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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 39TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)
APO San Francisco 96325

EGD-BA-3

8 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat)
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

THRU: Commanding Officer
45th Engineer Group
ATTN: S-3
APO 96308

Commanding General
18th Engineer Brigade
ATTN: AVBC-C
APO 96377

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC (DST)
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPDP-DT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army (ACSFOR DA)
Washington, D. C. 20310

Classified by EGD-BA-3
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31 1975

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~~DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS~~
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(C) Section I

A. (C) General:

1. (U) ORGANIZATION:

During the report period, the 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and four lettered line companies. Headquarters Platoon and the 1st Platoon of the 511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) remained attached to the 39th Engineer Battalion until 23 April when HQ Platoon became attached to the 27th Engineer Battalion. The 1st Platoon moved from the CHU LAI base camp (BT534036) to LZ GOLDIE (BS680658) in support of D Company. Headquarters Platoon, the support platoon, and two equipment platoons of the 630th Engineer Company (LE) were attached to the Battalion at the beginning of the period. On 23 April an equipment platoon of the 630th Engineer Company (LE) relocated to GIA LE, attached to the 27th Engineer Battalion. At the end of the report period preparations were underway for Headquarters of the 630th to relocate to GIA LE under the control of the 27th Engineer Battalion. On 24 February the Quarry Section of the 517th Engineer Company (LE) was attached to the 630th Engineer Company (LE) and remained under their operational control until 28 April. At this time, the 517th was detached from the 630th and attached to Company D, 39th Engineer Battalion. See Inclosure 1.

2. (U) Command: The 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) remained under the command of the Commanding Officer, 45th Engineer Group. The battalion remained in support of the Americal Division throughout the report period, with Headquarters and Headquarters Company at the same location within the CHU LAI Base perimeter. Incumbent commanders at the close of the reporting period were as follows:

CO, 39th Engr Bn	- LTC Tenho R. Hukkala
CO, Co A, 39th Engr Bn	- CPT Francis A. Warzetha
CO, Co E, 39th Engr Bn	- 1LT Bruce W. Haigh
CO, Co C, 39th Engr Bn	- CPT Gregory L. McClendon
CO, Co D, 39th Engr Bn	- 1LT William R. Porter
CO, HEC, 39th Engr Bn	- CPT George R. Paul II
CO, 511th Panel Bridge Co	- 1LT Wilbur H. Boutin
CO, 630th Light Equipment Co	- CPT James E. Hamilton

3. (C) Major Activities. In addition to LOC minesweeping and maintenance of Route QL-1, major activities during the report period included; upgrading Route HL-535 from BT134443 to BTO27344; restoration of the ASP at LZ BALDY (BT134443); construction of protective structures for CLDC; upgrade of QL-1 from QUANG NGAI (BS642747) to the SONG VE (BS695635) establishment of LZ GOLDIE (BS680568), and construction of revetment walls for USAF and 21st RAC at CHU LAI.

(a) Seventeen km of Route HL-535 from BT134443 to BTO27344 was upgraded to a one lane, all weather road during the period. Three thousand, eight hundred and fifty seven cubic yards of fill were hauled and 74 feet of culvert was installed. The project was completed on 23 February.

(b) The renovation of the ASP at LZ BALDY was completed on 23 February. The project involved the building of a storage cell, berm rehabilitation, and improvement of the perimeter roads.

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(c) At CHU LAI the battalion was constructing three 35 foot observation towers and ten perimeter bunkers. This project was in support of the CHU LAI Defense Command.

(d) The upgrade of 9.6 km section of QL-1 from QUANG NGAI to the SONG VE to modified MACV standards progressed significantly. During the period 101,000 cubic yards of fill were hauled, graded, and compacted in this section of the road; 19,000 cubic yards of 2-inch minus rock were stockpiled at LA HA pit; and a rock crusher was established at NANG TAY to provide additional base rock.

(e) LZ GOLDIE was established as a fire base for Company D and the 630th Engineer Company (LE) during the period. The project involved the construction of a two lane, 20-foot timber bridge; a 400 meter access road; establishment of a base camp; and construction of a perimeter berm. The project began on 5 March and was completed on 31 March.

(f) Three separate projects at CHU LAI consisted of the construction of protective revetments of M8A1 matting. Two separate sets of revetments were constructed at CHU LAI East Air Field for aircraft protection. Over 1,100 feet of wall were constructed to form aircraft stalls. At the 27th Surgical Hospital, 4,100 feet of revetment wall was started for the protection of that facility.

4 (C) Activities of Headquarters Company:

Throughout the report period, Headquarters Company was located at the CHU LAI Base Camp with the 39th Engineer Battalion Headquarters. Headquarters Company continued its assigned missions of supporting the line companies by accomplishing engineer support tasks. During the report period, the 511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) was located in the Battalion Headquarters Area and messing, administration, maintenance and supply were provided by Headquarters Company.

On 26 February 1969 a Lowboy Platoon was initiated and came under the supervision of the Headquarters Company's Heavy Equipment Platoon. The Lowboy Platoon consisted of five 5-ton and seven 10-ton tractors and trailers from the 630th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) and line companies. The mission of the Lowboy Platoon was to haul construction material from the battalion area to the line companies. Once the Lowboy Platoon reached a line company, it was offloaded and the platoon then hauled any excess material or deadlined equipment back to the battalion area. The platoon assisted in the movement of D Company from LZ BALDY to LZ GOLDIE and in the over all establishment of LZ GOLDIE during the month of March. It was also called on to haul repair materials for seven bridges blown during the period. When the 511th Engineer Company (PB) and one platoon of the 630th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) left the 39th Engineer Battalion on 24 April 1969, the Lowboy Platoon supported their movement to the dock site. Throughout the report period, the Heavy Equipment Platoon supported the line companies in their various projects on the upgrading and maintenance of QL-1. On 15 April 1969, the Heavy Equipment Platoon was placed under the operational control of Company D at LZ GOLDIE. At this time, the platoon took over the LA HA Pit operations from the 630th Engineer Company (LE). Even though the Heavy Equipment Platoon lost the use of three 29CM's and scrapers of the 630th Engr Co (LE), the platoon managed to maintain the same high level of production.

Enemy activity throughout the report period was light, and consisted of mortar and rocket fire upon the CHU LAI Base Area. Throughout the entire report period only one enemy mortar round landed in the Headquarters Company area.

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5 (C) Activities of Company A.

Company A, 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) was located at CHU LAI Base Camp (BT534036) for the first quarter of 1969; however, at various times elements or platoons were deployed to such areas as LZ SNOOPY, LZ GOLDIE, and LZ DOTTIE to add combat support to sister companies at these locations. Company A's primary mission was to provide engineer support for the Americal Division and direct combat and operational support for Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat). During this Quarter, Company A conducted minesweep from BT538028 to BS-609904. During the report period, Company A completed the KY HA Maintenance Project, the 21st RAC Project and the revetment wall for protection of helicopters on the 39th Engineer Battalion Helipad, the prefabrication of bunkers for LZ GOLDIE, and the rock haul to LA HA borrow pit to build a stockpile of 2 inch minus rock for future construction on QL-1. Projects still pending completion are the 27th Surgical Hospital Revetment wall, the Subsector VIII Perimeter Bunkers and the CHU LAI Defense Command Tower sites.

On 3 February, Company A completed work on the 300' x 200' KY HA Maintenance Area. The project was started on 21 October 1968. The primary mission was to remove all the old matting and to recompact the surface area; to lay M8A1 matting and to provide an adequate drainage system.

Work was continued on the USAF Revetment Wall designed for the new OV-10 Reconnaissance Aircraft, and by the end of February, the project was 98% completed. The bulk of the work completed during the month of February was repairing the defective east wall, filling the walls with 1027 cubic yards of sand and constructing roofing for the entire wall. A drainage system was constructed to prevent ponding around the walls.

The 21st RAC Project, which was started on 14 January 1969. The 48 foot wall was similar to the wall at the USAF site. The project was completed on 22 March 1969.

