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## Global flagships, local impacts

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**Over the past three decades, the use of site-specific, iconic flagship regeneration projects has become a popular tool for urban development. This is particularly true in former industrial cities that have suffered from both economic decline and poor image. Such projects are intended to act as catalysts for further development, to attract inward investment and help produce a new icon or image for the city and, as such, they are often geared to outside audiences of tourists, investors or potential residents. With their high profile and external audience, they strive to become global spaces. However, because they are built into an existing urban fabric, they have a very strong local impact. This paper reviews the development and evolution of flagship regeneration over the past three decades, particularly with reference to how it contrasts with other forms of urban regeneration. It will also review the major criticisms of flagship projects during this time, paying particular attention to their impact on local residents.**

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Virtually every city strives for iconic, prestigious, luxury and consumption-oriented developments. They are important in image reconstruction and place promotion, the attraction and retention of high-income residents, the procurement of further capital, and tourism. As a result, property-based, site-specific regeneration is common in most cities. Early examples of this type of regeneration include Boston's Faneuil Hall, Baltimore's Inner Harbor, London's Canary Wharf and countless convention centres. More recent examples are the Kop van Zuid in Rotterdam, Ocean Terminal in Leith (Edinburgh), Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Newcastle's Waterfront, Dublin's Docklands and the Salford Quays in Manchester. These types of redevelopment projects, which now span close to three decades, come under the umbrella of flagship regeneration. Flagships are defined as being self-contained, consumption-oriented, mixed-use, iconic, large-scale regeneration projects involving both private and public sectors, which aim to become catalysts for further economic regeneration.<sup>1</sup>

These spaces represent a confluence of the global and the local. They are global because they are oriented to an outside population of tourists and investors, make use of international architecture, often are designed by renowned 'starchitects' and strive to become the new international symbols or icons of their

respective cities, thereby hoping to place them higher on the competitive urban hierarchy. At the same time, they are also local spaces; they exist within a very specific urban fabric and built environment, and are surrounded by a local population. Considerable attention in the academic literature has focused on the role of flagships as a tool for economic regeneration,<sup>1–5</sup> their use as a tool for re-branding and re-imaging cities,<sup>6–10</sup> as well as their role in furthering urban inequalities and social exclusion.<sup>11–14</sup>

This paper has two main objectives. The first is to review the academic literature on flagships and to illustrate that, despite originating in the 1980s and 1990s, such development-led, consumption-based, growth-oriented and image-building regeneration is still the focal point of city-centre regeneration today. The second is to provide an overview of the major criticisms of this type of urban regeneration, paying particular attention to how they impact on local residents. Section 2 provides the historical context of the emergence of flagships and outlines the factors leading to their widespread proliferation as a tool for urban regeneration. Section 3 focuses on present trends in regeneration, showing how the flagship project has evolved as different forms of urban regeneration emerged. The major critiques of this type of regeneration are reviewed and analysed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 offers some conclusions and suggestions to make flagships more socially and spatially inclusive spaces.

While large-scale, iconic, flagship-based regeneration is evident throughout Western (and, increasingly, also formerly Communist) Europe and North America, this paper will primarily concern itself with the UK context, particularly with reference to the politics of urban regeneration.

### 2. CREATING WEALTH: THE IDEOLOGY AND CONTEXT OF FLAGSHIPS IN THE 1980s AND 1990s

Flagship regeneration emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, beginning first in American cities, though quickly spreading to Britain and, eventually, continental Europe. It was a response to both the cataclysmic shifts in cities brought about because of de-industrialisation and as an example of neoliberal strategies being developed and implemented at this time.

Some of the cities that were quickest to use property-based flagship regeneration schemes as a centrepiece of their regeneration strategies were those that suffered the strongest

effects of de-industrialisation (e.g. Baltimore, Newcastle, Bilbao) and its associated problems of high unemployment, declining public revenues and poor image. MacLeod<sup>12</sup> notes that 'as city after city endured catastrophic de-industrialisation and witnessed the suburban 'flight' of high-income earners and an associated concentration of impoverished residents in their inner areas, enormous stress was placed on urban government administrations'. De-industrialisation left a social and economic void, which, despite the advent of large-scale regeneration projects, has gone unfilled in many cases (see Harvey<sup>15</sup> for a vivid description of Baltimore). The creation of iconic flagships was seen as a way of redressing these issues, and key to the retention and attraction of affluent residents to cities.

