

Clients and Constituents:
Political Responsiveness in Patronage Democracies

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Online Appendix

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Online Appendix A – Additional Tables & Figures

Chapter 2

Table A2.1 – High-Level Politicians Spend a Considerable Amount of Weekly Time with Constituents—India-wide Survey

Type of Activity	Proportion of Time in a Typical Week
Meeting citizens	.31
Meeting bureaucrats	.10
Meeting own party politicians	.09
Meeting other party politicians	.02
Meeting district/block/village council representatives	.10
Meeting private sector	.04
Meeting local fixers	.05
Meeting NGOs	.05
Political party work	.14
Policy work/Office work	.10

Respondents were asked how many hours a week they meet with each type of visitor. I divided responses from each politician by the total number of hours reported across all types of visitors by that respondent. I then averaged these measures across all politicians of a given office to calculate the proportions shown here. Respondents are state- and national-level politicians across India. Data source: Politician Survey #2.

Table A2.2 – Citizens are the Predominant Type of Visitor to High-Level Politicians—India-wide Survey

Type of Visitor	Proportion of Visitors
Citizens	.51
Fixers	.07
Bureaucrats	.06
Businessmen	.03
NGO representatives	.04
Local politicians	.08
Respondent party politicians	.17
Other party politicians	.04

Entries in cells are the average proportion of each visitor type in the constituency. Respondents are state- and national-level politicians across India. Data Source: Politician Survey #2.

Table A2.3 – How Much of the Overall Development Budget is Influenced by High-Level Politicians and Targeted to Individuals? An Analysis of the Tamil Nadu State Rural Development Budget, 1999-2000¹

Name of Scheme (central/state % of funding)	Stated Purpose of Scheme	Expenditure (Rs. '000,000)	Percent of Total Budget	Who Selects the Beneficiaries?	Are Beneficiaries Individuals or Groups?
Employment Assurance Scheme (75%/25%)	Provide secondary employment in rural areas during lean season	1,213	17	MPs and MLAs in consultation with local elected bodies	Individuals
MLA Constituency Development Scheme (0%/100%)	MLA selects small capital projects for development of constituency	1,175	16	MLA	Group
MPs Local Area Development Scheme (100%/0%)	MP selects small capital projects for development of constituency	1,140	16	MP	Group
Jawahar Gram Samiridhi Yojana (75%/25%)	Improve infrastructure in rural areas while employing poor	1,099	15	Village council	Group
Indira Awas Yojana (75%/25%)	Provide dwellings to SCs/STs and other below the poverty line	779	11	MPs and MLAs through their role in District Rural Development Agencies (DRDAs)	Individual
Anna Marumalarchi Thittam (0%/100%)	Provide wide range of infrastructure and services to one village/constituency	726	10	MLA	Group
Tenth Finance Commission (100% Central)	Provide minor irrigation, roads, school buildings, noon meal centres, sanitation facilities	718	10	Village council, must be approved by MPs and MLAs via DRDAs	Group
Rural Housing - Credit cum Subsidy Scheme		50	1	MLA	Individual
Namakku Naame Thittam	Wide variety of development projects	100	1	Village council, must be approved by MPs and MLAs via DRDAs	Group

¹ The first five columns are taken largely from Wilkinson 2007: 124-125, Table 5.3.

Restructured Central/Rural Sanitation Programme (50%/50%)	Provide latrines for SCs/STs and rural poor	80	1	Village councils	Group
State Finance Commission	Direct grants by state to facilitate working of local government	46	1	Unclear	Group
Equalization and Incentive Grant	“Bridge the resources and infrastructural gap existing between local bodies”	46	1	Unclear	Group
Improved Chullah (Stove) Scheme	Provide improved stoves to reduce pollution and deforestation	4	0	Village council, must be approved by MPs and MLAs via DRDAs	Individual
Bio-Gas		4	0	Local officials	Unclear
TOTAL		7,180			

Table A2.4 – How Much of the Overall Development Budget is Influenced by High-Level Politicians and Targeted to Individuals? An Analysis of the Indian Central Government Rural Development Budget, 2016-17

Name of Scheme	Stated Purpose of Scheme	Expenditure (Rs. 10,000,000)	Percent of Total Budget	Can High-Level Politicians Exert Influence over Beneficiary Selection?	Are Beneficiaries Individuals or Groups?
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme	Provide a minimum number of days employment	38,500	45	Yes	Individual
National rural Livelihoods Mission—Aajeevika	Self-Help Groups	3,000	3	Yes	Individual/ Group
Housing for All: Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana	Housing for the poor	15,000	17	Yes	Individual
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana	Road construction	19,000	22	Yes	Group
Grants to National Institute of Rural Development		50	0	No	N/A
Assistance to the Council for Advancement of People's Action and Rural Technology (CAPART)		20	0	No	N/A
Management support to RD programs and district planning		255	0	No	N/A
Socio-Economic Caste Census (SECC) Survey		375	0	No	N/A
National Social Assistance Programme	Pensions and other support for needy groups	9500	11	Yes	Individual
Shyama Prasad Mukherjee RURBAN Mission	Infrastructure development in rural areas	300	0	Yes	Group
TOTAL		86,000			


Chapter 3

Table A3.1 – Politician Responses are Not Conditioned by Information on Electoral Behavior

	Electoral Treatments	Control	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Overall Response	.11 (.00)	.11 (.00)	.00 (.00)	23,251
Substantive Response	.04 (.00)	.04 (.00)	.00 (.00)	23,251
Request to Call or Meet	.02 (.00)	.02 (.00)	.00 (.00)	23,251

The first column shows average response rate for the consolidated “partisanship” treatments: whether the petitioner voted for the politician, shares the politician’s party, or both. The second column gives average response in the control condition where no partisan information was given. The third column shows the estimated effect of information on partisanship, while the final column gives the N for the comparison. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. Data source: Politician Field Experiment.

Figure A3.1 – Politician Responses are Not Conditioned by Information on Electoral Behavior (Control Conditions for Other Treatment Arms)



The figure reports mean response rates and 95% confidence intervals for the control condition of no information on partisan behavior (gray bar) and the consolidated partisanship treatment conditions (patterned bar), in the control condition for the local blocking treatment and with the ration card treatment. The dependent variable is whether the politician replied to the experimental message. The total sample sizes are: 997 for the control condition and 3,066 for the electoral treatments. Data source: Politician Field Experiment.

Table A3.2 – Response Rates by Treatment Condition (with standard error)

Electoral Behavior (1)	Local Appeals (2)	Type of Request (3)
a. No individual electoral information: .114 (.004)	a. No local appeal information: .118 (.004)	a. Ration card (11,922): .115 (.003)
b. Voted for politician in last election: .118 (.004)	b. Appealed to local politician, but he didn't help: .111 (.004)	b. Street lamp (11,694) .111 (.003)
c. Shares party with politician: .109 (.004)	c. Appealed to local politician, who is not petitioner's party, but he didn't help: .109 (.004)	
d. Shares party and voted for politician: .11 (.004)		
Overall Mean Response Rate: .113 (.002)		

The table shows the response rates and standard errors for each cell of Table 3.1. Here, the response rate in each cell averages over assignments in the other arms of the factorial experiment. For example, cell (1)a shows the average response in the control electoral condition, averaging over the randomized assignments to the treatment conditions in columns (2) and (3). Data source: Politician Field Experiment.

Table A3.3 – Messages and Response Rates for Each Combination of Treatment Conditions

Message Number	Treatment Number	Message	Overall Response Rate (Mean)	Standard Deviation	Observations
1	1a/2a/3a	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card . I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1313942	.3380005	997
2	1a/2b/3a	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card. I contacted my local leader but he didn't help . I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1123596	.3159859	890
3	1a/2c/3a	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card. I contacted my local leader but he is not my party and he didn't help . I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1098081	.3128172	938
4	1b/2a/3a	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you . I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card . I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1306043	.3371314	1,026
5	1b/2b/3a	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you . I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card. I contacted my local leader but he didn't help . I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1069519	.3092174	935
6	1b/2c/3a	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you . I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card. I contacted my	.1192469	.3242484	956

		<p>local leader but he is not my party and he didn't help. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?</p>			
7	1c/2a/3a	<p>Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am a supporter of XYZ party. I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?</p>	.112537	.3161821	1,013
8	1c/2b/3a	<p>Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am a supporter of XYZ party. I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card. I contacted my local leader but he didn't help. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?</p>	.1049841	.3066956	943
9	1c/2c/3a	<p>Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am a supporter of XYZ party. I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card. I contacted my local leader but he is not my party and he didn't help. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?</p>	.1108059	.3140354	1,092
10	1d/2a/3a	<p>Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you and am a supporter of XYZ party. I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?</p>	.1012658	.3018274	1,027
11	1d/2b/3a	<p>Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you in the last election and am a supporter of XYZ party. I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card. I contacted my local leader but he didn't help. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could</p>	.131334	.3379401	967

		you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?			
12	1d/2c/3a	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you in the last election and am a supporter of XYZ party. I am writing because I would like help getting a ration card. I contacted my local leader but he is not my party and he didn't help. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1031149	.3042724	931
13	1a/2a/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1162791	.3207085	1,075
14	1a/2b/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp. I contacted my local leader but he didn't help. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1128871	.3166129	1,001
15	1a/2c/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp. I contacted my local leader but he is not my party and he didn't help. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.0974771	.2967765	872
16	1b/2a/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you. I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1178189	.3225506	1,027
17	1b/2b/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you. I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp. I contacted my local leader but he didn't help. I	.1190211	.3239936	899

		tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?			
18	1b/2c/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you . I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp. I contacted my local leader but he is not my party and he didn't help . I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1137856	.3177245	914
19	1c/2a/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am a supporter of XYZ party . I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp . I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.112782	.3164748	1,064
20	1c/2b/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am a supporter of XYZ party . I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp. I contacted my local leader but he didn't help . I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.0970655	.2962141	886
21	1c/2c/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I am a supporter of XYZ party . I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp. I contacted my local leader but he is not my party and he didn't help . I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1125245	.3161653	1,022
22	1d/2a/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you and am a supporter of XYZ party . I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp . I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and	.1230315	.3286351	1,016

		help me or give me a number of who to contact?			
23	1d/2b/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you in the last election and am a supporter of XYZ party. I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp. I contacted my local leader but he didn't help. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.105802	.3077592	879
24	1d/2c/3b	Hello, I am [name] in your constituency and I voted for you in the last election and am a supporter of XYZ party. I am writing because I would like help installing a street lamp. I contacted my local leader but he is not my party and he didn't help. I tried to call and come to see you, but you were busy. Are you in the constituency now? Please could you text back and help me or give me a number of who to contact?	.1021566	.3030262	881

The table shows the message, response rate, standard deviation and number of observations (messages) for each possible combination of treatments in the factorial design (4x3x2=24 possible combinations). Data source: Politician Field Experiment.

Chapter 5

Table A5.1 – Relationship between Shared Party Membership with Local Council President and Benefit Receipt Differs Across States and Benefits – All Respondents

		Not Party ID of Local Politician	Party ID of Local Politician	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Any Benefit	Bihar	.64 (.01)	.64 (.04)	-.01 (.04)	2,627
	Jharkhand	.73 (.01)	.75 (.05)	.02 (.05)	1,883
	Uttar Pradesh	.88 (.02)	.83 (.88)	.04* (.02)	4,768
Benefit from Local Council	Bihar	.05 (.00)	.10 (.02)	.04* (.02)	2,625
	Jharkhand	.03 (.00)	.03 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	1,888
	Uttar Pradesh	.09 (.00)	.14 (.02)	.05** (.02)	4,767
Subsidized Consumables (PDS)	Bihar	.85 (.01)	.84 (.01)	-.01 (.04)	1,717
	Jharkhand	.91 (.01)	.93 (.03)	.02 (.04)	1,383
	Uttar Pradesh	.93 (.00)	.95 (.01)	.02 (.02)	3,983
Housing (IAY)	Bihar	.22 (.01)	.19 (.04)	-.03 (.04)	1,717
	Jharkhand	.17 (.01)	.16 (.05)	-.01 (.05)	1,382
	Uttar Pradesh	.06 (.00)	.06 (.01)	-.00 (.02)	3,982
Self-Help Groups (SGSY)	Bihar	.02 (.00)	.02 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	1,715
	Jharkhand	.01 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.01 (.01)	1,383
	Uttar Pradesh	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.01** (.00)	3,980
(ICDS)	Bihar	.13 (.01)	.16 (.04)	.04 (.03)	1,714
	Jharkhand	.13 (.01)	.10 (.04)	-.03 (.04)	1,385
	Uttar Pradesh	.08 (.00)	.08 (.02)	.00 (.02)	3,981
Low Price Grains (AY)	Bihar	.21 (.01)	.24 (.04)	.03 (.04)	1,713

	Jharkhand	.16 (.01)	.14 (.05)	-.02 (.05)	1,383
	Uttar Pradesh	.22 (.01)	.21 (.01)	-.01 (.03)	3,981
Pre/Post Natal Care (JSY)	Bihar	.12 (.01)	.15 (.04)	.03 (.03)	1,714
	Jharkhand	.10 (.01)	.04 (.04)	-.06 (.04)	1,382
	Uttar Pradesh	.08 (.00)	.13 (.02)	.05** (.02)	3,982
Work Program (MGNREGA)	Bihar	.09 (.00)	.08 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	2,640
	Jharkhand	.15 (.01)	.24 (.05)	.09* (.04)	1,888
	Uttar Pradesh	.18 (.00)	.26 (.02)	.08*** (.02)	4,768
State Pension	Bihar	.12 (.01)	.10 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	1,717
	Jharkhand	.08 (.01)	.09 (.04)	.01 (.04)	1,383
	Uttar Pradesh	.07 (.00)	.06 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	3,981
Old Age Pension	Bihar	.06 (.01)	.06 (.02)	.00 (.02)	1,716
	Jharkhand	.06 (.01)	.04 (.02)	-.02 (.01)	1,383
	Uttar Pradesh	.02 (.00)	.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	3,982

Cells report means or differences of means, with standard errors in parentheses. Respondents are individuals in Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh who responded to questions about party affiliation benefit receipt. Party ID of Local Politician=1 for those respondents who reported being members of a political party that matched the party they associated with the local council president. Data source: Citizen Survey #2.

