

A Class Act: Colonial European Settlers and Democratic Resistance

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Abstract

Whereas recent political economy research shows evidence that colonial European settlers promoted post-colonial democracy, class-based theories of democracy expect sizable overseas European settlements to undermine democracy prospects by creating a landed class. This paper presents a unified theoretical framework for studying democratic contestation and participation, yielding three hypotheses: Only British settler colonies should tend to exhibit beneficial contestation effects (H1), and sizable European minorities should strategically disfranchise non-Europeans (H2)—which could also undermine contestation (H3). Statistical analysis of data on elected legislatures and franchise size during colonial rule support these hypotheses, in addition to qualitative evidence from Africa, the British Caribbean, and Iberian America. By contrast, a broad post-independence sample exhibits a null correlation between colonial European population share and aggregate democracy scores in theoretically relevant specifications.

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Non-European countries have experienced diverse democratic records in the post-colonial era. Most non-European countries inherited political institutions directly from a Western European colonial state, which has inspired considerable research on aspects of the colonial period to explain subsequent democracy (reviewed in Lindberg and Smith, 2014; De Juan and Pierskalla, 2017). European settlers have attracted concerted attention because areas where numerous Europeans migrated experienced especially large disjunctures. “Neo-British” settler colonies—the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—in which Europeans came to compose a majority of the population provide paradigmatic examples, although sizable European minority populations also shaped numerous countries’ colonial and post-colonial trajectories in areas ranging from South America to the Caribbean to Africa.

Recent political economy research has argued that sizable European settler communities consistently transplanted representative institutions during the colonial era by replicating political systems from their home countries. Creating political checks and balances enabled settlers to secure property rights and to profit from trade. Furthermore, these beneficial inheritances persisted to positively influence post-colonial democratic institutions (Hariri, 2012, 2015; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001) and economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011; Easterly and Levine, 2016). This perspective embodies the recent shift in the colonialism-democracy literature toward studying specific colonial actors (Owolabi, 2014), and echoes broader ideas that crucial democratic innovations occurred in early settler colonies (Markoff 1999; Narizny 2012, 345).

However, applying a largely separate strand of the literature—class-based theories of democracy—to studying colonial European settlers suggests important *anti*-democratic effects. Large overseas European settlements often generated a minority class of landowners that dominated large swaths of the territory’s most fertile land, sometimes organized into plantations or haciendas.¹ Privileged landed classes usually oppose widespread democratic franchises that would dilute their political and economic power. Class-based theories instead focus on how the middle class (Moore, 1966; Ansell and Samuels, 2014), working class (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Collier, 1999), or the masses more broadly (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) seek to gain political privileges against the will of landed elites. This research tradition therefore expects anti-democratic legacies of European settlers. If instead European settlers

¹See, for example, Skidmore and Smith (2005) for Iberian America, Good (1976) for Africa, and Green (1976) for Caribbean plantation colonies.

are found to consistently promote democracy, then this would pose an important challenge to influential theories that argue landed interests should resist democracy.

This paper reconciles these opposing arguments about a central actor in Western colonialism by providing a theoretical framework that distinguishes democratic contestation from participation. Following Dahl (1971), contestation is the extent to which political competition is governed by free and fair elections, and participation distinguishes the scope of who can participate in politics, which corresponds with franchise size in polities where officials are chosen by elections. Hypothesis 1 posits that existing arguments about pro-democratic European settler legacies are circumscribed: they apply only to democratic contestation, and only where the metropolitan country has an established history of representative institutions. This conditionality mostly applies to British colonies.² Hypothesis 2 focuses on democratic participation and draws from class-based theories to posit that sizable European settler minorities should face strong incentives to use their political power to deny enfranchising the non-European majority. Hypothesis 3 combines ideas from the first two hypotheses on contestation and participation. Even in colonies where Europeans transplanted representative institutions, strategies to resist enfranchisement could subsequently undermine political competition. This logic implies that only colonies in which British settlers composed a majority of the population should settlers transplant representative institutions without facing incentives to coercively thwart majority rule. Empirically, these beneficial conditions correspond solely to the four historically exceptional neo-Britains.

The paper then presents quantitative and qualitative evidence to assess the democratic legacies of colonial European settlers. The first tests examine broad aggregate patterns by statistically assessing the association between colonial European settlers and post-colonial democracy in a large sample of countries. Whereas recent research indicates a systematic relationship in the aggregate post-colonial data, the present theoretical framework anticipates a null relationship. Although initial specifications demonstrate a strong positive

²This hypothesis relates to Fails and Kriekhaus's (2010) argument about European settlers and economic development. However, for studying democracy, it is crucial to disaggregate components of democracy. Furthermore, whereas Fails and Kriekhaus (2010) argue that only the neo-Britains received beneficial inheritances among settler colonies, the present argument applies to the wider British empire. It also relates to a broader literature on British colonialism and democracy (Weiner, 1987; Lange, 2004; Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom, 2004; Olsson, 2009).

correlation between European share of the colonial population and post-colonial democracy, the findings are sensitive to theoretically relevant alterations to the time period, sample, and geography controls; and to controlling for standard covariates from the colonialism-democracy literature. The results continue to be mostly null when changing key variables or conducting other sample alterations, using various instrumental variables to account for the endogeneity of settler location, and when analyzing either aggregate democracy indices or separately examining democratic contestation and participation.

Null findings in aggregated post-colonial data suggest the importance of examining the proposed disaggregated democracy hypotheses during the colonial era to better understand what European settlers did. Hypothesis 1 finds support from new data on elected colonial legislatures from the 17th to 20th centuries across 119 Western European colonies. Statistically, British settler colonies—but not settler colonies outside the British empire—are associated with the presence of elected legislatures prior to 1945. Until the mid-19th century, no other empire had experienced elected legislatures, but they were prevalent in British North America and the British Caribbean. Differences from the Spanish and Portuguese empires across the centuries are striking, although French settler colonies made some gains after the mid-19th century following democratic advances in the metropole.

All three major clusters of European settler minority colonies—Africa, British Caribbean, and Iberian America—support Hypothesis 2 by providing evidence that a politically influential landed class resisted enfranchising the non-white majority. Faced with threats to their political monopoly after World War II, European settler-dominated administrations in Africa reacted by repressing the African or Arab majority. Statistical evidence shows that a smaller percentage of the population was legally enfranchised in African settler colonies between 1955 and 1970, as most of the continent peacefully gained independence and majority rule. In the 19th century British Caribbean, settlers reacted to the end of slavery and a rising political threat from the former slave majority by trading their legislatures for direct Crown rule, thus preventing franchise expansion. Iberian America also featured high land inequality and resisted enfranchisement into the 20th century.

Supporting Hypothesis 3, in many cases, actions to resist enfranchisement also undermined the competitiveness of political institutions. In Africa, European settlers' repressive actions to prevent majority rule often caused liberation wars that brought guerrilla leaders to power and undermined political competition, although democratic institutions survived largely intact in South Africa. In the British Caribbean, elected

legislatures again became widespread in the 20th century, but working and middle class actors—prominent in class-based democracy theories—rather than landed European settlers propelled democratic gains. In Iberian America, landed inequality contributed to democratic instability in the 20th century.

Combining the evidence used to assess H1 through H3 demonstrates the prevalence of democratic resistance by colonial European settlers—anticipated by class-based theories of democracy—and the few number of countries with clear evidence of beneficial European settler democratic legacies. Besides the neo-Britains and South Africa, former settler colonies have either tended not to be democratic since gaining independence, or have become democratic for reasons unrelated to colonial European settlers. Despite evidence of settlers transplanting representative institutions in most British settler colonies, class-based theories of democracy find considerable support as actions to erode widespread political participation undermined potentially beneficial legacies in most European settler colonies.

The conclusion elaborates upon three broader implications offered by this analysis. First, it rethinks existing arguments that equate settler colonialism with direct rule or with promoting rule-based institutions at the exclusion of extraction, especially as these distinctions relate to democracy promotion. Second, the analysis provides a new test of class-based theories of democracy as well as integrates the colonialism-democracy literature with class-based research, which until this point have been largely separate. Third, the present theory based on disaggregating contestation and participation may be useful for studying democracy more broadly.

1 Existing and Alternative Hypotheses


After summarizing the conventional institutional transplantation thesis, this section proposes three new hypotheses about European settlers based on disaggregating democratic contestation and participation.

1.1 Existing Arguments

Amidst the large literature on legacies of European settlement, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and Hariri (2012, 2015) provide the clearest statements about European settlers from a broad array of colonies transplanting representative institutions from the metropolitan country. These theories emphasize

the long-term democratic implications of these institutions. Figure 1 summarizes Acemoglu et al.’s argument (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 1370). Although their primary goal is to explain economic development, colonial-era and contemporary political institutions are central to their framework.

Figure 1: Acemoglu et al.’s Theory



The first arrow links factors such as potential settler mortality rates (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001), historical population density (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002), and historical statehood (Hariri, 2012, 2015) to where Europeans settled, which the empirical analysis addresses.³ The second arrow links colonial European settlers to colonial-era institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) focus primarily on political representation and on political constraints against property expropriation, quoting historians who establish that settler colonies had representative institutions and that political life was modeled after the home country (1374). This occurred in part because European settlers often successfully lobbied the metropole for electoral representation and other civil liberties. Although Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) only present motivating evidence from neo-Britains, they explicitly argue that the positive legacies of European settlement are not limited either to only these four colonies (1387) or even only to British colonies (1388). Empirically, they proxy for early institutions with Polity IV’s aggregate democracy measure and constraints on the executive component in 1900 (Marshall and Gurr, 2014), and demonstrate a strong positive correlation with European settlement (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 1385).

The third arrow captures Acemoglu et al.’s long-term persistence mechanisms, which emphasize the sunk costs of institution-building and the difficulty of switching institutions after independence. Countries that did not inherit beneficial European settler legacies should face difficulties in creating better institutions that restrict government power and enforce property rights—i.e., institutions resembling those in the settler colonies (1376). Although their primary operationalization of contemporary institutions is an economic measure of protection against expropriation, they consider alternative specifications that use Polity IV’s constraints on the executive in recent decades (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2000). They also provide evidence that early institutions positively correlate with contemporary institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and

³I also ignore the fourth arrow given the current focus on political institutions.

Robinson, 2001, 1385).

Hariri (2012, 2015) expands upon the logic and evidence for the third arrow in Figure 1 by stressing the long-term importance of colonial Europeans' norms of representation. "European settlement and influence were among the important factors that helped shape the international distribution of political regimes" (Hariri, 2012, 474). In Spanish America, he argues that European settlers created "a system of comprehensive checks and balances" during the colonial era that "facilitated the spread of early representative institutions" (474). Large-scale European settlements also broke down traditional forms of authority that mitigated against post-colonial democracy elsewhere. Empirically, Hariri (2012) regresses Polity IV aggregate democracy scores averaged between 1991 and 2007 on a proxy for European influence, European language fraction, and demonstrates a strong positive correlation (487).⁴ Overall, these arguments and evidence support:

Conventional institutional transplantation hypothesis. European settlers should transplant representative institutions from their country of origin during the colonial era, and these institutions should persist after independence to facilitate long-term democratic advantages.

Although institutional transplantation is the main mechanism in the existing literature that connects European settlers and post-colonial democracy, other mechanisms also generate a similar empirical implication about long-term democratic advantages of settler colonies. Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that human capital, not institutions, is a more important cause of economic development. They critique Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) by positing: "Europeans who settled in the New World may have brought with them not so much their institutions, but themselves, that is, their human capital" (Glaeser et al., 2004, 274). In the context of democracy, human capital might capture cultural norms in which citizens "cherish and respect democracy," which is crucial for democratic consolidation (Persson and Tabellini, 2009, 89).

⁴ Although Hariri (2012, 2015) focuses only on an aggregate democracy index, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) additionally analyze a variable that specifically corresponds to democratic contestation. Therefore, because these mechanisms might be more consistent with enhancing democratic contestation rather than participation, the empirical analysis below of conventional institutional transplantation examines both aggregated and disaggregated democracy measures.

1.2 Disaggregated Democracy Hypotheses

This paper offers a different theory based off Dahl's (1971) distinction between democratic contestation and participation. The hypotheses collectively imply that only a limited set of settler colonies should have inherited positive democratic legacies. First, regarding contestation, institutional transplantation should mainly be limited to British colonies. Second, regarding participation, sizable European minority elites should resist enfranchising the majority when politically influential. Third, combining the ideas about contestation and participation, incentives to restrict participation may subsequently undermine contestation—therefore preventing colonial-era institutional transplantation from fostering long-term democracy after independence. These arguments imply the following modifications to the conventional institutional transplantation hypothesis for colonies with a sizable settler minority.

Disaggregated democracy hypotheses. British settlers—but not European settlers in other colonies—should transplant representative institutions from their country of origin during the colonial era (H1). However, in colonies with sizable European settler minorities, politically influential Europeans should resist enfranchising the majority (H2). Furthermore, Europeans' representative institutions might not persist because of sizable European minorities' anti-majority rule strategies (H3).

These scope conditions modify the conventional institutional transplantation hypothesis for all European settler colonies except the four neo-Britains in which British settlers composed a majority of the population. Furthermore, for all other settler colonies, they offer more direct implications for democratic evolution during the colonial era rather than afterwards, in contrast to the longer-term focus of recent political economy arguments about European settlers. Combining H1 and H3, the disaggregated democracy hypotheses do not provide a clear expectation about post-colonial contestation. H2 does not imply a long-term negative participation effect because a common consequence of gaining independence was reducing settlers' political influence, although settlers in 19th century Iberian America remained politically dominant even after independence. Therefore, the present hypotheses differ from existing ones not only by disaggregating democratic components, but also in the durability of the posited effects after independence.

1.2.1 Contestation: British Institutional Transplantation (H1)

Although Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and Hariri (2012, 2015) have proposed the compelling idea that European settlers would seek to replicate political institutions from their country of origin,

Europeans' institutional transplantation should have only bred representative political institutions if the settlers' home country in fact had a representative tradition. This factor sharply distinguished Britain from other colonizers.

In the first wave of colonization and decolonization that mainly occurred in North and South America, Britain and Spain collectively accounted for almost every colony with a sizable European population (see Appendix Table A.2). Britain had a long tradition of strong legislative constraints on the monarchy dating back to the Glorious Revolution, in contrast to Spain's absolute monarchy. Whereas Britain had the highest score on Polity IV's constraint on the executive variable in every year between 1800 and 1825, Spain had the lowest score on this variable in almost all these years. Hariri (2012, 474) correctly argues that neither metropole was fully democratic in the 19th century, but this did not imply that European settlers from Britain and Spain each drew from a similar representative tradition. After centuries of absolutist rule, France had a mixed democratic experience throughout the 19th century, fluctuating between republican and authoritarian periods.

Britain also differed from other European powers with settler colonies during the second major wave of decolonization after World War II. Portuguese migration to Angola and Mozambique occurred primarily during the Salazar dictatorship, which also had the lowest constraints on the executive score. And even though France—which had settler colonies in North Africa—enjoyed strong constraints on the executive for most of the 20th century, it endured regime instability in the 1950s. Spruyt (2005, 101) argues that elected officials in France's Fourth Republic were particularly susceptible to special interest pressures, such as European settlers and the military, due to unstable governments and weak party discipline. France's transition to the Fifth Republic corresponded with a decrease in Polity IV constraints on the executive to “slight to moderate limitation on executive authority.” Overall, these considerations yield the following hypothesis:

H1: British institutional transplantation hypothesis. Only settlers from a metropole with a representative tradition—which, empirically, usually corresponded to British colonialism—should transplant representative institutions during the colonial era.

This argument relates to broader debates about the importance of colonizer identity. Hypothesis 1 resembles earlier arguments that Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson's (2001, 2002) thesis relating European settlers and economic development is contingent on colonizer identity (Lange, Mahoney and Vom Hau, 2006; Mahoney,

2010) and mainly applies to British colonies (Fails and Krieckhaus, 2010). The present theory applies these insights to studying democracy rather than to economic development, which is crucial because of differing implications for the contestation and participation components of democracy. As discussed below, the Britain distinction is unimportant for the democratic participation legacies of European settlers.

And despite these earlier contributions, elaborating upon and (below) showing evidence of the importance of colonizer identity is key because this is a contentious point in the literature. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) explicitly argue against colonizer importance: “it appears that British colonies are found to perform substantially better in other studies in large part because Britain colonized places where [large-scale European] settlements were possible, and this made British colonies inherit better institutions” (1388). Similarly, Engerman and Sokoloff (2011, 44-46, 218) argue that variance in land endowments rather than in colonizer identity accounts for differences in colonial institutions. Other major statements on European settlers and democracy propose unconditional theories about European settlers (Hariri, 2012, 2015) and have expounded the similarities of 18th century British and Spanish colonialism (Hariri, 2012, 474). Furthermore, the colonialism-democracy literature as a whole has largely moved away from emphasizing the importance of differences among European colonizers, as Owolabi (2014) summarizes.

1.2.2 Participation: Resisting Enfranchisement (H2)

Whereas the contestation legacies of European settlers should be contingent on European colonizer, class-based theories of democracy expect sizable European settler minorities should negatively affect democratic participation across all empires. Even where Europeans transplanted representative institutions to promote democratic contestation, they created exclusive white political communities. This landed political elite faced strong incentives to resist enfranchisement to non-Europeans. Empirically, this usually meant denying representation to the majority because only in the neo-Britains (and perhaps Argentina and Uruguay) did colonial-era Europeans compose a majority.

Class-based theories of democratization and democratic consolidation have a long history in political science. Moore (1966) famously proposed “no bourgeoisie, no democracy,” a focus that recent research has also expounded (Ansell and Samuels, 2014). Others have focused on either the working class (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992) or the interplay between the working class and political elites (Collier, 1999).

Regardless of the specific actor posited to promote democracy, class-based theories agree that land-owning agricultural elites should repressively resist franchise expansion, especially in circumstances of high land inequality. Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) posit one plausible mechanism. Their theories consider an interaction between an elite minority and the masses. The masses may be able to achieve concessions from the political/economic elite because they pose a revolutionary threat by virtue of their large size. However, elites that control political power amidst high economic inequality face incentives to repress rather than to expand the franchise to include the masses—who would redistribute income from the elites to themselves. Landlords particularly fear democracy and redistribution because land is a non-mobile asset that is easy to redistribute under democratic rule (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 287-320). This same logic also explains landlords’ incentives to support coups against democracies when the opportunity arises.⁵

The empirical analysis below provides evidence of highly unequal land distribution patterns between Europeans and non-Europeans in colonies with a sizable European minority, such as parts of Africa, the sugar-producing Caribbean, and Iberian America. Furthermore, throughout much of the colonial era—and, in some cases, afterwards—European settlers wielded considerable political influence either by lobbying the metropole or by directly controlling the state, and therefore could achieve their preferred economic and related policies under minority rule.⁶ By contrast, in the few colonies where Europeans formed a majority group, inequality tended to be low because everyone was relatively wealthy, although Europeans still had incentives to not share political power with non-whites. Angeles (2007) provides statistical evidence for this non-monotonic relationship between size of the European settler population and economic equality, and Engerman and Sokoloff (2011) provide evidence from the Americas. Overall, these considerations yield the following hypothesis:

H2: Resisting enfranchisement hypothesis. Where politically influential, sizable European settler minority populations should block political representation for the non-European majority.

This hypothesis differs from some existing arguments about colonies with medium-size settler populations.

