PART II

EMILE: THE STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT

> In the natural order, since men are all equal, their common calling is man's estate and whoever is well raised for that calling cannot fail to fulfill those callings related to it. Let my student be destined for the sword, the church, the bar. I do not care. Prior to the calling of his parents is nature's call to human life. Living is the job I want to teach him. On leaving my hands, he will, I admit, be neither magistrate nor soldier nor priest. He will, in the first place, be a man. All that a man should be, he will in case of need know how to be as well as anyone; and fortune may try as it may to make him change place, he will always be in his own place (B 41-42; *Oc* 251-52).

CHAPTER TWO

Natural Man

> All our wisdom consists in servile prejudices. All our practices are only subjection, impediment, and constraint. Civil man is born, lives, and dies in slavery. At his birth he is sewed in swaddling clothes; at his death he is nailed in a coffin. So long as he keeps his human shape, he is enchained by our institutions (B 42-43; *Oc* 253).

I. Rousseau's Introduction

A. The Problem as Paradox.

> Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man. He forces one soil to nourish the products of another, one tree to bear the fruit of another. He mixes and confuses the climates, the elements, the seasons. He mutilates his dog, his horse, his slave. He turns everything upside down; he disfigures everything; he loves deformity, monsters. He wants nothing as nature made it, not even man; for him, man must be trained like a school horse; man must be fashioned in keeping with his fancy like a tree in his garden (B 37; *Oc* 245).

How an intellectual analysis starts can be extraordinarily important to the development of the argument subsequently set forth, a fact pithily put by Aristotle: "the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole" (*Ethic*s, 1.7.1098b6-7). Now, Rousseau begins his analysis with, literally, "everything," an exhaustive whole, the whole of creation. This whole he immediately divides into the products of two agents, the "Author of things" and "man," agents who produce, respectively, the contrary qualities of goodness and degeneracy. This initial distinction of the very first sentence is critical for all which follows in *Emile* because it reveals that Rousseau conceives the universe to be radically moral in the sense that each thing in it must ultimately be considered in terms of its goodness or lack thereof. The basic argument of *Emile*, then, should reflect this ultimately moral character of all human nature and conduct.

Turning to that human conduct, Rousseau finds that corruption pervades man's relations. He surveys the entire human environment, whether inanimate, vegetative, or animal—soil, climates, elements, seasons; crops from field and fruit tree; dogs, horses, slaves—and finds everywhere man's power to disfigure original goodness, specified now as the product of a depersonalized author, "nature." Indeed, man even distorts man, destroying his natural goodness. The verbs Rousseau uses in this paragraph provide a first clue to his view of the character of goodness: "degenerates," "forces," "mixes,"

"confuses," "disfigures." They all point to "deformity," literally, the change of form from what it should be. The goodness that the universe displays, therefore, is of a formal character: it is the order of all things, the coherence of all their relations. The degeneration man causes, then, is the breaking of those formal relations: he creates "deformity," confounding producer and product by playing the role of "the Author of things" in reshaping, for example, the natural growth of trees to fit his espaliered taste. The first paragraph, consequently, presents the central paradox that *Emile* will address. Stated simply, the paradox is clear: the "Author of things" makes only good, giving order to everything; yet man, one of those very products, destroys that goodness and order. How can a creature created "good" by "nature" create that which is not good? How does disorder arise from order?

The next paragraph identifies that source of corruption and disorder.

> Were we not to do this, however, everything would go even worse, and our species does not admit of being formed halfway. In the present state of things a man abandoned to himself in the midst of other men from birth would be the most disfigured of all. Prejudices, authority, necessity, example, all the social institutions in which we find ourselves submerged would stifle nature in him and put nothing in its place. Nature there would be like a shrub that chance had caused to be born in the middle of a path and that the passers-by soon cause to perish by bumping into it from all sides and bending it in every direction (B 37; *Oc* 245).

For Rousseau the source of corruption is not individual man, who is good by nature; rather, it is social man, man in association with man, who thereby takes on the group's opinions, habitual activities, and social institutions. Society appears as an extraordinarily powerful agent capable, if unrestrained, of overwhelming an individual, of destroying his natural goodness, and of replacing it with no other ordering principle of action, of humanity. Given the power of such an agent, an individual growing up in society—no matter that he is originally good—requires help and guidance from birth to preserve his natural goodness. The following paragraph indicates that, first and foremost, this is the true task of a mother because the "first education is the most important, and this first education belongs incontestably to women" (B 37 fn.; *Oc* 245 fn.). She is the agent "capable of keeping the nascent shrub away from the highway and securing it from the impact of human opinions"; she is the agent to "[f]orm an enclosure around your child's soul at an early date" (B 38; *Oc* 245-6). Yet, given the corrupt state of present human opinions, this mother will require, in order to fulfill her natural task, a plan for such action—"Someone else can draw its [the protective enclosure's] circumference" (B 38; *Emile* 246)—and that plan is what *Emile* will set forth.

In three short paragraphs, then, Rousseau has located his argument in the universe of possible discourses: his treatise will explore the moral character of human actions, focusing on the distinction between their natural origin in individuals and their unnatural origin in social groups. He has, moreover, used the paradox of his very first sentence to set the problem he intends to solve: what is that plan of action that will preserve a man's natural goodness, his inherent order, in the face of society's corrupting, disordering influence?[1]

B. <u>Education the solution.</u> His argument turns immediately to the discovery of that plan which will protect man from men. Where to begin?

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[1] For a schematic outline of the argument given here and throughout the entire *Emile*, as well as page references, see Appendix.

> Plants are shaped by cultivation, and men by education. If man were born big and strong, his size and strength would be useless to him until he had learned to make use of them. They would be detrimental to him in that they would keep others from thinking of aiding him. And, abandoned to himself, he would die of want before knowing his needs. And childhood is taken to be a pitiable state! It is not seen that the human race would have perished if man had not begun as a child (B 38; *Oc* 246-7).

Human growth, while it may lead to corruption, begins in natural goodness, as we saw above, and is essential for mature action, as we discover here. Maturity, the goal of growth, is not conceived of as just "size and strength," in other words, as only physical power. For Rousseau, power is in itself useless to the individual, even, as we see in this case, self-destructive; it is the correct "use" of power, not the mere possession of it, that ultimately concerns him. Although *Emile* is firmly oriented to the practical, the individual's genuine power will be reflected not in its exercise, not in the mere fulfillment of evanescent wants, but in the satisfaction of fundamental, natural "needs." And because one must grow into the state of "knowing his needs," infancy is essential to maturity. Without the prior period in which to learn the proper use of power, maturity would be without true power. It is worth noting, by the way, that Rousseau's method does not start with an adult model and reason backwards in time to how the child should be raised. Rather, since by adulthood man's natal goodness has been destroyed by society, the argument must begin at his birth and attempt to preserve his goodness.

As to this issue of growth, of human change, that alone which distinguishes adult from child is education: "Everything we do not have at our birth and which we need when we are grown is given us by education" (B 38; *Oc* 247). The examination of education, consequently, will be exhaustive of all possibilities of change in human life. A guiding issue in that growth and change will be the use of power, and the analysis will have a universal application for all mankind. The plan necessary to preserve man's goodness, thus, is a plan of education.

C. <u>The plan of education</u>. Given that men are born good and that education is the sole means of change in the growth of the individual's power, leading him either to goodness or to corruption, what is the plan of education that will solve man's fundamental problem? Rousseau begins his answer by turning to the question of source.