The large-scale flagships of the 1980s and 1990s were a manifestation of neoliberal beliefs held by both government and business leaders. Before this time, urban governments functioned as managers of the city, providing essential public services for health, safety and public education.<sup>11</sup> All levels of government pursued, to varying degrees, redistributive policies aimed at full employment and a basic national minimum.<sup>16</sup> This was reflected in the type of municipal projects being built, which focused on developments that benefited a wider citizenry such as large social housing projects.<sup>12</sup>

As neoliberal ideas took hold in the 1980s, flagship regeneration became a hallmark of an ideology that embraced 'trickle-down' economics (see Section 4.3), growth-oriented policies and the promotion of place. For cities, this has represented a transition from urban managerialism, noted above, to urban entrepreneurialism.<sup>12,17</sup> Front and centre in this has been the increasing inter-city competition for investment, jobs and tourists. This is done 'by encouraging the development of speculative forms of accumulation through the promotion of place'.<sup>18</sup> The latter point is realised through the construction of flagship projects. In other words, the goal was to create more wealth.

Harvey and others have outlined three characteristics of urban entrepreneurialism.

- (a) First is the use of a variety of actors involved in decision-making, primarily those from business or other pro-growth sectors, and often unelected and unaccountable.<sup>12,19-21</sup> Public-private partnerships, development agencies and other such groups are examples of these.
- (b) A second characteristic is the drive towards attracting inward investment and away from redistributive measures.<sup>6,12,17</sup> This is also linked to the idea of city competitiveness and place promotion. This strategy focuses on wealth creation, rather than wealth distribution.<sup>3</sup>
- (c) A third characteristic is that much of this promotion is geared to outsiders—tourists, investors, potential high-income residents—rather than local residents.<sup>12,17,22</sup> The use of iconic museums aimed at tourists is evidence of this, with much attention in recent years focusing on Bilbao's Guggenheim Museum.<sup>4,5,23</sup> While the city is now firmly on the tourist map with its Frank Gehry-designed iconic museum, questions have begun to be raised as to what the effect has been for the local population. As Hubbard<sup>24</sup> notes 'Focus of much urban governmental activity is no longer the provision of services for city residents, but a concern with the prosperity of the city and its ability to attract jobs and

investments'. The intention behind flagship developments is to create a showcase attraction or location.

Subsequent to this has been the rise of the importance of service- and knowledge-based industries. The growing role of sectors such as leisure, tourism, business and professional services and retail has given an important role to the aesthetic appearance of the built environment, as well as quality of life factors as determinants of economic growth.<sup>25-27</sup> These are the factors that now determine a city's prosperity, rather than access to raw materials or labour, as was characteristic of the industrial age. In this regard, cities have become centres of consumption rather than centres of production.<sup>28</sup> This transition has been more tenuous in cities that had large industrial bases rather than those that historically had more diversified economies.<sup>25,29,30</sup> A poor urban image, largely stemming from industrial decline, also proved to be a hindrance to investment and growth.

The role of iconic flagships in re-shaping a city's image has been, and still is, a central reason for their development. This transformation is summarised by Healey *et al.*<sup>26</sup>

Flagship development projects and promotional imagery were used vigorously to supplant the imagery of rustbelt cities and clothcap citizens which, it was assumed, would inhibit inward investment by the private sector, with the lifestyle imagery of a globalised 'yuppified' middle class.

Successful flagships become icons that are instantly recognisable by outside audiences as the new symbol of the city, such as Liverpool's Waterfront, the Guggenheim in Bilbao or Rotterdam's Erasmus Bridge. They serve as advertising billboards for their cities.<sup>10</sup> With inter-urban competition for investment high, presenting a post-industrial (or sanitised industrial heritage), prosperous, creative or culture-based image is seen by local elites and politicians as paramount to securing further investment, tourists and potential high-income residents, all of whom are attracted to these ideas.<sup>3,31,32</sup> Again, the intentions are to create a high-end consumption-oriented space.

Despite being seen as highly speculative ventures, many urban leaders have come to believe that their investments are secure and their benefits will be enjoyed by a wide spectrum of the population. For example, Loftman and Nevin<sup>33</sup> illustrate the case of regeneration projects in Birmingham that were predicated on three assumptions

- (a) they would directly and indirectly produce substantial benefits to the whole city
- (b) all residents would benefit from the developments
- (c) public-sector costs would be minimised.

