

# Rebel Regimes and Military Powersharing: Consequences of Conflict for Authoritarian Durability

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## Abstract

Dictators face a powersharing tradeoff: sharing power more credibly delivers spoils to elites, but also lowers organizational hurdles to staging a coup against the ruler. We argue that origins in violent rebellion create favorable conditions for achieving peaceful powersharing with military elites. Fighting enables rulers of rebel regimes to transform the military and to place members of their rebel group into top positions. Although these military elites possess the means to overthrow the ruler, sharing power with allies will alleviate coup risk. Using data on African regimes from 1960–2017, we establish that rebel regimes are significantly less likely to fall than others. We then show evidence for powersharing using originally collected data. Rulers in rebel regimes frequently transform the state military upon taking power. Compared to other regimes, they are more likely to appoint a Minister of Defense (who were usually guerrilla leaders) and less likely to face coups.

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# 1 INTRODUCTION

Choosing how much power to share with other elites is one of the most consequential decisions that authoritarian rulers make. Elites seek greater access to power and spoils, and—if marginalized from power—face incentives to challenge the dictator. In an attempt to lengthen his tenure in office, the ruler may choose to distribute rents and power to threatening elites, often by appointing them to key governmental positions (Haber 2006; Arriola 2009; Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015; Meng 2019). However, dispersing power beyond the hands of the ruler also reduces the organizational hurdles that empowered elites face to overthrowing the dictator in a coup. The downside risk of powersharing is somewhat underappreciated in scholarship on authoritarian institutions, although is a focus of research on ethnic conflict and on civil-military relations (Finer 1962; Roessler 2011; Singh 2014; McMahon and Slantchev 2015; Greitens 2016; Harkness 2018; Paine 2020).

The risk from sharing power is particularly acute in regimes where *coercive actors* are best-positioned to pressure the ruler, which creates a seemingly intractable dilemma. If the leader marginalizes military elites, they face stronger incentives to stage a coup and gain a greater share of spoils. However, by giving away key posts such as the Ministry of Defense, the minister can use this improved position to challenge the dictator. How do rulers navigate this tradeoff? Under what conditions can leaders share power with coercive actors without causing their own demise?

We argue that regimes with origins in violent rebellion benefit from particular conditions that enable their rulers to solve this dilemma. During the process of fighting for power, rulers in rebel regimes enjoy a relatively unique opportunity to transform the military and to elevate favored members of their rebel group into top governmental positions. These allies are typically able to make credible commitments to each other, due to years of experience and interactions. We differ from existing theories by stressing that ideological affinity and partisanship *are not sufficient* to ensure stability. A dictator has no friends, and his trusted allies can still turn on him if marginalized from power. Thus, co-conspirators from the rebellion pose a grave threat to the dictator unless he shares power and spoils with them—yet, because the leading elites are allies rather than rivals, letting them control the Minister of Defense should shore up the regime rather than open it up to overthrow. Overall, rebel regimes derive their stability from *peaceful powersharing between the ruler and military elites*. By contrast, regimes with alternative origins do not replicate these favorable conditions.

Civilian rulers typically inherit the existing military from their predecessor, which inhibits placing their allies into high positions. Nor are all regimes born in conflict the same: coup leaders face limited opportunities to transform the military and to learn about their main enemies. In such circumstances, attempts to share power with rival military elites often *increase* the likelihood of overthrow.

We show evidence of our theory using original data from Africa between 1960 and 2017. We use the Correlates of War dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) to code regimes that came to power by winning a violent conflict. This includes ten regimes that gained independence by fighting against a colonizer (colonial liberation regimes), and thirteen additional post-colonial rebel regime cases. Collectively, rebel regimes account for 14% of regimes in the region. Perhaps surprising, our set of rebel regimes is not strongly correlated with existing sets of revolutionary or liberation regimes studied by Colgan and Weeks (2015), Roessler and Verhoeven (2016), and Lachapelle et al. (2019).

We first establish the aggregate pattern: both types of rebel regimes (colonial liberation and not) exhibit a significantly lower probability of regime failure, and these findings are unaltered under numerous robustness checks. In any particular year, our baseline models estimate that non-rebel regimes are more than twice as likely to experience regime failure compared to rebel regimes. We also leverage a research design that addresses general concerns about the endogeneity of authoritarian regime types (Pepinsky 2014). Two-stage least squares models show the findings are robust to a source of exogenous variation in rebel regimes: climatic factors that affected where Europeans could settle during the colonial period—the actors who precipitated most of the region’s colonial liberation wars.

We then demonstrate the importance of military powersharing: rulers of rebel regimes more frequently and peacefully share power with military elites. We compiled original time-varying data on cabinet appointments, which shows that leaders in rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in 83% of years in office. We also compiled biographical information on these ministers: 87% of the Ministers of Defense were an important member of the rebellion. By contrast, non-rebel regimes appoint an independent Minister of Defense in only 56% of years. Presidents in non-rebel regimes commonly appointed *themselves* as Minister of Defense and, in some cases, shut military elites out of the cabinet entirely. We also collected information on the composition of the state military after rebel takeover. In nineteen of the twenty-three cases (82%), rebel regimes either completely transformed and displaced the existing state military, or occupied top positions in an integrated military. Finally, we show that rebel regimes face fewer coup attempts, which suggests that

these powersharing efforts are effective.

Our findings advance research on powersharing and on the consequences of rebels winning civil wars. First, we contribute to research on powersharing by highlighting conditions under which including potential challengers in the central government alleviates, rather than worsens, coup risk. Many scholars focus on powersharing in the context of either civil war initiation (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013; Roessler 2011; Paine 2019a) or termination (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; Licklider 2014; White 2020).<sup>1</sup> In these theories, incumbents are threatened by out-groups that can start (or continue) a rebellion. Although expedient for containing civil wars, such powersharing arrangements often lead to fragile coalitions beset by coups. Rebel regimes seem to directly contradict these findings: they have high levels of military powersharing yet are strikingly resistant to coups. We explain how, in the right circumstances, sharing power can actually *prevent rather than stimulate conflict*. When the leading elites are high-ranking military officials, the ruler faces a grave insider threat even if he tries to marginalize these elites. Nor, in contrast to the thrust of the IR literature on powersharing, does the ruler look to share power with out-groups. Instead, when the leading military elites are allies rather than rivals, diffusing power *within* the ruler's launching organization can be the best means of ensuring political survival.

By focusing on sharing power within the ruling faction, rather than across factions, we also differ from many studies that focus on *ethnic* powersharing across multiple groups (Arriola 2009; Roessler 2011; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015; Harkness 2018; Paine 2019a). It is generally assumed that conflict falls along ethnic lines (particularly in Africa), and incorporating members of other ethnic groups into the central government exacerbates coup risk. However, we show that rebel groups do not fall prey to this dilemma. In fact, most of the rebel groups in our sample are multi-ethnic, and, overall, rebel regimes are characterized neither by broad ethnic powersharing nor ethnocratic domination. Our original data on cabinet appointments and on military composition also provides alternative measures of powersharing that do not rely on ethnic composition (e.g., the widely used Ethnic Power Relations dataset) and improves upon commonly used aggregate indicators of powersharing, such as Polity IV scores.

Second, our emphasis on powersharing challenges existing research on revolutionary regimes. There is qualitative and, more recently, statistical, evidence that authoritarian regimes with revolutionary origins are

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<sup>1</sup>We focus on powersharing at the center in authoritarian regimes, but others also explicitly consider democratic regimes (Graham, Miller and Strøm 2017) or regional powersharing (Carter and Hassan 2020).

particularly long-lasting (Huntington 1968, 1970; Levitsky and Way 2013; Lachapelle et al. 2019; Miller 2019). These arguments stress the importance of shared ideological ties to create high affinity among elites and transforming society. However, many rebel regimes in our dataset lacked an explicit revolutionary ideology and either did not attempt (or failed) to transform society. Furthermore, the predominant narrative on civil wars in Africa expounds their destructiveness and contributions to economic collapse. Why have origins in violent rebellion generally produced long-lasting authoritarian regimes in Africa?

The problem with existing arguments about shared ideological ties among elites is that they cannot explain why the ruler would need to share power to survive—since the leading elites already exhibit high affinity toward each other. In fact, some make the opposite argument that revolutionary rulers typically create personalist regimes (Colgan and Weeks 2015). Instead, shared ideological ties play a secondary role in our framework because we anticipate that powerful allies should turn on a ruler that does not share power. Empirically, the set of rebel regimes that we study exhibits surprisingly little overlap with the sets of revolutionary or liberation regimes studied by Colgan and Weeks (2015), Roessler and Verhoeven (2016), and Lachapelle et al. (2019). Ideology plays a lesser role in regimes defined specifically by origins in violent rebellion as opposed regimes defined by their revolutionary vision.

Nor does Samuel Huntington’s well-known aphorism—“he who controls the countryside controls the country”—help to explain the durability of African rebel regimes (Huntington 1968, 292). Although existing studies contend that revolutionary regimes successfully consolidate control over the countryside, we argue that the scope conditions for social transformation do not fit most African countries. Instead, historical factors such as low population density, legacies from colonial rule, and high ethnic fractionalization impeded many rebel regimes from consolidating strong control over the entire national territory—and many African rebel regimes did not aim to transform society. Many of these regimes have persisted *despite* state weakness, rather than because of state power. Importantly, by focusing primarily on how rebel leaders secure their tenure by sharing power with military elites, we demonstrate that regime durability can be achieved through elite-level mechanisms, even *without* radical transformations to state and society.

## 2 THEORY

Existing theories propose a generic powersharing dilemma that authoritarian rulers face: more spoils reduce the desire of elites to overthrow the regime, but greater access to power at the center enhances their opportunity to seize power. Our theoretical contribution is to highlight that not all elites, even ones with coercive means, are the same. The powersharing dilemma is alleviated in regimes for which the ruler has opportunities to get allies into place. We argue this is typically the case for rebel regimes. The process of fighting for power enables these rulers to transform their militaries and to place members of their rebel group (i.e., allies) into top positions. By contrast, in scenarios where civilian and military elites perceive each other as rivals, sharing power may hasten the regime’s demise. This logic yields the main hypotheses about the durability of rebel regimes, their penchant for sharing power within the ruling faction, and their relative invulnerability to coups.

### 2.1 THE GENERIC POWERSHARING DILEMMA

Any dictator would, ideally, rule alone as a personalist or “sultanistic” autocrat that consumes all rents and power (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). In African countries where the first leader led a large-scale but peaceful independence movement, such as Sekou Toure in Guinea or Felix Houphouet-Boigny in Cote d’Ivoire, the ruler was often highly popular upon taking power (Collier 1982). Such leaders did not need to share power with other elites because they had already consolidated power and lacked credible elite challengers. Despite creating personalist regimes, some of these rulers survived for several decades after independence.

Most rulers do not enjoy this luxury. Elites seek greater access to power and spoils, and—if marginalized from power—face incentives to challenge the ruler.<sup>2</sup> To prevent threatening elites from turning on him, the ruler may share power in an attempt to lengthen his tenure in office (Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013). Empirically, in African regimes, powersharing often takes the form of cabinet appointments in which elites are given access to the highest levels of government (Arriola 2009; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015; Meng 2019, 2020a). Cabinet appointments provide elites with a steady stream of patronage: cabinet ministers are paid lucrative salaries, and are often provided with private

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<sup>2</sup>Some focus specifically on the *civil war* threat posed by actors marginalized from power (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013; Roessler 2011; Paine 2019a, 2020). Our focus on sharing power with *military* substantiates assuming that their outside option is a coup even if the ruler shuts them out of the cabinet.

luxury cars, houses, first-class travel, and control over government contracts (which they often reward to family members). In addition, these cabinet appointments provide elites with access to key state functions. For powersharing with military elites specifically, a key consideration is whether the president names a separate Minister of Defense, who controls the armed forces and is the highest-ranking military position in the regime.<sup>3</sup> This position constitutes a substantial handout: in addition to receiving all the benefits and salaries of other cabinet ministers, the Minister of Defense determines the creation and implementation of military policy, including the appointment, management, and mobilization of all security forces.

However, dispersing power beyond the hands of the ruler may fail to solve the problem of elites seeking to overthrow the ruler. Instead, sharing power may *exacerbate* the risk of overthrow by reducing the organizational hurdles that empowered elites face to overthrowing the dictator in a coup (Roessler 2011; Svolik 2012; Paine 2020). This risk is particularly acute for military elites, who are *especially good* at deposing leaders, as stressed in research on the guardianship dilemma—who will guard the guards? (Finer 1962; McMahon and Slantchev 2015). Coercive actors have a considerable advantage in leveraging their access to the state to mount a coup d'état. The coup threat is not trivial: coups are the most common way in which authoritarian leaders are deposed (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2018, 179). Between 1950 to 2014, a total of 471 coups were attempted worldwide, and 42% of those attempts occurred within Africa.<sup>4</sup> Many rulers in post-colonial Africa “came to fear that their professed allies, especially those with a foothold in the army, police, or security services, might exploit their regime access and coercive capacity to seize power on their own” (Roessler 2011, 307). Exemplifying this fear of coup plotters, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire sidelined his military politically. Throughout his entire reign, Mobutu was the commander-in-chief and Minister of Defense. No military officer ever held a cabinet post and regional military commanders were subordinate to regional civilian leaders. Within the military, Mobutu routinely shuffled elites in key positions so that no officer could develop an independent base of support (Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

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<sup>3</sup>In cases where the leader does not share power with military elites, he simply eliminates the Minister of Defense position, keeps the position vacant, or names *himself* as his own Minister of Defense.

<sup>4</sup>Authors' calculation using data from Powell and Thyne (2011). Supporting our focus on *elite* powersharing, viable coup attempts are most likely to come from the top of the military because of their favorable organizational position (Singh 2014, 9). Although the upper tier of the officer corps constitutes a small minority of any military, Singh (2014, 66) shows that top-ranking officers accounted for 61% of successful coups among a global sample between 1950 and 2000.

How do rulers navigate the powersharing dilemma? Under what conditions can they use cabinet appointments as a tool for promoting, rather than undermining, regime survival?

## 2.2 DISTINGUISHING ALLIES FROM RIVALS

The generic powersharing dilemma focuses primarily on *whether* the ruler shares power with other elites. Another crucial consideration is *with whom* the leader shares power. A dictator has no friends, and anyone may turn on him if not offered sufficient power and spoils. However, there are some elites with whom the dictator can establish stable powersharing relationships, whereas sharing power with other elites is problematic. We distinguish allies from rivals. An *ally* is an elite that is *less* likely to overthrow the ruler conditional on the ruler offering them a share of power, rather than if they are marginalized from power. For such elites, the added spoils gained from accessing power outweigh the greater opportunities to overthrow the ruler. By contrast, the opposite is true for *rivals*, who are *more* likely to overthrow the ruler if incorporated rather than marginalized. Rival elites face an overwhelming temptation to seize power even when offered cabinet positions (Roessler 2011). A possible reason is that, even under a powersharing arrangement, the ruler is still limited in the credibility of his commitment to maintain the relationship. Thus, if the rival does not strike when they have a chance, they might be removed from power in the future. By contrast, we define allies as elites for whom this commitment problem under powersharing is less severe.

A leader's allies are often members of his launching organization, the rebel group or ruling party that brought him to power. These organizations are typically unified around ideology (such as anti-colonialism or socialism) or shared identities such as ethnic or religious ties. Many argue that rebel groups have particularly strong partisan bonds, as fighting makes combatants more likely to remain loyal to the group based on moral and non-patronage based reasons (LeBas 2013; Levitsky and Way 2013; Lyons 2016; Lachapelle et al. 2019). Members of a rebel group are also better able to make *credible* commitments to each other, due to years of experience within the same social networks. These repeated interactions develop trust and in-group norms of reciprocity. Any viable rebel group also has exceptionally dense information networks (Larson and Lewis 2018). This results in better monitoring capability, which impedes coup plotting. High levels of information exchange also makes it more difficult for leaders to renege on promises to share rents. Peaceful powersharing is more easily sustainable amongst a leader and his allies due to underlying partisan affinity for each other, which also results in stronger commitment power.



However, we stress that partisanship alone is *not enough* to prevent a leader's allies from overthrowing him. If the leader excludes powerful allies from power and spoils, they will attempt to overthrow him. Autocrats are commonly overthrown by co-ethnics and even their own family members. Thus, seemingly, in order to stay in power, a ruler should share power with his elite allies. But if this strategy is so appealing, then why would leaders ever *not* share power with their allies? Why do some regimes still fall?

In the next section, we argue that some rulers are forced to interact with rival elites rather than allies. Leaders do not inherit a blank slate when they come to power. Instead, they must contend with existing institutions, such as the military, which determines the elites with whom they interact.

### 2.3 STACKING THE STATE WITH ALLIES IN REBEL REGIMES

We argue that leaders of rebel regimes are privileged on two dimension relative to civilian rulers or coup leaders: having the opportunity to move allies into top positions, and distinguishing allies from rivals.

***Rebel regimes.*** On the one hand, the generic powersharing dilemma is particularly acute for rebel regimes. No one can forcefully overthrow a government alone. Other military elites almost inevitably pose a credible threat to remove the leader. Specifically, a ruler's co-conspirators—the coercive agents who helped launch the leader into power—possess a unique ability to depose the leader due to their expertise in technologies of violence (Haber 2006; Roessler 2011).

However, the process by which rebel regimes gain power creates favorable conditions for peacefully sharing power with top military officials—despite the threat they pose. Rebel leaders create a private military to fight for power. During the rebellion, rulers can weed out obvious rivals from top positions within the rebel army. Upon defeating the government and taking power, their private armed forces typically displace the existing state military or otherwise gain a prominent position with the state military (see Section 4.2 for systematic evidence of this point). Thus, allies from the struggle occupy top positions in the rebel regime's military. Building a private military and fighting for power also provides rebel rulers with an information advantage for distinguishing allies from rivals—a generic difficulty given the incentives of rivals to disguise their true identity (Roessler 2011, 313). The average rebel regime in our dataset fought for 8.7 years before gaining power, with a corresponding figure of 12.6 years for colonial liberation cases.

The mechanisms we propose contrast with existing theories of revolutionary regimes, and also offer distinct

expectations about powersharing. First, we are skeptical that high levels of elite cohesion fostered during the war persist after fighting ends. Extant scholarship argues that revolutionary regimes benefit from elite cohesion due to the high cost of defection during the periods of conflict: in light of an existential threat, elites band together (Lachapelle et al. 2019). Yet, such arguments do not explain why elites would continue to band together after fighting ends and the external threat disappears. We thus agree with Slater (2010, 52), who aptly notes, revolutionary regimes “tend to fragment once their shared enemy is vanquished—especially when that enemy is a departed colonial power.”

Second, the key difference between our theory and existing accounts is that simple affinity among allies is not sufficient. A ruler has no intrinsic friends, and therefore needs to share power to secure the relationship. By contrast, existing theories do not explain why rebel rulers would engage in *powersharing* relationships. After all, if all elites are friends, then there should be *no need* to share power in order to credibly deliver spoils. If the security forces are “commanded by cadres from the liberation struggle and imbued with a revolutionary ideology . . . [and] thus highly partisan and thoroughly committed to the regime” (Levitsky and Way 2013, 10), then sharing power with military elites would seem to be immaterial to regime survival. In such case, partisanship should be sufficient in maintaining loyalty.<sup>5</sup> In fact, Colgan and Weeks (2015) make this argument exactly: revolutionary leaders should tend to personalize rather than to share power.

By contrast, we argue that allies become *potential challengers* once the fighting ends, and rebel regimes leaders are not immune from being overthrown once they take power. Quite the opposite. Military elites who held important posts during the war pose the most credible threats because of their positions in the military hierarchy and from commanding key operational units. Many such elites initially gained their positions because of their relationship with the rebel leader, thus making them allies and emphasizing the importance of transforming the military. However, even in cases where top rebel subordinates could initially have been characterized as sycophants, over time, their elevated position in the rebel hierarchy and command over troops make them threats. But their status as allies rather than rivals creates incentives for the ruler to share power with these threatening elites rather than to try to sideline them. Ideology may play a reinforcing role, but in our account, it cannot substitute for the importance of sharing power. Furthermore, among the broader class of rebel regimes that we evaluate empirically—as opposed to a sole focus on regimes that

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<sup>5</sup>We share a similar skepticism that family or ethnic ties are sufficient for loyalty without true powersharing, given the frequency with which these elites overthrow rulers.

espoused revolutionary ideologies—many of these movements lacked well-defined ideologies.

This logic also differentiates our theoretical expectations for rebel regimes from existing theories of civil war settlements. Considerable scholarship analyzes cases in which a regime negotiates a settlement with rebel groups to end a civil war in which the rebel units are integrated into the state military (Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; Licklider 2014). Such arrangements would constitute sharing power *across* distinct factions, in contrast to our emphasis on concentrating power *within* the victorious rebel group; the ruler shares power only with his top military allies.