1. Source—"internal/external."

> This education comes to us from nature or from men or from things. The internal development of our faculties and our organs is the education of nature. The use that we are taught to make of this development is the education of men. And what we acquire from our own experience about the objects which affect us is the education of things (B 38; *Oc* 247).

The fundamental distinction of this sixth paragraph is between internal and external sources. In respect to the former, it is important to note that nature is viewed as an internal principle of change; throughout the treatise Rousseau will continue to search for internal principles in order to delimit what in human activity is natural and, therefore, good (the connection between these two having been laid down in his first paragraph). Moreover, "nature" as a source encompasses two aspects, man's "faculties" and his "organs," in other words, his mental and his physical endowments. In opposition to these two natural sources of education stand two external ones, namely, "men" and "things." "Things" refers to the "objects" in the human environment, which include, we must remember, not only natural objects but also

man-made objects (thereby preventing any simple equating of "things" with goodness). Now "men," in contrast to "things" as objects, are a source of "use," that is, of purpose, of thought in human affairs. Consequently, this distinction between "men" and "things" is analogous to that just drawn between "faculties" and "organs": both are instances of an enduring philosophic issue, namely, the immaterial and the material (notice that Rousseau treats them in the same order each time). In short, to make certain that he has covered all sources of education, he has created a universally applicable matrix of change that is exhaustive of possibilities—sources of change can be either internal or external, and in each case either immaterial or material—and has applied this universal matrix to human change to generate four sources: "organs," "faculties," "things," and "men.".

SOURCES OF CHANGE

	INTERNAL (Natural)	EXTERNAL (Unnatural)
MATERIAL	"organs"	"things"
IMMATERIAL	"faculties"	"men"

This matrix of distinctions forms the origin, as we shall see, of his conception of the periods of development—hence, the kinds of education—and of the philosophical reflections of the Savoyard Vicar.

2. End—"whole/part." Having exhaustively laid down possible sources of education, Rousseau turns in paragraphs seven through nineteen to the question of the ends of education. In the first two of these paragraphs, he proceeds to set the sources in their proper relation to each other, in their proper order. While distinguishing the poorly educated man from the well educated, he presents another criterion fundamental to his argument.

> Each of us is thus formed by three kinds of masters. The disciple in whom their various lessons are at odds with one another is badly raised and will never be in harmony[2] with himself. He alone in whom they all coincide at the same points and tend to the same ends reaches his goal and lives consistently. He alone is well raised (B 38; *Oc* 247).

Rousseau introduces "harmony" as the feature essential for ordering the three sources of education. The individual, literally that whole which cannot be divided, must adjust his functional parts so that they harmonize in "ends." Underlying this conception of an individual "in harmony with himself" is another enduring philosophic issue, one like material/immaterial, which pervades the entire work, namely, the relation of part and whole. At this point, it is worth noting only that the wholeness of the individual, his harmony, provides the "goal," the criterion by which to judge among particular activities; thus, the whole is, in some sense, prior to its parts. Here the discussion of unity arises with regard to ordering the sources, the "masters," of education; and the basis of order is found in the degree to which each is subject to human intervention.

> Now, of these three different educations, the one coming from nature is in no way in our control; that coming from things is in our control only in certain respects; that coming from men is the only

[2] Bloom translates *d'accord* as "in agreement with," which I find a little too legalistic in connotation for Rousseau's context.

> one of which we are truly the masters. Even of it we are the masters only by hypothesis. For who can hope entirely to direct the speeches and the deeds of all those surrounding a child (B 38; *Oc* 247).

Given that the sources of education must be harmonized and that the education of nature is wholly beyond human control, the best education must follow the lead of nature, adjusting things and men as much as possible to fit the aims of the first. The potential still exists here, notice, for deriving power from the immediate experience of things and from a knowledge of human thought, but only so long as that externally derived power harmonizes with one's internal, natural power.

If the goal of education "is the very same as that of nature," which "has just been proved" (B 38; *Oc* 247)—if, so to speak, the end of education is the same as the source—then "nature," that internal principle of change, requires further specification if it is to serve not only as the stimulus but also as the goal at which education aims. As he observes himself, "But perhaps this word *nature* has too vague a sense" (B 39; *Oc* 24—Bloom's italics).

> Nature, we are told, is only habit. What does that mean? Are there not habits contracted only by force which never do stifle nature? Such, for example, is the habit of the plants whose vertical direction is interfered with. The plant, set free, keeps the inclination it was forced to take. But the sap has not as a result changed its original direction; and if the plant continues to grow, its new growth resumes the vertical direction. The case is the same for men's inclinations. So long as one remains in the same condition, the inclinations which result from habit and are the least natural to us can be kept; but as soon as the situation changes, habit ceases and the natural returns (B 39; *Oc* 247-48).

For Rousseau, nature is a "habit," that is, an activity. It is not something which *is*, such as an essential quality or a potentiality that exists independent of any action; rather, nature is what a thing *does*. The agricultural example indicates that nature is not, moreover, just any action. Only some actions are natural, namely, those unimpeded by external force. Nature, the internal, is related to the unnatural, the external, as the free-growing fruit tree is to the espaliered one: the latter tree grows in a fashion unlike the former until external restraints are removed; thereafter, it grows like the former. The "sap" of the tree, therefore, that internal principle of growth, of activity, is closely analogous to that internal principle of growth in men, to the development of their organs and faculties. In addition, Rousseau's example is doubly effective since the espaliered tree concretely shows not only the internal/external distinction but also human disruption of natural activity—which we already know to be well ordered because issuing from the universal Author—and such disruption is at the heart of Rousseau's argument about human activity. The application of this image to humans makes clear that human nature is composed of those customary activities which are performed without regard to the peculiarity of circumstance, those which persist when "the situation changes." Human nature so conceived is the universal regularity of action, the conformity of human change to law, to order. Particular actions can be contrary to nature, embedded as they necessarily are in particular circumstances, in those externals that may well restrain the agent; but actions which men universally engage in, ones which are independent of (potentially restrictive) circumstance, these compose his nature. This line of thought will lead us shortly to the unique quality of, even the necessity for the very existence of, that imaginative creation, Emile.

Rousseau's discussion here of "nature," incidentally, exemplifies one of the chief difficulties of, hence one of the chief sources of confusion in, the interpretation of his work. The word "habit" can indicate both activity peculiar to one set of circumstances—and thus potentially unnatural: "as soon as the

situation changes, habit ceases and the natural returns"—as well as activity based on universality—and thus natural. Consequently, while his conclusion to this paragraph on habit does form a circular definition—"If the name *nature* were limited to habits conformable to nature, we would spare ourselves this garble" (B 39; *Oc* 248—Bloom's italics)—the circle is not a vicious, or meaningless, one. This doubling of the meaning of individual terms—it occurs with many others in his text—requires careful attention to context if one is to discover in which sense he is using a word at a particular time. Terms take on meaning in *Emile*, then, not absolutely, univocally, but operationally, equivocally, from their employment in particular circumstances.

Having established human nature as an internal principle of universalized activity, Rousseau adds to his definition the forms that this activity can take on.

> We are born with the use of our senses, and from our birth we are affected in various ways by the objects surrounding us. As soon as we have, so to speak, consciousness of our sensations, we are disposed to seek or avoid the objects which produce them, at first according to whether they are pleasant or unpleasant to us, then according to the conformity or lack of it that we find between us and these objects, and finally according to the judgments we make about them on the basis of the idea of happiness or of perfection given us by reason. These dispositions are extended and strengthened as we become more capable of using our senses and more enlightened; but constrained by our habits, they are more or less corrupted by our opinions. Before this corruption they are what I call in us *nature* (B 39; *Oc* 248—Bloom's italics).