On 4 February 1969, Company A started work on a series of observation towers for the CHU LAI Defense Command (CLDC). Three towers 35 ft high and facing to the north were built in Subsectors I and III. The project now is 62% complete and being transferred to Company C due to a unit move by A Company.

On 31 January 1969, Company A was assigned the task of constructing 10 perimeter bunkers in Subsector VIII of the CLDC Area of Operations. Formal work started on the project on 4 February. The project was stopped at 15% completion due to combat support operations during the period. This project is being transferred to Company C for completion in the next report period.

On 23 February, Company A was assigned to build a revetment wall on the Battalion Helipad. This wall was horseshoe-shaped and the same design as the USAF Project, except that it was only three mats high, and capped with sandbags. The 82 foot wall was completed on 27 February.

During the month of February emphasis was placed on improving the living conditions in the Company Area to bring living quarters up to the standards authorized by USARV Regulations. All existing tent frames were improved and the living quarters were covered with tin roofing.

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On 26 February, A Company was assigned a mission to support D Company in a forthcoming move. Company A was responsible for cutting, composing, and loading bunker kits to be sent by convoy to LZ GOLDIE. This operation involved working in shift from 20 to 24 hours a day.

The working strength of the company was cut considerably by the movement of the Second Platoon on 7 March 1969, when they were deployed to LZ GOLDIE under the operational control of the D/39th Engineer Battalion to add operational combat support to this element. Their primary obligation was to construct wire barriers consisting of concertina defensive wire and tanglefoot wire obstacles around the entire perimeter. Their secondary missions included bunker construction, security, and any other support needed. While at LZ GOLDIE, the platoon installed 5,250 feet of triple concertina wire and constructed 10 living bunkers.

On 1 March, the First Platoon was placed in charge of the rock haul from RMK-BRJ at CHU LAI to the LA HA borrow pit (BS684677) south of QUANG NGAI. Their primary mission was control and security of the trucks which were pulled from every available source, and they were to continue this operation until 1 June 1969. However, on 14 March 1969, control of the convoy was given to the 511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) so that Company A could be employed elsewhere. The company was scheduled to have 1,400 cubic yards of rock delivered to LA HA by 14 March. On the 14th of March, Company A had hauled a total of 1,925 cubic yards of rock.

On 15 March 1969, the First Platoon convoyed south to LZ SNOOPY (BS709608). The primary mission was to provide infantry support for Company C at LZ SNOOPY. The First Platoon was to work on traffic control in the area of LZ GOLDIE during the day under the operational control of the 630th Engineer Company and return to LZ SNOOPY at night. The platoon's mission was then changed from traffic control to bunker construction. Due to increased enemy activity in the vicinity of LZ SNOOPY, the platoon assumed the mission of 24-hour guard at LZ SNOOPY. On the 31st of March they were relieved by the Third Platoon and convoyed back to CHU LAI Base Camp.

On 7 April, the First Platoon of Company A started construction of a protective revetment wall to encompass the entire 27th Surgical Hospital located at CHU LAI Base Camp. This project involved leveling a sand base and placing a five foot wide strip of M8A1 matting as a footer. The project is, at this time, 10% complete and is being transferred to Company C for completion in the next report period.

On 10 April, the Third Platoon returned from LZ SNOOPY and resumed work on the tower sites. They continued work on the bunker of tower number 2 and their work, before transfer to LZ GOLDIE on 20 April 1969, brought the project to 62% completion.

On the 16th of April it was reported that Bridge 419 (BS593933) on QL-1 had been destroyed by the enemy. The Third Platoon utilized 11 39th Engineer Battalion 5-ton trucks to haul 441 cubic yards of fill; and RMK-BRJ of CHU LAI hauled 225 cubic yards of fill, 135 yards of blast rock and 440 cubic yards of 3 inch minus base course rock. The bypass was open in 75 minutes.

Enemy activity was moderate during the period. There were 2 sniper incidents, 3 bridges blown, 3 bypasses partially or totally destroyed, and four mines found on QL-1. This activity centered around three main areas. Bridge 421 (BS568979) was

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blown on 23 February and 23 April. Bridge 421 bypass was blown on 25 February, 27 February, and again on 3 March. In addition, two mines were found in that area on 23 February and one sniper incident occurred on 18 April 1969. Bridge 419 was blown on 16 April 1969. Bridge 417 bypass (BS609904) was partially destroyed on 24 February and A Company's sweep team received 8-10 small arms rounds on 27 February 1969.

During this period, Company A hauled 3,502 cubic yards of fill and sand, poured 28 cubic yards of concrete, constructed bunkers and towers, and built several protective revetments for both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft; the USAF Revetment Project, the 21st RAC Revetment Project, the 39th Engineer Chopper Pad Revetment Wall were all completed this period. In addition, Company A prefabricated bunkers for LZ GOLDIE and provided infantry-type support at various fire bases of the 39th Engineer Battalion.

6. (C) Activities of Company B.

At the beginning of the report period, Bravo Company, 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) was located at LZ DOTTIE (BS632854). Third Platoon, Company B was stationed at the QUANG NGAI Airfield, (BS613719) in support of the 630th Engineer Company (LE). On 9 March the the 3rd platoon rejoined the company at LZ DOTTIE. The assigned mission of the company included the road maintenance and upgrading of bridges and drainage structures on highway QL-1 from QUANG NGAI (BS642747) to BINH SON (BS601922), a total distance of 18 km. In addition, Company B conducted a daily minesweep of route QL-1 between BS601922 and BS633811, a distance of 12 km.

At the start of the report period, major emphasis was placed on repair of enemy damage, renovation of existing living bunkers, construction of new facilities and improvement of the base camp defensive perimeter. Projects under construction at the start of the reporting period consisted of construction of 3 each gun pads for "D" Battery, 1/82 Artillery. Projects initiated during the report period consisted of construction of a new kitchen and dining area, construction of a new shower, and erection of 5 each Sea Huts. Work was started on installation of the new barbed tape around the defensive perimeter. Construction began on a catwalk under bridge QL1-418, BS596927. Company B was assigned the mission of filling and hauling sandbags to the new LZ GOLDIE as well as hauling 2 inch minus rock to the LA HA Pit from CHU LAI. Company B was further given the mission of removing a 270 foot section of double-single Bailey bridge and three piers at BS596927. Work was started on construction of a new 16'x16' Medics bunker and 6 each 12'x12' living bunkers for LZ DOTTIE. The ground was prepared for construction of 10 each 8'x8' guard bunkers to be located on bridges QL1-415 through QL1-418.

A new kitchen, started in January, was completed on 4 February while a new shower started at the same time was completed on 13 February 1969. The new kitchen consisted of a separate storage area, refrigeration unit, food preparation area, and dishwashing area. The square footage of the kitchen and dining area was 2,244 square feet. The new shower was built on a 20'x15' concrete pad.

On 17 February 1969, construction of 3 each gun pads for "D" Battery 1/82 Artillery was completed. The entire project involved 8,325 BF of lumber, 85 equipment hours and 1,312 man hours. On 1 March 1969, Company B received instructions to fill and haul sandbags from LZ DOTTIE to LZ GOLDIE. During the period 1 Mar 69 to 12 Mar 69, a total of 26,800 sandbags were filled and hauled to LZ GOLDIE.

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On the 3rd of March 1969, construction was begun on a catwalk to run under the entire length of bridge QL-418. This project was completed except for the hand rails on 20 Mar 69. On 9 March 1969, the 3rd platoon returned to LZ DOTTIE from QUANG NGA I and started work on installing new barbed tape on the defensive perimeter.

Starting on 13 March 1969, a daily convoy was established between CHU LAI and the LA HA Pit to transport 2-inch minus rock. To date, this unit has transported 857 cubic yards of rock to the LA HA Pit. Throughout the entire report period, work continued on improvement of living and fighting bunkers with a total of 8,600 new sandbags filled and placed.

