Ethnic Violence in Africa: Destructive Legacies of Pre-Colonial States

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Abstract

What explains differential rates of ethnic violence in post-colonial Africa? This paper argues that ethnic groups organized as a pre-colonial state (PCS) exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions in their post-colonial country. Insecure leaders in these countries traded off between inclusive coalitions that risked insider coups, and excluding other ethnic groups to risk facing outsider rebellions. A formal model implies PCS groups should be associated with coups because their historically rooted advantages often enabled accessing power at the center, whereas other ethnic groups in their countries—given strategic incentives for ethnopolitical exclusion—should fight civil wars more frequently than ethnic groups in countries without a PCS group. Analyzing new data on pre-colonial African states provides statistical evidence for these implications about civil wars and coups across a variety of model specifications. Strikingly, through 1989, 30 of 32 ethnic group-level major civil war onsets occurred in countries with a PCS group.

Keywords: African politics, Civil war, Coup d'etat, Ethnic politics, Historical statehood

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Violent political events such as civil wars and coups d'état have plagued Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, "Africa") since independence, causing millions of battle deaths and undermining economic development. Prior to 1990, 53 African rulers lost power via violent overthrow whereas only one stepped down after losing an election (Reno, 2003, 324). Violent perpetrators have often organized support around ethnic identity and have frequently espoused ethnic aims (Horowitz, 1985; Decalo, 1990), and most major civil wars since 1946 have involved distinct ethnic claims and recruitment.[1] However, African ethnic groups also exhibit considerable variance. Between 1946 and 2009, 82 percent of politically relevant ethnic groups did not participate in any ethnic civil wars, and 75 percent did not participate in any successful coup attempts.[2]

Although considerable research has advanced our understanding of the ethnicity-violence relationship, most existing theories do not convincingly explain variation within Africa. By focusing primarily on post-colonial causes, much of this research overlooks longer-term factors that may have affected variance in key underlying factors such as the political salience of ethnic differences. Cederman et al. (2010) and Cederman et al. (2013) consider African countries among a broader global sample and show that ethnic groups excluded from power in the central government initiate civil wars more frequently than groups with access to power. They argue that the spread of nationalist ideology to the colonized world explains the prevalence of ethnic exclusion in the post-colonial world (Cederman et al., 2013, 30-54). Roessler (2011, 2016) argues that weak institutions across Africa have fostered an internal security dilemma whereby leaders fearful of a coup d'etat follow an ethnic identity logic to exclude individuals from power at the center. Francois et al. (2015) examine a similar tradeoff and highlight the striking pattern—in contrast to earlier characterizations of "big man" rule in Africa—that to prevent both coups and revolutions, African rulers have consistently allocated cabinet posts in proportion to ethnic group size. Horowitz (1985) and Decalo (1990) present numerous case studies in which political factions emerged along ethnic lines in Africa and contributed to violence.

However, exposure to international ideologies and weak institutions were largely constant across the region. Why has Uganda experienced several major ethnic civil wars whereas Kenya has experienced none? Why did Benin experience a spiral of successful coup attempts after independence but not Cote d'Ivoire? Elusive answers to key questions such as these have engendered prominent critiques alleging that ethnic differences offer little explanatory power for political violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fearon et al., 2007).

[1] Using the data for the present paper, described below, counts 30 of 36 through 2009.

[2] See Appendix Table C.4.

This paper provides new insights into ethnicity and conflict by taking a longer-term historical perspective. It examines post-colonial legacies of ethnic groups organized as a state prior to colonization in Africa and provides three main contributions: (1) a new theory showing how pre-colonial statehood exacerbated the internal security dilemma that African rulers faced after independence, (2) a novel dataset on pre-colonial states in Africa, and (3) empirical evidence that this factor can explain considerable variance in post-colonial ethnic civil wars and coups—in fact, almost every major civil war in the region during the Cold War era occurred in a country with a pre-colonial state (PCS) group. Overall, the analysis combines historical and strategic considerations to provide a deeper understanding of the causes of ethnic violence in Africa. The conclusion discusses implications outside of Africa.

First, the theory proposes a two-step historical and strategic sequence that links pre-colonial statehood to post-colonial ethnic violence. It begins by explaining why ethnic differences were more politically salient in countries with a PCS group and why members of PCS groups tended to gain political ascendancy. PCS groups were, on average, distinguished from non-PCS groups through diverse historical channels: pre-colonial warfare and slaving, privileges in colonial governance (indirect rule), and incentives to create regionally rather than nationally oriented policies during the post-World War II decolonization era. These mechanisms contributed to divisive inter-ethnic relationships and also increased PCS groups' likelihood of accessing power in the central government.[3]

The theory then links these historical legacies to post-colonial rulers' internal security dilemma, producing specific ethnic violence patterns. A game theoretic model analyzes a government's tradeoff between preventing coups and preventing civil wars. Including a challenger in power at the center—for example, by granting cabinet positions—improves the government's ability to commit to a bargain, but also enables the challenger to potentially overthrow the incumbent through an insider coup. By contrast, excluding the challenger from access to political power in the capital—perhaps passively by not allowing it to have cabinet positions, or via active discrimination by the government—forces the challenger to mobilize an outsider rebellion if it wants to overthrow the incumbent. By exacerbating inter-ethnic tensions in their country, PCS groups created within-country spillovers that worsened the central government's commitment ability and created strategic incentives for ethnopolitical exclusion. Members of PCS groups should be associated with coups because

[3]Throughout, statements such as these refer to members of groups with certain traits tending to exhibit certain behavior, as opposed to suggesting that ethnic groups act as monolithic blocks.

their historically rooted advantages often enabled accessing power at the center, whereas members of other ethnic groups in their countries—given strategic incentives for ethnopolitical exclusion—should fight civil wars more frequently than ethnic groups in countries without a PCS group, where incentives to violently control the political arena tended to be lower.

Second, the paper presents an original dataset on pre-colonial states in Africa integrated with the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman et al., 2010), which codes politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to power in the central government.[4] The author consulted continent-wide historical maps and numerous additional secondary sources (96 in total) to code a binary PCS variable for each EPR ethnic group, based on the following operational definition for pre-colonial statehood: co-ethnics governed a substantial percentage of members of the EPR ethnic group through a single or small number of political organizations that exhibited some degree of centralized rule on the eve of colonization. This dataset improves upon the widely used Murdock (1967) dataset by (1) coding pre-colonial statehood for a list of politically relevant ethnic groups with available data on participation in violence, (2) reducing measurement error by assigning different PCS scores to far-flung ethnic groups whose level of political organization differed across space, and (3) providing more detailed and easily replicable information for each ethnic group (Appendix A provides lengthy country-by-country scoring justifications).

Third, statistical findings from a panel of ethnic groups between independence and 2009 show the importance of pre-colonial statehood for facilitating political violence in Africa—contrasting with the predominant focus in the civil war literature on more contemporary correlates. Regression models estimate that PCS groups participated in successful coup attempts more than twice as frequently as groups in countries without a PCS group, and stateless groups participated in a major ethnic civil war more than four times as frequently if a PCS group resided in their country. Strikingly, through 1989, 30 of 32 ethnic group-level major civil war onsets occurred in countries with a PCS group. The findings are similar when controlling for predictors of statehood in pre-colonial Africa and for common alternative explanations for political violence from the literature. The estimated substantive magnitude of the effects is consistently large, and formal sensitivity analysis demonstrates that unobserved covariates are unlikely to explain away the findings. Additional findings support hypotheses that either predict or condition on ethnopolitical inclusion, or condition on British colonialism or the Cold War era. Finally, surveying individual cases demonstrates that members of PCS

[4]Posner (2004) provides an earlier discussion of politically relevant ethnic groups.

groups were central to post-colonial civil wars and coups in 14 of 18 countries with a PCS group.

The new perspective on ethnic violence contributes to research on historical roots of African institutional weakness (Akyeampong et al., 2014; Nunn, 2014), historical causes of modern civil war and related political outcomes (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014; Fearon and Laitin, 2014; Dincecco et al., 2016; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016; García-Ponce and Wantchékon, 2017), and institutions in dictatorship (Svolik, 2012; Meng, 2017). It also offers a new perspective on the widely discussed legacies of pre-colonial statehood (Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2013). Many have linked pre-colonial statehood to stronger economic performance in Africa (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013) and elsewhere (Bockstette et al., 2002; Dell et al., 2017). Higher economic development should depress civil war propensity, yielding the theoretical prior that pre-colonial statehood should reduce political violence—contrary to the present analysis. The emphasis here also differs from classic works that downplay the importance of diversity in pre-colonial African political units. Herbst (2000) focuses primarily on generic challenges that rulers across time have faced in a region that, on average, has exhibited low population density. Mamdani (1996) and Ranger (2012) argue that European colonial administrators responded to a general lack of extant political organizations by "inventing" chiefly traditions to facilitate centralized tax collection in previously acephalous communities, and by granting widespread despotic powers to appointed leaders.

The analysis also differs from two related studies on pre-colonial statehood and post-colonial civil war. Wig (2016) and Depetris-Chauvin (2015) both reach the opposite conclusion as the current paper: ethnic groups organized as a pre-colonial state *decrease* post-independence civil war prospects. Below I discuss differences in data and statistical models that likely yield these divergent findings. Briefly, a core element of the present theory is that PCS groups create within-country spillovers, which implies the conflict propensity of stateless groups differs systematically depending upon whether or not there is a PCS group in their country. The statistical results in Wig (2016) and Depetris-Chauvin (2015) are premised on within-country comparisons, specifically, because every regression model contains country fixed effects. Therefore, using the language of the current paper, they compare the conflict propensity of PCS groups to stateless groups within their country. However, this approach will yield uninformative results if PCS groups caused within-country spillovers—in fact, the present theory associates PCS groups primarily with coups rather than with civil wars. Furthermore, compared to these two contributions, the current theory and results offer insight into a wider range of outcomes, such as coups and ethnopolitical inclusion.

1 Pre-Colonial Statehood and Politicized Ethnic Differences

Why does ethnicity sometimes compose an important political cleavage? How do politicized ethnic differences affect prospects for and the form of ethnic violence? These questions have received considerable attention in recent research that relates horizontal political inequalities—meaning that some groups have access to power in the central government whereas others do not—to ethnic conflict (Cederman et al., 2010; Roessler, 2011; Cederman et al., 2013; Wucherpfennig et al., 2016), and in ethnicity research more broadly (reviewed in Fearon, 2006). The present theoretical framework proposes a two-step historical and strategic sequence that links pre-colonial statehood (PCS) to post-colonial ethnic violence. First, through various historical channels discussed in the present section, PCS groups exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions within their colony. Second, the next section discusses how politicized ethnic differences heightened by PCS groups generated strategic reactions that sparked ethnic civil wars and coups after independence.

1.1 Related Theory on Politicized Ethnic Differences

Recent political science research such as Cederman et al. (2013) and Wucherpfennig et al. (2016) has primarily concentrated on three historical factors to explain inequalities in political power among ethnic groups: (1) historical warfare, (2) modernization and the spread of nationalism to the Third World, and (3) strategies of European colonial rule. First, the earlier pre-colonial era in Africa coincided with a pre-nationalist era. Historically, before nationalist ideas spread outside Europe, warfare was an important cause of group-level inequality and domination (Cederman et al., 2013, 33). Second, later in the pre-colonial era and into the colonial era, emergent nationalism hardened ethnic identities, facilitated inter-ethnic inequalities, and made groups cognizant of grievances toward other groups. Whereas many pre-modern societies lacked the ability to translate macro-cleavages into political action, modernization and nationalism created politically relevant differences among ethnic groups (Cederman et al. 2013, 34; Gellner 1983). Most post-colonial countries in Africa combine many nations—specifically, *ethnic* nations—into a single political unit. Therefore, these nascent differences contributed to differences in political power among groups. Third, colonizer identity and distance between the capital and where members of an ethnic group resided also influenced possibilities for gaining power at the center (Wucherpfennig et al., 2016). Britain tended to cede greater political authority to indigenous political units whereas France sought to centralize colonial rule to a greater extent. More

indirect British ruling strategies created greater opportunities for groups located farther from the capital to gain access to power at independence.

1.2 Pre-Colonial Statehood

However, these theories do not explain why ethnic differences carry extreme political importance in some countries—to the point of creating incentives for violence—but not others. Nor do they explain which types of ethnic groups tended to worsen inter-ethnic tensions. Taking a historical perspective and examining consequences of pre-colonial states through different historical periods—pre-colonial, high colonial, and decolonization—addresses this gap. The following grounds two key assumptions about pre-colonial state (PCS) groups and their within-country spillover effects that underpin the model of post-colonial ethnic violence in the next section. First, the negative influence of PCS groups on constructing inter-ethnic political institutions undermined the ability of post-colonial central governments to commit to bargains. Second, within countries containing a PCS group, historical factors privileged PCS groups over stateless groups in their country to gain political inclusion in the central government. Appendix B.1 provides additional citations for individual cases referenced.