According to Rousseau, then, four general forms of habitual activity occur in men by nature. The first is evidenced by the newborn child, who, being sensitive to, but not conscious of, his physical surroundings, relates passively to contact with his environment; he is "affected in various ways by the objects." Then, after gaining "consciousness of [his] sensations," the child becomes physically active. First, he initiates motion, starting "to seek or avoid" those objects that produce pleasure or pain, respectively. Later, he seeks or avoids objects as he discovers their "conformity or lack of it," as he finds them to be useful to him or not. Finally, using his "reason" to make "judgments" no longer just about physical pleasures and pains or about utility but now about "the idea" of his general welfare, he continues to seek or avoid the objects of his environment. In this case, moreover, his general welfare joins the idea of "happiness" to that of "perfection," which brings us back to the moral character of the Book's beginning: one's happiness here appears to rest upon ideas, upon the conscious recognition of the universe's perfection, of its orderliness, or in Rousseau's sense, of its goodness. In summary, then, these four forms of universalized activity represent four analytic perspectives on man's nature, ranging from the passive to the active, and within the active, from the calculations of hedonism through those of utility to ones of personal perfection, happiness, and goodness. Not surprisingly, these distinctions become the source of the main divisions of *Emile*. Book I treats the passive, not-yet-conscious behavior of the infant, Book II the consciousness of pleasure and pain in the child, Book III the discovery of utility by the rationality of the youth, and Books IV and V the development of natural moral judgment in the young adult, both male and female.

What is the basis of this four-fold distinction among forms of human activity? The basis has already appeared in the universal matrix of change that generated the sources of education. There, the fundamental distinction was between internal and external changes, between natural and unnatural; and it led to the discovery of nature as the source of the best education. Here, the fundamental distinction is between material and immaterial change, between physical and mental activity. Rousseau begins the

first period of development by focusing on the purely physical, non-conscious aspects of human life, namely, the body's passive reaction derived solely from sensitivity to the environment. It is, if you will, the equivalent of a plant's reaction to its environment. When mental awareness arises, however, the infant is transformed from a passive, physical being into an active one, making to physical stimuli mental responses that lead to purposive striving, namely, to seeking pleasures and avoiding pains. This first mental awareness is a direct response to and is in the service of the child's own body, and as such, it marks a fundamental shift from the purely internal/material to the internal/immaterial view. It is worth noting, moreover, that the introduction of "consciousness"—of the matrix's immaterial aspect, now specified in commonplace terms as mind—also marks the transition from passive to active existence. Any purely physical analysis of human behavior that leaves out the contribution of conscious mental activity will, for Rousseau, provide merely a picture of a sentient being passively reacting to the external situation, just as the espaliered tree responds to the gardener's restraints. That which transforms human activity from mere reaction to the environment into a purposive response is thought. Rousseau has consequently moved to the internal/immaterial part of his matrix and, taking a stance there, has viewed from this new perspective the internal/material portion, specified here as the physical pleasures and pains in one's own body which are purposively sought and avoided. Next, from the internal/immaterial viewpoint attention is directed toward the external/material part, and consciousness is placed at the service of personal utility. The mind's focus thus shifts to other bodies, to the use one can make of them rather than the pleasures and pains the environment directly gives one's own body. Finally, attention is directed toward the last part of the matrix, the external/immaterial. Here, reason leads one to formal rather than material ideas, to ideas of perfection and consequent happiness. Such ideas generate individual activity based on judgment, not on mere reaction, on purposive response, or even on utility. The matrix looks something like this, now:

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

In short, the active forms of human nature are distinguished from the passive by the presence of mental activity. Within these active, mental forms, we find, first, thought directed at things—either at the pleasures of one's own body or at the utility to oneself of other bodies—and second, thought directed at ideas themselves, at the rational conception of perfection, which leads to human happiness.

These four exhaustive perspectives on human nature, moreover, besides generating four distinct forms or "dispositions," also help fill out his understanding of human nature. We can now gather the various strands of his argument together and roughly sketch what his definition of nature is, always remembering that his use of terms gives his argument a fluidity that prevents fixing absolutely the meaning of any term independent of context. Given this caveat, we might summarize his conception of na-

ture as follows: human nature is any activity of the body or mind whose source is internal and whose form or disposition is universalizable, that is, having an end which is independent of particular circumstance. In brief, human nature is any internal, universalizable disposition of action.

Now that he has sketched his view of nature, he can explore the issue of the goal of education, which ought to be the same as that of nature. He turns immediately in paragraph thirteen to the question of this goal.

> It is, then, to these original dispositions that everything must be related; and that could be done if our three educations were only different from one another. But what is to be done when they are opposed? When, instead of raising a man for himself, one wants to raise him for others? Then their harmony is impossible. Forced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must choose between making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time (B 39; *Oc* 248).

The main conflict which Rousseau discovers in the goals of education, that between man and society, is one that is viewed once more by means of an internal/external distinction: the education of nature is for one's self, the education of men is for others. As presented here, the contrary goals admit of no compromise; either one or the other must be chosen as the ordering purpose of education.

Why does Rousseau view educational purposes in these either/or terms? As we saw earlier, the natural source of education was the internal, not the external; and the "goal" of education was "the very same as that of nature," thus, also the internal as distinct from the external. This internal/external distinction, now applied to goals, is here specified as self-directed as opposed to other-directed, and it leads to a consideration of an underlying philosophical issue, namely, the problem of the relation of part and whole.

> Natural man is entirely for himself. He is numerical unity, the absolute whole which is relative only to itself or its kind. Civil man is only a fractional unity dependent on the denominator; his value is determined by his relation to the whole, which is the social body. Good social institutions are those that best know how to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one and transport the *I* into the common unity, with the result that each individual believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no longer feels except within the whole (B 39-40; *Oc* 249).

The issue here is one of principle: which is prior, the individual or the "common unity," the community? If the community is what takes precedence over, and thereby establishes the value of, the individual, then the latter's very existence as a living being, his sensitive basis of reaction and action within his environment, is contingent upon the communal organism or being. By contrast, Rousseau has already set forth that the principle of human activity is internal, is one's nature, and thus cannot be viewed as external, as dependent upon the community's activities. In fact, external human forces are those actions which prevent nature from acting freely, as in the example of the espaliered tree. What Rousseau seeks, therefore, as the goal of education is "numerical unity, the absolute whole." This is a mathematical conception of a oneness which, like the integer "1", for example, retains the same character and value no matter where it occurs or to what use it is put. If, as he has asserted, men are born individually sensitive and develop to a maturity governed by the idea of perfection, then such unity must have its locus in the individual because *he* is the patient reacting to his environment or the agent seeking what is pleasurable, useful, or perfect. Indeed, the issue of wholeness involves the very question of existence: that man who

has been deprived of "his absolute existence" becomes merely the instrumental part of a larger organic whole, becomes one who "no longer feels except within the whole," despite the fact that all men are born with individual sensitivity. Also important to note at this point is that if wholeness or unity is the goal of education, then that whole must be closely related to "the idea of happiness or of perfection given us by reason," the idea which forms the highest form of natural human development. In other words, that perfection or goodness which issues from "the hands of the Author of things" itself reflects unity, the perception of which by human reason will form the basis of human happiness. Thus, the issues of nature, existence, and value will take their ultimate meaning from this unity or wholeness as Rousseau conceives of it.