Table A5.2 – Relationship between Shared Party Closeness with Local Council President and Benefit Receipt Differs Across States and Benefits – All Respondents

		Not Party ID of Local Politician	Party ID of Local Politician	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Any Benefit	Bihar	.66 (.01)	.55 (.02)	-.11*** (.02)	2,627
	Jharkhand	.74 (.01)	.67 (.04)	-.07* (.04)	1,883
	Uttar Pradesh	.85 (.00)	.76 (.01)	-.08*** (.01)	4,768
Benefit from Local Council	Bihar	.06 (.00)	.07 (.01)	.01 (.01)	2,625
	Jharkhand	.03 (.00)	.02 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	1,888
	Uttar Pradesh	.09 (.00)	.14 (.01)	.05*** (.01)	4,767
Subsidized Consumables (PDS)	Bihar	.86 (.01)	.83 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	1,717
	Jharkhand	.90 (.01)	.93 (.02)	.02 (.03)	1,383
	Uttar Pradesh	.94 (.00)	.90 (.01)	-.04*** (.01)	3,893
Housing (IAY)	Bihar	.22 (.01)	.23 (.03)	.01 (.03)	1,717
	Jharkhand	.18 (.01)	.12 (.03)	.05+ (.04)	1,382
	Uttar Pradesh	.06 (.00)	.05 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	3,982
Self-Help Groups (SGSY)	Bihar	.02 (.00)	.02 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	1,715
	Jharkhand	.01 (.00)	.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	1,383
	Uttar Pradesh	.00 (.00)	.01 (.00)	.01+ (.00)	3,980
(ICDS)	Bihar	.12 (.01)	.17 (.02)	.05* (.02)	1,714
	Jharkhand	.14 (.01)	.07 (.02)	-.07* (.03)	1,385
	Uttar Pradesh	.07 (.00)	.13 (.01)	.06*** (.01)	3,981
Low Price Grains (AY)	Bihar	.21 (.01)	.20 (.02)	-.01 (.03)	1,713
	Jharkhand	.16	.12	.04	1,383

		(.01)	(.03)	(.04)	
	Uttar Pradesh	.22 (.01)	.21 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	3,981
Pre/Post Natal Care (JSY)	Bihar	.12 (.01)	.13 (.02)	.01 (.02)	1,714
	Jharkhand	.10 (.01)	.04 (.02)	-.06* (.03)	1,382
	Uttar Pradesh	.08 (.00)	.09 (.01)	.01 (.01)	3,982
Work Program (MGNREGA)	Bihar	.09 (.01)	.07 (.01)	.02 (.01)	2,640
	Jharkhand	.16 (.01)	.14 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	1,888
	Uttar Pradesh	.18 (.01)	.20 (.01)	.02 (.01)	4,768
State Pension	Bihar	.11 (.01)	.12 (.02)	.01 (.02)	1,717
	Jharkhand	.08 (.01)	.10 (.03)	.02 (.03)	1,383
	Uttar Pradesh	.08 (.00)	.06 (.01)	-.02⁺ (.01)	3,981
Old Age Pension	Bihar	.06 (.01)	.06 (.02)	.00 (.02)	1,716
	Jharkhand	.06 (.01)	.06 (.02)	.00 (.02)	1,383
	Uttar Pradesh	.02 (.00)	.02 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	3,982

Cells report means or differences of means, with standard errors in parentheses. Respondents are individuals in Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh who reported feeling close to a political party and were able to identify the political party of the local council president, and also answered questions about benefit receipt. Party ID of Local Politician=1 for those respondents who reported feeling closest a political party that matched the local council president's. Data source: Citizen Survey #2.

Chapter 7

Table A7.1 – Total Number of Appeals is Higher for Non-Copartisans of Local Politicians (Bihar, Jharkhand & Uttar Pradesh)

	Not Party ID of Local Politician	Party ID of Local Politician	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Individual would Appeal to High-Level Politician	6.45 (.04)	5.81 (.10)	-.64*** (.10)	9,296

Cells report means or differences of means, with standard errors in parentheses. Respondents are all individuals in Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh who responded to questions about party affiliation and appeals for assistance. Party ID of Local Politician includes those reported feeling closest to a political party that matched the party they associated with the local council president. Data source: Citizen Survey #2.

Table A7.2 – Partisan Ties are Strongly Associated with A Higher Total Number of Appeals – Ordinary Least Squares Full Model (Bihar, Jharkhand & Uttar Pradesh)

Variables		
Partisan Relationships	No Party ID	.56*** (4.42)
	Not Party ID of Local Politician	.40*** (3.78)
Requested Service	Building Approval	1.50*** (14.11)
	Health Center	1.82*** (16.96)
	Tube Well	1.50*** (14.00)
Monthly Income (Rupees)	0-1,000	.13 (.59)
	1,001-2,000	.36 ⁺ (1.67)
	2,001-3,000	.94*** (4.27)
	3,001-4,000	1.19*** (5.14)
	4,001-5,000	1.04*** (4.18)
	5,001-6,000	.77** (2.67)
	6,001-7,000	.53 (1.33)
	7,001-8,000	1.44*** (3.22)
	8,001-9,000	.63 (1.09)
	9,001-10,000	1.08** (2.72)
Gender	Male	.14 ⁺ (1.89)
Caste Category	Scheduled Caste	.00 (.02)
	Scheduled Tribe	-.14 (-.72)
	Other Backward Caste	.15 (1.48)
State	Bihar	-.90*** (-7.58)
	Uttar Pradesh	-2.00*** (-18.54)
Constant		5.33
Adjusted R-squared		.09
N		9,271

* Ordinary least squares model with coefficients listed and t-ratios in parentheses. Citizen responses only. The excluded party affiliation category is “Party ID of Local Politician,” the excluded service type is caste certificate, the excluded income category is “more than 11,000 Rupees per month,” the excluded caste category is forward castes, and the excluded state is Uttar Pradesh. Data source: Citizen Survey #2.

Table A7.3 – Co-Partisans of Local Council President Petition Differently than Non-Copartisans (Bihar, Jharkhand & Uttar Pradesh)

	Not Party ID of Local Politician	Party ID of Local Politician	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Individual would Appeal to High-Level Politician	.67 (.00)	.60 (.01)	.07*** (.01)	9,296
Individual would Appeal Only to Local Politician	.29 (.00)	.37 (.01)	-.08*** (.01)	8,857

Cells report means or differences of means, with standard errors in parentheses. Respondents are all individuals in Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh who responded to questions about party affiliation and appeals for assistance. Party ID of Local Politician includes those reported feeling closest to a political party that matched the party they associated with the local council president. Data source: Citizen Survey #2.

Table A7.4 – Appeals to Multiple Actors, including High-Level Politicians, Increase for Non-Copartisans of Local Council Presidents

Type of Actor	Will Receive Appeal for Assistance (0-1)			
	Overall Mean Response	No Party ID	Not Party ID of Local Pol	Party ID of Local Pol
Local Council President	.92	.92	.92	.92
<i>Block Development Officer</i>	.72	.74	.74	.66
Local Council Secretary	.66	.66	.67	.65
<i>Local Council Member</i>	.66	.72	.67	.54
<i>State Legislator (MLA)</i>	.61	.65	.61	.55
<i>District Collector</i>	.58	.59	.59	.52
<i>Department Bureaucrat</i>	.57	.58	.57	.55
<i>Department Minister</i>	.43	.42	.44	.40
Chief Minister	.24	.21	.26	.21
<i>Village Association Representative</i>	.18	.22	.17	.13
Neighborhood Association Representative	.17	.21	.14	.14
<i>Family Member</i>	.14	.16	.14	.12
<i>Traditional Panchayat Representative</i>	.13	.16	.13	.11
<i>Caste Association Representative</i>	.12	.16	.12	.10
Local leader (<i>naya neta</i>)	.09	.09	.10	.08
<i>NGO Representative</i>	.08	.12	.08	.05
Middleman (<i>dalal</i>)	.08	.06	.08	.11

Actors types are listed in descending order, based on the average rate at which respondents said they would be contacted for assistance. Categories in bold are those actors who are state legislators. Categories in italics are those actors for whom there is a more than two percentage point increase in the perceived likelihood of receiving a request for assistance in both the no party ID and not the party of the local council president groups, relative to co-partisans of the council president. Data source: Citizen Survey #2.

Table A7.5 – Local Partisan Ties Affect Perceptions of Appeals to High-level Politicians, with covariates – Ordinary Least Squares Full Model (Bihar, Jharkhand & Uttar Pradesh)

Variables		
Partisan Relationships	No Party ID	.08*** (5.41)
	Not Party ID of Local Politician	.07*** (5.81)
Requested Service	Building Approval	.36*** (28.36)
	Health Center	.46*** (35.71)
	Tube Well	.35*** (27.27)
Monthly Income (Rupees)	0-1,000	.03 (1.09)
	1,001-2,000	.01 (.34)
	2,001-3,000	.09** (3.36)
	3,001-4,000	.11*** (3.90)
	4,001-5,000	.07* (2.47)
	5,001-6,000	.06+ (1.84)
	6,001-7,000	-.10 (.39)
	7,001-8,000	.18** (3.27)
	8,001-9,000	.06 (.88)
	9,001-10,000	.08+ (1.78)
Gender	Male	.02* (2.52)
Caste Category	Scheduled Caste	-.03+ (1.84)
	Scheduled Tribe	-.05* (2.08)
	Other Backward Caste	-.01 (.56)
State	Bihar	-.03* (2.20)
	Uttar Pradesh	.04** (2.92)
Constant		.24
Adjusted R-squared	.15	
N	9,271	

* Ordinary least squares model with coefficients listed and t-ratios in parentheses. Citizen responses only. The excluded party affiliation category is “Party ID of Local Politician,” the excluded service type is caste certificate, the excluded income category is “more than 11,000 Rupees per month,” the excluded caste category is forward castes, and the excluded state is Uttar Pradesh. Data source: Citizen Survey #2.

Table A7.6 – Local Partisan Ties Affect Perceptions of Appeals to High-level Politicians – Logit full model, with covariates (Bihar, Jharkhand & Uttar Pradesh)

Variables		
Partisan Relationships	No Party ID	.42*** (5.35)
	Not Party ID of Local Politician	.37*** (5.83)
Requested Service	Building Approval	1.58*** (24.50)
	Health Center	2.14*** (30.36)
	Tube Well	1.51*** (23.60)
Monthly Income (Rupees)	0-1,000	.14 (1.06)
	1,001-2,000	.04 (.31)
	2,001-3,000	.46** (3.37)
	3,001-4,000	.58*** (3.99)
	4,001-5,000	.37* (2.42)
	5,001-6,000	.32+ (1.81)
	6,001-7,000	-.10 (-.41)
	7,001-8,000	1.01** (3.21)
	8,001-9,000	.30 (.82)
	9,001-10,000	.44 (1.75)
Gender	Male	.12* (2.50)
Caste Category	Scheduled Caste	-.14+ (-1.85)
	Scheduled Tribe	-.25* (-2.07)
	Other Backward Caste	-.04 (-.57)
State	Bihar	-.16* (-2.10)
	Uttar Pradesh	.20** (3.01)
Constant		-1.19
Pseudo R-squared		.12
N		9,271

* Logit model with coefficients listed and z-ratios in parentheses. Citizen responses in Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh. The excluded party affiliation category is “Party ID of Local Politician,” the excluded service type is caste certificate, the excluded income category is “more than 11,000 Rupees per month,” the excluded caste category is forward castes, and the excluded state is Uttar Pradesh. Data source: Citizen Survey #2.

