18 examine different aggregate democracy indices from V-Dem and subcomponents of the electoral democracy index. The V-Dem codebook describes the 10 aggregated democracy indices evaluated in Table A.17. For Table A.18, the freedom of association variable answers the following question: "To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?" Clean elections captures: "To what extent are elections free and fair?" Freedom of expression denotes: "To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?" Elected officials expresses: "Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?" Finally, suffrage is "What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?"

 Table A.17: Alternative V-Dem Aggregate Democracy Indices

DV:	Additive polyarchy	Multiplicative polyarchy	Liberal democracy	Liberal component	Participatory democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0185***	0.0132**	0.0129***	0.0184***	0.00960***
	(0.00607)	(0.00541)	(0.00376)	(0.00647)	(0.00258)
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.00155	0.00640	0.00247	0.00408	0.00354
-	(0.00733)	(0.00391)	(0.00358)	(0.00516)	(0.00286)
Territory-years	3,116	3,116	3,046	3,064	3,104
R-squared	0.956	0.958	0.970	0.965	0.975
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A.17, continued

DV:	Participatory component	Deliberative democracy	Deliberative component	Egalitarian democracy	Egalitarian component
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0154***	0.0131***	0.0226**	0.0118***	0.0224***
	(0.00404)	(0.00421)	(0.00875)	(0.00337)	(0.00693)
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.00937**	0.000176	-0.00325	0.00278	0.00984**
_	(0.00426)	(0.00386)	(0.00684)	(0.00306)	(0.00479)
Territory-years	3,122	3,116	3,145	3,091	3,120
R-squared	0.968	0.968	0.957	0.978	0.978
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table A.17 estimates Equation 2 using various V-Dem aggregated democracy indices as the dependent variable. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Every column uses a linear link and includes a lagged dependent variable. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

		Panel A	A. Colonial autonomy		
DV:	Freedom of association	Clean elections	Freedom of expression	Elected officials	Suffrage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.00288	0.0100	0.0117**	0.115***	0.0375*
	(0.00818)	(0.00737)	(0.00549)	(0.0210)	(0.0212)
Independent $t-1$	-0.0113*	-0.00505	-0.00440	0.0641***	0.0202
	(0.00607)	(0.00965)	(0.00440)	(0.0216)	(0.0151)
Territory-years	3,145	3,122	3,145	3,105	3,145
R-squared	0.959	0.893	0.967	0.846	0.941
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Panel B. Five	e years before independen	ce	
DV:	Freedom of association	Clean elections	Freedom of expression	Elected officials	Suffrage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Last 5 colonial years $t-1$	0.0289***	0.0347***	0.0246***	0.131***	0.0711***
	(0.00628)	(0.00921)	(0.00510)	(0.0165)	(0.0147)
Independent $t-1$	-0.000827	0.00436	0.000894	0.0683***	0.0349**
	(0.00613)	(0.00900)	(0.00441)	(0.0177)	(0.0137)
Territory-years	3,145	3,122	3,145	3,105	3,145
R-squared	0.960	0.894	0.968	0.849	0.943
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A.18: Disaggregating Democracy

Notes: Panel A of Table A.18 estimates Equation 2 using each of the five subcomponents of the V-Dem electoral democracy index as the dependent variable, and Panel B replaces colonial autonomy in Equation 2 with the last five years of colonial rule. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Every column uses a linear link and includes a lagged dependent variable. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

A.5 Supporting Information for Varieties of Colonialism

The following details the sources for the different conditioning variables:

- British colonialism: We use a broad definition of British colonies, including territories over which Britain gained control as League of Nations mandates after World War I (e.g., Tanganyika/Tanzania) and exerted minimal internal control (e.g., Kuwait). This is somewhat broader than Lange's (2009) definition of British colonies because he does not include any of Britain's Middle Eastern colonies.
- Length of colonial rule: We use Olsson's (2009) colonial onset and independence data to calculate the length of Western European colonial rule.
- State antiquity: A territory's combined years with government above local level between 0 CE and 1500, with the cutoff year following Hariri (2012). Data from Putterman (2008).
- European settlers: We use logged European population percentage for the closest available data point to the year of independence. Easterly and Levine (2016) provide most of the data points, and Paine (forthcoming) describes the settlers variable in more detail.
- Disrupted colonial rule during World War II: Lawrence (2013) provides this data for French colonies and we coded it ourselves for the other empires.

