Curriculum and Richard McKeon's Philosophy of Rhetoric[1]

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I. Introduction

The theme of this year's AERA Annual Meeting, "The Art and Science of Educational Research and Practice," explicitly "acknowledges pluralism both in methods of inquiry and in forms of representation." This acknowledgement of pluralism implies an institutional recognition that the paradigm, to use Kuhn's term,[2] which has dominated educational thinking for several decades must be reconsidered. Such recognition provides a unique problem as well as opportunity for curriculum theory. Currently, curriculum tends to be made either by public agencies which set forth the goals of schooling—as in the President's *America 2000* proposal or in the various state legislatures' requirements of accountability through various kinds of "outcomes" assessment—or by publishers' instructional packages which provide the "teacher-proof" means by which these or other goals will be reached. In intellectual if not political terms, such conceptions of curriculum formation and implementation grow out of the positivist conception of knowledge as atomistic pieces of information and mechanistic sets of skills. As Tanner and Tanner have made clear, this positivist approach dominates even the apparently nonpolitical, professional curricular reforms designed to stimulate "inquiry" and "higher order thinking skills."[3]

The problem for curriculum theory today is to invent a new paradigm which will not only include but fruitfully relate both the art and science of educational research and practice in a pluralistic democracy. Several traditions of curricular criticism have already begun to explore alternative conceptions. The feminist critique of the absent "voice", e.g., Belenky *et al*., and the social critique of cultural pluralism, e.g., Giroux, have revealed the inhumane and unjust consequences of the "objectivist" position and have suggested new approaches to curricular thinking.[4] In addition, the exploration of multiple perspectives on experience has also drawn extensively on literary theory, with its tradition of disciplined examination of story-telling, including both what stories mean and what stories make of the teller as well as the audience, e.g., Witherell and Nod-

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[1] This paper was originally delivered jointly at the AERA (American Educational Research Association) Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, USA, on April 16, 1993**.**

[2] Thomas Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[3] Daniel Tanner and Laurel Tanner, *History of the School Curriculum* (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1990).

[4] Mary Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck Tarule, *Women's Ways of Knowing* (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Henry A. Giroux, *Teachers as Intellectuals* (Granby, Mass.: Bergin & Garvey, 1988).

dings, and on certain conceptions of psychology which have emphasized multiple ways of thinking, as in Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences.[5]

The object of this paper, however, is to explore another approach to pluralism, one which emphasizes intellectual diversity and has the potential both to liberate and to help organize the thinking of both students and teachers. That approach grows out of rhetoric, the discipline which from ancient times onward has systematically explored the plurality of human perspectives and invented means to bring them into fruitful relation to one another. In particular, this paper explores some of the educational consequences of a modern reinvention of rhetoric, that embodied in the philosophy of culture developed by the late philosopher Richard McKeon. McKeon has already had some influence, in America most notably through the work of Wayne Booth in literary criticism and Joseph Schwab in curriculum theory. Yet little has been done directly with his approach to rhetoric, and we are attempting to see what educational consequences it has.

With respect to his work in general, McKeon considered Dewey the most important influence on his work and tried, in some sense, to extend Dewey's ideas to fit the post-World War II world where *all* cultures and *all* intellectual traditions are in direct contact. In this undertaking, he argued that the central problem is to find a means by which the various kinds of expression of truth can be presented in a form which does not either refute them or reduce them to each other and which thereby allows each to develop its own position most fully and fruitfully. It is in searching for a solution to this problem that he engaged in one of the most extensive individual scholarly investigations of the twentieth century.

II. McKeon: A Biographical Sketch

Because McKeon is a rather unfamiliar figure today, a brief biographical sketch may be in order. Living from 1900 to 1985, Richard Peter McKeon began his philosophic career by studying at Columbia and Paris under such internationally known philosophers as F. J. E. Woodbridge (the major adviser on his Spinoza dissertation), John Dewey and Etienne Gilson and became, during a career spent mostly at the University of Chicago, an internationally known philosopher himself, serving as President and Vice President of a number of national and international philosophical associations and participating in various capacities in UNESCO after World War II.[6] His intellectual gifts and energy were remarkable. Bertrand Russell characterized him as "incredibly learned" when he was still in his 30s, and John Herman Randall, Jr., thought he was "the most learned of American historians of philosophy."[7] However legendary, though, McKeon's scholarship was merely the starting point of a most profound and original philosophic activity. One testimony to the power of McKeon's originality lies in a British publication which