Pre-colonial period (before ∼1885). Pre-colonial Africa featured diverse forms of political organization, ranging from stateless societies such as the Maasai in Kenya to hierarchically organized polities with standing armies such as the Dahomey in Benin.[5] Centralized states tended to create more salient identities for the peoples they governed and engendered more pronounced inequality across groups. Reid (2012) argues that Africa experienced a military revolution during the 19th century that enlarged the scale and vision of political violence in many parts of the continent (109). Ethnic groups organized as centralized states were well-positioned to create the war economies needed to profit from European guns and slave trading. The Dahomey in Benin and Baganda in Uganda gained political dominance by defeating rival states. Earlier, between 1400 and 1700, areas that contain members of a PCS group were more than twice as likely (29% to 14%) to experience at least one war.[6] Many PCS groups also participated in the continent's widespread slave trade, as in Chad, Madagascar, Mali, and Sudan, which created inequalities between the raiders and the raided. These interactions often created durable and divisive identities, as in Sudan between elite riverine

[5]For clarity, I use modern country names even when discussing pre-independence political units.

[6]Calculated by author using data presented below.

Arabs and previously enslaved Africans. Salient identities among members of PCS groups contrasted with the many non-PCS groups that "recognized no common name and had no feeling that they belonged to a common polity," such as the Tonga in Zambia (Colson, 1969, 29).

High colonial period (∼1900-1945). By elevating PCS groups in the colonial governance hierarchy, European colonial rule perpetuated—and perhaps enhanced—inter-ethnic inequalities in political power engendered by divergent political histories. This was most closely associated with British rule because it emphasized "indirect" governance.[7] PCS groups provided natural allies because ruling through extant local political hierarchies minimized colonial administrative costs. Examples include the Asante in Ghana, Buganda in Uganda, Hausa and Fulani in Nigeria, Lozi in Zambia, and riverine Arabs in Sudan. Famed British administrator Frederick Lugard originally developed the Native Authorities system—i.e., indirect rule—in northern Nigeria because the remains of the Sokoto caliphate provided a suitable bureaucratic infrastructure for governing the territory with few British officials on the ground. Gerring et al. (2011) provide statistical evidence from a sample of British colonies that longer history as a pre-colonial state covaries with less direct colonial rule. Indirect colonial rule often enabled PCS elites to control valuable resources such as land tenure allocation and funds from Native treasuries (Herbst 2000, 173-198; Posner 2005, 26-41). Native self-governance also frequently prevented cultural influences that would have undermined traditional elites, such as Britain's policy of not allowing Christian missionaries to operate in northern Nigeria. Furthermore, although Britain often attempted to also indirectly rule stateless groups, invented colonial authorities tended to have low legitimacy and mobilization ability. For example, in Nigeria, "[w]hen the British seized power in the north, they merely modernized an already accepted political institution. In the south, however, taxation was introduced to support a new order, which the people were prone to regard as tyrannical and antithetical to revered traditions" (Sklar and Whitaker, 1966, 21), consistent with Mamdani's (1996) and Ranger's (2012) discussions of the problems with attempting to "invent" political traditions in areas without a state.

Although other colonizers did not practice indirect rule as explicitly, the practicality of delegating gover-

[7]Collier (1982, 83-87) summarizes earlier debates in the literature by claiming that although some had exaggerated the difference between British indirect rule and French direct rule, there were still important distinctions—including how frequently the colonizer ruled through traditional authorities, and the role and prestige of the chief. Wucherpfennig et al. (2016) have recently discussed this debate.

nance tasks to PCS groups contributed to political inequalities among ethnic groups even beyond the British empire. Within the German and then Belgian empires, Tutsi kingdoms in both Rwanda and Burundi were de facto autonomous colonies. Even the French empire—typically associated with "direct" governance and forcibly uprooting extant political hierarchies—exhibited examples of ruling indirectly through PCS groups, as with the Fon in southern Benin and Muslim Sahelian groups in northern Chad. Thompson (1963, 169) argues that Benin differed from the rest of French West Africa in several respects: "the survival of more traditional chiefs in the south, the regional differences that continued to differentiate the Abomey area from that of Porto Novo,[8] and the sharper cleavage between the northern and southern parts of the country." Similarly, Nolutshungu (1996, 29) argues for Chad, "There was more respect for precolonial social distinctions and authority systems of the Islamic North, and therefore a greater willingness to assimilate them into a kind of 'indirect rule'." Whereas France granted Christian missionaries wide leeway in southern Chad, they were not allowed to interfere in the Islamic north (similar to Britain's dual policy in Nigeria). Therefore, although British indirect colonial rule should have most effectively perpetuated PCS groups' historical privileges, the historical basis for the argument extends beyond British colonies.

Decolonization period (post-1945). Different patterns of political party formation that emerged during decolonization reinforced the political salience of differences between PCS and stateless groups, engendering the fractured political arena—in some cases because of ethnopolitical exclusion, in others because of tenuous power-sharing coalitions—inherited by most countries that contained a PCS group. After 1945, Britain and France, later Belgium introduced or broadened elections in their African colonies. Some of the resultant political parties organized around nationalist ideals whereas others mirrored ethnic splits. Factions formed during the decolonization era were consequential for post-independence coalitions because political parties that won seats in the final colonial elections usually were included in the government at independence.

Uganda exemplifies PCS groups' privileges and the difficulty of forming broad nationalist parties during the decolonization era in colonies with a PCS group, in contrast to colonies like Cote d'Ivoire with no PCS groups and where a single nationalist party dominated the political landscape at independence. When Britain colonized Uganda, it bestowed the powerful state of Buganda with significant self-governance privileges. "The special status of Buganda in Uganda was the most important legacy of the colonial era" (Rothchild and Rogin, 1966, 341). Their founding treaty with Britain in 1900 "appeared to the Baganda as in some sense at

[8]Two separate PCS groups resided in these territories.

least an agreement between equals" (341). Therefore, Buganda's later "integration within the rest of Uganda posed serious problems first to colonial officials and subsequently to nationally oriented African politicians [because] Buganda could not be dethroned from its dominant position without seriously compromising the viability of Uganda as a whole" (Doornbos, 1977, 241). In response to Britain's attempt to unify colonial administration after World War II, Buganda attempted to secede from the rest of Uganda to "safeguard the traditions, Kabakaship, and the customs of Buganda in an independent Uganda" (Kyeyune and Nsibambi, 1962). The king—known as the *kabaka*—cited Buganda's distinct status in the Uganda Agreement of 1900 to promote his claim.

Consequently, "the power of traditional groups . . . precluded the success of a centralized, ideological mass party" among all Ugandans (Rothchild and Rogin, 1966, 389). Supporters of the *kabaka* instead created the Kabaka Yekka—meaning "king only"—party after the *kabaka* led a highly successful boycott of the 1961 Legislative Council elections in which less than 2% of eligible Baganda voted. Kabaka Yekka provided "a practical avenue through which Buganda could enter national politics and yet preserve its own autonomy and unity" (358). The ethnically oriented party received 38% of total votes in the final pre-independence parliamentary elections in 1962 (Schmidt, 1999). In response to political deadlock created by the sizable vote share of Buganda's ethnically oriented party, an inter-ethnic ruling coalition formed at independence that composed an "alliance of complete opposites" (Decalo, 1990, 152) between Buganda's Kabaka Yekka party and a major party led by a member of a non-PCS group, Milton Obote's UPC party.

Other countries with a PCS group that experienced electoral competition prior to independence exhibited similar patterns of politicized inter-ethnic differences generating locally oriented parties. In Nigeria, an aspiring sultan of Sokoto (pre-colonial state) led the Northern People's Congress. The party's platform emphasized "the integrity of the north [and] its traditions" whereas "support for broad Nigerian concerns occupied a clear second place" (Lovejoy, 1992, 43). Benin's three hegemonic regional parties split among the former Dahomey kingdom—whose leader descended from the former royal house—the Porto Novo kingdom, and the north. A divide between PCS and non-PCS groups also occurred in the form of north/south splits in Chad and in Sudan, and a coastal/highlanders split in Madagascar.

PCS groups also heightened the political salience of ethnic differences in colonies/countries that did not experience electoral competition. In Ethiopia (colonized briefly by Italy during World War II) and in colonial Rwanda and Burundi, the pre-colonial monarchy *was* the state and naturally provided the main source of

political cleavages. In two cases of violent transitions to independence, African rebel groups split along PCS lines: in Angola, Mbundu (PCS) for MPLA, Bakongo for FNLA, and Ovimbundu for UNITA; and in Zimbabwe, Shona for ZANU and Ndebele (PCS) for ZAPU. In sum, PCS groups tended to exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions prior to independence, setting the stage for post-colonial ethnic violence.

2 Pre-Colonial Statehood and Strategic Causes of Ethnic Violence

The second step in the historical and strategic sequence linking pre-colonial statehood to post-colonial ethnic violence explains how sharp inter-ethnic tensions induced by PCS groups incentivized strategic decisions that sparked ethnic civil wars and coups after independence. Although existing arguments explain how access to political power at the center affects prospects for civil wars and coups, they do not convincingly explain variation in either the prevalence or the form of ethnic violence across Africa. A simple model formalizes a government's tradeoff between preventing coups and preventing civil war. Including a challenger in power at the center improves the government's ability to commit to a deal, but also enables the challenger to potentially overthrow the incumbent through an insider coup—whereas excluding the challenger forces it to use the more tenuous strategy of initiating a civil war if it wants to violently overthrow the incumbent. Examining how pre-colonial state groups affect this core tradeoff generates hypotheses about ethnic violence. Broadly, these hypotheses distinguish ethnic groups in countries that contain at least one PCS group (PCS countries) from those that do not (non-PCS countries). More specifically, the hypotheses posit that PCS groups should participate in coups more frequently than stateless groups in non-PCS countries (SL groups), and that stateless groups in PCS countries (SLPCS groups) should participate in civil wars more frequently than SL groups. Figure 1 exemplifies the abbreviations. The Baganda in Uganda were organized under the Buganda kingdom before colonization and are a PCS group (black). Therefore, any stateless ethnic groups in Uganda, such as northern groups, are SLPCS (light gray), and Uganda is a PCS country. By contrast, there are no PCS groups in Kenya, and therefore all its groups—such as the Kikuyu—are SL (dark gray), and Kenya is a non-PCS country.

Figure 1: Examples of the Abbreviations



2.1 Related Theory on Ethnic Violence

Cederman et al. (2013, ch. 4) emphasize that many post-colonial states face the problem of multiple nations contained in a single political unit. The post-colonial state does not provide a neutral arena for competing group interests, and ethnic groups instead view the state as a prize. Only by entering and exerting influence in the political arena can ethnic groups articulate their social, cultural, and economic interests. This institutional logic generates Cederman et al.'s key hypothesis: if the incumbent regime blocks access for challenging groups, then the excluded groups face incentives to violently rebel. Roessler (2011) builds on this theory by addressing a key question: why would a ruler exclude ethnic groups if this raises the likelihood of a costly activity, violent rebellion? He argues that leaders in post-colonial Africa have faced a tradeoff between preventing coups and preventing civil wars. The surprising feasibility of executive removal by a military faction—given expectations at independence—has caused leaders to fear overthrow by political insiders. Many rulers have responded by prioritizing co-ethnics in central government positions and by excluding members of other ethnic groups, triggering the incentives for outsiders to launch civil wars on which Cederman et al. (2013) focus. Roessler posits that these leadership security fears often provoke conflict specifically along ethnic lines because ethnic identity provides an easy information shortcut in countries where ethnicity is believed to be politically salient. This logic yields Roessler's (2011) core hypothesis that ethnopolitical exclusion substitutes civil war risk for coup risk.[9]

[9]Two implicit assumptions in this framework and in much ethnic conflict research are (1) ethnicity is a useful framework for understanding motives for civil wars and for coups, even though these events are rarely couched purely in ethnic terms, and (2) civil wars and coups are alternative technologies for achieving

Despite positing a compelling strategic tradeoff faced by rulers in post-colonial Africa, crucial strategic and historical questions require additional attention. Why was the internal security dilemma more pernicious in some countries than others? What factors might prevent governments in some circumstances from excluding suspicious actors—i.e., why do coups occur empirically, given leaders' preferences to face challenges from outsiders rather than from insiders? How do historical factors affect these strategic considerations?

To make progress on these questions, the analysis formalizes the tradeoff between preventing coups and preventing civil wars. This lays the groundwork for the main theoretical contribution: explaining how PCS groups affected post-colonial rulers' calculus and conflict behavior—including subtle predictions regarding the modal violent technology used by different kinds of groups. The text briefly describes the setup and intuition for the theoretical results. Appendix E formally solves the complete and perfect information game solved using subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, as well as distinguishes the present model from others in the formal conflict bargaining literature (Section E.4). Briefly, the model resembles conflict bargaining models with commitment problems. The novel element here is that the ethnopolitical access choice allows the government to choose its commitment ability—and it may optimally choose *low* commitment ability. Other models show that building up the military—possibly to deter rebel groups—can trigger coups. But these models do not consider the possibility of pacifying the societal threat by sharing power with the opposition, nor the conditions under which that behavior will be optimal.

2.2 Formalizing and Analyzing the Coup-Civil War Tradeoff

The game considers a one-shot interaction between a government G and a challenger C that unfolds with three different moves. First, there is an ethnopolitical inclusion stage. With probability $1 - \beta_j \in (0, 1)$, the first strategic move in the game involves G choosing whether to include or exclude C from power at the center. With complementary probability β_j, this move does not occur because Nature exogenously requires G to include C. The subscript $j \in \{p, sp, s\}$ indicates that this probability differs depending on whether C is a PCS, SLPCS, or SL group, which next subsection discusses in more detail.

concessions from governments if bargaining fails, even though these coercion technologies also differ in important ways. The present theoretical framework adopts these premises, which Appendix E.5 defends at greater length.