**Coup regimes.** By contrast, coup regimes lack the conditions that should facilitate peaceful powersharing. Leaders of coup regimes lack an easy opportunity to restructure their military prior to taking power, which impedes placing allies in top positions. Successful coups are generally conducted quickly, within days or even hours. Knowledge of coup plots is almost always contained to a handful of people until the event happens, and often the exact roles of different members of the junta are unspecified until after they take power (Singh 2014). Thus, it is unusual for coups to displace all actors considered as inherent rivals from the top military positions. Successful coup plotters routinely engage in widespread purges of the military upon attaining power, and in some cases succeed in restructuring the military, as with Jerry Rawlings in Ghana (Singh 2014). However, in such cases, the ruler faces a high risk of countercoups (see the discussion below of civilian regimes), and often these attempts at restructuring simply trigger another coup.

The short and secretive nature of gaining power via a coup also creates an information problem for coup leaders. Rulers do not *learn* which elites are most capable of single-handedly deposing them, making it difficult to assess with which the elites the ruler should share power. Additionally, political decisions by officers disrupt the standard *esprit de corps*, which requires hierarchical command, meritocratic promotion, and discipline among subordinate officers and the rank and file (Finer 1962). This disruption makes it even more difficult for the leader of the new regime to ascertain which elites pose the greatest threat to him.

Moreover, coup leaders do not come to power with a launching organization, such as a ruling party or a rebel group. Only 7% (four cases) of rulers in our dataset that came to power via coups led a party-based regime according to Geddes, Wright and Frantz's (2014) data. Even in these cases, the coup leader lacked the party organization when coming to power with the party organization. For example, Valentine Strasser, the leader of Sierra Leone from 1992 to 1996, was only a junior military officer when he seized power three

days after his 25th birthday (becoming the world's youngest head of state). In fact, in a quarter of coup regimes, leaders not only lack a party organization when coming to power, but completely ban all party activity throughout their tenure (Svolik 2012).

Thus, a key element of our theory is that *not all regimes born out of conflict are the same*, and it is difficult for coup leaders to engage in peaceful powersharing after coming into office. Existing theories do not draw this distinction between rebel regimes and coup regimes. Roessler (2011) instead highlights the general impediments to successful interethnic powersharing and the particular danger posed by any coercive co-conspirators—"the armed actors who led, organized, or executed the *coup d'état or rebellion* that deposed the old regime" (328; our emphasis). Similarly, Colgan and Weeks (2015) distinguish regimes by their revolutionary ideology but do not distinguish the type of coercive origins—"[r]evolutionary leaders are therefore a strict subset of all leaders that come to power as a result of the use of force—such as *coups, assassinations, and revolts*" (166; our emphasis).

**Civilian regimes.** Are civilian leaders able to share power peacefully with military elites? Civilian leaders (who do not come into power through coups or wars) exhibit more heterogeneity in their ability to peacefully share power with coercive agents. However, they are generally disadvantaged relative to rebel regimes with regard to remaking the military and interacting with allies rather than rivals.

Civilian leaders are particularly wary of the guardianship dilemma: since they are not military leaders themselves, they are especially vulnerable to displacement by their own security officers. Being outside the military also makes it difficult for civilian leaders to move their own allies into top military positions. Instead, most rulers face a dreaded tradeoff between leaving in place rival subordinates and risking counter coups if they attempt to move allies into top positions.

Upon taking power, most post-independence civilian rulers inherited a military created by the colonial power (Horowitz 1985; Ray 2013; Harkness 2018). For most of the colonial period, Europeans monopolized the officer corps and were not worried about protecting against coups. Nor, given post-1884 agreements to not fight inter-imperial wars over African territories, were Europeans concerned about creating particularly effective fighting forces in the sense of military competence. Instead, their primary objective was to choose rank-and-file soldiers that would loyally follow commands to repress. Since colonial officials anticipated that the greatest need for force would be in the capital city, they often turned to groups of people in the

periphery that lacked ethnic ties to the capital (and had not previously revolted against the colonizer), and ascribed “martial” qualities to them. After World War II, most colonizers pivoted to recruiting Africans for the officer corps. This created new objectives because they wanted officers to have higher education levels. As with earlier “martial race” recruitment policies, ethnic considerations predominated, which elevated ethnicity to a highly salient political cleavage.

In many cases, the most highly educated groups who dominated the officer corps were distinct from the numerically largest groups, who often gained control of the government at independence. “Split domination” between civilian political and military officials created difficult tradeoffs for many post-independence rulers. This problem was particularly pressing in countries that contained a major ethnic group with a precolonial history of statehood, which usually undermined the formation of broad-based parties (Paine 2019a). For example, in Uganda, there was a rivalry between the King (Kabaka) of Buganda and the Uganda People’s Congress, a politically party that predominantly drew its support from the north. “It is hard to determine at what stage Prime Minister Obote [UPC] made up his mind to confront the Kabaka and the State of Buganda ... but it is tempting, from the small amount of evidence available and his careful preparing of the ground, to think that he had intended it all along” (Dinwiddy 1981, 514).

Faced with this predicament, a civilian ruler could acquiesce to the status quo, perhaps by using inclusive nationalist criteria for military recruitment. However, this strategy risked leaving rival officers in place who, due to ethnic differences, might perceive a threat to their power (even if none in fact existed). Instead, the alternative strategy of attempting to alter the composition of the military toward allies risked triggering counterattacks in which marginalized groups would leverage “whatever tactics and resources they have to fight against their declining status” (Harkness 2018; see also Sudduth 2017). These problems arose again in the 1990s amid the transition to electoral regimes in most African countries. Coups occurred frequently in countries that experienced a change in the ruling ethnic group and the outgoing ruler’s army was organized on ethnic lines (Harkness 2018).

## 2.4 HYPOTHESES

Table 1 summarizes the powersharing tradeoff for different types of regimes. Leaders in coup regimes face a high risk of overthrow whether they share power or marginalize military elites. Leaders in rebel regimes, similarly, face high coup risk if they exclude military elites because these actors are powerful.

However, unlike in coup regimes, sharing power in rebel regimes should greatly diminish the risk of a coup because the violent struggle enables getting allies into top positions. Finally, civilian regimes exhibit greater heterogeneity. In cases with popular decolonization leaders, coup risk tended to be low regardless of the powersharing choice, leading to durable personalist regimes. In cases of split domination or ethnic groups with precolonial states, coup risk tended to be high regardless of the powersharing choice, creating similar theoretical implications as for coup regimes. This logic yields three testable hypotheses.

**Table 1: Logic of Powersharing by Regime Origins**

	<b>Rebel regime</b>	<b>Coup regime</b>	<b>Civilian regime</b>
<b>Coup risk if marginalize military elites</b>	High	High	Varies
<b>Coup risk if share power</b>	Low	High	Varies
<b>Ruler shares power?</b>	Yes	No	Varies
<b>Expected regime durability</b>	High	Low	Varies

*H1. Rebel regimes should fail less frequently than other regimes.*

*H2. Rulers in rebel regimes should share power with military elites more frequently than rulers in other regimes.*

*H3. Rulers in rebel regimes should be overthrown by coups less frequently than rulers in other regimes.*

### 3 EVIDENCE OF REBEL REGIME DURABILITY

Despite considerable qualitative evidence on the durability of revolutionary regimes, scholars have only recently compiled data to assess the relationship statistically. Because our concept of rebel regimes and sample differ, we first establish that, in Africa, rebel regimes are less likely to experience regime failure than non-rebel regimes. We also improve upon research designs from related studies by showing robustness to a source of exogenous variation in rebel regimes: climatic factors that affected where Europeans could settle during the colonial period, the actors who precipitated most of the region's colonial liberation wars.

#### 3.1 DATA

**Sample.** Our sample consists of annual observations for each African country between 1960 and 2017, excluding years with warlord or provisional regimes. Countries that gained independence after 1960 enter the

dataset upon their first year of independence. We include all African countries with a population of at least 100,000 at independence, including North Africa and several islands. For South Africa, we exclude years before 1994; and, for Zimbabwe, years before 1980 because white-dominated, de facto colonial regimes are not viable counterfactual comparisons for African-ruled regimes.

The vast majority of country-years in Africa have been, and continue to be, authoritarian. A few countries introduced democratic reforms in the early 1990s, but scholars have since questioned the extent to which many of these reforms represented true democratization (Carter 2018). In fact, some argue that these seemingly democratic reforms in fact helped to entrench incumbents by creating an institutionalized foundation for their rule (Meng 2020a). Moreover, as we discuss in the conclusion, in countries like Namibia, which many consider to be relatively democratic, the same rebel organization that took power upon independence has ruled continuously. For these reasons, we do not drop country-years that meet some threshold of “democratic,” although we do include a robustness check in which we control for the level of democracy.

**Dependent variable.** The dependent variable is an indicator for REGIME FAILURE, equaling 0 in any year that the regime persists and 1 if it fails. This variable draws mostly from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), although we coded it ourselves for several countries that fall below their population threshold and for post-2010 years. They code a regime change if there is turnover in the leadership group, “the small group that actually makes the most important decisions” (315).

**Main explanatory variable.** A REBEL REGIME is any that came to power by winning a rebellion that generated at least 1,000 battle deaths. By “rebellion,” we mean a movement initiated by an outsider rebel group, i.e., people that are not part of the inner circle or coercive apparatus of the incumbent government when the movement begins. We distinguish outsider rebellions from insider coups (i.e., initiated by current members of the inner circle or coercive apparatus) that create a large death toll. In many cases, rebel leaders were former government insiders. However, in all such cases, they were excluded from the government when they initiated the rebellion and had to win battles to advance on the capital—distinct from a coup attempt. By “winning,” we mean that the rebel group either defeated the incumbent government militarily, or compelled a negotiated settlement that enabled the rebel group to control the government (either of an existing country, or by creating a newly sovereign country). In cases of negotiated settlements that we code as rebel regimes, the political wing of the rebel movement competed as a political party and won an election. To code this variable, we primarily combined information on conflict from Correlates of War (Sarkees and

**Table 2: List of Rebel Regimes**

Colonial liberation		Other rebel regime	
Algeria 62–92 <sup>*,**,†</sup>	South Africa 94–NA <sup>†</sup>	Burundi 05–NA	Liberia 97–03
Angola 75–NA <sup>*,†</sup>	Tunisia 56–11	Chad 82–90	Liberia 05–NA
Eritrea 93–NA <sup>*,†</sup>	Zimbabwe 80–NA <sup>**,†</sup>	Chad 90–NA	Rwanda 94–NA <sup>*,†</sup>
Guinea Bissau 74–80 <sup>*,**,†</sup>		Congo-B 97–NA	Sierra Leone 98–NA
Morocco 56–NA		DRC 97–NA <sup>†</sup>	South Sudan 11–NA <sup>†</sup>
Mozambique 75–NA <sup>*,†</sup>		Ethiopia 91–NA <sup>**,†</sup>	Uganda 86–NA <sup>**,†</sup>
Namibia 90–NA <sup>†</sup>		Ivory Coast 11–NA	

\* Lachapelle et al. (2019) code as revolutionary. \*\* Colgan (2012) codes as revolutionary. <sup>†</sup> Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as violent liberation.

Wayman 2010) with regimes from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). Appendix Section A.1 provides detailed coding notes.

Some specifications additionally distinguish between COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES—those that emerged from a violent struggle to gain independence and/or majority rule—and OTHER REBEL REGIMES. We consider the struggles in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia as “colonial” because they were wars to establish African majority rule, despite the fact that none were against a European power. We also apply this distinction to Eritrea’s independence war since it had been a colonial possession of Ethiopia following its forced annexation in 1962. Table 2 lists every rebel regime in our dataset.

Table 2 also highlights cases in which our measure of rebel regimes overlaps with related variables in the literature. Our variable overlaps fairly strongly with Roessler and Verhoeven’s (2016) list of violent liberation regimes. Every case that Roessler and Verhoeven (2016, 43) code as a violent liberation regime is also a rebel regime in our dataset, although there are ten additional rebel regime cases in which the rebel group did not proclaim liberation aims (that is, the cases in the table not denoted by <sup>†</sup>). Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) also list an additional twelve additional African regimes meet their criteria for espousing a liberation ideology, but did not gain power via an armed struggle.

By contrast, our list overlaps minimally with either Lachapelle et al.’s (2019) or Colgan’s (2012) list of revolutionary regimes. Lachapelle et al. (2019) code only six African cases as revolutionary, all of which meet our standards for a rebel regime, compared to twenty-three rebel regimes in our dataset. This is in part because our concept of rebel regimes is less restrictive, and thus it is unsurprising that many cases in Table 2 clearly do not meet their additional criterion—beyond rebel takeover—that the regime attempts a revolutionary transformation of society. However, we question whether a clear line divides the “revolutionary” cases



in Table 2 from many of the “non-revolutionary” ones (see also our argument about the difficulties of revolutionary societal transformation in Africa in Section 5.2). For example, despite proclaiming Marxist aims, Angola (which Lachapelle et al. 2019 code as revolutionary) was essentially a failed state at independence, whereas the ZANU party in Zimbabwe (coded as non-revolutionary) exhibited strong control over much of the country. Rebel groups in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda built strong grassroots parties during their struggles (Lyons 2016), yet Lachapelle et al. (2019) code only Rwanda as revolutionary. Coding regimes based on prior rebellion enables a clearer operational standard for African cases, in addition to comporting more closely with our theoretical discussion.

For Colgan (2012) and Colgan and Weeks (2015), only five of our twenty-three rebel regimes meet their criteria, and they code an additional thirty-six African regimes as revolutionary that did not gain power via rebellion. Our concepts share a focus on violent government takeover, but Colgan and Weeks include many cases of takeover via a coup as well. As discussed above, with regard to rulers peacefully sharing power with their military, we anticipate very different consequences for regimes that achieve power via rebellions rather than via coups. Additionally, like Lachapelle et al. (2019), Colgan and Weeks also incorporate into their measure various indicators of “radical domestic changes for the purpose of transforming the organization of society,” which explains why many of our rebel regimes do not meet their criteria for revolutionary.

**Covariates.** We control for various alternative explanations from the existing literature. Our list of covariates most closely resembles that from Boix and Svolik (2013), who incorporate various widely used controls. Three are economic: GDP per capita (logged), GDP growth, and oil and production per capita (logged). The others are population (logged), ethnic fractionalization, and religious fractionalization. We also control for colonizer fixed effects (British, French, Portuguese) and year fixed effects.

### 3.2 RESULTS

Table 3 presents estimates from linear regressions of the following form:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_R R_{it} + \mathbf{X}'_{it} \beta_X + \mathbf{T}'_{it} \beta_T + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{it}$  is regime failure,  $R_{it}$  is an indicator for REBEL REGIMES in Columns 1–4 and is disaggregated into COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES and OTHER REBEL REGIMES in Columns 5–8,  $\beta_R$  is the main

parameter of interest,  $\mathbf{X}_{it}$  is a vector of covariates included in Columns 2–4 and 6–8,  $\mathbf{T}_{it}$  is standard temporal dependence controls (years since last regime change and cubic splines), and  $\epsilon_{it}$  is a random error term. Every model in Table 3 estimates double-clustered standard errors by regime and country.

**Table 3: Regime Failure**

	DV: REGIME FAILURE							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0391*** (0.00687)	-0.0353*** (0.00711)	-0.0425*** (0.00781)	-0.0422*** (0.00798)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0322*** (0.00746)	-0.0275*** (0.00914)	-0.0335*** (0.0111)	-0.0265** (0.0117)
Other rebel regime					-0.0483*** (0.00814)	-0.0461*** (0.0105)	-0.0528*** (0.0109)	-0.0605*** (0.0123)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.00175 (0.00416)		-0.0137*** (0.00516)		-0.00221 (0.00432)		-0.0162*** (0.00604)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0648** (0.0315)		-0.0606* (0.0318)		-0.0625** (0.0314)		-0.0553* (0.0314)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000204 (0.000567)		0.000175 (0.000597)		-0.000235 (0.000568)		0.000234 (0.000603)
ln(population)			0.00298 (0.00361)	0.0146*** (0.00530)			0.00211 (0.00375)	0.0152*** (0.00519)
Ethnic frac.			0.00427 (0.0234)	0.00463 (0.0224)			0.00911 (0.0254)	0.0136 (0.0250)
Religious frac.			0.0105 (0.0165)	-0.00339 (0.0173)			0.0130 (0.0164)	-0.00148 (0.0171)
British colony			-0.00491 (0.0116)	-0.00207 (0.0110)			-0.00639 (0.0117)	-0.00426 (0.0109)
French colony			0.00284 (0.00966)	-0.000816 (0.00937)			0.000979 (0.0102)	-0.00478 (0.0101)
Portuguese colony			0.0117 (0.0180)	0.00437 (0.0196)			0.00526 (0.0179)	-0.00862 (0.0203)
Regime-years	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.014	0.045	0.044	0.048	0.015	0.045	0.044	0.048
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 3 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates (double-clustered by regime and country) in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last regime change and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Column 1 shows that rebel regimes are significantly correlated with a lower likelihood of regime failure. The predicted probability of regime failure in a particular year is more than twice as high for non-rebel regimes than for rebel regimes, 7.5% versus 3.6%. The discrepancies are similar when we disaggregate rebel regimes in Column 5: 4.4% for colonial liberation regimes and 2.8% for other rebel regimes. Columns 2 and 6 add the economic covariates to the respective baseline specification, Columns 3 and 7 add the other covariates, and Columns 4 and 8 add every covariate. Comparing the columns with and without covariates shows not only that the covariates do not eliminate the statistically significant relationship between rebel regimes and

regime failure, but also that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates changes minimally. Using information from these observed covariates shows that the magnitude of bias from unobserved covariates would need to be large in order to explain away the results, as Appendix Table B.1 shows more formally.

The appendix shows that the estimates are similar under various robustness checks. We performed a jack-knife sample sensitivity analysis in which we iteratively drop all observations from one country at a time, which enables demonstrating that the results do not hinge on a single outlier. Nor are our results driven by cases coded as revolutionary in existing datasets. In Appendix Table B.2 we re-estimated Columns 1–4 of Table 3 in three different ways: dropping every case that Lachapelle et al. (2019), Colgan (2012) and Colgan and Weeks (2015), or Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as revolutionary.

Our specifications omit some common covariates in the coup literature, such as size of the military and the presence of counterbalancing institutions, because they are post-treatment to the “assignment” of rebel regimes. We present two specifications in Appendix Table B.3 to account for some possible alternative explanations, despite post-treatment problems. The results are qualitatively unchanged when controlling for democracy levels. Another possibility is that rebel regimes are propped up mainly by international support that they receive amid ongoing civil wars. However, when controlling for rebel regimes, governments receiving international assistance during a civil war are significantly *more* likely to fail.

Appendix Table B.4 performs additional robustness checks. Panel A runs the models with a logit link. Panel B changes the sample to a cross-section of regimes and estimates Cox proportional hazard models. Finally, in our theory, we distinguished rebel regimes from coup regimes. Although both types of regimes achieve power by force, coup regimes generally lack similar sources of elite unity as rebel regimes. Panel C of this table shows evidence consistent with this argument. The sample consists only of regimes that gained power via force, therefore isolating the comparison of rebel regimes to coup regimes.

### 3.3 INSTRUMENTING FOR COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES

Assessing the causal effect of rebel regimes on stability poses difficult endogeneity problems. Despite controlling for commonly used covariates in the regimes literature and performing various forms of sensitivity analysis, rebel regimes clearly do not emerge randomly. To address this concern, we exploit a source of plausible exogeneity in colonial liberation regimes: percentage of a country’s territory that was suitable for colonial European settlement. The 2SLS results are qualitatively similar to the results found above, hence

more convincingly establishing a negative causal relationship. We briefly summarize the justification for the instrument here, and present extensive supporting details in Appendix Section B.2.

One of the most important predictors of decolonization wars in Africa was the presence of European settlers. After World War II, officials in most imperial metropolises introduced decolonization reforms, but these reforms were blocked in colonies with large European settler populations (and, similarly, in independent South Africa and quasi-independent Rhodesia). Existing research establishes that only in specific areas of Africa could Europeans create large settlements in which they replicated European agricultural practices. Thus, we can use climatic factors that influenced prospects for European settlement to provide an exogenous instrument for colonial liberation regimes. We use a variable from Paine (2019b) that combines GIS data for climate, rainfall, elevation, and tsetse fly prevalence. Each of these variables is measured “pre-treatment,” thus addressing endogeneity concerns. Regarding the exclusion restriction, there are no clear alternative channels (other than contested decolonization) through which these climatic factors would affect post-colonial regime stability, and sensitivity analysis shows that moderately large violations of the exclusion restriction would be necessary to invalidate the results.

## 4 EVIDENCE OF MILITARY POWERSHARING IN REBEL REGIMES

We now provide empirical evidence of our proposed mechanism: rebel regimes derive their stability through military powersharing. First, we show that rebel regimes have significantly higher levels of powersharing along coercive dimensions, compared with non-rebel regimes (H2). Second, we compiled information on the composition of the state military after rebel takeover to show that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, rebel leaders dominated the state military, which provided openings to appoint key allies to positions of power. Third, we use biographical information to show that elites who are appointed as the Minister of Defense in rebel regimes were indeed high-ranking rebel commanders who played an important role in the war. Finally, we demonstrate that this strategy of military powersharing is effective: rebel regimes are significantly less likely to face coup attempts (H3).

