TRENDS AND APPLICATIONS

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Comparing Military and Civilian Houshold Finances: Descriptive Evidence from Recent Surveys

Despite significant media and policy attention to the financial conditions of military and civilian households in American over the past few years, little is known about their relative standing and decision making. Using data from large national surveys, this analysis provides descriptive evidence on key differences for comparable young, low-moderate income and education military and civilian respondents. I find that military members have more types of savings accounts, more problematic credit card behaviors, and equivalent use of alternative financial services. I briefly discuss directions for future research and some policy implications.

In the United States, more than a decade of war and a struggling economy have generated substantial interest in the welfare of military families. Annual military compensation increases, new veterans' benefits (e.g., the Post 9/11 GI Bill), public and private sector commitments to reduce veteran unemployment, and military compensation reforms (e.g., the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission [MCRMC]) suggest a strong commitment to military service members and their families. Yet despite significant media and government attention to these topics, there has been little scientific research on the household finances of military families, a fact highlighted by Carlson, Nelson and Skimmyhorn (2015). Survey evidence suggests that younger military members are more financially secure than their civilian peers (Morath 2014; FINRA Foundation 2013), though these reports fail to account for the many other potential differences between the groups. Academic researchers have

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evaluated specific outcomes for military members, including the effects of payday lending (Carrell and Zinman 2014; Carter and Skimmyhorn 2016) and the use of alternative financial services (AFS) more generally (Fox 2012). Economists' interest in financial education has included work evaluating its effectiveness for military members (Bell, Gorin and Hogarth 2009; Skimmyhorn 2016). There also exists some evidence on the effects of military deployments on household financial decisions (Bell 2013). Most importantly, to the author's knowledge there have been no multivariate comparative analyses between military members and their civilian counterparts.[1]

Such comparisons can provide important initial insights into additional research questions and motivate appropriate policy review and development. The results below are particularly timely given recent two national-level policy actions. First, the president's MCRMC has generated Congressional attention and motivation for significant reforms to military compensation and financial education over the next few years to the tune of billions of dollars for the former and hundreds of millions of dollars for the latter. Second, recent Consumer Financial Protection Bureau actions on payday lending demonstrate the potential for regulations (i.e., the MLA) in support of military service members to serve as a model for financial product regulation nationwide. In both cases, this study can help benchmark individuals' relative financial well-being prior to the new policies taking hold. Using large national surveys of household financial decisions, I find that military members have more types of savings accounts, more problematic credit card behaviors, and equivalent use of AFS relative to comparable civilians. The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 I describe the data and in Section 3 I present the results. I discuss the research and conclude in Section 4.

DATA: THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL CAPABILITY STUDIES

This study uses data from the 2009 and 2012 National Financial Capability Studies (NFCS), sponsored by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Investor Education Foundation and developed in consultation with the Department of Treasury, the President's Advisory Council on Financial Capability, and leading academic researchers. Voluntary respondents completed the surveys online in 2009 and 2012 and

1. For comparative evidence between members of different services (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and different components (i.e., Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard), see Skimmyhorn (2014).

were compensated for their time. My sample combines data from the State-by-State (hereafter State) and Military Surveys.[2]

While the surveys were national in scope and carefully implemented, there may exist important sources of error that include selection into participation, nonresponse bias among participants, and measurement error.[3] In neither survey is the sample necessarily representative of the full US or military populations, though I restrict the sample to mitigate some of these differences. To focus on the population of the most policy interest (i.e., low to moderate income and education households), I restrict the sample to individuals aged 18–45 years old with less than a college degree and less than $75,000 in annual income. I restrict the military sample to enlisted members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. These restrictions generate a combined sample size of $n = 13{,}446$ civilians and $n = 606$ military service members. In Table A1 in the online appendix, I provide summary statistics that compare my sample to the complete NFCS samples of civilian and military members for those interested in the larger groups. I also note that the NFCS data reflect respondents' reports for the household and not just themselves.