Table A7.7 - Partisan Ties are not Associated with Appeals to High-level Politicians (Karnataka)

		Model	
		(1)	(2)
Variables			
Partisanship	Shares State Legislator's Party	.06 (.15)	.57 (1.03)
Gender	Male		.17 (.32)
Income (0-1 scale)			3.39 (1.09)
Age (years)			.03* (2.21)
Caste Category	Scheduled Caste		-.88 (-.62)
	Scheduled Tribe		-.74 (-.49)
	Other Backward Caste A		-.49 (-.36)
	Other Backward Caste B		-.08 (-.06)
Constant		1.30	-1.27
N		125	87

Logit model with coefficients listed and z-ratios in parentheses. The dependent variable is the probability that a High-level Politician received a request. Partisanship and Gender are 0-1 variables. The excluded Caste Category is Forward Castes. Data source: Citizen Survey #1.

+ = $p < .10$, * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, and *** = $p < .00$

Table A7.8 – Lack of Partisan Ties is not Associated with Appeals to High-level Politicians (Karnataka)

Variables		Model	
		(1)	(2)
Partisanship	No Party ID	-.08 (-.29)	-.12 (-.35)
Gender	Male		-.33 (-.93)
Income (0-1 scale)			1.02 (.48)
Age (years)			.02 ⁺ (1.92)
Caste Category	Scheduled Caste		.15 (.20)
	Scheduled Tribe		.64 (.66)
	Other Backward Caste A		.31 (.46)
	Other Backward Caste B		.23 (.34)
Constant		.11	-.69
N		249	177

Logit model with coefficients listed and z-ratios in parentheses. The dependent variable is the probability that a High-level Politician received a request. Partisanship (No Party ID) and Gender are 0-1 variables. The excluded Caste Category is Forward Castes. Data Source: Citizen Survey #1.

⁺ = p<.10, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, and *** = p<.001.

Chapter 8

Table A8.1 – Politician Responses are Not Conditioned by Information on Electoral Behavior

	Partisan Treatment	Control	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Voted for Politician	.12 (.00)	.11 (.00)	.01 (.00)	11,530
Politician’s Party	.11 (.00)	.11 (.00)	.00 (.00)	11,793
Politician’s Party & Voted for Politician	.11 (.00)	.11 (.00)	.00 (.00)	11,474

The first column shows average response rate for each of the three “partisanship” treatments: whether the petitioner voted for the politician, shares the politician’s party, or both. The second column gives average response in the control condition where no partisan information was given—this is the same comparison group for each of the treatment conditions. The third column shows the estimated effect of information on partisanship, while the final column gives the N for each comparison. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. Data Source: Politician Field Experiment.

Table A8.2 – The Substance of Politician Responses is Associated with the Personal Vote, but not Shared Partisanship

	Partisan Treatment	Control	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Voted for Politician	.36 (.02)	.31 (.02)	.05* (.03)	1,337
Politician’s Party	.32 (.02)	.31 (.02)	.01 (.02)	1,312
Politician’s Party & Voted for Politician	.30 (.02)	.31 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	1,292

The first column shows average rate at which politicians provided a substantive response, for each of the three “partisanship” treatments: whether the petitioner voted for the politician, shares the politician’s party, or both. The second column gives average response in the control condition where no partisan information was given—this is the same comparison group for each of the treatment conditions. The third column shows the estimated effect of information on partisanship, while the final column gives the N for each comparison. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. Data Source: Politician Field Experiment.

Table A8.3 – Requests for a Phone Call or Personal Meeting are Associated with the Personal Vote, but not Shared Partisanship

	Partisan Treatment	Control	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Voted for Politician	.25 (.02)	.20 (.02)	.05* (.02)	1,337
Politician’s Party	.22 (.02)	.20 (.02)	.02 (.02)	1,312
Politician’s Party & Voted for Politician	.22 (.02)	.20 (.02)	.02 (.02)	1,292

The first column shows average rate at which politicians requested a phone call or personal meeting, for each of the three “partisanship” treatments: whether the petitioner voted for the politician, shares the politician’s party, or both. The second column gives average response in the control condition where no partisan information was given—this is the same comparison group for each of the treatment conditions. The third column shows the estimated effect of information on partisanship, while the final column gives the N for each comparison. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. Data Source: Politician Field Experiment.

Table A8.4 – The Combined Effect of Local Appeals and Electoral Treatments Varies with State History of Elected Local Councils

State	Treatment	Local Appeals Treatment	Control	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Bihar (short history)	Local Appeal + Control	.12 (.02)	.08 (.03)	.04 ⁺ (.00)	374
	Electoral Condition				
	Local Appeal + Personal Vote & Politician’s Party	.10 (.02)	.10 (.01)	.00 (.02)	1,213
Karnataka (medium history)	Local Appeal + Control	.09 (.02)	.08 (.03)	.01 (.03)	333
	Electoral Condition				
	Local Appeal + Personal Vote & Politician’s Party	.08 (.01)	.09 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	1,056
Maharashtra (long history)	Local Appeal + Control	.08 (.02)	.14 (.03)	-.06* (.03)	423
	Electoral Condition				
	Local Appeal + Personal Vote & Politician’s Party	.13 (.02)	.13 (.01)	.00 (.02)	1,275

The first column shows response rate for the “local appeals” treatments: the petitioner requested help from a local leader who did not provide assistance or the petitioner requested help from a local leader who does not share his party and did not receive assistance. The second column gives average response in the control condition where no local appeals information was given. The third column shows the estimated effect of information on local appeals, while the final column gives the N for each comparison. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. Data Source: Politician Field Experiment and Bohlken (2015).

Chapter 9

Table A9.1 – States Display Strong Differences in Response Rates to Experimental Audit Messages

State	Dependent Variable	
	Effect on Base Response Rate	Effect on Response to At Least One Message
Andhra Pradesh	.36 (1.28)	.23 (1.57)
Assam	.60* (2.11)	.61*** (4.10)
Bihar	.96*** (3.65)	.65*** (4.62)
Chhattisgarh	.97*** (.28)	.44** (2.74)
Delhi	1.69*** (6.13)	1.34*** (8.34)
Gujarat	1.70*** (6.54)	1.40*** (9.76)
Haryana	1.09*** (3.87)	.69*** (4.37)
Himachal Pradesh	1.08*** (3.73)	.68*** (4.13)
Jammu & Kashmir	.83** (2.87)	.41* (2.55)
Jharkhand	.62* (2.09)	.57*** (3.52)
Karnataka	.73** (2.75)	.48** (3.38)
Kerala	1.30*** (2.72)	1.42*** (9.68)
Madhya Pradesh	.73** (2.72)	.40** (2.85)
Maharashtra	1.08*** (4.71)	1.05*** (7.65)
Meghalaya	1.40** (3.30)	1.04*** (6.23)
Mizoram	1.05*** (3.30)	.70*** (3.77)
Nagaland	.82** (2.68)	.65*** (3.82)
Odisha	.26 (.92)	.23 (1.55)
Puducherry	1.40***	1.13***

	(4.20)	(5.36)
Rajasthan	.84**	.62***
	(3.17)	(4.34)
Sikkim	1.55***	1.30***
	(4.72)	(6.17)
Tamil Nadu	1.62***	1.39***
	(6.26)	(9.89)
Telangana	.34	.05
	(1.17)	(.35)
Tripura	.53	.45**
	(1.64)	(2.61)
Uttar Pradesh	.33	.03
	(1.25)	(.20)
West Bengal	1.38***	1.14***
	(5.34)	(8.21)
Constant	-3.00	-1.28
N	21,044	21,044

Logit model with coefficients listed and z-ratios in parentheses. Politician responses from Politician Field Experiment. The dependent variables are the average baseline response rate in the state and the average rate at which politicians responded to at least one of the six messages they received. The excluded state is Arunachal Pradesh. ⁺ = p<.10, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, and *** = p<.00. Data Source: Politician Field Experiment.

Table A9.2 – Party in Power is Most Consistent Predictor of Responsiveness

	Overall Response Rate	Substantive Response	Request for Call/Meeting	Request for More Information
Turnout	.009*** (.002)	.004 (.003)	-.000 (.003)	.028*** (.005)
Vote Share	.011** (.004)	.014* (.006)	.017* (.007)	.006 (.010)
Vote Margin	-.002 (.003)	-.000 (.005)	-.004 (.006)	.013 ⁺ (.008)
Party in Power	-.283*** (.044)	-.317*** (.075)	-.394*** (.087)	-.180 (.117)
Constant	-3.052	-4.023	-4.099	-6.622
N	21,282	21,282	21,282	21,282

Logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Politician responses to fictitious citizen requests. ⁺ = p<.10, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, and *** = p<.00. Data Source: Politician Field Experiment.


Table A9.3 – The Local Appeals Treatment is Associated with Reduced Response Rates, in General

	Local Appeals Treatment	Control	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Did Not Receive Help from Local Leader	.11 (.00)	.12 (.00)	-.01 ⁺ (.00)	15,645
Did Not Receive Help from Local Leader, who is not Petitioner’s Party	.11 (.00)	.12 (.00)	-.01* (.00)	15,851

The first column shows response rate for each of the “local appeals” treatments: the petitioner requested help from a local leader who did not provide assistance and the petitioner requested help from a local leader who does not share his party and did not receive assistance. The second column gives average response in the control condition where no local appeals information was given—this is the same comparison group for each of the treatment conditions. The third column shows the estimated effect of information on local appeals, while the final column gives the N for each comparison. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$. Data Source: Politician Field Experiment.

Chapter 10

Figure A10.1 – Citizens perceive MLAs to be important sources of assistance, alongside local politicians and bureaucrats



Bars represent the proportion of respondents who said an individual would appeal to each individual or group for assistance in acquiring the service noted in the scenario. Dotted bars represent the Caste Certificate scenario, striped bars represent the Building License scenario, dark gray bars represent the Health Center scenario, and light gray bars represent the Tube Well scenario. “Mukhiya” refers to the village council president, BDO to the Block Development Officer, and DC to the District Collector (the latter two are bureaucrats). Data Source: Citizen Survey #2.

Table A10.1 – Co-Partisanship with a State Legislator is Associated with Expectations about Appeals to that Actor, Dependent on the Type of Good

Scenario:	Caste Certificate	Building Approval	Health Center	Tube Well
Respondent Shares Party with State Legislator	.02 (.78)	.06** (2.95)	-.00 (-.02)	.04+ (1.84)
Constant	.36	.71	.83	.71
R-squared	.00	.00	.00	.00
N	2,324	2,324	2,319	2,318

*Ordinary least squares model with coefficients listed and t-ratios in parentheses. Data Source: Citizen Survey #2.


Table A10.2 – F-Test Results Show Electoral Variables Improve Fit of Models for MLALADS Spending, but not Responsiveness in Field Experiment

	MLALADS Spending		Field Experiment Responsiveness	
	Electoral Variables	Demographic Variables	Electoral Variables	Demographic Variables
F-Statistic	1.74	.57	.55	2.15
Prob > F	.06	.80	.88	.03

Data Sources: Politician Field Experiment and Politician Spending Data.


Chapter 11

Figure A11.1 – Presence of Patronage Characteristics in Full Democracies (coded “Free” by Freedom House²)




Dotted bars indicate public wages as a percentage of total public expenditure, and gray bars indicate the percentage of respondents who had paid a bribe among those who said they had interacted with a government department in the past 12 months. Data Source: Cross-national Dataset on Patronage Democracy

Figure A11.2 – Access to Public Services is Relatively High Across Democracies




Average score for access to water, sanitation, electricity, education, and health services, as scored for specific indicators (noted in text) in the World Development Indicators, 2012. Data Source: Cross-national Dataset on Patronage Democracy

Figure A11.3 – Demand for Intermediation is Substantial Across Democracies



Percent of citizen survey respondents reporting that personal contacts are important for getting things done in the public sector. Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2013.

Figure A11.4 – Politicians and Parties in Most Democracies Exert at least a Minor Effort to Induce Voters with Preferential Benefits



Expert responses to the question: In general, how much do politicians and parties in your country make an effort to induce voters with preferential benefits to cast their votes for them? 1 = Negligible effort, 2 = Minor effort, 3 = Moderate effort, 4 = Major effort. Data Source: Democratic Accountability and Linkages Dataset 2008/9, included in Cross-national Dataset on Patronage Democracy.