### 4.1 MILITARY POWERSHARING

Table 4 assesses H2, which posits that rulers in rebel regimes should share power with military elites more frequently than rulers in other regimes. Appointing elites to key cabinet positions endows them with the

ability to control the entire ministry and to target material resources to their supporters and constituents. Thus, we use appointments of elites to key power positions within government to measure powersharing. For powersharing with military elites specifically, we focus on the appointment of a Minister of Defense. The Defense Minister controls the armed forces and is the highest ranking military position in the regime. The appointment of a Minister of Defense is *not* merely routine in African regimes. Presidents commonly hold onto this portfolio by naming *themselves* as their own Defense Minister. For example, Hastings Banda (the first president of Malawi) appointed himself as the Minister of Defense during his entire tenure, from 1964 until 1993. In other instances, leaders keep the position vacant or simply eliminate the Minister of Defense position altogether. Many leaders are often hesitant to name a separate Minister of Defense because of the generic dilemma of powersharing: rival elites can use that position to unseat the ruler in a coup.

To code Minister of Defense appointments, we use the Europa World Year Book (1960-2005) and data from the Central Intelligence Agency (2006-2017). Collectively, these sources contain annual records of the names and positions of all ministerial posts for every African country between 1960 and 2017. From these records we created a dummy variable called DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT that equals 1 if a separate elite was appointed as the Minister of Defense and 0 if the position was left vacant, eliminated from the cabinet, or the president named himself the head of that office. We also created a second variable called DEFENSE MINISTER SAME that equals 1 if a separate elite was appointed as the Minister of Defense *and* that the same person held the defense portfolio in the previous year (and set to missing in the first year of each regime). This variable takes a value of 0 if DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT equals 0, or if within the previous year the position had rotated to someone else. Accounting for the stability of these appointments is relevant in the context of elite politics in Africa. Leaders routinely practiced the “revolving door policy” of rotating cabinet ministers to try to prevent any one elite from consolidating power within a particular ministry (Dickie and Rake 1973; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Hassan 2017). Naming a Minister of Defense but frequently appointing new people to the position indicates a low degree of true powersharing. We therefore use DEFENSE MINISTER SAME for our main regressions in the body of the paper, but report results using DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT in the appendix.

Leaders in rebel regimes are significantly more likely to share power with military elites. Rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in 83% of regime-years. In fact, over half of all rebel regime cases appointed a Defense Minister in *every* year. By contrast, non-rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in only

56% of regime-years. Moreover, Minister of Defense appointments in rebel regimes were more stable, reflecting less frequent shuffling. Rebel regimes appointed the *same* Minister of Defense as the previous year in 65% of regime-years, compared to a corresponding figure of 34% for non-rebel regimes.

Mozambique, for instance, has had only five different Ministers of Defense since gaining independence in 1975, and the average tenure of a Defense Minister is 8.4 years. Ethiopia's post-1991 rebel regime has had only seven different Ministers of Defense. In both cases, the president has never personally held the Defense Minister portfolio or left the post vacant. Even Robert Mugabe, who had a reputation as a strongman dictator while he ruled Zimbabwe from independence in 1980 until 2017, made stable Minister of Defense appointments: the country had only six different Ministers of Defense during his tenure.

By contrast, leaders of non-rebel regimes often prefer to keep the Defense portfolio for themselves. Dawada Jawara of Gambia, for instance, appointed himself as Defense Minister from 1965 until 1992. When leaders of non-rebel regimes do name a Minister of Defense, they tend to shuffle cabinet appointments frequently to prevent any one elite from gaining too much influence. Burkina Faso has had nineteen different Ministers of Defense since the country became independent in 1960, *and* in many years the incumbent president has held the position himself. The average tenure of a Defense Minister was less than three years. In the Central African Republic, a Minister of Defense has been appointed in only 36% of years between 1960 and 2017, with an average tenure of less than two years.

**Table 4: Military Powersharing**

DV: DEFENSE MINISTER SAME								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.301*** (0.0546)	0.237*** (0.0566)	0.186*** (0.0576)	0.186*** (0.0598)				
Col. liberation regime					0.307*** (0.0706)	0.272*** (0.0649)	0.247*** (0.0642)	0.270*** (0.0757)
Other rebel regime					0.290*** (0.0748)	0.181** (0.0765)	0.101 (0.0743)	0.0761 (0.0749)
Regime-years	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458
Regimes	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.065	0.121	0.160	0.163	0.065	0.122	0.164	0.168
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES


*Notes:* Table 4 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates (double-clustered by regime and country) in parentheses. The sample here is smaller than that in Table 3 because (1) we set DEFENSE MINISTER SAME to missing in each country's first year in the dataset and (2) we exclude country-years without a national military. Appendix Table B.7 reports coefficients and standard errors for the control variables. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

In Table 4, we assess this relationship statistically. We estimate the same linear regression models as in

Equation 1 except we change the dependent variable. The sequence of specifications and covariates is identical to those in Table 3. The aggregate rebel regimes variable covaries significantly with more stable Defense Minister appointments than non-rebel regimes (Columns 1–4). The remaining columns disaggregate rebel regimes and show that the result is stronger for colonial liberation regimes, for which the coefficient estimates are larger in magnitude and statistically significant in every specification. Although other rebel regimes are significantly distinguished from non-rebel regimes in the most parsimonious specifications, this indicator loses statistical significance under different permutations of covariates.<sup>6</sup>

Numerous robustness checks yield similar findings. Appendix Table B.8 changes the dependent variable to DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT. Table B.9 performs the same three basic robustness checks as for Table 3: logit models, cross-section of regimes, and comparing rebel regimes only to coup regimes.

**Figure 1: Length of Rebellion and Military Powersharing in Rebel Regimes**



We now consider suggestive evidence for why the two categories of rebel regimes differ in their propensity for military powersharing. The average colonial liberation regime in our dataset fought for 12.6 years before gaining power. For other rebel regimes, the corresponding figure is 5.8 years. Across the entire sample, longer conflicts covary with more powersharing, which we highlight in Figure 1. The horizontal axis is number of years that the rebel group fought before gaining power, and the vertical axis is the same military

<sup>6</sup>Because regime transition years usually produce cabinet shuffling, we also estimated these specifications from while setting the first year of each regime to missing. The results are qualitatively unchanged.

powersharing dependent variable from Table 4. The regression line is in black, and the dashed gray line is the average value of the dependent variable among non-rebel regimes. The solid dots are the colonial liberation cases and the open dots are other rebel regimes. Among the seven cases in which the president named the same Minister of Defense in less than half the years of the regime, all experienced struggles of seven years or shorter. In most of these cases, the rebel group did not dominate the new military, and shorter struggles provide fewer opportunities for moving known allies into top military posts. Both factors should make the president more skeptical of delegating power to a separate Minister of Defense.

## 4.2 TRANSFORMING THE MILITARY

We expect rebel regimes to facilitate peaceful powersharing with military elites because, upon taking power, victorious rebel groups enjoy a unique opportunity to transform the state military. Although existing research on revolutionary regimes provides anecdotes in which rebels transformed the state military upon taking power (Levitsky and Way 2013; Lachapelle et al. 2019), we assess this claim systematically by compiling information on the state military for every rebel regime after taking power. We coded each case into one of three categories: Complete Military Transformation, Military Integration, and No Military Transformation. Table 5 summarizes the cases, and Appendix Section A.2 provides detailed coding notes.

**Table 5: Military Transformation in Rebel Regimes**

Complete Military Transformation		Military Integration	No Military Transformation
Algeria 62–92	Ivory Coast 11–NA	Burundi 06–NA	Liberia 05–NA
Angola 75–NA	Liberia 97–03	Chad 90–NA	Morocco 56–NA
Chad 82–90	Mozambique 75–NA	DRC 97–NA	Sierra Leone 98–NA
Congo-B 97–NA	Rwanda 94–NA	Namibia 90–NA	Tunisia 56–11
Eritrea 93–NA	Uganda 86–NA	South Africa 94–NA	
Ethiopia 91–NA	Zimbabwe 80–NA	South Sudan 11–NA	
Guinea-Bissau 74–80			

In thirteen of the twenty-three rebel regime cases, the rebel military completely transformed the military by displacing the existing state armed forces and replacing them with their own members. Consequently, members of the victorious rebel group dominated the new military. In most cases, the national military disintegrated by the end of the conflict, whether because European colonial soldiers fled the country (leaving African colonial soldiers at the mercy of the rebels) or defeat on the battlefield. In Mozambique, the guerrilla forces that fought Portugal in the liberation war became the new national army upon independence. In fact, FRELIMO even refused to integrate into their ranks black soldiers who had previously fought for



the Portuguese Army. Following the defeat of the military government in Ethiopia in 1991, the new regime disbanded the national army and replaced the armed forces with their own fighters. In Zimbabwe, the white colonial military remained intact, but military integration favored ZANU so blatantly that there was no pretense of sharing power with other organizations and we code it as complete military transformation.

These cases are also characterized by their lack of military integration *across* different rebel factions, even when multiple rebel groups participated in overthrowing the government. For example, in Zimbabwe, Mugabe used his ZANLA troops to subjugate ZIPRA forces. In Angola, MPLA monopolized control of political positions at independence and their armed wing FAPLA became the state military while excluding rebel troops from UNITA and FNLA, who then fought against MPLA for decades.

In six cases, military integration between the existing state military and the rebel forces occurred, largely due to terms of the civil war settlement. In these cases, rebel groups were ascendant in the new military, but did not dominate it to the same extent as in cases of complete transformation. All these regimes began in the 1990s or later, as the Cold War ended and international actors shifted to try to end long-running civil wars. South Africa is a well-known case of powersharing between former officials in the white apartheid regime and members of the ANC and other African groups. Africans from uMkhonto we Sizwe (the military wing of the ANC) and other armed groups came to dominate the highest ranks as well as the rank and file, while white officers from the former SADF remained prominent among other officer positions. Namibia and Burundi are similar cases in which members of strong rebel groups gained prominent positions within the existing state military, despite the latter not collapsing during the fighting. Chad and the DRC are somewhat different. Although rebels in each case achieved outright military victory the previous state military, their relative weakness upon winning compelled them to share power with armed opposition groups. In South Sudan, despite creating a new country, the new state military amalgamated various rebel groups that had fought against the Sudanese government.

Only in four cases were the rebel forces unable to transform the military at all. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the rebel military largely disintegrated upon taking power and international peacekeeping forces helped to construct a new state military. In Morocco and Tunisia, guerrilla fighters were less important than peaceful nationalist organizations for gaining independence from France.

### 4.3 MINISTER OF DEFENSE BIOGRAPHIES

We have argued that naming a separate Minister of Defense is a substantial giveaway to another elite actor—in particular if the president does not constantly shuffle the position—and thus constitutes sharing power with military elites. Still, the evidence from Table 4 does not rule out certain alternative explanations. We posit that building a private army from scratch and fighting for power enables the president to elevate *known allies* into top positions. Thus, we expect that the Ministers of Defense in rebel regimes should tend to be important members of the founding rebellion. By contrast, our mechanism would not find support if these Ministers typically are either (1) family members or obscure actors lacking any power base, or (2) members of the previous state military or from other rebel groups that fought for power (i.e., distinct from the group to which the president belongs).

To rule out these alternatives, we compiled biographical details about who served as Ministers of Defense in rebel regimes, paying particular attention to the role they played in the war that brought the regime to power.<sup>7</sup> This biographical information confirms that elites who served as the Minister of Defense were influential combatants from the conflict that brought the regime into power. Such actors amassed operational control over troops and gained legitimacy from the founding struggle, which enabled them to credibly threaten the leader if he attempted to personalize power. This is particularly true for rebel regimes that successfully transformed the military upon taking power. Within the first 20 years of rebel regimes that achieved complete military transformation, 87% of the Defense Ministers were important figures from the wars.<sup>8</sup>

For instance, Iko Carreira, Angola’s first Minister of Defense, served as head of security during the liberation war against Portugal. During that time, Carreira built the the army that would become the state military force after independence. Pedro Sebastiao, who was the third Minister of Defense in Angola, was a commander of the armed wing of the MPLA. He led the MPLA forces in the Battle of Nto, which was decisive in Angola’s path to independence. In Eritrea, Petros Solomon was appointed as the first Defense Minister following

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<sup>7</sup>Appendix Table B.17 summarizes the biographical information for the Ministers of Defense in all rebel regimes. We restricted attention to Defense Ministers who remained in their position for at least three years in order to exclude temporary or transitional appointments.

<sup>8</sup>There are a small number of Defense Ministers for which we could not find biographical information, and we exclude these observations from the calculation. However, even if we impose the quite conservative assumption that *every* missing observation not an important figure from the war, this percentage is still 76%.

independence. Solomon was a leading figure during the armed struggle. He was one of three members of the party's military committee, the head of the military intelligence unit, and a member of the political bureau of the party's Central Committee. Guinea-Bissau's first Defense Minister, Joao Bernardo Vieira, a celebrated guerrilla commander, had been the police commissar and military chief in southern Guinea-Bissau during the war. In Mozambique, Tobias Joaquim Dai was the Minister of Defense from 2000 to 2008. He had been the Commander of the FRELIMO Army during the civil war.

Consistent with our emphasis on the need for rebel rulers to share power, the founding conflicts often *created* credible challengers for the leader by giving certain elites command over troops and access to the military. Charles Namoloh, the Minister of Defense in Namibia from 2007 to 2010, was a mere union organizer when he first joined SWAPO in 1971. After receiving military training in SWAPO bases in Zambia, he returned and quickly moved up the ranks, eventually becoming the second in command of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia from 1979 to 1989. Similarly, Emmerson Mnangagwa, the Defense Minister in Zimbabwe from 2009 to 2013, was only a student when the liberation war began. He left to receive military training in the People's Republic of China and after returning, led a series of missions. He eventually became Mugabe's primary security adviser during the war and was responsible for integrating the two liberation armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA, into the Zimbabwe National Army.

Rebel rulers rarely named Defense Ministers from either the previous regime or from competing rebel factions. Above, we noted the lack of military integration in Angola and Zimbabwe despite multiple rebel groups. The handful of exceptions come from the cases in which, despite gaining the presidency, the rebel military units were integrated into the existing state army without displacing it. For example, the civil war settlement in Burundi called for a 50-50 distribution of Hutu (rebels) and Tutsi (incumbent regime) in the military. Despite a rebel leader becoming president, the first two Ministers of Defense following the settlement were high-ranking members of the *state* military during the rebellion. In Chad, Idriss Déby came to power in 1990 with a small rebel group. Although the existing military was unable to stop his advance, Déby was in a relatively weak position upon attaining power and pursued a policy of reconciliation with competing rebel factions. As we anticipate given the short rebellion to gain power (one year) and Déby's consequent impediments to placing allies in top positions, he frequently shuffled the Minister of Defense. The only person to hold the position for three years was Mahamat Nouri, a high-ranking official in the prior Hissène Habré regime who did not participate in Déby's rebellion. But not all military integration

cases shared the top military post outside the rebel group. In both South Africa and Namibia, the Defense Minister has always been a member of the majority-rule rebels.

#### 4.4 COUPS

Our third hypothesis is that rebel regimes should experience fewer successful coups. Table 6 assesses H3. Powell and Thyne (2011) provide annual data from 1960 to 2014 on successful coup attempts in all countries, and we supplemented the data using Archigos for 2015 through 2017. SUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPTS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a coup attempt that successfully removed the incumbent occurred in a particular year, and 0 otherwise. ALL COUP ATTEMPTS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a (failed or successful) coup was attempted in a particular year, and 0 otherwise.

**Table 6: Successful Coup Attempts**

	DV: SUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPTS							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0295*** (0.00683)	-0.0209*** (0.00634)	-0.0294*** (0.00673)	-0.0271*** (0.00686)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0218*** (0.00774)	-0.0175** (0.00857)	-0.0284*** (0.00905)	-0.0218** (0.0106)
Other rebel regime					-0.0418*** (0.00523)	-0.0265*** (0.00565)	-0.0308*** (0.00634)	-0.0343*** (0.00730)
Regime-years	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.010	0.041	0.040	0.043	0.011	0.041	0.040	0.043
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* Table 6 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates (double-clustered by regime and country) in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last successful coup and cubic splines. Appendix Table B.10 reports coefficients and standard errors for the control variables. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

We estimate identical linear regression models as Equation 1 except the dependent variable is SUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT. The sequence of specifications is identical to those in Table 3. Only three of the 23 rebel regimes have ever experienced a successful coup attempt, compared to half of the non-rebel regimes. Columns 1–4 show that rebel regimes are significantly less likely to experience successful coups, and this result is robust to including controls. The results are similar when we disaggregate rebel regimes into colonial liberation regimes and other rebel regimes (Columns 5–8). The results are also similar under various robustness checks: analyzing ALL COUP ATTEMPTS (Appendix Table B.11); when running logit models, using a cross-section of regimes, or comparing rebel regimes only to coup regimes (Table B.12).

## 5 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

The previous section demonstrated that sharing power with the military is an important contributor to the durability of rebel regimes. Here we show evidence against two alternative explanations. First, rebel regimes are not distinct in the extent to which they share power with other civilian actors or ethnic groups. Second, rebel regimes do not tend to consolidate greater control over the countryside.

### 5.1 ALTERNATIVE ELITE-LEVEL MECHANISMS: CIVILIAN AND ETHNIC POWERSHARING

Our theory highlights the importance in rebel regimes of sharing power with military elites. Although these elites pose a grave threat to the ruler, they also tend to be allies of the ruler, and hence can be bought off if offered perks such as the Ministry of Defense. However, we do not expect rulers in rebel regimes to necessarily face heightened incentives to share civilian positions. Any ruler can achieve survival benefits by distributing spoils more widely among civilian elites (Arriola 2009; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015), but it is unclear why these benefits would systematically differ in rebel regimes—in which *military* elites pose the gravest threat. Thus, we expect that differences in powersharing between rebel regimes and non-rebel regimes are restricted to *coercive dimensions only*.

Two pieces of evidence reject broader powersharing. First, we collected original data on the appointment of a Vice President or Prime Minister—the highest civilian position in the cabinet. Appointing a Vice President/Prime Minister is an important indicator of overall regime institutionalization, and this position is often the constitutional successor to the president (Meng 2020a,b). The Vice President and Prime Minister are functionally equivalent positions; the countries in our sample have *either* a Vice President or a Prime Minister, but not both. The Vice President/Prime Minister variable is coded similarly as the Defense Minister variable. We create a dummy variable called VP/PM APPOINT that equals 1 if an elite was appointed as the Vice President/Prime Minister, and 0 if the position was left vacant, eliminated from the cabinet, or the president named himself the head of that office. VP/PM SAME equals 1 if an elite was appointed as the Vice President/Prime Minister *and* that elite also held the position in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Appendix Table B.13 shows null coefficient estimates in almost every specification.

Second, in Table B.14 we examine data on the ethnic makeup of cabinets. We examine ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, the percentage of the country’s population with some membership in cabinet or other high-ranking positions in the central government; and ETHNOCRACY, an indicator for whether a single ethnic group either

controls all important political positions. The estimates are null, suggesting that rebel regimes also do not rely on a strategy of broad ethnic powersharing for their survival more than other non-rebel regimes, nor do they more narrowly concentrate power among the leading group.

This evidence also rules out an alternative mechanism that rebel regimes—rather than having advantages in military powersharing—are instead proxying for regimes in which one ethnic group successfully marginalizes all others. Appendix Table B.15 demonstrates this point even more clearly by summarizing the ethnic composition of every rebel group and rebel regime. The *majority* of rebel groups in our sample are multi-ethnic: in only 30% of cases did one main ethnic group organize its insurgency around aims for and recruitment of a single ethnic group. Furthermore, most rebel regimes are multi-ethnic after coming into power: in only 26% of cases did one ethnic group dominate the government within the first five years of the rebel regime’s existence. Cases of complete ethnic exclusion are in fact quite rare in our sample. In only 17% of cases (i.e., four) was the foundational rebel group *and* the subsequent rebel regime organized around a single ethnic group. To sum, the fact that most rebel groups and most rebel regimes are multi-ethnic suggests that ethnic ties are not the primary factor for explaining the durability of these regimes.

## 5.2 MASS-LEVEL MECHANISMS: TRANSFORMING STATE AND SOCIETY

“He who controls the countryside controls the country” (Huntington 1968, 292). This well-known aphorism linking revolutionary regimes to the transformation of society (see also Huntington 1970) is the leading explanation in the literature for why revolutionary regimes endure. Levitsky and Way (2013) and Lachapelle et al. (2019) argue that gaining power through violence, unleashing a program of social revolution, and defeating counterrevolutionaries eliminates alternative centers of power that underpinned the previous regime. We argue that this factor does not, on average, help to explain the durability of African rebel regimes.