Tables A.19 through A.24 add interaction terms for various conditioning variables to estimate models of the

form:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \cdot Independence_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t-1} \cdot C_i + \beta_2 \cdot Independence_{i,t-1} \cdot C_i + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t},$$
(A.3)

where C_i is the country-specific conditioning variable. Because the static conditioning variables are perfectly collinear with the unit fixed effects, the models do not contain the lower-order conditioning term. For the three binary conditioning variables, the corresponding regression table provides marginal effect estimates for each of colonial autonomy and independence for both values of the conditioning variable. For the continuous conditioning variables, the table presents marginal effect estimates for the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of the variable values.

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0130*	-2.820***	0.0737	0.0424**
	(0.00733)	(1.074)	(0.0472)	(0.0163)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ *SSA	0.00904		-0.0319	-0.0446**
-	(0.00974)		(0.0575)	(0.0173)
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.00784	-2.920**	0.0141	0.0263*
	(0.00777)	(1.240)	(0.0574)	(0.0146)
Independent $_{t-1}$ *SSA	-0.00590	3.375**	0.0552	-0.0206
-	(0.00525)	(1.460)	(0.0356)	(0.0151)
Territory-years	3,116	991	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.373	0.120
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal e	ffects	
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ SSA=0	0.0130*	0.330**	0.0737	0.0424**
	(0.00733)	(0.163)	(0.0472)	(0.0163)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ SSA=1	0.0220***		0.0418	-0.00223
	(0.00726)		(0.0535)	(0.00657)
Independent $_{t-1}$ SSA=0	0.00784	-0.486*	0.0141	0.0263*
- 1	(0.00777)	(0.264)	(0.0574)	(0.0146)
Independent _{$t-1$} SSA=1	0.00195	0.00183	0.0692	0.00576
1	(0.00529)	(0.00332)	(0.0431)	(0.00645)

Table A.19: Varieties of Colonialism: Sub-Saharan Africa

Notes: Table A.19 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and Sub-Saharan Africa because this combination perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.00846	-1.492	0.0940**	0.00170
	(0.00535)	(1.546)	(0.0430)	(0.00568)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ *British colony	0.0156*		-0.0475	0.0167
	(0.00798)		(0.0445)	(0.0122)
Independent $_{t-1}$	-0.00120	-0.591	0.0251	0.00311
	(0.00531)	(0.759)	(0.0450)	(0.00601)
Independent $_{t-1}$ *British colony	0.0132***	0.0307	0.0208	0.0122
	(0.00392)	(1.215)	(0.0438)	(0.00888)
Territory-years	3,116	1,003	830	2,365
R-squared	0.963		0.372	0.118
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal e	ffects	
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ British col.=0	0.00846		0.0940**	0.00170
	(0.00535)		(0.0430)	(0.00568)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ British col.=1	0.0241***	0.00842	0.0465	0.0184
	(0.00684)	(0.0139)	(0.0475)	(0.0112)
Independent _{t-1} British col.=0	-0.00120	-0.0693	0.0251	0.00311
,	(0.00531)	(0.101)	(0.0450)	(0.00601)
Independent _{t-1} British col.=1	0.0120*	-0.00149	0.0458	0.0153
,	(0.00677)	(0.00398)	(0.0510)	(0.00941)