⁵Ansell and Samuels’s (2014) theory distinguishes agricultural and industrial elites, but generates similar anti-democratic implications about agricultural elites and land inequality.

⁶This could change over time, however, such as between the 19th and 20th centuries in the British Caribbean because most colonies acquiesced to direct British rule.

Fails and Krieckhaus (2010) argue that British colonies besides the neo-Britains did not exhibit meaningful variation in settler population size, i.e., medium-size settler colonies should not differ from colonies largely devoid of European settlement. Easterly and Levine (2016) argue that medium-sized settler populations bequeathed positive economic development legacies. By contrast, the democratic participation legacies of sizable settler minorities should be negative.

1.2.3 Consequences of Disenfranchisement (H3)

In addition to directly negatively affecting democratic participation, anti-majority rule strategies could have also undermined colonial-era representative institutions—hence preventing colonial-era institutional transplantation from fostering long-term democracy after independence. There are at least two relevant channels. First, European settlers’ repression to prevent the majority from gaining power should raise the likelihood facing a violent challenge from below. Empirically, in post-World War II Africa, European population share positively correlates with liberation wars against Europeans (Paine, 2017). Even if whites continued to regulate their political participation through representative institutions during the violence, representative institutions should be less likely to persist after a transition to majority rule than if European settlers had peacefully acquiesced to franchise expansion. Second, in some historical circumstances, European settlers could request the colonizer to rule directly, as Green (1976) and Greene (2010b) discuss for the British Caribbean in the 19th century. This strategy reflected fear that the majority could potentially use extant representative institutions to advance their own political agenda. In cases where settlers disbanded their institutions and allowed the colonizer to directly rule the colony, Europeans did not bequeath representative institutions to leaders of the post-colonial state. These considerations imply:

H3: Undermining long-term contestation hypothesis. European settler minorities’ anti-majority rule strategies should undermine representative institutions where they exist, either by causing revolutionary regime transitions or by granting direct political control to the colonizer.

This hypothesis is theoretically intriguing because, juxtaposed with H1, it shows how an explanatory factor can yield divergent implications for different components of democracy—i.e., the elite’s franchise calculus can undermine contestation. This is a largely novel consideration among research on colonial legacies and democracy, which tends not to clearly distinguish components of democracy.

2 Do Colonial Europeans Correlate with Post-Colonial Democracy?

The remainder of this paper provides empirical evidence, beginning by examining large-N relationships among post-colonial countries. Conventional theories from the political economy literature expect European settlers to exhibit a systematic positive correlation with post-independence democracy levels, whereas the disaggregated democracy hypotheses—taken in sum—presented here anticipate null patterns in post-colonial data. Initial specifications in Table 1 demonstrate a strong correlation between European share of the colonial population and post-colonial democracy. However, the coefficient estimates are sensitive to theoretically relevant alterations to the time period, sample, and geography controls; and to controlling for standard covariates from the colonialism-democracy literature. The results continue to be mostly null when changing key variables or conducting other sample alterations, using various instrumental variables to account for the endogeneity of settler location, and when analyzing either aggregate democracy indices or separately examining democratic contestation and participation. The subsequent sections assess H1 through H3.

2.1 Data

Table 1 measures democracy with Polity’s IV aggregate democracy index, *polity2*, which ranges from -10 to 10 and is widely used in the literature (Marshall and Gurr, 2014). Additionally, Polity IV has temporal coverage dating back to 1800, which is crucial for assessing correlations with democracy at different periods of time in a sample that includes countries that gained independence in the 19th century. The appendix provides robustness checks using alternative democracy measures and subcomponents of democracy. Table 1 uses observations from almost every non-European country with Polity IV data, including countries such as China and Saudi Arabia that Western Europe never colonized (see Appendix Section A.1). The exceptions are the neo-Britains and Israel, discussed below. The first year for each country coincides with their first year of *polity2* data, which for former Western European colonies coincides exactly or very close to their year of independence, and the data span until 2015. Each column in Table 1 includes one observation for every country and averages democracy scores over the specified years, although robustness checks analyze panel data with and without year fixed effects.

To measure European settlers, Table 1 uses logged Western European population share near independence.

Easterly and Levine’s (2016) dataset provides most of the data, although Appendix Section A.1 details additional data sources. Easterly and Levine’s (2016) dataset is advantageous because it includes data on colonial European population from censuses and secondary sources, rather than uses indirect proxies such as estimated settler mortality rates (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001) or European language fraction (Hariri, 2012, 2015). Appendix Table A.2 lists every country in the Table 1 sample with a European population share of at least 5% near independence. Countries never colonized by Western Europe are coded to have zero percent Western European settlers. Logging this heavily right-skewed variable reduces the statistical influence of countries with especially large colonial European settler populations. This lessens the possibility that a handful of countries with extreme values will drive the results, although a robustness check shows similar estimates when using non-logged European population share.

The main specifications exclude the four neo-Britains because, as the theory section discussed, their historically unique and large colonial European populations may have exerted distinct influences from sizable settler minorities (see also Fails and Krieckhaus, 2010). There is no dispute that European settlers promoted post-colonial democracies in these countries, and of interest to examine whether this pattern extends beyond these four colonies. The main specifications also exclude Israel because of its historical uniqueness: a large population of Jewish immigrants from Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world, with a particularly large influx occurring in the final years of colonial rule after World War II prior to its contested independence. Not only were the majority of these settlers not British (Staetsky, Sheps and Boyd, 2013)—as opposed to the overwhelming majority of Europeans originating from the metropole in other settler colonies—it is exceedingly difficult to assess the percentage that derived from any Western European country, which is why Easterly and Levine (2016) do not include any data points for Israel.⁷ However, robustness checks show that the results are largely similar even when including these countries.

Appendix Table A.1 provides summary statistics. In addition to the main results from Table 1, this section also summarizes 20 robustness tables presented in Appendix Section B.1.

⁷Personal correspondence.

2.2 Main Results

Column 1 of Panel A in Table 1 demonstrates a positive and statistically significant correlation between logged colonial European population share and average post-colonial democracy levels between (a) the later of 1800 and the country's first year with Polity data, and (b) 2015. The coefficient estimate is particularly large in the post-1980 period, as Column 2 shows. Hypothetically increasing a country's colonial European population from zero percent to 25 percent, or roughly the value in Brazil and Venezuela, yields an increase in *polity2* score of 6.5. This is a large estimated effect—the difference between India and either Algeria or Tanzania in 2015—and is statistically significant. Post-1980 corresponds with the spread of “Third Wave” democratization forces to the post-colonial world. This time period is also relevant because much of the quantitative literature on European settlers primarily examines outcomes measured in the post-Cold War period (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Hariri, 2012; Easterly and Levine, 2016).

Despite decreasing somewhat in magnitude, the coefficient estimate remains statistically significant in post-1980 years in Column 2 even when controlling for five standard covariates in the colonialism and democracy literature (Panel B): ethnic fractionalization, Muslim population, colonial Protestant missionaries, forced settlement colonies, and state antiquity (Appendix Table A.3 provides additional description). By contrast, the Column 1 coefficient estimate decreases by 84 percent and loses statistical significance when adding these controls. The specifications with covariates are useful for comparing the importance of European settlers relative to other predictors of democracy. However, because other colonial governance strategies were endogenous to, or at least contemporaneous with, European settlement, it is important to assess the European settler correlation both with and without controls because the covariates may induce negative post-treatment bias.

In addition to some sensitivity to adding a handful of covariates, another concern with the findings in Columns 1 and 2 is that the coefficient estimates depend upon comparing countries at very periods of their post-colonial histories and in different world regions. Eighteen of the 20 countries with colonial European populations of at least 10 percent gained independence before World War II. All these colonies except for South Africa were in the New World. By contrast, only 9 of the 92 countries in the sample that were once-colonized by Western Europe but had a colonial European settler population of less than 10 percent gained independence before World War II. This implies that European settler colonies covary with a longer period

Table 1: Correlation Between European Population Share and Democracy

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.610*** (0.180)	1.173*** (0.216)	0.116 (0.235)	0.661 (0.433)	0.419 (0.326)
New World FE					5.176*** (1.353)
Observations	122	122	122	71	122
R-squared	0.074	0.189	0.001	0.040	0.265
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.0970 (0.176)	0.706*** (0.214)	-0.425** (0.212)	0.0554 (0.377)	0.255 (0.296)
New World FE					3.787** (1.610)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.969 (1.541)	-2.182 (1.822)	2.440 (2.227)	-1.875 (2.492)	-1.431 (1.819)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0380*** (0.0107)	-0.0534*** (0.0132)	-0.0383** (0.0159)	-0.0395** (0.0164)	-0.0485*** (0.0135)
Forced settlement colony	3.221* (1.802)	1.682 (2.021)	4.269** (1.794)	6.739*** (1.879)	0.601 (2.167)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.853** (0.405)	-0.0461 (0.425)	2.132*** (0.471)	0.0934 (0.501)	-0.166 (0.408)
State antiquity in 1500	0.717 (1.366)	0.760 (1.599)	3.085 (1.991)	1.805 (2.211)	0.695 (1.552)
Observations	122	122	122	71	122
R-squared	0.260	0.327	0.225	0.277	0.361
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full

Notes: Table 1 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

of independence in the post-1980 sample and with New World location. Longer post-colonial experiences may help to facilitate democracy (Olsson, 2009). Furthermore, implicitly using Old World countries as a counterfactual comparison for New World countries raises important confounding issues because these areas experienced vastly different pre-colonial histories as well as post-colonial opportunities for democratization. For example, proximity to the United States has improved prospects for democracy in Latin America relative to most Old World countries since the 1980s (Levitsky and Way, 2010).

Three natural strategies for addressing these confounding concerns considerably alter the estimated relationship between European settlers and post-colonial democracy, with or without the added covariates. First, Column 3 of Table 1 assesses short-term colonialism effects by analyzing democracy levels in countries' first full year of independence (Polity IV is measured as of December 31). If many European settler colonies

tended to create representative institutions during the colonial era, as the conventional institutional transplantation hypothesis posits, then there should be some divergence at independence. However, Column 3 of Panel A demonstrates that the coefficient estimate is 90 percent smaller in the first full year of independence than in Column 2 and is not statistically significant.⁸ In Column 3 of Panel B, the European settlers coefficient estimate flips to negative.

Second, Column 4 examines democracy levels post-1980 but greatly reduces variance in the year of independence compared to the sample in Columns 1 and 2 by only including the 71 countries with Polity IV data that gained independence after 1945. This is a useful sample to analyze because electoral competition and representation for colonial subjects became a concerted goal of colonial rule during the second major wave of decolonization following World War II. Additionally, although colonies with the largest European populations gained independence before World War II, many colonies with small but dominant European settler populations in Africa and the Caribbean gained independence later. Despite analyzing post-1980 years—the period most suggestive of a beneficial settler effect in the full sample—the coefficient estimate decreases by 44 percent compared to Panel A of Column 2 and loses statistical significance. This suggests that the post-1980 coefficient estimate in the full sample is in large part driven by rise and consolidation of democracy in Iberian America (not included in Column 4 because of early decolonization) starting in the late 1970s, more than a century after independence for these countries.

Third, Column 5 adds a New World fixed effect to Column 2 specification. The coefficient estimate for European settlers diminishes by 64 percent relative to Column 2 of Panel A and loses statistical significance. Therefore, to the extent that hemisphere-related sources of heterogeneity have affected prospects for democratization since 1980—for example, the United States has stronger influence on Latin America than either the United States or the European Union has on most of Asia—accounting for this heterogeneity overturns the strong association between settlers and democracy.

⁸Although coding democracy scores at independence may seem to be an error-prone process, the Polity IV coders do not flag any cases of coding uncertainty in the first full year of independence.

2.3 Robustness Checks

These findings are largely similar across 20 robustness regressions tables presented in Appendix Section B.1. Several tables include sample alterations: add neo-Britains, add Israel, or drop non-colonized territories. Other tables use alternative measures, which in some cases also alters the sample: Hariri's (2012) sample and European language fraction variable; Boix, Miller and Rosato's (2013) democracy measure, which enables incorporating many small islands into the sample; or the non-logged version of the European population share variable from Table 1. Additional tables use various instruments from the literature to address endogenous European settlement (see the first arrow in Figure 1). Two more tables use panel data rather than average democracy scores, with and without year fixed effects. Finally, additional tables disaggregate components of democracy and/or condition on British colonialism.

Overall, considering Table 1 and the various robustness checks, the evidence does not support a systematic positive relationship between colonial European population share and post-colonial democracy, although British colonies are more suggestive of positive effects. However, concluding from null results that European settlers were unimportant would be premature. Given the considerable attention paid to European settlers in the literature, it would indeed be surprising if they left no discernible systematic trace on any aspects of democracy. Evaluating the disaggregated democracy hypotheses using data mostly from the colonial era demonstrates clearer trends.

3 Assessing H1: British Institutional Transplantation

The remainder of the paper analyzes the three disaggregated democracy hypotheses by examining quantitative and qualitative evidence. Hypothesis 1 finds support from new data on elected colonial legislatures from the 17th to 20th centuries across 119 Western European colonies. Statistically, British settler colonies—but not settler colonies outside the British empire—are associated with the presence of elected legislatures. Until the mid-19th century, no other empire had experienced elected legislatures, but they were prevalent in British North America and the British Caribbean. Differences from the Spanish and Portuguese empires across the centuries are striking, although French settler colonies made some gains after the mid-19th century following democratic advances in the metropole. Closer examination of colonial rule in Iberian America—home to

many of the largest colonial European populations—highlights the absence of any tangible legacies of political representation and contestation, which persisted throughout the 19th century in most Iberian American countries.

3.1 Patterns Throughout the Colonial Period


Figure 2 shows the percentage of colonies with an elected colony-wide legislature between 1700 and 1959, although the fraction of the population that could vote was very small in most of these legislatures prior to World War II.⁹ Panel A codes a colony-year as 1 if it has an elected legislature either in the present year or in any previous years, and 0 otherwise.¹⁰ The lines average over the different categories of colonies. The sample only contains colonized years, and therefore the territories change over time depending on when they are colonized and gain independence. Panel B shows the number of colonies by category. Settler colonies are those in which Europeans composed at least 5% of the population at any point in the colony’s history. The sample contains 119 colonies, including many island nations not included in Table 1 and several territories that have not gained independence. Appendix Section A.2 provides additional data details, and Appendix Table A.4 lists every colony along with years colonized and years with an elected legislature.

Figure 2 offers three main takeaways. First, until the mid-19th century, elected legislatures were exclusively limited to British settler colonies. All colonies founded by English settlers in North America and the Caribbean, and some colonies founded by British conquest, created elected legislatures shortly after colonization. In the 1850s, similar political developments occurred in Oceania and in Cape Colony/South Africa. Greene (2010a) discusses New World colonies and shows evidence that, for Englishmen, liberty was “not just a condition enforced by law, but the very essence of their national identity” (3-4). Settlers’ colonial assemblies consciously sought to replicate the English House of Commons and to obtain corresponding political privileges (7). British North American colonies largely controlled their internal affairs and their legislatures even outpaced the English House of Commons in terms of autonomy due to their “continuous and continuing British connection and the tremendous impact of the British constitution upon their own

⁹The cutoff year for the figure is 1959 because the percentages are difficult to interpret afterwards. The sample fluctuates rapidly because many countries gained independence in 1960 and following years.

¹⁰The discussion of H2 for the British Caribbean examines within-colony changes in legislatures over time.

Figure 2: Elected Colonial Legislatures from 18th to 20th Centuries



perception of the constitutional order” (Finer, 1997, 1403). Even in smaller Caribbean islands with less ability to resist British encroachment, legislatures exerted considerable autonomy, fully controlling finances and exerting extensive executive powers (Green, 1976, 68).

These British institutions contrasted sharply with the “despotisms” of 18th-century Spanish, Portuguese, and French American empires (Greene, 2010a, 10). Finer (1997, 1383) quotes Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, written in 1776: “In everything except their foreign trade, the liberty of the English colonists to manage their own affairs in their own way is complete ... The absolute governments of Spain, Portugal, and France, on the contrary, take place in their colonies.” Spain, which possessed most of the remaining American colonies at the time, practiced authoritarian direct rule. The Spanish crown did not legally allow colonial officials to perform any executive or legislative functions. “Formal power was not shared by anyone outside the immediate Council and the king” (Hanson, 1974, 202), local officials functioned solely as judiciaries, and no colony-wide parliamentary bodies were established (Morse, 1964, 144). The one institution with some popular participation existed at the local level: *cabildos*, or town councils. However, shortly after towns were formed, the Spanish Crown typically diminished the power of *cabildos* and sold the office to raise revenues (Finer, 1997, 1387). Haring (1947, 177-178) proclaims: “As a repository of people’s liberty, a training school for the democratic system to be set up after independence, the *cabildo* possessed no potency at all. It had little or no freedom in action or responsibility in government. Its weakness was not a recent

development at the turn of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, the institution had been in a state of collapse for generations.” The first and only attempt to promote general elections occurred in 1809 in response to turmoil in Spain caused by the Napoleonic wars, but even these elections were to an empire-wide assembly in Spain rather than to local legislatures—and, colonial representatives were never seated in the *Junta Central* (Posada-Carbó, 1996, 4, 42).

These differences also highlight the importance of colonizer identity relative to natural endowments, a debate that has received considerable attention in the literature (e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff 2011; Frankema 2009, 44-84). At the turn of the 19th century, elected legislatures were prevalent across British territories regardless of whether the territory was suitable for small-scale farming (northern United States, Canada) or for sugar plantations (much of the Caribbean). Colonies recently conquered from France “inhabited by alien people” provided the main exceptions to British settler colonies having representative institutions (Green, 1976, 76). These colonies “required firm executive authority and rendered the immediate application of legislative government and English legal institutions neither possible nor desirable” (76). Spain imposed similar authoritarian institutions across South America, Central America, and the Caribbean despite varying endowments, as did France among its Caribbean sugar colonies and Quebec prior to 1763 (Narizny, 2012, 360).

The second observation from Figure 2 is that many settler colonies, even outside the British empire, gained electoral representation starting in the mid-19th century. Shortly after the 1848 revolution in France and the establishment of the Second Republic, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Reunion each created legislatures. Whites in Algeria also gained representation later in the 19th century. However, French Tunisia never gained a legislature, nor did authoritarian-ruled Portuguese settler colonies in Africa. Furthermore, Emerson (1962, 232) qualifies the relevance of these legislatures in centrally ruled French colonies: “Despite the revolutionary tradition of liberty and equality, the French colonies offered little in the way of democratic institutions . . . At best the French created advisory councils of a dubiously representative kind with some financial and administrative powers but little general legislative competence,” a pattern that persisted even after World War II (also see Delivagnette 1970, 263).

Third, by the 1930s, many non-settler colonies had established elected legislatures, such as India (1910), Nigeria (1923), and Mali (1925). However, only in the decades after World War II did other types of colonies catch up to British settler colonies, as France introduced legislative elections across its Sub-Saharan African

colonies in the 1940s and 1950s, Britain gradually decolonized its entire empire, and even Portugal relented in an abortive attempt to gain African support of the colonial project in the early 1970s.