Many African countries have inauspicious conditions for rebel regimes to fundamentally transform society, even if they attempt social revolution. Herbst (2000) discusses the generic problem that rulers in Africa throughout history—precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial—have faced to consolidating territorial control. A high land-to-population ratio has typically created incentives for residents to move rather than to submit to the will of an encroaching state. Before European colonialism began, states typically aimed to control people rather than specific territory, given the scarcity of the former. Despite superior military technology, European colonizers failed to solve this problem. They usually invested only enough to balance the budgets within

the colonies. In fact, by carving up the continent into territorially delineated spheres of influence—which later engendered the international borders for postcolonial African states—European rule likely exacerbated the problem of establishing effective territorial control. At independence, African rulers typically faced considerable difficulties to broadcasting power across their entire territory, not only because of the large size of many countries, but also because European rule typically failed to develop effective tax systems. These conditions have posed daunting challenges for would-be revolutionaries to create an effective state that could transform society.

Thus, we do not expect existing hypotheses about rebel regimes—revolutionary or otherwise—controlling the countryside to apply to Africa. This argument is difficult to test systematically, but available evidence suggests that rebel regimes do not exhibit greater control over society than other regimes. Lachapelle et al.’s (2019) preferred proxy for destruction of alternative centers of power is V-Dem’s Core Civil Society Index (Coppedge 2018). Appendix Table B.16 (Panel A) shows no statistically significant differences for this dependent variable. Panel B of this table shows that the estimates are also null when comparing rebel to non-rebel regimes on a measure of “stateness.” Appendix Section B.6 discusses Angola in more depth, a case that exemplifies why regime durability and state weakness are not mutually exclusive.

## 6 CONCLUSION

This paper studied the tradeoff that dictators face when they contemplate sharing power with other elite actors, in particular military elites. We argue and show evidence that rulers of rebel regimes typically face advantages for solving this dilemma. To gain power, they need to build a private military. During the rebellion, they can move allies into place within the military hierarchy. Upon taking power, they typically supplant or dramatically overhaul the existing state military with their own force. This differentiates them from regimes that inherit an existing military and whose officer corps views themselves as rivals to the new ruler. Overall, we show the rebel regimes in Africa survive longer, share power more frequently, and face fewer successful coups than other regimes.

Our findings suggest important avenues for future research. In contrast to existing work on revolutionary regimes, our findings are inconsistent with a Tilly-esque account in which conflict promotes state-building (Tilly 1992). Despite surviving for long periods, rebel regimes in Africa have typically faced challenges

to consolidating societal control and have frequently faced armed challengers after gaining power. Of the twenty-three rebel regimes, seventeen (74%) experienced a major civil war during its reign, compared to 23% of non-rebel regimes. Another important consequence of conflict in Africa is that, in some cases, victorious rebel groups failed to create their own regime and instead triggered state collapse: Chad in 1979, Somalia in 1991, Libya in 2011, and Central African Republic in 2014. Future research could study why some victorious rebel movements produce long-lasting regimes, yet others cause state collapse—as the “successful” cases suggest, the dividing line between the two may be subtle.

We also suggest the need to consider rebel regimes amid broader debates about causes of democratization in Africa. The stability created by sharing power between rulers and military elites undermines long-run prospects for transitioning to multiparty democracy. Consequently, many exceptions to post-Cold War democratization in Africa had origins in violent conflict. Some of these cases were colonial liberation regimes, whereas other rebel regimes formed later (e.g., Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda). Other rebel regimes had elements of electoral competition after supplanting white minority rule, namely Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. In Zimbabwe, ZANU used its coercive advantage gained from fighting for power to displace competitors. South Africa and Namibia have each experienced less overt repression, although the party founded during the liberation struggle has won every election since taking power, and most experts deem electoral competition in Namibia in particular as unfair.

Finally, we situate African cases within a general framework for understanding powersharing and authoritarian durability. Despite the general weakness of formal institutions in the region, many African authoritarian regimes have survived for long periods of time. In some cases, weak formal institutions facilitated the survival of personalist regimes, as with Felix Houphouet-Boigny in Cote d’Ivoire or Mobutu Seso Seko in Zaire. However, we have identified a set of African regimes that have survived for long periods of time while sharing power with one of the gravest threats to the rulers: military elites. This general dilemma of sharing power with the military applies to any regime. Yet, in other regards, African rebel regimes are distinct from rebel regimes in other regions. We discussed some historically rooted impediments to consolidating control over the countryside in most African countries. Existing hypotheses that revolutionary regimes typically establish firm control over society are more plausible elsewhere. Consider, for example, three classic cases in which social revolutions preceded long-lasting authoritarian regimes: China, Russia, and Vietnam. Each country experienced a long history of a state governed by members of the dominant ethnic group. Although



these factors did not preordain that the revolutionary group would consolidate control over the countryside, they created more favorable conditions than in African states lacking a similar history. Understanding these similarities and differences will help to situate authoritarianism in Africa in a broader global context.

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# Online Appendix

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## A DATA APPENDIX

### A.1 CODING REBEL REGIMES

To code civil wars in which the rebels were victorious, we primarily used the Correlates of War dataset and their associated coding books (COW; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Dixon and Sarkees 2015), while also consulting other widely used conflict datasets to verify questionable cases and to ensure we did not miss any (Fearon and Laitin 2003, or FL; Armed Conflict Database, or ACD, Gleditsch et al. 2002). We included both intra-state wars as well as extra-state wars between African rebel groups and European colonizers (in COW, an extra-state war is one in which a member of the inter-state system fights a non-state actor outside its borders). We then matched these conflicts with regimes from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) (GWF).

The three conflict datasets each use slightly different coding procedures which, in addition to possible measurement error, lead to slightly different lists of wars. FL provide one entry for each distinct war, and their main operational criterion is that at least 1,000 battle deaths occur during the course of the war (the same standard that we use). This is less stringent than COW's standard of 1,000 *annual* battle deaths, although in their article FL state that they doubt all of COW's conflicts meet this standard (thus producing a list quite similar to FL's). ACD codes whether each year of a conflict produces at least 25 battle deaths or at least 1,000 battle deaths.

Both FL and COW explicitly code whether rebels won a civil war. One problem, which necessitates complementing the coding procedure with reading descriptions of each case, is that in a small number of conflicts, a regime change occurs in the middle of the conflict. These cases are usually easier to discern from COW because they code distinct episodes within conflicts that FL code as a single civil war. For example, FL code a single civil war in Congo-Brazzaville from 1997 to 2002 that ended with government victory. By contrast, COW codes one conflict in 1997 and a second from 1998–99 (the discrepancy in end years comes from low-level fighting in 2000–02). The bout of fighting in 1997 ended in *rebel* victory, and the second in government victory. Thus, FL's dataset do not list Congo-Brazzaville as a case involving rebel victory because they code the entire period of fighting as a single civil war. As another example, in Sierra Leone (see detailed notes below), rebel victory occurred in 1998 in a war that COW codes as lasting from 1998–2000.

**Colonial liberation wars.** COW codes outright rebel victory for the anti-colonial extra-state wars preceding the following regimes: Morocco 56–NA, Tunisia 56–11, Algeria 62–92, Mozambique 75–NA, and Namibia 90–NA. For Angola 75–NA, they code the liberation struggle as ending with Portugal withdrawing (indicating a clear rebel victory) and the conflict transforming to a non-state war among the different rebel factions, in which the MPLA gained control. COW states that Guinea-Bissau 74–80 does not meet their death threshold (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 534), although according to FL's dataset notes, the total death toll was 15,000, hence meeting our threshold of 1,000. Eritrea 93–NA is another case that COW codes as rebel victory, but in an intra-state war within Ethiopia. The wars for majority rule in both Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa are also intra-state wars. The war that yielded the Zimbabwe 80–NA regime ended with a negotiated settlement in 1979, but it meets our standard of rebel victory because one of the rebel groups, ZANU, won the subsequent elections and took power. For South Africa 94–NA, the only relevant entry from COW is an intercommunal war between the government-sponsored militia Inkatha and the African National Congress (ANC). However, other civil war datasets code a conflict as occurring between the South African government and ANC (FL, ACD), which is also reflected in standard narratives of the struggle (e.g., Reno 2011, 105–18). Thus, this case is similar to Zimbabwe: the war ended in a negotiated settlement, and we code the subsequent regime as a rebel regime because ANC gained control of the government.

**Other rebel regimes.** COW codes outright rebel victory for the wars preceding the following regimes: Chad

82–90, Uganda 86–NA, Chad 90–NA, Ethiopia 91–NA, Rwanda 94–NA, Congo-Brazzaville 97–NA, DRC 97–NA, Sierra Leone 98–NA, Liberia 05–NA, Ivory Coast 11–NA, South Sudan 11–NA. South Sudan is somewhat complicated because the war ended in 2002 with a scheduled referendum in 2006 for southern independence. The referendum passed, which enabled South Sudan to gain independence five years later. Despite the delay, the independence of South Sudan resulted unambiguously from the Second Sudanese War, hence our coding of a rebel regime. COW codes the war preceding Burundi 05–NA as ending in a compromise. We code this case as rebel regime for same reason as South Africa and Zimbabwe: the rebels’ political party, CNDD-FDD, won the post-settlement elections. COW also codes the war preceding Liberia 97–03 as ending in a compromise, and Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Party won the post-settlement election (with Taylor becoming president).

***Not coded as rebel regimes.*** There are four cases in which no regime follows a rebel victory because there is a warlord or transition period: Chad 79–82, Somalia 91–NA, Libya 2011–NA, and Central African Republic 2014–NA. The first two cases are in GWF’s dataset, which goes through 2010. We do not include any GWF years with warlord or transition regimes in our dataset. To be consistent with this rule after 2010, we excluded all country-years in which either Polity IV (Marshall and Jagers 2002) codes a transition year for the regime or in which the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR; Vogt et al. 2015) codes it as a period of state collapse. Thus, we drop the Libya 2011–NA and Central African Republic 2014–NA cases.

Two cases that do not meet our standards for a rebel regime deserve additional comment. First, Guinea-Bissau’s post-1999 regimes. For Guinea-Bissau, there is a “Military War” entry in COW for 1998–99. In this conflict, the incumbent president (João Bernardo Vieira) dismissed his military chief of staff, Ansumane Mané. When Vieira sent troops to arrest Mané, the army split into two; a year later, Mané’s troops won. This case violates our requirement that the rebel leader is excluded from the government when the war begins. Instead, this case is a purge/coup (i.e., involving insiders) that generated war-level casualties, but unlike our rebel regime cases, Mané did not have to build a private military. An informative contrast is with the civil war in Chad from 1989–90, which brought to power the Chad 90–NA regime. In that case, the incumbent president Hissène Habré purged his senior advisor Idriss Déby, who fled the capital along with two other senior advisors and seventy-four soldiers into Sudan. After organizing there and in Libya, they built up a new army of 2,000 troops that defeated Habré’s army in 1990. Thus, the key difference is that a *privately organized force* rather than existing units of the military defeated the incumbent ruler.

Second, Sierra Leone 97–98. Sierra Leone’s first civil war ended in 1996 with a compromise, and the rebel group RUF lost in the subsequent elections. However, the democratically elected president was overthrown in a coup in 1997, and the coup leader invited RUF to join the government. This case fails our standard for a rebel regime for two reasons. First, RUF gained power in the central government because of a coup rather than from winning a civil war. Second, unlike the cases listed above in which the war ended in a negotiated settlement (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Burundi), RUF did not win the subsequent elections nor did they control the presidency.



## A.2 CODING MILITARY TRANSFORMATION IN REBEL REGIMES

### A.2.1 Complete Military Transformation

**Algeria 62–92.** The main rebel group that fought for independence in Algeria was the National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale; FLN). Its armed wing was the National Liberation Army (Armee de Liberation Nationale; ALN), which was renamed the People's National Army (Armee Nationale Populaire; ANP) in 1962. "As the new Algerian national army grew out of the anti-colonial resistance organization, this organization is coded rather than the colonial army. In 1957, a brutal French counter-insurgency campaign broke down the organization of the Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN) ... The military units inherited at independence combined units from the internal and external armies as well as the French colonial army" (Harkness 2018 appendix). Entelis (1994, 206) reiterates that the Algerian military consisted "primarily" of the ANP (formerly, ALN).

**Angola 75–NA.** Three main rebel groups fought for independence in Angola: MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA. MPLA gained control of the capital at independence as the liberation struggle transformed into a civil war with FNLA and UNITA. MPLA's anti-colonial military became the state military upon independence. "In the early 1960s, the MPLA named its guerrilla forces the People's Army for the Liberation of Angola (Exercito Popular de Libertacao de Angola—EPLA) ... [In 1974,] the MPLA announced the formation of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola—FAPLA), which replaced the EPLA. By 1976 FAPLA had been transformed from lightly armed guerrilla units into a national army capable of sustained field operations. This transformation was gradual until the Soviet-Cuban intervention and ensuing UNITA insurgency, when the sudden and large-scale inflow of heavy weapons and accompanying technicians and advisers quickened the pace of institutional change" (Smaldone 1991, 210-11). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

**Chad 82–90.** The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Goukouni Oueddei was the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armees du Nord; FAN). There are three important antecedent events described in COW. (1) The Chadian government faced a rebellion by the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) that ended in 1971, although FROLINAT remained intact. It later split into two factions, FAN and the People's Armed Forces (Forces Armees Populaires; FAP). (2) FAP fought a rebellion against the government from 1977 to 1978, and the government allied with FAN to help end the rebellion. President Malloum named the leader of FAN, Hissène Habré, as prime minister, although the government's accord with FAN also called for military integration, which was not implemented. (3) In 1979, FAN (later joined by FAP) attacked government troops, leading to international mediation and the creation of a coalition government in which the leader of FAP, Oueddei, became president; the leader of the (former) government armed forces (Chadian Armed Forces/Forces Armees Tchadiennes/FAT), Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue, became vice president; and Habré became defense minister. This begins a three-year warlord period in GWF's dataset.

The rebellion that engendered the rebel regime of 1982–90 began in 1980, when Habré's troops attacked FAT and FAP troops. Following FAN's overthrow of Oueddei in 1982, "After Habré consolidated his authority and assumed the presidency in 1982, his victorious army, the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armees du Nord—FAN), became the nucleus of a new national army. The force was officially constituted in January 1983, when the various pro-Habré contingents were merged and renamed FANT [Chadian National Armed Forces/Forces Armees Nationales Tchadiennes] ... At the time of its official establishment in 1983, FANT consisted primarily of FAN troops, the well-disciplined and hardened combat veterans who had been the original followers of Habré. FANT gradually expanded, recruiting members of the former national army,

FAT, who were predominantly southerners of the Sara ethnic group. Later, additional southerners, the comandos or codos who had opened a guerrilla campaign against the government in 1983, were won over after two and one-half years of negotiations. Assigned to rehabilitation camps for retraining, the physically fit among them were also inducted into FANT. Finally, in the latter half of 1986, after FAP, the largest component of Goukouni's northern rebel army, had revolted against its Libyan ally, FAP soldiers were merged into FANT to join the campaign against the Libyan bases in Chad . . . Only the Presidential Guard, a select force mostly drawn from Habré's own ethnic group, retained its separate identity" (Tartter 1990, 175, 179-80, 172).

**Congo-Brazzaville 97–NA.** The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Pascal Lissouba was the Cobra militia organized by ex-president Denis Sassou Nguesso (he lost an election in 1992). "Northern and Mbochi dominance in the postdemocratic Congolese army is somewhat hard to document but at the same time widely acknowledged. At the highest levels of army leadership, the pattern is clear. Upon his return to power, Sassou immediately brought back all of the northern officers who had been sidelined by Lissouba. Sassou put northern officers in charge of five of the country's eight military zones. He appointed General Yves Mutondo Mungonge, from Likouala, as his chief of staff soon after seizing power. In January 1999, shortly after the start of the 1998–1999 war, Sassou replaced him with Brigadier General Jacques Yvon Ndolou, another northerner who later became minister of defense. Although Sassou's military representatives have claimed that the integration of former militiamen into the army forces was neutral and open to all, no one takes this claim seriously. Virtually all southern Congolese aver that former Cobra militiamen were gradually integrated into the army, whereas militiamen from the other groups were not. A larger number of former Cobras were taken into the reorganized gendarmerie, as well as into the police forces of southern cities. Some junior officers who abstained from the fighting during the war of 1997 were allowed to retain their posts if they occupied technical posts and if the regime did not consider them a security risk. In these cases, however, they retained limited access to arms and intelligence. The army now appears to be much more uniformly northern than it was before 1991, though the claim would be impossible to document" (Clark 2008, 262-3).

**Eritrea 93–NA.** One of EPRDF/TPLF's allies in the struggle against the Mengistu regime (see the coding notes for Ethiopia) was the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Eritrea's post-independence military is the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF). "The EDF grew directly out of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which was reorganized to serve this function in the 1990s" (Connell 2019, 73). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

**Ethiopia 91–NA.** The regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam faced numerous armed challengers. The main rebel group that defeated his regime in 1991 was the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which was created in 1989 as a coalition of anti-Mengistu rebels, most importantly the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). "After the defeat of the military government in 1991, the provisional government disbanded the former national army and relied on its own guerrilla fighters for national security. In 1993, however, the Tigrayan-led government announced plans to create a multi-ethnic defense force. This process entailed the creation of a new professional army and officer class and the demobilization of many of the irregulars who had fought against the military government, although many Tigrayan officers remained in command positions" (Library of Congress 2005).

**Guinea-Bissau 74–80.** The main rebel group that fought for independence in Guinea-Bissau was the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano para a Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde; PAIGC), whose armed wing was the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (Forças Armadas Revolucionárias do Povo; FARP). "What happened to the 'guerrilla army' after independence?"

The foundation and evolution of the state of Guinea-Bissau was strongly linked to the FARP. Consisting of former freedom fighters, the FARP was the political and military structure of the one-party state regime” (Embaló 2012, 259). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

**Ivory Coast 11–NA.** The main rebel group that fought against the regime of Laurent Gbagbo was the New Forces of Ivory Coast (Forces Nouvelles de Cote d’Ivoire; FN). “On 17 March 2011, President Ouattara combined the former rebel Forces Nouvelles (FN) with cooperating elements of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS), the former government’s security forces, into the Republic Forces of Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI - Force Republicaines de Cote d’Ivoire), the country’s new official military” (GlobalSecurity.org n.d.). “Many headaches have been caused by attempts to amalgamate the two armies that were fighting each other a year ago—the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) from the Gbagbo camp and the former rebels from the north, the Forces Nouvelles (FN), who supported Ouattara—into a new army, the Forces Républicaines de Cte d’Ivoire (FRCI), which was formed on 17 March. So far, the integration process is proving to be very difficult. One of the main stumbling blocks has been the lack of hierarchy and integration within the command structure of the FRCI. The former rebels of the Forces Nouvelles (FN), who made a significant contribution to Ouattara’s military victory, are disproportionately represented and currently make up the bulk of the soldiers. This makes it more difficult to integrate the formerly hostile FDS soldiers. ... The decision to give so many top positions in the new armed forces to former rebel leaders has attracted widespread criticism” (Zandt 2012, 35-36).

**Liberia 97–03.** The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the Liberian government was the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor. The NPFL began fighting in 1989 against President Samuel Doe, leading to his death in 1990 and the installation (via international involvement) of Amos Sawyer as president. The NPFL never disarmed, and large-scale fighting resumed in 1992. It ended in 1996 with a compromise peace accord that called for elections the next year, which Taylor’s National Patriotic Party won. “The question of SSR [security sector reform] in Liberia first came up at the end of what Liberians call the ‘first war.’ In 1997, following a return to tentative peace, Charles Taylor was elected as president of Liberia. While some complained of electoral irregularities, many saw the victory of Taylor as the only means of preventing him from going back to war. A key component of the effort to ensure sustained peace and stability was the reform of the security sector by ECOMOG [West African regional troops]. Unsurprisingly, Taylor prevented ECOMOG from carrying out the reforms. He instead transformed his NPFL into the national army and avoided creating a truly national force. Abusive forces fiercely loyal to him, such as the Anti-Terrorism Unit, dominated the security landscape as Taylor continued to pillage the country’s resources.” (Onoma 2014, 146).

Toure (2002, 20) provides additional detail: “The international community’s preoccupation with the holding of elections as a means of peacefully resolving the Liberian civil war resulted in the neglect of the restructuring of the army—one of the most critical areas and pre-conditions to peacebuilding and in ensuring a stable post-war environment in Liberia. On being elected president in July 1997, Charles Taylor refused to allow ECOMOG to supervise the restructuring of his security services. The failure of the international community to give equal importance to the restructuring plan and to support the process gave Taylor overwhelming and unrestrained control and influence over the state security services. Taylor succeeded in creating a private army largely consisting of former fighters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). He appointed NPFL operatives to head key state security agencies. The domination of the state security apparatus by former NPFL fighters and the ruthlessness with which these agencies have operated, continue to pose a significant threat to peace in Liberia.”