Second, a bargaining stage occurs. G offers a share $x \in [0,1]$ of government revenues to C. Third, there is a conflict stage. C responds to G's offer by either accepting or fighting. If C accepts, G can commit to deliver x to C with probability θ_k.[10] This probability depends on whether C is included in or excluded from power. Formally, $k \in \{i, e\}$. With complementary probability $1 - \theta_k$, C receives nothing if it accepts because G has reneged on the deal. If instead C fights, it wins with probability $q_{k,l} \in (0,1)$, which depends on its ethnopolitical inclusion status k and on its exogenous strength $l \in \{s, w\}$ ("strong" or "weak," introduced below). A fight destroys $\phi \in (0,1)$ percent of revenues, and the winner consumes all remaining revenues. A fight initiated by an included C is denoted as a coup attempt and a fight by an excluded C is denoted as a civil war. Figure 2 presents the game tree.

Figure 2: Game Tree



The following assumptions express the countervailing consequences of granting C access to power. On the one hand, including C via cabinet or other executive positions improves G's ability to commit to a deal: C receives G's offer with probability θ_i if C is included and $\theta_e < \theta_i$ if excluded. On the other hand, C's probability of succeeding at a coup exceeds its probability of winning a civil war, $0 < q_{e,l} < q_{i,l} < 1$.[11] These countervailing implications imply that although C's opportunity cost of fighting is higher under

[10] Appendix Section E.1 characterizes the bounds on this probability.

[11] Roessler (2016, 37) distinguishes between coup conspirators' partial control of the state and insurgents'

inclusion—because there is a higher probability that G commits to its offer—C's expected utility of fighting is also higher under inclusion because coups succeed with higher probability.

The final parameter of interest is whether C is a strong or weak type, $l \in \{s, w\}$, which affects its probability of winning. Holding fixed ethnopolitical inclusion status k, strong types win with higher probability than weak types: $0 < q_{k,w} < q_{k,s} < 1$.

Table 1 summarizes equilibrium behavior for different values of G's commitment ability under inclusion and of C's fighting strength. Appendix E presents sufficient assumptions for this behavior, and Appendix Proposition E.1 formally characterizes the equilibria strategy profile. There are two possible reasons that C will be excluded in equilibrium, and only one generates fighting. The weak type of challenger accepts the equilibrium offer regardless of whether it is included or excluded from power. In this circumstance, it is optimal for G to exclude C for an *opportunistic* rationale because the weak type will not punish G with a rebellion if excluded.

G's calculus differs if it faces the strong type of challenger. The defining element of strong C is that it will reject any offer, i.e., rebel in equilibrium, if excluded. G's optimal action, and whether or not fighting occurs in equilibrium, depends on its commitment ability. If commitment ability under inclusion, θ_i, is high enough, then G can and will facilitate peaceful bargaining by including the strong type. If instead commitment ability under inclusion is low, then G faces a tradeoff between preventing a coup and preventing a civil war. G optimally chooses to exclude C and substitutes a civil war for a coup because rebellions succeed with lower probability than coup attempts. This provides a *strategic* rationale for exclusion: G excludes to avoid a coup. However, even in this coup-civil war case, G might not be able to avoid a coup attempt because the initial Nature move might force G to include C. Of course, in reality, a ruler might include in power actors it perceives as allies that later betray her, but the model does not include this or other sources of private information because it is not necessary to generate the main tradeoffs.

lack of such power access and need to build a private military organization. "This organizational distinction helps to account for why coups are often much more likely to displace rulers from power than rebellions."

Table 1: Coups, Civil Wars, and Inclusion/Exclusion

	Weak challenger	Strong challenger
Low commitment ability under inclusion	If C included: No coup If C excluded: No civil war $\Longrightarrow$ G prefers (opportunistic) exclusion $\Longrightarrow$ No fighting in equilibrium	If C included: Coup If C excluded: Civil war $\Longrightarrow$ G prefers (strategic) exclusion $\Longrightarrow$ CW in eq. if Nature does not force inclusion $\Longrightarrow$ Coup in eq. if Nature forces inclusion
High commitment ability under inclusion	If C included: No coup If C excluded: No civil war $\Longrightarrow$ G prefers (opportunistic) exclusion $\Longrightarrow$ No fighting in equilibrium	If C included: No coup If C excluded: Civil war $\Longrightarrow$ G prefers inclusion $\Longrightarrow$ No fighting in equilibrium

2.3 Key Assumptions about Pre-Colonial Statehood

The model captures a general tradeoff between preventing coups and preventing civil wars. Without further consideration, it is unclear how the tradeoff will be resolved in a given empirical setting. Three key parameters affect prospects for equilibrium fighting and for whether fighting will take the form of coups or civil wars: commitment ability under inclusion (θ_i), the exogenous probability that G must include C (β_j), and whether C is strong or weak. The historical discussion of PCS groups grounds two key assumptions about the first two parameters, and an extension to the model presented in Appendix Section E.3 shows that the theoretical implications are identical when assuming PCS groups are more likely to be the strong type of challenger. Combining the logic of the coup-civil war tradeoff with these empirical facts about pre-colonial statehood generates testable hypotheses.

> **Assumption 1** (Government commitment ability)**.** *The negative influence of PCS groups on constructing inter-ethnic political institutions undermined the ability of the post-colonial government to commit to bargains made at the center. As Appendix Section E.2 describes more formally, the commitment parameter under inclusion, θ_i, is drawn from different distributions for PCS and non-PCS countries. In expectation, θ_i is lower for PCS countries (i.e., if C is PCS or SLPCS) than for non-PCS countries (i.e., if C is SL).*

> **Assumption 2** (Historical privileges and ethnopolitical inclusion)**.** *Within countries containing a PCS group, historical factors privileged PCS groups over stateless groups in their country to gain political inclusion in the central government. Formally, C's exogenous inclusion probability depends on the group's/country's pre-colonial state status: β_p for PCS groups, β_s for SL groups, and β_{sp} for SLPCS groups, with $0 < \beta_{sp} < \beta_s < \beta_p < 1$.*

Assumption 1 states that G is less able to commit to a deal with an included challenger in a PCS country—i.e., if C is either a PCS group or a SLPCS group. This assumption offers an important consideration for weakly institutionalized environments. Even in settings where the rule of law and constitutions are not

well established, there are alternative ways for political leaders to commit to bargains. In many non-PCS countries, such as Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya, rulers created nationalist parties that facilitated inter-ethnic cooperation after independence. This relates to broader contentions from the authoritarian politics literature about how party institutions can alleviate commitment problems (Svolik, 2012).

By contrast, the disruptive influence of PCS groups created country-wide spillovers because they inhibited creating inter-ethnic political institutions during the decolonization era. This decreased any ruler's ability in a PCS country to commit to deals—regardless of whether or not members of a PCS group controlled the executive branch. Uganda exemplified this point: the Baganda's ethnic-specific party created a non-cohesive political arena held together at independence by a tenuous power-sharing agreement among rival ethnic parties. SLPCS often responded strategically to PCS groups' organizations by creating their own ethnic-specific organizations, reflecting the key argument about within-country spillovers in PCS countries.[12] Therefore, θ_i captures in a reduced form way the extent of inter-ethnic institutional relations created prior to independence, with greater institutional ties facilitating higher commitment ability.

Assumption 2 states that the exogenous inclusion probability β_j is higher if C is a PCS group than an SL group. Additionally, because PCS groups' dominance in the colonial hierarchy often came at the expense of stateless groups in their countries, β_j is lower for SLPCS groups than for SL groups. Two substantive considerations from the previous section justify assuming that the exogenous inclusion probability is highest for PCS groups. First, PCS groups' prominence in colonial governance often facilitated representation at the center even in countries where SLPCS groups had ascended through elections, as shown in Uganda.

Second, the political advantages of PCS groups should also make them more likely to dominate all government positions. This implies G and C would belong to the same PCS group, which precludes G from excluding C along ethnic lines. However, even in cases of shared ethnicity between G and C, the general political instability caused by historical statehood (Assumption 1) makes C a potential coup threat. Gassebner et al. (2016) conduct an extreme bounds analysis on determinants of coups and find that some of the

[12]The more typical assumption in ethnic civil war research is that the "treatment status" of an ethnic group is independent of treatments received by other ethnic groups in the country (Cederman et al., 2013; Depetris-Chauvin, 2015; Wig, 2016). As an exception, Lacina (2015) posits a different within-country spillover mechanism. She argues that ethnic groups are most likely to fight separatist civil wars when they have less representation in the central government than other groups residing in their territory.

few robust correlates of coups are political instability events such as government crises, civil wars, purges, and general strikes (see also Powell 2012, 1031 and Bell and Sudduth 2015). This evidence is relevant for PCS countries. By destabilizing the political arena, PCS groups should generate broader societal crises such as civil wars. This creates propitious conditions for coups even if one ethnic group dominates the political arena. Therefore, *inter*-ethnic strife caused by PCS groups can also engender *intra*-ethnic tensions. For example, in Sudan, riverine Arabs (PCS group) have dominated power at the center since independence, but successful military coups have rotated power between civilian and military regimes. Successful coup attempts in 1958, 1969, 1985, and 1989 all stemmed from failures by the incumbent government to eliminate southern rebels and from disagreements over how to best combat the rebellions (Bechtold 1990, 582, 592; Tartter 1992, 234-237).

2.4 Hypotheses

The following states the hypotheses to be tested, which follow from formal propositions derived in Appendix Section E.2.[13] Assumption 1 implies that political violence—either civil wars or coups—should be more likely in PCS countries than in non-PCS countries. Low government commitment ability increases the likelihood that G cannot buy off C regardless of whether C is included or excluded from power (see the top right box in Table 1). Assumption 2 explains the form that violence should take for PCS and for SLPCS groups. PCS groups' historical privileges should make their members more likely to be included in power even when strategic incentives stemming from low commitment ability dictate exclusion. This pushes members of PCS groups to use the insider technology, coup d'état. By contrast, SLPCS groups' lack of such privileges should make their members easier to dislodge from power—given strategic incentives for exclusion in PCS countries—associating SLPCS groups with civil wars. Crucially, the posited within-country spillover effects of PCS groups implies that the relevant comparison for PCS groups and for SLPCS groups is to SL groups. Therefore, theoretical considerations require disaggregating stateless groups by whether or not any PCS groups reside in their country. This logic yields the two main hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. *SLPCS groups should participate in civil wars more frequently than SL groups.*

[13] Specifically, Proposition E.5 yields H1, Proposition E.6 yields H2, Proposition E.2 yields H3, Proposition E.3 yields H4 and H5, and Proposition E.4 yields H6.

Hypothesis 2. *PCS groups should participate in coups more frequently than SL groups.*

The theoretical building blocks for the two main hypotheses yield secondary hypotheses. SLPCS groups face two disadvantages for gaining inclusion in power at the center. First, low commitment ability for governments in PCS countries creates strategic incentives to exclude (Assumption 1). Second, SLPCS groups tended to be disadvantaged in the colonial hierarchy relative to PCS groups (Assumption 2).

Hypothesis 3. *SLPCS groups should be included in power at the center less frequently than SL groups.*

There is no similar implication as H3 for PCS groups relative to SL groups. Despite strategic exclusion incentives in PCS countries, PCS groups' historical advantages summarized in Assumption 2 makes it ambiguous whether PCS or SL groups should be more likely to have access to power at the center.

The theory also carries implications for ethnic violence conditional on ethnopolitical representation. Conditional on ethnopolitical exclusion, PCS and SLPCS groups should each fight civil wars more frequently than SL groups. Governments in PCS countries are more likely than governments in non-PCS countries to face a tradeoff between coups and civil wars because of low commitment ability (Assumption 1). This dilemma incentivizes governments in PCS countries to exclude for strategic reasons—i.e., excluding strong challengers even though these groups will fight a civil war if excluded—rather than for opportunistic reasons, which entails excluding weak groups that will not rebel conditional on exclusion.

Hypothesis 4. *Conditional on ethnopolitical exclusion, PCS groups should participate in civil wars more frequently than SL groups.*

Hypothesis 5. *Conditional on ethnopolitical exclusion, SLPCS groups should participate in civil wars more frequently than SL groups.*

Conditional on ethnopolitical inclusion, PCS groups should attempt coups more frequently than SL groups. Low commitment ability (Assumption 1) makes any group in a PCS country more likely to attempt a coup, and PCS groups' historical privileges (Assumption 2) enabled them to often be included in power even when strategic rationale dictated exclusion. There is no analog of H6 for SLPCS groups because they did not share these historical privileges.

Hypothesis 6. *Conditional on ethnopolitical inclusion, PCS groups should participate in coups more frequently than SL groups.*

Finally, although these hypotheses will be tested using a broad sample of Sub-Saharan African countries since independence, it is also useful to specify conditions under which Assumptions 1 and 2 should hold most strongly. The posited colonial mechanisms are most relevant for ex-British colonies because Britain was more likely to rule indirectly through PCS groups' established political hierarchies, which is why some regression specifications condition on British colonialism. Furthermore, the focus on events leading up to independence suggest the mechanisms should be most likely to operate earlier in the post-colonial era, and some regression specifications condition on the Cold War period.