On 2 April 1969, work was started on the removal of a 270 foot section of double-single Bailey bridge and three piers at Bridge QL-418. The bridge was disassembled by 7 April and by 15 April the three piers had been removed and hauled to CHU LAI. The supply room was completed on 8 Apr 69, the day room on 28 Apr and work was started on the remaining three Sea Huts. Construction of defensive positions on bridges QL-415 thru 418 was started on 25 April and placement of a new super-structure on bridge 416, BS624865, was started on 28 April 1969.

Enemy activity, which had reached a low point during the first part of February, resumed when LZ DOTTIE came under a mortar attack at 0200 hours on the morning of 23 February. Forty rounds of 82mm mortar, 1 B-40 rocket, and small arms fire were received, resulting in only minor damage. A sweep of the defensive wire the following morning revealed 1 KIA, 1 AK-47 rifle, 8 bloody NVA and VC pistol belts, 2 B-40 rockets, and numerous home made hand grenades.

At 0930 hours the same morning, the north sweep team came under attack by an estimated company size unit at BS610901. The fire fight that followed resulted in six (6) confirmed VC KIA, while Company B received negative casualties. Bridge QL-416 (BS724865) was blown on the morning of 23 February, resulting in the destruction of the southern 3 spans. Again on the morning of 24 February, the north sweep team came under attack at the same location as the previous day. The fire fight that followed resulted in four (4) VC KIA and the capture of one (1) SKS semi-automatic rifle. Total enemy activity during the report period consisted of two (2) blown bridges, 15 blown culverts, 8 sniper incidents, 4 ambushes, 2 road blocks, 2 phony minefields, and a total of 41 separate mining incidents.

The VIP Program during the report period resulted in an expenditure of 583,500 piasters thru 30 April 1969 for mines and ammunitions. For the report period, Company B had placed 537 linear feet of culvert for drainage, hauled 4,672 cubic yards of fill for drainage and road upgrade, and poured 36 cubic yards of non reinforced concrete.

7. (C) Activities of Company C.

Throughout the report period, Company C was located at LZ SNOOPY. At the beginning of the report period the Third Platoon, 630th Engineer Company (LE), was under the operational control of Company C for base camp security, rations, and quarters. The assigned mission of Company C and its attachments was to upgrade QL-1 to modified MACV standards from MO DUC to the SONG VE. Company C's mission also included the maintenance and upgrading of all bridges and drainage structures between MO DUC and the SONG TRA KHUC, a total of 22.7 km, and daily minesweep opera-

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tions on QL-1 between MO DUC and the SONG VE, a distance of 12.4 km. On 13 March 1969 Company C's overall area of responsibility was reduced to the area between MO DUC and the SONG VE when Company D assumed responsibility of the area from the SONG VE to the SONG TRA KHUC.

The commencement of the report period found Company C with only one major construction project in progress. This was the construction of bridge QLL-412 (BS660-699), a joint US-ARVN engineer project. Several bridge projects were initiated during the report period including the reconstruction of 4 bridges which had been destroyed or damaged by enemy activity. An increased emphasis was placed on maintenance of equipment and improvement of perimeter defense.

During February, Company C continued to receive a large number of sniping incidents on minesweep of QL-1, particularly in the vicinity of "Snipers Gap" (BS716600 to BS724570). A maximum effort was placed on the completion of QLL-412, a 2 lane, steel stringer, pile bent bridge, due to the urgent need to haul fill across the bridge for upgrade south of QUANG NGAI City. On 11 February, B Battery, 1/82nd Artillery moved onto LZ SNOOPY with four 155mm howitzers to provide artillery support for the expected enemy TET offensive. Their security, messing facilities, and quarters were provided by Company C.

During the early morning hours of 23 February, bridge QLL-406 (BS706618) was blown resulting in destruction of the south abutment and one adjoining span. Bridge QLL-411 (BS674778) was also blown the same night resulting in the destruction of one 20 foot span. QLL-406 was reopened to one lane traffic on the morning of 23 February by repairing one lane of the damaged span. A bypass was also constructed around QLL-406 utilizing approximately 765 cubic yards of fill and 80 feet of 60" CMP. Bridge QLL-411 was also opened to traffic the same day by construction of a 40 foot, double-single, Bailey bridge bypass across 30 feet of waterway. The following morning at 0300 hours, QLL-410 (BS685659) was completely destroyed by enemy demolitions; however, traffic was not delayed due to an existing bypass.

More emphasis was placed on Civic Action during the month of February. A total of 1100 man hours and 68 equipment hours were expended in placing two 60 foot 36" culverts at QLL-412A (BS658659) and two 60 foot 36" culverts at QLL-411E (BS668687) and QLL-410B (BS683661) to aid local civilians in the irrigation of farm land. In addition to culvert placement, approximately 1500 feet of damaged lumber was donated to local refugees to help them rebuild homes which had been destroyed through VC terrorist activities. The remainder of February was directed toward the improvement of base camp security and improvement of living bunker protection and cover.

March was marked by increased enemy activity, continued emphasis on maintenance of equipment, and preparation for the USARV Annual General Inspection. On 1 March, Company C installed 30 feet of M4T6 dry span which opened an expedient access road to LZ GOLDIE (BS680658). On 5 March, phase 1 of the NANG TAY Access Road to LZ GOLDIE was completed by hauling fill for a 400 meter pioneer road, installation of 2 culverts, and the construction of a 2 lane 20 foot timber trestle bridge. On 7 March, Company C provided security for the recovery of an OH-6 helicopter which had crashed as a result of hostile fire in the vicinity of "Snipers Gap". At 0030 hours, 10 March 69, bridge QLL-404 was partially destroyed by enemy demolitions making it impassable to wheeled vehicle traffic. By 1500 hours of the same day, one lane of the bridge was open to all types of traffic by placement of 6 stringers and 1,000

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board feet of decking and treadway. On 12 March the 3rd Platoon, 630th Engineer Company (LE), was released from Company C and reassigned to its parent organization at LZ GOLDIE. Also on 12 March the ARVN 1/4 Battalion departed LZ SNOOPY, and was replaced by the first platoon of Company A. At this time Company C began preparing the abandoned ARVN area for occupation by B/1/82 Artillery. This project involved the construction of a new access road, clearing of a minefield, and displacement of 10,000 cubic yards of fill in order to provide a level area for gun emplacements.

Work throughout the remainder of March was directed toward the construction of living and fighting bunkers at LZ GOLDIE. During the period 18-27 March, Company C was subjected to a series of 14 daylight mortar attacks. Despite the accurate and intensive enemy mortar barrages the company succeeded in completing its assigned missions which included bridge QLL-412. At approximately 0235 hours on the morning of 26 March LZ SNOOPY came under a heavy rocket, small arms, and ground attack by an NVA Company. Following the initial half hour of concentrated direct fire, occasional rocket fire continued until 0530 hours. Gunships and flareships were on the scene by 0255 hours and provided close air support for 3 1/2 hours. At daylight a search of the compound area revealed 6 NVA killed inside the defensive wire, and resulted in the capture of one NVA prisoner of war. Enemy arms captured included 4 AK-47's, 100 Chi Com grenades, 2 rockets, and one RPG-7 launcher. Company C had one guard bunker take a direct hit with a B-40 rocket and friendly casualties totaled 3 KIA and 8 WIA, with no significant damage to equipment or storage area. A perimeter sweep conducted the following morning through the area adjacent to the LZ netted two VC detainees and the discovery of an enemy tunnel complex. During the period 19-30 March daily infantry sweeps were conducted. Due to increased enemy activity, less time was devoted to the area of Civic Action in March, with only 50 man hours and 100 equipment hours being expended. A total of 2,000 board feet of scrap lumber was donated to local refugees.