While the NFCS contains a large number of financial outcomes of interest to researchers and policy makers, I analyze three that provide insight into important areas of household financial situations: savings, credit cards, and AFS. The importance of the first two areas is evident from their place in leading financial education curricula worldwide (e.g., Treasury's "My Money Five," the National Endowment for Financial Education programs, and the OECD's International Network on Financial Education). As for the AFS use, while less common in the general population, high-cost lending has been a prominent topic in US discussions of military members' financial situations and has received significant attention from policy makers. For each outcome area I create an index that captures data from multiple NFCS items, as described below:

The Savings Account Index is the sum of four indicators:

2. The NFCS Military and State-by-State survey methodologies, questionnaires and data are publicly available at: http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads.php.

3. The NFCS relies on self-reported demographic and financial outcomes that may suffer from measurement error. Since the paper relies on comparisons across groups (e.g., military members vs. civilians or military services vs. each other), measurement errors are less concerning if the self-reports are biased equally across groups. However, given the military's concern for service members' financial affairs and its legal authority over many aspects of their lives, these self-report concerns might be more significant among service members.

- *Has an emergency fund* = 1 for those who report that they have set aside funds to cover expenses for 3 months in the case of sickness, job loss, economic downturn, or other emergencies.
- *Has non-retirement investments* = 1 for those who report that outside of retirement accounts, they have investments in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, or other securities.
- *Has retirement investments from employer* = 1 for those who report having retirement plans through a current or previous employer, like a pension plan, a Thrift Savings Plan, or a 401(k).
- *Has own retirement investments* = 1 for those who report having other retirement accounts not through an employer like an IRA, Keogh, SEP, or any other type of account they have set up.

While a more ideal measure of savings behavior would capture the total amount of savings or the frequency of saving, the NFCS does not solicit this information. The current measure provides some insight into savings behavior based on the number and types of accounts individuals have.

The Poor Credit Card Behavior Index is the sum of four indicators:

- *Not paying in full* = 1 for those who report not always paying their balances in full.
- *Exceeding limit* = 1 for those who report being charged a fee for exceeding their credit line.
- *Paying a late fee* = 1 for those who report paying a fee for a late payment.
- *Cash advance* = 1 for those who report using their credit card for a cash advance.

As with the savings outcome, the NFCS questions are not ideal. The welfare consequences of these behaviors may not be clear given the limited view of other financial decisions, but these behaviors seem hard to describe as positive. A balance estimate or total interest and fees estimate might be more useful in analyzing welfare consequences. However, the varied nature of the behaviors should provide insight into individuals' use of one of the most important financial products in the modern economy.

The AFS Use Index is the sum of three indicators:

- *Taken a payday loan* = 1 for those who reported using this type of loan over the past 5 years.
- *Taken an auto title loan* =1 for those who reported using this type of loan over the past 5 years.

- *Taken a refund anticipation loan* =1 for those who reported using this type of loan over the past 5 years.

As with the outcomes above, a balance or total payments for AFS is ideal, but the NFCS does not collect this data. The index should provide insight into use of the most salient AFS by analyzing the number of products used.

The NFCS contains a number of detailed individual characteristics that I use, including indicators for gender, age (18–24, 25–34, 35–44), marital status (single, currently married, previously married), having children, minority status, education level (less than high school, high school graduate, some college) and annual income (<$15K, $15–25K, $25–35K, $35–50K, $50–75K). The NFCS also includes widely used financial literacy questions, developed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) shown to correlate with a number of important financial outcomes (for reviews, see Lusardi and Mitchell 2014; Hastings, Madrian, and Skimmyhorn 2013). I construct a financial literacy index (from 0–5) that reflects the total number of questions (interest rates, inflation, bond prices, diversification, and mortgages) answered correctly. Finally, I create a financial confidence index (from 0–18) that reflects the sum of three self-reported measures (good at dealing with day-to-day financial matters, good at math, and overall financial knowledge). Algood and Walstad (2016) document the positive relationship between self-reported confidence and financial behaviors above and beyond actual knowledge.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Given the voluntary nature of military service and the significant differences in military and civilian life, we would expect differences in the characteristics of those in each group. As such, none of the results in this paper should be taken as causal evidence on the financial effects of military service. For example, if military members demonstrated more problematic credit card behaviors it could be the case that people likely to demonstrate these behaviors are more likely to join the military or that military service and its frequent relocations contribute to these behaviors.