3 Data and Empirical Setup

3.1 Sample

The unit of analysis in the main regression specifications is ethnic group-years. The Ethnic Power Relations database (EPR; Vogt et al., 2015) codes politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to power in the central government, and provides the ethnic group units used in the present study.[14] The civil war sample includes almost all group-years between each countries' year of independence and 2009 for politically relevant ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, and between independence and 2005 for the coup regressions. The temporal restrictions will be explained below. Appendix Section C.1 lists African countries missing EPR data, most of which are small countries that do not meet key scope conditions of the theory by not having an indigenous population or by lacking multiple ethnic groups that can compete for power.

3.2 Pre-Colonial States

Defining states has posed difficulties for social scientists, including anthropologists that have long debated how to classify states in pre-colonial Africa (Southall, 1974; McIntosh, 2005). Even pre-colonial African polities that exhibited hierarchical organization pose classification challenges when considering "stateness" traits used by social scientists to explain historical state formation in other regions. African rulers and

[14] "We classify an ethnic group as politically relevant if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination" (Cederman et al., 2010, 99).

the African state system as a whole placed lower emphasis on territorial sovereignty than did early modern Western Europe (Warner, 2001). Even highly centralized states by African standards usually possessed rudimentary political institutions compared to contemporary Asian agrarian empires (Kohli, 2004, 297).

Coding PCS groups. Acknowledging these difficulties, an EPR ethnic group is coded as belonging to a pre-colonial state if co-ethnics governed a substantial percentage of members of the EPR ethnic group through a single or small number of political organizations that exhibited some degree of centralized rule on the eve of colonization. Although the working definition of a state is minimal, the paucity of reliable historical information for most pre-colonial African political organizations makes it difficult or perhaps impossible to operationalize a conceptual definition that requires more nuanced information about the degree of centralization for each group. I restrict attention to states that existed at the eve of colonization because the theory posits that pre-colonial states' influence on colonial policies is a key persistence mechanism.[15]

Constructing the dataset proceeded in three main steps that Appendix A discusses in detail along with country-by-country coding justifications. First, I consulted 11 continent-wide maps of historical states and other sources to generate a list of candidate states. Second, I used additional secondary sources to match candidate states with EPR ethnic groups to generate a list of candidate PCS groups. Third, I examined four conditions that correspond with the working definition of pre-colonial states to determine which candidate groups were coded as PCS: (1) co-ethnic governance requires the state was independent rather than tributary, (2) some evidence of central authority such as acknowledged hierarchy of authority in regions outside the capital and centralized tax collection, as opposed to nomadic confederations or trading centers, (3) one (or a small number of) states governed a substantial percentage of members of the EPR ethnic group, as opposed to groups such as Yoruba in Nigeria or Bamileke in Cameroon that were fractured into dozens or hundreds of mini-states, and (4) these conditions held on the eve of colonization. In total, I consulted 96 sources to code the PCS variable. Figure 3 uses the same color scheme as Figure 1: PCS groups in black, SLPCS groups in light gray, and SL groups in dark gray. Appendix Table A.2 lists every PCS group and PCS country.

[15]In addition to theoretical considerations, this coding decision also reflects practical considerations. Information about pre-colonial states in Africa becomes even sparser in periods predating the eve of colonization. Additionally, suppose groups with a state that had collapsed before the eve of colonization—and therefore are coded as stateless—exhibited similar tendencies as PCS groups. Then this coding procedure should *underestimate* the effects of PCS groups.

Figure 3: PCS Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa



Notes: Countries that are entirely white are not included in the sample, as Appendix Section C.1 discusses. Other white spots correspond with territory where EPR does not list any politically relevant ethnic groups as residing. Ethnic groups in Eritrea are SLPCS prior to 1993 because they belonged to Ethiopia.

A robustness check considers an alternative PCS measure that changes the third operational criterion. For the main measure, groups like the Tswana in Botswana that were not organized into a single state but exhibited characteristics of centralized rule are coded as PCS if only a small number of states governed people within the modern ethnic group, especially if one state was clearly ascendant. However, additional regression results use an alternative operationalization in which groups like the Tswana are not coded as PCS, and Appendix Table A.2 denotes all such groups with an asterisk.

Two reasons motivate using a binary variable rather than an ordinal or continuous PCS measure. First, conditional on a PCS group being large enough to potentially disrupt creating nationally oriented political organizations,[16] the theory does not offer clear predictions for how the size of PCS groups should matter. Perhaps larger PCS groups linearly imply less ability to cooperate, or perhaps there is a non-linear effect in which very large PCS groups can achieve sufficient support to mitigate the sources of bargaining failure described above. This could possibly be true in the mostly peaceful PCS countries Botswana, Guinea,

[16]Only in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the largest PCS group less than 10% of country's population (Luba-Kasai, 7%), and the median size of the largest PCS group in PCS countries is 27%.

Senegal, and Zambia (see Appendix B.2), all of which feature a PCS group composing at least 40% of its country's total population. Although this is an intriguing consideration for future research, I prefer a simpler measure that directly relates to the hypotheses proposed here. Second, at the country level, having at least one PCS group or not is the key theoretical distinction. Conditional on having at least one, the number of PCS groups should be unimportant because even one PCS group should create conditions for ethnic violence. The theory does not suggest that multiple PCS groups would necessarily yield more permissive conditions for violence.

Improvements over existing measures. Despite the numerous important research questions to which existing measures of historical political centralization such as Murdock (1967) and Bockstette et al. (2002) have contributed, a new measure is needed to properly assess the present hypotheses. Bockstette et al. (2002) code a territory's history of state-like institutions dating back over two millennia to the year 0 CE. Their dataset uses modern country boundaries as the unit of analysis and therefore uses too high an aggregation level for analyzing ethnic groups.

Murdock (1967) codes a political "jurisdictional hierarchy" variable at the ethnic group level on the eve of colonization that is widely used in the literature. However, his ethnic group units cannot directly be used for conflict analysis because no dataset codes civil wars and coups to correspond with his dataset.[17] Furthermore, existing research on ethnic conflict has demonstrated the importance of focusing on *politically relevant* ethnic groups (Posner, 2004; Cederman et al., 2013), and many of Murdock's groups have never been politically relevant in the post-independence period. Although it is possible to geo-match Murdock's 826 Africa ethnic group polygons with the 217 EPR ethnic group polygons in the present dataset, this procedure would likely introduce considerable measurement error in the key independent variable because the two datasets differ vastly in their ethnic group units.[18]

[17] ACLED's (Raleigh et al., 2010) highly disaggregated civil war data, which could be matched with Murdock's (1967) ethnic groups, is available only since 1997 and therefore is not useful for assessing a historical factor posited to have its strongest effects closer to independence.

[18] Wig (2016) uses this coding procedure. Inspecting jurisdictional hierarchy scores for the set of ethnopolitically excluded EPR ethnic groups in his dataset highlights numerous scorings that, given the evidence presented in Appendix A, seem problematic. For example, stateless or fractured groups such as Niger's Kanouri, Nigeria's Yoruba, and Central African Republic's and Chad's Sara are coded as having "large

Another contributor to measurement error from combining Murdock (1967) and EPR ethnic groups is that many African ethnic groups are located in multiple countries. In the present dataset, 45% (97 of 217) of politically relevant ethnic groups have co-ethnic kin in at least one neighboring country in the dataset. Whereas Murdock assigns one score per ethnic group, empirically, many historically important and far-flung groups' level of political organization differed across space. For example, Britain and France purposely drew the border between Nigeria and Niger to correspond with the upper limits of the Sokoto caliphate, splitting centrally organized Fulani in Nigeria from fractured Fulani states in Niger (Touval, 1966, 289). Additional examples identified in the present coding procedure include the Malinke, coded as a PCS group in Guinea and in Senegal but as non-PCS in Gambia; Ngoni, coded as PCS in South Africa and in Zimbabwe but as non-PCS in Mozambique and in Malawi; and Yoruba, coded as PCS in Benin but as non-PCS in Nigeria.

These problems with combining Murdock (1967) and EPR data could be addressed by using a large volume of secondary sources to verify the matches, but then the coding procedure would closely resemble the present one. A final advantage of the present measure is that the country-by-country scorings presented in Appendix A allow researchers to easily examine every coding decision made for the current PCS variable, as opposed to Murdock's (1967) terse coding justifications and reference list.

3.3 Dependent Variables

The author coded the ethnic group-level civil war data by assigning Fearon and Laitin's (2003) major civil wars (at least 1,000 battle deaths during the conflict) updated through 2009 to EPR ethnic groups. This occurred primarily by using information from the ACD2EPR dataset (Vogt et al., 2015), which links civil wars from the Armed Conflict Database (ACD; Gleditsch et al., 2002) to EPR ethnic groups, to determine whether the rebel group exhibited ethnic aims and recruitment—and, if so, for which ethnic group(s). Focusing on major civil wars ensures that minor skirmishes do not drive the findings in one direction or another. Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin (2003) provide an explicit scheme for distinguishing civil war episodes, which is crucial for analyzing conflict onset. Appendix Section C.2 elaborates upon the coding procedure and on the advantages of the present measure. Robustness checks examine Roessler's (2011) and Vogt et al.'s (2015)

states," and groups such as Guinea's Malinke and Madagascar's Highlanders are coded as having "petty chiefdoms" despite their large and powerful empires on the eve of colonization.

ethnic group-level civil war measures,[19] described in more detail below.

The coup variable draws from Roessler (2011), who coded the ethnic identity of groups that participated in coups from McGowan's (2003) database through 2005.[20] As in almost all of Roessler's (2011) coup regressions, the main coup variable analyzed here only includes successful coup attempts. This relates both to concrete data limitations—Roessler's (2011) dataset has full coverage for the ethnicity of groups that participated in successful coups but exhibits considerable missing data for failed coups—and to inherent limitations to measuring failed coups (Kebschull, 1994). Many failed coups will not produce sufficient evidence to know that they occurred—or, given verification difficulties, the ruler might make up a plot as an excuse to purge dissidents—and to code the ethnicity of the main participants.[21] However, a robustness check uses all coup attempts as the dependent variable.

3.4 Origins of Pre-Colonial Statehood and Control Variables

Pre-colonial statehood was not randomly assigned across Africa. Although there is no silver bullet research design for addressing this fundamental causal inference concern, the statistical models control for posited causes of state formation in pre-colonial Africa and for alternative explanations of civil wars and coups, in addition to other strategies for generating plausible counterfactual comparisons. Appendix Table C.1 provides summary statistics for all variables in the full sample, and Appendix Table C.5 discusses every covariate and its sources in more depth.

A growing social scientific literature has examined causes of state formation in pre-colonial Africa. Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson (2013, 7-8) argue that much of this research applies factors proposed in research on European state formation—population density, trade, and warfare—and analyzes their applicability to

[19] Consistent with the present distinction between civil wars and coups, a handful of conflicts in ACD2EPR that are coup attempts are not counted as civil wars.

[20] "A coup d'état involves the sudden, often violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group . . . Thus, a coup is a change in power from the top that always results in the abrupt replacement of leading government personnel" (McGowan, 2003, 342).

[21] Although the theory makes predictions about coup attempts rather than successful coups, the logic applies equally to successful coups because a high percentage chance of success provides incentives to attempt a coup.

Africa. Studies using ethnic group-level data have shown that pre-colonial states were more likely to emerge in territories exhibiting greater ecological diversity, which promoted trade (Fenske, 2014), and with lower tsetse fly prevalence, which facilitated higher population density (Alsan, 2015). At the country level, Nunn (2008) demonstrates a negative correlation between slave exports and political centralization. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) and Dincecco et al. (2016) examine long-term effects of historical warfare in Africa, albeit without directly analyzing effects on pre-colonial state formation. In a broader sample, Putterman (2008) shows a strong relationship between timing of a territory's Neolithic revolution and historical state development. However, Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson (2013) provide qualifying evidence for our extent of knowledge on pre-colonial African state formation. Testing many anthropologists' contentions that Euro-centric state formation models are inapplicable to Africa, they show null correlations between pre-colonial centralization and factors related to each of population density, trade, and warfare in a sample of African ethnic groups. Each table accounts for these possible determinants of pre-colonial statehood by including specifications with and without the five pre-colonial covariates: ecological diversity, tsetse fly, slave exports, historical warfare, and Neolithic timing.

It is also important to account for alternative explanations proposed in the literature for civil wars and coups. Therefore, each table considers specifications with the following seven covariates: at the country level, income per capita, population, democracy level, and geographic constraints to broadcasting power; and at the ethnic group level, share of the national population, distance from the capital city, and presence of a giant oil field. Some of these covariates raise post-treatment bias issues, which is why each table also includes specifications that do not contain these seven covariates.