April was marked by a decrease in overall enemy activity, continued emphasis on preparation for the USARV AGI, a maximum effort on fill haul to QL-1, and reconstruction of damaged bridges. On 8 and 9 April, Company C was inspected by the USARV AGI team and received the highest rating of the four line companies in the 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) in spite of heavy enemy activity throughout the previous month. Work was continued on QLL-404, QLL-406 and QLL-411. On 15 April, the first platoon began construction of living and fighting bunkers for their new area on LZ SNOOPY, in preparation to join command post defenses with B/1/82 Artillery. On 18 April, bridge QLL-403 was partially damaged by the destruction of a 20 foot span. On the following day, the bridge was opened to one lane traffic by the utilization of damaged material on hand. On 21 April work began on a fill haul and upgrade project from the SONG VE River to QLL-409 (BS682646). At present 1,472 cubic yards of fill have been hauled and compacted. On 22 April bridge QLL-411 was completed by repairing the damaged 20 foot span and placing new stringers and hand rails on all four spans. On 26 April, the restoration of QLL-404 was completed by repairing the damaged section and placing hand rails. Bridge QLL-403 was being restored at the close of the report period. Civic Action projects continued with 60 man hours and 25 equipment hours expended.

By the end of the report period, the construction of 4 destroyed bridges and two access roads had been completed, and the reconstruction of two pile bent bridges remained to be scheduled. The first platoon continued to construct their new area. During the reporting period, Company C had placed 462 feet of CMP, hauled or placed 20,246 cubic yards of fill and poured 13 cubic yards of reinforced concrete.

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8. (C) Activities of Company D.

At the beginning of the report period, Company D was located at LZ BALDY. On 28 February, the company deployed to the Base Camp at CHU LAI in preparation for relocation to LZ GOLDIE. They remained at LZ GOLDIE through the end of the report period. The primary mission of Company D during the beginning of the report period was the completion of the upgrade of approximately 20 km of Route HL-535 to a one lane, all weather road with turnouts. Secondary missions included the completion of the ASP at LZ BALDY and the upgrade of 4 km of Route HL-535 to a one lane, all weather road with turnouts. At the beginning of March, Company D was given the primary mission of establishing a new fire base at LZ GOLDIE and the upgrade of QL-1 from QUANG NGA I to SONG VE.

The upgrade of Route HL-535, a vital main supply route linking LZ ROSS and LZ BALDY, involved the grading and compaction of 3,874 cubic yards of fill and the installation of 74 feet of culvert. The project was complete on 24 February. The completion of the road cut convoy time between LZ ROSS and LZ BALDY from 4 hours to approximately 30 minutes.

The upgrade of 4 km of Route HL-535 to a one lane, all weather road with turnouts was started by Company D on 18 February. This project involved the grading and compaction of fill and the placing of several feet of culvert. This project was completed on 26 February.

On 23 February, Company D completed the restoration of the ASP at LZ BALDY for the 295th Ordnance Company. The project was begun on 24 October 1968. The overall mission involved the building of a storage cell, improvements and additions to the perimeter road, installation of 280 feet of 60 inch culvert for drainage purposes and the restoration of the perimeter berm. The project was completed on 23 February.

A 20' x 110' reefer pad was constructed by Company D for the 80th Support Group at LZ BALDY. The project was started on 21 February and completed on 26 February.

Mining incidents in Company D's AO increased in the middle of February. On 13 February, one concrete type mine, 12"x12"x16" with a bamboo pressure device was found at BT000348. On the same date one 105mm type mine with a kick type firing device was found at BT000349. Both mines were blown in place. On 14 February another concrete type mine was found at BT089405. An M-16 type mine was found at site BT178-419. All mines were blown in place.

On 28 February Company D deployed to the HQ Base Area at CHU LAI for preparation for relocation to LZ GOLDIE. The 3rd Platoon continued to LZ DOTTIE on the same date to begin staging preparations, and 2nd Platoon continued to LZ SNOOPY. During the period 28 February through 5 March, Company D provided security for the construction of an access road at LZ GOLDIE and for Companies B and C minesweep operations.

On 5 March, the 2nd Platoon moved to LZ GOLDIE to establish security on the new LZ. The 3rd Platoon arrived from LZ DOTTIE on the same morning bringing materials for living/fighting bunkers. On the afternoon of the same day, the remainder of Company D arrived on the new LZ with a 48 truck convoy made up of vehicles from Company D's sister elements and the 23rd S&T Battalion. The overall mission at LZ GOLDIE involved the establishment of a fire base for Company D and the 630th Engineer Company (LE), establishment of a quarry site and construction of a perimeter berm. Within 2

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weeks time 31 living-fighting bunkers had been constructed. Company D expended over 15,000 meters of barbed tape for use as triple standard concertina; and 4,180 meters of 2 and 4 pace double apron fence were also constructed. During the establishment of LZ GOLDIE, Company D used 3,360 cubic yards of fill in the construction of a 6 foot berm with perimeter road. A total of 30,993 man hours and 17,231 equipment hours were expended by Company D in the establishment of LZ GOLDIE. The fire base was essentially completed on 31 March. On 22 April, the crusher site was completed.

Enemy activity, which had been light during February, increased considerably in the middle of March. On 19 March LZ GOLDIE received 12 mortar rounds. Company D sustained 1 KIA and 3 WIA. On 21 March the minesweep team received approximately 50 sniper rounds. On 25 March the LZ again received 3 mortar rounds with negative damage, and on 26 March four more mortar rounds were taken with negative damage. On 7 April, 4 mortar rounds produced negative damage, and on 9 April the LZ received 4 more mortar rounds and an undetermined amount of small arms fire. Again, no damage was reported. Fourteen mortar rounds were received on 16 April with no damage reported.

Civic Action during the report period involved the hauling of fill to the Cao Dien Church in Anng Hamlet.

At the end of the report period, Company D completed 4 guard bunkers at Bridge QL1-411. The bunkers will be used by ARVN forces to provide security for the bridge. Improvements on LZ GOLDIE include the construction of additional guard bunkers, installation of perimeter lights, construction of a shower and mess hall and the addition of tangle foot and concertina. For the entire report period, Company D hauled a total of 20,842 cubic yards of fill for the upgrade of Routes QL-1, HL-535, HL-534 and the establishment of LZ GOLDIE.

9. (C) Activities of 630th Engineer Company. (Light Equipment)

At the beginning of the report period, the 630th Engineer Company (LE) had its Headquarters, 1st Platoon, and approximately one-half of its Maintenance Platoon located at QUANG NGAI airstrip adjacent to A Company of the 104th ARVN Engineer Group. The 2nd Platoon was located at LZ NANCY in support of the 14th Engineer Battalion. The 3rd Platoon was attached to C Company, 39th Engineer Battalion located at LZ SNOOPY. Parts of the maintenance section and the supply section were located at CHU LAI with the 39th Engineer Battalion.

During the report period, the company's primary task was the upgrade of QL-1 to modified MACV standards from QUANG NGAI to MQ DUC. At this time the 3rd Platoon, 630th, was working south from the SONG VE. The 1st Platoon, worked from the base at QUANG NGAI airfield south from QUANG NGAI to the SONG VE.

Enemy activity at the beginning of the report period was light but increased in the middle of February. On 18 February, the company received 50 to 75 rounds of small arms fire and 4 mortar rounds at QUANG NGAI. On 21 February, 5 rockets containing CS gas struck 250 meters north of the compound. Again on 23 February, the company received 6 mortar rounds 300 meters north of the compound and on 24 February, the company received another mortar round. At 1500 hours, on 5 March the compound received 3 rockets 250 meters from the perimeter.

On the 1st of March, the Quarry Section from the 517th Engineer Company was attached to the 630th to operate a quarry at NANG TAY (LZ GOLDIE). During this time, the 3rd Platoon at LZ SNOOPY continued to upgrade QL-1 from LZ SNOOPY, south.

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On 9 March, the 630th, minus the 3rd Platoon and Maintenance and Supply sections, moved into LZ GOLDIE and proceeded to secure its perimeter. On 13 March, the 3rd Platoon moved from LZ SNOOPY to LZ GOLDIE. On 16 March, the supply and maintenance sections moved from CHU LAI into the LZ. On 19 March the LZ came under attack and received 8 60mm mortar rounds. On 25 March the company received 3 60mm mortar rounds and on 26 March, 2 60mm mortar rounds.