In Table 1, I provide initial insight into some of the differences for the military and civilian samples by observable characteristics and financial outcomes. The Panel A results suggest that military members are less likely to be female, younger, less likely to be single, more likely to be married, about equally likely to be divorced, about equally likely to have children, slightly less likely to be a minority, slightly more educated (among this

TABLE 1
Summary Statistics

Panel A. Individual Characteristics	Civilian $N = 13{,}446$		Military $N = 606$		Difference	
Characteristics, %	Mean (1)	SD (2)	Mean (3)	SD (4)	(3)–(1) (6)	*p* Value (7)
Female	58.81	(49.22)	17.99	(38.44)	−40.82	.000
Age 18–24	32.70	(46.91)	23.93	(42.70)	−8.77	.000
Age 25–34	33.83	(47.32)	57.26	(49.51)	23.43	.000
Age 35–44	33.47	(47.19)	18.81	(39.11)	−14.66	.000
Single	50.54	(50.00)	31.52	(46.50)	−19.02	.000
Currently married	39.07	(48.79)	58.91	(49.24)	19.84	.000
Previously married	10.40	(30.52)	9.57	(29.44)	−0.83	.500
Has children	53.24	(49.90)	54.95	(49.80)	1.72	.407
Minority	35.69	(47.91)	31.68	(46.56)	−4.01	.039
Less than HS education	11.50	(31.90)	1.82	(13.36)	−9.68	.000
High school graduate	38.78	(48.73)	18.98	(39.24)	−19.80	.000
Some college education	49.72	(50.00)	79.21	(40.62)	29.48	.000
Income less than $15K	28.12	(44.96)	6.44	(24.56)	−21.68	.000
$15K ≤ Income < $25K	18.25	(38.63)	10.89	(31.18)	−7.36	.000
$25K ≤ Income < $35K	16.23	(36.87)	18.32	(38.71)	2.09	.193
$35 ≤ Income < $50K	17.96	(38.39)	31.19	(46.36)	13.23	.000
$50K ≤ Income < $75K	19.44	(39.58)	33.17	(47.12)	13.73	.000
Financial literacy index (Lo=0–5=Hi)	2.33	(1.38)	2.85	(1.31)	0.53	.000
Financial confidence (Lo=0–18=Hi)	11.82	(4.06)	13.02	(3.59)	1.21	.000
Panel B. Financial Outcomes						
Outcome	Mean (1)	SD (2)	Mean (3)	SD (4)	(3)–(1) (6)	*p* Value (7)
Savings outcome index (Min=0–3=Max)	0.6365	(0.8678)	1.1444	(1.0168)	0.5079	.000
Poor credit card behavior index (Min=0–4=Max)	0.7415	(1.0985)	1.0718	(1.0896)	0.3303	.000
AFS outcome index (Min=0–3=Max)	0.4095	(0.7365)	0.4250	(0.8167)	0.0154	.652

Source: 2009 and 2012 NFCS State-by-State and Military Surveys. Sample restricted to 18- to 45-year olds with less than a college degree. Military sample restricted to enlisted members. For each variable, means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are provided. Respondents answering "Don't know" or "Prefer not to say" for the financial literacy index questions are coded as not correctly answering. Respondents answering "Don't know" or "Prefer not to say" for the outcomes in panel B are omitted. The differences and p-values reflect the results of t-tests for each variable by military status assuming unequal variance. All statistics are unweighted.

non-college degree sample), and of higher income. They also have more financial literacy and financial confidence.

The Panel B results suggest that military members have more types of savings accounts (1.1444 vs. 0.6365) and more problematic credit card behaviors (1.0718 vs. 0.7415) and both differences are statistically significant ($p < .01$). In terms of AFS use, military members do not differ

in meaningful ways (economically or statistically) from civilians (0.4250 vs. 0.4095).