3. Form—"domestic/public." This fundamental opposition of educational goals, of conceptions of the whole, between self and other, between individual and society, provides the principal distinction in forms of education. Rousseau turns in paragraphs twenty through twenty-seven to the question of the kinds of educational practice. "From these necessarily opposed objects [namely, man and citizen] come two contrary forms of instruction—the one, public and common; the other, individual and domestic" (B 40; *Oc* 250). Of the former kind he notes: "Do you want to get an idea of public education? Read Plato's *Republic*. . . . It is the finest[3] educational treatise ever written" (B 40; *Oc* 250). This last is an instance of those astounding statements that have helped give rise to the perception of Rousseau as self-contradictory. After all, he here gives an extraordinary encomium to a defender of public, common education, of the education of others, after an argument that has apparently demonstrated such instruction to be unnatural. But Rousseau does not view Plato in the customary fashion; the latter is not merely an apologist for the supremacy of the state. This is suggested by the distinction between Plato and Lycurgus.

> When one wishes to refer to the land of chimeras, mention is made of Plato's institutions. If Lycurgus had set his down only in writing, I would find them far more chimerical. Plato only purified the heart of man; Lycurgus denatured it (B 40; *Oc* 250).

Although he does not elaborate here on his remarks, Rousseau sees in Plato the possibility of a public education which *is* natural, provided it is based upon the purification of "the heart of man." Such education, however, cannot exist in eighteenth-century France: "Public instruction no longer exists and can no longer exist, because where there is no longer fatherland, there can no longer be citizens" (B 40; *Oc* 250). We may be able to see in these words a hint of the solution to this problem that receives attention later in *Emile*. For Rousseau, the good state is identified as the "fatherland," *la patrie*; the state, in other words, as a metaphorical family, and it is with the formation of the family in Book V that Rousseau enters into the principles of politics and citizenship. But back here at the beginning, what we should gather from these remarks is that Rousseau is not wholly opposed to "public and common" education; what he does find, however, is that in his present circumstances, such education is a grave mistake, creating confusion between self and other and producing "double men, always appearing to relate everything to others and never relating anything except to themselves alone" (B 41; *Oc* 250).

If the "public and common" form of education is not possible in present circumstances, then Rousseau will explore the "individual and domestic" form.

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[3] Bloom translates *le plus beau* as "the most beautiful." I think Rousseau means to praise substance as well as style.

> There remains, finally, domestic education or the education of nature. But what will a man raised uniquely for himself become for others? If perchance the double object we set for ourselves could be reunited[4] in a single one, by removing the contradictions of man a great obstacle to his happiness would be removed. In order to judge of this, he would have to be seen wholly formed: his inclinations would have to have been observed, his progress seen, his development followed. In a word, the natural man would have to be known. I believe that one will have made a few steps in these researches when one has read this writing (B 41; *Oc* 251).

He is explicitly aware of the issue raised by trying to translate the ancient education into modern circumstances: utilizing once more the internal/external distinction, he observes that education for self appears to preclude positive relations with others. Yet he suggests that this apparent contradiction of self and other may yield to a principle of unity, a principle he has already explored above. In a sentence that commentators rarely note, he states the transformation which is the ultimate object of his work: "If perchance the double object we set for ourselves could be reunited in a single one, by removing the contradictions of man a great obstacle to his happiness would be removed." Rousseau is suggesting that education for self, properly conceived, may also be education for others, that the education of the "natural man," of Emile, may also have the same ultimate goal as the education of the citizen in Plato's *Republic*: the harmony of the good man in the good society. It is important to remember that Plato's analysis in the *Republic* is based on an analogy between the individual and the state, where the psychology of the former both reflects and is reflected by the polity of the latter, where, in other words, self and other form a perfect union and the education of the one *is* the education of the other. In order to know whether such unification of man and citizen is possible, though, the "natural man" must "be seen wholly formed," which is what we will see in Emile.

How will such a man be educated, such a goal be attained? The answer lies in the famous "negative education":

> To form this rare man, what do we have to do? Very much, doubtless. What must be done is to prevent anything from being done (B 41; *Oc* 251).

If man is not to form man, if he is to do nothing, then nature will form him. The crucial distinction between public and domestic education is not their ends, which, as we have just seen, may well be the same, but their form. And we know from the earlier discussion of the four forms of natural disposition in humans what Rousseau envisions should happen in natural human development if human disruption is prevented. Negative education is not surrender either to external chance or to internal whimsy; it is the negation of human deformation and the affirmation of natural formation.

4. Subject Matter—"General/Particular." If such is the form of good education, the method by which to reunify self and other, in what does that education consist? What is its content? Rousseau turns to this question in paragraphs twenty-eight through thirty-three.[5]

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[4] Bloom translates *se reunir* as "joined," which suggests an aggregation of discrete parts to make a whole, whereas Rousseau views the whole as prior to, thereby transforming, the parts. Also, Bloom puts a comma after "of man" though the French has it after "single one," as here.

[5] Bloom divides paragraph thirty, beginning "Our true study...," into two paragraphs, the second beginning just after the quotation from Nonius Marcellus. Thus, the French paragraph number thirty-two, beginning "One thinks only...," where the discussion concludes, is Bloom's number thirty-three.

First, the content should not be a specialized one, composed of knowledge and skills directed at special purposes, such as a particular social position.

> In the social order where all positions are determined, each man ought to be raised for his. If an individual formed for his position leaves it, he is no longer fit for anything. Education is useful only insofar as fortune is in agreement with the parents' vocation. In any other case it is harmful to the student, if only by virtue of the prejudices it gives him (B 41; *Oc* 251).

What is required, then, is the knowledge and skills that allow an individual to function universally, that is, independent of circumstance, past, present, or future. Training for a particular circumstance actually incapacitates the individual if the circumstance changes. As Rousseau puts it a page later, "We must, then, generalize our views and consider in our pupil abstract man, man exposed to all the accidents of human life" (B 42; *Oc* 252). This conception of education as general, note, conforms closely to his earlier definition of nature, and the notion of "abstract man" foreshadows Emile.

> In the natural order, since men are all equal, their common calling is man's estate and whoever is well raised for that calling cannot fail to fulfill those callings related to it. Let my student be destined for the sword, the church, the bar. I do not care. Prior to the calling of his parents is nature's call to human life. Living is the job I want to teach him. On leaving my hands, he will, I admit, be neither magistrate nor soldier nor priest. He will, in the first place, be a man. All that a man should be, he will in case of need know how to be as well as anyone; and fortune may try as it may to make him change place, he will always be in his own place (B 41-42; *Oc* 251-52).

Rousseau evidently views this education as not only general but also as truly liberal, one which will free a man from the circumstances of vocation, of social position, even of "fortune" or chance, and will make him most fully human, "[a]ll that a man should be." Furthermore, we should note the idea of one's "own place," here introduced for the first time. "Place," I intend to argue, is central to *Emile*, both in form and in matter. In method, Rousseau's work is rhetorical, that is, using commonplace distinctions—as in his matrix—to generate philosophic ideas and arguments. In content, Emile—himself a rhetorical device, a commonplace—moves through the work in search of his proper place in life. The movement on both levels is from common to proper, from community to property. As Rousseau moves through his work, he becomes more and more explicit about the importance of common and proper places. Here we need only observe that maturity involves knowledge of one's proper place in the whole of things, knowledge of one's property, and that this property is intimately connected with the issue of freedom.