Three new 29OMs were acquired on 15 March, bringing the company's total to 4 and greatly enhancing the haul capability of the company. Work continued on QL-1 with all 630th hauling capabilities augmented by support from the 39th Engineer Battalion. Enemy activity decreased slightly and the upgrade of QL-1 to modified MACV standards continued unhampered. Enemy activity began increasing on 7 April when the compound received 4 60mm mortar rounds. On 9 April, 4 60mm mortar rounds and 20 small arms rounds were received inside the perimeter. On 16 April, 14 82mm mortar rounds were received. These attacks produced no casualties and limited minor damage. During this time the company hauled an average of 1600 cubic yards fill daily, placed 20 barrels of peneprime, and distributed 24,900 gallons of water to various sections of QL-1. With the completion of a headwall, the rock crusher from the 517th was essentially ready for operation on 22 April.

On 22 April, the 1st Platoon and all equipment were transported north by LST and attached to the 27th Engineer Battalion near Phu Bai. The activities of the 630th from 1 February through 30 April consisted primarily of QL-1 upgrade to modified MACV standards. Secondary operations included conduct of minesweep, placing in operation a 75TPH rock crusher, and the establishment of a firebase on LZ GOLDIE. During this period, the company graded and compacted a total of 100,950 cubic yards of fill, hauled 919,050 gallons of water, and placed 107 barrels of peneprime.

B (C) INTELLIGENCE:

(1) Reconnaissance:

During the report period, the Battalion Reconnaissance Section performed reconnaissance missions to update route information for planning further maintenance and upgrade operations on QL-1 from BS738528 to BT522043. On 5 February, a reconnaissance was made of QL-1 from MO DUC to CHU LAI, with personnel from 45th Group Headquarters, of all bridges and culvert sites to include priority civic action projects along QL-1. During this reconnaissance, stops were made at possible rock quarry sites and borrow pits. One reconnaissance was performed outside our AO to update bridge information contained in MACV printout between BT522043 to BTL45457. Approximately 30 ground/aerial reconnaissance/escort missions were accomplished during the report period.

(2) Enemy Activity

During the report period, enemy activity increased in the latter part of February and the first week of March. Activity during the second week of March subsided slightly. During the last two weeks of March enemy activity increased once again and decreased to a moderate level during the month of April.

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a. Mines: During the report period the Battalion encountered 55 mines within its AO. The majority of these mines consisted of bamboo pressure type firing devices, flashlight batteries and an electric blasting cap attached to explosives. Charges ranged in size from 10 to 40 pounds. A new type mine was found in the Battalion AO. The mine, a manufactured fiberglass mine, believed to be of Czech or Russian make, was found on the bypass of QL1-421 (BS568979) on 23 February 1969. The bridge was blown in the early morning on the same date. The mine was 12" in diameter, 6" deep and approximately 15 to 20 pounds in weight. Mines of this type have been found visually but have not been found with a mine detector. Four mines of this type have been found in B Company's AO. It is believed that this type mine was involved in three incidents at coordinates BS619880. A total of 11 mines were detonated during this report period: Vietnamese civilian vehicles detonated 4 mines; US military vehicles detonated 5 mines, 1 mine was command detonated and one was detonated by a member of a minesweep team. US casualties due to mines were 1 KIA and 5 WIA. Vietnamese casualties due to mines were 17 KIA and 4 WIA. It is noted that of the 55 mine found in the Battalion AO during the report period, only 20 were detonated. This was a significant improvement over the results during the previous report period. However, non-metallic, undetectable mines still present serious hostile threat. The following is a breakdown of mines detected versus mines detonated by month:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>DETECTED</u>	<u>DETONATED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
February	25	5	30
March	17	4	21
April	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	44	11	55

b. Booby Traps: During this period the battalion encountered 4 booby traps. In one instance, an M-16A1, Bouncing Betty, was found 50 meters to the north side of the road. The M-16A1 was covered with straw and booby trapped with a nylon cord. The following is a breakdown of booby traps by month:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>DETECTED</u>	<u>DETONATED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
February	2	0	2
March	1	0	1
April	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	3	1	4

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(c) Other enemy initiated activities during the report period were as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Sniper Attacks	19	10	5	34
Ambushes	2	0	1	3
Mortar Attacks	3	22	4	29
Bridges Blown	7	1	3	11
Culverts Blown	8	8	2	18
Ground Probes	2	1	0	3
Road Obstacles	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>13</u>
TOTAL	44	50	17	111

(3) Weather Data: During the report period, rainfall was very light. No rain damage was reported. Average rainfall by month was as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AVERAGE RAINFALL FOR PERIOD*</u>
February	2.6
March	.34
April	<u>2.79</u>
TOTAL	5.73

*Average from readings at LZ DOTTIE, LZ SNOOPY, and CHU LAI.

c. (C) CASUALTIES: Casualties for the period reflect the intense enemy activity against LZ SNOOPY (Company C) and to a lesser extent LZ GOLDIE (Companies A, D, and 630th):

	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>KNH</u>
HHC	3	0	0
A	3	0	2
B	5	0	0
C	17	5	0
D	8	1	0
511th	0	0	0
630	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	38	6	2

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D. (U) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

(1) During the report period, the Battalion worked a normal six-and-one-half-day work week. Time was allotted on Sundays for mandatory training, religious Services, and maintenance of equipment. A total of 128 hours of mandatory training was conducted by the Battalion. In addition to Tool Box Safety lectures and daily motor stables, one hour per week was allotted to maintenance and safety training. Three potential career NCO's attended the combat leadership course conducted by the Americal Division Combat Center, compared to four during the previous report period. The decrease was caused by a cut back in allocations from the Combat Center. A total of 81 new in-country personnel attended the Americal Replacement Training Center during the period.

(2) During the report period, units of this Battalion were engaged in 72 company days of direct combat support operations. The remaining time was spent on construction tasks not directly related to combat operations.

E. (U) MOVEMENTS:

1. Company Moves:

a. 5 March, Company D, from LZ BALDY (BT134443) to LZ GOLDIE (BS680658), staging through CHU LAI (BT534036), LZ DOTTIE (BS627856) and LZ SNOOPY (BS700607).

b. 9 March, 630th Engineer Company (LE) (-) from QUANG NGAI to LZ GOLDIE (BS680658).

c. 30 April, Company A from CHU LAI (BT534036) to LZ GOLDIE (BS680658).

2. Platoon moves:

a. 3 February, Third Platoon, Company D from LZ BALDY (BT134443) to LZ ROSS (BTO27342) and returned on 14 February.

b. 7 March, Second Platoon, Company A from CHU LAI (BT534036) to LZ GOLDIE (BS680658) and returned on 15 March.

c. 9 March, Third Platoon, Company B from QUANG NGAI (BS603719) to LZ DOTTIE (BS627856).

d. 15 March, First Platoon, Company A from CHU LAI (BT534036) to LZ SNOOPY (BS700607) and returned on 31 March.

e. 31 March, Third Platoon, Company A from CHU LAI (BT534036) to LZ SNOOPY (BS700607) and returned on 10 April.

f. 14 April, First Platoon, 511th Engineer Company (PB) from CHU LAI (BT534036) to LZ GOLDIE (BS680658).

g. 14 April, Heavy Equipment Platoon, Headquarters Company, from CHU LAI (BT534036) to LZ GOLDIE (BS680658).

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h. 23 April, Headquarters Platoon, 511th Engineer Company (PB) from CHU LAI (BT534036) to GIA LE (Detached from 39th).

i. 23 April, First Platoon, 630th Engineer Company (LE) from LZ GOLDIE (BS-680658) to GIA LE (Detached from 39th).

j. 29 April, Third Platoon, Company A, from CHU LAI (BT534036) to LZ GOLDIE (BS680658).