Importantly, while these results provide evidence on the groups' differing financial outcomes, they do not account for the other differences displayed in Panel A. As a result, I complete a more meaningful analysis using a multivariate regression framework that allows me to identify the differences in military and civilians conditional on other observable characteristics (e.g., age, education, financial literacy, etc.). In Equation 1 I provide my primary regression specification for these analyses:

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{MILITARY}_i + X_i'\delta + \theta_s + \omega_{2012} + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where Y_i is the financial outcome of interest for individual i. MILITARY_i is an indicator that takes on the value of 1 if an individual is in the military and a value of 0 for civilians. X_i is a vector of individual characteristics, including gender, age, marital status, dependents, minority status, education level, income level, financial literacy index score (0–5), and financial confidence index score (0–18). θ_s represents state fixed effects for the individual's state of residence. ω_{2012} is an indicator that equals one for 2012 NFCS respondents. α_1 is the parameter of interest and reflects the average difference in each outcome between military and civilian members. In all specifications I cluster the standard errors at the state level to account for correlations in the errors between individuals in each state.

As discussed previously, since the study is observational and there is no exogenous variation in military service, α_1 cannot be interpreted causally. Instead, it represents a combination of all factors that make military members and civilians differ for each financial outcome. These differences include but are not limited to differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., mathematical abilities, financial knowledge), non-cognitive abilities (e.g., propensity to plan, self-control), time preferences (e.g., personal discount rates), risk preferences (e.g., willingness to participate in the stock market), and any institutional/employer factors that differ on average between military and civilian members (e.g., financial education, counseling, choice architectures). While the characteristics X_i can account for some differences (e.g., education and the financial literacy index may account for some of the cognitive ability differences), the typical concerns with omitted variable bias prevail here and my estimates should be interpreted in a descriptive manner.

In Table 2 I provide the main results for the savings account type index. I focus my discussion on the coefficient estimate for MILITARY_i, its economic magnitude (relative to the sample mean for civilians, which I include at the top of each column in each panel) and its statistical

TABLE 2
OLS Estimates for Savings Account Index

Variable	Outcome Mean	(1) 0.6365	(2) 0.6365	(3) 0.6365	(4) 0.6365
Military		0.5800***	0.4854***	0.3794***	0.3754***
		(0.0391)	(0.0393)	(0.0439)	(0.0441)
Female			−0.1598***	−0.1249***	−0.0963***
			(0.0205)	(0.0201)	(0.0198)
Age 25–34			0.1053***	0.0245	0.0282
			(0.0207)	(0.0199)	(0.0199)
Age 35–44			0.1441***	0.0326	0.0270
			(0.0239)	(0.0227)	(0.0226)
Married			0.1389***	−0.000	−0.004
			(0.0204)	(0.0203)	(0.0200)
Previously married			−0.0200	−0.0383	−0.0409
			(0.0306)	(0.0291)	(0.0286)
Has children			−0.058**	−0.065***	−0.063***
			(0.0226)	(0.0230)	(0.0229)
Minority			−0.0113	−0.006	−0.001
			(0.0197)	(0.0191)	(0.0183)
High school graduate				0.0655***	0.0362
				(0.0224)	(0.0218)
Some college				0.1647***	0.1057***
				(0.0244)	(0.0245)
Income $15K–$25K				0.0903***	0.0773***
				(0.0210)	(0.0207)
Income $25K–$35K				0.2427***	0.2275***
				(0.0263)	(0.0259)
Income $35K–$50K				0.3896***	0.3634***
				(0.0264)	(0.0256)
Income $50K–$75K				0.5997***	0.5617***
				(0.0283)	(0.0268)
Financial literacy					0.0279***
					(0.0051)
Financial confidence					0.0217***
					(0.0022)
R^2		.1046	.1236	.1831	.1944
Observations		10,997	10,997	10,997	10,997
Clusters		51	51	51	51

Source: 2009 and 2012 NFCS State and Military surveys. The table displays OLS estimates of Equation 1. All specifications include state indicators and an indicator for the year 2012. Omitted categories are Age 18–24, Single, Less than HS graduate, and Less than $15K income. The outcome reflects the reported number of different types of savings accounts and varies from 0–3. The outcome mean is computed for the comparison (civilian) group. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the State level.
$^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$.

significance. The naïve model (Col. 1) suggests that on average, military members have 0.5800 (91% compared to the mean of 0.6365) more savings accounts than civilians. The magnitude of the relationship falls in models 2 through 4 as additional controls are included, suggesting omitted variable bias and highlighting that these estimates are not causal. In the most complete specification (Col. 4) the results suggest that military members

have 0.3754 (59%) more types of accounts than civilians. In all cases the estimated relationships are statistically significant ($p < .01$). Education, income, financial literacy, and financial confidence correlate positively with the savings account index, while the female and dependents indicators correlate negatively.