A second aspect of the content of this domestic education is that it will be practical, not theoretic.

> Our true study is that of the human condition. He among us who best knows how to bear the goods and the ills of this life is to my taste the best raised: from which it follows that the true education consists less in precept than in practice. We begin to instruct ourselves when we begin to live (B 42; *Oc* 252).

The real subject matter of education, "Our true study," is less "precept" than "practice," not so much abstract knowledge but knowledge in action: "knows how" will take precedence over knows that. This orientation to action, seen earlier in the definition of nature, applies, not surprisingly, to life as a whole, to the "human condition," as well as to knowledge: that man is most alive who not merely knows but acts.

> One thinks only of preserving one's child. That is not enough. One ought to teach him to preserve himself as a man, to bear the blows of fate, to brave opulence and poverty, to live, if he has to, in freezing Iceland or on Malta's burning rocks. You may very well take precautions against his dying. He will nevertheless have to die. And though his death were not the product of your efforts, still these efforts would be ill conceived. It is less a question of keeping him from dying than of making him live. To live is not to breathe; it is to act, it is to make use of our organs, our senses, our faculties, of all the parts of ourselves which give us the sentiment of our existence. The man who has lived the most is not he who has counted the most years but he who has most felt life (B 42; *Oc* 253).

Though the education of a natural man that will unify self and other is to be a general, liberal education, yet it will also, if it is to make for the complete human, be one of practice, not theory, of the full activity both of body—"organs"—and of mind—"senses" and "faculties"—that is, of everything which makes us aware we exist. Since, however, practice or action is always particular—*this* act excludes all other possible acts at the same moment—while the education proposed is general—not directed at specific circumstances—Rousseau has transformed liberal education in a complex way: it is an education that will allow a man to be himself universally, yet the education that forms, as well as the "self" that is formed, is composed of particular actions. The resolution of this apparent paradox, plus the removal of the self/other opposition, lies at the heart of *Emile* and of its conception of natural education, of the liberal arts, of education for human freedom.

5. *Re*view. If we turn back to *re*view these first thirty-three paragraphs of Book I, we can see clearly the outline of Rousseau's introduction to his work. He begins with a paradox which sets his problem, next establishes that in education lies the potential solution, and then sketches that plan of education which has the best chance of actually solving the problem. The reader can see in the discussion of this plan the treatment of the successive questions of the source, end, form, and subject matter of education. This fourfold treatment, of course, has a striking similarity to Aristotle's four causes—efficient, final, formal, and material, respectively. My analysis, however, is not intended to note a new "source of influence" on Rousseau's thought; the "causes," after all, are so much a part of the western intellectual tradition that they have themselves become commonplaces. Which precisely *is* the point here. For Rousseau uses these four commonplaces, which are in some sense exhaustive of possible principles, to explore carefully the bases of education. What I would argue, therefore, is that behind the frequent criticism of Rousseau's logic, or rather of his lack of it, is the failure to recognize, or at least the unwillingness to admit the validity of, his systematic use and rhetorical transformation of logical terms and methods taken from other approaches to intellectual analysis. We shall see hereafter that the intellectual structure laid down in these paragraphs I have isolated as his introduction—namely, the focus on activity, plus the chief distinctions of internal/external, active/passive (seen here in the immaterial/material commonplace, a shift in terms I will explain later), and whole/part—that this structure will govern, organize, and give meaning to his entire argument. Rousseau may have his own way of thinking, but he does so consistently.

Before proceeding to the main body of the text, moreover, we should note that the conception of nature and of education already sketched in suggests certain consequences for the idea of freedom that we shall be tracing. First, goodness and order are the ends of nature and, consequently, of education; in itself, freedom is not. While a term of great importance in the argument, freedom will still be subject to other criteria, namely, those of nature, which will give it its ultimate value. As a result, the argument even at this point indicates that the concern is not just with the power to act but with the power to act in

accord with certain criteria. Second, and as a consequence of this first point, the dependence of freedom upon the criteria of nature entails complexity of meaning for the former. Since human nature is active in several formal ways, freedom must also be reflected in various forms. Thus we should not expect a univocal definition of the term. Rather, like nature, freedom will take on circumstantial meanings that depend upon the place at which it occurs in the argument. We would expect freedom to take on four different meanings relative to the four different forms of nature that organize the book's argument. Thought different, these four meanings need not be contradictory and thereby destructive of the coherence of Rousseau's conception. What we need to explore, by way of contrast, is whether the four perspectives on human freedom can be related to each other fruitfully. If they can, then a further internal demonstration of the coherence of Rousseau's work can be established, providing an important perspective on the interpretation of *Emile*.

II. Book I: Growth

A. The Child as Living Being.

> All our wisdom consists in servile prejudices. All our practices are only subjection, impediment, and constraint. Civil man is born, lives, and dies in slavery. At his birth he is sewed in swaddling clothes; at his death he is nailed in a coffin. So long as he keeps his human shape, he is enchained by our institutions (B 42-43; *Oc* 253).

Rousseau's imagery is vigorous: society is slavery.[6] But to conclude immediately that, therefore, a primitive savage or a Robinson Crusoe alone on his island is the only model of human freedom is to miss both what Rousseau is saying as well as the subtlety of his argument and the beauty of its structure. Book I, like the other four, is filled with a wealth of details, examples, asides, and aphorisms. Nevertheless, the basic structure of his argument can be seen, and it is to this that I wish to turn, attempting to maintain focus on the central issues he is dealing with rather than to explicate all his comments.

The quotation above marks the transition to the main body of Book I. That Rousseau begins his study of the infant by discussing swaddling clothes is not as arbitrary as might first appear. The beginning he is making here, in fact, is analogous to that which began the work. As the gardener binds the branches of the espaliered tree, so the nurse binds the limbs of the newborn child. As a result, "the impulse of the internal parts of a body which tends to growth finds an insurmountable obstacle to the movements that impulse asks of the body" (B 43; *Oc* 254). In both cases, in the tree and in the child, the intervention of human agents distorts natural movement. The issue remains the same in both instances: "growth," the internal, natural principle of activity, is restricted by the external, human application of force. The espaliered tree symbolizes, I would suggest, an idea that dominates the entire discussion in Book I. Just as he noted earlier, "Plants are shaped by cultivation, and men by education" (B 38; *Oc* 246), so now his *initial* treatment of human education will be, in essence, the cultivation of the infant as if it were a plant—a living creature, to be sure, and not merely inert matter, yet one without even those qualities that might be attributed to an animal. To put it in analytical terms, Rousseau's initial perspective on the human being takes a middle ground: neither man *qua* matter nor man *qua* animal, but man *qua* living, that is, with an internal principle of growth. The importance for freedom of this first perspective will appear shortly.

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[6] How similar is this beginning to the opening of *The Social Contract*: "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in irons" (Rousseau 1959-69, 3:351).

B. Parental Duties. The main argument of Book I divides into two principal parts. The first examines who cultivates the child—mothers and nurses, fathers and tutors (B 42-52; *Oc* 253-66)—while the second examines the young plant to be cultivated—Emile, his natal qualities, and his needs (B 52-74; *Oc* 266-98).

1. Mothers and Nurses. The first part begins, as noted, with swaddling, which exemplifies the chief problem of human existence.

> Where does this unreasonable practice come from? From a denatured practice. Since mothers, despising their first duty, have no longer wanted to feed their children, it has been necessary to confide them to mercenary women who, thus finding themselves mothers of alien children on whose behalf nature tells them nothing, have sought only to save themselves effort (B 44; *Oc* 255).