Online Appendix B – Methods and Data Sources

Online Appendix Table B.1 – States, Districts, and Blocks included in Citizen Survey #2

State	District	Block
Bihar	Araria	Bhargama
		Forbesganj
		Kursakanta
		Narpatganj
		Raniganj
		Sikti
	Bhagalpur	Goradih
		Jagdishpur
		Pirpanti
		Sultanganj
	Bhojpur	Arrah
		Bihiyan
		Piro
		Sahar
		Tarari
		Udwant Nagar
	Gaya	Belaganj
		Khizirsarai
		Wazirganj
	Jamui	Chakai
		Gidhaur
		Jamui
		Jhajha
	Katihar	Kadwa
		Manihari
	Khagaria	Alauli
		Chautham
		Gogri
		Mansi
	Munger	Bariarpur
	Muzaffarpur	Bandra
		Dholi (Moraul)
		Kurhani
		Saraiya
	Nalanda	Chandi
		Islampur
		Parbalpur
	Paschim Champaran	Chanpatia
		Majhauria
		Piprasi
Saran	Baniapur	
	Ekma	
	Maker	
	Marhaura	
	Mashrakh	
	Nagra	
	Panapur	
	Revelganj	

	Siwan	Sonepur
		Taraiya
		Barharia
		Basantput
		Bhagwanpur Hat
		Darauli
		Daraundha
		Goriakothi
		Hussainganj
		Maharajganj
		Mairwa
		Raghunathpur
		Siwan Sadar
		Vaishali
Jandaha		
Lalganj		
Mahua		
Jharkhand	Bokaro	Chandankiyari
		Chandrapura
		Gomiya
		Petawar
	Deoghar	Karro
		Palojori
		Sarath
	Dhanbad	Baghmar
		Baliyapur
		Dhanbad
		Topchanchi
	Giridih	Bagodar
		Birani
		Deori
		Dumari
		Gandey
		Jamua
		Pirtand
		Sariya
		Tisari
	Godda	Godda
		Mahagama
		Mehrama
		Pathargama
	Hazaribag	Barkatha
	Koderma	Chandvaara
		Jainagar
		Markachcho
	Palamu	Chainpur
		Husainabaad
		Medininagar
	Ramgarh	Mandu
		Patratu
	Uttar Pradesh	Agra
Etmadpur		
Jagner		

		Khandauli
		Shamsabad
	Allahabad	Bahria
		Jasra
		Manda
		Meja
		Uruwan
	Ambedkar Nagar	Bhiyawan
		Jahangir Ganj
		Jalal Pur
		Katehari
		Ram Nagar
	Balia	Bairia
		Beruarbari
		Chilkahar
		Dubhar
		Navanagar
	Barabanki	Dariyabad
		Haidargarh
		Masauli
		Nindaura
		Trivediganj
	Bareilly	Bhadpura
		Bhut
		Nawabganj
		Ramnagar
		Shergarh
	Basti	Bankati
		Basti
		Gaur
		Ramnagar
		Sau Ghat
	Bijnor	Afzalgarh
		Dhampur
		Kotwali
		Najibabad
		Noorpur
	Chitrakoot	Karwi
		Manikpur
		Mau
		Pahari
		Ramnagar
	Etah	Aliganj
		Marehra
		Nidhauri Kalan
		Sakit
		Shitalpur
	Fatehpur	Bahua
		Devmai
		Khajuha
		Malwan
		Vijaypur
	Gazipur	Kasimabad

		Manihari
		Mohammedabad
		Saidpur
	Ghazaibad	Bhojpur
		Dhaulana
		Muradnagar
		Rajapur
		Simbhawali
	Hardoi	Ahirori
		Bawan
		Bilgram
		Sandi
		Sandila
	Jhansi	Badagaon
		Bamaur
		Chirgaon
		Moranipur
		Moth
	Kanpur	Bheetargawan
		Bilohar
		Ghatampur
		Kalyanpur
		Vidhunu
	Kheri	Bankeyganj
		Behjam
		Bijuwa
		Palia
		Ramia Behar
	Kushi Nagar	Dunhahi
		Fazilnagar
		Kartainganj
		Kasaya
		Nebua Naurangia
	Mahamaya Nagar	Hasayan
		Hathras
		Mursan
		Sasni
		Sehpau
	Mainpuri	Barnahal
		Ghiror
		Jageer
		Karhal
		Kuraoli
	Mathura	Chhata
		Farah
		Mat
		Mathura
		Nohjhil
	Mau	Badraon
		Dohri Ghat
		Fatehpur Madaun
		Kopaganj
		Ranipur

	Moradabad	Asmauli
		Bahjoi
		Baniyakhera
		Bhagatpur Tanda
		Bilari
	Pratapgarh	Aspur Deosara
		Babaganj
		Lakshamanpur
		Patti
		Sandwa Chandrika
	Rae Bareli	Deenshah Gaura
		Lalganj
		Rahi
		Rohania
		Sataon
	Sant Ravidas Nagar	Aurai
		Bhadohi
		Deegh
		Gyanpur
		Suriyavan
	Sitapur	Behta
		Laharpur
		Machhrehta
		Maholi
		Sakran
Sonbhadra	Babhani	
	Chatara	
	Ghorawal	
	Mayurpur	
	Robertsganj	
Unnao	Fatehpur Chaurasi	
	Hasanganj	
	Mianganj	
	Nawabganj	
	Sikandarpur Karan	

Politician Survey #1/Bureaucrat Survey #1/Citizen Survey #2: Survey Questions Used in This Book

Politician Respondents

1. Typically, how many hours per week do you spend on the following activities (mark answer for all items):
 - a. Legislative/policy work
 - b. Meeting with constituents
 - c. Meeting with bureaucrats/government officials
 - d. Meeting with representatives of the private sector
 - e. Meeting with representatives of NGOs
 - f. Work for your political party
 - g. Other
2. On a typical day when you are in the constituency, how many visitors do you receive?
3. Out of every 100 visitors that you receive in the constituency, how many are:
 - a. Individual citizens/voters
 - b. Private individuals, fixers or naya neta, acting on behalf of citizens
 - c. Bureaucrats/state officials
 - d. Businessmen/representatives of the private sector
 - e. Representatives of NGOs
 - f. Party members
 - g. Politicians from other parties
 - h. Other
4. When citizens visit you, what is the most common thing that they request?
 - a. Recommendations for employment
 - b. Help in resolving police cases
 - c. Help with land affairs
 - d. Help getting a ration card
 - e. Help getting a caste certificate
 - f. Help with MGNREGA scheme
 - g. Help getting other welfare scheme (please specify)
 - h. Help with education department
 - i. Help with other government service (please specify)
 - j. Other (please specify)
5. When an individual, a fixer or naya neta, approaches you on behalf of a citizen, what is the most common thing that they request?
 - a. Recommendations for employment
 - b. Help in resolving police cases
 - c. Help with land affairs
 - d. Help getting a ration card
 - e. Help getting a caste certificate
 - f. Help with MGNREGA scheme
 - g. Help getting other welfare scheme (please specify)
 - h. Help with education department
 - i. Help with other government service (please specify)
 - j. Other (please specify)

6. Do you have power to transfer bureaucrats between positions?
7. If yes, which bureaucrats can you transfer?
 - a. IAS officers in your constituency
 - b. State administrative officers in your constituency
 - c. Other lower level bureaucrats in your constituency
 - d. IAS officers in your department
 - e. State officers in your department
 - f. Other
8. [Survey experiment: one example of text] Ram [**Yadav**] is a voter in your constituency and he is having difficulty filing a complaint with the Police for some objects that were stolen from his home. He comes to you to request that you intervene with the police on his behalf. How likely is it that you will be able to help him?
 1. Very unlikely
 2. Somewhat unlikely
 3. Not likely or unlikely
 4. Somewhat likely
 5. Very likely
9. [Survey experiment: one example of text] Another citizen comes to you for help because he is having difficulty with a case that has been brought against him in the district court. He is a respected member of the community, a supporter of the [**JD (U)**], and often engages in social work activities in his village. How likely is it that you will be able to help him?
 1. Very unlikely
 2. Somewhat unlikely
 3. Not likely or unlikely
 4. Somewhat likely
 5. Very likely

Bureaucrat Respondents

1. How many times have you been transferred to a new position in the last five years?

Citizen Respondents

1. Gender (reported by enumerator)
2. How old are you? (years)
3. How many years of school did you complete?
4. What is your religion?
5. What is your Caste group?
6. Considering your main job and all other sources of income, what was your approximate income in the last month?
7. Are you a beneficiary of any government schemes?
8. If yes, which schemes?
 - a. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)
 - b. State Old Age Pension (SOAPS)
 - c. Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pensioners Scheme (IGNOAPS/IGWPS/IGDPS)
 - d. Public Distribution System (PDS)
 - e. Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY)

- f. Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY)
 - g. Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS)
 - h. Antodaya Yojna
 - i. Janani Suraksha Yojna (JSY)
 - j. Other (please specify)
9. In the last year, have you received a benefit or job from your Gram Panchayat?
10. If yes, which benefits or jobs?
- a. Job (specify)
 - b. Housing
 - c. Other income support
 - d. Any other benefit
11. With which political party is the Mukhiya of your gram panchayat affiliated?
12. Are you a member of a political party?
13. If yes, which party?
14. To which political party do you feel closest?
15. There is a view that voters vote for a party or candidate because he/she has received personal gifts such as money/food/liquor from that party or candidate. In your area, how many people accept the distribution of such gifts?
- a. No one
 - b. Very few
 - c. Some
 - d. Many
 - e. Almost every one
16. [Survey experiment] A citizen is having trouble getting a [**caste certificate/business license/tube well/health center**]. Which of the following people do you think he would ask for assistance?
- a. Mukhiya (local council president)
 - b. Panchayat member (local council member)
 - c. Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA)
 - d. Department minister
 - e. Chief Minister
 - f. Gram panchayat Secretary (local council bureaucrat)
 - g. Department bureaucrat
 - h. Block Development Officer
 - i. District collector
 - j. Middleman (dalal)
 - k. Local leader/naya neta
 - l. NGO representative
 - m. Caste association representative
 - n. Traditional panchayat representative
 - o. Village association representative
 - p. Neighborhood association representative
 - q. Family member
 - r. Other

Explanatory Notes: The following descriptions are offered to give context to the answer categories for citizen survey question #16:

Politicians

As noted in the main text, politicians from all levels of government in India were included in the survey, excluding major metropolitan areas. Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected to the national legislature from state constituencies approximately every five years, unless the government falls or an election is called early. Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) are state legislators also elected to a five-year term in a parliamentary system, though the elections often do not coincide with those for the central government. Below the state level, there are three layers of local councils, or panchayats. These councils are at the district/zilla, block/tehsil, and village/gram level, and also serve five-year terms. Politicians at the gram panchayat level are typically not allowed to campaign on the basis of party membership, though party membership is sanctioned at higher levels.

Bureaucrats

The bureaucrats considered in this study are government employees who are not elected and typically serve in either the Indian Administrative Service or the respective State Administrative Service. Respondents included bureaucrats in three posts: District Collector, Block Development Officer, and Panchayat Secretary. Each individual is the highest-ranking bureaucrat at their level of the administration and each is typically responsible for the implementation of government schemes delegated to their particular level. The District Collector has historically been seen as one of the most powerful actors in rural India, given the preponderance of central government schemes with implementation decentralized to the district level. In recent years, more implementation of schemes has been shifted to the block and, especially, panchayat level, potentially increasing the relative power of panchayat secretaries, though this remains up for debate.

Individual Non-State Intermediaries

This group is made up of two types of individuals, middlemen and fixers, who play some role in facilitating access to government services, but who do not hold any official position with the government. While both types of actors' primary role is to facilitate access to services, their modes of operating and the basis of their relationship with those whom they assist differ. Middlemen (*dalal*) are actors who tend to play a particular role associated with a single service or set of services. These are individuals who will often be found outside government offices offering to help an individual apply for a government service, for a fee. These agents have received relatively little theoretical attention, though they have been highlighted in a number of recent empirical studies of corruption in India (Bertrand et al. 2007; Pinto & Peisakhin 2010). Fixers (*naya neta*/new leaders or *stahniya neta*/local leaders), on the other hand, play a more fluid role, serving the range of needs of individual citizens, bureaucrats, and politicians at any particular moment. While the importance of these actors has been shown to differ quite radically over different parts of India (Manor 2000; Corbridge et al. 2005; Kruks-Wisner 2011), their general role is consistent: "These are political operatives 'who do not hold any formal political or administrative positions,' but who practice the art of approaching officials for favors and making the wheels of administration move in support of such favors" (Manor 2000: 817, quoting Reddy

and Haragopal 1985). Fixers are much less likely to receive a set fee for their services, and instead may act on the expectation of a future favor in return.

Local Organizations

This category includes a range of intermediary organizations of which individuals may be a member or may be an acquaintance of members. Two are regionally oriented, the village and neighborhood associations. The former are organizations representing the entire village, while the latter act for particular neighborhoods within a village. Caste associations are similar, but act on behalf of a particular caste group within the area, rather than the area as a whole. These groups may advocate on behalf of their members, implement projects within the village, or put on various events for the community.