Given the restricted outcome range in this index, I complete tobit estimates in Table A2 in the online appendix. The results are qualitatively similar as the statistical significance holds but all point estimates are larger in magnitude. For readers interested in the decomposition of these results, I provide linear probability model estimates for each type of savings account in Table A3 in the online appendix.

In Table 3 I provide the results for the poor credit card behaviors index. The baseline model suggests that military members have 0.3989 (54%) more problematic behaviors than civilians. The magnitude of the relationship decreases as additional controls are included. The final model suggests that military members have 0.2324 (31%) more problematic behaviors than civilians. All these results are statistically significant ($p < .01$).

In Table 4, I provide the regression estimates for the AFS use index. Here the results are relatively stable from the baseline model to the full model, which suggest that military members have used 0.0109 (2%) fewer AFS in the past 5 years. These results are neither statistically or economically significant. The individual characteristic results suggest that age, previously married, children and minority status all positively correlate with AFS use. The income relationship appears hump-shaped. Education, financial literacy and financial confidence are negatively related to AFS use. These findings stand in contrast to many previous media and other reports (Tanik 2005) of concerning levels of AFS use by military members that prompted Congressional passage of the MLA and continued attention from the CFPB. The findings here do not refute the fact that military members, on average, use these products at higher rates than the full civilian population. They do suggest that when compared to civilians similar in age, education, income, and the other individual characteristics used here, military members are no more likely to use these services.[4]

4. The timing of the NFCS surveys and the wording of these questions complicates their interpretation. These data were collected in 2009 and 2012, after the MLA was implemented. Hence the lack of differences in AFS use could reflect the special protections afforded service members and their spouses under the law. If the MLA was ineffective, then the comparable levels of use might suggest there is no need for additional special protections. The NFCS questions also ask about AFS product use in the past 5 years, making it possible that individuals reported AFS use from before the MLA. This might also suggest no meaningful differences in AFS use by military status since military members and civilians had similar financial product choices before the MLA.

TABLE 3
OLS Estimates for Poor Credit Card Behavior Index

Variable	Outcome Mean	(1) 0.7415	(2) 0.7415	(3) 0.7415	(4) 0.7415
Military		0.3989***	0.3600***	0.2341***	0.2324***
		(0.0509)	(0.0530)	(0.0570)	(0.0575)
Female			−0.0014	0.0171	0.0314
			(0.0196)	(0.0193)	(0.0188)
Age 25–34			0.1950***	0.1312***	0.1296***
			(0.0225)	(0.0225)	(0.0224)
Age 35–44			0.2080***	0.1273***	0.1204***
			(0.0258)	(0.0259)	(0.0259)
Married			0.1273***	0.0214	0.0205
			(0.0212)	(0.0223)	(0.0227)
Previously married			−0.0127	−0.0284	−0.0311
			(0.0329)	(0.0340)	(0.0346)
Has children			0.1165***	0.1244***	0.1261***
			(0.0187)	(0.0188)	(0.0187)
Minority			0.0563**	0.0473**	0.0538**
			(0.0227)	(0.0226)	(0.0223)
High school graduate				0.1693***	0.1670***
				(0.0287)	(0.0290)
Some college				0.2976***	0.2834***
				(0.0285)	(0.0295)
Income $15K–$25K				0.1800***	0.1795***
				(0.0269)	(0.0273)
Income $25K–$35K				0.2502***	0.2493***
				(0.0308)	(0.0313)
Income $35K–$50K				0.3752***	0.3729***
				(0.0307)	(0.0309)
Income $50K–$75K				0.3756***	0.3674***
				(0.0317)	(0.0329)
Financial literacy					0.0339***
					(0.0073)
Financial confidence					−0.006**
					(0.0027)
R^2		0.0272	0.0489	0.0752	0.0768
Observations		13,728	13,728	13,728	13,728
Clusters		51	51	51	51

Source: 2009 and 2012 NFCS State and Military surveys. The table displays OLS estimates of Equation 1. All specifications include state indicators and an indicator for the year 2012. Omitted categories are Age 18–24, Single, Less than HS graduate, and Less than $15K income. The outcome reflects the reported number of poor credit card behaviors and varies from 0–4. The outcome mean is computed for the comparison (civilian) group. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the State level. $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$.