In Britain, the belief amongst politicians that flagships would work to solve the economic and social problems of cities was best represented by the former Conservative secretary of state for the environment, Nicholas Ridley, who stated that 'if you regenerate the land, automatically it will solve the problems of unemployment'.<sup>3</sup>

The emergence of large flagships was borne out of this context. Economically, it emerged out of a need for inward investment due to de-industrialisation. Politically, it became a manifestation of neoliberal ideas and urban entrepreneurialism. It was

also seen as an answer to an increasingly competitive inter-city market place, where cities had to 'sell' themselves, particularly places seen to have a poor image (often associated with the negative effects of de-industrialisation). The goals of such projects were, and remain, squarely focused on creating more wealth rather than directly confronting any social or poverty concerns, which are either ignored or addressed under the mantra of 'trickle-down'.

### 3. URBAN REGENERATION EVOLVES: NEW FLAGSHIPS AND APPROACHES SINCE 1997

Since the emergence of flagships, other more socially based forms of urban regeneration have evolved. Ridley's viewpoint (as quoted in Section 2) seems outdated when contrasted with new forms of regeneration that focus on people, deprived areas and social capital. In Britain, since New Labour came to office in 1997, these types of regeneration have taken a more prominent role than under the Conservative party. The same is also true in other European and North American countries.<sup>21</sup> One of the major turns was away from purely physical regeneration towards a more holistic idea that put people at the centre. Cochrane<sup>34</sup> sums up this transition, stating 'Instead of believing that growth will solve problems, the understanding is that the process of social exclusion and community breakdown may themselves get in the way of growth'. In 1998, the social exclusion unit reported that too much emphasis had been placed on physical renewal instead of better opportunities for people.<sup>34</sup> This was followed by the 2000 urban white paper, which also favoured a more people-based approach (although it should also be noted that other reports at the time favoured physical regeneration). Much of the physical regeneration was to focus on urban infrastructure designed to enhance the quality of life and employment prospects of a wide range of social groups, while, at the same time, boosting urban economies and property markets.<sup>21</sup> It is the former of the two goals that was largely absent from earlier urban regeneration models that focused on trickle-down approaches—a formula that now appears to be both out of date and out of fashion.

One reason for this shift was the different areas targeted by urban regeneration over the past decade. As traditional flagships are predicated on their ability to become catalysts for further growth, they exist in locations within a city where they are the most profitable. This tends to be city centre or other prominent locations such as waterfronts in places like Liverpool, London or Hamburg. As they are based on creating affluent space, they tend not to be located in a city's poorest areas. However, if they are located in poor areas, they quickly become affluent space. London's Docklands and countless other flagships were built in poorer parts of the city, only to see them become exclusive areas in a very short space of time.

Over the last ten years, some of the most deprived estates, neighbourhoods and localities have received more attention that has been aimed at improving the lives and opportunities of their inhabitants.<sup>35</sup> One of New Labour's key goals when taking office in the UK was to focus on development in deprived areas, particularly in the country's worst housing estates.<sup>21,36</sup> Again, it is not only the attention towards physical regeneration, but also an understanding that, by focusing on marginalised areas, the government ultimately must deal with helping people out of poverty. As Atkinson<sup>37</sup> notes 'urban regeneration's turn to the

community represents at least in part an attempt to reconstitute socially excluded communities, the spaces within which they live and how they live their lives'. The same emphasis towards focusing urban regeneration attention towards deprived communities can be seen in other European countries such as the Netherlands and Spain.<sup>38</sup>

Another major change in urban regeneration practise has been the use of local community input and participation. This represents a major shift from previous flagship and property-based methods, which were highly criticised for their lack of community involvement and detachment from the local citizenry. New methods of urban governance could have the potential to enable local residents to become genuine participants in the planning and management of their communities.<sup>35,39</sup> The UK government has stated that 'real, sustainable change will not be achieved unless local people are in the driving seat from the start'.<sup>40</sup>

Community-based, sustainable development that is oriented towards the needs of deprived communities represents a genuine change from the old methods of flagship and waterfront-based, growth-oriented regeneration. Such projects have had a major impact in reducing poverty and inequalities, but it would be a fallacy to suggest that the 1980s and 1990s flagship project has disappeared entirely from the scene. While the former have emerged in many deprived and peripheral areas, much city-centre regeneration is still predicated on iconic, consumption-led projects that are aimed at a higher-income or visitor audience. And several authors<sup>18,41</sup> have argued that New Labour has continued the neoliberal, winner-take-all approach to regeneration inherited from its predecessors.