3.5 Statistical Models

Following standard practice in the ethnic civil war literature (e.g., Cederman et al., 2013, 73), the models contain a panel of ethnic group years.[22] The regression tables estimate logistic regressions:

$$\ln\left(\frac{Y_{it}}{1-Y_{it}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_P \cdot P_i + \beta_S \cdot S_i + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_X + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{1}$$

[22]The panel structure is appropriate because the sample of politically relevant ethnic groups changes over time. Furthermore, some covariates and conditioning variables are time-varying. However, robustness checks show similar results when analyzing cross-sectional data.

where Y_{it} is an indicator variable for ethnic civil war onset (with years of ongoing civil war dropped) or successful coup attempt, P_i is an indicator for PCS groups, S_i is an indicator for SLPCS groups, β_P and β_S are the main parameters of interest, $\boldsymbol{X}_{it}$ is a vector of covariates that differs by column, and ϵ_{it} is a random error term. The vector $\boldsymbol{T}_{it}$ contains standard event history controls for each of civil wars and coups—years since the last year in which the event occurred and cubic splines—plus lagged country-level civil war incidence in the civil war regressions. The main regression specifications cluster standard errors at the ethnic group level.

Importantly, most specifications do not include country fixed effects. A key premise of the theory is that PCS groups cause within-country spillovers, which necessitates comparing groups in PCS countries to SL groups, as the hypotheses state.[23] The main hypothesis about civil wars (H1), for example, concerns *stateless* groups in PCS countries because PCS groups tended to exclude SLPCS groups from power. Therefore, the within-country comparisons generated by modeling country fixed effects would not provide a valid test of the hypotheses. This distinguishes the present analysis from existing statistical studies on pre-colonial statehood and civil war such as Wig (2016) and Depetris-Chauvin (2015), which use a subnational unit of analysis and include country fixed effects in every regression model. Finally, no models include ethnic group fixed effects because the PCS, SLPCS, and SL indicators are time invariant. A robustness check models ethnic group intercepts as random effects.

4 Pre-Colonial Statehood and Ethnic Violence

4.1 Main Results

Table 2 supports the main hypotheses, H1 and H2. The dependent variable is major ethnic civil war onset in Panel A and successful coup attempt in Panel B. In both panels, Column 1 contains a specification with the two PCS indicators—leaving SL groups as the omitted basis category—and event history controls without additional covariates. Panel A shows that SLPCS groups participated in civil wars 4.4 times more frequently

[23] This also makes uninformative country random effect models, which estimate a mixture between the fixed effect (within-country) and pooled (between-country) estimators.

than SL groups, in 1.0% of ethnic group years compared to 0.2%.[24] PCS groups participated in civil wars 2.4 times more frequently than SL groups, in 0.5% of ethnic group years. Panel B shows that PCS groups participated in successful coups 2.3 times more frequently than SL groups, in 2.0% of ethnic group years compared to 0.9%. By contrast, SLPCS groups participated in successful coup attempts less frequently than SL groups, which corresponds with their infrequent access to political power documented below.

Table 2: Main Results for Pre-Colonial Statehood, Civil Wars, and Coups

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.881	0.947*	0.952	1.122*
	(0.550)	(0.551)	(0.579)	(0.638)
SLPCS group	1.494***	1.531***	1.570***	1.702***
	(0.460)	(0.445)	(0.492)	(0.568)
Group-years	7,360	7,360	7,360	7,360
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.836***	0.878**	0.713**	1.005***
	(0.313)	(0.382)	(0.283)	(0.387)
SLPCS group	-0.593	-0.634	-0.411	-0.213
	(0.399)	(0.447)	(0.441)	(0.477)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 2 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the PCS group indicator and for the SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Section 3.1 describes the sample in each regression, Section 3.4 describes the covariates, and Section 3.5 describes the event history controls for each civil war and for each coup regression.$^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Analyzing raw trends in the data demonstrates that, quite simply, SL groups have rarely initiated civil wars. The first major ethnic civil war in a non-PCS country occurred in 1989 in Liberia. In total, only six major ethnic group-level onsets occurred in non-PCS countries between independence and 2009. This compares to 44 group-level onsets in PCS countries, including 30 through 1989. PCS groups and SL groups participated in roughly the same number of successful coups between independence and 2005: 29 versus 26. However, the percentage difference arises because of the infrequency of PCS groups in the data relative to SL groups. Appendix Table D.1 shows these relationships in cross-tabular form.

The main findings are similar when adding different sets of control variables. In both panels of Table 2,

[24]Every reported predicted probability fixes the event history controls at their mean values, and the other PCS country category at 0.

Column 2 adds the five predictors of African state formation discussed in Section 3.4 to the Column 1 specification. Column 3 adds the seven political violence covariates discussed in Section 3.4 to the Column 1 specification, and Column 4 includes all these controls. The relationships between SLPCS groups and civil wars (Panel A) and between PCS groups and coups (Panel B) are statistically significant at 5% in every specification. PCS groups are associated with higher civil war frequency than SL groups, although this result is not statistically significant in every specification in Table 2 nor in many of the robustness checks shown below. Recall that the theoretical expectations for PCS groups and civil wars are ambiguous because although they should tend to rebel when excluded (H4), their historical advantages for gaining access to power (Assumption 2) should decrease their usage of outsider rebellion techniques.

The theoretically relevant coefficient estimates are also stable in magnitude across the various specifications. Altonji et al. (2005) present a commonly used metric for using this type of information to learn about bias from unobserved covariates, and I follow standard practice in the literature by performing the calculations on linear models, shown in Appendix Table D.6.[25] In all but one case, the magnitude of the estimates when adding controls (Columns 2 through 4) exceeds the magnitude of the theoretically relevant estimates (SLPCS in Panel A, PCS in Panel B) in the restricted specification (Column 1). This implies that the magnitude of the bias of unobserved covariates would need to go in the opposite direction as the bias from omitting observables to overturn the results. Even in the PCS coefficient estimate in Column 3 of Panel B, the bias from unobservables would need to be more than 16 times larger than the bias from omitting the covariates contained in that specification to overturn the positive coefficient estimate.[26] Overall, the insensitivity of the coefficient estimates to adding covariates implies that—although it is impossible to control for every possible confounder—if the control variables included the tables are substantively relevant, then there is less reason to believe that covariates not included in any of the specifications would overturn the results.

[25] Altonji et al. (2005) present an econometric derivation, and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011, 3237-8) provide an applied discussion.

[26] Altonji et al. (2005) calculate a corresponding figure of 3.55 for their own analysis, which they interpret as large in magnitude.

4.2 Additional Robustness Checks

Numerous additional robustness checks demonstrate mostly similar findings. Appendix Tables D.2 through D.8 examine alternative statistical models: cross-sectional rather than panel data (Appendix Table C.4 provides associated descriptive statistics), adding ethnic group random effects to Table 2, replacing logit with either rare events logit or OLS, adding year fixed effects to Table 2, and estimating two-way clustered standard errors by country and ethnic group.

Other tables present alternative measures and yield similar findings as Table 2. Appendix Table D.9 uses alternative measures of the dependent variables. Panel A uses the standard civil war measure in EPR studies from the ACD2EPR dataset (Vogt et al., 2015), described above, with a threshold of 25 battle deaths per year and a two-year lapse rule for coding new conflicts. Panel B replaces the civil war measure with that from Roessler (2011). He uses a similar coding procedure as the civil war variable in Table 2 by also building off Fearon and Laitin's (2003) civil war list, but with few exceptions does not distinguish non-ethnic wars from civil wars in which stated aims and recruitment patterns followed ethnic lines. Panel C analyzes successful coup attempts. Appendix Table D.10 evaluates the alternative PCS and SLPCS measures discussed on page 20 for which the PCS distinction is restricted to groups organized under a single pre-colonial polity.

One difference from Table 2 is that in some of these alternative specifications, the PCS group indicator in the civil war regressions is positive and statistically significant across all four columns: cross-sectional data (Tables D.2 and D.3), the Roessler civil war measure (Table D.9, Panel B), and the alternative PCS measure (Table D.10). These findings reinforce the broader pattern that civil wars have occurred rarely in non-PCS countries, and that SL groups have participated in ethnic civil wars less frequently than either SLPCS or PCS groups.

4.3 Comparing Transnational Ethnic Groups

Many scholars have touted the artificiality of Africa's borders (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016), which have contributed to civil war and other adverse outcomes either by "dismembering" ethnic groups across international boundaries or by "suffocating" incompatible ethnic groups into the same country (Englebert et al., 2002). However, artificial does not mean random, and there is considerable evidence that groups' statehood influenced the colonial border drawing process (Englebert et al. 2002, 1096-7 provide

several examples). One possible confounding concern that relates to dismemberment is that perhaps more belligerent non-PCS groups were placed into PCS countries, maybe because colonizers were more likely to partition these groups across international boundaries.[27] Appendix Section D.2 shows suggestive evidence that groups in PCS countries participated more frequently in ethnic civil wars when adding transnational ethnic group fixed effects to the regression specification, although these findings are somewhat less conclusive than the main findings because the tests have low statistical power.[28]

5 Evidence for Theoretical Logic

This section assesses intervening implications of the theory by providing a series of secondary tests that predict or condition on ethnopolitical inclusion, or condition on British colonialism or the Cold War era. Appendix Sections B.2 and B.3 present brief case evidence that illustrates the centrality of PCS groups to political violence in most PCS countries.

5.1 Predicting or Conditioning on Ethnopolitical Inclusion

Statistical evidence supports Hypotheses 3 through 6, which either predict or condition on ethnopolitical inclusion. These results relate to three findings from the literature. First, whereas Roessler (2011) shows that ethnopolitical exclusion covaries positively with civil war onset and negatively with successful coups, the present findings show that pre-colonial statehood can explain variance in ethnic violence even when stratifying on access to central power. Therefore, historical conditions matter even when accounting for more contemporary causes. Second, the findings yield an opposing finding from Wig (2016) by showing

[27] Even if true, however, this would not explain away the correlations for PCS groups. Other factors related to endogenous border formation include constructing the borders to maximize PCS groups' population share (perhaps in part by not partitioning them across international boundaries) and placing the capital closer to PCS groups, but Columns 3 and 4 in almost every table control for these two factors.

[28] All the findings in this paper relate to Englebert et al.'s (2002) discussion of suffocation because of the posited incompatibilities between PCS groups and other ethnic groups in their country with regard to achieving peaceful power-sharing agreements.

that, conditional on exclusion, PCS groups rebel more often than SL groups.[29] Third, few studies have endogenized ethnopolitical status. Wucherpfennig et al. (2016) examine distance from the capital and colonizer identity, and the present findings contribute to this small but important research agenda.

Table 3 analyzes ethnopolitical inclusion using data from the EPR database (Vogt et al., 2015). A group-year is coded as 1 on the ethnopolitical inclusion variable if it scores "monopoly," "dominant," "senior partner," or "junior partner" on EPR's political status variable; and 0 otherwise. For all four values, the group commands either the presidency or at least cabinet positions in the administration (Cederman et al., 2010, 99-101). Using a similar set of specifications as in Table 2, the four columns in Panel A support Hypothesis 3 by demonstrating the rarity of ethnopolitical inclusion for SLPCS groups relative to SL groups. In Column 1, the predicted probability for inclusion is 40% for a SLPCS group and 69% for a SL group. This difference is statistically significant in all specifications. Panel B considers a different counterfactual comparison by stratifying the sample to only include groups from PCS countries and including country fixed effects. This within-country analysis compares PCS groups to the omitted basis category of SLPCS groups. The various specifications provide quantitative support for Assumption 2 by showing that PCS groups gained ethnopolitical inclusion more frequently than SLPCS groups.

Table 4 assesses the three conditional civil war and coup hypotheses. The dependent variable is ethnic civil war onset in Panel A and successful coup attempt in Panel B. The sample in Panel A is excluded ethnic groups and the sample in Panel B is included ethnic groups, therefore stratifying on the dependent variable from Table 3.[30] Covariates in the different specifications mirror those from Table 2. Appendix Tables C.2 and C.3 provide associated summary statistics for the samples of included and of excluded ethnic group years.

Supporting Hypothesis 4, the predicted probabilities in Column 1 of Panel A show that excluded PCS

[29] As discussed above, these differences arise in the present study because (1) PCS groups are not compared to stateless groups in their own country and (2) the PCS variable should have less measurement error.

[30] Running the Panel B regressions with an interaction term for ethnopolitical inclusion and calculating marginal effects yields identical findings. This is not possible for Panel A: the interaction term between inclusion and PCS groups drops out because no included PCS groups in the sample initiated a civil war. To maintain uniformity across the panels, for both I present models estimated on a truncated sample without interaction terms.

Table 3: Ethnopolitical Inclusion

	DV: Ethnopolitical inclusion			
	Panel A. Comparisons to SL groups			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.269	0.198	0.321	0.429
	(0.386)	(0.417)	(0.402)	(0.444)
SLPCS group	-1.210***	-1.342***	-0.837**	-0.875**
	(0.272)	(0.297)	(0.362)	(0.345)
Group-years	7,791	7,791	7,791	7,791
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Comparisons within PCS countries			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	1.521***	1.227**	1.372***	1.243**
	(0.513)	(0.500)	(0.486)	(0.505)
Group-years	4,187	4,187	4,187	4,187
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 3 summarizes a series of logistic regressions with ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Panel A presents coefficient estimates for the PCS group indicator and for the SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and Panel B presents coefficient estimates for the PCS group indicator (leaving SLPCS groups as the basis category). Every specification in Panel B contains country fixed effects. The event history controls, years since last event (i.e., "peace years") and cubic splines, count from the last year that the dependent variable changed values (akin to civil war onset and coup onset). The sample in Panel A is identical to that in Panel A of Table 2 (except in Table 3 no group-years are dropped because of ongoing civil wars). The sample in Panel B omits groups in non-PCS countries. Section 3.4 describes the covariates. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$.

groups initiated civil wars 4.4 times more frequently than excluded SL groups, in 2.5% of ethnic group years compared to 0.6%. Supporting Hypothesis 5, excluded SLPCS groups initiated civil wars 2.9 times more frequently than excluded SL groups, in 1.7% of ethnic group years.[31] Supporting Hypothesis 6, the predicted probabilities in Column 1 of Panel B show that included PCS groups participated in successful coups 2.7 times more frequently than included SL groups, in 2.0% of ethnic group years compared to 0.9%. These estimates remain statistically significant across the different specifications.