Swaddling, consequently, leads to a discussion of a mother's duties, which are usually mishandled in one of two ways. She either neglects them, especially nursing (B 44-47; *Oc* 255-59); or, "instead of neglecting a mother's care, a woman carries it to excess" (B 47; *Oc* 259), that is, she gives excessive attention to her duties (B 47-48; *Oc* 259-61). Notice that Rousseau has exhaustively treated the possible errors in the relation of mother (or surrogate) and child: one may excessively dominate the child (by swaddling), neglect it (through not nursing), or become oversolicitous (in responding to every whim). These errors are important, for they lead to the consequence that the child's "first ideas are those of domination and servitude" (B 48; *Oc* 261). Now come the father's duties (B 48-49; *Oc* 261-63), and like mothers, they customarily neglect them, hiring tutors as substitutes. Enter Rousseau.

2. Fathers and Tutors. The ensuing description of the method that he will pursue is revealing from many viewpoints, setting forth not only, on the one hand, both his manner of analysis as well as Emile's mode of action, but also, on the other, the criteria proposed to the reader for testing the validity of the endeavor, both in formal and in substantive terms. Forthrightly admitting his failings as an actual tutor, he proposes that,

> instead of doing what is necessary, I shall endeavor to say it.
>
> I know that in undertakings like this one, an author—always comfortable with systems that he is not responsible for putting into practice—may insouciantly offer many fine precepts which are impossible to follow. And in the absence of details and examples, even the feasible things he says, if he has not shown their application, remain ineffectual.
>
> I have hence chosen to give myself an imaginary pupil, to hypothesize that I have the age, health, kinds of knowledge, and all the talent suitable for working at his education, for conducting him from the moment of birth up to the one when, become a grown man, he will no longer have need of any guide other than himself. This method appears to me useful to prevent an author who distrusts himself from getting lost in visions; for when he deviates from ordinary practice, he has only to make a test of his own practice on his pupil. He will soon sense, or the reader will sense for him, whether he follows the progress of childhood and the movement natural to the human heart.
>
> This is what I have tried to do in all the difficulties which have arisen. In order not to fatten the book uselessly, I have been content with setting down the principles whose truth everyone should sense. But as for the rules which might need proofs, I have applied them all to my Emile or to other examples; and I have shown in very extensive detail how what I have established could be put into practice. Such at least is the plan I have proposed to follow. It is up to the reader to judge if I have succeeded.

> The result of this procedure is that at first I have spoken little of my Emile, because my first educational maxims, although contrary to those which are established, are so evident that it is difficult for any reasonable man to refuse his consent to them, But in the measure I advance, my pupil, differently conducted than yours, is no longer an ordinary child. He requires a way of life special to him. Then he appears more frequently on the scene, and toward the last times I no longer let him out of sight for a moment until, whatever he may say, he has no longer the least need of me (B 50-51; *Oc* 264-65).

3. Rousseau's Method of Thinking. We have here the essence of Rousseau's way of thinking. It is a fine statement of a historically recurrent way of making an argument, one that I will call, in a non-pejorative sense, a rhetorical method. In such an approach, one begins by laying down distinctions, rules, even a matrix (as we have seen above above), which he believes his audience, or most of them, or the most "reasonable," will accept without prior demonstration—as Rousseau puts it, "setting down the principles whose truth everyone should sense." One then proceeds by means of *common*places, topics (literally, from the Greek *topos*, "a place") that the audience should readily agree to—we have already seen ones such as good/evil, nature/society, internal/external, active/passive, excess/defect—and the successive application of these commonplace distinctions both gives greater and greater refinement to one's subject and also more and more precisely distinguishes from all other possible perspectives the view being taken. The chief persuasive device in such argumentation, aside from the commonplaces themselves, is the example, either historical or hypothetical. Emile is precisely such an example writ large. In this sense, Rousseau is writing a rhetorical history, one which will tell the story of the development of a human from a commonplace being scarcely distinguishable from any other living organism to the most unique of individuals, a man who has learned his proper place in the universal order. This is why in terms of method—in addition to the substantive reasons given here—Rousseau notes that he will have to give a proportionately greater number of examples from Emile's life as he grows older in order to prove his argument: the transition will be from common to proper place, from generally known to specifically defined.

This method of argument, moreover, is the precise formal counterpart to the substantive method that both Emile will engage in as he develops and the tutor will employ as his "negative education." Both tutor and tutee will use what I will call in practice an operational method: each will act and, in so doing, produce consequences which will reveal that act's value, whether considered with regard to growth, pleasure, utility, or morality. The consequences of the action taken will generate, in one sense, criteria by which to judge the act. We must be careful, however, not to infer that Rousseau is, therefore, either in morals or elsewhere, purely a relativist, that is, one who holds that whatever works is therefore good. We shall shortly see that criteria besides mere initiation of process are involved in making judgments of knowledge and of value; but, nevertheless, an agent's action is essential for his coming to know and judge something. This is very much in the spirit of the practical: if one can *do* something, then he knows it. Such a perspective continually reappears in Emile's upbringing as an emphasis on practice rather than on theory. Moreover, I might observe that we, as readers of this book, ought to attempt to judge it on the basis of similar criteria if we are to understand Rousseau within the context of what he states he is trying to achieve. To view him methodologically in terms, say, of Marxian dialectical social theory, of Freudian reductive biography, or of Deweyan problem-solving habits, may be interesting, even illuminating—any one of these or other approaches may well lead in the end to the judgment one finds most compelling with regard to Rousseau—but nevertheless, it would not be to judge the success or failure of his argument in a manner that conforms to *his* conception of the correct way to go about making such evaluations.

C. The Child. With the introduction of the "imaginary pupil" and Rousseau's discussion of his rhetorical method, the perspective of the work shifts from parents and their surrogates to the child and his development. The rest of Book I is divided into two sections: the first considers physical matters—on the one hand, the qualities Rousseau presumes Emile will have at birth, his background (B 52-56; *Oc* 266-72), and on the other hand, his needs after birth (B 56-61; *Oc* 272-79)—while the second considers mental concerns—the first sensations (B 61-64; *Oc* 279-85) and the origin of language (B 64-74; *Oc* 285-98).

1. Physical Concerns. In the brief discussion of Emile's native endowments, four points are relevant to our examination. One is that because Rousseau "is propounding a model," he will be describing "a common mind, such as I assume my pupil to be" (B 52; *Oc* 266). He is explicit that his pupil is a "model" and that, as such, is *by nature* a "common"-place. As to the uncommon, extraordinary individuals, they "raise themselves in spite of what one does" (B 52; *Oc* 266). Emile is to be no aristocratic, Platonic philosopher-king; rather, he is, if anything, closer to an Everyman. Herein lies one of Rousseau's most powerful ideas for modern democratic education.

A second point:

> Locale is not unimportant in the culture of men. They are all that they can be only in temperate climates. The disadvantage of extreme climates is obvious. A man is not planted like a tree in a country to remain there forever; and he who leaves one extreme to get to the other is forced to travel a road double the length of that traveled by him who leaves from the middle point for the same destination.
>
> . . . If, then, I want my pupil to be able to be an inhabitant of the earth, I will get him in a temperate zone—in France, for example—rather than elsewhere (B 52; *Oc* 266-67).

Here the emphasis in the agri*culture* of the nascent plant is upon the common*place*, that location on earth which, midway between the extremes of climate, will allow the child to grow to his fullest and with the greatest potential flexibility in regard to his future "place."