3. SUMMARY: A total of 8 company days were expended on unit moves during the report period.

F. (C) SUPPLY:

(1) General: At the beginning of the report period, all supply support for assigned companies was provided through the Battalion S-4. In addition, the two attached Companies, the 511th Engineer Company (PB) and 630th Engineer Company (LE) were supported with technical assistance. The S-4 was responsible for the repair and return of all weapons and mine detectors supported by the 588th Maintenance Company (Direct Support). The repair of mine detectors was significantly improved due to the establishment of 25% maintenance float by the 588th and command emphasis on repair parts for these items. Class V supply was completely revamped in accordance with USARV Regulation 735-28, to establish a Basic Load and Base Camp Defense Stocks. The ammunition outlook has vastly improved and ammo supply to assigned companies is being supplied on a timely basis. TA-50-901 (Organizational Clothing and Equipment) stocks are being trimmed and closely monitored at Battalion level to allow a 10% stockage based on total Battalion personnel strength. This will alleviate and correct the problem of excesses at Company level, with Battalion S-4 supporting assigned companies on a direct exchange (one for one) basis. No problems have been encountered on Class II and IV supplies.

(2) Logistics Support: Logistics support was provided by the following organizations:

(a) 23rd Supply and Transport Battalion, located at Chu Lai, organic to the Americal Division.

(b) 588th Maintenance Company (DS), located at Chu Lai, organic to the 80th General Support Group.

(c) 295th Ordnance Company (Ammo), located at Chu Lai, organic to the 336th Ordnance Battalion at Da Nang.

(3) Combat losses during the report period: None

(4) Critical shortages of equipment within the Battalion and attached companies continued to hamper operational capabilities. These shortages are:

(a) Compressor, Air 250 CFM 5

(b) Truck, Dump 5-ton 19

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(c) Truck Utility $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	4
(d) Detector Set, Mine	12
(e) Loader, Scoop	1
(f) Distributor, Bituminous	1
(g) Truck, Cargo $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton	3
(h) Truck, Cargo $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	5
(i) Truck, Lift, Fork	1

NOTE: The mission of this Battalion is greatly impaired due to the shortage of Forklift. The only off-load and on-load capability that is available at this time are cranes and a 5-ton wrecker which is slow and inefficient for small loads required on Bill of Materials. The mission could be vastly improved if a forklift was available for use.

(5) At the end of the report period the S-4 section was operating water points at CHU LAI, LZ DOTTIE, LZ GOLDIE and LZ SNOOPY with a total output of 31,500 gallons per day.

G. (C) MAINTENANCE:

(1) General. The maintenance program has shown continued effectiveness during the report period. There was a slight increase in the deadline rate from the 8.8 percent at the end of the previous reporting period to 10.4 percent on 30 April 1969. This increase was due to the deletion of low deadline items from inclusion in the computation of the deadline rate and heavy equipment commitment in the upgrade of OL-1.

(2) Support. The 588th Maintenance Company (Direct Support) continued to provide direct support maintenance for the battalion. There was no significant change in the status of the Authorized Stockage List of the 588th Maintenance Company; however, an influx of repair parts personnel was reflected in the increase fill of routine repair parts requisitions.

(3) Prescribed Load List (PLL) and Repair Parts Summary. Following is a summary of the PLL stockage level and requisitioning data during the report period.

(a) PLL. The overall zero balance of PLL line items for Battalion at the end of the report period was 46.9 percent. This represents an 8.1 percent reduction in zero balance PLL line items.

(b) Requisitioning

	<u>REGULAR REQUISITIONS</u>	<u>RED BALL REQUISITIONS</u>
Number submitted	4372	288
Cancelled	482	21
Filled	1251	109
Percent Filled	32.2	40.9

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The above percentages are based on the uncanceled requisitions and represent an increase of 21.4 percent from the previous report period in the fill of regular requisitions and a decrease of 2.9 percent in the fill of Red Ball Requisitions.

H. (U) MEDICAL:

During the report period the Battalion Medical Section continued its efforts to improve the health and sanitation of the command. During the months of February, March and April, emphasis was placed on the organization and training of the Field Sanitation Teams. The Battalion Medical Section also served as a coordinator for supplies and equipment to insure that all unit teams, whether assigned or attached, maintained a uniform level of supplies and equipment as outlined in USARV Reg 40-22. Medical Aid personnel were instructed to make frequent checks on living quarters to insure that personnel had aerosol and rub-on insect repellent, and to make sure that these items were not used simply for inspection purposes or to decorate supply room shelves.

I. (C) CIVIC ACTION:

(1) During the report period, a total of 130 man days of Civic Action assistance was rendered. The projects included the improvement of QUANG NGAI Hospital, construction of irrigation ditch, providing scrap lumber to local civilians for the repair of damaged homes, hauling 210 cubic yards of fill for the regrading of school areas and hauling wood for use at refugee camp at MO DUC. Materials donated toward Civic Action projects include 216 feet of culvert, 25 bags of cement, and 3,500 board feet of scrap lumber.

(2) During the report period turn-ins under the Volunteer Informant Program amounted to an all time high. During the month of February, the 39th Engineer Battalion paid 541,500\$VN for ordnance, which is the highest amount the Battalion has ever paid out in one month. Since December 1967, the 39th Engineer Battalion has paid out a total of 2,735,620\$VN. Monthly turn-ins were as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Mines	145	121	90	356
Grenades	376	185	215	776
40mm, M-79	364	43	124	531
60mm Rounds	218	48	112	378
81mm Rounds	71	9	10	90
105mm Rounds	110	52	52	214
155mm Rounds	9	1	2	12
4.2" Rounds	1	4	1	6
Rocket Rounds	58	0	16	74
EXPENDITURES	541,500\$VN	248,900\$VN	255,500\$VN	

TOTAL EXPENDITURES 1,045,900\$VN

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2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

A. PERSONNEL: None.

B. OPERATIONS:

(1) (U) Utilization of Front Loader as a Fork Lift.

(a) OBSERVATION: Resupply operations are often delayed due to a lack of loading equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the lack of forklift capability at battalion level, the shipment of BCM and supplies from S-4 to the using units is often delayed to such an extent that work on a project must be slowed down, or, in some cases, stopped. Although it is possible to load the majority of material by hand, this is a process wasting valuable time and man-power. Also, since many of the materials needed are issued by the pallet, a forklift would offer the ideal solution.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: By building an expedient fork-type device (Inclousure 2) and utilizing it with a front loader, the loading problem can be resolved. The apparatus requires a dozer blade cutting edge which acts as the lifting device, a small piece of metal to act as a back plate, and bolts. The dozer blade is placed in the bucket, with the rear part of the blade bent so as to hook over the rear weld plate of the bottom of the bucket. Where the blade extends between the bucket teeth, it is bolted to the back plate to help keep the blade stationary while lifting. When the bucket closes, it provides a clamp for the blade. This system has the advantages of being simple to construct and providing the capability of being transferred from one front loader to another with a minimum of time and energy. The only disadvantages are that the maximum safe lift capacity is 3000 pounds, and that care must be taken when picking up a load in order to keep from snapping the retaining bolts. Also, it is essential that the operator always have a guide, for the operator cannot see the blades.

(2) (U) Bunker Construction.

(a) OBSERVATION: Generally, living bunkers constructed beneath ground level have an observation port close to ground level. During recent mortar attacks it was noted that when a mortar round hits close to bunkers of this type, it causes shrapnel to be spread throughout the inside of the bunker.

(b) EVALUATION: Construction of blast walls up to the height of the observation port prevents shrapnel from entering the bunker. When a mortar round hits near a bunker, the fill stops the shrapnel from entering the bunker.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When construction of new bunkers is being accomplished, it is recommended that bunkers not be dug in beneath ground level, but rather they be built on ground level with fill pushed up around the sides.

(3) (U) Expedient Method of Placing Large Timbers.