Table A.20: Varieties of Colonialism: British Colonial Rule

Notes: Table A.20 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and British colonial rule because Autonomy*non-British rule perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. The p-value in Column 1 for colonial autonomy conditional on British colonialism=0 is 0.119. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0143**	2.501	0.0411	0.0123
	(0.00544)	(2.048)	(0.0671)	(0.0114)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ *Length of colonial rule	5.82e-06	-0.0637**	3.24e-05	-1.66e-05
	(3.46e-05)	(0.0290)	(0.000166)	(4.59e-05)
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.000955	-0.771	0.0618	0.00902
	(0.00582)	(1.228)	(0.0592)	(0.00856)
Independent $t-1$ *Length of colonial rule	1.58e-05	0.00153	-0.000101	-5.82e-06
	(1.63e-05)	(0.00972)	(0.000135)	(3.61e-05)
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.372	0.117
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal e	ffects	
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Colonial rule=64 years	0.0147***	-7.76e-10	0.0431	0.0113
	(0.00454)	(9.24e-09)	(0.0593)	(0.00912)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Colonial rule=80 years	0.0148***	-6.22e-07	0.0437	0.0110
	(0.00447)	(2.35e-06)	(0.0574)	(0.00860)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Colonial rule=144 years	0.0152***	-0.00525	0.0457	0.00994
	(0.00482)	(0.00479)	(0.0509)	(0.00695)
Independent _{$t-1$} Colonial rule=64 years	0.00197	-1.94e-10	0.0554	0.00865
	(0.00558)	(3.14e-08)	(0.0537)	(0.00721)
Independent _{$t-1$} Colonial rule=80 years	0.00222	-4.57e-08	0.0537	0.00855
,	(0.00554)	(1.60e-07)	(0.0524)	(0.00695)
Independent _{t-1} Colonial rule=144 years	0.00323	-0.00222	0.0473	0.00818
	(0.00553)	(0.00431)	(0.0481)	(0.00635)

Table A.21: Varieties of Colonialism: Length of Colonial Rule

Notes: Table A.21 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0147**	-8.365***	0.0770	0.0105
	(0.00623)	(2.005)	(0.0476)	(0.00919)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ *State antiquity	0.00170	8.264***	-0.202*	0.00108
	(0.0188)	(2.769)	(0.101)	(0.0226)
Independent _{t-1}	0.00305	0.0543	0.0651	0.00443
	(0.00571)	(0.926)	(0.0463)	(0.00662)
Independent $t-1$ *State antiquity	-0.000173	-2.161	-0.0716	0.0261*
	(0.00710)	(1.722)	(0.0529)	(0.0137)
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.373	0.118
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal e	effects	
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ State antiquity=0	0.0147**	-0.00345	0.0770	0.0105
	(0.00623)	(0.00354)	(0.0476)	(0.00919)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ State antiquity=0.11	0.0148***	-0.00697	0.0548	0.0106
	(0.00512)	(0.00616)	(0.0435)	(0.00750)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ State antiquity=0.56	0.0156*	-0.109	-0.0364	0.0111
	(0.00802)	(0.0690)	(0.0539)	(0.00838)
Independent _{t-1} State antiquity=0	0.00305	0.000192	0.0651	0.00443
	(0.00571)	(0.00319)	(0.0463)	(0.00662)
Independent _{t-1} State antiquity=0.11	0.00303	-0.00116	0.0572	0.00731
1	(0.00557)	(0.00566)	(0.0459)	(0.00626)
Independent _{t-1} State antiquity=0.56	0.00295	-0.0740	0.0250	0.0191**
, – – –	(0.00610)	(0.0724)	(0.0517)	(0.00820)

Table A.22: Varieties of Colonialism: State Antiquity

Notes: Table A.22 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0171**	-39.40***	0.0560	0.00112
	(0.00690)	(4.724)	(0.0458)	(0.00662)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ *ln(Eu. pop. %)	0.00143	-8.303***	0.00751	-0.00445*
	(0.00211)	(1.195)	(0.0125)	(0.00261)
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.00553	-0.938	0.0480	0.00777
	(0.00566)	(1.057)	(0.0425)	(0.00706)
Independent _{t-1} *ln(Eu. pop. %)	0.00154	-0.131	0.00276	-0.000332
	(0.00119)	(0.303)	(0.00678)	(0.00220)
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.372	0.118
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal e	ffects	
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Eu. pop. %=0.0%	0.0106	-0.0620	0.0214	0.0216*
	(0.00681)	(0.0751)	(0.0610)	(0.0115)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Eu. pop. %=0.1%	0.0140***	-0.0331	0.0395	0.0110
1	(0.00484)	(0.0215)	(0.0453)	(0.00704)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Eu. pop. %=0.9%	0.0169**	-0.0129	0.0549	0.00179
1	(0.00668)	(0.0119)	(0.0453)	(0.00649)
Independent _{t-1} Eu. pop. %=0.0%	-0.00156	-0.0250	0.0353	0.00930
	(0.00695)	(0.0759)	(0.0562)	(0.00938)
Independent _{t-1} Eu. pop. %=0.1%	0.00213	-0.0155	0.0419	0.00850
	(0.00569)	(0.0212)	(0.0470)	(0.00652)
Independent _{t-1} Eu. pop. %=0.9%	0.00530	-0.00772	0.0475	0.00782
	(0.00563)	(0.0120)	(0.0426)	(0.00691)