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[5] Carol Witherell and Nel Noddings, eds., *Stories Lives Tell* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1991). Howard Gardner, *Frames of Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

[6] See John F. Callahan, "Richard Peter McKeon (1900-1985)," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, *47*, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1986), pp. 653-62. Thomas M. Conley, "The virtues of controversy: *In memoriam* R. P. McKeon." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, *71*, no. 4 (November, 1985), pp. 470-75. Alan Gewirth, "Richard Peter McKeon (1900-1985)," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association*, *58*, no. 5 (June 1985), pp. 751-52. Jacques Cattell Press, ed., *Directory of American Scholars*, Vol. 4: *Philosophy, religion, and law* (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1982), p. 338.

[7] Gewirth, *op. cit.*

lists McKeon as one of only 413 individuals in *all* fields *worldwide* who have contributed most to the twentieth century.[8]

If his scholarship and philosophic insight have been significant in this century, so have his contributions to education. He wrote repeatedly on the explicit problems of education in the twentieth century, especially the problems of the liberal arts. Not confining his efforts to theoretic treatments of education, he was, as Dean of the Division of Humanities at Chicago under President Robert Maynard Hutchins from 1937 to 1947, "the chief founder of the undergraduate College's 'core curriculum.'"[9] Later, he turned his attention to an interdisciplinary Committee at Chicago on "the Analysis of Ideas and the Study of Methods," commonly referred to as "Ideas and Methods" or "I&M." I&M became the attempt to institutionalize his conception of education for philosophic interpretation, insight, and invention. It was "a program devoted to inquiry into both Ideas and Methods: the analysis of philosophical positions and of the methods of discovery and justification devised in their elaboration and defense."[10]

In both theory and practice, then, McKeon attempted to explore the consequences of his conception of philosophy, one whose root he frequently stated was that "any question pushed far enough is philosophic." Though the machinery of his philosophy can become formidable, in intent his approach is far from the specialized, technical conception of philosophy held by many academic philosophers of the twentieth century; and in application his ideas can illuminate virtually any field of human thought and action.

III. The Rhetorical Character of McKeon's Philosophy

Two circumstances guide his work. One is that by living in the twentieth century, we are the beneficiaries of over two and a half millennia of an immeasurably rich, diverse, and contradictory philosophic discussion. The other circumstance is that since the end of the Second World War, we are experiencing an unprecedented growth in contact among radically diverse cultures throughout the world. It is to this plurality of ideas and actions over both time and space that McKeon attempts to provide some understanding. He calls his work the philosophy of culture, and in that philosophy he treats both cultural pluralism and intellectual pluralism in an analogically similar fashion.

In a 1952 autobiographical essay entitled "A Philosopher Mediates on Discovery,"[11] McKeon states that early in his career he discovered a paradoxical truth, one which provides the

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[8] See Elizabeth Devine, Michael Held, James Vinson, and George Walsh, eds., *Thinkers of the Twentieth Century; A Biographical, Bibliographical and Critical Dictionary* (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 3-6.

[9] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, p. 752. That curriculum is especially important for today's discussions because Chicago is the only major American university in the twentieth century which has had a common course of studies, a true "core" and not just a set of distribution requirements, for *all* students, one which *included* the "hard" sciences.

[10] See Conley, *op. cit.*, p. 471.

[11] In Richard McKeon, *Rhetoric: Essays in Invention and Discovery*, ed. Mark Backman (Woodbridge, Conn.; Ox Bow Press, 1987), pp. 195-220.

central theme of his work. He cites two sources as stimulating his insight. Reading Cicero's *De Finibus*, he ran across the following passage:

> "My view, then, Cato," I proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle, and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a body of doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno [the Stoic] on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master's predecessors."[12]

Citing Aristotle's refutation of Plato, the Academy's various non-Platonic doctrines, and so on, McKeon says he first found this remark "obviously false."

> Yet as I read Cicero I became more aware of the full import of his thesis—that all philosophies . . . are particular expressions of the same truth and that, in so far as they succeeded in expressing that truth, they differ only verbally."[13]

He had a similar experience while reading Plato's *Protagoras* when Socrates quotes an unknown poet that "the good are sometimes bad and sometimes good."