City-centre regeneration has continued to rely on iconic and catalytic forms of regeneration that fit within Bianchini *et al.*'s definition of flagships stated more than 15 years ago.<sup>1</sup> Projects such as Glasgow Harbour, the Newcastle–Gateshead Waterfront,<sup>42</sup> Gunwharf Quay in Portsmouth<sup>16</sup> and other European projects such as Euralille in France and Dublin's Docklands (see in particular<sup>13,14,23,43</sup>) are still being built along the lines of traditional flagships. There has been a stronger emphasis on selling a chic urban lifestyle, and luxury apartments are at the heart of many of today's city-centre or waterfront regeneration plans (both Leeds and Edinburgh serve as notable examples).

The forms may have evolved, but their goals of attracting inward investment and people, creating salubrious spaces and the development of marketable icons to help raise the city's profile in the inter-urban marketplace remain a relative constant in city-centre regeneration. Indeed, city-centre regeneration projects appear miles away (literally and figuratively) from community-based regeneration and show little signs of abating. Their critiques also remain similar to those first raised when projects such as Baltimore's Inner Harbor<sup>15</sup> and London's Docklands<sup>21</sup> were first built. The remainder of this paper will examine the major criticisms of flagship-based regeneration, with an emphasis on the impact on local residents.

### 4. CRITIQUES OF FLAGSHIPS

Most flagships follow patterns that replicate previous developments that are seen to have been successful. This leads to what

have been referred to as 'clone cities'.<sup>3</sup> However, the replication of flagships has had an impact on their potential for continuing success. This cookie-cutter effect leads to diminishing returns for each, and creates a paradox in which places that were designed to be original and innovative help to create a landscape of homogeneity in both place and products.<sup>44</sup>

With so many cities vying for major international flagships or icons, it is simply not feasible for all of them to have one:<sup>45</sup> there are simply too many places competing for too few visitors, high-end residents and capital. This can sometimes lead to spectacular failures. For example, Flint, Michigan tried to re-invent itself as a tourist destination with the decline of the auto industry. The city opened AutoWorld in 1984, as well as a major hotel, both of which closed within two years.<sup>46</sup> The City Museum in Washington, DC, which opened in 2003 and subsequently closed, is another example of a failed attraction.<sup>4</sup> As Harvey<sup>17</sup> notes 'how many successful convention centres, sports stadia, Disney-worlds, harbour places and spectacular shopping malls can there be?'

#### 4.1. Conflicting visions of the city

As stated earlier, one of the goals of flagships is to create a new symbol for a city—both Bilbao's Guggenheim and Rotterdam's Erasmus Bridge serve as Continental examples of this. However, the image being presented may not reflect the reality of the city or the views that urban residents themselves hold. This image-versus-reality gap has the potential to be both divisive and confrontational.

This raises an important question: for whom are these projects designed, the local population or outsiders? The answer to this question will not only influence the design and uses of flagships, but also their reception and acceptance by the local population. Swyngedouw *et al.*<sup>14</sup> critically note that

Repositioning the city on the map of the competitive landscape meant re-imagining and recreating urban space, not just in the eyes of master planners and city fathers and mothers, but primarily for the outsider, the investor, developer, businesswoman or man, or the money-packed tourist.

A key battleground for this confrontation has often revolved around culture and local history: urban boosters create a marketable and sanitised image that can be packaged and sold, while many local residents try to preserve their own identities that may not fit into this vision. In order for a development to be seen as successful from a local perspective, it must fit into the identity of the place concerned, rather than being forced upon it.<sup>42</sup> According to the literature, however, this has rarely been the case. Philo and Kearns<sup>47</sup> observe that

Conflicts *do* frequently arise because the manipulation of culture and history by the place marketers runs against the understandings of local culture and history built into the daily encounters with city spaces of the city's 'other peoples'

Part of this conflict emerges because flagships rarely involve local community input—they are conceived by development corporations or public-private partnerships and their target audience is outside the immediate area (tourists, investors and the like). The goals tend to have little to do with local residents, particularly lower-income groups, and several studies have

highlighted this conflict between large flagships and local residents.<sup>12,33,48</sup> MacLeod<sup>12</sup> questions the benefits of such projects for the local population, particularly the low-income or marginalised groups targeted under more community-based regeneration practices, stating

if the renaissance of these tenderly manicured landscapes alongside the active introduction of business improvement districts has done much to recover the exchange and sign value of many city centres, questions remain about the legitimate use-value of such spaces for a wider citizenry.

The image presented and the views held by local residents towards their own city may, therefore, be very different.