A third point regarding Emile's endowments appears in Rousseau's choice of pupil from a rich, noble family. This appears to contradict Emile's commonplace quality, yet not the way Rousseau presents it. Since, regarding wealth and position, "there are more men who fall than ones who rise" (B 52; *Oc* 267), a rich man stands more in need of this universalizing, commonplace education than does a poor man. Furthermore, "a poor person can become a man by himself" (B 52; *Oc* 267), a foreshadowing of subsequent discussion of the corrupting character of wealth and the greater closeness of the poor, especially the rural poor, to nature, and thus to goodness. Rousseau is no defender of an elitist education solely for the rich; he only chooses this wealthy, noble background for Emile to exhibit most clearly the future flexibility in living that his commonplace education, his operational method, makes possible.

The fourth and last point is that Emile is to be gifted with a common body, that is, "well formed, vigorous, and healthy" (B 53; *Oc* 268). This bodily gift is critical, moreover, to all that follows, for a "frail body weakens the soul" (B 54; *Oc* 269). Since *Emile* will trace the development of the mind from the body, the latter must be healthy if the former is to have "healthy" ideas. The discussion of medicine, hygiene (the "only useful part of medicine" [B 55; *Oc* 271]), and exercise that follows in the text need not detain us once the main idea here of common health is recognized.

The second portion of the discussion of Emile's physical concerns begins with the observation, "With life there begin needs" (B 56; *Oc* 272); and it quickly deals with diet, environment (the country), and cleanliness (including baths). The first consideration of Emile's "needs," consequently, is of those held in common with plants: food, location, and protection from disease. These reflect the external, circumstantial cultivation of internal, native characteristics necessary for any living organism's survival, and in respect to such cultivation the child is entirely passive.

2. Mental Concerns. The human infant, however, is more than just a young plant, the "shrub" of paragraph two, and the remainder of Book I is devoted to a consideration of sensation and language. Rousseau introduces this section with a beautiful image that expresses the transition from physical to mental concerns:

> where education begins with life, the child is at birth already a disciple, not of the governor, but of nature. The governor only studies under this first master and prevents its care from being opposed. He watches over the nursling, observes him, follows him. He vigilantly spies out the first glimmer of his weak understanding as the Muslims at the approach of the new moon spy out the instant of its rise (B 61; *Oc* 279).

As the fasting Moslem awaits the rise of the new moon and his first food, so the tutor avidly awaits the rise of the new mind. In less poetic form, the rest of the Book will examine the signs that indicate the birth of consciousness, which first appears as the awareness of sensation, the next step in the development of the child and the main topic of Book II.

The argument returns once more to an attack on swaddling and other restraints of physical movement. The point now, however, is not the earlier one of the inhibition of physical growth; here, physical restraints limit the first steps toward awareness of self.

> We are born capable of learning but able to do nothing, knowing nothing. The soul, enchained in imperfect and half-formed organs, does not even have the sentiment of its own existence. The movements and the cries of the child who has just been born are purely mechanical effects, devoid of knowledge and of will (B 61; *Oc* 279-80).

The characterization here of the infant as agent, producing two motions—one of body, "movements," and one of voice, "cries"—is most important. Rousseau holds the child to be active, an author of motions, *by nature*. This is precisely the point at which plants and animals are distinguished. The education of nature in a plant, if you will, is merely growth; the education of nature in an animal, by contrast, consists not only of growth but also of motion in body and voice. We will return to cries shortly after examining bodily motion, that is, change of place. Locomotion becomes the key to consciousness, and Rousseau is explicit about its importance.

> Everything is learning for animate and sensitive beings. If plants had progressive movement, they would have to have senses and to acquire knowledge. Otherwise, the species would soon perish (B 62; *Oc* 281-82).

For Rousseau, the presence of locomotion, of "progressive movement," necessitates sensation; and sensation necessitates consciousness, that is, "knowledge" in some sense. If a plant lives, it is self-evidently in its proper place; if, however, it has locomotion and changes its place, it may or may not find a new proper place within the environing commonplace, and in any case, it will not be able to evaluate its new

location. Sensation becomes the instrument by which to "learn" its proper place if the species is not to die out—and self-preservation, as we shall see the Savoyard Vicar argue (B 277; *Oc* 581), is the principle of the universe. Thus, the activeness the child has at birth is the source of that locomotion that represents in him the potential for animal consciousness.

To clarify his view of the beginning point in the development of human consciousness, Rousseau makes a vivid psychological image out of a classical myth.

> Let us suppose that a child had at his birth the stature and the strength of a grown man, that he emerged, so to speak, fully armed from his mother's womb as Pallas did from the brain of Jupiter. This man-child would be a perfect imbecile, an automaton, an immobile and almost insensible statue. He would see nothing, hear nothing, know no one, would not be able to turn his eyes toward what he needed to see. Not only would he perceive no object outside of himself, he would not even relate any object to the sense organ which made him perceive it: the colors would not be in his eyes; the sounds would not be in his ears; the bodies he touched would not be on his body; he would not even know that he had one. The contact of his hands would be in his brain; all his sensations would come together in a single point; he would exist only in the common *sensorium*; he would have only a single idea, that is, of the *I* to which he would relate all his sensations; and this idea or, rather, this sentiment would be the only thing that he would have beyond what an ordinary baby has (B 61; *Oc* 280).

Rousseau hypothesizes that an individual fully formed internally has no awareness of the external world, not even of his own body, except insofar as he is active. One must *use* organs and faculties in order know that they exist and that the external world exists.[7] Otherwise, he would not be aware that any object he sees, hears, or touches is outside him, not even be aware that he is sensing it with his eyes, ears, or skin. Instead, the object, undifferentiated by any qualities of the individual senses, would enter into awareness only as a general disturbance of the "common *sensorium*." Here again, as in earlier discussion of commonplaces, the emphasis is upon the "common": the first conscious sensation lacks any of the differentia of the five proper senses. The chief difference between Pallas and pupil is that the latter's "soul," as we have just seen, is "enchained in imperfect and half-formed organs"; if he were "fully armed," he, too, would become aware of this first "idea"—really a "sentiment"—of an "*I*," of that which is properly himself and to which he will "relate all his sensations" of the "common *sensorium*." This "*I*" could be called his first conscious property.

Given the movement in Emile from common to proper, how does he come to possess this property? First, as this quotation has made clear, he must grow to a point where his "organs" are no longer wholly "imperfect and half-formed." Second, the natural activity of the child and the activity of the environment upon him give rise to the key activity in the entrance into consciousness: habit.

> Children's first sensations are purely affective; they perceive only pleasure and pain. Able neither to walk nor to grasp, they need a great deal of time to come little by little into possession of the representative sensations which show them objects outside of themselves. But, while waiting for these objects to gain extension, to move, so to speak, farther away from their eyes, to take on dimensions and shapes for them, the recurrence of the affective sensations begins to submit them to the empire of habit. . . . Food and sleep too exactly measured become necessary for them at the end of

[7] For the same idea discussed briefly, see above, p. 19.

> the same spans of time, and soon desire no longer comes from need but from habit, or, rather, habit adds a new need to that of nature. This is what must be prevented.
>
> The only habit that a child should be allowed is to contract none. . . . Prepare from afar the reign of his freedom and the use of his forces by leaving natural habit to his body, by putting him in the condition always to be master of himself and in all things to do his will, as soon as he has one (B 62-63; *Oc* 282).