> This is a paradox employed humorously to introduce a good Socratic point, that the good have the capacity of becoming bad, but the bad have no capacity whatever for becoming but must always remain what they are. Yet, as I read in the Platonic dialogues I found myself modifying the verse of the unknown poet and speculating on the evidence that Plato found in the questions of Socrates and in the doctrines of other philosophers—which he can alternately quote for his purposes or refute—that the true is sometimes false and sometimes true."[14]

The conjunction of these two experiences led McKeon to a conclusion which guides all his work.

> The recognition, therefore, that there is a sense in which truth, though one, has no single expression and a sense in which truth, though changeless, is rendered false in the uses to which it is put, was attractive in spite of the fact that it ran counter to my most fundamental convictions at the time.[15]

In this same essay McKeon states that his insight raises "an old problem which has been discussed under many guises, . . . the problem of the one and the many,"[16] here formulated as one truth with many expressions and uses of it. In his "Spiritual Autobiography," written a year later, McKeon states that the circumstances noted above and the paradox they give rise to argues for

> the conclusion that the starting point of philosophic discussion in our times must be the consideration of the vast diversity of analyses that have been made, and that are still being made,

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 202.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 203.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 204.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 198.

of problems which have a recognizable continuity, despite changes, revolutions, and new discoveries.[17]

McKeon characterizes this activity as "propaedeutic to the treatment of philosophic problems as such"[18] and refers to it throughout his work as "historical and philosophic semantics."

The way in which he approaches this semantic issue is where the rhetorical aspect of his philosophy expresses itself most clearly. The central problem in such an undertaking is to find a means by which the various expressions of truth can be presented in a form which does not reduce them to each other and which allows each to develop its own position most fully. To solve this problem he turns to rhetorical invention and uses the device of a matrix.[19] McKeon argues that we should begin with experience, with what he describes, referring to William James' formulation, as that big, buzzing confusion which is the nature of consciousness. Regarding that confusion, an individual can take one of four possible approaches in attempting to make sense of it. All of them are reductions of the infinitely complex nature of experience in order to discover meaning and to gain understanding. In one approach, we could view experience from the point of view of an englobing whole which organizes and gives meaning to everything it contains, thereby reducing the infinite complexity of experience to a universal unity. In direct opposition to this, we could view experience in terms of its least parts which, when added together, construct whatever wholes we may experience; the reduction here is to elemental simples. If one approaches experience neither in terms of a whole which gives it meaning nor in terms of parts which make it up, we could deal with it in terms of problems directly encountered, evaluating the circumstances proper to each problem, and then resolving it; the reduction here is to a series of kinds of experience which organize and give meaning to individual experiences. Finally, we could be suspicious of all such attempts to reduce experience to external frameworks, holding that all we know is what we can individually do; here the reduction is to the perspective each agent takes on his or her experience (see Figure 1).

This matrix is in some sense both exhaustive of possible approaches one can take to experience and yet also, as a matrix, without fixed meanings. Meanings arise only as one begins to relate the various terms, that is, begins to construct a philosophic position. The matrix, consequently, possesses both definitive and creative power. It forms the central commonplace of McKeon's thought, for out of it, in a dizzying variety of inventions, he constructs his entire philosophy. Let me turn to one central invention, a semantic schematism which underlies most of his work from the 1950s onward.

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[17] Richard McKeon, *Freedom and History and Other Essays: An Introduction to the Thought of Richard McKeon*, ed. Zahava K. McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 13.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] This is not the way he proceeds in the two articles already mentioned; there he uses what he calls a "problematic" approach. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the rhetorical or "operational" approach becomes dominant. It is particularly clear in the introductory courses he taught at Chicago, from which much of the following discussion is drawn. Three of these courses—introductions to the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities—are currently being prepared for publication by the University of Chicago Press.