#### 4.2. Flagships as a diversion for the masses: bread versus circuses

Grand regeneration projects have been criticised because they only serve to act as a diversion for residents from the greater problems that their city is facing. Geographer David Harvey has been at the forefront of this argument. On the surface, the city may appear prosperous, dynamic and ready to accommodate outside capital, yet this only serves to mask increasing poverty and deterioration.<sup>17,19</sup> This strategy is not new; Harvey and others<sup>11,47,49</sup> have cited the classic Roman formula of bread and circuses. The idea is that by giving citizens a base level of sustenance and occasionally providing large spectacles, they will be caught up in the moment of the event and ignore the real problems. Eisinger<sup>11</sup> quotes former Philadelphia mayor Edward Rendell on the opening of the city's new convention centre in 1993

I feel like a Roman emperor. I can't give decent city services, I want to close [city] health centres, and I want to cut back on library hours and here I am giving bread and circuses to the people.

Launching a new flagship can generate feelings of success and urban pride amongst the local population. However, according to the bread and circuses argument, it is simply a façade and a means of social control. As noted by Harvey, 'if it brightens the urban scene then it does so in the vein of a carnival mask that diverts and entertains, leaving the social problems that lie behind the mask unseen and uncared for'.<sup>22</sup> The Marxist political economy perspective states that such spectacles are one mechanism that local business and political elites can use to prevent social unrest between high- and low-income residents.<sup>49</sup>

This criticism is in stark conflict with the idea that flagships can enhance civic pride because it suggests that, if they do, it is under a shadowy veil of deception and disguise. But will local residents be aware of this? Do they get caught up in the euphoria or are they able to see beyond the spectacle to the faded and decaying city around them?

#### 4.3. Greater socio-economic polarisation

An extensive amount of literature has argued that flagship projects lead to greater socio-economic divisions within cities.<sup>13,14,16,44,50</sup> Some authors have also noted that urban regeneration projects of this type lead to greater social exclusion of lower-income residents because of the high costs of their shops, restaurants and attractions, high or elitist cultural forms, and their alien or unwelcoming atmosphere.<sup>1,16,45,51</sup>

Flagships focus on wealth creation rather than wealth distribution.<sup>3</sup> As a result, they do not address issues concerning poverty and social equity. Harvey criticises this type of development because it focuses on the speculative construction of place rather than ameliorating the socio-economic conditions in an area.<sup>17</sup> The profit motive is a key factor in this, which can limit or exclude certain types of development that may be more socially or community orientated.<sup>52</sup>

Proponents frequently cite trickle-down theory—whereby flagships generate wealth and this increased prosperity is supposed to then filter down to lower strata of society—as key to their success. However, this claim, particularly with reference to job creation, is a highly contentious one and has been strongly refuted by the academic community.<sup>1,3,26,53–55</sup> One of the heaviest criticisms in this regard has concerned the ability of flagships to provide permanent jobs, particularly for the segments of society with the greatest need for employment. While flagships do provide employment, the types of low-paid, low-skill jobs they produce—cleaners, food service workers, low-level retail and tourism—offer little in the way of social advancement.<sup>16,29,55</sup> In most cases, the jobs created have not replaced jobs lost due to de-industrialisation.<sup>10,12,15</sup>

These criticisms are pertinent precisely because many flagships rely on a high degree of public funding for their construction and operation. Many studies, in fact, have focused on how this type of site-specific regeneration serves to divert much needed municipal funds away from the provision of basic services such as housing.<sup>1,17,24,29,33,57,58</sup> This raises the question of whether or not it is appropriate to use scarce public funds to finance highly speculative flagships. Indeed, some scholars have equated such investments with a subsidy for affluent consumers and corporations at the expense of the working class and the poor.<sup>15,17</sup> From the perspective of local residents, it has been noted that such subsidies, particularly ones designed to attract outsiders, can lead to cynicism and mistrust.<sup>11</sup>

#### 4.4. Greater spatial polarisation

This socio-economic impact also has a spatial form. One of the major criticisms of flagship developments is that site-specific regeneration creates 'two speed revitalisation',<sup>23</sup> whereby downtown areas become revitalised while peripheral areas remain blighted. As MacLeod<sup>12</sup> states, 'the new urban glamour zones conceal a brutalising demarcation of winners and losers, included and excluded'. As noted earlier, these tend to be in city-centre or prominent waterfront locations, leading to a greater spatial differentiation between 'have' and 'have not' parts of a city.<sup>26</sup>