Traditional panchayats are more formal organizations that reflect a history of local councils in India that predates the formalization of these bodies through the 73rd amendment of the Indian Constitution. Some of these bodies have been maintained and serve as an alternative source of governance and dispute resolution within the local community.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are any other bodies working within the local community. Often these organizations are based elsewhere in the country, but their activities have become quite common in rural India. In many cases these are domestic NGOs, not necessarily the offshoots of international organizations. They may be working for general “development” goals or for more specific issues such as clean water or women’s empowerment.

Table B.5 – Response Rates by Location for Politician Survey #2

State/Union Territory	Number of Responses²	Response Rate (%)
Andhra Pradesh	6	5.4
Arunachal Pradesh	2	1.8
Assam	5	4.6
Bihar	1	0.9
Chhattisgarh	0	0.0
Delhi	10	9.1
Gujarat	3	2.7
Haryana	5	4.6
Himachal Pradesh	2	1.8
Jammu & Kashmir	1	0.9
Jharkhand	1	0.9
Karnataka	4	3.6
Kerala	5	4.6
Madhya Pradesh	5	4.6
Maharashtra	12	10.9
Meghalaya	2	1.8
Manipur	0	0.0
Mizoram	2	1.8
Nagaland	2	1.8
Odisha	4	3.6
Puducherry	2	1.8
Rajasthan	5	4.6
Sikkim	3	2.7
Tamil Nadu	19	17.3
Telangana	1	0.9
Tripura	2	1.8
Uttar Pradesh	3	2.7
West Bengal	3	2.7

² Due to some non-response on the state origin question, the total respondents shown here does not sum to 126.

Politician Survey #2: Survey Questions Used in this Book

1. In what language would you prefer to take the survey? [Rest of survey given in that language]
2. Where are you a legislator?
3. Typically, how many hours per week do you spend on the following activities?
 - a. Legislative/policy work
 - b. Meeting with constituents
 - c. Work for your political party
 - d. Meeting with bureaucrats/officials
 - e. Meeting with politicians in your party
 - f. Meeting with politicians in other parties
 - g. Meeting with members of village/block/district panchayat
 - h. Meeting with representatives of the private sector
 - i. Meeting with local fixers/naya neta
 - j. Meeting with representatives of NGOs
4. Approximately how many days per month do you spend in your constituency? (0-30)
5. Do you hold regular visiting hours in the constituency? (yes or no)
6. (If yes) For how many hours in a typical week do you hold visiting hours? (0-60)
7. During a typical week, how many individual citizens:
 - a. Come to your home or office?
 - b. Call you on the telephone?
 - c. Contact you on WhatsApp?
 - d. Send you an SMS/text message?
 - e. Send you an email?
 - f. Contact you on Facebook or other public social media?
8. Out of every 100 visitors that you receive at your home/office, how many are:
 - a. Individual citizens/voters
 - b. Private individuals (fixers or naya neta) acting on behalf of other citizens
 - c. Local politicians (municipal councilor or village/block/district council member) acting on behalf of individual citizens
 - d. Bureaucrats/state officials
 - e. Businessmen/representatives of the private sector
 - f. Representatives of NGOs
 - g. Members of your political party
 - h. Members of other political parties
9. When citizens visit you, what are the **three most common** things for which they request help? (Please indicate the most common requests with a 1, 2, and 3 the appropriate boxes)
 - a. Employment
 - b. Resolving police cases
 - c. Land affairs
 - d. Ration card
 - e. Caste certificate
 - f. APL or BPL card
 - g. Help with MGNREGA

- h. Housing
 - i. Help with Education Department
 - j. Road
 - k. Drainage
 - l. Pension (widow, old age, other)
 - m. Drinking water/hand pump
 - n. Electricity
 - o. Government loan
 - p. Help with legal matters
 - q. Help with health matters
 - r. Tubewell/irrigation
 - s. Street lights
 - t. Kerosene
 - u. Public toilets
 - v. Marriage assistance
10. When an individual, such as a naya neta or local politician, visits you on behalf of another citizen, what are the **three most common** things for which they request help? (Please indicate the most common requests with a 1, 2, and 3 in the appropriate boxes) (same options as above)
11. We would now like you to compare four sets of hypothetical citizens who might come to you for assistance with getting a service or benefit from the government. For each pair of individuals, please carefully review the descriptions of the citizens shown in the table. Then, please answer the questions about these individuals that follow below.

Table B.6 – Conjoint Experiment Attributes

	Individual 1	Individual 2
[Gender]		
[Political Party Preference]		
[Age]		
[Education level]		
[Monthly Income]		
[Caste group]		
[Assistance requested]		

If you only had the time and resources to help one of these individuals, which one would you help?

12. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates that you are not at all likely to help this individual and 10 indicates that you are extremely likely to help this individual, where would you place Individual 1?
13. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates that you are not at all likely to help this individual and 10 indicates that you are extremely likely to help this individual, where would you place Individual 2? (Your answer should differ from that for Individual 1).

Table B.7 - Subject Pool for Citizen Survey #1 (Karnataka)

Type of Office/Center	Taluks in Survey	Respondents
Government taluk office in non-computerized areas	2	155
Government taluk office in computerized areas with public and private option	18	411
Privately-operated center in computerized areas with public and private option	18	437

Citizen Survey #1: Survey Questions Used in this Book

1. Were you able to get the service for which you came to the center/office today?
2. How much did you pay in official fees?
3. How many days after you applied for the service did it take to get it?
4. How much money did you spend overall while trying to get service?
5. How many times did you visit the office for this service?
6. How long did you spend at the office on your first visit?
7. How long did you spend at the office on your second visit?
8. How long did you spend in total at the office on all your other visits?
9. Did any official ask for extra money other than the regular amount?
10. If yes, how much did they request?
11. How likely are you to request a politician's help for accessing a government services?
12. If yes, which type of politician would you ask for help?
 - a. MP
 - b. MLA
 - c. State minister
 - d. Chief Minister
 - e. Grama Panchayat Adhyaksha
 - f. Member of Gram Panchayat from their ward
 - g. Non-elected political party representative
 - h. Other
 - i. no answer
13. Have you requested help from a politician in the past?
14. If yes, for what service?
 - a. Land records
 - b. Ration cards
 - c. Caste certificates
 - d. Income certificates
 - e. Pension benefits
 - f. Building license
 - g. Other
 - h. No response
 - i. Road/road repair
 - j. Insurance
 - k. House/building

- l. Police
 - m. Loan
15. Which politician did you ask?
- a. MP
 - b. MLA
 - c. State minister
 - d. Chief Minister
 - e. Grama Panchayat Adhyaksha
 - f. Member of Gram Panchayat from their ward
 - g. Non-elected political party representative
 - h. Other
 - i. no answer
16. Were you successful in getting that service?

**Table B.8 – Politician Field Experiment:
Message Language by State**

State	Language
Andhra Pradesh	Telegu
Arunachal Pradesh	English
Assam	Assamese
Bihar	Hindi
Chhattisgarh	Hindi
Delhi	Hindi
Goa	Marathi
Gujarat	Gujarati
Haryana	Hindi
Himachal Pradesh	Hindi
Jharkhand	Hindi
Karnataka	Kannada
Kerala	Malayalam
Madhya Pradesh	Hindi
Maharashtra	Marathi
Manipur	English
Meghalaya	English
Mizoram	English
Nagaland	English
Odisha	Odiya
Puducherry	Tamil
Punjab	Punjabi
Rajasthan	Hindi
Sikkim	English
Tamil Nadu	Tamil
Telangana	Telegu
Tripura	Bengali
Uttar Pradesh	Hindi
Uttarakhand	Hindi
West Bengal	Bengali

Table B.9 – Politician Field Experiment – States and Names for Messages – Percentages used for randomization

State	No Name	Hindu Upper Caste	Hindu OBC	Hindu SC	ST	Hindu (not specific)	Muslim	Christian	Jain	Sikh
Andhra Pradesh	10	15	25	25	10	0	15	0	0	0
Arunachal Pradesh	10	0	0	0	20	50	0	20	0	0
Assam	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bihar	10	10	30	20	10	0	20	0	0	0
Chhattisgarh	10	10	30	20	10	0	20	0	0	0
Delhi	10	10	30	20	10	0	20	0	0	0
Gujarat	10	10	20	20	10	0	20	0	10	0
Haryana	10	10	30	20	0	0	0	0	0	30
Himachal Pradesh	10	25	30	20	15	0	0	0	0	0
Jammu and Kashmir	10	10	30	20	10	0	20	0	0	0
Jharkhand	10	10	30	20	10	0	20	0	0	0
Karnataka	10	25	30	20	15	0	0	0	0	0
Kerala	10	10	20	15	10	0	20	15	0	0
Madhya Pradesh	10	25	30	20	15	0	0	0	0	0
Maharashtra	10	10	30	20	10	0	20	0	0	0
Manipur	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Meghalaya	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mizoram	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nagaland	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Odisha	10	25	30	20	15	0	0	0	0	0
Puducherry	10	25	30	20	15	0	0	0	0	0
Rajasthan	10	10	20	20	10	0	20	0	10	0
Sikkim	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tamil Nadu	10	25	30	20	15	0	0	0	0	0
Telangana	10	15	25	25	10	0	15	0	0	0
Tripura	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uttar Pradesh	10	10	30	20	10	0	20	0	0	0
Uttarakhand	10	10	30	20	10	0	20	0	0	0
West Bengal	10	10	30	20	10	0	20	0	0	0

Table B.10 – Politician Field Experiment: Number of Names Used (by State)

State	First	Last
Andhra Pradesh	25	27
Arunachal Pradesh	6	4
Assam	13	22
Bihar	37	45
Chhattisgarh	17	22
Delhi	22	25
Goa	17	18
Gujarat	33	36
Haryana	37	41
Himachal Pradesh	4	4
Jammu and Kashmir	4	6
Jharkhand	34	39
Karnataka	20	25
Kerala	28	20
Madhya Pradesh	13	21
Maharashtra	27	34
Manipur	0	0
Meghalaya	0	0
Mizoram	0	0
Nagaland	0	0
Odisha	25	33
Puducherry	4	4
Punjab	11	34
Rajasthan	31	32
Sikkim	0	0
Tamil Nadu	18	22
Telangana	16	27
Tripura	0	0
Uttar Pradesh	47	56
Uttarakhand	12	34
West Bengal	47	44

Table B.11 – Politician Shadowing: Example Write-up Format

TIME	ACTIVITIES	PEOPLE	COMMENTS	QUESTIONS	ANSWERS
8:00 AM	About 7-8 people were present in MLA's waiting area	8			
8:15 AM	Someone came and told to us that MLA will come after sometimes.	9		I asked to a person about that someone	He said that person is probably the brother of MLA
8:30 AM	MLA came in meeting area and told to everyone that he was stuck in a problem, his Chacha named [XX] passed away and he was busy whole day at his place.	9		I asked who is [XX] chacha.	MLA said he was very dear to me and called me beta always.
8:45 AM	A person came near to MLA and talked about the problem regarding electricity and said that the poles and wires were settled, but don't know why the all setup were removed. MLA listened and after giving assurance about the matter started talking on the phone.	4	MLA said on the phone that in [XX] village there is electricity under the Rajiv Gandhi Power Project, then why all the power setups were removed.	I asked they are from which village?	Someone answered they are from [XX] Village.
9:00 AM	A man and a lady came to MLA and start complaining about any agent and said he is troubling me and told that the agent came with 20-25 person. MLA said that you go to the police station and file F.I.R against him after F.I.R I will take care of this matter.	10	MLA said something happen in everyone's life so please don't bother, everything will be sort out.	I asked who they are and what's their problem?	MLA said these people are from [XX] village. Their land is occupied in highway project so the agent pressurizing these people for selling their land.
9:15 AM	Someone gave a slip to MLA. After seeing the slip MLA said there is long procedure and much estimation for 1000 mtr. Wire, 7 pole arrangements otherwise I will give you money so that the time will be taken about 6-7 months.	12		I asked from which place these people belong? What are their estimation?	MLA said this person name is [XX], Pradhan of [XX] village. These people came here after making estimation of the power setup which has been completely demolished.
9:30 AM	A person said to MLA that he borrowed the money amount of 50000 Rs from a person now he wants	12	MLA said we (he and police) are always messed up	I asked who are these people? And what will you	MLA answered they are local people, some people troubling them. If police didn't

	100000 Rs in return of that money. After saying no he beat me and threatened me. MLA said you go police station with an application against that person, if nobody listen you there then you can inform me, I will take care of this.		together. He came from jail after 4 days last time.	do in this matter?	hear them then I will do something.
9:45 AM	A person came to MLA and said what happened with that person who passed away from electric shock. MLA called on phone to someone and asked about the matter, after disconnecting the call he said to person that there is no compensation in this kind of tragedy so we can't help.	10	MLA said now you can get help from Family Welfare Association, which can be called as National Family Benefit Scheme.	I asked who he is and whom you called?	MLA answered he is from [XX] village and his son dead by electric shock, so he want some compensation. I called Junior Engineer of power house.
10:00 AM	[XX] called someone and said, in [XX] village a person died from electric shock, if his family gets some benefit from National Family Benefit Scheme then they can get 30000 Rs. About one year ago he got married. Person's name is [XX] and father's name is [XX].	8		I asked, whom you called up?	MLA said, I called to SDM.
10:15 AM	MLA called to his PA and said prepare application letter for these people in which one person died from H.I.V, his wife and son also suffering from H.I.V	4		I asked about the village from which they belong? From where you will arrange the grant?	MLA said, I called to SDM. Their grant will be passed from National Family Benefit Scheme, for which I prepare the application form.
10:30 AM	Someone called to MLA and said that he is coming in an hour. Because he is going in someone's funeral.	4	MLA said to a person who was sitting there that lets go with me on bike and we will come soon.	I asked, who died?	MLA said, the uncle of his party worker name [XX].