WHOLE

AGENT ⟵———————— **EXPERIENCE** ————————⟶PROBLEM

PART

Figure 1. *Matrix of Experience.*

These four ways of dealing with experience which the matrix lays out McKeon calls *modes of thought*, assigning a name to each and giving an appropriate example from Greek philosophy. The whole-centered mode of thought is *assimilation*, its exemplary practitioner Plato; the part-centered mode is *construction*, its example Democritus; the problem-centered mode is *resolution*, exemplified by Aristotle; and the agent-centered mode is *discrimination*, its classic practitioners the Sophists. Modes of thought are, of course, in this form mere commonplaces. They can take on greater specificity through some simple formal distinctions. For instance, in speaking and writing, we use individual terms (what McKeon calls *selection*); combine two terms into propositions (*interpretation*); connect propositions together into arguments, using three or more terms (*method*); and makes some assumptions about what terms, interpretations, and methods fit together into a coherent system (*principle*).[20] Table 1 indicates the terminology McKeon uses to describe these various aspects of the modes of thought relative to each mode.

Next, McKeon argues that one need not use the same mode of thought throughout when dealing with principle, method, interpretation, and selection. In fact, he finds no major thinker since the death of Aristotle in 322 BC has used the same mode of thought throughout. So he adds a further refinement to the set of distinctions above. Turning to the original matrix once more and giving the four nodes different but cognate names to relate them to these questions of knowing, he observes that there are three logically exhaustive sets of relations among the four terms; and he uses them to distinguish kinds of principles, methods, and interpretations. He assigns to each of the three sets a commonplace philosophic distinction to characterize the problems each typically deals with. The question of interpretation raises the issue of whether what we experience can be explained on a phenomenal level or whether we need to appeal to a reality that either underlies or transcends in order to account for what we experience. The question of method raises the issue of whether one method can apply to all experience or whether we need different ones to deal with different aspects of our experience. The question of principle, the be-

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[20] Although these four aspects are here derived formally, McKeon also often makes connections between them and Aristotle's four causes, i.e., efficient, material, formal, and final. In doing so, he usually calls attention to his transformation of the causes into rhetorical commonplaces along the lines of Cicero's four "questions," namely: Is it? What is it? What kind is it? and Why? One example of this occurs in "A Philosopher Meditates on Discovery," *op. cit.*, p. 207.

Table 1. Modes of Thought: Principle, Method, Interpretation, and Selection.

MODE OF THOUGHT	PRINCIPLE	METHOD	INTERPRE- TATION	SELECTION
ASSIMILATION (Plato)	Comprehen- sive	Dialectical	Ontological	Thought
CONSTRUCTION (Democritus)	Simple	Logistic	Entitative	Thing
RESOLUTION (Aristotle)	Reflexive	Problematic	Essentialist	Language
DISCRIMINATION (Sophists)	Actional	Operational	Existentialist	Action

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ginning point or fundamental assumption from which we start, raises the issue of whether the true basis of knowledge rests upon finding the best part to build upon or upon finding the correct whole which will provide the proper context within which to establish meaning.[21] Each position so defined is then further subdivided into another pair, shown by the direction of the arrows, each pointing to the most basic term in the pair under consideration (see Figure 2).

PRINCIPLE	METHOD	INTERPRETATION
KNOWLEDGE	KNOWLEDGE	KNOWLEDGE
KNOWER KNOWN	KNOWER KNOWN	KNOWER KNOWN
KNOWABLE	KNOWABLE	KNOWABLE
(Whole/Part)	(Universal/Particular)	(Reality/Process)

Figure 2. *Matrices for Principle, Method, and Interpretation*.

The set of distinctions that these questions raise can then be worked into a revised version of the schematism originally shown in Table 1. Table 2 shows how these questions affect each

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[21] A fourth philosophic problem, that between the one and the many, is related to selection, but is not directly involved in the distinctions being set up here.

mode of thought (represented by the connecting lines) and how they weave an exhaustive explo-ration of the issues raised.

Table 2. Semantic Schematism.

MODE OF THOUGHT	PRINCIPLES	METHODS	INTERPRETATIONS
ASSIMILATION RESOLUTION	Holoscopic Comprehensive Reflexive	Universal Dialectical Operational	Ontic Ontological Entitative
CONSTRUCTION DISCRIMINATION	Meroscopic Simple Actional	Particular Logistic Problematic	Phenomenal Existentialist Essententialist

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This, then, is the full semantic schematism which provides the "propaedeutic" machinery mentioned above that is needed to prepare us for investigation of the philosophic problems fac-ing us.[22] What is most important for our purposes here is that the schematism *as it stands* is lit-erally without meaning, it is arbitrary; so we don't have to worry at the beginning about the exact meaning of the structure that has been set up. It is, instead, a complex set of topics generated from a simple matrix through the use of a few rhetorical distinctions and, when the column of *se-lection* is included, allows 256 (4^4) [*sic*] distinct possibilities of philosophic interpretation. Its immediate use is to provide a way to interpret what has been or could be expressed about the full range of philosophic problems. Yet it is a device even more powerful than just that. Fundamen-tally, McKeon's schematism is an invention to stimulate inventing. As such, this rhetorical ap-proach has the potential for liberating the thinking of both teachers and students, allowing each to consider and even create alternatives to what is offered as *the* knowledge and skills of a par-ticular field.