DISCUSSION

Using data from the 2009 and 2012 National Financial Capability Studies, this research compares select financial outcomes of military and

TABLE 4
OLS Estimates for Alternative Financial Services Index

Variable	Outcome Mean	(1) 0.4095	(2) 0.4095	(3) 0.4095	(4) 0.4095
Military		−0.0081	−0.0268	−0.0125	−0.0109
		(0.0526)	(0.0532)	(0.0525)	(0.0526)
Female			−0.0303**	−0.0359***	−0.0445***
			(0.0135)	(0.0134)	(0.0134)
Age 25–34			0.1239***	0.1187***	0.1179***
			(0.0191)	(0.0207)	(0.0206)
Age 35–44			0.0676***	0.0720***	0.0742***
			(0.0188)	(0.0207)	(0.0207)
Married			−0.0148	−0.0023	−0.0007
			(0.0193)	(0.0196)	(0.0195)
Previously married			0.0577**	0.0536*	0.0549*
			(0.0282)	(0.0286)	(0.0286)
Has children			0.2737***	0.2596***	0.2592***
			(0.0163)	(0.0161)	(0.0162)
Minority			0.1146***	0.1152***	0.1129***
			(0.0134)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)
High school graduate				−0.0374	−0.0293
				(0.0242)	(0.0241)
Some college				−0.067***	−0.050**
				(0.0234)	(0.0237)
Income $15K–$25K				0.1450***	0.1488***
				(0.0174)	(0.0177)
Income $25K–$35K				0.1375***	0.1423***
				(0.0232)	(0.0231)
Income $35K–$50K				0.0684***	0.0758***
				(0.0210)	(0.0213)
Income $50K–$75K				−0.0374	−0.0266
				(0.0229)	(0.0229)
Financial literacy					−0.0113**
					(0.0048)
Financial confidence					−0.0040**
					(0.0019)
R^2		.0179	.0672	.0775	.0785
Observations		13,539	13,539	13,539	13,539
Clusters		51	51	51	51

Source: 2009 and 2012 NFCS State and Military surveys. The table displays OLS estimates of Equation 1. All specifications include state indicators and an indicator for the year 2012. Omitted categories are Age 18–24, Single, Less than HS graduate, and Less than $15K income. The outcome reflects the reported number of alternative financial services used and varies from 0–3. The outcome mean is computed for the comparison (civilian) group. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the State level.
$^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$.

civilian households. I find that military members, relative to their civilian counterparts, have more types of savings accounts, more problematic credit card behaviors, and are equally likely to use AFS. The results suggest a nuanced story on these households' financial situations.

To the author's knowledge, this is the first large-scale analysis of the differences between military and civilian members that accounts for their many observable differences. In some cases, the lack of significant differences, once observable characteristics are controlled for, suggests there may be no need for differential treatment. In other cases, the differences are informative and can guide policy makers as they evaluate the potential need for special protections for military members (e.g., the Military Lending Act or the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act), identify areas for improved education, or consider areas for new policies.

The findings also suggest the need to collect additional data (e.g., risk and time preferences and behavioral measures such as self-control and propensities to plan) to more precisely identify potential reasons for the observed differences. Another approach would be experimental surveys that try to isolate the reasons for individuals' decisions, and experimental policy approaches to financial education and other service provision. Since the military services have the autonomy to develop and implement a wide array of policies (e.g., training and education, quality of life, pre- and post-deployment programs), as well as the ability to collect detailed administrative and survey data, this environment represents one of the most promising areas for research into household financial decision making and for refinement of program evaluation techniques. These efforts hold promise for more effectively preparing military members for the financial challenges of all-volunteer service in the modern economy, as well as developing a better understanding of the effectiveness of public policy in serving members of low and moderate income households.

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