3.2 Statistical Evidence: British Settler Colonies and Elected Legislatures

Table 2 statistically assesses these patterns using a series of logit models. In Column 1, the dependent variable equals 1 if the colony has an elected legislature in that year and 0 otherwise. The sample contains the same countries as in Figure 2, and comprises a panel of all years between 1600 and 1945 in which the territory was colonized. Because the comparisons occur across such a long period, every specification includes century fixed effects. Following Table 1, Column 2 drops the neo-Britains and Column 3 adds a New World fixed effect. Column 4 replaces the British colonial rule variable and interaction with constraints on the executive in the metropole (Appendix Section A.2 describes the coding procedure for this variable). Columns 1 through 4 use the same binary European settler variable as in Figure 2. Several considerations motivate using this simple measure: the panel contains a very long period of time, some countries fluctuated considerably in European population share over time, and data on colonial European populations is inherently uncertain farther back in time. However, Column 5 uses the same continuous European population share variable and sample as in Table 1, therefore also dropping the neo-Britains.

Table 2 strongly supports H1. In all columns, the marginal effect estimate is positive and statistically significant among British colonies or colonies whose metropole has high executive constraints, but not among non-British colonies or low metropolitan constraint colonies. In Column 1, the predicted probability of a legislature is nearly 7 times larger for British settler colonies compared to non-British settler colonies, 72% versus 11%. Although none of the columns in Table 2 contain substantive covariates, Appendix Table B.22 runs specifications that include the covariates from Panel B of Table 1 and drops the neo-Britains in every specification. These supplemental results demonstrate in a different way that Engerman and Sokoloff's (2011) posited geographic factors do not drive the results because the forced settlement control captures conditions that encouraged plantation agriculture—and, as noted, many plantations colonies created elected legislatures despite otherwise exploitative institutions.

Table 2: Settler Colonies and Elected Legislatures, 1600–1945

DV: Elected legislature					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Settler colony	0.407 (0.634)	0.422 (0.638)	0.0769 (0.678)	-0.00888 (1.271)	
British colony	0.429 (0.410)	0.427 (0.410)	0.405 (0.397)		5.454** (2.218)
Settler*British colony	2.679*** (0.640)	2.615*** (0.665)	2.525*** (0.624)		
New World FE			0.891* (0.458)		
Exec. constraints in metropole				0.575*** (0.219)	
Settler colony*Exec. constraints in metropole				0.346* (0.196)	
ln(Colonial European pop. %)					-0.0366 (0.263)
British colony*ln(Colonial European pop. %)					0.756** (0.329)
Observations	14,367	13,857	14,367	14,367	8,688
Century FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sample	FULL	No Neo-Br.	FULL	FULL	Table 1
Marginal effect estimates					
Settler colony British rule	0.621*** (0.0777)	0.611*** (0.0840)	0.538*** (0.0959)		
Settler colony Highest metropole exec. constraints				0.539*** (0.0665)	
ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule					0.162** (0.0633)
Settler colony Non-British rule	0.0336 (0.0545)	0.0351 (0.0554)	0.00653 (0.0579)		
Settler colony Lowest metropole exec. constraints				0.00357 (0.0103)	
ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule					-0.00198 (0.0141)

Notes: Table 2 summarizes a series of logit regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. Every specification contains century fixed effects. The bottom part of the table presents the marginal effect estimates and corresponding standard error estimates for the European settlers variables under various values of conditioning variables. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

3.3 Nineteenth Century Iberian America

Although Iberian American countries do not exhibit evidence of institutional transplantation during colonial rule, anti-monarchical ideas that inspired their wars of liberation could plausibly have triggered early democratic gains after independence (Hariri, 2012, 474). Related, many of these post-colonial countries modeled their constitutions on that of the United States. Although this argument is somewhat different than claims of *colonial*-era institutional transplantation, it suggests an alternative pathway through which European settlers could have spurred democratic competition. However, Appendix Section A.2.2 shows that most Iberian

American countries experienced a long time lapse between independence and the onset of competitive elections, and early limited elections correlate neither with European settlers nor with subsequent democracy. This reinforces the evidence that colonial institutional transplantation was mostly limited to British settlers rather than being more widespread.

4 Assessing H2: Landed Elites Resisting Enfranchisement

Many settler minority colonies support Hypothesis 2 by providing evidence that a politically influential landed class resisted enfranchising the non-white majority. This section analyzes the three main clusters of European settler minority colonies: Africa, British Caribbean, and Iberian America. Faced with threats to their political monopoly after World War II, European settler-dominated administrations in Africa reacted by repressing the African or Arab majority. Statistical evidence shows that a smaller percentage of the population was legally enfranchised in African settler colonies between 1955 and 1970, as most of the continent peacefully gained independence. In the 19th century British Caribbean, settlers reacted to the end of slavery and a rising political threat from the former slave majority by trading their legislatures for direct Crown rule, thus preventing franchise expansion. Iberian America also features high land inequality and resisted enfranchisement into the 20th century.

4.1 Twentieth Century Africa

Examining data from 20th century Africa statistically demonstrates divergent patterns of franchise expansion after World War II. This is relevant testing ground for the theory because European settlers in Africa tended to be politically influential in this period, as opposed to colonized territories in the British Caribbean in which settlers had largely lost political power by the 20th century. Africa is also a useful setting because there is a natural control group with which to compare the settler colonies: the many African colonies with little to no settler presence. Additional evidence demonstrates the extent of land inequality in African settler colonies and that settlers acted to restrict franchise expansion.

Africa's settler colonies exhibited a divergent path from the rest of the continent following the post-World War II "winds of change" that yielded peaceful transitions to majority rule and independence in most of non-

settler Africa. Figure 3 contains all countries in continental Africa (plus Madagascar) in every year between 1900 and 2000, i.e., both before and after independence. Examining pre- and post-independence periods is useful because the timing of independence was endogenous to European settler pressure, as settlers' political clout often enabled delaying reforms (Paine, 2017). Panel A demonstrates broad patterns of suffrage expansion during the 20th century across Africa, with three key periods. First, prior to World War II, the percent of the population with the legal franchise was low in all territories. In fact, this percentage tended to be higher in the settler colonies because they experienced legislative elections earlier, with the franchise restricted to whites. South Africa, Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and Algeria each had legislatures for Europeans at the turn of the 20th century. Second, both settler and non-settler territories experienced increases in suffrage in the decades following World War II, but this process occurred more slowly in settler colonies. Panel B, which zooms in on the 1955 to 1970 period, shows more clearly that non-settler colonies expanded the franchise more rapidly than settler colonies as decolonization proceeded in Britain's and France's non-settler colonies. Finally, after this period, Panel A shows that non-settler territories eventually caught up as liberation wars in Portuguese Africa, British southern Africa, and (earlier) in French North Africa ended with Africans or Arabs gaining majority rule. This does not imply that these countries became democratic, only that legal restrictions of the franchise based on race and other qualifications had been overturned.

Figure 3: Legalized Suffrage in 20th Century Africa (Pre- and Post-Independence)




Table 3 statistically assesses these differences between 1955 and 1970 and demonstrates support for H2

using the same sample of African countries as Figure 3. As in Table 2, Column 1 models the settler colony dummy, British colonialism, and their interaction. Column 2 adds covariates. Columns 3 and 4 run otherwise identical models that replace the settler colony dummy with the continuous logged European population share variable from Table 1. Across the columns, the table shows that settlers are strongly negatively associated with franchise size among both British and non-British colonies. In Column 1, the expected difference in percent enfranchised is 44%, with 70% legal enfranchisement in non-settler colonies versus 26% in settler colonies. Appendix Table B.23 shows the results are similar when not controlling for British colonialism and its interaction, which is useful to examine because the individual marginal effect estimates for the binary settler colony variable in Table 3 are based on a small number of colonies: the only British settler territories (by the 5% threshold) in this sample are South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the non-British settler colonies are Algeria, Angola, Namibia, and Tunisia. Finally, Appendix Table B.24 shows the results are also similar when replacing the legalized enfranchised population percentage variable with a binary variable for majority rule, i.e., whether or not at least 50% of the population has the legal franchise.

Considerable evidence supports the key redistributive mechanism for H2 posited by class-based theories: the settler landed elite feared franchise expansion and took repressive preventative actions. Research by area specialists and historians of Africa supports that land inequality between Europeans and Africans was starkly higher in settler than non-settler colonies. “In many African colonies without settlers, the colonial authorities did not attempt to disrupt local tenure practices. Indirect rule was interpreted to call for, in some places, vesting local authorities with control over land” (Herbst, 2000, 190). By contrast, almost all the colonies that experienced disruption to existing land tenure practices “saw exceptionally large amounts of land alienated during white rule for the benefit of white settlers” (189). Table 4 summarizes starkly unequal land distribution patterns in four major settler colonies, compared to 0% European land alienation in most colonies (see Hailey 1957, 687).

Until 1945, there were no major challenges to European settlers’ political hegemony.¹¹ However, changes after World War II facilitated African mobilization, creating a threat from below unless the political elite responded with concessions (Young, 1994, 182-217). The key economic difference between settler and non-settler colonies—considerable European alienation of land—created broad interests against decolonization

¹¹Paine (2017) provides additional detail on the political power of settlers, including their relationship with the metropole.

Table 3: Legalized Enfranchisement in Africa, 1955–1970

	DV: Avg. % of pop. legally enfranchised, 1955-70			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Settler colony	-37.96* (20.27)	-36.77** (16.82)		
British colony	-15.21* (7.553)	-9.071 (8.409)	-20.82 (27.39)	-0.145 (24.76)
Settler*British colony	-12.37 (21.60)	-0.519 (16.17)		
ln(Colonial European pop. %)			-11.05*** (3.964)	-11.34*** (4.064)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)*British colony			-1.077 (4.531)	1.974 (4.179)
Ethnic fractionalization		-7.436 (13.28)		-10.08 (13.42)
Muslim pop. %		0.0995 (0.128)		0.102 (0.147)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923		-5.983 (3.969)		-2.608 (5.267)
State antiquity in 1500		11.80 (20.11)		10.55 (17.38)
Colonies	42	42	42	42
R-squared	0.317	0.417	0.386	0.445
Marginal effect estimates				
Settler colony British rule	-50.32*** (7.457)	-37.29*** (8.742)		
ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule			-12.12*** (2.195)	-9.368*** (3.460)
Settler colony Non-British rule	-37.96* (20.27)	-36.77** (16.82)		
ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule			-11.05*** (3.964)	-11.34*** (4.064)

Notes: Table 3 summarizes a series of logit regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The dependent variable is legally enfranchised population percent averaged between 1955 and 1970, and the sample is all continental African countries plus Madagascar. The forced settlement covariate is not used because it equals 0 for every country in this sample. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

in settler colonies. For farmers, relatively low technological barriers to entry on many Europeans' farms would make it easy to replace Europeans with Africans (Kahler, 1981, 391). European land control also created positive spillovers for non-agricultural whites. The major settler colonies were founded upon preferential European access to land, and displacing Africans from their land created a cheap, mobile labor supply (Palmer, 1977, 246; Mosley, 1983, 13-6). Consequently, politically influential settlers responded with repression rather than with concessions to the African majority. South African and Southern Rhodesian whites elected extreme parties after World War II to combat rising African demands, and French settlers in Algeria rigged the 1948 legislative elections to prevent Arab representation. Overall, all six African colonies coded as settler colonies in Figure 2 experienced a major liberation war to gain independence (or, in the case of South Africa, to end European political dominance and gain majority rule) amidst repression intended to

Table 4: European Settler Land Domination in Africa

Territory	Eu. settler % of population	Eu. settler % alienated land	Eu. settler % cultivable land
South Africa	20%	87%	61%
Algeria	11%	34%	27%
Southern Rhodesia	6%	50%	58%
Kenya	1%	7%	25%

Source: Land data from Lutzelschwab (2013), Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Figures for Algeria exclude the Sahara.


prevent enfranchising Africans.

4.2 Nineteenth Century British Caribbean

By the 20th century, European settlers in the British Caribbean had largely lost the political influence that originally had enabled them to establish elected legislatures. Therefore, in the 20th century, they do not match the scope conditions of H2 that settlers must be politically influential to expect the disenfranchisement effect. Their lack of political power, however, stemmed from actions taken across the region in the 19th century to prevent franchise expansion. Several decades after Britain outlawed slavery in its empire in 1833, European settlers fearful of the former slave majority gaining legislative representation acquiesced to direct British rule in most British Caribbean colonies. These episodes provide concrete evidence of politically influential landed interests resisting enfranchisement. However, unlike settler colonies in Africa in the 20th century, it is more difficult to assess the counterfactual for British Caribbean colonies in the 19th century—i.e., if they did not have a sizable European settler minority—because there is no natural control group.

Figure 4 summarizes the pattern. It differs from Figure 2 in two ways. First, it only contains British Caribbean settler colonies. Second, as in Table 2, the legislature variable equals 1 if the colony has an elected legislature in a particular year and 0 otherwise, as opposed to whether or not it has *ever* had an elected legislature. The figure shows the prevalence of legislative institutions in the British Caribbean prior to the 1860s. The fluctuations in Panel A prior to this period arise from newly colonized territories (see Panel B) that had not yet created legislatures, as opposed to any colonies reversing legislative representation. However, at the end of the 1870s, only the Bahamas, Barbados, and Bermuda still had elected legislatures. Appendix Table A.5 provides country-by-country on legislative reversals.

Figure 4: Elected Colonial Legislatures in the British Caribbean



Historical evidence closely matches the expectations of class-based theories. Most British Caribbean colonies produced sugar and, by the 19th century, featured a small landed settler elite ruling over a vastly larger slave population. Among nine British sugar colonies with disaggregated population data around 1830, slaves ranged from six times the size of the white population in Barbados to more than 30 times in Grenada (Green, 1976, 13). Correspondingly, sugar was either the principal or the only product in these colonies, and plantations provided the core social and economic units (35).

In the 19th century, British settlers faced two types of challenges to their political power, which they exercised through elected legislatures. First, the latent threat of revolution from below by the slave majority became more acute in the 19th century. In addition to the successful Haitian revolution, “Slave rebellions significantly increased after 1815 on all the British islands. Slaves rebelled both in the major sugar colonies and on the smaller islands” (Rogoziński, 2000, 161-163, 185). A second challenge arose after decades of successful lobbying by white Caribbean planters to retain slavery finally failed in 1833 (Greene, 2010b, 74-75), when Britain outlawed slavery throughout its empire. Although this policy created the possibility of former slaves gaining political representation, European settlers reacted by increasing property right restrictions on voting while creating exceptions for whites that could vote under the old rule (Rogoziński, 2000, 194). Table 5 summarizes available voter data in several colonies and shows that less than 1% of the population could vote in the 1850s despite slavery ending over a decade ago. Overall, British settlers “had no intention of sharing their liberty with former slaves or of making island liberty less exclusive” (Greene, 2010a, 15).

Table 5: Voter Population Share in Mid-19th Century in Select British Caribbean Colonies

Colony	Year	Voters	Population	Voter population %
Barbados	1857	1,350	135,939	0.99%
Grenada	1854	191	28,732	0.66%
Jamaica	1863	1,457	441,300	0.33%
Saint Vincent	1850s	273	22,239	1.23%
Tobago	1850s	135	9,026	1.50%

Sources: Rogoziński (2000, 194) provides data on number of voters. Barbados population measured in 1851 and Jamaica in 1861 from Rogoziński (2000, 188), Grenada in 1829 and Saint Vincent in 1825 from Rogoziński (2000, 120), and Tobago in 1775 from Wells (1975, 253).

Apprehensive of mass enfranchisement by either peaceful or revolutionary means, settlers ultimately disbanded their legislatures in most colonies and acquiesced to direct British Crown rule. After slavery ended, plantation agriculture in the Caribbean became less profitable, which in turn decreased government revenues. Over time, an increasing share of white planters believed that an authoritarian government with a strong executive would increase private investment in the islands (Green, 1976, 361) and prevent non-whites from gaining political power. In 1852, Britain’s Secretary of State for the Colonies warned that absent reforms, “they must anticipate being overwhelmed in the Assembly by representatives of the coloured and black population” (363). The triggering event for moving to direct British rule occurred after a major revolt led by former slaves at Morant Bay in Jamaica in 1865. Although the government successfully repressed the rebellion, “the gravity of the crisis was vastly greater than anything experienced in Jamaica since emancipation” (390). This revolt was interpreted by whites in starkly racial terms. Jamaica’s governor “declared that only a strong-minded government could preserve the island from further violence” (395) in his speech that preceded a vote to disband the legislature. Facing largely similar circumstances, most of the remaining British Caribbean followed this pattern in the 1860s and 1870s. Contrary to their British neighbors in North America, or later in South Africa and Rhodesia, the very small size of the white plantocracy made them vulnerable (Greene, 2010b, 70), yielding metropolitan rule as the desired solution to their fear from below.¹²

Notably, the three British Caribbean colonies that retained their representative institutions during this period faced less dire circumstances than in Jamaica and most other sugar colonies. Neither Bermuda nor the

¹²The possibility of creating British Crown rule was also historically contingent. For example, settler populations in Tanganyika/Tanzania, Northern Rhodesia/Zambia, and Kenya were influential but not large enough to follow the South African or Rhodesian path of ruling independently of Britain. After World War II, Britain developed a firm commitment to promoting electoral representation that included non-Europeans.

Bahamas contained sugar plantations (Green, 1976, 65), and Barbados was “the sugar colony in which the prosperity of the planters was not imperilled and their political domination not challenged (353-4). Although the sample of British Caribbean islands is too small to permit meaningful statistical comparisons across colonies (for example, comparing sugar colonies to non-sugar colonies), Dippel and Carvalho (2015) exploit longitudinal data from this region in the mid-19th century to show that a proxy for the number of political newcomers in a particular electoral cycle correlates positively and strongly with the timing of legislature disbandment. Therefore, disenfranchisement reacted to challenges from below.

4.3 Iberian America

The absence of representative institutions in colonial Iberian America, discussed above, implies that examining franchise size during colonial rule is not relevant. However, post-colonial evidence is still relevant for assessing H2. Colonial-era Iberian settlers created countries with among the highest levels of land inequality in the world. Therefore, evidence of early franchise expansion in the region would provide disconfirming evidence for H2. Instead, Appendix Section A.3 shows that all Iberian American countries featured very limited franchises throughout the 19th century. Large franchises did not become prevalent in the region until the 1950s, more than a century after independence for almost all these countries. Furthermore, qualitative evidence shows that landed interests consistently acted to thwart franchise expansion.

5 Assessing H3: Consequences of Disenfranchisement

Supporting Hypothesis 3, in many cases, actions to resist enfranchisement also undermined the competitiveness of political institutions. In Africa, European settlers’ repressive actions to prevent majority rule often caused liberation wars that brought guerrilla leaders to power and undermined political competition, although democratic institutions survived largely intact in South Africa. In the British Caribbean, elected legislatures again became widespread in the region in the 20th century, but working and middle class actors—prominent in class-based democracy theories—rather than landed European settlers propelled democratic gains. In Iberian America, as Appendix Section A.4 discusses, landed inequality contributed to democratic instability in the 20th century.

5.1 Twentieth Century Africa

Of the six continental African territories coded as settler colonies for Figure 2, only South Africa exhibits clear evidence of colonial institutional transplantation promoting high political competition after European colonial rule ended. By contrast, three cases mostly fit the pattern predicted by H3, and the other two are irrelevant for assessing H3 because they did not have colonial legislatures.¹³ European settlers in Algeria, Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and South-West Africa/Namibia had each created elected legislatures two decades or more before World War II ended, each experienced lengthy decolonization wars as European settlers attempted to cling to power, and each failed to consolidate democracy after independence.