IV. Some Educational Consequences

A rhetorical philosophy provides curriculum theorizing with a means by which to create an intellectual *environment* both rich in the variety of issues which make up any subject yet structured enough so that students can recognize that the debates encountered are not just a chaos of arbitrary opinions but are in fact interrelated dialogues about fundamentally different concep-tions of society, morality, justice, human nature, knowledge, and so on. Such an environment can, given a diversity of perspectives both presented in the materials and also encouraged in the

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[22] McKeon never published this schematism during his lifetime though he used it extensively in his teaching. It circulated informally from the mid-1960s onward among his students and col-leagues in a mimeographed typescript entitled "Philosophic Semantics and Philosophic Inquiry." It has recently been published in his *Freedom and History, and Other Essays*, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-56.

students' responses to those materials, make clear why isolated facts, ideas, theories cannot be offered in any simple sense as the "right" ones. By avoiding definitiveness in the face of various intellectual conflicts while providing some structures with which to think, a rhetorical approach can gently but firmly move students from a passive assimilation of academic material "to get a grade" to a more active consideration of the very real problems we face as educators and society as a whole.

An example of this orientation is an introductory course in teacher education, called "Social Foundations of American Education," that we have taught together. The course was divided into four units: student, curriculum, circumstance, and teacher.[23] For each unit, a reading reflecting one of the four different "modes of thought" was read by the whole class and discussed. For instance, for the mode of construction, we might use Skinner's *Walden Two*; for assimilation, Charlotte Perkins Gilman's *Herland*, for resolution, Dewey's *Experience and Education*; and for discrimination, Roger's *Freedom To Learn For the 80's*.[24] This produces a 4 X 4 matrix of ideas that demonstrates that any educational position can be located in a structure of alternative, frequently silent or silenced "voices" in such a way that, if a student has a general sense of how the different modes of thought work, he or she can *invent*, even if they have not read related materials, something of the kinds of alternatives that are possible. Moreover, they can begin to see that, for instance, questions of psychology relative to the topic of the "student" have consequences for thinking about their subject matter specialties, which form part of the "curriculum," about what they will do as the "teacher," and also about what kind of society and environment, the "circumstance," the first three topics considered grow out of and into. Possibly most important in this process, their capacity to make connections grows not out of a grasp of discrete, atomistic data, facts, or information but, instead, out of an understanding of kinds of intellectual relations that potentially exist among different points of view.

Such a rhetorical conception of the educational environment applies not just to individual courses, however, but also to whole curricula. How can a group of faculty with differing points of view about what a subject is, what its proper methods are, what its purposes and values are, and how the learning of it should be evaluated, develop a curriculum which will provide for individual students going through it a sense of the "subject" *as a whole*? Here is where rhetorical theory may also benefit curricular thinking. Curriculum can be conceived as a series of topics which "lay out" a field in an exhaustive sense yet also allow individual instructors *and students* to give meaning along the way to particular questions or topics which are being investigated and described. What this points toward is a series of structured topics that organize without unduly restricting individual teachers and students as they seek to make the field their own. Further-

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[23] These, of course, are related to Schwab's topics because, like his, they are drawn from the traditional rhetorical analysis of all situations into questions of speaker, speech, audience, and subject. See his essays on "The Practical" in Joseph J. Schwab, *Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education: Selected Essays*, ed. Ian Westbury and Neil J. Wilkof (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978).