[31]The model extension in Appendix Section E.3 offers a reason for why the magnitude of this estimated effect is larger for PCS than for SLPCS groups based on PCS groups' greater likelihood of being the strong type of challenger.

Table 4: Conditional Ethnic Violence Results

	Panel A. DV: Ethnic civil war onset Sample: Excluded ethnic groups			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	1.503***	1.443**	1.830***	2.086***
	(0.577)	(0.593)	(0.636)	(0.723)
SLPCS group	1.075**	1.042**	1.523***	1.708**
	(0.525)	(0.520)	(0.580)	(0.663)
Group-years	2,961	2,961	2,961	2,961
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt Sample: Included ethnic groups			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	1.002***	1.159**	0.857**	1.107***
	(0.374)	(0.456)	(0.344)	(0.415)
SLPCS group	0.0297	0.292	0.111	0.354
	(0.410)	(0.422)	(0.412)	(0.510)
Group-years	3,958	3,958	3,836	3,836
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 2 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the PCS group indicator and for the SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The sample in Panel A is similar to that in Panel A of Table 2 but only contains group-years with ethnopolitical exclusion. The sample in Panel B is similar to that in Panel B of Table 2 but only contains group-years with ethnopolitical inclusion. Section 3.4 describes the covariates and Section 3.5 describes the event history controls for each civil war and for each coup regression. The smaller sample size in Columns 3 and 4 of Panel B compared to Columns 1 and 2 results from included oil-rich groups never participating in a successful coup attempt, and are dropped by the logistic regression. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

5.2 Conditioning on British Colonialism and Cold War Era

The next two tables show the results vary across different theoretically subsamples. If the theory is correct, then the estimated conflict effects should be pronounced in British colonies. Indirect colonial rule through PCS groups is a posited persistence mechanism, and Britain was the most willing to rule through existing political hierarchies. Supporting this implication, no ethnic civil war occurred in a non-PCS country that Britain colonized, compared to 18 distinct group-level civil war onsets in PCS countries that Britain colonized. Technically, Equation 1 cannot be estimated with civil war as the dependent variable among the sample of British colonies because controlling for the two PCS indicators induces perfect separation in the models. Panel A of Table D.13 excludes former British colonies and shows that the correlation between SLPCS groups and civil wars remains strong. This indicates that although the theory has greater explanatory power for British colonies, it does not apply solely to British colonies.

Panel B examines successful coups disaggregated by British colonialism. The evidence is mixed. On the one

hand, the strong correlation between PCS groups and successful coups among ex-British colonies further supports the theoretical framework because the effects should be pronounced in ex-British colonies. On the other hand, although the coup hypothesis finds support in non-British colonies without adding additional controls, the result loses statistical significance in Columns 2 through 4. One speculative possibility for this discrepancy is that Britain frequently encouraged coalition governments at independence, therefore including more groups and providing greater opportunities for coups. This would put more PCS groups in position to attempt coups against groups with whom they could not commit to share power, as Appendix B.3 shows for Uganda and Nigeria.[32]

Additionally, earlier years of the post-colonial era should exhibit the largest effect estimates. The theory focuses on historical factors culminating at the end of colonial rule that created incentives for political violence after independence in PCS countries. Additionally, poor economic performance across the region and destabilizing conditions caused by the end of the Cold War—including renewed electoral competition after 1989 and new prospects for political cleavages—could create alternative sources of ethnic tensions in non-PCS countries. Appendix Table D.14 shows that the coefficient estimates for the main civil war and coup specifications are large in magnitude when conditioning on pre-1990 years, whereas there is no evidence that pre-colonial statehood contributes to ethnic violence when examining post-Cold War years. This in part accounts for the discrepancy between the present findings and those in Depetris-Chauvin (2015), who only examines years since 1997.

5.3 Qualitative Evidence

Qualitative evidence provides additional support for the plausibility of the proposed theoretical mechanisms. Appendix Section B.2 organizes PCS countries into modal paths of ethnic violence. In 14 of 18 PCS countries, a PCS group dominated the government at or shortly after independence, and/or participated in at least one civil war or successful coup between independence and the end of the Cold War era. This evidence shows that ethnic violence occurred in most PCS countries and that, where it occurred, PCS groups frequently were involved. Process tracing evidence from Uganda and Nigeria, presented in Appendix Section B.3, further supports the posited theoretical mechanisms.

[32] A recent contribution on colonialism and coups focuses specifically on British colonies (Ray, 2016).

6 Conclusion

What explains differential rates of ethnic violence in post-colonial Africa? This paper argues that ethnic groups organized as a pre-colonial state (PCS) exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions in their post-colonial country. Insecure leaders in these countries traded off between inclusive coalitions that risked insider coups, and excluding other ethnic groups to risk facing outsider rebellions. A formal model implies PCS groups should be associated with coups because their historically rooted advantages often enabled accessing power at the center, whereas other ethnic groups in their countries—given strategic incentives for ethnopolitical exclusion—should fight civil wars more frequently than ethnic groups in countries without a PCS group. Analyzing new data on pre-colonial African states provides statistical evidence for these implications about civil wars and coups across a variety of model specifications. Strikingly, through 1989, 30 of 32 ethnic group-level major civil war onsets occurred in countries with a PCS group.

By addressing many core topics in research on ethnicity and political violence, the present analysis offers many directions for future research. The theoretical framework proposes a two-step historical and strategic sequence that links pre-colonial statehood to post-colonial tradeoffs between facing insider or outsider threats. Although the present theory focuses specifically on pre-colonial statehood, examining the effects of other historical factors in this framework could prove fruitful. Compared to most existing ethnic conflict research, this paper makes a more concerted attempt to understand strategic (but also see Roessler 2011 and Francois et al. 2015) and historical causes of ethnopolitical inclusion (also see Wucherpfennig et al. 2016), and the mechanisms explicated here should apply more broadly. The dataset compiled for this paper could be used to test many additional topics in the vast literature on pre-colonial statehood. Additionally, the statistical results go against existing findings on pre-colonial statehood and violence (Wig, 2016; Depetris-Chauvin, 2015) and qualify existing arguments about benefits of historical statehood espoused in economic development research (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). Continued analysis is needed to understand the impact of pre-colonial statehood.

Finally, is Sub-Saharan Africa seeks unique? If so, why? One distinctive regional attribute is that most countries lack a majority ethnic group. Therefore, although PCS groups in Africa tended to have historical advantages, many PCS groups' hold on power was tenuous because they were not numerically preponderant. In some cases, like Uganda, non-PCS groups dislodged PCS groups from power. By contrast, in many

Asian countries, an ethnic group with a historical state dominated the government in the 20th century and composed a large majority of the country's population. On the one hand, this may prevent violence by discouraging other groups from attempting to control the government. One the other hand, this may encourage emboldened majority groups to pursue ethnically exclusionary policies that spark civil wars. Future work that assesses how well the present theory exports to other regions will contribute to understanding African uniqueness and to our emerging knowledge of how historical factors have affected prospects for modern political violence.

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A Coding Pre-Colonial States

The following elaborates upon the coding rules described in the paper, followed by country-by-country coding discussions.

A.1 Coding Rules

Definition A.1. *An ethnic group from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset is coded as belonging to a pre-colonial state if co-ethnics governed a substantial percentage of members of the modern ethnic group through a single or small number of political organizations that exhibited some degree of centralized rule on the eve of colonization.*

The following three steps operationalized this definition:

1. ***Generate a list of candidate states.*** First, I consulted a uniform set of sources, 11 continent-wide maps of historical states, to generate a list of candidate states. If none of these candidate states yielded any EPR ethnic groups in the country to be coded as PCS (see next two steps), then I additionally consulted the pre-colonial history section of the country's *Encyclopaedia Britannica* page, the source used by Putterman (2015). Consulting numerous different sources on historical states makes it unlikely that the data will fail to incorporate any major states in pre-colonial Africa. Table A.1 summarizes the 11 different maps used in the coding. I found three of the maps because they are used by Depetris-Chauvin (2015): Ajayi and Crowder (1985), Barraclough and Parker (1993), and McEvedy (1996). Although useful for identifying candidate states, none of these sources explicitly say what they mean by states, and often list notable peoples alongside states. This emphasizes the importance of gathering additional information about the candidate states.

Table A.1: Maps of Historical States

Source	Notes
Ajayi and Crowder (1985; Section 55)	Includes all states from the map "European Colonies and African States on the Eve of the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference."
Atmore (1985; 12, 63)	Includes all states from his maps "Northern Africa on the eve of partition" and "Southern Africa on the eve of partition."
Barraclough and Parker (1993; 235)	Includes all states and other selectively labeled empires from the map "Africa before the partition by European powers 1800 to 1880."
Gailey (1971)	Includes all indigenous states in the map "European Territory - 1884."
Griffiths (1995, 39)	Includes all states from his map "19th Century AD."
Johnston (1884; xvi-1)	Includes all states in the map.
Kasule (1998; 83, 85)	Includes all states from his map in either 1880 or 1885.
McEvedy (1996; 107, 111, 113, 115)	Includes all states identified in at least one of his maps from 1878, 1885, 1890, or 1900.
Oliver and Atmore (2005; 124-5)	Includes all states from the map "Africa on the eve of partition: African states and European settlements."
Pakenham (1991; 19, 280)	Includes all states from the maps "Africa before the scramble: indigenous and alien powers in 1876" and "Africa in 1886: the scramble half complete."
Reid (2012; xix)	Includes all states with demarcated territories in the map "Nineteenth-century military revolution."

2. ***Match candidate states with EPR ethnic groups and countries.*** Second, I used additional secondary sources to match candidate states with EPR ethnic groups to generate a list of candidate PCS groups. In many cases, descriptions of the candidate state listed an ethnic group that corresponded to an EPR ethnic group. I also compared the location of the candidate state (in particular its capital) with EPR ethnic group polygons from Vogt et al. (2015). Candidate states without a corresponding politically relevant EPR ethnic group were not scrutinized further. For example, the Benin empire in Nigeria governed members of the Edo ethnic group, but this is a not a politically relevant ethnic group in the EPR dataset.

   The capital of the candidate state must be located within the same modern country borders as the EPR ethnic group. This consideration ensures groups are not coded as PCS simply because a pre-colonial state governed ethnic kin located far away. The text provides several examples of ethnic groups split among multiple countries that are coded as PCS in one country but not another.

3. ***Code pre-colonial state (PCS) groups.*** Third, given a list of candidate PCS groups, I assessed whether the group met the criteria in Definition A.1. These four criteria are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to code a group as PCS.

   (a) *Co-ethnic governance.* The candidate state was independent rather than a tributary state to another empire, such as the Adamawa emirate that was subordinate to the Sokoto Caliphate.

   (b) *Some degree of centralization.* There is evidence that the state actually exhibited some degree of centralized rule (i.e., government above the local level). In addition to relying on historians' statements about the state's level of centralization, when possible I compiled information about central administrative institutions. Dahomey (in modern-day Benin) was a paradigmatic state: "The state was a form of absolute monarchy unique in Africa. The king, surrounded by a magnificent retinue, was the unchallenged pinnacle of a rigidly stratified society of royalty, commoners, and slaves. He governed through a centralized bureaucracy staffed by commoners who could not threaten his authority" (*Encyclopaedia Britannica* Dahomey).

   Overall, the required level of centralization to satisfy this criterion is fairly low, with the justification that even modest forms of pre-colonial ethnic-wide hierarchical political organization would likely trigger the theoretical mechanisms. Additionally, higher standards for centralization would lead only a handful of groups to be coded as PCS. For example, after stating that "by the standard of political units in precolonial sub-Saharan Africa, Sokoto would rank among the most centralized, stable, and sizable," Kohli (2004, 297) continues: "The political structure of the Sokoto Caliphate was nevertheless rudimentary, especially when compared with other non-Western agrarian monarchies of the period . . . Sokoto attained high levels of neither political stability nor stateness: There was no centralized army; centralized administration was weak, if nonexistent; the quality of rule varied across emirates, as well as over time," among other considerations.

   Although the bar for "some degree of centralization" is low, two types of groups failed this criterion: nomadic and/or pastoralist groups (for example, the Maasai in Kenya), and groups that governed trading centers but without evidence that a central organization existed or exhibited any degree of control, for example, the Bateke in Republic of Congo.

   (c) *One or a small number of political organizations governed a substantial percentage of members of the EPR ethnic group.* The group was ruled by one or a small number of distinct political organizations. This rules out groups fractured into a large number of distinct states, ranging from dozens (e.g., Yoruba in Nigeria) to hundreds (e.g., Bamileke in Nigeria) of separate states.