Table 6: Colonial Democratic Legacies in African Settler Colonies

Country	Independence year/ first year non-Eu. rule	Colonial European settler legislature at independence?	Democratic years in first decade
South Africa	1910/1994	YES	10
Tunisia	1956	NO	0
Algeria	1962	YES	0
Zimbabwe	1965/1980	YES	0
Angola	1975	NO	0
Namibia	1990	YES	0

Sources: Last column is the count of democratic years in first decade of independence using Boix, Miller and Rosato's (2013) binary democracy measure.

Zimbabwe exemplifies how repression to resist enfranchisement could also negatively impact prospects for democratic consolidation after independence. Robert Mugabe became president at independence after a prolonged war with the Rhodesian government. However, within a decade of achieving independence, the ruling party ZANU used its coercive organization that it had built during the decolonization war to repress political opposition and to become a de facto one-party state, fitting Levitsky and Way's (2010, 240) concept of a competitive authoritarian regime. Another plausible effect of the war on undermining post-colonial democracy was to select a ruler that was not cultivated through the democratic system—which had deep roots in colonial Rhodesia—and was less likely to respect democratic norms. Namibia is a somewhat ambiguous case because it is sometimes considered a democratic success story. For South Africa and Namibia, Bratton and van de Walle (1997, 81, 178-179) highlight the possible pro-democratic

¹³Zero percent of Tunisia's population was legally enfranchised until its first year of independence. Portugal granted legislative representation to its colonies in 1973 as an abortive attempt to settle its decolonization wars that began in the early 1960s, although the guerrilla groups in Angola and its other colonies did not participate.

role of European settlers: “The process of liberalization would seem to be relatively easier in regimes where competition is tolerated; the main challenge is then the simpler one of expanding the franchise to allow political participation.” However, the revolutionary party SWAPO has been in power since independence in 1990 with limited checks on executive power, and Namibia appears to be better categorized as competitive authoritarian than as democratic (Melber, 2017).¹⁴ Finally, FLN revolutionary leaders in Algeria did not hold even semi-competitive executive elections after independence, with every presidential election prior to 1995 involving only one candidate who received over 90% of the vote (Nohlen, Thibaut and Krennerich, 1999, 60).

5.2 Twentieth Century British Caribbean

Across most of the British Caribbean, European settlers’ decisions in the 1860s and 1870s to voluntarily disband their legislatures (see Figure 4) support H3 by showing that strategies to resist enfranchisement undermined electoral contestation. However, Table 7 shows that most of these countries have been stable democracies initially after and since independence. This subsequent evidence does not disconfirm H3 because the push for electoral institutions before independence came from non-Europeans rather than from landed European settlers.

The crucial political events and changes occurred starting in the 1930s. Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, St. Kitts, and St. Vincent each experienced strikes and riots in the 1930s in reaction to economic austerity caused by the Great Depression (Rogoziński, 2000, 313-314). With the white plantocracy having previously relinquished political control to Britain in the 19th century, Britain reacted to widespread strikes and riots in the 1930s with concessions in the 1940s that went “much further than the local upper classes would have dreamed of” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 240). In addition to organizing workers, trade union leaders also organized labor parties across the region (Rogoziński, 2000, 315-319) that advocated for political representation and participated in the first elections under universal suffrage in the 1940s (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 236-238). Jamaica was the first colony to gain universal suffrage, in 1944, followed by the rest within the next decade.

¹⁴Polity IV codes Namibia as having moderate constraints on the executive. Similarly, Miller (2015) codes Namibia as having medium levels of contestation, corresponding with his category of electoral authoritarianism.

Table 7: Colonial Democratic Legacies in British Caribbean Settler Colonies

Country	Independence year	Colonial European settler legislature at independence?	Democratic years in first decade
Jamaica	1962	NO	10
Trinidad and Tobago	1962	NO	10
Barbados	1966	YES	10
Bahamas	1973	YES	10
Grenada	1974	NO	5
Dominica	1978	NO	10
St. Lucia	1979	NO	10
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1979	NO	10
Antigua and Barbuda	1981	NO	0
Belize	1981	NO	10
St. Kitts and Nevis	1983	NO	10
Bermuda	-	YES	-

Sources: Last column is the count of democratic years in first decade of independence using Boix, Miller and Rosato's (2013) binary democracy measure.

In addition to Britain rather than settlers making the policy choices in response to demands for democratic representation among the non-European majority, important structural changes had also occurred to alter the balance of power between white plantation owners and the masses. Economic changes weakened the plantocracy by increasing foreign land ownership (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 238-239). Furthermore, in the aftermath of slavery, Britain granted metropolitan legal rights to freed slaves in the Caribbean. Corresponding educational gains during the Crown rule period may have helped to facilitate societal organization (Owolabi, 2015). Overall, movements toward democracy in the British Caribbean the 20th century occurred in spite of rather than because of European settlers, and “the driving force behind democratization and decolonization was an alliance of the working-class and the middle classes” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 244).

6 Summarizing the Democratic Legacies of European Settlers

Combining the evidence used to assess H1 through H3 demonstrates the prevalence of democratic resistance by colonial European settlers—anticipated by class-based theories of democracy—and the few number of countries with clear evidence of beneficial European settler democratic legacies. In the four neo-Britains—which have received little attention here because of the broad consensus about pro-democratic legacies in existing research—settlers resisted expanding the franchise to non-Europeans, but this exerted less deleterious consequences for competitive political institutions because European descendants composed a majority.

South Africa since 1994, despite experiencing lengthy repressive white rule over the majority, has also managed to consolidate democratic institutions originally created by Europeans (Table 6). Bahamas and Barbados also provide some support for beneficial European settler legacies because settlers created legislatures that lasted uninterrupted until independence, and they have both been democratic since independence (Table 7). However, the seeming importance of European settlers dissipates when comparing them to other countries in the region, which regained legislative representation at least several decades before independence and mostly have been democratic since independence.

Regarding other settler colonies, Appendix Section A.2.2 shows that no Iberian American countries experienced high levels of political competition within a decade of independence in the 19th century. Table A.8 provides information on colonial-era legislatures and post-colonial democracy for the other territories coded as settler colonies in Figure 2—i.e., those outside continental Africa, the British Caribbean, or Iberian America—that mostly featured large slave populations. The two possible examples of settler-transplanted institutions creating post-colonial democracies are Israel and Mauritius. However, as described above, existing theories do not work well for Israel because it amalgamated a widespread Jewish diaspora, as opposed to the traditional pattern of settlers from the *metropolitan country* migrating for favorable economic or political opportunities. For Mauritius, Britain permanently gained control of the colony during the Napoleonic wars, and governed it directly as a Crown Colony just like St. Lucia and Trinidad—two exceptions to the broader pattern in the Caribbean of British settlers creating elected legislatures shortly after colonization. The first legislative elections occurred in Mauritius in 1886, more than 50 years after the end of slavery fundamentally altered its economy and undermined European settler dominance.

Therefore, besides the neo-Britains and possibly a few other countries, former settler colonies have either tended not to be democratic since gaining independence, or have become democratic for reasons unrelated to colonial European settlers. Despite evidence of settlers transplanting representative institutions in most British settler colonies, class-based theories of democracy find considerable support as actions to erode widespread political participation undermined potentially beneficial European settler legacies in most colonies.

7 Broader Implications

The analysis carries three broader implications. First, existing research equates settler colonialism either with direct rule (Hariri, 2012, 2015) or with promoting rule-based institutions at the exclusion of extraction (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002). However, the present analysis rethinks both of these perspectives, especially as they relate to democracy promotion. It is certainly true that European settlers disrupted traditional political institutions that Hariri (2012, 2015) argues undermined post-colonial democratic prospects in territories that did not experience widespread European settlement. Large settler communities created more direct relationships between Europeans and non-Europeans, in contrast to, for example, many indirectly ruled African colonies in which colonial administrators simply sought to raise sufficient tax revenue to balance the budget and only minimally altered traditional landholding patterns. However, as shown, direct rule by settlers also hindered democratic promotion in important ways. In the British Caribbean, a critical shift occurred when these colonies moved from settler rule to a different form of direct rule by the British Crown. Britain had stronger incentives than the settlers to promote education among non-Europeans (Owolabi, 2015), and fewer incentives to repress demands for democracy. This is consistent with Lange's (2004) findings relating direct British rule to post-colonial democracy. The analysis also calls into question the important distinction raised by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) between settler and extractive colonies. Outside the neo-Britains, European settlers tended to organize the colonial economy specifically to extract from natives (Africa, Iberian America) or from non-European migrants (Caribbean and other plantation islands). These actions created negative economic and political consequences even in colonies, such as many in the British Caribbean, that created exclusive legislatures for whites—thus combining aspects of settler institutional and extractive colonialism.

Second, the analysis provides a new test of class-based theories of democracy—which are needed given recent critiques—as well as integrates the colonialism-democracy literature with class-based research, which until this point have been largely separate. Boix's (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) formal class-based accounts of regime transitions have been extensively empirically critiqued in recent research (e.g., Haggard and Kaufman, 2012; Ansell and Samuels, 2014). However, these theories serve as a useful framework for studying settler colonialism, where in most cases a small European political and economic elite faced strong incentives to minimize the masses' political power. Also, the broad literature on colonial-

ism and democracy has tended not to integrate itself with broader theories of democracy, such as class-based frameworks, and the present paper provides a step in that direction.

Third, the present theory based on disaggregating contestation and participation may be useful for studying democracy more broadly. Typically, different aspects of democracy are either aggregated theoretically, or distinguished without considering their possible interactions. For example, in all political regimes in Boix's (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) models, the median voter chooses policy (i.e., perfect competition among those enfranchised), and "democracy" in essence means a large franchise. However, as the present theory shows, an explanatory factor may exert differential effects on various components of democracy—settlers in some colonies promoted contestation, but almost always undermined participation—yielding the need for more theoretical development that evaluates heterogeneous incentives.

Overall, in contrast to a large literature on legacies of colonial European settlers, this paper shows evidence more consistent with class-based theories of democracy: European settlers do not explain democratic variation across much of the post-colonial world because of their actions to resist franchise expansion. The considerations raised here should help to further our understanding of how colonialism affected democracy and other outcomes.

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Online Appendix

(See Appendix Section [B](#) for Additional Regression Tables)

A Additional Data Information and Discussion

A.1 Additional Data Information for Table 1

All European settler data outside of Africa comes from Easterly and Levine’s (2016) dataset. For each colony, I used the data point closest to the year of independence. The European population share variable for African countries uses three sources that estimate European settlers as a percentage of the population. Lawrence (2010) provides a data point for each French colony between 1946 and 1950, Mosley (1983) for southern British colonies and several others in 1960, and United Nations (1965) for various colonies for up to three years ranging from 1946 to 1961. The latter two sources were identified using the replication data for Easterly and Levine (2016). For African colonies in which multiple sources provided a European settlers estimate, I average the estimates. For Mauritius, I incorporated information from Mauritius’ 1962 census on the percentage of inhabitants that primarily spoke either English or French in their homes at the time of the census (Statistics Mauritius, [n.d.](#), 16). Although Easterly and Levine (2016) did not find information about European settlers in every colony, they assume that no information means no settlers: “colonial histories (which are virtually all written by European historians) are extremely unlikely to fail to mention significant European settlements.” Table [A.2](#) lists every country in the Table 1 sample with a colonial European population share of at least 5%. Table [A.2](#) does not contain every territory coded as a settler colony for Table [A.4](#), which are described in depth below.

The countries in the Table 1 sample, which is restricted to those with Polity IV data, are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, North Korea, South Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

<i>Full sample</i>			
Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Average polity2	-1.76	4.579	122
Average polity2, post-1980	0.039	5.493	122
polity2 at independence	-1.902	6.176	122
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	-5.228	2.039	122
Ethnic fractionalization	0.51	0.254	122
Muslim pop. %	32.961	39.452	122
Forced settlement colony	0.082	0.275	122
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.619	1.061	122
State antiquity in 1500	0.295	0.327	122
<i>Post-1945 independence sample</i>			
Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Average polity2, post-1980	-0.753	4.884	71
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	-5.555	1.48	71
Ethnic fractionalization	0.582	0.244	71
Muslim pop. %	36.092	38.613	71
Forced settlement colony	0.085	0.28	71
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.836	1.295	71
State antiquity in 1500	0.24	0.303	71

Table A.2: European Population Share Data for Table 1 Sample ($\geq 5\%$ of pop. at independence)

Country	Eu. pop. share	Location/colonizer	Year indep.
Canada	98.5%	North America/Britain	1867
New Zealand	93.7%	Oceania/Britain	1907
United States	80.7%	North America/Britain	1783
Australia	75.4%	Oceania/Britain	1901
Uruguay	57.0%	South America/Spain	1829
Cuba	44.2%	Caribbean/Spain	1902
Chile	42.3%	South America/Spain	1818
Argentina	33.0%	South America/Spain	1824
Ecuador	32.4%	South America/Spain	1830
Colombia	32.4%	South America/Spain	1820
Guatemala	28.9%	Central America/Spain	1839
Venezuela	26.4%	South America/Spain	1830
Dominican Republic	25.0%	Caribbean/Spain	1844
Brazil	23.4%	South America/Portugal	1823
Panama	21.7%	Central America/Spain	1903
South Africa	20.1%	Africa/Britain	1910
Mexico	18.1%	North America/Spain	1821
Namibia	12.9%	Africa/South Africa	1990
Peru	12.6%	South America/Spain	1824
Algeria	10.9%	Africa/France	1962
Costa Rica	9.4%	Central America/Spain	1838
Paraguay	8.0%	South America/Spain	1811
Mauritius	7.1%	African island/Britain	1968
Haiti	6.3%	Caribbean/France	1804
Zimbabwe	6.0%	Africa/Britain	1969
Bolivia	5.9%	South America/Spain	1825
Honduras	5.7%	Central America/Spain	1838
Tunisia	5.5%	Africa/France	1958

Notes: Table A.2 only lists countries in the Table 1 sample with at least 5% European population share at independence. Countries with positive European population shares but less than 5% at independence are not listed. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.3: Data for Covariates in Table 1

Variable	Notes and description	Source
Ethnic fractionalization	Computed as 1-Herfindahl index of ethnic group shares.	Alesina et al. (2003)
Muslim population %	Measured in 1980.	La Porta et al. (1999)
Protestant missionaries	Number of Protestant missionaries per 10,000 people in 1923.	Woodberry (2012)
Forced settlement	Indicator variable for colonies in which “descendants of non-indigenous African slaves and/or Asian indentured laborers make up at least 60 percent of the postcolonial population.”	Owolabi (2015)
State antiquity	A territory’s combined years with government above local level between 0 CE and 1500 (unit of analysis is modern countries), with the end year following Hariri (2012).	Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) and author’s own coding using their source, Encyclopædia Britannica (2017)

A.2 Supporting Information for Assessing H1

A.2.1 Data Information for Figure 2 and Table 2

Sample. Owolabi’s (2015) dataset contains observations from many modern-day countries colonized by Western Europe as of 1945, and several territories that have remained as colonial dependencies. The sample contains most of his units plus every former Western European colony that gained independence prior to 1945, as well as Bhutan, Eritrea, and Namibia. The only territories in Owolabi’s (2015) data excluded from the present dataset are seven small present-day dependencies (i.e., never gained independence) that lack data on European population in both Owolabi’s (2015) and Easterly and Levine’s (2016) datasets. This resulting sample contains 110 present-day countries and 9 dependencies. For modern-day countries that are subsets of a larger colony, only the country with the capital of the colony is included in the sample. This coding rule was only used for Spanish continental America, which is coded as four vicerealties. Because there were no representative institutions in Spanish America, decreasing the number of Spanish American units in the sample makes it harder to find support for H1. For modern-day countries that combine separate colonies, such as as Trinidad and Tobago, I use data from the colony with the largest population.

European settlers. For most territories, coding for the binary European settlers variable (Europeans composed at least 5% of the population at any point during colonial rule) is based off the data described in Section A.1. Rogoziński (2000, 78, 165, 212) provides colonial-era data for Martinique and Guadeloupe. Green (1976, 13) provides additional colonial-era data for Guyana. Easterly and Levine (2016) do not have data on Portuguese islands Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe prior to the mid-20th century. Putterman and Weil’s (2010) descendency data shows that 41% of Cape Verde’s residents lived in Portugal in 1500. This high figure is the basis for coding Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe as settler colonies for Table 2 (Putterman and Weil 2010 do not have data for Sao Tome and Principe).

Every country listed in Table A.2 is coded as a settler colony in Table A.4 except those not included in Table A.4 (recall the only units for continental Spanish America are the four vicerealties). Most countries coded as settler in Table A.4 but are not listed in Table A.2 are small islands not included in the Table 1 sample. The only territories coded as settler colonies in Table A.4 that are in the Table 1 sample but are not listed in Table A.2 are Israel (which the paper discusses), ones whose European settler percentage declined over time under colonial rule (Cape Verde, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) or—given the coding procedure for African colonies described above—whose European settler percentage peaked at the end of colonial rule in colonies that decolonized late (Angola).

Colonizer. For territories colonized by multiple European powers at different times, only the final colonizer is coded (the only partial exceptions are Somalia and Libya, which are coded as Italian colonies despite gaining independence as UN Mandates administered by Britain after Italy lost World War II). Consequently, the colonial onset year corresponds with colonization by that power, as opposed to the first year of colonization by any Western European power. For example, Tanzania is coded as colonized in 1919 by Britain, ignoring the earlier period of German colonization. Onset year is coded using Olsson (2009) and Encyclopaedia Britannica (which is also Olsson’s (2009) source). For countries that combined multiple colonies with different colonizers, I use the colonizer for the larger territory. For example, Somalia is coded as an Italian colony despite combining Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland.

Metropolitan constraints on the executive. Column 4 of Table 2 controls for constraints on the executive in the metropole. For years after 1800, this is measured using Polity IV’s annual constraints on the executive variable (for transition years, the data point from the last year without missing data is imputed). For earlier centuries, this is calculated by averaging data from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), which is measured in 50 year intervals.

Elected colonial legislatures. Table A.4 lists the first year with an elected colonial legislature for every territory in the Table 2 sample. For territories in the V-Dem (Coppedge and Zimmerman., 2016) dataset that had 0 percent of the population legally enfranchised early in the 20th century, the first year with a positive population percent enfranchised is coded as the first year with an elected legislature. Consulting secondary sources showed that increases in enfranchised population percent did indeed arise because an elected legislature had been created. For territories either not included in the V-Dem dataset or that V-Dem codes as having a positive percent of the population enfranchised in 1900, I consulted additional secondary sources listed in Table A.4.

For most territories in the panel dataset used for Table 2, the legislature is coded as existing for every year after the first (each territory falls out of the sample when it gains independence). The only exceptions are British Caribbean colonies, for which there is considerable documented evidence of legislative reversals. Table A.5 lists the data used to generate Figure 4. The rationale for not attempting to code legislative reversals outside the British Caribbean is threefold. First, outside the British Caribbean, there is scant evidence of legislative reversals. V-Dem does not provide any examples in the 20th century in which legally enfranchised population percent decreased from a positive level to 0 during the colonial era. Secondary sources used to code the election onset variable in earlier centuries did not indicate any reversals, either, save for the British Caribbean. The one additional example found during the coding process is that Kuwait created an elected legislature in 1938 that was disbanded the next year and then periodically reappeared in the future. Therefore, there does not seem to be much measurement error induced by not coding reversals outside the British Caribbean. Second is practical: whereas coding elected legislative onset is straightforward for most colonies, more fine-grained evidence on the timing of elections during the colonial era (especially before the 20th century) is not well-documented, especially for the smaller colonies. Third, this coding decision biases against the findings from Table 2, as the only colonies for which reversals are coded (i.e., changing what would be 1’s for all other colonies to 0’s for many years in British Caribbean colonies) are all British settler colonies.