[24] B. F. Skinner *Walden Two* (New York: Macmillan, 1976. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Herland* (New York : Pantheon Books, 1979. John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1938). Carl R. Rogers, *Freedom To Learn For the 80's* (Columbus, Ohio : Merrill, 1983).

more, by completing such a curriculum students could come to have a variety of perspectives on the diversity of views taken on the subject(s) in question and would have repeated and, therefore, potentially habit-forming experiences through repeatedly considering the field not just as presented in one form but in comparing that form with others. In short, they would have an education in growing to understand that thinking, doing, and feeling are all sources of plural meanings and choices. As such, their curriculum both would have made most likely that they would interact with what had been presented to them in an active, reflective manner and would have provided a basis for them to act as truly free individuals.

An example of this use of rhetorical philosophy can be seen in a curricular reform in teacher preparation taking place at one of our institutions. In the formation of a pilot, experimental program, a group of 30 faculty have agreed to use the educational matrix sketched out in the foundations course as a guide for the entire teacher preparation program. After extended discussions of the need for new integration of the university's program with the public schools, of the diversity of students in the schools (and in our program) requiring new sensitivity and adaptation of teaching methods, and of the differences the faculty have about fundamental educational questions, the topical matrix has evolved as one way of ordering the diversity of experience and understanding that teacher-trainees and their faculty require. Thus, in connection with the introductory course outlined above, university students will have field experiences that focus on recognizing diversity in the circumstances and ways in which students are taught in schools. The psychology course will explore the variety of ways, based on the four "modes of thought," in which children and their learning have been viewed. The "methods" courses will explore fundamentally different models of teaching.[25] And so on.

A central point of this example is that a rhetorical orientation can respect the intellectual freedom of *both* student and faculty. It is a fact that intellectuals differ about basics; rhetorical philosophy does *not require* that they think in a certain way, only that they acknowledge that other ways do exist (even if considered erroneous). This permits curriculum construction to weave differing points of view together into a "whole" in the sense of an intellectual map that lays out basic moves that can be made when reflecting on experience, the world, one's knowledge. Thus, the structure is inclusive without being incoherent, informing without being indoctrinating. One can locate oneself in the world of intellectual activity and even reconceive that world, if so desired.

In conclusion, we have come to believe that the kind of thinking that Richard McKeon's philosophy of rhetoric makes possible provides an unusually rich source of ideas for truly transforming education to encourage the growth of free, reflective individuals who understand the human diversities of thought, action, and feeling. McKeon's work provides a new way of understanding and bridging the apparently disconnected points of view represented in the debates over cultural diversity, freedom and democracy, values, the intellectual disciplines, and, most relevant for us here, the curriculum which should make up the public schools.

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[25] The work of Bruce Joyce and Marsha Weill is helpful here. See their *Models of Teaching*, 3rd edition (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988)

V. A Note on Reading Further in McKeon

The best source of information about what McKeon is doing is, of course, McKeon himself. The most complete bibliography of his work publicly available can be found in John F. Callahan's memorial (see footnote 6). Brief sketches of his ideas can be found in the other citations of footnotes 7 and 8. The three autobiographical essays by McKeon are worth careful study for an overview of what *he* thought he was doing. We would suggest reading them in the order of their composition: "A Philosopher Meditates on Discovery" (see footnote 11), his "Spiritual Autobiography" (see footnote 17), and "The Circumstances and Functions of Philosophy" (in *Philosophers on Their Own Work*, Vol. I, ed. André Mercier and Maja Svilar [Bern: Verlag Herbert Lang, 1975], pp. 95-112).

Two recent publications pull together important essays. One is *Freedom and History and Other Essays: An Introduction to the Thought of Richard McKeon* (see footnote 17); the other is *Rhetoric: Essays in Invention and Discovery* (see footnote 11). Both contain useful introductions. In the former appears the article on "Philosophic Semantics and Philosophic Inquiry" (pp. 242-56), on which my analysis above is based. Finally, a student of McKeon's who followed him from Columbia to Chicago and received his Ph.D. there in 1949, George Kimball Plochman, has recently published an account of his experiences as a student of McKeon's and an analysis of his work as a whole (see his *Richard McKeon: A Study* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). This work contains the most extensive survey of McKeon's work as a whole currently available.

2016 Addendum: The first of the three courses mentioned above in footnote 19 on page 5 has now been published: Richard McKeon, *On Knowing—The Natural Sciences*, ed. David B. Owen and Zahava K. McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). The second is currently in press: *On Knowing—The Social Sciences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). The third is in preparation.

A website introductory to McKeon's work can be viewed at *richardmckeon.org*.