11:30 AM	MLA returned from [XX]'s home and asked to a person who was sitting in meeting area about the problem, that boy replied I am coming regarding the admission in polytechnic.	10		I asked about the boy and his problem	MLA said his name is [XX] and he wants to take loan for admission in polytechnic.
11:45 AM	I went along with MLA for site visit.	4	On the way MLA greets everyone.		
12:00 PM	MLA stopped at a place where he said to me for waiting and himself went in a cabin.	4		I asked to MLA's bodyguard about the place.	Bodyguard told his name [XX] and said this is the office of their party.
12:15 PM	MLA called me inside the office and ask for lunch.	2		I asked to MLA, that is he had lunch at this time daily?	MLA answered before going for visit in area I take lunch at this place.
1:00 PM	We took about 45 minutes for lunch.	5			
1:15 PM	MLA was talking to his party workers in the office. He was discussing about the propaganda of upcoming election in their areas.	8		I asked to MLA, are you daily talks to your workers like this?	MLA answered, not daily but most of the time I do meet with my workers.

Politician Shadowing: Training Manual

1. Background on Research Project

The primary goal of this project is to develop an understanding of “the daily life” of state politicians (Members of the Legislative Assembly, or MLAs) and village politicians (presidents of local village councils) in India. In particular, we are interested in the activities of politicians when they are in their constituency, rather than at the legislature in the capital or elsewhere. We want to understand how politicians spend their time in the constituency, what are their normal activities, and what they try to accomplish and how. We have a specific interest in the ways in which politicians engage with individual constituents, either at their home or in the community. At the same time, we want to understand how these individual interactions fit in with the broader set of engagements with other public and private individuals and groups, as well as the range of different events in which a politician takes part while in his/her electoral district.

There are a number of themes that are relevant to the project and that should be kept in mind by the field team. These are not the only things that we care about, but they should give you a sense of the main things that are of interest to us about politicians:

- Interactions with citizens—how and when does the politician interact with individual citizens? What are the “rules” of these engagements? In other words, can individuals approach politicians at any time, or are there set programs and procedures for when individuals can meet the politician? If there are procedures, do these procedures differ across different types of people? In what ways? How does the politician explain the reason or need for these interactions?
- Interactions with other politicians—with whom in the politician’s political party does he/she regularly engage? What about other parties? What are the formats of these interactions (letter, phone, in person)? What is the typical content of these interactions? Does the politician have regular interactions with elected politicians at other levels, e.g. Members of Parliament, Members of the Legislative Assembly, Zilla/District panchayat politicians, Block Samiti politicians, Gram Panchayat politicians? If so, what is the content of these interactions and how does it differ across these different relationships?
- Interactions with bureaucrats—with which bureaucrats does the politician interact, e.g. department officers, district collector, block officers? What are the formats of these interactions (letter, phone, in person)? What is the typical content of these interactions and how does it differ across different types of bureaucrats?
- Interactions with others—does the politician spend a significant amount of time interacting with other types of actors (e.g. representatives of NGOs or the private sector)? If so, who are these individuals and what is the content of their discussions?
- Efforts to allocate resources—if an MLA, is the politician making active use of his/her MLA local area development fund? If yes, what does this look like in the field? Is he/she asking for input on what projects to initiate or satisfaction with previous projects? Is he/she visiting project sites to evaluate progress? Is he/she meeting with contractors or other individuals about past or potential projects?

- Discussion of policymaking—To what extent does the politician talk about the activities of the legislature while he/she is in the constituency? With what types of individuals does he/she have these discussions?
- Other activities—on what other activities, if any, does the politician spend significant amounts of time?
- Role as a Politician—How does the politician perceive his/her role as an elected official? What are the activities that seem of most importance to him/her and why? Does there seem to be any conflict between what the politician sees as important and what he/she thinks others believe to be important?
- Challenges—What does the politician see as the biggest challenges to his/her role in the constituency? Why does he/she think these challenges exist? What does she/he do to try to overcome these obstacles?

2. Shadowing Overview

“Shadowing” refers to the practice of observing an individual in the context of his/her everyday life. In this project, this means observing a politician as they spend time in their constituency. The role of the Senior Investigator (SI) will be to accompany their assigned politician throughout all of their activities on days in the constituency. For example, if the politician has visiting hours at his house to meet with citizens and other guests, the SI will sit and observe these meetings. If the politician attends a political rally, the SI will attend and observe this rally. If the politician goes to a wedding or other social event of a constituent, the SI will also attend. In general, whatever the politician does, the SI will accompany him/her and observe.

The SI will also take detailed notes on his/her observations, as discussed below in section 5.

3. Basic Logistics

The SIs should take with them into the field a minimum of the following items:

- Multiple hardback notebooks in which to keep their notes
- A large number of pens (15-20), so that they never need to look for a writing instrument
- Clothes and toiletries for the duration of the expected time with the politician
- A mobile phone to remain in contact with the Project Manager
- A camera to document their shadowing (this can be the same device as the phone in the case of a camera phone, but it should have reasonably good resolution to allow for printable photographs)

4. Prior to Beginning Shadowing

Once the politician has agreed to the shadowing engagement and a specific SI has been assigned to that politician, but before the actual shadowing begins, the SI should learn as much as possible about the specific individual. This can be from public data as well as media reports such as newspaper articles. Relevant information includes, but is not limited to:

- Names of family members and close associates
- Political party
- Number of times he/she has been an MLA/council president

- Other political positions the person has held
- Occupation other than politician
- Any major issues or projects in which the person has been engaged

Background information should be documented and included as a part of the SI's field notes.

5. Note taking

Written notes are the primary form of documentation for shadowing. It is fundamental to the success of the project that SIs take detailed and comprehensive notes while they are in the field. Thus, it is important to make observations on any and every thing that the SI sees and experiences while shadowing. This includes, at a minimum:

- What are the settings where you are observing during the day (e.g. politician's house, public market, village, constituent home)? Make note of the location and any relevant details (e.g. the name of the village, the name of a house's owner).
- What is the content of an interaction? What are people talking about? Does the conversation stay on that topic, or does the topic change? If someone is making a request of the politician, who are they, what are they asking for, and for whom? What is the politician's response to these discussions/requests?
- What is the mood in a given interaction? Are people friendly, confrontational, respectful, etc.?
- What is your own impression of an interaction? How does it make you feel?
- What are your initial impressions of the politician and his/her associates? Do these impressions change during the shadowing period? If so, how and why?

5.1. Daily Timed Notes

Over the course of each day, the SI should make a note about what the politician is doing at a minimum of every 15 minutes. In other words, the specific time of events should be noted and if an event continues for at least 15 minutes, the continuation of that event should be noted. This is the basic structure for note taking throughout the day. Within the SI's notebook, he/she should use a three-column structure for note taking, along the lines shown in Figure 1. This is a hypothetical example of shadowing a politician with the initials HR (an example from a real research project on a different topic is provided on the last page of this document).

- The first column, Time, is simply for noting each time interval (15 minutes or shorter).
- The second column, Activities, is for noting the specific activities that take place, the actors involved, the location, and any other details. The examples shown here are the minimum amount of detail I expect, and the SI can provide much more detailed information, as discussed above, within the timed notes, as appropriate.
- The third column, Comments/Questions, is for any observations or questions that the SI has about the current activities. This can be particularly helpful when he/she has a question, but the politician is unable to provide commentary at that moment. The SI can go back to these notes later in the day/week as a basis for questions to the politician during a quieter moment.

Figure 1 – Example Daily Notes Format

Date: 20/11/15

Time	Activities	Comments/Questions
9:00	HR visited Hanuman temple in Vijayanagar village, accompanied by wife and Ram Yadav. About 20 villagers there watching	Why was this particular temple chosen for a visit? Wife seemed happy to be there, RY less so.
9:10	Continued visit at temple, met with priest [name]. Priest seemed agitated about something, but conversation was inaudible.	What did HR discuss with priest?
9:25	Concluded visit at temple, took car back to house	
9:40	Traveling to house with wife and Ram Yadav	
9:55	HR arrived at house and greeted individuals waiting there	
10:05	Opened house for visitors, accompanied by Rajendra Prasad and Dharam Yadav, who are party workers of the SP; approximately 150 people already in line outside the house	What happens to people who do not make it to the front of the line?
.....		

5.2. Relationship Notes

The SI should also keep a running list of people who interact with the politician and are referenced in the timed notes. This should take the form of a two-column list in a different part of the notebook, along the lines of the example in Figure 2

Figure 2 – Example Relationship Notes Format

Individual	Role
Shri Devi	HR's wife, director of children's education NGO [name] based in Lucknow
Ram Yadav	HR's closest associate, manages HR's daily schedule and activities. Also acts as "social worker" in home village [name]
Rajendra Prasad	SP worker, typically assists HR with visitors during home visiting hours (see notes for visiting hours 20/11/15 – 23/11/15)
Sita Devi	Sarpanch of Vijayanagar, SP loyalist (see 20/11/15 notes)
Dharam Yadav	SP party worker (see notes for visiting hours 20/11/15), also has major land holdings in the constituency

5.3. “Debrief”/End-of-Day notes

In addition to taking notes during the day, the SI should write “debriefing” notes at the end of each day. These notes should include the SI’s general impressions about the activities of the day, any observations about the kind of work the politician is doing and why they might be doing it, observations about the behavior of other individuals around the politician, etc.

There is no specific format for the End-of-Day notes, but the SI should dedicate a separate section in a notebook for these notes. Where a specific event is discussed, the SI should also include the time and date of that activity, so that it can be cross-referenced with the information in the Daily Notes.

5.4. “Other” notes

Outside these formats, the SI can take advantage of any “down times” in activity to write up more detailed notes of the events of the day. This can include specific accounts of events and also stories about things that have happened. There is no specific format for these notes, they can be added to the columns in the Daily Notes or written up elsewhere. If these notes are not in the column format noted above, they should be put in a separate dedicated section in a notebook. These notes should also include clear references to the time and date of the activity(ies) discussed, so that they can be cross-referenced with the information in the columns.

5.5. Drawings

In addition to written notes, the SI is encouraged to draw pictures or diagrams of the spaces where the politician is working. For example, what is the layout of the politician’s house/office where he/she greets guests? Where do the politician’s companions stand at public events? What parts of villages does the politician visit?

6. Photographs

In addition to the diagrams noted above, the SI should take regular photographs of activities and events throughout the shadowing period. This should include, but is not limited to:

- The politician’s home/office where they receive visitors, during the time when they are receiving these individuals
- The line of visitors outside the politician’s home/office when they are receiving visitors
- Public events that the politician attends
- The politician in interaction with people during visits in the constituency
- Public works sites and/or MLALADS projects that the politician visits while in the constituency

When preparing these photos, the titles of the photos should be coded and linked to specific events documented in the SI’s written notes.

7. “Other” Documentation

It is possible that the SI will have opportunities to collect other materials during the course of shadowing, such as pamphlets, local media with reference to the politician, etc. Please retain these materials along with documentation of the circumstances under which they were acquired (day/time/location/event/from whom).

8. Asking Questions

While there is no questionnaire or set of specific questions to cover during the shadowing period, the SI should take the opportunity to ask questions of the politician while they are together. This does not mean constantly asking questions, because we do not want to overly distract the politician from his/her work in the constituency. But it does mean taking the time to ask questions to clarify anything that the SI observes, to gain additional understanding of the reasons why a politician is doing certain things, to gain insights into project themes, and to allow the politician to reflect on his/her own experience in the constituency.

8.1. Clarifying Questions

There are many reasons why an SI may need to ask questions to clarify what has happened and/or the importance of something that has happened. It is very important that the SI assume he/she **does not** understand what is happening while observing. For example, if there is a conversation that occurs and the SI cannot hear all of it, then he/she should not guess about the content. Instead, the SI should make a note about the conversation in the field notebook and then ask the politician about it later. Similarly, if something happens and it is not clear what the relevance of the event is to the politician, then the SI should make a note of it and ask the politician to comment on it later.