Table A.23: Varieties of Colonialism: European Settlers

Notes: Table A.23 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. The p-value in Column 1 for colonial autonomy conditional on Eu. pop. % = 0.0% is 0.126. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0183***	-2.276**	0.0569	0.00732
	(0.00575)	(1.081)	(0.0462)	(0.00809)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ *WWII disruption	-0.0133*		-0.0557	0.0124
	(0.00756)		(0.0387)	(0.0115)
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.00367	0.392	0.0519	0.00361
	(0.00581)	(1.006)	(0.0473)	(0.00662)
Independent $_{t-1}$ *WWII disruption	-0.00233	-2.434*	-0.0749**	0.0251**
	(0.00354)	(1.363)	(0.0354)	(0.0105)
Territory-years	3,116	989	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.372	0.120
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal e	ffects	
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ WWII disruption=0	0.0183***		0.0569	0.00732
	(0.00575)		(0.0462)	(0.00809)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ WWII disruption=1	0.00500	0.240	0.00119	0.0198**
	(0.00618)	(0.176)	(0.0332)	(0.00865)
Independent _{$t-1$} WWII disruption=0	0.00367	0.00165	0.0519	0.00361
	(0.00581)	(0.00355)	(0.0473)	(0.00662)
Independent _{$t-1$} WWII disruption=1	0.00135	-0.394*	-0.0229	0.0287***
	(0.00579)	(0.226)	(0.0457)	(0.0101)

Table A.24: Varieties of Colonialism: Disrupted Colonial Rule During WWII

Notes: Table A.24 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and British colonial rule because Autonomy*non-disruption perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. The p-value in Column 1 for colonial autonomy conditional on WWII disruption=0 is 0.421. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

A.6 Supporting Information for Endogeneity of Independence Timing

Sample for Panel B of Table 3: The 14 French Sub-Saharan African countries that gained independence in 1960 are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

Sample for Panel C of Table 3: The regions are North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The 16 minor colonies are as follows, with the major colony in parentheses: Morocco and Tunisia (Algeria), Burundi and Rwanda (DRC), Gambia and Sierra Leone (Ghana/Nigeria), Bhutan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka (India), Cambodia and Laos (Vietnam), and Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia (Zimbabwe). Pakistan is excluded because it did not exist as a separate colony until just prior to independence. We did not separately code which French Sub-Saharan African countries met the minor colony definition, and none of these are included in Panel C.

A.7 Decolonization Wars and Guerrilla Regimes

Another strategy for addressing endogeneity is to separate out the colonies that generate the starkest concerns about endogenous independence timing: countries in which a guerrilla regime inherited the state at independence following a major decolonization war. In these colonies, we are nearly certain that conflict influenced the timing of decolonization, since the colonial regime was forced to cede control to its previous opponents, often after a period of military stalemate or failure. In the eight countries in our sample for which that happened, independence was essentially an exercise in military surrender rather than in constitutional transfer. Table A.25 shows that the positive relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy remains among non-guerrilla countries. Unsurprisingly, there is no relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy for the guerrilla regimes. The body of the article discussed how major decolonization wars usually prevented colonizers from granting autonomy. In Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, colonial autonomy preceded the major liberation war, and we would not expect autonomy to promote democracy here because colonial autonomy was exclusive to whites and contributed to the decolonization struggle. Autonomy in Indonesia in the 1940s and in Vietnam in the 1950s represented late attempts to mitigate violence, making democratic gains unlikely because autonomy reacted to violence.