**Mozambique 75–NA.** The main rebel group that fought for independence in Mozambique was the Mozambique Liberation Front (Portuguese Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique; FRELIMO), whose armed wing

was the People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique; FPLM). "The new state had to create a new national army drawn from the guerrilla forces, and this had to be accomplished quickly. As a result the new Forças Armadas de Moçambique/Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique (FAM/FPLM) had to resolve a number of fundamental issues: first, whether the transition would entail an incorporation of the thousands of Mozambicans who had served in the colonial forces; and second, whether the new army would follow either an essentially Western (Portuguese) institutional arrangement with "traditional" rank structure and administration, or the guerrilla administrative structures and command-and-control typologies. Following on this issue of operational doctrine—and as sub-themes—were issues regarding the new army's size and capabilities ... Some 30,000 Mozambicans (or three times Frelimo's guerrilla force) who had served in the colonial army were purposely marginalised. According to Paulino Macarique: 'the records show that during the negotiations, the Portuguese delegation proposed that all Mozambicans within the colonial army should be integrated into the new post-independence army. Frelimo rejected the proposal on grounds that they were part of the colonial machinery which had to be dismantled'" (Malache, Macarique and Coelho 2005, 161, 163). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

**Rwanda 94–NA.** The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Juvénal Habyarimana/Théodore Sindikubwabo was the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Its armed wing was the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which it renamed the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) in 1999. Following its military victory, the RPA "assumed the role of a national army, and has reportedly accepted 4,000 ex-members of FAR [*Forces armées rwandaises*, the former state military]. But the overwhelming bulk of both the command and the rank-and-file remain affiliated with the RPF. Moreover, because virtually all members of the RPF had military experience, many of those taking senior posts in the civil service are former members of the RPA" (Reed 1996, 498).

Prior to the RPF's military victory, there was a failed attempt at military integration (the Arusha Agreement of 1993) on which the government reneged. Despite military victory, the RPF implemented some aspects of the accord, including the integration of Hutu soldiers in the army to guard against both an internal security threat (Hutus were an overwhelming majority of the population) and external security threat (particularly the DRC, where Rwandan forces invaded in 1997 to overthrow Mobutu). "Once the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Army (RPF/RPA) took power, its leaders were determined to build a capable force that could defend the country from formidable guerrilla forces. The regime controlled the process so that recruits, including ancien régime soldiers from the FAR and rebel guerrillas, were integrated in waves over the span of a decade into the RPA and, after 1999, into the RDF" (Burgess 2014, 88). However, because the RPA replaced the existing state military and integrated Hutu troops from a clear position of strength, we code this as a case of complete military transformation rather than military integration.

**Uganda 86–NA.** The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regimes of Milton Obote/Tito Okello was the National Resistance Movement (NRM), whose armed wing was the National Resistance Army (NRA). "Upon taking power, the NRM controlled the civilian state apparatus and could also transform itself from a guerrilla movement to a government equipped with a defense force. All the leading personnel in the UPDF (Uganda People's Defense Force), the various police forces, and the presidential guard came from the Movement" (Makara, Rakner and Svåsand 2009, 191).

**Zimbabwe 80–NA.** The main armed groups that fought for liberation from white rule were the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Their respective political wings were the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Major fighting in the 1970s engendered a negotiated settlement with the white government (the Lancaster House Agreement). Elections with mass African participation occurred in

1980, which ZANU won. The settlement did not explicitly call for military integration, but this “was seen as a means of facilitating cooperation among all involved” (Jackson 2014, 49), in particular among ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the former Rhodesian state army, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). However, Mugabe deliberately undermined military integration and instead elevated ZANLA above the other organizations: “This case is one in which an initial integration was deliberately undermined for political reasons. The initial integration produced a superficially effective military, but real control lay with Mugabe” (61). Regarding the RSF, “Almost as soon as the election result was announced [in 1980], various units of the RSF began to melt away . . . The exodus of senior and middle-ranking white officers, along with many professional soldiers, weakened the ZNA (Zimbabwean National Army)” (57). Regarding ZIPRA, new officers “were selected from within their own organizations and therefore had some internal credibility. There were, however, political considerations, and after a time it was noted that the minority ZIPRA was being underrepresented, even before ZANLA launched a purge of the security services and effectively took control . . . The new military had been created fairly successfully in a short period, although obvious problems remained. However, the Mugabe government soon took control of the institution, pushing out former ZIPRA personnel and bringing senior military officers into its political alliance in return for economic benefits . . . [I]n a departure from the initial aims of integrating the factions, but in keeping with his Marxist principles, Mugabe established military units outside the integration structure. By 1983, Mugabe had arrested virtually all the senior military leadership of ZIPRA, and in March 1983 all the senior leadership of ZAPU, including Nkomo, went into exile. The unrelenting harassment of ZIPRA cadres led many to leave the APs [assembly points], which were still functioning. This led to widespread violence against former ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA, coupled with segregation, disarmament, disappearances, and an overall downplaying of ZIPRA’s role in the liberation struggle that continues to date. These moves meant that of the initial triumvirate designated to share power in the 1980 agreement, only ZANLA senior officers remained. This effectively cleared the way for the creation of a ZANU-led, politicized security policy that, as in the Chinese model, emphasized the political role of the military. A number of new units then emerged, undermining much of the integration that had taken place. . . . The creeping politicization coincided with the creation of two sets of security units outside the integration structure: the Fifth Brigade (5B) and the Zimbabwe People’s Militia (ZPM).” (54, 57, 58).

## A.2.2 Military Integration

**Burundi 05–NA.** The main (predominantly Hutu) rebel groups that fought to overthrow the Tutsi-dominated regime of Pierre Buyoya were the National Forces of Liberation (Force Nationale de Liberation; FNL) and Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). The war ended in a negotiated settlement, although this occurred in phases: FDD signed a ceasefire with the government in 2003, and FNL in 2006. The peace settlement called for military integration and a 50-50 balance rule between Hutus and Tutsis. Thus, Hutus did not *dominate* the officer corps of the revamped army, and post-war Ministers of Defense were Tutsi officers (see our Ministers biographies at the end of the appendix).

“The FDD forces were largely successful on the battlefield, although the FAB forces [i.e., the government military] were not defeated outright. Rebel successes are reflected in the agreements, whose provisions constitute a near-revolution in the country’s distribution of power, including the creation of a new military integrating FAB and rebel forces. This outcome was consolidated when the CNDD-FDD (the party formed from the politico-military movement) won large majorities in the national assembly and local councils in the 2005 elections . . . The accords provided extensive guidance on military reform. They established a rule of ethnic balance that posts would be allocated equally to Hutus and Tutsis; the overall composition of the security forces was to be balanced in this way ‘in view of the need to achieve ethnic balance and to



prevent acts of genocide and coups d'état' ... With the Arusha Accords in the background, the creation of an integrated military occurred through power sharing among the CNDD-FDD, the transitional government, and the high officer corps of FAB ... At the dawn of integration, ex-FAB officers constituted the bulk of the officership, although former CNDD-FDD members were placed in key positions and have been elevated over the years. The new military operates under the scrutiny of foreign officers temporarily reassigned from the Netherlands and Belgium to Burundi's Defense Ministry. The authority of these foreign officers is boosted by the substantial aid that their countries provide to Burundi. This balance of ex-FAB presence and CNDD-FDD presence, and of domestic presence and international presence, reduces the risk of any one political group's gaining what Huntington (1957) calls 'subjective' control of the military institutions" (Samii 2014, 215, 217, 218, 223).

**Chad 90–NA.** The main rebel groups that fought to overthrow the regime of Hissène Habré were the April 1 Movement and the Patriotic Salvation Movement (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut; MPS), both led by Idriss Déby. (NB: he merged the April 1 Movement into the MPS during the rebellion.) Habré and Déby were former allies, and Déby served as commander-in-chief of the military until Habré purged him and two other senior advisors on April 1, 1989. "The three supposed rebels gathered a column of seventy-four loyal soldiers, fought their way out of the capital (N'Djamena), and fled toward Sudan, pursued by a contingent of Habré's troops" (Dixon and Sarkees 2015, 643). Déby's two other collaborators died, but he eventually amassed an army of about 2,000 people that captured various cities in Chad and, in December 1990, the capital city.

This case is unambiguously a rebellion because Déby needed to build a private army and win battles to capture the capital. However, his rebel group was relatively small. Upon taking power, he operated from a relatively weak bargaining position vis-a-vis other factions of the existing state army, which did not dissolve during the fighting despite Déby's outright victory. He also had to contend with various other rebel groups operating in the country. "Déby, taking a page from Habré's playbook, pursued a policy of reconciliation with rebel factions, and in the early 1990s, various groups abandoned their struggle and joined the Déby regime. His first cabinet was larger than Habré's last, with 33 ministers, including a few holdovers from the previous regime. Yet, particularly in the early years of his rule, Déby had problems with his own allies; ironically, the grievances against Déby were similar to those the April 1st Group had against Habré. Members of Déby's own Zaghawa tribal group also became resentful of Déby's powersharing. Even though he 'elevated many Zaghawa to key ministerial positions,' and the Zaghawa dominated Déby's rebel army at the time of the overthrow, they had since 'felt sidelined by the president, who had committed himself to introducing multiparty democracy,' even if at the expense of Zaghawan interests" (Atlas and Licklider 1999, 45-46).

**Democratic Republic of the Congo 97–NA.** The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko was the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire*; AFDL). The AFDL replaced Mobutu's former state military, the Armed Forces of Zaire (*Forces Armées Zaïroises*; FAZ), which largely disintegrated during the war. "[O]n May 17, 1997, all resistance collapsed. DSP [Special Presidential Division/*Division Spéciale Présidentielle*/Mobutu's elite security force] and FAZ troops took off their uniforms and tried to cross the Congo into Brazzaville or hide among the population. The Mobutist state finally received its formal obituary. The war of liberation was complete" (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 229).

Despite defeating the government, organizationally, the AFDL was very weak because of its heavy reliance on Rwandan military assistance and "[t]he speed with which the AFDL moved through the DRC also meant that it had little time to establish organizational structures to administer its new territory, relying instead on Mobutu-era officials. It did hold referenda to identify particularly corrupt officials, who were removed,

but unlike other movements, the remaining officials had no organizational, ideological, or military links to either the AFDL or the RPA [the Rwandan military]” (Reed 1998, 20).

The new state military was the *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC; Armed Forces of the Congo). After gaining power and facing attacks from new foreign-sponsored rebel groups, the weakness of the FAC “forced Kabila to eventually accept a political and military power-sharing deal,” specifically, the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement in 1999 (Verweijen 2014, 140). Kabila repeatedly sought to undermine the military integration provisions, instead favoring his personally controlled presidential guard, which “constituted a parallel power network in the armed forces” (Verweijen 2014, 143).

Despite these heavily personalist elements of the state military, the weakly organized rebel group that launched the regime did not dominate the military. Neither of the two Ministers of Defense that served at least three years (see the table at the end of the appendix) came from the rebellion. Although not fully implemented, the quota system for personnel selection is also consistent with the non-domination by FAC: “The division key followed a quota system roughly based on the numbers of combatants that each faction had declared in Sun City, leading to the following division: 35 percent FAC, 17 percent MLC, 28 percent RCD-G, 8 percent Mai-Mai, and 12 percent other groups” (Verweijen 2014, 145). The partial nature of the military integration also enabled rival groups to avoid domination by the FAC. “[F]actions which agreed to dismantle their military structures did not necessarily abstain from militarized power politics. The ex-belligerents adopted two main strategies to offset the potential loss of influence caused by army integration: First, they tried to maintain economic and political control by building up power bases within the political and administrative institutions—for example, by entrenching themselves locally or provincially in unelected administrative positions or by forging alliances with factions that were likely to have good electoral results. Second, they attempted to maintain military spheres of influence by building up client networks both within and outside the military” (Verweijen 2014, 148-9).

**Namibia 90–NA.** The main armed group that fought for independence was the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), and the political wing of the movement was the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO). “Since Namibia had no army at independence, one of the priorities of the new government was the establishment of an integrated Namibian Defense Force (NDF)” (Dzinesa 2012, 279). Indicating PLAN’s ascendancy in the new military, “The overall commander of the Namibian Defence Force is the former PLAN leader, Dimo Hamaambo” (Grotpeter 1994, 405), and every post-independence Minister of Defense was a member of SWAPO during the rebellion (see the table at the end of the appendix). However, unlike most other colonial liberation cases, PLAN did not directly transition to become the national military upon independence. Instead, the 10,000-strong PLAN army and the 8,000-strong SWATF army were each demobilized before creating the new NDF, overseen by a British Military Advisory and Training Team (Mills 1992). Harkness (2018 appendix, 103) reiterates: “On independence, the new national army was formed by integrating the armed wing of the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) with the colonial South West African Territorial Force (SWATF).” The integration of these two military forces into the new state military leads us to code this case as military integration.

**South Africa 94–NA.** The main armed group that fought for liberation against white rule was uMkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation; MK), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC). Other armed African groups were the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), the military arm of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and the Kwa Zulu Self Protection Force (KZSPF) of the Inkatha Freedom Party. The war ended in a negotiated settlement that called for elections with mass African participation and military integration. There were eight separate forces in total to integrate: the state military (South African Defence Force; SADF), separate militaries for the four “homelands,” MK, APLA, and KZSPF (Licklider 2014, 122). Whereas SADF and the homeland forces were organized for conventional warfare, the three African groups

were organized for guerrilla warfare. The absence of outright rebel victory was important for shaping the negotiations. “The NSF troops [those from MK/ALPA/KZSPF] saw themselves as having won the war against the SADF and the homeland forces, so it was not obvious to them why they should adapt to the SADF model. SADF personnel, conversely, felt that they had never been defeated and resented the insertion of former enemies whom they regarded as unprepared . . . Over time, agreement began to emerge. The new military would be modern, which in practice meant that it would adopt the SADF model in many ways . . . Some MK leaders would be given high-level positions, and its rank and file would be given training and fair opportunities for promotion. . . . The initial results of the negotiations suggest that the SADF had definitely done better than its opponent, but this impression is deceptive because the inevitable political victory of the African National Congress meant that many of the subsidiary agreements were simply overridden later. The SADF was compelled to accept the full integration of forces and such programs as affirmative action and the fast-tracking of members of the NSF. The NSF were compelled to accept a new SANDF initially led and very much controlled by members of the old SADF . . . The four homeland armies were all small and composed of SADF ethnic units, usually led by white South African officers. These groups played no significant role in the negotiations and were fairly easy to integrate into the new military. The Pan-Africanist Congress stayed out of the negotiations until the end but finally agreed to be integrated; the KZSPF Party militias were not brought into the process until 1996, and then only as new recruits. Interestingly enough, the PAC cadres, although fewer in numbers and with less combat experience, fared somewhat better in the integration process proportionately than those from MK” (122, 123, 126).

Over the next decade as the merger occurred: “the proportion of Africans in the SANDF went from about 40 percent to almost 70 percent, while the white proportion dropped from 47 percent to 18 percent. However, these figures conceal important differences. Blacks dominate both the enlisted personnel (of whom only about 2 percent are white) and the highest ranks (brigadier general and up), where a majority are MK veterans; whites still occupy more than half the officer and noncommissioned officer positions, the so-called operational positions. That most lower-level officers and noncommissioned officers are white in part reflects major educational differences resulting from the apartheid educational system . . . There is also some concern that the current military is becoming increasingly politicized, because it is closely linked to the ANC” (128, 129). As our biographical data show, the first Minister of Defense was a former MK fighter, indicating ANC’s ascendancy in the military. Williams (2002) provides details about a shift in the balance of power that occurred among the top generals in 1998 following the forced resignation of the white chief-of-staff of the SANDF (he had disseminated unsubstantiated rumors of a coup plot by senior MK officers). This shift “signalled the demise of the so-called ‘old guard’ within the new SANDF” and created a transition to more liberal white officers and a “grouping consist[ing] mainly of former MK officers located largely in the SANDF” (23, 24).

**South Sudan 11–NA.** The main rebel group that fought against the northern-dominated Sudanese regime was the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (in particular the faction led by John Garang after a split in 1991; SPLM-Garang), whose armed wing was the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Following a ceasefire in 2002 and a referendum in 2006, South Sudan gained independence in 2011. Despite creating a new country with no incumbent state military, the new South Sudan People’s Defence Forces amalgamated various rebel groups and factions of SPLM that emerged during the war. “South Sudan’s current defense force is composed of the SPLA, the rebel movement that liberated the country; various militia forces that had opposed the SPLA during the war but were absorbed into it after the 2005 peace agreement; and a large number of military personnel that were part of the northern Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), but who were also absorbed into the SPLA. This composition has made for a very volatile relationship among the senior command officers” (Jok 2011, 11).



### A.2.3 No Military Transformation

**Liberia 05–NA.** The main rebel groups that fought to overthrow the regime of Charles Taylor were Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Neither had a role in the post-war government or military. Both were highly factionalized and essentially ceased to exist after the transition (Käihkö 2015, 2018). Instead, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of the Unity Party won the 2005 presidential election, and international actors created the post-war military. “Peacemaking and postconflict reconstruction in Liberia had come to be defined as the washing away of the NPFL’s and Taylor’s influence in the country even though the NPFL had for long periods been the country’s most powerful force. Indeed, even the security of the interim government and the elected government of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf that replaced it in 2005 were guaranteed not by local power bases superior to the NPFL, but by the UN peacekeeping mission in the country. Thus, the peculiar thing about Liberia is not that ‘there was no clear winner of the war,’ as claimed by the ICG (2009, 22). It is that the eventual ‘winning’ regime has no firm local roots but is instead guaranteed by an impressive international force . . . The U.S. State Department on its own decided to completely demobilize the existing AFL [Armed Forces of Liberia] and create an entirely new force into which former members of the AFL were not necessarily going to be integrated” (Onoma 2014, 147, 148).

**Morocco 56–NA.** The main rebel group that fought for independence was the Army of Liberation (Jaish-al-tahrir). However, neither the monarch Muhammad V nor the Istiqlal party (who led the broader independence movement) controlled these forces. “The main body of the Moroccan army was recruited by French officers among Berber-speaking mountain tribes in a country that is predominantly Arab in language and culture. After independence in 1956, this army, though still largely commanded by French-trained Berber officers, was enlarged from 20,000 to 30,000 men by the addition of guerrilla fighters of the Moroccan Army of Liberation. It is under the control of the King instead of being responsible to a civilian cabinet” (Halpern 1963, 269). “With the establishment of the Royal Army, however, the Liberation Army became an anomaly to the new Moroccan administration as well as an obstacle to negotiation with the French on conventions for economic aid, etc. The absorption of the irregular army also posed peculiar problems for the Istiqlal. Many of the officers and non-commissioned officers were Moroccans of French Army background who had had little or no connection with the party before independence. Those coming from the urban resistance were very likely cell members of the Istiqlal, but none were acknowledged party leaders prior to independence. The troops were recruited mostly from local tribes, who had never been in contact with the Istiqlal for the most part and who recognized only the King as their leader” (Ashford 1959, 16).

**Sierra Leone 98–NA.** The main armed groups that, in February 1998, initiated a rebellion to overthrow Sierra Leone’s government were the *Kamajors* and foreign ECOMOG troops (from Guinea, Ghana, and Nigeria) fighting on behalf of former president Ahmad Kabbah. At the outset of the rebellion, the government was a coalition between the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). There are three important antecedent events. (1) Sierra Leone experienced a civil war between 1990 and 1996, initiated by RUF. The government allied with private civilian militias, known as *Kamajors*, to fight RUF. (2) International pressure caused the military government to hold elections in 1996, which Kabbah won. (3) In 1997, a military faction overthrew Kabbah; they then formed the AFRC and invited RUF into the governing coalition.

In March 1998, the Kabbah coalition overthrew AFRC/RUF, who (now as the out-of-power faction) continued to fight against the new Kabbah government until 2002. Despite largely achieving military victory over RUF, the Kabbah government had a weak bargaining position because of its heavy reliance on foreign troops, in contrast to the typical rebel regimes that contained a strong domestic core to the rebel army. When

signing the Lomé agreement of 1999 (which ultimately failed to keep the peace), President Kabbah “did not trust his own forces and had spent the war relying on the protection of either foreign troops or the civil militias. His primary security fear was not, therefore, a military merger, but rather maintaining the status quo” (Kovacs 2014, 208). We code this case as no military transformation because of Kabbah’s heavy reliance on foreign troops.

**Tunisia 56–11.** The main rebel group that fought for independence was the *fellagha* guerrillas. However, the guerrillas “were not organized by Neo-Destour [the main independence movement], which claimed it did not approve of violence” (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 315). Instead, in 1954, leaders of Neo-Destour used “all their influence” to induce the *fellagha* to lay down their arms in 1954 (Perkins 2014, 131). Ben Youssef led the *fellagha*; he had earlier developed a rivalry with Habib Bourguiba, the leader of Neo-Destour. Prior to the first independence elections, Bourguiba engineered the electoral rules to deny seats to supporters of Youssef (136), who “opposed the agreement with the French and French actions in Algeria [and] continued guerrilla activities in southern Tunisia in 1956” (Dixon and Sarkees 2015, 316). “Because the Tunisian army consisted of only a few thousand men, many of them former guerrillas lacking adequate training, ending the rebellion required the assistance of the former colonizer. With some reluctance, the French army and police cooperated with the Bourguiba government ... and by June 1956 the last of the *fellagha* were killed or captured” (Perkins 2014, 136).