Table A.4: Elected Colonial Legislatures

Country	Colonizer	Settler colony	Colonized	Legislature ^a	Year indep.	Source
Cape Verde	Portugal	YES	1462	1972	1975	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Dominican Republic	Spain	YES	1492	-	1821	^b
Mozambique	Portugal	NO	1505	1973	1975	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Cuba	Spain	YES	1511	-	1898	^b
Mexico/New Spain	Spain	YES	1521	-	1824	^b
Sao Tome and Principe	Portugal	YES	1522	1972	1975	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Colombia/New Granada	Spain	YES	1525	-	1819	^b
Peru	Spain	YES	1531	-	1821	^b
Brazil	Spain	YES	1533	-	1822	^b
Argentina/Rio de la Plata	Spain	YES	1536	-	1816	^b
Angola	Portugal	YES	1576	1973	1975	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
United States	Britain	YES	1607	1619	1783	Finer (1997, 1400)
Bermuda	Britain	YES	1612	1620	-	^c
Indonesia	Netherlands	NO	1619	1919	1949	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
St. Kitts and Nevis	Britain	YES	1623	1640	1983	^c
Barbados	Britain	YES	1627	1639	1966	^c
Antigua and Barbuda	Britain	YES	1632	1640	1981	^c
Netherlands Antilles	Netherlands	YES	1634	1936	-	Oostindie and Klinkers (2012, 61)
Guadeloupe	France	YES	1635	1854	-	Idowu (1968, 265)
Martinique	France	YES	1635	1854	-	Idowu (1968, 265)
Senegal	France	NO	1638	1879	1960	Idowu (1968, 268)
French Guiana	France	YES	1643	1878	-	Idowu (1968, 268)
Bahamas	Britain	YES	1648	1729	1973	^c
Reunion	France	YES	1650	1854	-	Idowu (1968, 265)
Jamaica	Britain	YES	1660	1660	1962	^c
Haiti	France	YES	1665	-	1804	^d
Suriname	Netherlands	NO	1667	1866	1975	Nationale Assemblée (n.d.)
Canada	Britain	YES	1713	1758	1867	Girard (2010, 169)
India	Britain	NO	1750	1910	1947	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Dominica	Britain	YES	1759	1760	1978	^c
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Britain	YES	1762	1760	1979	^c
Grenada	Britain	YES	1763	1760	1974	^c
Equatorial Guinea	Spain	NO	1778	1968	1968	Nohlen, Thibaut and Krennerich (1999, 351-366)
Malaysia	Britain	NO	1786	1955	1957	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Australia	Britain	YES	1788	1852	1901	Waterhouse (2010, 231)
Guyana	Britain	NO	1796	1892	1966	^c
Belize	Britain	YES	1798	1854	1981	^c
Sri Lanka	Britain	NO	1802	1911	1948	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Trinidad and Tobago	Britain	YES	1802	1925	1962	^c
South Africa	Britain	YES	1806	1853	1994	Greene (2010a, 21)
Sierra Leone	Britain	NO	1808	1925	1961	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Mauritius	Britain	YES	1814	1886	1968	Selvon (2012)
Seychelles	Britain	YES	1814	1948	1976	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
St. Lucia	Britain	YES	1814	1925	1979	^c
Gambia	Britain	NO	1816	1947	1965	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Singapore	Britain	NO	1819	1948	1963	Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001a, 239-259)
Algeria	France	YES	1830	1883	1962	Aldrich (1996, 215)
Cote d'Ivoire	France	NO	1830	1925	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
New Zealand	Britain	YES	1840	1854	1907	Greene (2010a, 20)
Gabon	France	NO	1841	1946	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
French Polynesia	France	NO	1842	1946	-	Aldrich (1996, 212, 215)
Hong Kong	Britain	NO	1842	1985	1997	Hong Kong Government (1984)
Comoros	France	NO	1843	1947	1975	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Nigeria	Britain	NO	1851	1923	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Vietnam	France	NO	1859	1922	1945	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Bahrain	Britain	NO	1861	1972	1971	Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001b, 49-56)
Djibouti	France	NO	1862	1946	1977	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Benin	France	NO	1863	1925	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Cambodia	France	NO	1863	1947	1964	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Lesotho	Britain	NO	1868	1960	1966	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Fiji	Britain	NO	1874	1905	1970	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Ghana	Britain	NO	1874	1926	1947	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Guinea-Bissau	Portugal	NO	1879	1973	1974	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)

Elected Colonial Legislatures, continued

Country	Colonizer	Settler colony	Colonized	Legislature ^a	Year indep.	Source
Congo	France	NO	1880	1946	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Guinea	France	NO	1881	1925	1958	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Tunisia	France	YES	1881	1956	1956	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Egypt	Britain	NO	1882	1924	1922	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Botswana	Britain	NO	1885	1920	1966	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Congo, Democratic Republic	Belgium	NO	1885	1960	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Solomon Islands	Britain	NO	1885	1964	1978	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Myanmar	Britain	NO	1886	1922	1948	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Macau	Portugal	NO	1887	1976	1999	Shiu-Hing (1989, 843)
Maldives	Britain	NO	1887	1933	1965	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Brunei	Britain	NO	1888	-	1984	Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001b, 47-51)
Somalia	Italy	NO	1888	1956	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Eritrea	Italy	NO	1890	1956	1950	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Uganda	Britain	NO	1890	1958	1962	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Zambia	Britain	NO	1890	1926	1964	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Zimbabwe	Britain	YES	1890	1899	1980	Willson, Passmore and Mitchell (1963)
Malawi	Britain	NO	1891	1955	1964	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Kiribati	Britain	NO	1892	1967	1979	Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001a, 673-685)
Tuvalu	Britain	NO	1892	1967	1978	Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001a, 823-832)
United Arab Emirates	Britain	NO	1892	-	1971	Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001b, 289-292)
Laos	France	NO	1893	1946	1949	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Mali	France	NO	1893	1925	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Burkina Faso	France	NO	1895	1948	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Kenya	Britain	NO	1895	1920	1963	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Madagascar	France	NO	1895	1946	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Chad	France	NO	1898	1946	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Guam	United States	NO	1898	1970	-	EB Guam ^e
Philippines	United States	NO	1898	1907	1946	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Sudan	Britain	NO	1898	1949	1956	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Central African Republic	France	NO	1899	1946	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Tonga	Britain	NO	1900	1875	1970	Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001a, 809-822)
Mauritania	France	NO	1903	1946	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Swaziland	Britain	NO	1903	1921	1968	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Papua New Guinea	Australia	NO	1906	1951	1975	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Vanuatu	French	NO	1906	1975	1980	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Bhutan	Britain	NO	1910	-	1947	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Libya	Italy	NO	1912	1956	1951	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Morocco	France	NO	1912	1963	1956	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
East Timor	Portugal	NO	1914	1973	1975	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Kuwait	Britain	NO	1914	1938	1961	Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001b, 155-167)
Samoa	New Zealand	NO	1914	1873	1962	Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001a, 779-794)
Qatar	Britain	NO	1916	-	1971	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
U.S. Virgin Islands	United States	YES	1917	1970	-	EB U.S. Virgin Islands ^e
Lebanon	France	NO	1918	1923	1946	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Burundi	Belgium	NO	1919	1953	1962	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Cameroon	France	NO	1919	1946	1960	Collier (1982, 37)
Namibia	South Africa	YES	1919	1926	1990	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Rwanda	Belgium	NO	1919	1955	1962	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Tanzania	Britain	NO	1919	1958	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Togo	France	NO	1919	1946	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Iraq	Britain	NO	1920	1922	1932	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Jordan	Britain	NO	1920	1924	1946	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Nauru	Australia	NO	1920	1951	1968	Viviani (1970, 105)
Niger	France	NO	1922	1946	1960	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Syria	France	NO	1922	1918	1946	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)
Israel	Britain	YES	1923	1920	1948	Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016)

^aFirst year with elected legislature under colonial rule. - denotes that no elected legislature was created under colonial rule.

^bThe lack of elected colonial legislatures in Spanish and Portuguese America is based on discussions from numerous secondary sources: Engerman and Sokoloff (2005), Finer (1997, 1383-1394), Hanson (1974), North and Weingast (2000), Posada-Carbó (1996), Przeworski (2009), Rogoziński (2000), and Stanley and Stein (1981). The text provides additional details on town council elections and on the Spanish empire-wide assembly elections of 1809.

^cMany British Caribbean colonies were either colonized by European settlers, or gained through conquest but gained legislative representation shortly afterwards (Green, 1976, 65). These years are coded from Greene (2010b). Several others were ruled as Crown colonies for much of the 19th century and gained legislative representation afterwards. Belize is coded from EB Belize (see note e below). Guyana is coded from MacDonald (1992, 11-12). St. Lucia is coded from Nohlen (2005, 581). Trinidad and Tobago is coded from Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) (also see Nohlen (2005, 628)). Although Tobago had created a legislature before 1925, following the coding rule stated above, Trinidad’s data is used because Trinidad is the larger of the two islands.

^dNo legislature coded for Haiti based on discussions in Rogoziński (2000, 164-168) and Idowu (1968), which do not mention a legislature in Haiti but do in other French colonies.

^eAll sources noted as “EB” are the Encyclopædia Britannica (2017) page for that country.

Table A.5: Panel Data on Elected Legislatures in British Caribbean Colonies

Country	Legislative years	Additional sources
Antigua and Barbuda	1640-1867, 1951-	Dippel and Carvalho (2015), Nohlen (2005, 61-72)
Bahamas	1729-	
Barbados	1639-	
Belize	1854-1871, 1936-	EB Belize
Bermuda	1620-	Nohlen (2005, 223-4)
Dominica	1760-1898, 1924-	
Grenada	1760-1876, 1951-	
Guyana	1892-	Dippel and Carvalho (2015), Nohlen (2005, 301-315)
Jamaica	1660-1865, 1884-	
St. Kitts and Nevis	1640-1877, 1937-	
St. Lucia	1925-	Central Electoral Office (n.d.)
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1760-1866, 1951-	Dippel and Carvalho (2015), Nohlen (2005, 595-606)
Trinidad and Tobago	1925-	

Notes: The last column lists any additional sources for the country not stated in Table A.4. All sources noted as “EB” are the Encyclopædia Britannica (2017) page for that country.

A.2.2 Competition in 19th Century Iberian America


Although Iberian American countries do not exhibit evidence of institutional transplantation during colonial rule, anti-monarchical ideas that inspired their wars of liberation could plausibly have triggered early democratic gains after independence (Hariri, 2012, 474). Related, many of these post-colonial countries modeled their constitutions on that of the United States. Although this argument is somewhat different than claims of *colonial*-era institutional transplantation, it suggests an alternative pathway through which European settlers could have spurred democratic competition. However, this section shows that most Iberian American countries experienced a long time lapse between independence and the onset of competitive elections, and early limited elections correlate neither with European settlers nor with subsequent democracy. This reinforces the evidence that colonial institutional transplantation was mostly limited to British settlers rather than being more widespread.

North and Weingast (2000) emphasize the challenges facing Iberian American countries after independence. They argue that the breakdown of the colonial authoritarian order—which occurred after Latin American countries gained independence in the early 19th century through anti-colonial wars—left elites scrambling to create a new institutional equilibrium. “Citizens in the new societies were unlikely to be able to police adherence to limits on political power. Instead, these conditions fostered the development of an authoritarian system. The absence of widespread support for constitutional principles made adherence to them unlikely” (39). Instead, elites attempted to reconstruct “the authoritarian-autocratic model of 16th century Spain and Latin America” (41) in response to widespread political disorder. Anti-monarchical sentiments tended to result in disorder rather than in competitive governance because of the centrality of the Crown to political

order under under Iberian rule (31). Removing this coordination device explains post-independence political “chaos” (Morse, 1964, 157-8), and explains why the “most enduring [political] problem was that of reconstructing legitimate authority in the absence of the king” (Safford, 1987, 56). The written letter of the formal constitutions was unimportant because there was no representative tradition that induced compliance with them (North and Weingast, 2000, 40-41), and reasons related to H2 provided elites with incentives to counter republican and liberal principles that “conflicted with the system of maintaining corporate privileges; for example, landed elites’ right to labor, the independence and power of the church and the military” (38).

To highlight the long time delay between independence and the emergence of competitive institutions with quantitative data, Figure A.1 plots the percentage of Iberian American countries with certain democratic traits over time. In Panel A, the solid black line presents the percentage of the 19 Iberian American countries with the highest level on Miller’s (2015) trichotomous contestation variable (which is calculated by combining six existing indices), which corresponds to either “competitive oligarchies” (if the country has high competition but low participation) or “democracies.” The figure demonstrates the rarity of highly competitive institutions in Iberian America throughout the 19th century, reaching roughly half the region only in the mid-20th century and then—after a period of democratic reversals—only becoming preponderant since the end of the 20th century. Although most of the world was undemocratic in the 19th century, the dashed black line in Panel A shows that Iberian America failed to experience the same gains in contestation as in Western Europe. Iberian America has experienced more competition than the rest of the non-European world (gray line), although this gap did not become permanent and pronounced until the Third Wave of democratization when most of Iberian America finally consolidated competitive institutions—well more than a century after independence for most of these countries (the “rest of world” countries change over time when countries gain independence, and therefore the composition of this sample changes dramatically after 1945).

Figure A.1: Political Competition in Iberian America and Elsewhere, 1830–2004



Only when lowering the contestation threshold to the medium level on Miller’s (2015) trichotomous contestation variable, as shown in Panel B, is it possible to find evidence potentially consistent with institutional

transplantation closer to independence in Iberian America. The majority of countries in the region experienced at least medium levels of political competition between 1850 and 1900, and therefore correspond to what Miller (2015) labels as either “electoral oligarchy” (medium contestation and low participation) or “electoral authoritarian” (medium contestation and high participation). For reference, Miller’s (2015, 506) motivating examples of electoral oligarchy are the United Kingdom from 1815-34, Mexico from 1917-54, and Egypt from 1922-52. The motivating examples of electoral authoritarianism are Soviet Union/Russia from 1989-, Mexico from 1955-1999, and Egypt from 1976- (the dataset ends in 2004). Using a different dataset, Przeworski (2009, 14) shows a similar pattern as in Panel B of Figure A.1: Latin America compares favorably to Western Europe throughout the 19th century in terms of the frequency of elections (regardless of their democratic caliber), a topic that has received attention in qualitative research as well (Posada-Carbó, 1996).

It is possible that early limited elections in some Iberian American countries resulted from colonial European settler institutional transplantation, and in turn made subsequent democracy more likely. Related to this idea, Miller (2015) provides evidence from a broader global sample that early electoral competition correlates with later democratization. This possibility, however, is not well-supported for European settlers in Iberian America. Table A.6 demonstrates two pieces of contradictory evidence. First, there is a negative rather than positive correlation between European population share at independence and the percentage of the country’s first 10 years of independence in which it scored at least the medium level on Miller’s (2015) contestation variable, denoted as the extent of “early competition.” Second, among all years after the first decade of independence, there is a negative rather than positive correlation between the amount of early competition and *polity2* score. The lack of support for institutional transplantation here is not a function of low statistical power, either, because the sign of the coefficient estimates go in the wrong direction. Przeworski (2009) provides an explanation consistent with these findings: Iberian America’s experimentation with elections at low levels of income undermined prospects for future democratization. Competition at low income levels created unstable regimes, which in turn destabilized future regimes.

Table A.6: Settlers, Early Competition, and Democracy in Iberian America

DV:	Early competition	<i>polity2</i>
Years	≤10 yrs. indep.	>10 yrs. indep.
	(1)	(2)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	-0.123 (0.122)	
Early competition		-0.748 (1.354)
Country-years	19	3,189
Countries	19	19
R-squared	0.050	0.004

Notes: Table A.6 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Despite providing broad support for H1, these overall patterns documented in Figure A.1 do not suggest the absence of regional variation in the timing of electoral reforms to promote competition. Chile is typically considered a case of early electoral reform. Unlike most of the region, it managed to avoid persistent warfare in the 19th century (North and Weingast, 2000, 30). “Competitive elections were held in Chile as early as the 1830s, although democratic limitations included a suffrage restricted by property and literacy requirements, the absence of the secret vote, and the subordination of the legislature to the executive” (Collier, 1999, 59), an argument that finds support in considerable research (Valenzuela 1996; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 176). Albeit in the context of franchise expansion rather than democratic competition, Engerman and Sokoloff

(2005) discuss Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay as exceptional in the region for their large European population shares. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 234-5) discuss the differences between Costa Rica and the rest of Central America: “The crucial factors setting it apart were the relative weakness of the oligarchy and relative strength of the rural middle class which had their roots in colonial times,” when Costa Rica was “poor and sparsely populated.” “After 1889 responsible government and contestation became institutionalized, but property, income, and literacy qualifications kept the suffrage still highly restricted.” Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 160-1) also code Argentina and Uruguay as the first South American countries to become fully democratic (in 1912 and 1919, respectively), although neither of these cases provide evidence of institutional transplantation near independence. Democratization occurred after nearly a century of periodic warfare following independence. Furthermore, even in these cases that highlight regional variance, every one experienced at least one collapse in competitive institutions during the 20th century. Neither these four nor the rest of Iberian America became consistently democratic until after 1980.

A.3 Supporting Information for Assessing H2: Suffrage in Iberian America

The absence of representative institutions in colonial Iberian America, discussed above, implies that examining franchise size during colonial rule is not relevant. However, post-colonial evidence is relevant for assessing H2. Colonial-era Iberian settlers created countries with among the highest levels of land inequality in the world. Therefore, evidence of early franchise expansion in the region would provide disconfirming evidence for H2. Instead, this section shows that almost all Iberian American countries featured very limited franchises for more than a century after independence. Furthermore, qualitative evidence shows that landed interests consistently acted to thwart franchise expansion, and Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) provide additional supportive evidence by examining within-region variance.

Figure A.2 plots political participation over time. The black line plots the percentage of Iberian American countries with high participation on Miller’s (2015) dichotomous participation variable, calculated by combining six existing participation indices. High participation became prevalent in the region only after 1950, and the end of the section discusses regional variation. One caveat is that franchise size was low across the world throughout the 19th century. The dashed black line shows this pattern for Western Europe, and the gray line for all other countries in the world (the “rest of world” countries change over time when countries gain independence, and therefore the composition of this sample changes dramatically after 1945). A large gap emerged between Iberian America and Western Europe for most of the 20th century. Data from Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) in the 19th and early 20th centuries summarized in Table A.7 reveals a similar pattern: Iberian America featured a small percentage of its population that participated in elections both in absolute terms and relative to the United States and Canada. Iberian America instead more closely resembles the rest of the post-colonial world in the 20th century despite its seeming advantages from experiencing a much longer period of post-colonial governance (Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008; Olsson, 2009). Overall, consistent with H2, these patterns show that Iberian America experienced over a century in which the dominant regional trend was limited political participation.