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)	ln(Income/pop.)
			growth	growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$	0.0174***	-1.307	0.0473	0.0119
	(0.00522)	(0.900)	(0.0485)	(0.00776)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ *Guerrilla regime	-0.0183**		-0.00201	-0.0157
	(0.00752)		(0.0464)	(0.0138)
Independent _{t-1}	0.00367	-0.452	0.0435	0.00960
-	(0.00585)	(0.754)	(0.0462)	(0.00658)
Independent _{t-1} *Guerrilla regime	-0.00334	-1.582	-0.0627***	-0.00740
	(0.00465)	(2.049)	(0.0200)	(0.0119)
Territory-years	3,116	1,000	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.372	0.117
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal e	ffects	
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Guerrilla=0	0.0174***	0.0422	0.0473	0.0119
	(0.00522)	(0.0576)	(0.0485)	(0.00776)
Colonial autonomy $_{t-1}$ Guerrilla=1	-0.000886		0.0453*	-0.00372
	(0.00613)		(0.0233)	(0.0112)
Independent $_{t-1}$ Guerrilla=0	0.00367	-0.00626	0.0435	0.00960
•	(0.00585)	(0.0131)	(0.0462)	(0.00658)
Independent _{t-1} Guerrilla=1	0.000327	-0.364	-0.0192	0.00220
	(0.00564)	(0.447)	(0.0438)	(0.0119)

Table A.25: Guerrilla Takeover at Independence

Notes: Table A.25 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and guerrilla regimes because this combination perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

A.8 Comparing Post-Independence to the "High" Colonial Period

The main results compare independent countries to the colonial counterfactual generated by post-1945 colonial rule. However, some theories suggest the effects of colonialism differed during the "high" colonial period between roughly 1919 and 1945. These decades are widely considered to have provided a brief period of relatively consolidated colonial rule (Abernethy, 2000, 104-132). Despite our lack of evidence that independence produced considerably different outcomes than late colonial rule, perhaps post-independence outcomes diverged from those during the high colonial period. For instance, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced no new internal wars between 1919 and 1945, though it was quite conflict-prone before and after.

Unfortunately, we cannot compare post-independence to the high colonial counterfactual using a two-way fixed effects strategy because very few countries gained independence between 1919 and 1945 (only Egypt and Iraq). This makes it impossible to distinguish the effect of high colonial rule from global trends—e.g., after-effects of World War I, the global depression, and World War II—and therefore we cannot exclude the possibility that international trends unrelated to colonialism influenced any differences in outcomes. Econometrically, collinearity disables estimating year fixed effects in models that compare post-independence to pre-1945 colonialism, and even a time trend variable would be uninformative because of the lack of overlap between the pre- and post-periods in these regressions.

Caveats aside, Table A.26 estimates Equation 1 but uses a different sample that contains (1) colonized years between 1919 and 1945 and (2) post-independence years (although uses the same country sample as Table 2). The table presents suggestive evidence that post-independence differences are stronger when comparing to this earlier period. Independent countries have been considerably more likely to fight internal wars than were territories in the high colonial period. Despite the small size of most colonial militaries, it appears that they were largely successful at keeping the peace in these early years before nationalism swept across the globe. Therefore, although colonial transitions may have been particularly violent (Wimmer and Min 2006), the period in between the world wars was not.

By contrast, post-independence outperforms high colonialism when analyzing revenues and democracy. Despite Young's (1994) characterization of strong *bula mutari* colonial fiscal regimes, Table A.26 shows instead that post-independence regimes have more effectively raised revenues. The post-independence pe-

riod has also been more democratic than the high colonial period, although the differences in magnitude are not large enough to be statistically significant (p-value=0.165).⁹ Despite democratic shortcomings in the post-colonial world, Mamdani's (1996) discussion of the despotism of the colonial era finds some support when focusing on this earlier colonial period.

However, once again, we cannot exclude the possibility that global trends unrelated to colonialism drive any of these results. Furthermore, sparse income data prior to 1945 makes it impossible to run the income regressions.

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.)
	(first difference)		growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent $_{t-1}$	0.00167	1.023***	0.0412**
	(0.00119)	(0.391)	(0.0164)
Territory-years	4,971	1,746	1,741
R-squared	0.018		0.032
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	NO	NO
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES

Table A.26: Changing the Counterfactual: Post-Independence vs. High Colonial Period

Notes: Table A.26 estimates Equation 1 but uses a different sample that contains (1) colonized years between 1919 and 1945 and (2) post-independence years. Therefore, because the models include an indicator for post-independence, the omitted basis category is colonized years between 1919 and 1945. Every model contains territory fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1 and 3 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

⁹Column 1 uses the first-difference in democracy levels rather than democracy level. This is because the unit-root tests failed to reject the null of non-stationarity for level, but did reject this null for the firstdifference. The results of the unit root tests differ from those for Table 2 because of the absence of year fixed effects in the Table A.26 regressions, in addition to a different sample.

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