8.2. Motivation Questions

The SI can also ask questions to gain information on why a politician does something in particular. For example, if the politician has to choose between attending two different events at the same time, the SI can inquire as to why one was chosen over the other. Or, if the politician is visiting a particular development project, the SI can ask why this project is of particular interest. Similarly, if two different citizens ask for help with getting access to a welfare benefit and the politician helps one and not the other, or helps them in different ways, then the SI can ask about the logic for these decisions.

8.3. Questions about Project Themes

The SI should also ask questions of the politician to attempt to gain insight into the themes of the project discussed above. For example:

- For MLAs, how does the MLA select projects and locations for the MLA Local Area Development Scheme?
- How does the MLA make decisions about providing assistance to individual citizens? Is there a sense that the politician helps certain individuals more readily than others? If so,

the SI can ask about the reasons for this. Does the politician seem more willing to help individuals with certain kinds of requests over others? Again, if this is the case then the SI can ask about it.

- How often, and when, does the politician accept visitors at his home or office? The SI can ask about why this is done in a particular way.
- What ideas and opinions does the politician talk about with reference to his work, such as his thoughts about his role as an elected representation, the state of his community, the constituency, the state, the country? The SI can ask the politician to expand on any of these themes and topics.

8.4. Encouraging Reflection

It will also be helpful to encourage the politician to reflect on or provide commentary on what they are doing and why they are doing it. Reflection can take place at any calm point in the day, particularly in the evening. If there is a break in activity, ask the politician to discuss more general issues related to his/her experience in this role. For example, ask the politician to comment on their activities from the day, how representative this is of a typical day, any issues that came up that seem particularly important or need further attention, etc. This is a chance to cover remaining questions in the SI's notes, but it is also the politician's opportunity to frame the day for the SI and can offer important perspectives on what a politician does and why he/she does it.

9. Making Observations

In addition to the specific topics and questions covered to this point, the SI should make general observations about the politician's environment and the kinds of individuals with whom he interacts. This will include, but is not limited to:

- When the politician meets with visitors, how many people generally come to make requests? To answer this question, the SI should both make a rough count of people at the politician's home/office as well as take photographs of the people waiting.
- Who are the people who make requests of the politician?
 - o Are there individual citizens? If so, do these individuals tend to come by themselves or with a group?
 - o Are there other individuals who come on behalf of a different individual or group? If so, who are these people (are they informal helpers, lawyers, or officials at a different level of government?)
 - o What other kinds of people, e.g. bureaucrats, party workers, other politicians, NGO representatives, representatives of other organizations? Provide an approximate breakdown of visitors across the categories of people (e.g. 50% individual on their own, 15% individuals in groups, 10% private individuals on behalf of others, 5% business people, 3% bureaucrats, 3% party workers, 4% other politicians).
- When the politician goes to an event in the constituency, what kinds of people or groups are sponsoring these events (e.g. neighborhood associations, the party, caste associations, etc.)?

- In what kind of constituency is this politician working? Is it largely rural, semi-urban, urban? How does the politician negotiate the geographic characteristics of the constituency and how does this/might this affect his work? For example, can the politician visit many small groups in one day because he represents a constituency with a dense population? Or must he arrange a few large meetings spread out over the course of the day in order to meet many constituents in a more sparsely populated area? How do these choices affect the way the politician thinks about how to represent his district?

10. Techniques for minimizing/accounting for the “observer” effect

It is inevitable that the politicians being shadowed will at least initially note the presence of the SI and possibly alter their behavior as a result. It’s likely that this will lessen over the shadowing period, but it is important to try to reduce this effect as much as possible and also be aware of when it seems to be conscious on the mind of the politician. These are some strategies for accounting for the politician’s awareness of the SI as an observer:

- Ask the politician about whether the day so far has been “normal” or representative of a typical day in the constituency
- Make note of any time that the politician comments on the SI as an observer, e.g. “what are you writing down?”
- When the politician is interacting with others, who will be more conscious of the SI as an observer, the SI should make every effort to be discrete and not intrude on the discussion.

In general, there is no reason to keep daily notes private from the politician, particularly if sharing them would increase trust. If there is something that the SI wants to write down that he/she thinks should remain private from the politician, he/she should try to write this in a separate notebook maintained for end-of-day observations, rather than the notebooks that will be out and visible to the politician during the day.

11. Unexpected Events/Problems

Shadowing is, by its nature, unpredictable and intensive. It is hard to know exactly what the situations are that the SI will experience and, as a result, it is impossible to prepare fully for the experience. The SIs should feel comfortable bringing up any issue, concern, problem, or question with the Project Manager. The Project Manager should similarly feel comfortable raising these questions/issues with the Principal Investigator during the course of the shadowing engagement. We will make every effort to respond quickly and thoroughly to any issues that are raised. While this is a new and exciting research opportunity, we also want to be sure that the SIs are safe and reasonably comfortable during their shadowing engagement and will make every effort to ensure this is the case.

Example 1 – Three column note-taking format

<p>10⁵⁰ phone rings. Stud answers + Intercoms to Mⁿ - it's a lady from energy solutions arena. He answers + says you know what were interested in the probably not interested this year. She wanted to know if he wanted season-tix.</p> <p>M scrolls through email still. we talk about meet-ups in TX</p> <p>S comes in for bank statement + asks for 4 cks.</p> <p>M says he needs to look @ time sheets first + she says he doesn't get time sheets [jekij + not?]. He says well then u don't get checks. She says ok + brings train-back in says B didn't do one. M looks train over - are 2 pg. long each. puts aside + back to email - finds email on European trip + we talk about the conf. in Europe + back to vacis M.</p> <p>friend sent photo of U2 stage for news tomorrow. Stay at U2 + jup holiday conf sign, then also when U2 came here + radio station put a 2 after u on mtn.</p> <p>10⁴⁵ M goes 2 men's room. Does this every hour/ half hour + tells me its a mtg I'm not invited to. But before a after he uses his time to wander through + say hi a check in w/ chps. I hear her talking to Janice about casual stuff this time.</p>	<p>how much of shadowing involves merely seeing diff personalities?</p> <p>How do I format out identity analysis?</p> <p>Q4M: How often or at what times does home + work collide? Does it bother him? Get him off his game? make sense for him?</p> <p>how would you define home/ non-work?</p>	<p>(25)</p>
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From: Rebecca Gill, Joshua Barbour, Marleah Dean, (2014) "Shadowing in/as work: ten recommendations for shadowing fieldwork practice", Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 9 Iss: 1, pp.69 - 89

Online Appendix C – Vignette and Conjoint Survey Experiments

In this appendix, I outline in greater detail the additional survey experiments described in brief in Chapter Three. The goal of these experiments is to further test the finding that politicians respond in a non-partisan manner to citizen requests, in general, and that their responses also do not typically reflect attention to the ethnicity of the petitioner. I first describe a set of scenario-based survey experiments focused explicitly on partisanship and ethnicity, before moving to a conjoint experiment designed to evaluate a wider range of individual-level characteristics among constituent petitioners.

A Vignette Survey Experiment on Assistance and Contingency

In order to test further potential preferences on the basis of co-partisanship or co-ethnicity, I use a pair of scenario-based survey experiments, presented to politicians in my survey conducted in Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh (Politician Survey #1). These experiments evaluate the degree to which politicians identify the provision of assistance with electorally relevant categories such as ethnicity or partisanship. Thus, the goal here is to distinguish further if information about a petitioner's caste or party affiliation, and thus knowledge of whether the politician *shares* the ethnicity or partisanship of the individual, affects a politician's willingness to provide assistance.

For each experiment, the respondent was presented with a scenario describing an individual who is having difficulty engaging with the state in some manner. Both scenarios dealt with common issues faced by rural Indian citizens and involve potential intervention by the politician with the bureaucracy, which is the key way in which high-level politicians can help citizens, whether the issue involves scheme benefits or non-scheme assistance. Because the

scenarios were designed to identify if *either* ethnicity or partisanship was related to the provision of assistance, not to *compare* the effects of these characteristics against each other, the substantive content differed across the two experiments. This also allowed me to present both scenarios to every respondent, which boosted the statistical power of the experiments, and to randomly manipulate the ethnicity of the petitioner in one scenario and the party of the petitioner in the other. Within each experiment, the only information that changed across the treatment conditions was the surname—which indicates caste—or the party ID of the individual.

The two scenarios were read to respondents as follows, and each was followed by questions about the assistance the politician could provide to such a petitioner:

Ethnicity Scenario

Ram [**caste-identified surname**] is a voter in your constituency and he is having difficulty filing a complaint with the Police for some objects that were stolen from his home. He comes to you to request that you intervene with the police on his behalf.

Partisanship Scenario

Another citizen comes to you for help because he is having difficulty with a case that has been brought against him in the district court. He is a respected member of the community, a supporter of the [**party name**], and often engages in social work activities in his village.

In terms of the characteristics of these requests, both imply at least a medium level of effort on the part of the politician to provide assistance. In either case, the politician would need to make a phone call and negotiate with the relevant bureaucrats; simply signing a letter is unlikely to be sufficient. In both cases the request is for an intervention that is also rival in nature—if the politician helps the petitioner, she is by default acting against the other party to the situation, thereby excluding that person from her assistance and, potentially, the desired benefits of either situation (the presumably stolen goods or the court decision). Finally, the politician's

ability to discern partisanship of the petitioner is ensured by the experimental design. Unlike in the field experiment, here partisanship is not reported by the petitioner himself; this could potentially boost the credibility of the information that the petitioner is a co-partisan of the politician. Overall, these scenarios present cases that are in the intermediate to contingent space on the spectrum of types of goods (see Chapter Two), implying a relatively hard test of my constituency service argument.

There were four versions of each scenario in a state. The names were varied in the ethnicity experiment to reflect four major caste groups, e.g. in Bihar: Bumihar (Brahmin), Yadav (Other Backward Class), Chamar (Scheduled Caste), and Santhal (Scheduled Tribe). I chose one name per category per state on the basis that it is clearly identified with a particular caste category. In the partisanship experiment, I chose the four most popular parties in each state at the time of the survey, e.g. in Bihar: Bharatiya Janata Party, Janata Dal (United), Rashtriya Janata Dal, and Indian National Congress (the details of treatments for each state are provided in Appendix B).

After hearing a scenario, respondents were asked to respond on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = very unlikely and 5 = very likely: “How likely is it that you will be able to help him?” While “ability to provide” is not the same as “willingness to provide,” asking about the latter had a greater potential to induce social desirability bias in responses. Politicians may be concerned that they will be perceived as unwilling to provide assistance generally if they answer the question honestly. A question about ability to help, in contrast, allows a respondent to mask any variations in actual willingness under the guise of ability—in other words, “I wanted to help him, but I just wasn’t able to.”

In these experiments, we can think of the “treatment” as being one of two things. First, each politician respondent is assigned with equal probability to a scenario in which the treatment is the hypothetical individual’s particular caste or party ID. Second, we can also think of the treatment as being assigned a scenario in which the particular caste or party does or does not match the respondent’s *own* caste or partisan affiliation. It is the latter interpretation that is of greatest interest here, given the common hypothesis in the literature that shared partisan or caste identity should be associated with the provision of public benefits. The control condition is then the assignment of a scenario in which the caste or party name *does not* match that of the respondent. For this interpretation, each respondent has a 25% chance of being assigned to treatment in the caste experiment, as virtually every politician belongs to one of the four broad caste categories included in the scenario (and for this analysis I only use politicians who belong to one of these groups). In the party scenario, approximately 85% of respondents belong to one of the four major parties in each state, and each had a 25% chance of assignment to the co-partisanship treatment; those who do not, and thus have a 0% chance of being assigned to treatment, are dropped from the analysis.

Table C1 reports *t*-tests comparing the mean response of individuals sharing the caste group or party of the individual in the scenarios to those who do not. Respondents are all high-level politicians (national and state legislators).³

³ Results of an analysis testing the first interpretation of what the treatment is in the experiment, in which I compare responses of politicians exposed to different scenarios without conditioning on the co-partisan or co-caste relationship, present no consistent effects of manipulating the ethnicity or party of the hypothetical individual (results not shown).

Table C1 – Citizens’ Caste and Party Do Not On Average Affect Politicians’ Willingness to Help

(Survey Experiment: Effects of Co-Partisanship and Co-Ethnicity)

	Citizen Petitioner and Politician from Same Caste Group/Party	Citizen Petitioner and Politician from Different Caste Group/Party	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Caste Scenario	4.96 (.02)	4.94 (.02)	.01 (.03)	532
Party Scenario	3.37 (.15)	3.14 (.09)	.23 (.18)	504

Respondents were asked to respond on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = very unlikely and 5 = very likely: “How likely is it that you will be able to help him?” Cells report means or differences of means, with standard errors in parentheses. Respondents are state and national level politicians from Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh. The first row reports results of varying the caste group of the petitioner, the second the result of varying his party. Data Source: Citizen Survey #2.