## B SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR REGRESSION TABLES

### B.1 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR TABLE 3

**Sensitivity to unobserved covariates.** Table B.1 shows that the coefficient estimates are relatively insensitive to unobserved covariates. Therefore, although it is impossible to control for every possible confounder, if the covariates included Table 3 are substantively relevant, then there is less reason to believe that covariates not included in any of the specifications would overturn the results. Specifically, Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) present a commonly used metric that estimates how large the bias from unobserved covariates would need to be for the true coefficient to be 0 in a statistical model, given information from how much adding observable covariates changes the estimates. To compute this measure, Table B.1 compares the coefficient estimates for the rebel regimes indicators in specifications with and without covariates. Specifically, it compares the coefficient estimate for all rebel regimes in each of Columns 2-4 to that in Column 1, and the coefficient estimates for colonial liberation regimes and other rebel regimes in each of Columns 6-8 to those in Column 5. Negative numbers in Table B.1 imply that the coefficient estimate in the specification with covariates exceeds in magnitude the coefficient estimate in the restricted specification. This indicates an estimate highly robust to omitted covariates because the magnitude of the bias of unobserved covariates would need to go in the opposite direction as the bias from omitting observables to drive the coefficient estimate to 0. This is the case for five of the nine estimates in Table B.1. In other specifications, the estimates are positive but large in magnitude. For example, in Column 2, the bias from unobservables would need to be 9.2 times larger than the bias from omitting the covariates contained in this specification to overturn the positive coefficient estimate. This reflects the fact that adding covariates only minimally affects the baseline coefficient estimates. For comparison, Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) calculate a corresponding figure of 3.55 for their own analysis, which they interpret as large in magnitude.

**Table B.1: Sensitivity to Unobserved Covariates for Table 3**

Column in Table 3:	(2)	(3)	(4)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	9.2	-12.4	-13.4			
Colonial liberation regime				5.8	-26.7	4.7
Other rebel regime				21.7	-11.7	-4.9

**Jackknife sample sensitivity analysis.** We assessed the robustness of the estimates in Table 3 to jackknife sample alterations. For each column in Table 3, we iteratively dropped every year for each country in the sample. In all 204 regressions ( $51 \times 4$ ) with the aggregate rebel regimes indicator, the negative coefficient estimate is statistically significant at 1%. This is also true for the other rebel regimes indicator. For colonial liberation regimes, in 155 of the 204 (76%) sensitivity regressions, the coefficient estimate is significant at 1%; and all but two of the 204 are significant at 5%. When dropping all years from either Gambia or Namibia, the coefficient estimate for colonial liberation regimes slightly exceeds 5% (0.0503 and 0.0524).

**Table B.2: Dropping Revolutionary Regimes from Table 3**

DV: REGIME FAILURE				
Panel A. Lachapelle et al. (2019)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no LLWC cases)	-0.0429*** (0.00683)	-0.0391*** (0.00736)	-0.0448*** (0.00799)	-0.0456*** (0.00806)
Regime-years	2,391	2,391	2,391	2,391
Regimes	159	159	159	159
Countries	48	48	48	48
R-squared	0.013	0.046	0.045	0.050
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Colgan and Weeks (2015)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no CW cases)	-0.0404*** (0.00672)	-0.0361*** (0.00703)	-0.0437*** (0.00841)	-0.0433*** (0.00826)
Regime-years	2,430	2,430	2,430	2,430
Regimes	160	160	160	160
Countries	50	50	50	50
R-squared	0.014	0.047	0.046	0.050
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel C. Roessler and Verhoeven (2016)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no RV cases)	-0.0393*** (0.00733)	-0.0344*** (0.00724)	-0.0386*** (0.00859)	-0.0396*** (0.00836)
Regime-years	2,250	2,250	2,250	2,250
Regimes	153	153	153	153
Countries	41	41	41	41
R-squared	0.010	0.046	0.045	0.049
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.2 re-runs Columns 1–4 in Table 3 while dropping all observations from regimes that we code as REBEL REGIME=1 and that an existing dataset codes as revolutionary. Panel A drops six rebel regimes that Lachapelle et al. (2019) code as revolutionary. Panel B drops five rebel regimes that Colgan and Weeks (2015) code as revolutionary. Panel C drops twelve rebel regimes that Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as violent liberation regimes. Table 2 denotes which regimes are dropped in each panel.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table B.3: Table 3 with Post-Treatment Controls**

DV: REGIME FAILURE								
Panel A. Democracy covariate								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0407*** (0.00726)	-0.0398*** (0.00875)	-0.0456*** (0.00909)	-0.0446*** (0.00914)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0349*** (0.00875)	-0.0275*** (0.0103)	-0.0331*** (0.0115)	-0.0251** (0.0127)
Other rebel regime					-0.0479*** (0.00838)	-0.0570*** (0.0118)	-0.0602*** (0.0123)	-0.0675*** (0.0131)
V-Dem polyarchy	-0.0520*** (0.0157)	-0.0712*** (0.0205)	-0.0760*** (0.0227)	-0.0709*** (0.0221)	-0.0508*** (0.0158)	-0.0763*** (0.0205)	-0.0791*** (0.0222)	-0.0753*** (0.0211)
Regime-years	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.016	0.048	0.047	0.051	0.016	0.049	0.048	0.052
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. International support for government								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0486*** (0.00858)	-0.0430*** (0.00870)	-0.0474*** (0.00950)	-0.0467*** (0.00959)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0389*** (0.00864)	-0.0318*** (0.0101)	-0.0327*** (0.0121)	-0.0261** (0.0131)
Other rebel regime					-0.0622*** (0.0106)	-0.0596*** (0.0124)	-0.0649*** (0.0124)	-0.0716*** (0.0136)
Intnat'l support for gov.	0.0535*** (0.0157)	0.0471*** (0.0152)	0.0451*** (0.0160)	0.0422*** (0.0159)	0.0550*** (0.0159)	0.0493*** (0.0157)	0.0481*** (0.0165)	0.0459*** (0.0164)
Regime-years	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.021	0.049	0.048	0.051	0.021	0.050	0.049	0.053
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* The series of regression specifications in Table B.3 are identical to those in Table 3 except each panel adds one additional covariate to each column (for expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates). In Panel A, we control for V-Dem's electoral democracy index (polyarchy). In Panel B, we control for an indicator variable that equals 1 in every year that the Non-State Actor dataset (Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009) lists the country's government as receiving military support from another country during an ongoing civil war; and equals 0 otherwise. The estimates are qualitatively identical when recoding this indicator variable to equal 1 only if the military support came from a non-African country (not reported).

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table B.4: Robustness Checks for Table 3: Logit, Cross Section, Coercive-Origins Regimes**

DV: REGIME FAILURE								
Panel A. DV: Logit models								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.846*** (0.466)	-1.791*** (0.480)	-1.948*** (0.466)	-1.984*** (0.465)				
Col. liberation regime					-1.799*** (0.685)	-1.654** (0.751)	-1.819** (0.758)	-1.685** (0.804)
Other rebel regime					-1.889*** (0.618)	-1.913*** (0.641)	-2.057*** (0.641)	-2.210*** (0.669)
Regime-years	2,563	2,272	2,272	2,272	2,563	2,272	2,272	2,272
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Pseudo R-Squared	0.0568	0.117	0.114	0.127	0.0568	0.117	0.114	0.127
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Cross-section of regimes								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.977*** (0.475)	-1.657*** (0.513)	-1.925*** (0.482)	-1.754*** (0.475)				
Col. liberation regime					-2.118*** (0.698)	-1.812** (0.752)	-2.002*** (0.711)	-1.679** (0.735)
Other rebel regime					-1.813*** (0.612)	-1.478** (0.596)	-1.847*** (0.602)	-1.819*** (0.599)
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Panel C. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0621*** (0.0128)	-0.0584*** (0.0150)	-0.0677*** (0.0181)	-0.0656*** (0.0179)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0563*** (0.0157)	-0.0369** (0.0185)	-0.0517* (0.0270)	-0.0387 (0.0268)
Other rebel regime					-0.0674*** (0.0109)	-0.0843*** (0.0189)	-0.0847*** (0.0247)	-0.0939*** (0.0244)
Regime-years	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354
Regimes	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89
Countries	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
R-squared	0.031	0.088	0.089	0.094	0.031	0.090	0.090	0.096
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* The series of regression specifications in Table B.4 are identical to those in Table 3 except for the following changes in each panel (for expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates). In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4 and 6–8. The missing values are from years in which no successful coups occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. In Panel B, we summarize a series of Cox proportional hazards models, estimated with robust standard errors clustered by country. For the time-varying covariates, we computed the average value for each regime. In Panel C, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates for the rebel regimes indicators are consistently larger than those in Table 3, although due to the smaller sample size here (excluding civilian regimes drops 46% of the sample), the coefficients are less precisely estimated. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

## B.2 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE RESULTS

### B.2.1 Historical Background on African Colonialism

Following decades of relatively peaceful European rule in Africa, the colonial project fell into crisis after World War II. Greater mobilization ability by Africans, weakened European powers with domestic populations more skeptical of overseas rule, and a shift to a bipolar international system with two superpowers hostile to overseas colonialism forced new choices onto European colonists (Young 1994). In most cases, it was clear to both metropolitan officials and major producers that the economic costs of retaining colonial rule outweighed the benefits (Fieldhouse 1986), especially when factoring in the higher likelihood that Africans (or, in North Africa, Arabs) would revolt without reforms. Consequently, in the two decades following World War II, most of the continent peacefully transitioned to African majority rule and independence.

The main exceptions were territories with sizable European populations. Wherever they settled in large numbers, European settlers usually composed a politically influential interest group—and, in independent South Africa and semi-independent Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), they directly controlled the state. White settlers had considerable vested interests in their domination of the best land, a non-mobile asset they expected to lose under African majority rule. Their control of land also created a cheap and mobile labor supply of Africans that they could exploit (Mosley 1983). Consequently, European settlers fiercely resisted delegating control to the African or Arab majority, which frequently engendered decolonization violence. Data from Paine (2019b) shows that:

- Among the seven territories with the largest European population shares around World War II, every one experienced a major colonial liberation war.
- Among the next ten-highest, four did.
- Among the 25 lowest, only one did.
- (The highest category contains cases with colonial European population shares between 2.7% and 20.1%, the middle category between 0.4% and 2.5%, and the lowest category no greater than 0.4%.)

Although African rebel groups did not gain control of the post-colonial state in all cases with a major decolonization war, the European population percentage was high in every case we code as a colonial liberation regime, except two. Guinea-Bissau's decolonization war was essentially a spillover of Portugal's wars in Angola and Mozambique. Both these colonies, in particular Angola, had significant settler populations. (Paine 2019b discusses how white settler influence over the colonial regime was lesser but still considerable in the Portuguese cases.) Additionally, Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia rather than from a European country.

### B.2.2 Justification for Instrumental Variable

Climatic factors that influenced prospects for European settlement provide a plausible instrumental variable for colonial liberation regimes. Historians have discussed conditions required for replicating large-scale European agricultural settlements in Africa (Mosley 1983, 5; Lutzelschwab 2013, 145). Temperate climate, found at the northern and southern tips of the continent, enabled large-scale European-style farming settlements. The remainder of the continent contains tropical climate, which obviates most temperate farming practices. However, Europeans could cultivate similar cereal crops as at home in tropical areas that met three conditions. First, they needed high enough rainfall to grow crops. Second, high enough elevation created

moderate temperatures. Third, Europeans needed land without the tsetse fly, which causes sleeping sickness in humans.

We use a variable from Paine (2019b) that combines GIS data for climate, rainfall, elevation, and tsetse fly prevalence. For each country, the variable measures the logged percentage of its territory that had either:

- Mediterranean climate, or
- All three of:
  - Rainfall of at least 20 inches per year, and
  - 3,000 feet in elevation (Mosley 1983, 5 proposes both of these thresholds), and
  - the lowest quartile on Alsan’s (2015) tsetse fly suitability index.

Figure B.1 depicts these conditions. The variable used below takes the natural log to prevent a handful of cases with extreme values of the instrument from driving the results. Our variable for the area of each country does not include desert and semi-desert area to eliminate territory where very few people, European or not, would settle.

**Figure B.1: African Territory Suitable for Large-Scale European Settlement**



Three main considerations motivate why this is a reasonable instrument for studying the effects of colonial liberation regimes. First, all components of the instrument are exogenous in the sense that they are not caused by political factors that could affect regime durability. Importantly, the tsetse fly data comes from Alsan’s (2015) tsetse fly suitability index—which is derived from historical climate data—rather than from colonial or post-colonial maps of tsetse fly prevalence, which may be affected by climate change or by stronger states better able to control the fly (389). We also estimate models with various pre-independence covariates (logged population density in 1800, whether any ethnic groups in the country had a precolonial state, index of rugged terrain, colonizer fixed effects) to account for additional sources of heterogeneity. We use these rather than the more standard (relative to the literature) set of covariates used in Table 3, which are mostly post-independence and therefore inappropriate “post-treatment” controls relative to our instrument. Of course, factors such as historical population density might have also been influenced by the instrument, which is why we also estimate specifications without the covariates.



Second, Panel B of Table B.5 demonstrates that the instrumental variable is strongly correlated with rebel regimes. We prefer estimating 2SLS estimates of colonial liberation regimes directly on land suitability rather than a 3SLS specification with an intermediate stage that controls for European population percentage given the difficulty of satisfying and assessing the additional exclusion restrictions.

Third, the exclusion restriction is plausible. One would have to construct an alternative explanation for how particular climatic conditions affected regime durability independent of their effect on rebel regimes. Paine (2019b) examines how these climatic conditions—by affecting the size of the European settler population—generated decolonization violence. However, this is not an independent channel from our main explanatory factor, because this violence generated the colonial liberation regimes. In addition to the lack of existing theory that supports such a connection, Table B.6 demonstrates that only reasonably large violations of the exclusion restriction would make the main coefficient estimates insignificant at conventional levels.

### B.2.3 Results

Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table B.5 present findings from two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions that estimate simultaneous equation models composed of the linear analog of Equation 1 and:

$$R_{it} = \beta_{0,Z} + \beta_Z \ln Z_i + \mathbf{X}'_{it} \beta_{X,Z} + \mathbf{T}'_{it} \beta_T + \epsilon_{Z,it}, \quad (\text{B.1})$$

where  $Z_i$  is the instrument. In Columns 3 and 4, the first-stage equation is:

$$CL_{it} = \beta_{0,Z} + \beta_Z \ln Z_i + \beta_{OR} OR_{it} + \mathbf{X}'_{it} \beta_{X,Z} + \mathbf{T}'_{it} \beta_T + \epsilon_{Z,it}, \quad (\text{B.2})$$

where  $CL_{it}$  indicates colonial liberation regimes and  $OR_{it}$  indicates other rebel regimes. We use the instrument only for colonial liberation regimes given the theoretical justification that climatic factors affected rebel regimes by triggering decolonization conflicts. Although the dependent variable is binary, it is standard to estimate such instrumental variable regressions with 2SLS (Angrist 2001). Additionally, the discreteness of the endogenous regressor—colonial liberation regimes—causes particular problems for nonlinear endogenous regressor models by violating the assumption of additive, independent errors (Wooldridge 2014, 227). Furthermore, linear and nonlinear models tend to produce similar results for non-extreme values of the explanatory variable (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 107) and, as noted, logging the climate instrument guards against horizontal outliers.

The estimates in Panel A of Table B.5 reaffirm those in Table 3. In fact, the magnitude of the estimates in Table B.5 are more than twice as large as the corresponding estimates in (unreported) OLS models with the sample sample and set of covariates. Panel B presents the first-stage regressions using Equation B.1 only. It shows that in each specification, the partial F-test for the instrument exceeds the conventional standard of 10 for a weak instrument (Staiger and Stock 1997).

**Table B.5: Instrumental Variable Regressions**

Panel A. 2SLS. DV: Regime failure				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (IV=land suitability)	-0.0849** (0.0355)	-0.102** (0.0417)		
Col. liberation regime (IV=land suitability)			-0.0871** (0.0377)	-0.101** (0.0397)
Other rebel regime			-0.0566*** (0.00890)	-0.0594*** (0.0135)
ln(pop dens. in 1800)		0.00134* (0.000803)		0.00114 (0.000769)
Precolonial state		0.0223 (0.0149)		0.0207 (0.0134)
Rugged terrain		-0.00562 (0.00497)		-0.00526 (0.00486)
British colony		0.00289 (0.0233)		0.00712 (0.0208)
French colony		0.00698 (0.0234)		0.0110 (0.0218)
Portuguese colony		0.0636* (0.0346)		0.0685* (0.0367)
Regime-years	2,210	2,210	2,210	2,210
Regimes	142	142	142	142
Countries	42	42	42	42
R-squared	0.009	0.039	0.009	0.041
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Panel B. First stage. DV: Col. liberation regime				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(% area suitable for Eu. agri.)	0.0523*** (0.0155)	0.0647*** (0.0190)	0.0489*** (0.0141)	0.0687*** (0.0184)
Other rebel regime			-0.116* (0.0619)	-0.0540 (0.0494)
R-squared	0.196	0.320	0.315	0.518
Covariates?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
F-test for IV	11.4	11.6	12.0	14.0
Panel C. Reduced form. DV: Regime failure				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(% area suitable for Eu. agri.)	-0.00444*** (0.00141)	-0.00654*** (0.00168)	-0.00426*** (0.00141)	-0.00679*** (0.00174)
Other rebel regime			-0.0465*** (0.00834)	-0.0582*** (0.00991)
R-squared	0.013	0.017	0.017	0.023
Covariates?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table B.5 presents a series of 2SLS estimates with Equation B.1 as the first stage. The sample differs from that in Table 3 because island countries (except Madagascar) and countries that did not gain independence from a European country (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia) are missing data on the climate instrument. Panel B presents the first-stage estimates and Panel C presents the reduced-form estimates. In the latter two panels, for expositional clarity, we omit the coefficient estimates for the covariates; and the samples in those panels are identical to those in the corresponding columns in Panel A. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the exclusion restriction. Because the exclusion restriction is unlikely to be perfectly satisfied in any social scientific research, it is important to assess how badly it would have to be violated to invalidate our results. Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) provide a suitable method with the stated purpose: “Often the instrument exclusion restriction that underlies the validity of the usual IV inference is suspect; that is, instruments are only plausibly exogenous. We present practical methods for performing inference while relaxing the exclusion restriction” (260). They assume that instead of the linear link for Equation 1, the dependent variable is generated by:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_R R_{it} + \gamma \ln Z_i + \mathbf{X}'_{it} \beta_X + \mathbf{T}'_{it} \beta_T + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (\text{B.3})$$

If  $\gamma \neq 0$ , then the instrument directly affects the outcome, i.e., the exclusion restriction is not perfectly satisfied. Although it is likely that  $\gamma \neq 0$  in any applied research situation, this is only problematic for the present 2SLS estimates of the rebel regime coefficients if  $\gamma$  is large in magnitude. Because  $\gamma$  is unobservable, we can examine how the results would change for different hypothetical values of  $\gamma$ . Table B.6 states for each specification in Table B.5 the value of  $\gamma$  for which the p-value of the 2SLS estimated effect of rebel regimes (or the disaggregated indicators) would equal either 0.05 or 0.10. If the true  $\gamma$  is negative and smaller in magnitude than the amount stated in the table, then the coefficient estimate for rebel regimes from the stated column in Table B.5 is statistically significant at the stated threshold. If instead the true  $\gamma$  is positive, then the magnitude of the coefficient estimate from the regression table is *downwardly* biased. The numbers in parentheses in Table B.6 state the  $\gamma$  thresholds as a percentage of the reduced form estimated effect of the instrument on regime failure.

**Table B.6: Assessing Sensitivity of IV Results to Exclusion Restriction Violations**

Column in Table B.5:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Stat. sig. at 5% if $\gamma \geq$	-.0011	-.0023	-.0009	-.0024
(% of reduced-form estimate)	(25%)	(35%)	(21%)	(35%)
Stat. sig. at 10% if $\gamma \geq$	-.0018	-.003	-.0016	-.003
(% of reduced-form estimate)	(41%)	(46%)	(38%)	(44%)

Table B.6 demonstrates that the 2SLS estimates are insensitive to moderately large violations of the exclusion restriction. Approximately 29% of the reduced form effect of the instrument on regime failure must occur through channels other than colonial liberation regimes for the liberation regimes coefficient estimate not to be significant at least at the 5% level. The corresponding figure is 42% for the 10% significance level. We lack an alternative hypothesis suggesting an unmodeled channel of this magnitude.