(a) OBSERVATION: On several occasions the need for crane work has arisen at two job sites at the same time. Each of these instances involved the placing of large size stringers on a multi-span, timber trestle bridge.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to keep from halting work at a job site due to non-availability of a crane, a method had to be devised for placing heavy stringers without the use of a crane.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: It was found that a satisfactory alternate method could be accomplished utilizing the following equipment and procedures: The equipment required is two simple block and tackle rigs with rope (length depending upon the length of the bridge). The block and tackle is attached to the cap on the opposite shore from the stockpiled stringers; e.g. when placing the stringers on the first bay the block should be attached to the third cap toward the far shore. The rope should be strung so as to give two running ends, one of which is to be attached to the cap. The other running end will go to either the near or far shore depending upon the location of the pulling source. All that remains is to place a light weight ramp or slide connecting the bents for the purpose of sliding the stringers into the desired position.

(4) (C) Security Alertness When Changing Guard Reliefs.

(a) OBSERVATION: The most recent enemy attack on LZ SNOOPY occurred at the exact time the Sergeant of the Guard was posting new sentinels.

(b) EVALUATION: Enemy forces use the time when new reliefs are being posted to penetrate perimeter defenses. This is usually when alertness is at its lowest, and noise and light discipline tends to be lax.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Guards should maintain a high degree of alertness when reliefs are changing. The minimum number of personnel should be exposed while changing reliefs. Guards should be changed at varying times to confuse any enemy intelligence sources.

(5) (U) Troop Fatigue and Accident Prevention.

(a) OBSERVATION: During a recent sustained period of intense enemy activity many unsafe acts by friendly personnel were observed, and a high increase in reportable accidents was noted.

(b) EVALUATION: During this period troops were not being given sufficient time to recuperate from battle weariness and general fatigue. Due to an increased alert status, and a greater work load due to enemy closing of the road, engineer troops could simply not be given sufficient time off from duty.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders should alert all supervisors to the fact that fatigued soldiers become extremely careless under sustained pressure. On the spot corrections should be made and used to the maximum, and recuperation time should be afforded when at all possible.

(6) (U) Pinning Caps to Piles and Stringers.

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the buildup of defensive positions and guards on LOC bridges, the enemy has resorted to blowing bridges in a hasty manner by placing satchel charges on the decking and over the stringers. Results have been cut stringers and split caps.

(b) EVALUATION: The splitting of pile caps has been caused by pinning all the stringers along the centerline of the cap. The caps are split by the drift pins when the stringers are cut and fall into the gap. Staggering the drift pins (both pile and stringer) so that they do not all penetrate the centerline of the cap will prevent the splitting.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: When pinning caps to piles and stringers to caps, place all drift pins in a staggered pattern so that a minimum number fall along the centerline.

(7) (U) Re-Use of Materials to Repair Damaged Bridges.

(a) OBSERVATION: Re-use of materials to repair a partially damaged or destroyed bridge is sometimes difficult because of size discrepancies between timbers of normally the same size.

(b) EVALUATION: Minor differences in size of timbers caused by swelling or differences in mill cut can be a major problem when trying to fit used materials to an existing bridge.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When the difference is minor (e.g. stringers will not seat fully on the cap), the problem may be solved by laying loose decking on the difficult stringers to provide support and then backing a 5-ton vehicle over the covered area. This will force the stringer into place safely, and with minor effort.

(8) (U) Structural Use of Sandbags.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of sandbags as support for crossmembers for firing ports is highly inadequate.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of sandbags for any type of structural support creates a safety hazard and endangers the stability of the complete structure. Sandbags have been used previously as support for crossmembers of firing ports. The bags themselves tend to split under pressure and release the fill. Deteriorating sandbags cause a sag in the sandbag cover over the gun ports which results in an entire side of a bunker collapsing. Another hazard is rain. The sandbags tend to become slippery. This also causes imbalance and possible collapse.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Sandbags should be used for protective cover only. The use of timbers in the fill surrounding the bunker to support crossmembers should alleviate the problem.

(9) (U) Drainage on LZ.

(a) OBSERVATION: Protective berms around fire bases stop the natural watershed. The stoppage of the natural drainage can result in the flooding of living and fighting bunkers and possible collapse of these bunkers.

(b) EVALUATION: Protective berms although necessary present a neverending drainage problem. This problem can in turn cause loss or damage to personal and government property plus create a sanitation problem.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When erecting bunkers at fire bases care should be taken to implement adequate drainage facilities to carry off water which would be retained inside the berm. A step up, a small berm, or interceptor ditch should be constructed at the entrance to all bunkers to prevent water from flowing into the bunkers. Culverts or carry off pipes should be installed to prevent pooling next to bunkers.

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(10) (U) Utilization of Lowbeds.

(a) OBSERVATION: During a series of recent unit moves and the establishment of a new LZ, there arose an urgent need to efficiently utilize all available lowbed trailers in the battalion.

(b) EVALUATION: Under normal circumstances, the lowbeds of the battalion are under the day-to-day control of the individual companies. This meant that excessive, coordination was necessary to arrange the efficient use of available lowbeds, and unnecessary travel time from the company to the pick-up site was lost daily. To more effectively utilize lowbeds they were organized as a section under the Battalion Heavy Equipment Platoon. This permitted the S-3 to control the movement of large bills of materials efficiently and to insure that convoy regulations were adhered to.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When there is a large volume of material or equipment to be moved a considerable distance by lowbeds, commanders should consider a temporary reorganization of the battalion's available lowbeds as an independent section under S-3 control.

(11) (U) Extra Use of Loader H90CM or AC6454.

(a) OBSERVATION: It was noted at times that a lowbed trailer and the materials it was carrying were damaged when an attempt was made to push the materials off the lowbed.

(b) EVALUATION: It is not always possible to use slings to remove material from a lowbed, as with large timbers. The only method available was to push the materials off the lowbed using a bucket loader. An expedient set of forks can be produced using two used dozer blade cutting edges. The forks should be 2"x8"x5' and can be readily attached to the clam of the bucket loader. This converts a bucket loader into a fork lift thus speeding up off-loading time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units construct a set of expedient forks thus enabling expedient removal of large timbers when a forklift or other materials handling equipment are unavailable.

(12) (U) Expedient Jack Handle for 25-ton Bridge Jack.

(a) OBSERVATION: Often when working with 25 ton bridge jacks the authorized handle is not available.

(b) EVALUATION: An attempt to use 60" pry bars has proven unsuccessful due to the fact that the metal is not strong enough and will bend. It has been noted that used drill steel from a rock drill is an excellent substitute, being of the desired thickness and strength.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That used drill steels from a rock drill be substituted when the normal 25 ton jack handle is not available.

(13) (C) Minesweep Security.

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(a) OBSERVATION: When APC's are used as a rear security element and progress at the same pace as the minesweep, they offer an excellent target to rocket fire.

(b) EVALUATION: The normal tendency is to have the APC's follow directly behind the sweep team when crossing open areas; therefore, they present a very desirable target to enemy rocket fire. With close radio coordination, the APC can effectively support minesweep team from 500 meters or more.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When traveling through an open area APC and tank support for minesweep teams should travel at varying distances behind the sweep team to prevent presenting a good target to the enemy. Good radio contact must be maintained to insure that support is available on the spur of the moment.

(14) (U) Repair of Enemy Damage to Bridges.

(a) OBSERVATION: Often the Engineers repair enemy damage to bridges only to have them blown the night the work is finished.

(b) EVALUATION: In an attempt to re-open blown bridges little or no emphasis is placed upon bridge security and defensive fortifications. The enemy is often able to easily overrun bridge defenders due to the lack of adequate bunkers and field fortifications.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That sufficient bunkers and field fortifications be built prior to the start of repair of enemy damage so that the defenders have a reasonable chance of defending the bridge.

(15) (U) Destruction of Concrete T-Beam Bridges.