The experience of Baltimore, a city that has actively used flagship regeneration, serves to illustrate this point. Baltimore's Inner Harbor regeneration was one of the first flagship projects anywhere, providing a model that other cities have emulated. Yet, rather than creating a better quality of life for all residents of the city, it has created two Baltimores: the business, cultural and tourist centre, and the adjacent poor neighbourhoods.<sup>8,11,15</sup> However, tourists and affluent residents do not see this 'other Baltimore' because the regenerated places where most tourists visit and the deprived neighbourhoods where most of the population lives are spatially separated.<sup>46</sup> The regenerated Baltimore also failed to stimulate further regeneration in

adjacent low-income neighbourhoods; moreover there was insufficient revenue generated from the flagship to permit subsequent investment in the deprived parts of the city.<sup>11</sup> Costs kept rising as more investment was needed to make previous developments economically viable. Harvey has called this 'feeding the downtown monster'.<sup>15</sup>

However, the reverse has also been shown to be true. Rather than existing as islands (as in Baltimore), flagships can act as a catalyst for the gentrification of adjacent areas and subsequent displacement of their populations. The link between the two is well established in the literature.<sup>8,42,58</sup> If flagship projects work as their promoters intend, adjacent areas witness increasing property prices, which can lead to further spatial segregation of the population because of displacement.<sup>7–9,55</sup> There is often fear among residents about this type of change, with frequent concerns that property price increases will force them to become displaced.<sup>57</sup> The transformation of much of London's East End from a working-class community to a global finance centre after the Docklands development is testament to the power flagship projects can have over adjacent areas—and the disruption and upheaval they can cause to lower-income residents living nearby.

Current UK policies and practices for city-centre regeneration focus on the ideas of gentrification and the attraction of high-income residents to live, work and play there.<sup>51</sup> Luxury residential developments built for affluent residents are lauded as symbols of success and an urban renaissance.<sup>51</sup> In this way, the 'target audience' for much city-centre regeneration is still aimed at a high-income clientele and, in this way, must be regarded as a continuation of earlier rounds of flagship regeneration. The creation of luxury spaces—regardless of whether they are oriented towards consumption, leisure, tourism, residential space or offices—remains the aim.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

Practices of urban regeneration have evolved and the past ten years have seen a rise in the number of community-based regeneration schemes aimed directly at addressing problems of poverty and social exclusion, something with which flagship proponents originally dealt under the ideology of trickle-down theory. Armed with these new approaches, the idea of trickle-down appears, for many observers, to be an outdated mode of urban regeneration, especially with regards to its ability to reduce social and spatial inequalities throughout a city.

Yet the goals and intentions behind the flagships of the 1980s and 1990s—the logic that argued that cities needed to reposition themselves in the urban marketplace by creating marketable and saleable locations—are still present in city centres and waterfronts throughout the UK, Western Europe and North America. While the spaces created have evolved with the times, the high-end, consumption-oriented, iconic spaces that are driven by market forces and meant to be catalysts for further development are still being built and planned. Convention centres, aquariums and themed tourist malls are now a bit passé, but the luxury apartments, warehouse conversions, museums and iconic architecture all share similar values: the creation of wealth, the attraction of affluent residents and the pursuit of profit.

For these city-centre spaces to be more inclusive will require a

rethink of their goals from all the key actors involved: governments, local authorities, development corporations and the private sector. Purely focusing on creating wealth or attracting affluent tourists or residents will create prosperous islands, but do little for the wider population. To be successful, they will need to incorporate many of the goals and intentions seen in community-based regeneration.

One of the major criticisms of flagships is their lack of community involvement. By taking lessons from other forms of regeneration, future projects can be more locally oriented spaces that incorporate a more holistic sense of place and identity. If a city is to embark on creating a new iconic project, it would be more likely to be embraced and valued by citizens if it genuinely incorporated their views. However, this will prove to be a challenging issue. As Eisinger<sup>11</sup> cogently notes

Building a city as an entertainment venue is a very different undertaking than building a city to accommodate residential interests.

Herein lies the challenge: while more community-based regeneration has, at its heart, the goal of improving the lives and opportunities of local residents, flagships are much more about image reconstruction, prestige and profit. Until these goals are repositioned to be more economically and socially inclusive, global flagships will remain the haunts of an elite gentry, not of the wider local urban citizenry. If these issues are not addressed, they will continue to reinforce social, economic, cultural and spatial divisions within the city.

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