### B.3 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR TABLE 4

**Table B.7: Table 4 with Estimates for Covariates**

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER SAME							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.301*** (0.0546)	0.237*** (0.0566)	0.186*** (0.0576)	0.186*** (0.0598)				
Col. liberation regime					0.307*** (0.0706)	0.272*** (0.0649)	0.247*** (0.0642)	0.270*** (0.0757)
Other rebel regime					0.290*** (0.0748)	0.181** (0.0765)	0.101 (0.0743)	0.0761 (0.0749)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0131 (0.0231)		0.00700 (0.0343)		0.0102 (0.0238)		-0.0157 (0.0374)
Growth in ln(GDP p.c.)		0.129 (0.0873)		0.164* (0.0845)		0.139 (0.0895)		0.196** (0.0854)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000699 (0.00269)		-0.00266 (0.00248)		-0.000874 (0.00271)		-0.00207 (0.00236)
ln(population)			0.0370 (0.0244)	0.0363 (0.0323)			0.0323 (0.0242)	0.0478 (0.0316)
Ethnic frac.			0.199 (0.149)	0.200 (0.148)			0.249 (0.152)	0.265* (0.148)
Religious frac.			0.0273 (0.135)	0.0280 (0.124)			0.0388 (0.136)	0.0233 (0.127)
British colony			-0.161* (0.0891)	-0.171** (0.0860)			-0.176** (0.0886)	-0.186** (0.0837)
French colony			-0.0393 (0.0923)	-0.0338 (0.0891)			-0.0555 (0.0930)	-0.0607 (0.0863)
Portuguese colony			0.159 (0.127)	0.163 (0.125)			0.105 (0.146)	0.0801 (0.150)
Regime-years	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458
Regimes	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.065	0.121	0.160	0.163	0.065	0.122	0.164	0.168
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.7 is identical to Table 4, except here we present the coefficient and standard error estimates for the substantive control variables. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

**Table B.8: Table 4 with Defense Minister Appointment**

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.268*** (0.0636)	0.187*** (0.0655)	0.113* (0.0686)	0.115 (0.0715)				
Col. liberation regime					0.263*** (0.0865)	0.214*** (0.0800)	0.162* (0.0869)	0.191* (0.103)
Other rebel regime					0.276*** (0.0693)	0.143* (0.0787)	0.0456 (0.0752)	0.0162 (0.0752)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0192 (0.0308)		0.00320 (0.0438)		0.0170 (0.0316)		-0.0171 (0.0496)
Growth in ln(GDP p.c.)		0.154 (0.101)		0.203** (0.0926)		0.162 (0.104)		0.234** (0.0969)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000958 (0.00359)		-0.00373 (0.00331)		-0.00110 (0.00355)		-0.00320 (0.00325)
ln(population)			0.0584* (0.0322)	0.0628* (0.0365)			0.0547* (0.0322)	0.0730** (0.0362)
Ethnic frac.			0.241 (0.212)	0.241 (0.211)			0.280 (0.215)	0.300 (0.214)
Religious frac.			0.0182 (0.177)	0.0134 (0.162)			0.0274 (0.178)	0.00944 (0.165)
British colony			-0.206* (0.110)	-0.220** (0.109)			-0.219** (0.111)	-0.233** (0.107)
French colony			-0.0161 (0.111)	-0.00910 (0.104)			-0.0291 (0.113)	-0.0334 (0.103)
Portuguese colony			0.219* (0.132)	0.223* (0.122)			0.177 (0.156)	0.147 (0.159)
Regime-years	2,470	2,470	2,470	2,470	2,470	2,470	2,470	2,470
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.054	0.131	0.207	0.212	0.054	0.132	0.209	0.217
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.8 is identical to Table 4 except it changes the dependent variable to DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table B.9: Robustness Checks for Table 4: Logit, Cross Section, Coercive-Origins Regimes**

DV: DEFENSE MINISTER SAME								
Panel A. DV: Logit models								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	1.241*** (0.240)	1.027*** (0.248)	0.832*** (0.258)	0.830*** (0.269)				
Col. liberation regime					1.270*** (0.311)	1.199*** (0.297)	1.168*** (0.290)	1.283*** (0.352)
Other rebel regime					1.196*** (0.324)	0.762** (0.328)	0.398 (0.326)	0.276 (0.330)
Regime-years	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458
Regimes	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Pseudo R-Squared	0.0475	0.0929	0.127	0.129	0.0476	0.0944	0.131	0.134
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Cross-section of regimes								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.385*** (0.0587)	0.337*** (0.0658)	0.295*** (0.0626)	0.277*** (0.0665)				
Col. liberation regime					0.384*** (0.0683)	0.319*** (0.0739)	0.296*** (0.0821)	0.297*** (0.0911)
Other rebel regime					0.385*** (0.0873)	0.351*** (0.0982)	0.294*** (0.0838)	0.262*** (0.0899)
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.184	0.234	0.296	0.307	0.184	0.235	0.296	0.307
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Panel C. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.398*** (0.0565)	0.303*** (0.0681)	0.245*** (0.0617)	0.248*** (0.0672)				
Col. liberation regime					0.397*** (0.0710)	0.355*** (0.0673)	0.310*** (0.0527)	0.359*** (0.0712)
Other rebel regime					0.400*** (0.0742)	0.198** (0.0863)	0.151* (0.0797)	0.107 (0.0858)
Regime-years	1,337	1,337	1,337	1,337	1,337	1,337	1,337	1,337
Regimes	87	87	87	87	87	87	87	87
Countries	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38
R-squared	0.157	0.248	0.258	0.269	0.157	0.256	0.264	0.281
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* This table follows the same structure as Table B.4. The series of regression specifications in Table B.9 are identical to those in Table 4 except for the following changes in each panel (for expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates). In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. In Panel B, we estimate linear models on a cross-section of regimes, with robust standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable is the percentage of years for each regime in which DEFENSE MINISTER SAME=1. For the time-varying covariates, we computed the average value for each regime. In Panel C, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates for the rebel regimes indicators is consistently larger than in Table 4, although due to the smaller sample size here (excluding civilian regimes drops 46% of the sample), the coefficients are less precisely estimated. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## B.4 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR TABLE 6

**Table B.10: Table 6 with Estimates for Covariates**

DV: SUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPTS								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0295*** (0.00683)	-0.0209*** (0.00634)	-0.0294*** (0.00673)	-0.0271*** (0.00686)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0218*** (0.00774)	-0.0175** (0.00857)	-0.0284*** (0.00905)	-0.0218** (0.0106)
Other rebel regime					-0.0418*** (0.00523)	-0.0265*** (0.00565)	-0.0308*** (0.00634)	-0.0343*** (0.00730)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.000236 (0.00373)		-0.00699 (0.00462)		-0.000466 (0.00387)		-0.00826 (0.00546)
Growth in ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0509* (0.0285)		-0.0487* (0.0291)		-0.0498* (0.0289)		-0.0466 (0.0296)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000447 (0.000454)		-0.000366 (0.000504)		-0.000457 (0.000453)		-0.000327 (0.000499)
ln(population)			0.00390 (0.00309)	0.0106** (0.00428)			0.00382 (0.00314)	0.0111** (0.00446)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0228 (0.0171)	-0.0247 (0.0155)			-0.0221 (0.0183)	-0.0210 (0.0177)
Religious frac.			0.0113 (0.0166)	0.00387 (0.0172)			0.0116 (0.0167)	0.00391 (0.0172)
British colony			-0.00597 (0.0102)	-0.00592 (0.0104)			-0.00616 (0.0103)	-0.00666 (0.0105)
French colony			0.00576 (0.00753)	0.00419 (0.00743)			0.00553 (0.00774)	0.00262 (0.00788)
Portuguese colony			0.00516 (0.0182)	0.00207 (0.0189)			0.00431 (0.0188)	-0.00307 (0.0203)
Regime-years	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.010	0.041	0.040	0.043	0.011	0.041	0.040	0.043
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.10 is identical to Table 6, except here we present the coefficient and standard error estimates for the substantive control variables. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

**Table B.11: Table 6 with All Coup Attempts**

	DV: ALL COUP ATTEMPTS							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0404*** (0.0128)	-0.0346*** (0.0126)	-0.0450*** (0.0157)	-0.0423*** (0.0157)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0358*** (0.0133)	-0.0345*** (0.0130)	-0.0487*** (0.0175)	-0.0423** (0.0196)
Other rebel regime					-0.0499** (0.0223)	-0.0347 (0.0246)	-0.0391* (0.0233)	-0.0424 (0.0261)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.000757 (0.00534)		-0.00771 (0.00622)		0.000753 (0.00549)		-0.00772 (0.00804)
Growth in ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0706 (0.0456)		-0.0632 (0.0463)		-0.0706 (0.0457)		-0.0632 (0.0469)
ln(oil & gas income)		-2.33e-05 (0.000735)		-4.43e-05 (0.000757)		-2.37e-05 (0.000737)		-4.41e-05 (0.000772)
ln(population)			0.00760* (0.00456)	0.0139** (0.00622)			0.00793* (0.00449)	0.0140** (0.00680)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0110 (0.0332)	-0.00991 (0.0327)			-0.0136 (0.0349)	-0.00987 (0.0360)
Religious frac.			-0.00361 (0.0218)	-0.0123 (0.0234)			-0.00457 (0.0218)	-0.0123 (0.0234)
British colony			-0.00799 (0.0159)	-0.00705 (0.0155)			-0.00736 (0.0159)	-0.00706 (0.0156)
French colony			0.0143 (0.0116)	0.0118 (0.0121)			0.0151 (0.0124)	0.0118 (0.0142)
Portuguese colony			0.0137 (0.0306)	0.00835 (0.0318)			0.0167 (0.0326)	0.00829 (0.0360)
Regime-years	2,234	2,234	2,234	2,234	2,234	2,234	2,234	2,234
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.028	0.054	0.055	0.057	0.029	0.054	0.055	0.057
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.11 is identical to Table 6 except it changes the dependent variable to ALL COUP ATTEMPTS, i.e., either failed or successful. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .



**Table B.12: Robustness Checks for Table 6: Logit, Cross Section, Coercive-Origins Regimes**

DV: SUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPTS								
Panel A. DV: Logit models								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.484*** (0.503)	-1.239** (0.495)	-1.677*** (0.490)	-1.569*** (0.502)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.928** (0.460)	-0.818* (0.480)	-1.287** (0.533)	-1.083* (0.601)
Regime-years	2,563	1,949	1,949	1,949	2,351	1,801	1,801	1,801
Regimes	165	165	165	165	152	152	152	152
Countries	51	51	51	51	40	40	40	40
Pseudo R-Squared	0.0406	0.0925	0.0920	0.103	0.0281	0.0799	0.0776	0.0899
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Cross-section of regimes								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.121*** (0.0211)	-0.0957*** (0.0203)	-0.104*** (0.0239)	-0.0924*** (0.0266)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.109*** (0.0235)	-0.0761*** (0.0222)	-0.0851*** (0.0282)	-0.0643* (0.0366)
Other rebel regime					-0.131*** (0.0209)	-0.111*** (0.0215)	-0.118*** (0.0301)	-0.114*** (0.0318)
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.035	0.065	0.058	0.069	0.036	0.066	0.059	0.070
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Panel C. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0437*** (0.00999)	-0.0341*** (0.00966)	-0.0418*** (0.0109)	-0.0397*** (0.0109)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0374*** (0.0114)	-0.0328*** (0.0108)	-0.0491*** (0.0128)	-0.0469*** (0.0138)
Other rebel regime					-0.0528*** (0.00837)	-0.0365*** (0.0108)	-0.0311** (0.0145)	-0.0304** (0.0150)
Regime-years	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354
Regimes	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89
Countries	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
R-squared	0.023	0.081	0.086	0.090	0.023	0.081	0.086	0.090
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* This table follows the same structure as Tables B.4 and B.9. The series of regression specifications in Table B.12 are identical to those in Table 6 except for the following changes in each panel (for expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates). In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4. The missing values are from years in which no successful coups occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. For Columns 5–8, none of the OTHER REBEL REGIMES have ever experienced a successful coup attempt, and therefore every observation for these regimes are dropped in these columns (in addition to the dropped observations in Columns 6–8 for years with no successful coup attempts). In Panel B, we estimate linear models on a cross-section of regimes, with robust standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable is the percentage of years for each regime in which SUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPTS=1. For the time-varying covariates, we computed the average value for each regime. In Panel C, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

## B.5 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

**Table B.13: Civilian Powersharing**

Panel A. DV: VP/PM SAME								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0899 (0.0765)	-0.0293 (0.0704)	-0.0165 (0.0724)	-0.0221 (0.0712)				
Col. liberation regime					0.0512 (0.0978)	-0.0388 (0.0941)	-0.0354 (0.136)	-0.0699 (0.135)
Other rebel regime					0.133 (0.107)	-0.0186 (0.104)	0.000865 (0.0847)	0.0208 (0.0883)
Regime-years	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,850
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.004	0.079	0.122	0.127	0.005	0.079	0.122	0.128
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. DV: VP/PM APPOINT								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0456 (0.0838)	-0.136** (0.0693)	-0.128 (0.0833)	-0.130* (0.0785)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0467 (0.115)	-0.184* (0.111)	-0.203 (0.155)	-0.218 (0.144)
Other rebel regime					0.152* (0.0807)	-0.0787 (0.0704)	-0.0569 (0.0784)	-0.0474 (0.0830)
Regime-years	1,893	1,893	1,893	1,893	1,893	1,893	1,893	1,893
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.001	0.195	0.259	0.260	0.009	0.197	0.262	0.264
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.13 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates (double-clustered by regime and country) in parentheses. The sequence of specifications is identical to those in the main tables. For expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

**Table B.14: Ethnic Powersharing**

Panel A. DV: ETHNIC REPRESENTATION								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0204 (0.0932)	-0.0760 (0.0905)	0.0205 (0.0900)	0.00895 (0.0867)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0228 (0.124)	-0.0750 (0.124)	0.106 (0.110)	0.0621 (0.113)
Other rebel regime					-0.0164 (0.0962)	-0.0777 (0.101)	-0.0972 (0.0994)	-0.0614 (0.112)
Regime-years	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.001	0.035	0.075	0.100	0.001	0.035	0.087	0.103
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. DV: ETHNOCRACY								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0107 (0.128)	0.0223 (0.115)	-0.0839 (0.0978)	-0.0838 (0.0969)				
Col. liberation regime					0.103 (0.172)	0.0788 (0.161)	-0.0100 (0.143)	0.0153 (0.145)
Other rebel regime					-0.198* (0.112)	-0.0691 (0.121)	-0.186 (0.116)	-0.215* (0.114)
Regime-years	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.000	0.092	0.201	0.213	0.021	0.097	0.206	0.220
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.14 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates (double-clustered by regime and country) in parentheses. The sequence of specifications is identical to those in the main tables. For expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates. Data on the ethnic makeup of cabinets is from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR; Vogt et al. 2015). In Panel A, the dependent variable is ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, the percentage of the country's population with some membership in cabinet or other high-ranking positions in the central government (i.e., "junior partner" or higher in the EPR scheme). In Panel B, the dependent variable is ETHNOCRACY, an indicator for whether a single ethnic group has a status of either "monopoly" or "dominant," hence shutting out members of any other ethnic group from influential cabinet positions. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table B.15: Ethnic Composition of Rebel Regimes**

Case	Main rebel group	First five years of regime
Algeria 62–92	Arabs	Arabs
Angola 75–NA	Mbundu-Mestico	Mbundu-Mestico
Burundi 06–NA	Hutu	Hutu, Tutsi
Chad 82–90	Toubou	Toubou, Hadjerai, Sara, Zaghawa/Bideyat
Chad 90–NA	Hadjerai, Zaghawa/Bideyat	Hadjerai, Zaghawa/Bideyat, Sara, Toubou
Congo-B 97–NA	Mbochi	Mbochi, Batéké, Kouyou
DRC 97–NA	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	Tutsi-Banyamulenge, Luba Shaba, Lunda-Yeke
Eritrea 93–NA	Christian Eritreans, Muslim Eritreans	Christians, Other Muslims
Ethiopia 91–NA	Tigry, Amhara, Oroma	Tigry, Amhara, Oroma
Guinea-Bissau 74–80	Cape Verdean, Balanta	Cape Verdean
Ivory Coast 11–NA	Non-ethnic	Northerners, Baule, Other Akans, Southern Mande
Liberia 97–03	Gio, Mano	Americo-Liberians, Gio, Mano
Liberia 05–NA	Krahn, Mandingo	Americo-Liberians, Krahn, Mandingo, Gio, Mano
Morocco 56–NA	Arabs, Berbers	Arabs
Mozambique 75–NA	Makonde-Yao, Tsonga-Chopi	Makonde-Yao, Tsonga-Chopi
Namibia 90–NA	Non-ethnic	Ovambos, 7 others
Rwanda 94–NA	Tutsi	Tutsi
Sierra Leone 98–NA	Mende	Mende
South Africa 94–NA	Africans (esp. Xhosa), Coloreds, Asians	Xhosa, 12 others
South Sudan 11–NA	Dinka, Nuer, others	Dinka, Nuer
Tunisia 56–11	Non-ethnic	Non-ethnic
Uganda 86–NA	South-Westerners, Baganda	South-Westerners, Baganda, Basoga
Zimbabwe 80–NA	Shona, Ndebele	Shona, Whites
% ethnically exclusive	30%	26%

*Notes:* The column “Main rebel group” lists every ethnic group that participated in the main rebel group that launched each rebel regime (Section A.2 states these rebel groups). To code this, we use ACD2EPR for every rebel group their dataset contains (as the name suggests, this dataset matches rebel groups from the Armed Conflict Dataset, ACD, with ethnic groups from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset, EPR). “Non-ethnic” means that ACD2EPR codes the main rebel group as not proclaiming aims for and recruiting mainly from any particular ethnic groups. For cases that ACD2EPR does not contain (all the missing cases are colonial liberation cases), we used the coding notes from EPR to determine the ethnic composition of the rebel group.

The column “First five years of regime” lists every ethnic group whose power status EPR codes as junior partner or higher within the first five years of the start of the rebel regime, with the group with the highest power status listed first. “Non-ethnic” means that EPR codes ethnicity as not politically relevant in that country at that time.

We highlight in gray every case in which a single ethnic group dominated both the rebellion to gain power and the first five years of the regime.

Measuring a regime's control over society is particularly difficult. As noted in the text, we follow Lachapelle et al. (2019) by using V-Dem's Core Civil Society Index (Panel A of Table B.16). Another relevant measure is the Bertelsmann Transformation Index's (BTI) "stateness" variable, which equals the average of scores on four categories: (1) monopoly on the use of force, (2) state identity, (3) no interference in religious dogmas, and (4) basic administration. Since the third category is irrelevant for our purposes, we computed the average among the other three. The main drawback of this variable is its limited temporal coverage, since it begins in 2006. Panel B uses the average value of our adjusted stateness variable for 2006, 2008, and 2010, and shows null correlations for a cross-section of countries in 2006 (i.e., for each country, REBEL REGIME takes its value from 2006).

**Table B.16: Controlling the Countryside**

Panel A. DV: V-Dem Core civil society index								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0124 (0.0569)	-0.0699 (0.0499)	-0.0533 (0.0481)	-0.0472 (0.0459)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.119* (0.0699)	-0.0855 (0.0678)	-0.111 (0.0769)	-0.0838 (0.0770)
Other rebel regime					0.143** (0.0640)	-0.0448 (0.0611)	0.0264 (0.0552)	0.00129 (0.0535)
Regime-years	2,562	2,562	2,562	2,562	2,562	2,562	2,562	2,562
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.000	0.387	0.484	0.511	0.083	0.388	0.495	0.515
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. DV: Adjusted BTI stateness								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.108 (0.501)	0.0491 (0.483)	-0.177 (0.482)	0.137 (0.415)				
Col. liberation regime					0.852* (0.495)	0.879 (0.541)	0.591 (0.628)	0.141 (0.536)
Other rebel regime					-0.961* (0.558)	-0.740 (0.574)	-0.797 (0.477)	0.133 (0.619)
Countries	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
R-squared	0.001	0.193	0.244	0.493	0.136	0.286	0.300	0.493
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006

Notes: Table B.16 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates (double-clustered by regime and country) in parentheses. The sequence of specifications is identical to those in the main tables. For expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates. Higher values for the coefficient estimates in Panel A indicate a stronger and more autonomous civil society. Higher values for the coefficient estimates in Panel B indicate greater stateness. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

## B.6 REGIME DURABILITY DESPITE STATE WEAKNESS IN ANGOLA

The colonial liberation case of Angola exemplifies a regime that has endured for a long period despite exerting weak control over society. Following a lengthy liberation war with Portugal, the government (MPLA) faced a high-intensity center-seeking challenge from UNITA between 1975 and 2002, which had also participated in the liberation struggle. By the time the post-independence period began, UNITA had become a counterrevolutionary movement funded by South Africa and the United States to counter the Marxist orientation of MPLA, who received military backing from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Angola is a typical rebel regime with regard to the military powersharing mechanisms: MPLA created the state military during the liberation struggle, and it has been immune to coups while consistently sharing power with military elites.

The Angolan regime nearly fell in the 1990s due to the collapse of the state in much of the country. “Cumulatively, four decades of fighting have unmade and reshaped Angola, socially and physically. Most of the conflict took place in the countryside, depopulating rural areas and crippling a once vibrant rural economy. The country, which in 1975 was the world’s fourth largest exporter of coffee, had few commercial coffee farms at all by 2002. Roads and bridges were systematically destroyed and the soil sown indiscriminately with landmines,” and state weakness also created an opening for rebels in Cabinda to attempt to secede (Le Billon 2007, 104-5). UNITA held territory and mined diamonds outside the government’s stronghold in Luanda. In 1992, as part of a ceasefire, MPLA participated in elections judged free and fair by the international community, thus creating an alternative channel through which UNITA might have gained power. However, MPLA won and UNITA rejected the results, leading to renewed fighting (Fituni 1995, 152).