Iberian American settler colonies fit the scope conditions of the theory that anticipate resisted enfranchisement. There is widespread consensus that the distribution of land in Iberian America is highly unequal and that this inequality dates back to the colonial era. Skidmore and Smith (2005, 22) describe the rise of a colonial landed elite: “Typified by vast territorial holdings and debt peonage, the haciendas [great landed estates] often became virtually autonomous rural communities governed by the owners of their foremen. Land titles were hereditary, and most were held by creoles. By the mid-eighteenth century, the [Spanish] crown was confronting a proud New World nobility.” Frankema (2009b, 35) describes how dividing up land

Figure A.2: Political Participation in Iberian America and Elsewhere, 1830–2004




Table A.7: Percent of Population Voting in Elections

Countries/Years	1840-1880	1881-1920	1921-1940
U.S./Canada	13.0%	20.5%	39.5%
Iberian America	0.6%	5.7%	10.2%
ARG/CRI/URU	-	8.8%	16.3%
Rest of Ib.Am.	0.6%	4.2%	7.2%


Sources: Figures in the cells are the average percentage of the population voting in elections, based on averaging Engerman and Sokoloff's (2005) select data for various countries and years within the different categories. Following Engerman and Sokoloff (2005), Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay are distinguished from the rest of the region.

created differences even among European settlers: “In the early colonisation phase in the 16th century the prospects of fortune attracted a rapidly increasing stream of new immigrants. The early conquest-settlers divided the best tracts of land. In due time the chances of social mobility started to decline and increasingly depended on birth and entrepreneurship.”

Various datasets on land inequality substantiate the extreme degree of land inequality in Iberian America. Frankema (2009a) calculates a Gini coefficient on the distribution of land for 111 countries and dependencies during the 20th century. Higher numbers indicate greater inequality. The median land Gini coefficient among the 19 Iberian American countries is 38% higher than that for other countries (77.5 versus 56.2), and the difference in means is statistically significant. Using Vanhanen's (1997) data on the percentage of total farms that were family farms—as opposed to larger landholdings, such as haciendas or plantations—in 1868 shows evidence that this divergence had indeed already occurred during the 19th century, although the number of territories in the dataset is somewhat limited. Lower numbers indicate greater inequality. In the 17 Iberian American countries, the median percent family farms was 79% lower than in the 22 other European and non-colonized countries with data (5% versus 23.5%), and the difference in means is statistically significant. Appendix Figure A.3 shows the distribution of these variables using kernel density plots.

Qualitative research on democratization in Iberian America argues that unequal landowning patterns engendered anti-democratic legacies. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 155) claim in Spanish America, “the nature of large landowners and other elite sectors was crucial for the intensity of resistance

Figure A.3: Inequality in Iberian America



Notes: Figure A.3 presents kernel density plots of Frankema's (2009a) land Gini index (Panel A) and of Vanhanen's (1997) percent family farms variable (Panel B), with Iberian America distinguished from the rest of the world. In Panel A, higher values indicate greater inequality. In Panel B, lower values indicate greater inequality.

against democratization.” Similarly, Collier (1999) evaluates the role that different classes played in transitions to democracy in Europe and South America in the late 19th and 20th centuries. She devotes little attention to landed elites because they never positively contributed to transitions. Instead, “the hegemony and dominance of the politically privileged traditional elite and/or corporate groups” predisposed them to oppose franchise expansion (34). As another example, Skidmore and Smith (2005, 50) discuss how landed elites in several Iberian American countries acquiesced to limited franchise reforms starting in the late 19th century only in reaction to working-class growth. This provided incentives for elites to collude with the middle class to prevent full franchise expansion.

As with competition, there is some variation within the region. Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) hypothesize that countries with lower levels of income and land inequality, and higher levels of population homogeneity, should be less resistant to expanding the franchise—based on similar logic as H2 posited here. Their main contrast is between the United States and Canada versus Iberian America, but they also discuss some within-region variation for Iberian America. “Those countries that are thought to have long had more economically and ethnically homogenous populations, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, were the first to implement suffrage institutions associated with greater access to and use of the franchise” (917).¹⁵ Table A.7 shows this pattern. However, they also offer a caveat: “Although this pattern is consistent with the hypothesis, the limited information available means that this is but a weak test” (917), as they do not have country-level data for any of these three countries in the 19th century on the percentage of the population that voted in elections (910-1). Overall, despite caveats, Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) highlight some variation within Iberian America that is consistent with H2.

¹⁵Although Argentina is exceptional in the region for its high percentage of Europeans, it still has extremely high inequality. It ranks 11 out of Frankema's (2009a) 111 territories for highest land Gini, and 11 out of Vanhanen's (1997) 40 countries for lowest percentage family farms in 1868, at only 5%.

A.4 Additional Information for Assessing H3: Twentieth Century Iberian America

Restricting attention to colonial-era institutions, H3 is irrelevant for Iberian America because there were no inherited electoral institutions to overturn. However, as noted, some Iberian American countries had established competitive political institutions by the first few decades of the 20th century, and the remainder of the century generated a prolonged contest between the working class and political elites over democracy (Collier and Collier, 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Collier, 1999). Although it is infeasible here to offer a comprehensive analysis of problems of democratization and democratic consolidation in 20th century Iberian America, it is useful to highlight that conditions dating back to colonial-era European settlers contributed to regime instability. For example, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 155) offer the broad argument for the region that “the nature of large landowners and other elite sectors was crucial for the intensity of resistance against democratization.” Similarly, Collier and Collier (1991) argue that organized labor was crucial for breaking landed power to push countries in the region toward democracy, with reversals stemming from the desire to curb labor power. As discussed in Section A.3, the extreme extent of land inequality in the region dates back to colonial European settlements, and Ansell and Samuels (2014) provide statistical evidence that higher land inequality covaries with a lower likelihood of democratic transitions.

Argentina provides an informative example. Its very large European population and relative wealth would seem to imply an easy case for the institutional transplantation thesis to explain. However, instead of inheriting stable proto-democratic institutions, “Argentina’s political history is marked by a recurrent pattern of institutional instability” (Levitsky and Murillo, 2005a, 22). Even nearly a century after independence when Argentina experienced its first democratic regime, this merely preceded a pattern of military coups reversing democratic gains, six between 1930 and 1976. This has provoked scholars such as Levitsky and Murillo (2005b) to attempt to explain “the country’s persistent failure to build enduring political and economic institutions and its continued propensity toward crisis” (1) and O’Donnell (1994) to understand why, as late as the early 1990s, Argentina lacked the type of institutions that should produce enduring democracy.

Furthermore, the most plausible explanations by area specialists for democratic consolidation across much of the region starting in the 1980s—more than 150 years after independence for many of these countries—focus on popular mobilization by the working class (Collier 1999; Haggard and Kaufman 2016, 110-116) or on the United States’ foreign policy shift toward promoting democracy in the region (Mainwaring and Perez-Liñan 2014, 230-1; Levitsky and Way 2010), as opposed to emphasizing the democratic virtues of colonial European settlers.

A.5 Additional Information for Summary of Implications

Table A.8: Colonial Democratic Legacies in Other Settler Colonies

Country	Independence year/ first year non-Eu. rule	Colonial European settler legislature at independence?	Democratic years in first decade
Haiti	1804	NO	0
Israel	1948	YES	10
Mauritius	1968	YES	10
Cape Verde	1975	NO	0
Sao Tome and Principe	1975	NO	0
Seychelles	1976	NO	0
French Guiana	-	YES	-
Guadeloupe	-	YES	-
Martinique	-	YES	-
Netherlands Antilles	-	NO	-
Reunion	-	YES	-
U.S. Virgin Islands	-	NO	-

Sources: The sample in Table A.8 consists of every colony coded as a settler colony for Figure 2 that is not in continental Africa, the British Caribbean, or Iberian America. Last column is the count of democratic years in the first decade of independence using Boix, Miller and Rosato's (2013) binary democracy measure. Every country in the table is coded by Owolabi (2015) as a forced settlement colony except for Israel.

B Additional Regression Tables

List of Tables

1	Correlation Between European Population Share and Democracy	15
2	Settler Colonies and Elected Legislatures, 1600–1945	22
3	Legalized Enfranchisement in Africa, 1955–1970	26
4	European Settler Land Domination in Africa	27
5	Voter Population Share in Mid-19th Century in Select British Caribbean Colonies	29
6	Colonial Democratic Legacies in African Settler Colonies	31
7	Colonial Democratic Legacies in British Caribbean Settler Colonies	33
A.1	Summary Statistics	43
A.2	European Population Share Data for Table 1 Sample ($\geq 5\%$ of pop. at independence)	43
A.3	Data for Covariates in Table 1	44
A.4	Elected Colonial Legislatures	46
A.5	Panel Data on Elected Legislatures in British Caribbean Colonies	48
A.6	Settlers, Early Competition, and Democracy in Iberian America	50
A.7	Percent of Population Voting in Elections	52
A.8	Colonial Democratic Legacies in Other Settler Colonies	55
B.1	Add Neo-Britains	57
B.2	Add Israel	58
B.3	Only Former Colonies	59
B.4	Non-Logged European Population Share	61
B.5	European Language Fraction and Hariri’s (2012) Sample	62
B.6	Hariri (2012) without Neo-Britains and with Logged Settlers	63
B.7	Boix et al. (2013) Democracy Measure and Expanded Sample	64
B.8	Data Sources for Instrumental Variable Analysis	65
B.9	Settler Mortality Instrument (with neo-Britains)	66
B.10	Settler Mortality Instrument (without neo-Britains)	67
B.11	Population Density Instrument (with neo-Britains)	68
B.12	Population Density Instrument (without neo-Britains)	69
B.13	Neolithic Transition Instrument (with neo-Britains)	70
B.14	Neolithic Transition Instrument (without neo-Britains)	71
B.15	Country-Year Panel	72
B.16	Country-Year Panel with Year Fixed Effects	73
B.17	Contestation	74
B.18	Participation	75
B.19	Democracy: Conditioning on British Colonialism	77
B.20	Contestation: Conditioning on British Colonialism	78
B.21	Participation: Conditioning on British Colonialism	79
B.22	Settler Colonies and Elected Legislatures (1600–1945) with Covariates	80
B.23	Legalized Enfranchisement in Africa, 1955–1970 (No British colonial control)	81
B.24	Majority Rule in Africa, 1955–1970	82

B.1 Additional Results for Table 1

B.1.1 Alter the Sample

Appendix Tables B.1 to B.3 consider three sample alterations: add neo-Britains to the Table 1 sample, add Israel to the Table 1 sample, and restrict the Table 1 sample only to countries formerly colonized by Western Europe. The findings are somewhat more suggestive of a positive European settler effect when including the neo-Britains (Appendix Table B.1), but the coefficient estimate in the first year of independence is inconsistent in sign with and without covariates, and the specification with the New World fixed effect loses statistical significance when adding the covariates in Panel B. Using Putterman and Weil's (2010) descendency data yields an estimate that 17% of Israel's population that was Western European, making Israel one of the largest settler colonies among post-1945 decolonizers. Given its consistent democratic record, Column 4 of Appendix Table B.2 becomes statistically significant in Panel A, but not when adding additional controls. Finally, Appendix Table B.3 for only colonized countries is largely similar to Table 1.

Table B.1: Add Neo-Britains

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.879*** (0.193)	1.303*** (0.191)	0.387 (0.240)		0.536* (0.302)
New World FE					5.221*** (1.342)
Countries	126	126	126		126
R-squared	0.153	0.254	0.018		0.324
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full + neo-Brs	Full + neo-Brs	Full + neo-Brs	Post-1945 indep.	Full + neo-Brs
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.468** (0.224)	0.887*** (0.200)	-0.0151 (0.285)		0.400 (0.272)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.597 (1.633)	-2.335 (1.831)	1.183 (2.375)		-1.527 (1.836)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0393*** (0.0108)	-0.0520*** (0.0130)	-0.0448*** (0.0158)		-0.0465*** (0.0134)
Forced settlement colony	2.309 (1.917)	1.082 (1.998)	3.640* (1.913)		-0.0146 (2.189)
State antiquity in 1500	-0.131 (1.439)	0.722 (1.639)	1.135 (2.047)		0.757 (1.561)
New World FE					3.916** (1.550)
Countries	126	126	126		126
R-squared	0.259	0.373	0.096		0.407
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full + neo-Brs	Full + neo-Brs	Full + neo-Brs	Post-1945 indep.	Full + neo-Brs

Notes: Table B.1 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. It alters the Table 1 sample by adding the four neo-Britains. The Column 4 specifications are omitted because all four neo-Britains gained independence before 1945. Protestant missionaries in 1923 are not used as a control variable because this variable is missing for all four neo-Britains. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.2: Add Israel

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.659*** (0.183)	1.186*** (0.212)	0.194 (0.244)	0.757* (0.405)	0.510 (0.315)
New World FE					4.803*** (1.322)
Countries	123	123	123	72	123
R-squared	0.085	0.196	0.004	0.056	0.265
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full + Israel	Full + Israel	Full + Israel	Full + Israel	Full + Israel
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.163 (0.183)	0.724*** (0.211)	-0.334 (0.226)	0.189 (0.373)	0.337 (0.279)
New World FE					3.444** (1.512)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.020 (1.552)	-2.197 (1.821)	2.370 (2.240)	-2.044 (2.504)	-1.532 (1.824)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0379*** (0.0108)	-0.0533*** (0.0132)	-0.0382** (0.0159)	-0.0405** (0.0162)	-0.0489*** (0.0134)
Forced settlement colony	3.047* (1.825)	1.634 (2.020)	4.029** (1.840)	6.480*** (1.859)	0.589 (2.161)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.930** (0.408)	-0.0251 (0.418)	2.238*** (0.488)	0.103 (0.495)	-0.107 (0.397)
State antiquity in 1500	1.026 (1.388)	0.845 (1.581)	3.509* (2.007)	2.143 (2.211)	0.895 (1.546)
Countries	123	123	123	72	123
R-squared	0.268	0.333	0.229	0.284	0.362
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full + Israel	Full + Israel	Full + Israel	Full + Israel	Full + Israel

Notes: Table B.2 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. It alters the Table 1 sample by adding Israel. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.3: Only Former Colonies

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.484** (0.202)	1.231*** (0.231)	-0.227 (0.269)	0.661 (0.433)	0.468 (0.339)
New World FE					5.146*** (1.364)
Countries	98	98	98	71	98
R-squared	0.049	0.231	0.006	0.040	0.331
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Former colonies	Former colonies	Former colonies	Post-1945 indep.	Former colonies
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.0303 (0.214)	0.794*** (0.252)	-0.682** (0.261)	0.0554 (0.377)	0.342 (0.324)
New World FE					3.919** (1.695)
Ethnic fractionalization	-2.040 (1.812)	-2.843 (2.083)	0.0909 (2.388)	-1.875 (2.492)	-1.864 (2.076)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0372*** (0.0139)	-0.0463*** (0.0155)	-0.0480** (0.0194)	-0.0395** (0.0164)	-0.0384** (0.0159)
Forced settlement colony	3.365* (1.816)	1.721 (2.055)	4.667** (1.803)	6.739*** (1.879)	0.588 (2.196)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.854** (0.412)	0.0388 (0.429)	2.033*** (0.466)	0.0934 (0.501)	-0.0783 (0.417)
State antiquity in 1500	2.173 (1.747)	1.450 (1.879)	6.555*** (2.396)	1.805 (2.211)	1.248 (1.822)
Countries	98	98	98	71	98
R-squared	0.248	0.340	0.284	0.277	0.387
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Former colonies	Former colonies	Former colonies	Post-1945 indep.	Former colonies

Notes: Table B.3 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. It alters the Table 1 sample by only including former Western European colonies. The Column 4 specifications are identical to those in Table 1 because that sample is already restricted to only ex-colonies. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B.1.2 Alternative Measures

Table 1 logs colonial European population share to reduce the influence of extreme values of the main explanatory variable, which is heavily right-skewed. Table B.4 shows the results are very similar when using the raw percentage.

Appendix Table B.5 uses Hariri's (2012) somewhat smaller sample (although it includes the neo-Britains) and alternative measure of European influence: percentage of the population that speaks a Western European language as its primary language, measured in the 1990s. Table B.5 is more suggestive of a beneficial European settler influence (see Column 5), although the coefficient estimate is inconsistent in sign for Columns 3 and 4 when adding covariates. Appendix Table B.6 shows even weaker evidence for a European settler effect when logging the language fraction variable and dropping the neo-Britains, which removes the statistically significant association in the New World fixed effect specifications.

Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) provide a binary democracy measure that has coverage from 1800 to 2010. Their data not only enable assessing an alternative democracy variable, they also cover many small Caribbean and Pacific island countries (e.g., Dominica, Kiribati) that lack Polity IV data. The findings from Appendix Table B.7 closely resemble those from Table 1. Other democracy datasets such as V-Dem (Coppedge and Zimmerman., 2016) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) cannot be used to replicate all columns in Table 1 because they do not provide data for the 19th century.