Again Rousseau uses a term, this time "habit," in two senses: "natural habit" as opposed to acquired. By nature, the child can form "representative sensations," those based on the repeated presentation of objects to sight, hearing, contact, and so on, repetitions that bring the child to awareness of the substantive enduringness of things outside himself. For Rousseau, the danger lies not in these mental *re*presentations within of things without but in the "affective sensations" that become associated with objects, namely, the pleasures and pains of the body they give rise to. In both the "representative sensations" of the mind and the "affective sensations" resulting in the body, the child is passive relative to the objects; they appear and disappear and cause pleasure and pain without any initiation or choice on the child's part. The key issue here is not the education of things, which by itself would be natural and, because part of the ordered universe stipulated at the beginning, good. Rather, the education of man makes its impression: as swaddling had earlier hindered the natural motion of growth, now man chooses what objects and what activities the child will be presented with; if he does not follow the direction of nature, he will limit the child's liberty. What is this direction of nature? It is the habit of no acquired habit, a universalized activity in accord with his earlier definition of nature. Such universalized habit is that activity common to all humans in the absence of impediment, conceived now as not only external restraint but also externally originated internal predisposition which prevents the child from experiencing, that is, sensing, to the fullest the possibilities of life in its physical environment, including, as Rousseau treats them, experiences of light and dark, satiety and hunger, hot and cold, noise and silence, and so on. In these latter, he is especially concerned with avoiding the unnatural association of fear with physical circumstances not naturally hazardous to human self-preservation.

This habituation, though the first step to consciousness, has so far been viewed as passive in character, as the result of the activity of things upon the child's mind and body. This passive habit of representation must be transformed into one that is active in order for Emile to reach full consciousness.

> It is only by movement that we learn that there are things which are not us, and it is only by our own movement that we acquire the idea of extension. It is because the child does not have this idea that, without making any distinction, he reaches out his hand to grasp the object which touches him or the object which is a hundred paces from him. This effort he makes appears to you a sign of the desire to dominate, an order he gives to the object to approach or to you to bring it to him; but that is not at all so. It is only the same objects which he sees at first in his brain, then in his eyes, he now sees at the end of his arms and can imagine no extension other than that which he can reach. Take care then to walk him often, to transport him from one place to another, to make him feel change of place, in order to teach him to judge distances. When he begins to know them, then the method must be changed, and he must be carried as you please and not as he pleases; for as soon as he is no longer abused by sense, the cause of his effort changes. This change is remarkable and requires explanation (B 64; *Oc* 284-85).

Change of place, the movement of the body in part (for example, here the hand and arm) or in whole, is that which allows the child—who already has a rudimentary sense of self, has become aware "that there are things which are not us," although for him such "things" lack "dimensions and shapes," as we just saw (B 62; *Oc* 282)—allows him to learn about "extension," space, shape, location, about one's proper place as opposed to other objects' place. The motion of things with their consequent effect upon the child's senses has given rise to a vague awareness of pleasure and pain from indeterminate sources, but the locomotion of the child has given rise to an awareness of other things in their full shape, extension, and location, which is the key to animal consciousness of self. The movement of the argument has been from common to proper by means of an "other": this other-as-object has existed first without differentiation in the child's "common *sensorium*," "in his brain, then in his eyes, . . . [then] at the end of his arms," and finally fully materialized in *its* proper place. This proper location externally of other bodies marks the full birth internally of the "self," of the soul's "sentiment of its own existence" (B 61; *Oc* 280).

The end of the full paragraph just quoted indicates that the birth of the full consciousness of self/other gives rise to the awareness that others may help with one's own pleasures and pains. Rousseau is explicit that at this moment the method of education must change because the child's natural needs may now be expanded to include artificial ones if the education of men permits it. The essence of this change is communication, and so the question of language enters.

> The discomfort of the needs is expressed by signs when another's help is necessary to provide for them. This is the source of children's screams. They cry a lot; . . . .
>
> All our languages are works of art. Whether there was a language natural and common to all men has long been a subject of research. Doubtless there is such a language, and it is the one children speak before knowing how to speak. . . .
>
> From these tears that we might think so little worthy of our attention is born man's first relation to all that surrounds him; here is formed the first link in that long chain of which the social order is formed (B 64-65; *Oc* 285-86).

Two languages are distinguished, the natural and the artificial; and it is important to note that even the former, the cries and tears of the infant before learning to speak, is subject to corruption. If the cries and tears are the result of acquired, that is, non-universalized, habit (as seen above), of the desire to control others to satisfy needs beyond those of nature, the very basis of the entire social order is corrupted. The chains of social slavery are anchored in the crib.

Consequently, the issue underlying both habits and needs, locomotion and communication, is power, the power over self and the power over others, whether things or people. Though the issue appears here only in its rudimentary form as the child advances toward full consciousness, Rousseau is explicit as to its import.

> The first tears of children are prayers. If one is not careful, they soon become orders. Children begin by getting themselves assisted; they end by getting themselves served. Thus, from their own weakness, which is in the first place the source of the feeling of their dependence, is subsequently born the idea of empire and domination. But since this idea is excited less by their needs than by our services, at this point moral effects whose immediate cause is not in nature begin to make their appearance; and one sees already why it is important from the earliest age to disentangle the secret intention which dictates the gesture or the scream (B 66; *Oc* 287).

If human intervention were absent, the growth of consciousness, the development of motion and emotion, of habit and expression, would *of necessity* proceed according to nature, and the education of things would complement the education of nature. Such, Rousseau will suggest in Book II, is the development of wild animals. But the human animal is subject to the presentation or withholding of things by other humans as well as to their activities. Thus, even at this early stage when the child's acts and expressions are not themselves "moral," at least not in the sense of Books IV and V, they form a physical basis for the future perception of the proper relation between human self and human other, a perception that must be treated as moral in a strict sense after the passions arise in the last two Books.

Let us, however, return to the main theme of Book I. We should note that the rise of locomotion and language, of sensation and self-consciousness, are a reflection of the Moslem's new moon; they are the far border of infancy and the passage to a new perspective. As is made clear in the closing paragraph of Book I, the essence of infancy is growth; animal consciousness is yet to come.

> The first developments of childhood occur almost all at once, The child learns to talk, to feed himself, to walk, at about the same time. This is, strictly speaking, the first period of his life. Before it he is nothing more than he was in his mother's womb. He has no sentiment, no idea; hardly does he have sensations. He does not even sense his own existence (B 74; *Oc* 298).

Now, for such a being, what is freedom? The freedom of a tree growing wild, as opposed to the espaliered tree. The sole cultivation that man can provide is to assure that the tree's environment gives adequate nourishment, favorable location, and protection from disease—all those conditions that make for future growth. Here, the end of growth is growth. Beyond such facilitation, nothing should be done, the education of nature, internal development, being both the necessary and sufficient condition. At this level, no need exists to distinguish Emile from other children, assuming they have a normal constitution; and according to Rousseau's plan, we view commonplaces, seeing little of Emile specifically. His freedom is that of a seed allowed to germinate without external restraint; but because he is human and not just a seed, external restraint includes not only physical limitation but also repeated activity that forms habit. The power of movement, in the passive sense of growth, is the essence of this freedom: either swaddling clothes or habituation to a schedule fixed by man—for example, feeding or sleeping by the clock rather than by need and the sun—is contrary to nature. But, after all, the freedom of a growing plant is relatively limited, as is the length of exposition in Book I, the shortest in *Emile*.