The inability of MPLA to gain control over the national territory until twenty-seven years after independence is unsurprising when considering factors stressed by Africanists. Herbst (2000) scores Angola as among the African countries with the most difficult political geographies given its large size and scattered population centers, and specifically asserts that “[t]he large territory of Angola has made it extremely difficult for the government to find a military solution to the civil war that began at independence in 1975” (151). The country’s borders are a product of negotiations between Portugal and Britain in the late nineteenth century, and include significant territory beyond the historical Mbundu kingdoms of Kasanje and Matamba. These borders contain several medium-sized and regionally segmented ethnic groups whose historical rivalries ultimately undermined the initial promise in the 1960s that the liberation movement would develop a unified nationalist identity, as opposed to distinct ethnic organizations (Fituni 1995, 149; Le Billon 2007, 102; Reno 2011, 64-78). For MPLA, the main ethnic constituency is the Mbundu, who are primarily located near the capital city of Luanda and compose 20% of the population. For UNITA, it is the Ovimbundu, located in the central highlands and composing 35% of the population. The third major anti-colonial rebel group (defeated several years after independence) was FNLA, represented by Bakongo in the northwest of the country with 15% of the population. Cabindan Mayombe, of the separatist rebel group FLEC, compose 2% of the population. As in many countries with similar histories, members of an ethnic group that was organized as a state prior to colonization (Mbundu in MPLA) gained control of the government at independence and did not share power with members of other ethnic groups (Paine 2019a). Overall, Angola exemplifies that regime durability and state weakness are not mutually exclusive.

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**Table B.17: Minister of Defense Biographical Information**

Country	Defense Minister	Important figure from the war?	Biography
Algeria	Houari Boumediene (1962-1965)	Yes	Served as a colonel during the war, the highest rank in the FLN forces. He was also the chief of staff of the ALN, the FLN's military wing. Served as the second president of Algeria after his MoD appointment.
	Khaled Nezzar (1990-1992)	No	Went to military school in Algiers and received training in Moscow, but was too young to fight in the independence war. Was appointed within the MoD in 1965 upon finishing his training.
Angola	Iko Carreira (1976-1980)	Yes	He was a key figure in Angola's struggle for independence. He was a veteran MPLA militant who served as head of security during the war of liberation against Portugal. He is credited with being the architect of the Angolan modern army.
	Pedro Maria Tonha (1981-1995)	Yes	As a guerilla in the 1960s, Tonha fought against Portuguese colonial rule. Pedro Maria Tonha led government (MPLA) forces through nearly 15 years of civil war. After independence in 1975, he became governor of central Huambo province. He became defense minister in 1981.
	Pedro Sebastiao (1996-1998)	Yes	General Pedro Sebastiao was noted to have had a brilliant military career and was a former MPLA guerilla. In November 1975, he was commander of the FAPLA (armed wing of the MPLA) squadron and in that capacity was in the front line at the Battle of Ntó where he fended Congolese invaders off of Cabinda. The Battle of Ntó was decisive in Angola's path to independence.
	Kundy Paihama (1999-2010)	No	Kundy Paihama served as governor of Cunene, Benguela, Huila, and Luanda provinces. He speaks several Angolan languages which is rare for senior MPLA officials.
	Candido van Dunem (2010-2014)	No	Officer in the Angolan armed forces. Served as a military advisor to Angola's Permanent Mission to the UN from 2000-2004.
Burundi	Joao Manuel Gonalves Lourenco (2015-2017)	Yes	Began his military career fighting with the MPLA in the liberation war. Received training in the Soviet Union. Was appointed as a provincial governor in 1984. Is the current president of Angola.
	Germain Niyoyankana (2005-2010)	No	Prior to his appointment as Defense Minister, Niyoyankana was a lieutenant general in the army, and before that, he was the army chief of staff.
			During the 1993-2005 civil war, he was a top army commander in the state military and is credited with

Chad	Pontien Gaciyubwenge (2011-2014)	No	peacefully integrating former Hutu rebels into the army, which was historically dominated by Tutsis. He was also part of the extant state military. While combating the rebels during the civil war, he made his way up the hierarchy in the army, going from battalion commander, to group commander, military region commander, and finally brigadier general. He was the Director General of Planning and Studies within the MoD before his appointment. First civilian to hold the MoD position, he has a legal background.
	Emmanuel Ntahomvukiye (2015-2017)	No	
	Mahamat Nouri (2001-2004)	No	
	Wadel Abdelkader Kamogue (2008-2012)	No	
Congo - B	Bichara Issa Djadallah (2013-2015)	Yes	During the 1970s, Hourri was the number two commander of Habre's rebel forces, and later rose to be the leader of the Northern forces. He held several portfolios under Habre, including Minister of the Interior. After Habre was ousted by Deby, Nouri became a close ally of Deby and held several portfolios, including Minister of the Interior in addition to the Minister of Defense. Nouri is considered one of Deby's greatest threats. Played a key role in the 1975 coup that overthrew Tombalbaye. Controlled southern Chad during the subsequent Habre regime, was appointed as Minister of Agriculture. After Deby came to power in 1990, he was appointed as the Minister of Civil Service and Labor from 1993-1994. He ran for president as an opposition candidate in 1996 and 2001. Deby named him the president of the national assembly in 1997, and then MoD in 2008.
	Itihi Ossetoumba (1999-2001)		
	Jacques Yvon Ndolou (2002-2009)	Yes	Founding member of the PCT and was on the five-member executive committee of the National Revolutionary Council. In 1989, he was appointed as the number-two position in the regime, in charge of the PCT Political Bureau.
	Charles Richard Mondjo (2012-2017)		
DRC	Charles Mwando Simba (2009-2012)	No	Served as an army officer during the war, and was the Director of Lessons and Studies at the Military Academy from 1987-1993. Was the commander of the country's economic capital for five years. Served as the Chief of Staff of the Congolese Armed Forces for ten years before his MoD appointment. Led an anti-Tutsi militia separate from the ADFL.

Eritrea	Crispin Atama Tabe (2015-2017)	No	Background in law and career in civil services. Past posts include the National Intelligence Agency and Minister of the Interior of the Eastern Province. A leading figure in the EPRP and the EPLF from the 1970s. He was born in Tigray to Eritrea parents from Asmara. He studied at Haile Selassie University in Addis Ababa. He left to join the EPLF in 1972 where he worked in mass administration department. At the EPLF's First Congress in 1977, he was placed on the front's Political Committee and appointment head of the Department of Public Administration. In 1986, he joined the General Staff, and was credited for being the leading strategist in the last years of the armed struggle. Sebhat stayed with the army until 1992, when he was appointed the major of Asmara. He returned to the army in 1995 to become the Minister of Defense and Eritrea's first full general.
	Gen. Sebhat Ephrem (1995-2017)	Yes	
Ethiopia	Siye Abraha (1991-1994)	Yes	Abraha was one of the founders of the TPLF and was a key commander during the war.
	Tefera Walwa (1997-2000)		
	Abedula Gemedo (2002-2005)	No	
Guinea Bissau	Kuma Demekesa (2006-2008)	Yes	Received military training after the war. Reached the rank of Major General of the National Defense Force in 1998.
	Siraj Fergesa (2009-2017)	No	Was a founding member of the rebel group and spent several years as a prisoner of war during the war. Served as the Minister of Internal Affairs before his MoD appointment.
	Joao Bernardo Vieira (1974 – 1978)	Yes	Joined the party as an administrator promoting economic development in the early 1990s.
	Commandant Umaru Djalo (1979 – 1980)	No	Celebrated guerilla commander in the national liberation struggle, which took place from 1963 to 1974. He joined the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) party in 1960, and became a police commissar and military chief in southern Guinea-Bissau in the 1960s. Received military training in China, and was named vice president of the War Council in 1965, and the first president of the National Assembly in 1973. Djalo held the position of Member of the Council of State in Cabral's government in 1977, which was indicative of the fact that the top members of the PAIGC political party were also the top government officials in the new government of Guinea-Bissau. According to some, Djalo was one of the closest men to President Cabral before he was overthrown in the coup of 1980.
Ivory Coast	N'Guessan Michel Amani (2011-2017)	No	Background in teaching and was appointed as the Minister of National Education from 2000-2007.

Liberia	Daniel Chea (1997-2003)		
	Brownie Samukai (2006-2017)	No	From 1999-2005, he served as a security officer with the UN, primarily responsible for refugee resettlement.
Morocco	Mahjoubi Aherdane (1961-1965)	Yes	Founding member of the Moroccan Liberation Army.
	Abderrahmane Sbai (1997-2009)	No	Background in civil service before MoD appointment.
	Abdellatif Loudiyi (2010-2017)	No	Career civil servant who served in the Ministry of Finance before MoD appointment.
Mozambique	Alberto Joachim Chipande (1976-1994)	Yes	He was a leading member of FRELIMO and has held positions on the Political Bureau and Central Committee. In September 1964, he legendarily fired the first shot against the Portuguese colonial forces in Mozambique's liberation war.
	Aguiar Jonassane Reginaldo Real Mazula (1995-1999)	No	Aguiar Mazula was the first civilian Minister of Defense in Mozambique. He was Minister of Labor and Minister of State Administration before he was named Minister of Defense. Although he was not involved in the independence war, as Minister of Labor he played a large role in negotiating Mozambique's civil war peace talks in the late 1980's and early 1990's.
	Gen (retd) Tobias Joaquim Dai (2000-2008)	Yes	Dai fought in the Mozambican Independence War against Portugal and rose up in the FRELIMO military ranks to become Commander of the Army during the civil war.
	Filipe Nyussi (2008-2014)	No	He comes from the northern province of Cabo Delago, which was the birthplace of Chipande as well as the Mozambican independence movement more broadly. Although Nyussi did not take part in the independence movement, both of his parents were veterans of the liberation war as FRELIMO members.
Namibia	Agostinho Mondlane (2015-2017)		
	Peter Mueshihange (1990 – 1994)	Yes	One of the original activists that formed the Ovamboland People's Organization (OPC) in 1958 in Cape Town, South Africa. In 1970 was named the acting secretary for foreign affairs of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which was the independence movement that turned into the main political party in Namibia (a SWAPO official has government Namibia since its independence in 1990).

Rwanda	Phillemon Malima (1995 – 1997)	Yes	Served as the SWAPO Representative to the USSR from 1987 to 1989 during the liberation war. Before becoming Defense Minister in 1995, he was the Deputy Minister of Defense under Mueshihange. Member of the SWAPO political party, and was sent into exile in 1974, when he went to Zambia and later left for military training in the Soviet Union. Returned to Namibia in 1979 to fight in its war for independence, and was the Director of Communications at Shiumaba from 1979 to 1982. From 1983 to 1989, he was the Director of Communications for the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia, a wing of SWAPO. Was Deputy Minister of Defense from 1995 to 1997, before he became the head Minister of Defense.
	Erikki Nghimtina (1998 – 2004)	Yes	
	Charles Namoloh (2007 – 2012)	Yes	Joined SWAPO in 1971 as a union organizer. Namoloh was arrested and lashed for supporting SWAPO, and after he was released from prison in 1974 he left Namibia to go to SWAPO military bases in Zambia. Became chief of staff of Dimo Hamaambo, the second in command of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, from 1979 to 1989. Helped establish the Namibian Defense force after independence in 1990, and worked with it from 1990 to 1995. Was a member of the 18 person SWAPO "Politburo". Called the "Father of the Special Forces in the People's Liberation Army of Namibia.
	Nahas Angula (2013-2015)	No	Was in exile during the war. He was in charge of SWAPO voter registration.
	Paul Kagame (1994-1999)	Yes	Kagame was received military training in the United States prior to the civil war. During the war, Kagame specialized in intelligence gathering, and he rose through the ranks of the NRA, joining Museveni as a top leader of the NRA. Under the Museveni president, Kagame served as the head of military intelligence. In 1990, Kagame led the newly organized RPF troops during the civil war. In the post-genocide Rwandan government, Kagame was appointed as the Vice President and Minister of Defense.
	Emmanuel Habyarimana (2000-2002)	No	Habyarimana was a former member of the Rwandan Armed Forces under President Juvenal Habyarimana. Following the successful attacks of the RPF, he joined the newly constituted Rwanda Defense Forces as a colonel.
	Marcel Gatsinzi (2003-2009)	No	Gatsinzi was a second lieutenant in the Rwanda Army prior to the civil war. During the war, he also served as Army Chief of Staff.

	James Kabarebe (2010-2017)	Yes	During the war, he was a high-ranking commander. His unit later became the Republican Guard for Kagame.
Sierra Leone	Paolo Conteh (2008-2017)		
South Africa	Joe Modise (1994-1998)	Yes	Modise served as high command in Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's armed faction, after the party was banned in 1960. He was vital in its creation and recruitment. He received training in Czechoslovakia and the USSR in 1963 and 1964. He returned to Tanzania in 1964 before going to Zambia and Botswana to find a way to covertly enter ANC cadres into South Africa. He was asked to take over command of the armed faction from 1965 to 1984 while Mandela was imprisoned. He was elected as well to the ANC's national executive committee during this time. When the ANC was unbanned in 1990, Modise moved rapidly through the politic ranks, becoming the first black Minister of Defense in 1994 where he oversaw the integration of the ANC's armed faction with the apartheid army.
	Mosiua Patrick Lekota (1999-2008)	Yes	Was educated at the University of the North but was expelled in a student protest and became a permanent organizer for the South African Students' Organisation, the first major black consciousness organization. With other black consciousness leaders, he was charged under the Terrorism Act and found guilty of conspiring to commit acts that might endanger the maintenance of law and order. Imprisoned for six years on Robben Island, he became a staunch supporter of the African National Congress under the influence of Nelsen Mandela and others. Released in 1982, he became publicity secretary for the United Democratic Front the following year. He was detained, then charged with high treason relating to the revolt in the Vaal Triangle. Convicted with others in 1988, he received a 12-year sentence, which was overturned on appeal. He worked for the ANC from 1990, then in 1994 became premier of the Free State until 1996.
	Charles Nqakula (2008-2009)	Yes	Nqakula was a journalist in the apartheid era was placed under a banning order for political activism in 1981, having been detained regularly by either the Ciskeian or South African authorities. He was elected as publicity secretary of the United Democratic Front in 1983 and by this time was working underground for the ANC. He was arrested in the same year, and decided to leave South Africa to undergo military training in Angola, where he joined Umkhonto we Sizwe. He also received



			<p>military training in the USSR and East Germany. He served as MK commander for the Western Cape from 1988, and emerged from the underground upon receiving amnesty in 1991. He progressed through the ranks of the South African Communist Party until he was elected as Deputy General Secretary in 1991 and subsequently as the party's General Secretary in 1993. In 1999 he became the chairperson of the SACP. In 1994 he was elected as a member of Parliament and acted as the parliamentary counselor to the president until 2001, when he took over the position of Deputy Minister of Home Affairs. In 2002, he became Minister of Safety and Security, and in 2008 he was moved to the position of Minister of Defense, which he held until 2009.</p> <p>During apartheid, Sisulu was the editor of <i>Times of Swaziland</i>, then taught at the high school and college levels before completing an MA at the University of York. She was detained as a terrorist for 11 months, alleged to have possession of funds from the ANC, a banned party at the time. Sisulu then went into exile and joined Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC, where she worked underground. She specialized in Intelligence during this training. Upon the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, she returned to South Africa and worked as a personal assistant to Dr. Jacob Zuma before becoming an administrator in the ANC's Department of Intelligence and Security. She became Deputy Minister of Home Affairs in 1996 and served until 2001, whereupon she became Minister of Intelligence until 2004. She then was the Minister of Housing until 2009, whereupon she became Minister of Defense until 2012.</p> <p>Underwent military training in Angola and the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, she served as the head of the commission that investigated ANC deserters. Before her MoD appointment, she was the Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Correctional Services.</p>
	Lindiwe Sisulu (2009-2012)	Yes	
	Nosiviwe Mapisa Nqakula (2013-2017)	Yes	
South Sudan	John Kong Nyuon (2011-2012)		
Tunisia	Bahi Ladgham (1960-1966)	Yes	One of the architects of the Tunisian army. Was a key member of the Franco-Tunisian negotiations for independence.
	Abdallah Farhat (1977-1979)	No	Background in civil service.
	Slaheddine Baly		

Uganda	(1981-1988) Abdallah Kallel	No	Background in civil service.
	(1989-1991) Abdelaziz Ben Dhia		
	(1992—1996) Dali Jazi		
	(2002-2005) Kamel Morjane	No	Too young to fight in the independence war. Background in civil service.
	(2006-2010) Farhat Jorchani	No	Too young to fight in the independence war. Background in law.
Uganda	(2015-2017) Amama Mbabazi	Yes	Mbabazi played an instrumental role during the war and is a founding member of the NRM. From 1986-1992, he was the head of the External Security Organization. He was said to be the “final man” before Museveni made any decisions.
	(2001-2006)		
Zimbabwe	Crispus Kiyonga	No	Prior to 1981, Kiyonga competed in elections as a UPM candidate. During the war, he joined the NRM. Prior to his appointment as Minister of Defense, Kiyonga has held many portfolios, including Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Health.
	(2007-2016)		
	Richard Chemist Hove	Yes	He was a member of ZANU since 1963 and worked at party headquarters in Zambia from 1966-1968 as Accounting Secretary. Hove was then appointed chief representative to Western Europe at ZANU headquarters in London in 1968 before serving as secretary for external affairs in Zambia in 1971. From 1971-1973, he was a member of Dare Rechimurenga, a war council formed to combat Rhodesian colonial rule. Hove became head of broadcasting services in the Department of Information and Publicity in 1973. He was arrested in 1975 with other ZANU leaders but was released ahead of the planned Geneva conference. He then became deputy secretary for external affairs for ZANU in 1978. Throughout the 1980s he rose through the ministerial ranks of Zimbabwe upon independence, becoming the Minister of Public Service for Zimbabwe in 1980, the Minister of Home Affairs in 1981, the Minister of Trade and Commerce/National Economic Planning Commission from 1982-1985, and the Minister of Mines from 1985-1990. Additionally, during this time he was a member of the Politburo and Central Committee of ZANU as well as a member of Parliament.
	(1990-1992)		
	Moven Enock Mahachi	Yes	In 1975, he was nearly sentenced to death by the white Rhodesian government for recruiting young black men as guerilla resistance fighters. In 1980 he
	(1992-2000)		

Sydney Sekeramayi (2001-2008)	Yes	<p>became one of Mugabe's youngest ministers, first serving as Lands Minister and then serving as Home Affairs Minister. In 1999 he was implicated for the abduction and torture of two journalists who had negatively reported on Mugabe and the Zimbabwean military. He was considered to be one of Mugabe's most loyal and trusted officials. After being expelled from school in Rhodesia, he moved to Czechoslovakia to study, then to Sweden where he became a doctor in the 1960s. He became ZANU's main representative in Sweden during this time. In 1976 he moved to Mozambique. In the 1980s he played a role in the Gukurahundi massacres. After Mahachi died in a 2001 car crash, Sekeramayi became the Minister of Defense and was once believed to be a leading candidate to succeed Mugabe as President.</p>
Emmerson Mnangagwa (2009-2013)	Yes	<p>As a student he was a member of both the Zambian United National Independence Party and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union. Shortly after Ndabaningi Sithole, Leopold Takawira, Robert Mugabe, and others broke away from ZAPU and formed the Zimbabwe African National Union. In August, 1963, Mnangagwa left ZAPU and joined the new party in Zambia. He was sent to the People's Republic of China for military training and then returned to the country in mid-1963 when he led a group of Chinese trained guerrillas on a mission to blow up a train near Masvingo. He was arrested inside the country two years later and served nine years at the Khami Maximum Security Prison before being released as part of a general amnesty in 1974. He left the country and returned to Zambia, where he studied law and was admitted to the Zambian bar in 1976. He was then sent to Mozambique by ZANU and in 1977 was elected to the party's Central Committee. During this period in Mozambique, Mnangagwa became Mugabe's primary adviser on matters pertaining to security. In 1980 Mugabe named him minister of state in the prime minister's office, with responsibilities for state security. In that position, Mnangagwa was responsible for integrating the two liberation armies, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, with the remnants of the former Rhodesian security forces, into the Zimbabwe National Army. He also helped to forge a mutual defense to duty inside Mozambique in an attempt to protect Zimbabwean railway traffic from attacks by the Mozambique National Resistance. In the mid-</p>

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Sydney Sekeramayi (2013-2017)	No	1980s he gained a reputation as a hardline supporter of ZANU and Prime Minister Mugabe and alienated many ZAPU supporters when he directed the government's heavy-handed crackdown on dissidents in Matabeleland. Served as the party's representative to Sweden during the war.
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Note: There are a few Defense Ministers with insufficient biographical information; we leave these entries blank.