Table B.4: Non-Logged European Population Share

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Colonial European pop. %	7.797*** (2.359)	18.70*** (5.197)	-0.321 (3.237)	38.54 (24.04)	1.890 (6.023)
New World FE					6.335*** (1.097)
Countries	122	122	122	71	122
R-squared	0.030	0.121	0.000	0.036	0.254
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Colonial European pop. %	1.224 (3.031)	10.16* (5.222)	-3.826 (3.263)	10.82 (21.53)	0.591 (6.700)
New World FE					4.457*** (1.632)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.947 (1.569)	-1.970 (1.851)	2.409 (2.287)	-1.796 (2.530)	-1.327 (1.790)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0387*** (0.0105)	-0.0576*** (0.0128)	-0.0343** (0.0156)	-0.0401** (0.0162)	-0.0499*** (0.0134)
Forced settlement colony	3.306* (1.797)	2.226 (2.036)	3.816** (1.816)	6.618*** (1.791)	0.650 (2.262)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.872** (0.406)	0.109 (0.401)	2.068*** (0.474)	0.0460 (0.504)	-0.174 (0.437)
State antiquity in 1500	0.636 (1.425)	0.244 (1.706)	3.536* (2.014)	1.753 (2.267)	0.437 (1.610)
Countries	122	122	122	71	122
R-squared	0.260	0.309	0.214	0.279	0.358
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full

Notes: Table B.4 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.5: European Language Fraction and Hariri's (2012) Sample

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% pop. Western European language	5.516*** (1.247)	8.695*** (1.066)	1.771 (1.462)	10.38*** (2.007)	5.949*** (2.048)
Latitude	-0.0323 (0.0317)	-0.0108 (0.0290)	-0.0881** (0.0376)	0.0340 (0.0597)	-0.00847 (0.0288)
New World FE					2.567* (1.537)
Countries	111	111	111	61	111
R-squared	0.199	0.341	0.058	0.231	0.351
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% pop. Western European language	2.769** (1.212)	7.327*** (1.083)	-0.473 (1.435)	-2.528 (7.971)	5.912*** (1.826)
Latitude	-0.0113 (0.0385)	0.0128 (0.0431)	-0.0755 (0.0537)	0.0494 (0.0783)	0.0162 (0.0431)
New World FE					1.344 (1.900)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.213 (1.756)	-0.149 (1.962)	1.568 (2.748)	0.991 (2.734)	0.0644 (2.047)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0201* (0.0121)	-0.0354** (0.0152)	-0.00909 (0.0209)	-0.0159 (0.0218)	-0.0350** (0.0153)
Forced settlement colony	2.119 (2.007)	-1.180 (2.060)	4.602** (1.977)	10.37 (6.817)	-1.153 (2.146)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	1.392*** (0.505)	0.451 (0.533)	2.835*** (0.502)	0.548 (0.606)	0.372 (0.571)
State antiquity in 1500	1.215 (1.499)	0.791 (1.664)	3.638 (2.304)	0.588 (2.587)	0.776 (1.653)
Countries	107	107	107	61	107
R-squared	0.244	0.343	0.216	0.274	0.346
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)

Notes: Table B.5 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. It alters the Table 1 sample to only include countries from Hariri's (2012) sample. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.6: Hariri (2012) without Neo-Britains and with Logged Settlers

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(% pop. Western European language)	0.512*** (0.142)	0.965*** (0.144)	0.0780 (0.190)	0.923*** (0.284)	0.540 (0.336)
Latitude	-0.0239 (0.0316)	-0.00424 (0.0413)	-0.0809* (0.0444)	0.0375 (0.0631)	-0.00192 (0.0394)
New World FE					3.256 (2.020)
Countries	107	107	107	61	107
R-squared	0.117	0.262	0.028	0.170	0.282
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(% pop. Western European language)	0.264* (0.157)	0.812*** (0.163)	-0.202 (0.192)	0.0604 (0.504)	0.483 (0.320)
Latitude	-0.0103 (0.0391)	0.0158 (0.0479)	-0.0762 (0.0541)	0.0546 (0.0767)	0.0214 (0.0453)
New World FE					2.694 (2.126)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0884 (1.806)	-0.309 (2.025)	1.354 (2.734)	1.082 (3.058)	0.159 (2.039)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0217* (0.0121)	-0.0378** (0.0152)	-0.0114 (0.0207)	-0.0166 (0.0224)	-0.0362** (0.0153)
Forced settlement colony	2.558 (1.996)	-0.430 (2.157)	5.098** (2.004)	7.975** (3.325)	-0.614 (2.326)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	1.219** (0.494)	-0.000176 (0.508)	2.857*** (0.472)	0.470 (0.726)	0.0160 (0.500)
State antiquity in 1500	1.079 (1.495)	0.677 (1.597)	3.317 (2.288)	0.565 (2.592)	0.659 (1.601)
Countries	107	107	107	61	107
R-squared	0.233	0.319	0.221	0.274	0.332
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs

Notes: Table B.6 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. It alters the Table 1 sample to only include countries from Hariri's (2012) sample, minus the neo-Britains. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.7: Boix et al. (2013) Democracy Measure and Expanded Sample

DV: Boix et al. (2013) binary democracy					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.0467*** (0.0118)	0.0928*** (0.0148)	0.0133 (0.0152)	0.0973*** (0.0276)	0.000740 (0.0190)
New World FE					0.545*** (0.0858)
Countries	141	141	141	97	141
R-squared	0.075	0.205	0.004	0.138	0.394
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full (plus more islands)	Full (plus more islands)	Full (plus more islands)	Post-1945 indep. (plus more islands)	Full (plus more islands)
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	-0.00962 (0.0117)	0.0458*** (0.0168)	-0.0511*** (0.0149)	-0.00681 (0.0298)	-0.00805 (0.0177)
New World FE					0.435*** (0.0966)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.1000 (0.0777)	-0.190* (0.112)	0.117 (0.0988)	-0.139 (0.127)	-0.0946 (0.103)
Muslim pop. %	-0.00185*** (0.000501)	-0.00300*** (0.000746)	-0.00160** (0.000722)	-0.00227*** (0.000834)	-0.00237*** (0.000712)
Forced settlement colony	0.368*** (0.0882)	0.246** (0.0990)	0.379*** (0.104)	0.473*** (0.100)	0.125 (0.103)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.0567*** (0.0155)	0.00572 (0.0202)	0.105*** (0.0174)	0.0294 (0.0214)	-0.0129 (0.0199)
Countries	141	141	141	97	141
R-squared	0.417	0.356	0.352	0.422	0.445
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full (plus more islands)	Full (plus more islands)	Full (plus more islands)	Post-1945 indep. (plus more islands)	Full (plus more islands)

Notes: Table B.7 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The countries with data on Boix, Miller and Rosato's (2013) variable but not Polity IV are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brunei, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Maldives, Nauru, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B.1.3 Instruments to Address Endogenous European Settlement

Europeans were not randomly assigned to settlement areas. The literature has devoted considerable attention to understanding factors that influenced European settlement and to finding appropriate instrumental variables. Using instruments from the literature yields similarly non-robust findings as Table 1. Appendix Tables B.9 and B.10 use Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson's (2001) settler mortality instrument, Tables B.11 and B.12 use Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson's (2002) historical population density instrument, and Tables B.13 and B.14 use the Neolithic transition instrument from Hariri (2012) and Hariri (2015). Each of these articles provides additional substantive and technical motivation (e.g., exogeneity, exclusion restriction) for these instruments. Table B.8 describes the variables.

Table B.8: Data Sources for Instrumental Variable Analysis

Variable	Notes and description	Source
Neolithic timing	Thousands of years elapsed as of 2000 since a territory transitioned to agricultural production (the unit of analysis is modern country boundaries).	Putterman and Trainor (2006)
Population density in 1500	Log population per square kilometer in 1500.	Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002)
Settler mortality	Log of estimated settler mortality, capped at 250 deaths per 1000, the version of the settler mortality variable used in Acemoglu, Gallego and Robinson (2014).	Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2012), Acemoglu, Gallego and Robinson (2014)

Table B.9: Settler Mortality Instrument (with neo-Britains)

DV for second stage: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	2.643*** (0.753)	2.430*** (0.525)	2.579** (1.213)	16.16 (69.38)	3.518 (2.342)
New World FE					-6.110 (9.852)
Countries	61	61	61	35	61
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	AJR (2001)	AJR (2001)	AJR (2001)	AJR (2001)	AJR (2001)
F-test for IV in first stage	8.1	8.1	8.1	0.1	1.9
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	3.530*** (1.190)	2.633*** (0.736)	4.040** (1.968)	-2.662 (4.013)	3.305* (1.629)
New World FE					-5.885 (7.410)
Ethnic fractionalization	9.316* (5.332)	3.528 (3.786)	16.04* (8.423)	0.417 (4.018)	1.014 (3.826)
Muslim pop. %	0.0517 (0.0681)	0.00166 (0.0414)	0.0804 (0.0935)	0.0107 (0.0473)	-0.0233 (0.0456)
Forced settlement colony	1.365 (1.918)	0.992 (1.407)	2.556 (2.711)	14.99 (10.54)	2.890 (2.997)
State antiquity in 1500	6.190 (6.038)	3.391 (3.359)	11.20 (8.020)	2.703 (3.204)	3.416 (3.411)
Countries	61	61	61	35	61
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	AJR (2001)	AJR (2001)	AJR (2001)	AJR (2001)	AJR (2001)
F-test for IV in first stage	6.3	6.3	6.3	0.6	2.9

Notes: Table B.9 summarizes the second stage of a series of 2SLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The instrument for logged colonial European population percent in the first stage is logged estimated settler mortality rates, described in Table B.8. Table B.9 alters the Table 1 sample to only include countries from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson's (2001) sample. Protestant missionaries in 1923 are not used as a control variable because this variable is missing for all four neo-Britains. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.10: Settler Mortality Instrument (without neo-Britains)

DV for second stage: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	2.807 (2.191)	3.042* (1.619)	3.377 (3.711)	16.16 (69.38)	7.383 (16.34)
New World FE					-19.56 (59.99)
Countries	57	57	57	35	57
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	AJR (2001) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2001) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2001) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2001) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2001) minus neo-Brs
F-test for IV in first stage	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.1	0.2
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	2.069 (1.711)	2.951* (1.685)	1.859 (2.266)	-1.947 (1.384)	6.153 (11.60)
New World FE					-17.14 (47.26)
Ethnic fractionalization	4.909 (6.403)	4.375 (5.904)	9.326 (8.809)	0.712 (4.001)	1.109 (6.656)
Muslim pop. %	0.0290 (0.0508)	0.00971 (0.0511)	0.0501 (0.0680)	0.00818 (0.0349)	-0.0440 (0.120)
Forced settlement colony	1.438 (1.848)	0.477 (1.811)	2.019 (2.841)	12.94*** (4.456)	6.035 (13.73)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	2.346 (1.489)	0.592 (1.562)	4.888** (2.221)	0.447 (1.813)	-1.508 (6.078)
State antiquity in 1500	5.204 (4.825)	3.828 (4.173)	9.985 (6.054)	3.111 (2.442)	4.766 (7.582)
Countries	57	57	57	35	57
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	AJR (2001) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2001) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2001) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2001) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2001) minus neo-Brs
F-test for IV in first stage	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.8	0.3

Notes: Table B.10 summarizes the second stage of a series of 2SLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The instrument for logged colonial European population percent in the first stage is logged estimated settler mortality rates, described in Table B.8. Table B.10 alters the Table 1 sample to only include countries from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson's (2001) sample, minus the neo-Britains. Column 4 of Panel A is identical to the corresponding specification in Table B.9. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.11: Population Density Instrument (with neo-Britains)

DV for second stage: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.695*	0.805*	0.228	-0.725	-0.800
	(0.412)	(0.427)	(0.495)	(1.188)	(1.027)
New World FE					10.43**
					(4.000)
Countries	123	123	123	70	123
R-squared	0.138	0.216	0.011		0.241
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	AJR (2002)	AJR (2002)	AJR (2002)	AJR (2002)	AJR (2002)
F-test for IV in first stage	91.3	91.3	91.3	16.4	24.6
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.545	0.685	0.0678	-1.079	-0.376
	(0.503)	(0.457)	(0.666)	(1.326)	(0.921)
New World FE					7.131**
					(3.372)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.516	-2.283	1.032	-2.008	-0.910
	(1.685)	(1.874)	(2.413)	(2.333)	(1.830)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0388***	-0.0559***	-0.0448**	-0.0461**	-0.0489***
	(0.0133)	(0.0151)	(0.0177)	(0.0184)	(0.0146)
Forced settlement colony	1.302	0.652	2.467	7.475***	-1.804
	(2.096)	(2.228)	(2.041)	(2.630)	(1.979)
State antiquity in 1500	-0.121	0.277	0.929	0.781	-0.0167
	(1.555)	(1.694)	(2.391)	(2.462)	(1.705)
Countries	123	123	123	70	123
R-squared	0.250	0.367	0.091	0.135	0.400
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	AJR (2002)	AJR (2002)	AJR (2002)	AJR (2002)	AJR (2002)
F-test for IV in first stage	61.7	61.7	61.7	11.8	19.6

Notes: Table B.11 summarizes the second stage of a series of 2SLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The instrument for logged colonial European population percent in the first stage is logged population density in 1500, described in Table B.8. Table B.11 alters the Table 1 sample to only include countries from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson's (2002) sample. Protestant missionaries in 1923 are not used as a control variable because this variable is missing for all four neo-Britains. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.12: Population Density Instrument (without neo-Britains)

DV for second stage: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	-0.0321 (0.476)	0.249 (0.575)	-0.458 (0.617)	-0.725 (1.188)	-1.732 (1.404)
New World FE					12.83** (5.157)
Countries	119	119	119	70	119
R-squared		0.071			0.006
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	AJR (2002) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2002) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2002) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2002) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2002) minus neo-Brs
F-test for IV in first stage	50.8	50.8	50.8	16.4	15.8
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	-0.669 (0.547)	0.0802 (0.608)	-1.537** (0.768)	-1.948 (1.693)	-1.143 (1.146)
New World FE					8.706** (3.897)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.241 (1.606)	-2.244 (1.875)	1.799 (2.310)	-1.306 (2.616)	-0.559 (1.801)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0508*** (0.0144)	-0.0635*** (0.0166)	-0.0573*** (0.0194)	-0.0435** (0.0213)	-0.0550*** (0.0161)
Forced settlement colony	3.285* (1.777)	1.897 (2.279)	4.577** (1.963)	7.689** (3.033)	-1.122 (1.922)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.869** (0.395)	-0.0185 (0.418)	2.111*** (0.471)	0.847 (0.724)	-0.227 (0.517)
State antiquity in 1500	-0.785 (1.605)	-0.349 (1.831)	0.740 (2.439)	0.931 (2.635)	-0.752 (1.921)
Countries	119	119	119	70	119
R-squared	0.185	0.288	0.152		0.283
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	AJR (2002) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2002) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2002) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2002) minus neo-Brs	AJR (2002) minus neo-Brs
F-test for IV in first stage	29.2	29.2	29.2	7.6	13.5

Notes: Table B.12 summarizes the second stage of a series of 2SLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The instrument for logged colonial European population percent in the first stage is logged population density in 1500, described in Table B.8. Table B.11 alters the Table 1 sample to only include countries from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson's (2002) sample, minus the neo-Britains. Column 4 of Panel A is identical to the corresponding specification in Table B.11. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.13: Neolithic Transition Instrument (with neo-Britains)

DV in second stage: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	1.404*** (0.370)	1.586*** (0.412)	1.201*** (0.458)	1.492 (1.007)	1.336* (0.683)
New World FE					2.168 (2.598)
Countries	121	121	121	67	121
R-squared	0.120	0.269			0.302
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)
F-test for IV in first stage	112.2	112.2	112.2	48.2	53.8
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	1.044 (0.731)	0.764 (0.719)	1.044 (1.012)	0.746 (1.052)	0.732 (0.747)
New World FE					3.291 (2.888)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.0843 (1.893)	-1.386 (1.969)	2.331 (2.995)	-0.0799 (3.282)	-0.299 (1.959)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0326* (0.0173)	-0.0568*** (0.0168)	-0.0279 (0.0252)	-0.0353** (0.0171)	-0.0471*** (0.0139)
Forced settlement colony	1.165 (2.583)	1.018 (2.530)	1.959 (2.943)	7.207** (3.097)	-0.497 (2.603)
State antiquity in 1500	1.800 (1.977)	1.108 (2.082)	3.576 (3.059)	3.147 (2.269)	2.036 (1.693)
Countries	121	121	121	67	121
R-squared	0.229	0.377	0.003	0.252	0.414
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)	Hariri (2012)
F-test for IV in first stage	20.7	20.7	20.7	22.2	27.3

Notes: Table B.13 summarizes the second stage of a series of 2SLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The instrument for logged colonial European population percent in the first stage is years elapsed since the country's Neolithic transition, described in Table B.8. Table B.13 alters the Table 1 sample to only include countries from Hariri's (2012) sample. Protestant missionaries in 1923 are not used as a control variable because this variable is missing for all four neo-Britains. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.14: Neolithic Transition Instrument (without neo-Britains)

DV for second stage: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	1.243*** (0.426)	1.511*** (0.482)	1.063** (0.530)	1.492 (1.007)	1.284* (0.729)
New World FE					2.104 (2.551)
Countries	117	117	117	67	117
R-squared	0.008	0.198			0.233
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs
F-test for IV in first stage	117.1	117.1	117.1	48.2	50.1
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.681 (0.827)	0.495 (0.859)	0.634 (1.149)	0.739 (1.029)	0.563 (0.817)
New World FE					3.278 (2.861)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.471 (1.772)	-1.294 (1.956)	3.569 (2.815)	-0.159 (3.099)	-0.250 (1.943)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0314* (0.0170)	-0.0590*** (0.0174)	-0.0223 (0.0243)	-0.0356** (0.0166)	-0.0488*** (0.0141)
Forced settlement colony	2.488 (2.574)	1.903 (2.705)	3.487 (3.007)	7.221** (3.056)	0.0531 (2.562)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.932** (0.468)	-0.136 (0.543)	2.491*** (0.462)	-0.0629 (0.625)	-0.139 (0.499)
State antiquity in 1500	2.501 (1.843)	0.972 (2.117)	5.371* (2.817)	3.069 (2.242)	1.900 (1.667)
Countries	117	117	117	67	117
R-squared	0.213	0.322	0.132	0.253	0.365
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs	Hariri (2012) minus neo-Brs
F-test for IV in first stage	17.2	17.2	17.2	27.8	24.5

Notes: Table B.14 summarizes the second stage of a series of 2SLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The instrument for logged colonial European population percent in the first stage is years elapsed since the country's Neolithic transition, described in Table B.8. Table B.14 alters the Table 1 sample to only include countries from Hariri's (2012) sample, minus the neo-Britains. Column 4 of Panel A is identical to the corresponding specification in Table B.13. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B.1.4 Panel Data

Table B.15 replaces the cross-section of democracy levels averaged over time with a panel of country-years, and Table B.16 adds year fixed effects to that specification. The latter specification is useful for accounting for time-varying changes in the international climate toward democracy promotion and any possible temporal inconsistencies in how Polity IV data are coded. None of the main findings from Table 1 are qualitatively altered.

Table B.15: Country-Year Panel

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.618*** (0.146)	1.157*** (0.218)	0.116 (0.235)	0.620 (0.435)	0.379 (0.325)
New World FE					5.284*** (1.336)
Countries	10,697	4,225	122	2,521	4,225
R-squared	0.055	0.121	0.001	0.020	0.173
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.300* (0.162)	0.709*** (0.213)	-0.425** (0.212)	-0.00122 (0.356)	0.230 (0.292)
New World FE					3.970** (1.588)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.782 (1.415)	-2.156 (1.813)	2.440 (2.227)	-1.801 (2.358)	-1.363 (1.790)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0301*** (0.00968)	-0.0521*** (0.0131)	-0.0383** (0.0159)	-0.0404** (0.0161)	-0.0468*** (0.0134)
Forced settlement colony	0.620 (1.439)	1.718 (1.978)	4.269** (1.794)	6.912*** (1.783)	0.613 (2.109)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	1.117*** (0.405)	-0.0747 (0.425)	2.132*** (0.471)	0.0688 (0.479)	-0.222 (0.396)
State antiquity in 1500	0.132 (1.214)	0.764 (1.583)	3.085 (1.991)	2.029 (2.153)	0.676 (1.528)
Countries	10,586	4,225	122	2,521	4,225
R-squared	0.113	0.206	0.225	0.163	0.231
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full

Notes: Table B.15 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The Column 3 specifications are identical to those in Table 1 because they incorporate only a single year of democracy data for each country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.16: Country-Year Panel with Year Fixed Effects

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.760*** (0.149)	1.183*** (0.219)	-0.388 (1.037)	0.613 (0.435)	0.399 (0.324)
New World FE					5.328*** (1.333)
Countries	10,697	4,225	122	2,521	4,225
R-squared	0.213	0.226	0.478	0.158	0.279
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.559*** (0.175)	0.728*** (0.213)	-1.743** (0.777)	-0.00749 (0.355)	0.244 (0.290)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.125 (1.454)	-2.106 (1.832)	3.309 (4.029)	-1.833 (2.377)	-1.304 (1.808)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0349*** (0.00941)	-0.0524*** (0.0132)	-0.0669*** (0.0225)	-0.0397** (0.0162)	-0.0470*** (0.0135)
Forced settlement colony	0.613 (1.324)	1.746 (1.991)	9.101*** (3.179)	6.958*** (1.775)	0.628 (2.127)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.712* (0.403)	-0.0775 (0.427)	1.245 (0.862)	0.0389 (0.482)	-0.226 (0.390)
State antiquity in 1500	1.608 (1.303)	0.702 (1.593)	13.53*** (4.239)	1.848 (2.189)	0.613 (1.537)
New World FE					4.015** (1.580)
Countries	10,586	4,225	122	2,521	4,225
R-squared	0.276	0.311	0.648	0.300	0.337
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.16 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B.1.5 Disaggregating Democracy

Tables B.17 and B.18 disaggregate democracy components using Miller's (2015) dataset, described in Sections A.2.2 and A.3. Although the findings for contestation resemble those from Table 1, the findings for participation are somewhat different. When considering all years, the coefficient estimate for colonial European population share is negative, and is negative and statistically significant for the first year of independence. By contrast, the coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant for all the post-1980 specifications. Similar to the differences among Columns 1 through 3 in Table 1, this suggests that a democratic divergence between settler colonies (specifically, Iberian America) and other non-European countries emerged only well after independence—raising important questions for theories based on colonial-era influences.