The easiest cases are ones in which there was only a single state, like the Buganda kingdom for the Baganda in Uganda. However, for the primary PCS measure, a group split into several states could be coded as PCS if there were either a small number of states or if one state was clearly ascendant. For example, Angola's Mbundu-Mestico had two historical states and are coded as PCS. (Table A.2 distinguishes all such cases. Appendix Table D.10 re-runs the results when the only groups coded as PCS meet all the criteria and were governed by a single pre-colonial state.) Tswana in Botswana are also coded as PCS despite being split into eight chiefdoms because Ngwato governed nearly half the Tswana population and the Tswana demonstrated their ability to collectively organize.

Furthermore, in some cases secondary sources highlighted only a single state, but either (1) the secondary sources also indicated considerable diversity in political organization among that ethnic group (e.g., Myene in Gabon) or (2) the EPR politically relevant ethnic group composes more than one ethnic group and the state ruled only one of these groups (e.g., Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga) in Zimbabwe). In such cases, I assessed whether or not the state governed a substantial percentage of the EPR ethnic group, measured by comparing a map of the state to the EPR ethnic group polygon or by examining population estimates. Although there is no bright line for "substantial," in the only three cases for which a state exhibited evidence of centralized institutions but was deemed too small relative to the size of the whole EPR ethnic group to code the group as PCS, rough population estimates suggest less than 20% (Myene in Gabon, Northerners in Malawi, Ovambo in Namibia).

(d) *On the eve of colonization.* Finally, the ethnic group exhibited these characteristics at the onset of European colonization—even if its state had declined from its zenith—under the justification that groups' influence on colonial policies is a key mechanism in the present theory. For example, whereas Malawi's Chewa were organized under the Maravi Confederacy that may have once met the criteria for centralization, it fell in 1720. By the time British colonial rule began in the late 19th century, Chewa were not centralized under either one or several states. In most cases, this criterion implies the state had to exist in the 1880s—when Europe began conquering most of the interior territory of Africa—to count. This is also the time period covered by most of the maps. However, some ethnic groups in Senegal are coded as PCS despite their states falling to France in the 1860s because France began conquering the interior of Senegal prior to the broader "scramble for Africa." Similarly, pre-1880s Portuguese penetration into Angola weakened Mbundu kingdoms, although they still meet the PCS criteria.

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Table A.2: List of PCS Groups

Country	**EPR ethnic group**	**Historical state(s)**
Angola	Mbundu-Mestico*	Kasanje/Matamba
Benin	South/Central (Fon)	Dahomey
Benin	Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun)	Porto Novo
Botswana	Tswana*	Tswana chiefdoms
Burundi	Tutsi	Burundi
Chad	Muslim Sahel groups	Ouaddai
DRC	Luba Kasai	Luba
DRC	Luba Shaba	Luba
DRC	Lunda-Yeke	Lunda
Ethiopia	Amhara	Ethiopia
Ghana	Asante (Akan)	Asante
Guinea	Malinke	Samori
Guinea	Peul	Futa Jalon
Madagascar	Highlanders	Merina
Mali	Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.)	Tukulor
Nigeria	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	Sokoto
Rwanda	Tutsi	Rwanda
Senegal	Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur)*	Bondu/Futa Toro
Senegal	Serer*	Sin/Salum
Senegal	Wolof*	Walo/Kajor/Bawol/Jolof
South Africa	Zulu	Zulu
Sudan	Fur	Darfur
Sudan	Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin and Danagla	Mahdist
Uganda	South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro)*	Ankole/Bunyoro/Toro
Uganda	Baganda	Buganda
Zambia	Bemba speakers*	Kazembe/Bemba
Zambia	Lozi (Barotse)	Lozi
Zimbabwe	Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)	Ndebele

*All groups ruled by more than one pre-colonial state are coded as non-PCS for the alternative PCS coding.

A.2 Country-by-Country Coding Discussions

Country-by-country coding discussions follow. EPR ethnic groups coded as PCS for the primary PCS measure are stated in bold red, and groups that are not coded as PCS for the alternative PCS measure (because there was more than one state) additionally have an asterisk next to their name. When citing *Encyclopaedia Britannica* online (academic edition), I list the specific article from which I drew the information as "EB [title of article]."

A.2.1 Angola

Candidate states from maps: Kasanje, Ovimbundu, Kongo.

- *Kasanje. EPR group: Mbundu-Mestico.* The **Mbundu-Mestico*** belonged to two major states, Kasanje and Matamba (Warner 1991a, 12-13). Imbangala invasions created the Kasanje state, which was populated by Mbundu. "By the time Ndongo was extinguished as an independent state, Kasanje had grown to be one of the most powerful states in West Central Africa" (Birmingham 1966, 126). Furthermore, "Lower-ranking Imbangala officials had no independent authority which might detract from the power concentrated in the position of the single titled king," reflecting the "near-total centralization in the Imbangala *kilombo*" (Miller 1976, 236, 268). The "Imbangala kingdom of Kasanje . . . flourished in northwestern Angola between ca. 1620 and 1912" (Miller 1979, 51), although earlier Portuguese incursions weakened the kingdom throughout the nineteenth century (NB: Portugal began colonizing Angola much earlier than most European colonies in Africa, 1750 by Ertan et al.'s (2016) list of European colonial onsets). The sister of a monarch from the older Mbundu state of Ndongo founded the Matamba state. The kingdom lasted throughout the 19th century, although its once-peaceful relations with Portugal became increasingly hostile as they encroached on Matamba territory, and was destroyed by a Portuguese expedition in 1909 (EB Matamba).
- *Ovimbundu. EPR group: Ovimbundu-Ovambo.* There were 22 distinct Ovimbundu states that "were not politically unified" (Heywood 2000, 1-2). They even faced difficulties projecting power within their own domain: "The legacy of the Imbangala mentality of pillage, the history of incessant warfare between the states, the [low] population density, the persistence of local identities, and the almost total absence of state bureaucracies also limited the power that Ovimbundu rulers exercised" (4).
- *Kongo. EPR group: Bakongo.* The Kongo Kingdom disintegrated in the 17th century, leaving the Bakongo politically fractured on the eve of colonization. "Their former political unity long broken, the various segments of the ethnolinguistic category [of Bakongo] in Angola experienced quite different influences in the colonial period" (Warner 1991b, 72).

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A.2.2 Benin

Candidate states from maps: Dahomey, Porto Novo, Borgu.

- *Dahomey. EPR group: South/Central Fon.* The Dahomey state of the **South/Central (Fon)** "was a form of absolute monarchy unique in Africa. The king, surrounded by a magnificent retinue, was the unchallenged pinnacle of a rigidly stratified society of royalty, commoners, and slaves. He governed through a centralized bureaucracy staffed by commoners who could not threaten his authority ... Dahomey was organized for war, not only to expand its boundaries but also to take captives as slaves ... From approximately 1680, a regular census of population was taken as a basis for military conscription" (EB Dahomey).

- *Porto Novo. EPR group: Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun).* Although information about Porto Novo is more scarce, it appears to meet the criteria to code **Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun)** as PCS. The Yoruba kingdom Porto Novo was a distinct kingdom from Dahomey whose capital was the eponymous city on Benin's coast, situating it at the center of the slave trade. Dahomey experienced continual warfare throughout the 19th century with Porto Novo (Decalo 1990, 91), whose native dynasty remained independent during the 19th century (Hargreaves 1963, 54; see also EB Benin). Its king list stretches from 1688 to 1913, when France ended the kingdom (Decalo 1995, 295). Yoruba-Nagot are more populous than Goun (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999), implying that the Yoruba/Nagot's kingdom covered more than half of the amalgamated EPR group "Yoruba/Nagot and Goun." Furthermore, many Goun also lived in Porto Novo and were "strongly affected by Yoruba cultural influences" (Decalo 1995, 189).

- *Borgu. EPR group: Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchma).* Among groups in northern Benin, "No centralized protostates had emerged among the Bariba, Pila Pila, and other groups, though small powerful states existed in Nikki, Kouande, Djougou, Parakou, and Kandi" (Decalo 1990, 92). Parakou was the administrative center, and Nikki was the most important city on the Dahomey side of the border of the former Borgu state of the Bariba people that was partitioned between British Nigeria and French Dahomey. Borgu, however, did not even rule over all the Bariba and was tributary: "During the pre-colonial era the population was organized into several quasi-feudal semi-autonomous states hierarchically linked and owing traditional allegiance to that of Bussa in Nigeria" (Decalo 1995, 95).

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A.2.3 Botswana

Candidate states from maps: Tswana.

- *Tswana. EPR group: Tswana.* Coding the **Tswana*** as PCS is a borderline coding decision because Tswana were fractured. There were eight main separate Tswana tribes, with the following population breakdowns calculated using population data from each of their native reserve territory in 1936: Ngwato (47%), Tawana (19%), Kwena (12%), Ngwaketse (11%), Kgatla (6%), Malete (3%), Rolong (1%), and Tlokwa (1%) (Schapera 1955, 2). Each tribe "manages its own affairs under the direction of a chief (*kgosi, morena*), who is independent of the rest" (Schapera 1940, 56). However, the chiefdoms achieved centralized political institutions. Lange (2009, 142) describes their political organization as "centralized chiefdoms" in which "the chieftaincy was a powerful position, having executive, judicial, and legislative power as well as a high level of discretion over chiefdom lands and cattle." Furthermore, the Tswana as a whole demonstrated some cohesion by collectively fighting against South African Boers and, under the leadership of the predominant chief, Khama III of the Ngwato, requested British protection in the 1870s (144).

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A.2.4 Burundi

Candidate states from maps: Rundi.

- *Rundi. EPR group: Tutsi.* The Rundi **Tutsi** state lasted from the late 16th century until the end of colonial rule. The state incorporated all the regions that eventually composed modern Burundi during the reign of Ntare Rugamba between 1796 and 1850 (Newbury 2001, 265-6). Although political conflict among Ntare Rugama's sons decreased the extent of centralized rule relative to the neighboring Rwandan state, politics were centered around the state. "This was political struggle, not anarchy: Baganwa often fought over recognized positions, including that of kingship itself—the control of royal rituals ...kingship in Burundi was in many cases not strong enough to suppress political conflict; nonetheless, it was often central to political struggle in Burundi and influential in the forms those struggles assumed" (285).

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A.2.5 Cameroon

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: Kotoko, Bamum.

- *Kotoko. EPR group: Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples).* Kotoko was not an independent state, and was instead incorporated into Borno, whose capital was in Nigeria (DeLancey and DeLancey 2000, 118). The secondary sources consulted also mention that Kotoko was part of a broader grouping of political entities in northern Cameroon. Germany (Cameroon), Britain (Nigeria), and France (Chad) partitioned the former states of Adamawa, Borno, and Mandara, all of which occupied territory in northern Cameroon (Barkindo 1985, 29). The imperial capitals of the Adamawa emirate of the Sokoto empire (EB Adamawa) and Borno were located in Nigeria. Mandara, located in the polygon of the EPR group "Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders)" in Cameroon, had become a weak tributary state by the onset of colonization. After reaching its zenith in the late 18th century, "The beginning of the nineteenth century, however, saw Mandara at the nadir of its fortunes when the *Jihad* of Modibbo Adama and the creation of the Emirate of Fombina (Adamawa) detached much of its territory and forced the Sultan to seek the aid of Borno" (Barkindo 1985, 31). The kingdom was located in the Mandara mountains, and EB's entry for "Mandara Mountains" mentions peoples "living in dispersed homesteads or villages of small, circular huts" and nothing about a history of political centralization.
- *Bamum. EPR group: Bamileke.* Farther south, "The Fulani expansion [NB: the Fulani are widespread across western Africa and controlled states such as Sokoto and Adamawa] reached its southernmost point with the conquest of Bamum, a state founded in the 17th century by Nshare, the son of a Tikar chief. Bamoum was one of the largest of numerous states that emerged in the grassland areas of Cameroon at that time" (EB Cameroon). The historical capital of the Bamum, Foumban, is located in EPR's Bamileke polygon. However, the Bamileke were politically fractured: "Bamileke is a collective term referring to a loose aggregation of some 100 states or chiefdoms of the eastern Grassfields in the western province of Cameroon ... [a] history of shifting borders, alliances, and the influx of refugees from neighboring states makes each Bamileke state a political composite of diverse peoples owing allegiance to the king and the established royal institutions. During the precolonial era, the Bamileke fought wars among their constituent states as well as with the neighboring Nso and Bamoun" (La Famille Bamileke 2016; see also Firmin-Sellers 2001).

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A.2.6 Central African Republic

Candidate states from maps: Bobangi.

- *Bobangi. EPR group: Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.).* The Bobangi were among the riverine peoples that escaped enslavement, and settled on and monopolized trade along the Oubangui river for two centuries prior to French colonization (Decalo 1998, 191; Kalck 2004, 26), but the sources do not suggest this trading center developed centralized institutions across Central African Republic's various riverine groups (more on this below).

Candidate states from EB: Dar al-Kuti, Zande, Bandi.