(a) OBSERVATION: In incidents where enemy damage has been inflicted on concrete T-Beam bridges the most serious damage has resulted from destroying the concrete piers, thus dropping the spans.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy is not able to obtain sufficient explosives to destroy concrete T-Beam bridges by using pressure charges or by blowing abutments. Unprotected piers in the water present easy access and maximum destruction of the bridge with minimum explosives.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That barbed wire and concertina barriers at least six (6) feet thick be placed around all piers, from river bottom to at least the high water mark. This insures a stand off distance from any attached charges, making destruction more difficult.

C. TRAINING: None

D. INTELLIGENCE

(1) (C) Infantry Sweeps and Patrols.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted during recent attacks on fire bases that the enemy has used dead space and tunnel complexes within 1000 meters of LZ's as staging areas from which to launch attacks.

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(b) EVALUATION: Daily patrolling and sweeping of possible staging areas and likely avenues of approach would afford discovery of enemy activity and thus give an early warning by indicating the enemy's presence in the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders implement a program to insure that daily sweeps and patrols are being carried out in areas adjacent to their LZ's.

(2) (C) Low Level Intelligence and Security.

(a) OBSERVATION: Vietnamese civilians are becoming increasingly knowledgeable in obtaining low level intelligence.

(b) EVALUATION: The barber and laundry shops in the vicinity of LZ's are common stopping places for members of a unit. Frequent visits of personnel to these areas has contributed a large amount of low level intelligence to the Vietnamese civilians. Intelligence such as people departing the unit, unit strength, and unit operations are some examples of the type of information which has been reaching Vietnamese civilians. Insufficient emphasis has been placed on safeguarding security in areas of low level intelligence.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders implement a program to insure that all personnel are aware of the enemy's capability of exploiting local nationals in order to obtain low level intelligence.

(3) (C) Enemy Use of Pyrotechnics.

(a) OBSERVATION: Recently it was observed that during and after an enemy ground attack against an LZ, a green and white flare was observed being fired from an area not normally occupied by friendly troops. It is certain that this flare was used as a pyrotechnic signal, and in this particular case it was intended to be a signal for enemy withdrawal from the perimeter.

(b) EVALUATION: It is now known that the NVA are using pyrotechnics in South Vietnam. Enemy flares have been noted several times recently either just before or after enemy activity against military installations in this area.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That all personnel be given an explanation and briefing on pyrotechnics and their use. An attack can possibly be broken by alertness of guards who have knowledge of these flares. It is also recommended that all personnel be alerted to the importance of reporting stray pyrotechnics immediately.

E. LOGISTICS:

(1) (U) Communications Maintenance.

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the almost constant use of communications equipment in the field, it was found that maintenance was not being performed on a daily basis for a great majority of items. This was especially true of vehicle mounted radios and whip antennas which had become frozen.

(b) EVALUATION: Radiotelephone operators have not been given sufficient time to properly pull maintenance on their radios. After a full day's operation on project sites, the radios were being returned to the CP and placed on guard bunkers for

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the purpose of making scheduled radio checks throughout the night to report guard status. Also, although maintenance checklists were available at motor stables, vehicle operators were overlooking their vehicle mounted communications equipment, as no item on the checklist covered this area. The specific trouble with whip antennas is caused by the moisture and heat characteristic to Vietnam. The antennas were becoming frozen at the connecting joint due to expansion and contraction of the condensed moisture inside the hollow of the antenna. The water also collects at the antenna base and causes poor electrical connections which hinder good reception and transmission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A procedure should be established to insure that specific time and knowledgeable supervision is provided all RTO's. This can be accomplished by requiring the RTO's to take their radios to the unit commo section during the time set up for unit motor stables. It is also recommended that vehicle mounted radios and whip antennas be added to the daily motor stables checklist. Operators should be required to take apart their antenna in order to clean the joint and base connection.

(2) (U) Excessive Heat in M-59 Stove Cabinet.

(a) OBSERVATION: Excessive heat builds up in the M-59 cabinet when used in conjunction with the M-2 burner unit.

(b) EVALUATION: When the M-2 burner unit is adjusted to a sufficient air pressure for the purpose of grilling food with the M-59 cabinet, excessive heat build up makes accurate adjustments difficult and causes a safety hazard.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Excessive heat build up with these units may be reduced by the removal of the sliding doors on the M-59 cabinet and cutting small air vents into the grill assembly.

F. ORGANIZATION: None

G. OTHER:

(1) (U) Escape and Evasion: None



T.R. HUKKAIA

LTC, CE

Commanding

2 Incl

DISTRIBUTION:

6 - CO, 45th Engr GP, ATTN: S-3
8 - CG, 18th Engr Bde, ATTN: AVBC-C
3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCG (DST)
2 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT

EGD-3 (8 May 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 39th Engineer Battalion
(Combat) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, Headquarters, 45th Engineer Group (Const), APO 96308 23 May 1969

TO: Commanding General, 16th Engineer Brigade, AFM: AVBC-C
APO 96377

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) has been reviewed by this headquarters and is considered to be an excellent account of the 39th Engineer Battalion's activities during the reporting period ending 30 April 1969.

2. I concur with the observations and recommendations of the Battalion Commander.

JOHN G. WAGNER
COL, CE
Commanding

AVBC-BC (8 May 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 39th Engineer Battalion for the Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

12 JUN 1969


DA, Headquarters, 18th Engineer Brigade, APO 96377

TO: Commanding General, U.S. Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) as indorsed by the 45th Engineer Group (Construction). The report is considered to be an excellent account of the Battalion's activities for the reporting period.

2. This headquarters concurs with the observations and recommendations of the Battalion and Group Commanders, with the following comments added:

Reference section 2 paragraph e(2), cutting holes in the grill assembly creates a safety hazard by exposing the cook to a direct flame. Better alternatives to prevent over heating would be: Placing the burner on the bottom position of the M59 cabinet; ensuring that the generator control valve which regulates the size of the flame is functioning properly; and improving the ventilation around the stove, by rearranging kitchen cabinets and installing fans.


J.W. MORRIS
Colonel, CE
Commanding

CF:
CO, 45th Engr Gp
CO, 39th Engr Bn

AVHGC-DST (8 May 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) for
Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 9637514 300 1000

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Utilization of Front Loader as a Fork Lift," section II, page 18, paragraph B(1); nonconcur. The bucket of the front loader is not designed to pick up loads in this fashion. Further, as pointed out in the ORLL, there are extreme disadvantages to this misuse of a front loader. An EIR should be submitted on this idea, to determine the feasibility of the machine being modified for use in a dual role as fork lift and front loader.

b. Reference item concerning "Bunker Construction," section II, page 18, paragraph B(2); concur in part. The majority of bunkers constructed in RVN are built above ground. This may be attributed to two primary reasons: In IV CTZ, and portions of III CTZ, a high water table prohibits excavation below ground level; also, excavation adds to the work involved in bunker construction, so many units construct their bunkers above ground and utilize natural ground level as the floor. Further, it may be desirable to have firing ports near ground level to permit grazing fire. This item should be left to the discretion of the commander, as dictated by his local situation.

c. Reference item concerning "Extra Use of Loader H90CM or AG6454," section II, page 21, paragraph B(11); nonconcur. Comments in paragraph a, above, apply to this recommendation.

d. Reference item concerning "Excessive Heat in M-59 Stove Cabinet," section II, page 24, paragraph E(2); nonconcur. Since the sliding doors on the M-59 cabinet can be left open during operation, their removal would be superfluous. Cutting additional vents in the grill assembly would weaken the structure and could create a safety hazard. The proper methods of safely operating the M-2 burner unit in the M-59 cabinet, under normal conditions and under conditions of extreme heat, are outlined in paragraph 2 - 13 and 2 - 15, TM 10-7360-204-12, Range Outfit, Field, Gasoline Model 59. Proper operating methods will be reiterated in the forthcoming Food Service Newsletter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
39th Engr Bn
18th Engr Bde

GPOP-DT (8 May 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 39th Engineer
Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 30 April
1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forward-
ing indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. Tucker
D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG



ORGANIZATION

39th ENGINEER BATTALION (C) (A)


30 April 1969



Inclosure 1



Inclosure 2



UNCLASSIFIED

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