Table B.17: Contestation

DV: Miller (2015) Ordinal Contestation					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.106*** (0.0192)	0.161*** (0.0264)	0.0255 (0.0325)	0.145*** (0.0434)	0.0535 (0.0401)
New World FE					0.720*** (0.173)
Countries	117	116	117	77	116
R-squared	0.163	0.242	0.005	0.132	0.335
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)	Post-1945 indep. (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.0547** (0.0217)	0.118*** (0.0284)	-0.0511 (0.0327)	0.0555 (0.0437)	0.0414 (0.0360)
New World FE					0.617*** (0.185)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.130 (0.190)	-0.405* (0.242)	0.609** (0.261)	-0.219 (0.341)	-0.295 (0.231)
Muslim pop. %	-0.00212* (0.00122)	-0.00414** (0.00170)	-0.00313* (0.00178)	-0.00260 (0.00204)	-0.00325* (0.00172)
Forced settlement colony	0.353 (0.229)	0.119 (0.288)	0.672*** (0.194)	0.735*** (0.270)	-0.0435 (0.298)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.191*** (0.0557)	0.0328 (0.0627)	0.361*** (0.0620)	0.116* (0.0657)	0.0387 (0.0495)
State antiquity in 1500	0.121 (0.165)	0.134 (0.212)	0.243 (0.259)	0.246 (0.290)	0.135 (0.209)
Countries	117	116	117	77	116
R-squared	0.325	0.324	0.279	0.298	0.384
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)	Post-1945 indep. (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)

Notes: Table B.17 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. Although Miller (2015) has coverage back to 1815, the dataset is missing data for some years in which Polity IV has data, which accounts for the discrepancy in country-year observations from Table 1. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.18: Participation

DV: Miller (2015) binary participation					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	-0.00172 (0.0147)	0.0590*** (0.0119)	-0.0396** (0.0191)	0.0800*** (0.0224)	0.0513*** (0.0177)
New World FE					0.0517 (0.0716)
Countries	117	116	117	77	116
R-squared	0.000	0.138	0.027	0.126	0.140
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)	Post-1945 indep. (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	-0.0293 (0.0178)	0.0418*** (0.0135)	-0.0768*** (0.0264)	0.0752*** (0.0266)	0.0453** (0.0181)
New World FE					-0.0280 (0.0790)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0560 (0.129)	-0.0678 (0.115)	0.242 (0.189)	-0.0483 (0.161)	-0.0728 (0.119)
Muslim pop. %	-0.000701 (0.00107)	-0.00258*** (0.000877)	-0.000366 (0.00158)	-0.00234** (0.00115)	-0.00262*** (0.000897)
Forced settlement colony	0.151 (0.0996)	0.0578 (0.0868)	0.107 (0.140)	0.139* (0.0706)	0.0651 (0.0842)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.0864** (0.0343)	-0.0222 (0.0313)	0.119*** (0.0402)	-0.0498 (0.0393)	-0.0225 (0.0317)
State antiquity in 1500	-0.0783 (0.122)	0.0904 (0.107)	-0.271 (0.166)	0.0747 (0.162)	0.0904 (0.107)
Countries	117	116	117	77	116
R-squared	0.093	0.216	0.147	0.195	0.216
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)	Post-1945 indep. (Miller 2015)	Full (Miller 2015)

Notes: Table B.18 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. Although Miller (2015) has coverage back to 1815, the dataset is missing data for some years in which Polity IV has data, which accounts for the discrepancy in country-year observations from Table 1. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B.1.6 Conditioning on British Colonialism

Finally, the present theoretical framework suggests the relevance of conditioning on British colonialism—although H1 through H3 primarily concern colonial-era rather than post-colonial aspects of democracy. Appendix Table B.19 adds a British colonialism dummy and an interaction term with colonial European population share to Table 1, and presents marginal effect estimates of colonial European population share for British and non-British colonies. Neither type of colony exhibits a robust positive correlation with aggregate democracy. Disaggregating contestation and participation, Tables B.20 and B.21 add a British colonialism dummy and an interaction term with colonial European population share to Tables B.17 and B.18, respectively. For contestation, although the coefficient estimate for colonial European population share is consistently statistically significant among British colonies in Panel A, the findings in Columns 3 and 4 are not robust to adding covariates. Table B.21 shows that the positive and statistically significant post-1980 coefficient estimates for participation shown in Table B.18 are limited to British colonies.

Table B.19: Democracy: Conditioning on British Colonialism

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
In(Colonial European pop. %)	(1) 0.610*** (0.162)	(2) 1.185*** (0.238)	(3) 0.204 (0.215)	(4) 0.562 (0.463)	(5) 0.256 (0.340)
British colony	6.216* (3.228)	1.692 (3.536)	10.45*** (2.715)	4.919 (5.021)	4.702 (3.623)
In(Colonial European pop. %)*British col.	0.575 (0.567)	0.125 (0.616)	0.747 (0.566)	0.425 (0.858)	0.683 (0.636)
New World FE					5.627*** (1.285)
Countries	122	122	122	71	122
R-squared	0.173	0.197	0.225	0.112	0.280
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Marginal effect estimates					
In(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=1	1.185** (0.543)	1.310** (0.568)	0.951* (0.524)	0.987 (0.722)	0.939 (0.589)
In(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=0	0.610*** (0.162)	1.185*** (0.238)	0.204 (0.215)	0.562 (0.463)	0.256 (0.340)
Panel B. Covariates					
In(Colonial European pop. %)	(1) 0.249 (0.178)	(2) 0.793*** (0.234)	(3) -0.0690 (0.218)	(4) 0.573 (0.485)	(5) 0.189 (0.337)
British colony	3.056 (3.270)	0.177 (3.827)	5.370** (2.709)	-3.374 (5.016)	4.089 (4.114)
In(Colonial European pop. %)*British col.	0.118 (0.552)	-0.139 (0.641)	0.0417 (0.520)	-0.888 (0.876)	0.514 (0.686)
New World FE					4.448*** (1.668)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.281 (1.591)	-2.272 (1.883)	1.812 (2.105)	-1.723 (2.386)	-1.545 (1.867)
Muslim pop. %	-0.0384*** (0.0109)	-0.0538*** (0.0136)	-0.0395** (0.0155)	-0.0427** (0.0180)	-0.0471*** (0.0140)
Forced settlement colony	2.860* (1.614)	1.650 (2.157)	3.622*** (1.237)	7.258*** (2.042)	-0.0435 (2.211)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.467 (0.402)	-0.175 (0.395)	1.333*** (0.407)	-0.190 (0.528)	-0.446 (0.462)
State antiquity in 1500	1.153 (1.366)	0.955 (1.639)	4.042** (1.760)	1.661 (2.200)	0.853 (1.601)
Countries	122	122	122	71	122
R-squared	0.307	0.333	0.342	0.316	0.372
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Marginal effect estimates					
In(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=1	0.367 (0.536)	0.653 (0.609)	-0.0273 (0.479)	-0.315 (0.672)	0.703 (0.606)
In(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=0	0.249 (0.178)	0.793*** (0.234)	-0.0690 (0.218)	0.573 (0.485)	0.189 (0.337)

Notes: Table B.19 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The bottom part of the table presents the marginal effect estimates and corresponding standard error estimates for the European settlers variable for British and non-British colonies. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.20: Contestation: Conditioning on British Colonialism

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.0942*** (0.0169)	0.158*** (0.0312)	0.00754 (0.0290)	0.0604 (0.0452)	0.0159 (0.0383)
British colony	0.830*** (0.283)	0.250 (0.326)	1.501*** (0.309)	1.003** (0.426)	0.711** (0.317)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)*British col.	0.0768 (0.0512)	0.0209 (0.0594)	0.129** (0.0630)	0.120 (0.0748)	0.103* (0.0613)
New World FE					0.831*** (0.142)
Countries	117	116	117	77	116
R-squared	0.311	0.252	0.288	0.230	0.365
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Marginal effect estimates					
ln(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=1	0.171*** (0.0483)	0.179*** (0.0505)	0.137** (0.0559)	0.180*** (0.0596)	0.119** (0.0536)
ln(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=0	0.0942*** (0.0169)	0.158*** (0.0312)	0.00754 (0.0290)	0.0604 (0.0452)	0.0159 (0.0383)
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	0.0703*** (0.0212)	0.125*** (0.0320)	-0.0185 (0.0316)	0.0498 (0.0492)	0.00749 (0.0388)
British colony	0.369 (0.359)	0.162 (0.399)	0.574 (0.450)	0.389 (0.553)	1.033** (0.450)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)*British col.	0.0107 (0.0598)	0.00511 (0.0669)	-0.00125 (0.0750)	0.0349 (0.0919)	0.143* (0.0763)
New World FE					0.817*** (0.184)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.180 (0.185)	-0.426* (0.250)	0.524** (0.246)	-0.244 (0.337)	-0.348 (0.230)
Muslim pop. %	-0.00224* (0.00120)	-0.00418** (0.00172)	-0.00338** (0.00168)	-0.00220 (0.00208)	-0.00290 (0.00180)
Forced settlement colony	0.269 (0.201)	0.0825 (0.293)	0.524*** (0.162)	0.629** (0.279)	-0.222 (0.302)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.105 (0.0716)	-0.00419 (0.0797)	0.212** (0.0860)	0.0661 (0.0748)	-0.0994 (0.0719)
State antiquity in 1500	0.134 (0.163)	0.139 (0.218)	0.275 (0.241)	0.217 (0.286)	0.0953 (0.212)
Countries	117	116	117	77	116
R-squared	0.375	0.330	0.373	0.317	0.413
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Marginal effect estimates					
ln(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=1	0.0811 (0.0593)	0.130** (0.0566)	-0.0198 (0.0760)	0.0848 (0.0734)	0.151*** (0.0574)
ln(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=0	0.0703*** (0.0212)	0.125*** (0.0320)	-0.0185 (0.0316)	0.0498 (0.0492)	0.00749 (0.0388)

Notes: Table B.20 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. Although Miller (2015) has coverage back to 1815, the dataset is missing data for some years in which Polity IV has data, which accounts for the discrepancy in country-year observations from Table 1. The bottom part of the table presents the marginal effect estimates and corresponding standard error estimates for the European settlers variable for British and non-British colonies. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.21: Participation: Conditioning on British Colonialism

DV: <i>polity2</i> score					
Panel A. No substantive covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	-0.0248* (0.0133)	0.0500*** (0.0131)	-0.0603*** (0.0184)	0.0439 (0.0343)	0.0340* (0.0200)
British colony	0.740*** (0.211)	0.184 (0.149)	0.849** (0.324)	0.323 (0.246)	0.236 (0.145)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)*British col.	0.110*** (0.0387)	0.0380 (0.0315)	0.108* (0.0593)	0.0692 (0.0467)	0.0472 (0.0319)
New World FE					0.0934 (0.0726)
Countries	117	116	117	77	116
R-squared	0.124	0.149	0.131	0.157	0.155
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Marginal effect estimates					
ln(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=1	0.0857** (0.0363)	0.0880*** (0.0286)	0.0475 (0.0563)	0.113*** (0.0316)	0.0812*** (0.0287)
ln(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=0	-0.0248* (0.0133)	0.0500*** (0.0131)	-0.0603*** (0.0184)	0.0439 (0.0343)	0.0340* (0.0200)
Panel B. Covariates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)	-0.0394** (0.0170)	0.0341** (0.0141)	-0.0801*** (0.0278)	0.0423 (0.0357)	0.0275 (0.0216)
British colony	0.676** (0.267)	0.315* (0.182)	0.708* (0.414)	0.327 (0.285)	0.363* (0.210)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)*British col.	0.103** (0.0456)	0.0542* (0.0326)	0.0923 (0.0695)	0.0700 (0.0495)	0.0619 (0.0373)
New World FE					0.0455 (0.0951)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.00320 (0.132)	-0.0905 (0.119)	0.180 (0.189)	-0.0648 (0.175)	-0.0862 (0.122)
Muslim pop. %	-0.000620 (0.00106)	-0.00253*** (0.000868)	-0.000338 (0.00158)	-0.00229** (0.00114)	-0.00246*** (0.000909)
Forced settlement colony	0.0777 (0.0897)	0.0294 (0.0907)	0.0145 (0.121)	0.121 (0.0967)	0.0124 (0.0923)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.00301 (0.0442)	-0.0557 (0.0436)	0.0179 (0.0631)	-0.0582 (0.0480)	-0.0610 (0.0461)
State antiquity in 1500	-0.111 (0.117)	0.0715 (0.106)	-0.294* (0.168)	0.0713 (0.168)	0.0691 (0.107)
Countries	117	116	117	77	116
R-squared	0.145	0.230	0.181	0.226	0.231
Year sample	All	Post-1980	First yr. indep.	Post-1980	Post-1980
Country sample	Full	Full	Full	Post-1945 indep.	Full
Marginal effect estimates					
ln(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=1	0.0636 (0.0475)	0.0883*** (0.0329)	0.0122 (0.0725)	0.112*** (0.0379)	0.0894*** (0.0327)
ln(Colonial European pop. %) Br. col.=1	-0.0394** (0.0170)	0.0341** (0.0141)	-0.0801*** (0.0278)	0.0423 (0.0357)	0.0275 (0.0216)

Notes: Table B.21 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. Although Miller (2015) has coverage back to 1815, the dataset is missing data for some years in which Polity IV has data, which accounts for the discrepancy in country-year observations from Table 1. The bottom part of the table presents the marginal effect estimates and corresponding standard error estimates for the European settlers variable for British and non-British colonies. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B.2 Additional Tables for Assessing H1

Table B.22: Settler Colonies and Elected Legislatures (1600–1945) with Covariates

DV: Elected legislature					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Settler colony	-1.420 (1.390)	-1.420 (1.390)	-1.648 (1.502)	-0.190 (2.112)	
British colony	0.449 (0.395)	0.449 (0.395)	0.387 (0.397)		5.129*** (1.955)
Settler*British colony	3.666*** (1.184)	3.666*** (1.184)	3.950*** (1.355)		
New World FE			0.768 (0.649)		
Exec. constraints in metropole				0.677** (0.324)	
Settler colony*Exec. constraints in metropole				0.263 (0.326)	
ln(Colonial European pop. %)					-0.188 (0.326)
British colony*ln(Colonial European pop. %)					0.739** (0.320)
Ethnic fractionalization	5.76e-06** (2.32e-06)	5.76e-06** (2.32e-06)	6.57e-06** (2.65e-06)	2.00e-07 (8.15e-07)	4.26e-06** (2.01e-06)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923	0.154* (0.0805)	0.154* (0.0805)	0.0986 (0.0945)	0.187*** (0.0724)	0.218** (0.101)
Forced settlement colony	0.154 (0.520)	0.154 (0.520)	-0.276 (0.590)	0.425 (0.476)	1.653** (0.811)
Muslim pop. %	0.00263 (0.00719)	0.00263 (0.00719)	0.00435 (0.00714)	-1.11e-06 (0.00599)	0.00658 (0.00774)
Observations	11,626	11,626	11,626	11,626	8,688
Century FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sample	FULL w/o Neo-Br.	FULL w/o Neo-Br.	FULL w/o Neo-Br.	FULL w/o Neo-Br.	Table 1
Marginal effect estimates					
Settler colony British rule	0.473*** (0.108)	0.473*** (0.108)	0.484*** (0.103)		
Settler colony Highest metropole exec. constraints				0.385*** (0.0958)	
ln(Colonial European pop. %) British rule					0.100* (0.0534)
Settler colony Non-British rule	-0.0732 (0.0506)	-0.0732 (0.0506)	-0.0815 (0.0503)		
Settler colony Lowest metropole exec. constraints				0.000441 (0.0105)	
ln(Colonial European pop. %) Non-British rule					-0.00818 (0.0126)

Notes: Table B.22 summarizes a series of logit regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The specifications are identical to those in Table 2 except every specification contains four substantive control variables (the state antiquity control is not used because of considerable missing data; recall the Table B.22 sample contains many smaller colonies not included in Table 1). No column includes the neo-Britains because they are missing data on the Protestant missionaries in 1923 variable (and, therefore, Columns 1 and 2 are identical). Every specification contains century fixed effects. The bottom part of the table presents the marginal effect estimates and corresponding standard error estimates for the European settlers variables under various values of other conditioning variables. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B.3 Additional Tables for Assessing H2

Table B.23: Legalized Enfranchisement in Africa, 1955–1970 (No British colonial control)

	DV: Avg. % of pop. legally enfranchised, 1955-70			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Settler colony	-42.08*** (14.50)	-34.63*** (11.80)		
Ethnic fractionalization		-5.648 (13.56)		-7.709 (14.60)
Muslim pop. %		0.102 (0.129)		0.102 (0.147)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923		-7.743* (4.031)		-4.528 (5.437)
State antiquity in 1500		13.09 (19.94)		11.69 (18.07)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)			-11.70*** (2.630)	-9.888*** (3.435)
Colonies	42	42	42	42
R-squared	0.241	0.400	0.328	0.420

Notes: Table B.23 summarizes a series of logit regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for legalized suffrage averaged between 1955 and 1970, and the sample is all continental African countries plus Madagascar. The forced settlement covariate is not used because it equals 0 for every country in this sample. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.24: Majority Rule in Africa, 1955–1970

	DV: Avg. % of years with majority rule, 1955-70			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Settler colony	-0.432** (0.213)	-0.431** (0.167)		
British colony	-0.141 (0.0901)	-0.0635 (0.0867)	-0.370 (0.267)	-0.144 (0.227)
Settler*British colony	-0.219 (0.225)	-0.0575 (0.147)		
ln(Colonial European pop. %)			-0.127*** (0.0390)	-0.137*** (0.0394)
ln(Colonial European pop. %)*British colony			-0.0426 (0.0453)	-0.00893 (0.0377)
Ethnic fractionalization		-0.0308 (0.178)		-0.0827 (0.170)
Muslim pop. %		-1.88e-05 (0.00119)		-2.57e-05 (0.00147)
Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923		-0.0734* (0.0402)		-0.0167 (0.0540)
State antiquity in 1500		0.372* (0.206)		0.358* (0.185)
Colonies	42	42	42	42
R-squared	0.363	0.511	0.477	0.569
Marginal effect estimates				
Settler colony British rule	-0.651*** (0.0707)	-0.488*** (0.0539)		
ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule			-0.169*** (0.0230)	-0.146*** (0.0314)
Settler colony Non-British rule	-0.432** (0.213)	-0.431** (0.167)		
ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule			-0.127*** (0.0390)	-0.137*** (0.0394)

Notes: Table B.24 summarizes a series of logit regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether at least half the adult population can legally participate in elections coded using Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016), averaged between 1955 and 1970, and the sample is all continental African countries plus Madagascar. The forced settlement covariate is not used because it equals 0 for every country in this sample. The bottom part of the table presents the marginal effect estimates and corresponding standard error estimates for the European settlers variables under various values of other conditioning variables. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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