I find no discernible relationship between sharing the partisanship or caste of the petitioner and politicians’ likelihood of reporting that they would be able to help. It is useful to note that I have sufficient power to detect reasonable effects of the treatment in each case, if those effects exist. For instance, given the sample sizes and standard deviations of the outcome variables, I can detect a minimum effect of 0.1 and 0.4 on the outcome variable’s 1-5 scale in the caste and party experiment, respectively, at 80% power. These effects constitute less than ¼ of one standard deviation in each case, suggesting that I have considerable power in these experiments. For the caste experiment, one concern is ceiling effects, since it turned out that politicians in both conditions expressed great confidence in their capacity to help citizen Ram with his police case. I investigate the effect of caste on responsiveness in the conjoint experiment in the next section. However, no apparent ceiling or floor effects influence the partisanship experiment, and the effect of partisanship is still null. Similar experimental designs with comparable sample sizes in India have found strong effects of partisanship or caste prompts on,

for example, citizens' voting choices.⁴ Thus, if the petitioners' partisanship exerted a strong effect on politicians' willingness or ability to help them, my experiment would likely detect it. The findings therefore further corroborate the results of my field experiment.

When these results are disaggregated by state, I do, however, observe variation in the potential relevance of partisan ties. This is useful to describe, as it informs my exploration of how patterns of partisanship and party penetration in local politics (described in Chapter Six) affect incentives for responsiveness (see Chapter Eight). While there are no observable differences across states in the effect of shared caste in the ethnicity scenario (results not shown), there is variation in the results for the party scenario. As shown in Table C2, there is a positive effect for shared partisanship in Bihar and Jharkhand, but not in Uttar Pradesh. In Bihar, this partisan bonus is equivalent to 16% over the average response in the state of 3.46, while in Jharkhand it is a 27% increase over the average response of 3.55. (In Jharkhand, the effect size is quite large but is not quite significant at standard levels. That said, with only 33 politicians in the experimental study group in that state, precision is also quite low). While these differences are real, the marginal effect in percent terms is still relatively modest even in Bihar and Jharkhand. Note that partisan penetration at the local level is modest or weak in Bihar and Jharkhand, whereas it is quite strong in Uttar Pradesh (Chapter Six). Strikingly, and consistent with my argument, however, we see the strongest evidence that politicians provide constituency service in Uttar Pradesh.

⁴ E.g., Dunning and Nilekani (2013). See also my Chapter Five.

Table C2 –Party Affiliations Affect Politicians’ Willingness to Help in Some States
(Survey Experiment: Effects of Co-Partisanship)

	Citizen Petitioner and Politician from Same Party	Citizen Petitioner and Politician from Different Party	Estimated Effect (Difference of Means)	N
Bihar	3.31 (.14)	3.87 (.24)	.56* (.29)	213
Jharkhand	3.35 (.34)	4.30 (.40)	.95⁺ (.57)	33
Uttar Pradesh	3.06 (.12)	2.52 (.20)	.54 (.24)	258

Respondents were asked to respond on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = very unlikely and 5 = very likely: “How likely is it that you will be able to help him?” Cells report means or differences of means, with standard errors in parentheses. Respondents are state and national level politicians from Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh. + = $p < .10$, * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$. Data Source: Citizen Survey #2.

A Conjoint Experiment with Multiple Attributes

In order to gain a more comprehensive view of contingency in service provision by high-level Indian politicians, I also conducted a survey experiment on contingency in the online cross-state survey targeting a national population of legislators (Politician Survey #2). The broader geographic coverage of this survey allows me to evaluate whether the limited effects of partisanship that I observe in Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh extend to other parts of the country. In this case, I use a conjoint analysis to examine politicians’ reported willingness to help individuals conditioning on a range of characteristics, including age, gender, income, caste group, and, most importantly for this discussion, political party preference. Political scientists have increasingly used conjoint designs—a type of factorial survey experiment—to assess the relevance of multiple characteristics to a specific choice.

In this implementation of the technique, politician respondents were asked to compare two individuals with different characteristics and then consider, if they “only had the time and resources to help one of these individuals,” which one would they help. Respondents were also asked separately to score how likely they would be to help each of the individuals. The table they were shown, with an example of potential individual attributes, is provided in Table C3.⁵

Table C3 – Example of Conjoint Analysis Prompt

	Individual 1	Individual 2
Gender	Male	Female
Political party preference	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party
Age	18-25	36-45
Education level	Middle	Senior Secondary
Monthly income (Rs./month)	4,001-5,000	3,001-4,000
Caste group	Forward caste	Forward caste
Assistance requested	Bank loan	Hand pump

The attributes included in the profile were chosen to reflect the types of characteristics that may be relevant to the receipt of public benefits—such as income—as well as those that may typically be associated with partisan behavior—such as caste group and political party preference. The inclusion of multiple categories also reduces the risk that a respondent will perceive that they may be judged according to their reaction to a single attribute level. There were seven categories of characteristics for each individual (or “attribute profile,” per the literature on conjoint experiments), as outlined in Table C.3. Respondents were shown a list of characteristics for two individuals, the content of which was fully randomized. In addition, the order of the attribute categories was randomized. The potential values for each category of attributes were the same across all respondents, with the exception of “preferred political party,”

⁵ For further details on Politician Survey #2, see Appendix B.

for which the options were the two to four most popular political parties in each state, based on the most recent state election returns. The full set of attributes and their potential levels is provided in Tables C4 and C5. There were no combinations of characteristics that are excluded *a priori* from the experiment. The attribute levels were chosen to reflect a broad swath of the population, though there is no variation in religion, as only Hindu caste groups were included. For the types of services requested, a large number were chosen to reflect both difficulty of access and, in particular, whether the services tend to benefit directly an individual or a group. The choice of political parties was determined by the set of parties that gained a substantial number of seats in the most recent election, with no fewer than two and no more than four parties included for any state in the survey. In the analysis, I examine whether the individual in the table preferred the party of the respondent, rather than comparisons across specific parties.⁶

Respondents were then asked questions about these individuals; in particular, they were asked to choose which of two individuals they would help if they only had the time and resources to help one, and they were asked to rate their likelihood of helping each individual on a 0-10 scale (where they were prompted to avoid giving each individual the same rating). For each respondent, the experiment was repeated three additional times with independent randomization of attributes profiles each time, which creates the potential for both within and across subject analyses. Twenty-eight politicians responded to the conjoint portion of the survey, for a total of 100 usable profile comparisons. While the study group is small, it involves politicians from a wider number of states than in Politician Survey #1 and therefore provides a useful complement to the previous analysis.

⁶ As pre-specified in the pre-analysis plan registered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) under registration ID 20160921AB.

Online Appendix Table C.4 – Conjoint Attributes – Attribute Levels

Attribute		Attribute Level	Baseline
Gender		Male	Male
		Female	
Political Party Preference (see Online Appendix Table C.5)		Party 1	Not Respondent's Party
		Party 2	
		Party 3	
		Party 4	
Age		18-25	18-25
		26-35	
		36-45	
		46-55	
		56-65	
		65+	
Education level		Below primary	Below primary
		Education level	
		Primary	
		Middle	
		Matriculation/Secondary	
		High/Senior Secondary	
		Graduate	
Monthly Income (Rupees per Month)		<1,000	<1,000
		1,000-2,000	
		2,001-3,000	
		3,001-4,000	
		4,001-5,000	
		5,001-6,000	
		6,001-7,000	
		7,001-8,000	
		8,001-9,000	
		9,001-10,000	
		>10,000	
Caste group		Forward caste	Forward caste
		Other backward caste	
		Scheduled caste	
		Scheduled tribe	
Assistance requested	Individual benefit	Income Certificate	Income certificate
		Electricity	
		Housing/Residence	
		Pension	
		Bank Loan	
		Police Issue	
	Job	Individual benefit	
	Group benefit		Road
			Drainage
			Street Light
Hand Pump			

Online Appendix Table B.8 – Preferred Political Party (by state) for Conjoint Analysis

State	Parties			
Andhra Pradesh	Telegu Desam Party	YSR Congress Party	N/A ⁷	N/A
Arunachal Pradesh	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	N/A	N/A
Assam	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	Asom Gana Parishad	All India United Democratic Front
Bihar	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	Rashtriya Janata Dal	Janata Dal (United)
Chhattisgarh	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party		
Delhi	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	Aam Aadmi Party	
Gujarat	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party		
Haryana	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	Indian National Lok Dal	
Himachal Pradesh	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party		
Jammu & Kashmir	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	National Conference	People's Democratic Party
Jharkhand	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	Jharkhand Mukti Morcha	
Karnataka	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	Janata Dal (Secular)	
Kerala	Indian National Congress	Indian Union Muslim League	Communist Party of India	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
Madhya Pradesh	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party		
Maharashtra	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	Shiv Sena	Nationalist Congress Party
Manipur	Indian National Congress	All India Trinamool Congress		
Meghalaya	Indian National Congress	United Democratic Party (Meghalaya)		
Mizoram	Indian National Congress	Mizo National Front		
Nagaland	Indian National Congress	Nagaland People's Party		
Odisha	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	Biju Janata Dal	
Puducherry	Indian National Congress	All India N.R. Congress	All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	
Rajasthan	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party		

⁷ Not Applicable - For those states where fewer than four parties were relevant electorally, only the parties receiving a significant number of seats in the assembly were included.

Sikkim	Sikkim Democratic Front	Sikkim Krantikari Morcha		
Tamil Nadu	Indian National Congress	All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	
Telangana	Indian National Congress	Telangana Rashtra Samithi	Telegu Desam Party	
Tripura	Indian National Congress	Communist Party of India (Marxist)		
Uttar Pradesh	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	Samajwadi Party	Bahujan Samaj Party
Uttarakhand	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party		
West Bengal	Indian National Congress	Bharatiya Janata Party	All India Trinamool Congress	Communist Party of India (Marxist)

The primary analysis involves multivariate regression analysis to estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE), or the effect of each individual treatment component (attribute) on a politician’s likelihood of saying that he would provide assistance to one individual over another. Specifically, the AMCE is “the marginal effect of attribute l averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining attributes.”⁸ For questions where a respondent is asked to choose between two profiles, this is the marginal effect of a given attribute on the likelihood that politicians will choose a particular profile. Figure C1 shows the AMCEs, and 95% confidence intervals, for the set of attributes included in the profiles. For each attribute, the comparison category is listed first and has no AMCE shown (e.g. for Age, the comparison category is 18-25).

As the figure shows, the results suggest no effect of shared partisanship on a high-level politician’s choice over which individual to provide assistance. The partisanship treatment (PID) is shown at the bottom of the figure, with an AMCE that cannot be statistically distinguished from zero. This is in contrast to several of the other attributes, for which there are effects that are

⁸ Hainmueller et al. 2013: 10.

discernable from zero despite the small sample size in this survey. Thus, this analysis offers additional evidence, from across India, that high-level politicians, in general, do not take partisanship into account when providing assistance to individual constituents. These results also contrast sharply with conjoint experiments undertaken with local brokers in India, who do very substantially condition their responsiveness on the partisanship of their petitioners.⁹

Regarding those categories for which there is a discernable effect on likelihood of assistance, including gender, caste category (for scheduled castes), and a number of the age categories, perhaps the most important for further discussion is caste. As noted above, caste may be viewed as a likely indicator of partisanship. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that, across the range of states and castes represented among the included politician respondents, any particular caste category should be privileged above any other. Alternatively, this finding might plausibly suggest a more sanguine interpretation, that politicians, in general, are more willing to help those individuals who are perceived to be disadvantaged, relative to the comparison group of forward castes, though we did not observe a similar effect in the results of the larger scale field experiment. A similar argument for preferencing perceived disadvantaged groups could be made for the findings privileging female petitioners.

⁹ Auerbach and Thachil 2016.

Figure C1 – Politicians Do Not Condition Assistance on Partisanship (Conjoint Experiment Results Showing AMCEs)




Figure reports the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for each of the attributes included in the conjoint analysis. The AMCE is the causal effect of a given attribute measure on the likelihood that a respondent reported that they would provide assistance to an individual making a request, relative to the effect for the baseline measure in an attribute category. For each attribute category shown, the first measure listed (e.g. 18-25 for age) is the baseline measure for that attribute. Data Source: Conjoint Survey Experiment in Politician Survey #2.

Overall, the findings from this conjoint experiment reinforce those from the field and survey experiments: high-level politicians do not, in general, take partisanship into account when making decisions about whether or not to provide assistance to individual petitioners. Thus, they are frequently offering constituency service to those making requests. The act of providing assistance may well be electorally motivated, but that does not entail that elected officials are

inclined only to serve their existing supporters. Instead, political representatives often engage in the provision of assistance to a wide range of constituents.