- *Preface for the remaining candidate states.* In Central African Republic: "Many of the ethnic groups in the region were organized in the precolonial era into small sultanates, but all were of minor geographical scope and little political and military weight" (Decalo 1998, 191). In the broader region of central Africa: "In the forests of Gabon and Middle Congo and the savannas of Oubangui-Chari and southern Chad, were small tribal groups whose traditional social organization had in many cases been upset by migrations and invasions coincident with the spread of the coastal slave trade and Muslim slave-raiding in the north" (Ballard 1965, 233-4).
  - *Dar al-Kuti. EPR group: Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula).* Tributary to the Wadai kingdom in Chad (Kalck 1992, 48; Bradshaw and Fandos Rius 2007).
  - *Zande and Bandi. EPR group: Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.).* Two Bandi (also spelled Bandia) sultanates existed on the rivers that compose Central African Republic's southern border: Bangassou and Rafai (Kalck 1992, 16), which correspond with their eponymous modern towns. The Zande (also called Azande) people divided between Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan also carved out small but fractured states: "During their conquests, scions of the royal clan carved out kingdoms for themselves, and wars between these various kingdoms were frequent" (EB Zande). The evidence for Bobangi, Zande, and Bandi is consistent with Decalo's (1998, 191) argument that riverine peoples in Central African Republic were fractured among many small sultanates.

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A.2.7 Chad

Candidate states from maps: Ouaddai, Bagirmi, Bornu.

- *Historical background on these states.* These are the three traditional states in Chad according to the literature: Ouaddai (also spelled "Wadai"), Bagirmi, and Bornu (also referred to as Kanem-Bornu; Bornu broke off the former Kanem empire before subsequently conquering Kanem). These states created a wide gulf between themselves and neighboring stateless societies. "The nearly stateless societies of the South, smaller and less well armed, could not simply be absorbed by the great states of the Sahel that emerged at various points in the thousand years preceding colonization. One principal reason was that they served as hunting grounds for slaves, a role they could not fulfill if, by incorporation into the Sahelian states of Ouaddai, Baruirmi, and Kanem, they became a part of Dar-el-Islam" (Nolutshungu 1996, 27-8). Similarly, Decalo (1980, 28-9) argues "the recorded history of the country is very much the story of the tug-of-war between the Muslim slave-states of the Sahel (Baguirmi, Ouadai, and Kanem-Bornu) and their deep razzias in the animist and disorganised Sara south."
- *Ouaddai. EPR group: Muslim Sahelian groups.* Ouaddai "developed an elaborate hierarchical structure with a powerful absolute monarchy" (Decalo 1997, 326). The **Muslim Sahelian group** Maba founded the Ouaddai state (Decalo 1997, xxv, 276), which included most of the territory spanned by the EPR Muslim Sahelian groups' group-location polygon. After 1982 in the EPR dataset, Muslim Sahelian groups split into Hadjerai and Zaghawa/Bideyat, and both are coded as PCS groups.
- *Bornu. EPR group: none.* The capital of Bornu is in Nigeria.
- *Bagirmi. EPR group: none.* Bagirmi was not independent in the 19th century, and instead was "under nearly continuous military pressure from—and [was] frequently tributary to—both the Kanem-Bornu Empire and the Ouadai state" (Decalo 1997, 78).

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A.2.8 Congo, Democratic Republic

Candidate states from maps: Luba, Lunda, Kuba, and Azande.

- *Luba. EPR groups: Luba Kasai and Luba Shaba.* The Luba were organized into a large state in which "the king retained a great deal of power over appointments and tribute" over the empire's provinces (Bobb 1999, 261). EB "Luba-Lunda states" refers to the Luba state as centralized and describes its expansion. This state corresponds with **Luba Kasai** and **Luba Shaba**, which renowned historian Jan Vansina also identifies as two of the major Luba clusters (Bobb 1999, 261).
- *Lunda. EPR group: Lunda-Yeke.* The Lunda organized a large state that "consisted of a centralized core, a ring of provinces closely tied to the capital, an outer ring of provinces that paid tribute but were otherwise autonomous, and a fringe of independent states that shared a common Lunda culture" (EB Lunda Empire). EB "Luba-Lunda states" refers to the Lunda state as centralized and describes its expansion. This state corresponds with **Lunda-Yeke**.
- *Kuba. EPR group: none.* Kuba does not correspond with any EPR ethnic groups. Comparing a map of the Kuba state (Vansina 1978, 8) with GeoEPR polygons, eastern parts of Kuba overlap with western

parts of the GeoEPR polygon for Lulua. However, the Lulua were not ruled as part of Kuba: "In the 19th century, rebellions in the east and Lulua invasions in the south weakened Kuba to the point of civil war" (EB Kuba).

- *Azande. EPR group: Azande.* EPR codes Azande as politically irrelevant.

References

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A.2.9 Congo, Republic

Candidate states from maps: Teke.

- *Teke. EPR group: Bateke.* The kingdom of Teke (also called the Tio kingdom or the kingdom of Anziku) was a trading center. "The political structure was unique. A state without a central army or a unified set of courts, central councils, central administration, delegation of authority from top down, where at least two ideologies competed (kingship based on *nkira* and lordship on *nkobi*), where rule at each level was most reminiscent of leadership in a kinship unit. The state did not even present a unified policy towards the outside, e.g. towards the Europeans" (Vansina 1973, 431-2). The "sub-chiefdoms nominally ruled in the name of the Makoko who retained the prerogative of appointing them [but] were virtually autonomous" (Decalo et al. 1996, 48). Instead, the capital Mbe served as the trading center of the Pool region, which was an "economic and trade hub" (48).

Candidate states from EB: Loango, Kongo.

- *Loango. EPR group: Vili.* This was an ancient kingdom of the Vili people. However, "By the 18th century, power had become fragmented. A long interregnum began in 1786, and when a king was finally enthroned he lacked any real authority" (EB "Kingdom of Loango"). Martin (1972, 158-174) provides additional details on the "dismemberment of the old Vili kingdom" (174) and offers concurring summarizing statements such as: "The fragmented scene of 1870 was a far cry from the powerful, unified kingdom described by European traders in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries" (158).
- *Kongo. EPR group: Bakongo.* The capital of the Kongo kingdom was in Angola (also see Angola's Kongo entry).
- *Final note.* Coding no PCS groups in Congo is consistent with the general contention that "in the forests of Gabon and Middle Congo and the savannas of Oubangui-Chari and southern Chad, were small tribal groups whose traditional social organization had in many cases been upset by migrations and invasions coincident with the spread of the coastal slave trade and Muslim slave-raiding in the north" (Ballard 1965, 233-4).

References

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A.2.10 Cote d'Ivoire

Candidate states from maps: Kong.

- *Kong. EPR group: Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur).* Kong was a trading center that briefly expanded in the mid-18th century (Saul 1998, 549-50) but "was unstable and failed to endure as a centralized state" (Perinbam 1988, 453). Its capital, Kong, corresponds with the EPR polygon for "Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)." Until defeat by Samori at the end of the 19th century, Kong served as the core of a decentralized trading empire that featured alliances by independent states and houses (Perinbam 1988, 455; Saul 1998, 564). Mundt (1995) refers to Kong specifically as a "trading center" (119) and Oliver and Atmore (2005, 70) label Kong as tributary to Asante.

Candidate states from EB Cote d'Ivoire: several small eastern states.

- *Small eastern states. EPR group: Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur).* EB Cote d'Ivoire mentions small eastern states of Gyaman, Ndenye, Sanwi, and Baule that were related to the Asante empire in contemporary Ghana either because they were formed by migrants from Asante or because the states were tributaries to Asante (Mundt 1995 explicitly states that the two main ones, Gyaman and Sanwi, were tributaries). EB also mentions Bouna, which was founded by Dagomba migrants from contemporary Ghana (Mundt 1995, 44-5). None of the states were large and therefore did not govern a sizable portion of Cote d'Ivoire's northern ethnic groups. For example, Boone (2003, 232) estimates Sanwi's population at 40,000 in 1956. Combining Maddison's (2010) population estimate for Cote d'Ivoire in 1956 with EPR's figure for "Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)" as a percentage of the country's total population yields an estimate that Sanwi composed less than 4% of this ethnic group's population, consistent with the claim of this group being fractured among numerous small kingdoms and other types of polities. Boone (2003, 181-2) cites different historical sources claiming "the absence of an Ashanti-type [as in Ghana] federal monarchy with a supreme chief anywhere in the Ivory Coast" and "at the time of colonial contact, 'there were no large-scale political entities in the Ivory Coast . . . comparable with the Ashanti in Ghana, Mossi in Upper Volta, or with the resurgent Muslim states of Mali and Senegal."'

References

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A.2.11 Djibouti

Candidate states from maps: none. EB does not have a section on pre-colonial Djibouti (which perhaps reflects the lack of pre-colonial statehood). Examining Alwan and Mibrathu's (2000) entries for Djibouti's two EPR ethnic groups, Afar and Somali (specifically, the Issa clan), do not indicate any pre-colonial states.

References

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A.2.12 Eritrea

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: none.

A.2.13 Ethiopia

Candidate states from maps: Ethiopia and Oromo.

- *Ethiopia. EPR group: Amhara.* After Ethiopia declined in power and territorial scope in the 17th and 18th centuries, "the second half of the nineteenth century, by contrast, saw a still sharper swing in the opposite direction. The fragmented polity was pulled together, its territory was more than doubled, and its independence was assured in the face of European invasion" (Clapham 1977, 37-8). The monarch personally commanded the state's army, and the government extracted regular taxes from its regions (44). The **Amhara** controlled the monarchy.
- *Oromo. EPR group: Oroma.* Reid's (2012) map includes the Oromo. However, the Oromo belonged to "political organisations without kings" and whose " 'non-state' system [was] characterized by pastoral militarism" (Reid 2012, 68; see also EB Oromo).

References

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A.2.14 Gabon

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB Gabon: Orungu.

- *Orungu. EPR group: Myene.* Orungu is one of the six Myene clans that are "linked by language though historically fractured into tiny entities" (Decalo 1998, 117). Although its kings "grew rich and powerful from taxing and regulating the slave trade" in the first half of the 19th century, they numbered only 5,000 (Gardinier and Yates 2006, 251; Decalo 1998, 118) and did not compose a large enough percentage of the Myene to code the EPR ethnic group Myene as a whole as PCS. Dividing 5,000 by Rich's (2010, 208) estimate that "perhaps 30,000 or so belonged to Omyènè-speaking clans, although the lack of firm statistics makes this only a rough estimate" yields 17%. Furthermore, the Orungu's centralized structures distinguished them from other Myene groups (Gardinier 1983, 501; Bucher 1975, 544). This coding supports the general contention that, "in the forests of Gabon and Middle Congo and the savannas of Oubangui-Chari and southern Chad, were small tribal groups whose traditional social organization had in many cases been upset by migrations and invasions coincident with the spread of the coastal slave trade and Muslim slave-raiding in the north" (Ballard 1965, 233-4).

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A.2.15 Gambia

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: Malinke.

- *Malinke. EPR group: Mandinka.* Malinke states were tiny and highly fractured. Hughes and Gailey (1990, 102) refer to "states," but then proceed to list 15 separate Malinke states along the Gambia river.

References

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A.2.16 Ghana

Candidate states from maps: Asante and Fante.

- *Asante. EPR group: Asante (Akan).* In the Asante empire of the **Asante (Akan)**, central political power was organized around a monarch that presided over a standing army and bureaucracy (EB Asante Empire; Apter 1972, 23) and was "one of the most highly organized military and political systems on the west coast of Africa" (Apter 1972, 25).
- *Fante. EPR group: Other Akans.* Although the coastal Akan group Fante created states, their various chiefdoms/states were autonomous from each other—and at times subordinate to Asante—and only occasionally banded together, when threatened (Owusu-Ansah 2005, 119-20). "Among the Fanti and other coastal states we find an almost endless process of fragmentation of authority. For instance, the people now know as the Fantis are in fact a surprisingly large number of sovereign and independent states" (Agbodeka 1964, 85).

References

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A.2.17 Guinea

Candidate states from maps: Futa Jalon and Samori's empire.

- *Futa Jalon. EPR group: Peul.* Futa Jalon emerged as part of the wider West African Fula jihads in the early 18th century and survived until it was incorporated by France in 1896 (Oliver and Atmore 2005, 64; EB Fouta Djallon). This "centralized state" of the **Peul** "maintained a dominant position in the area through independence in 1958" (O'Toole 2005, 96) and collected tribute from the villages and administered a legal system (Cowan 1962, 150).
- *Samori's empire. EPR group: Malinke.* The **Malinke** warlord Samori Toure conquered territory and created an independent state in modern-day Guinea in the late 19th century (O'Toole 2005, 161). He was "an able administrator. He divided his empire into provinces and cantons; each was ruled by one of his faithful appointed representatives" (Cowan 1962, 151). Boone (2003, 247-8) refers to Samori as "an ambitious centralizer and state builder."

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A.2.18 Guinea-Bissau

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: Kaabu.

- *Kaabu. EPR group: none.* The Kaabu state was centered in Guinea-Bissau and extended into Senegal. It was a Mandinka state that originally broke away from the Mali Empire and lasted in some form until being destroyed by Futa Jalon in 1867 (Lobban and Mendy 1997, 219). However, EPR does not code Mandinka as a politically relevant ethnic group in Guinea-Bissau. Lobban and Mendy's (1997) map of Kaabu shows the state was located in the northeast part of the modern country, where EPR does not map any politically relevant ethnic groups.

References

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A.2.19 Kenya

Candidate states from maps: Maasai.

- *Massai. EPR group: Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu.* The Maasai were a nomadic warrior group (EB Maasai).

Candidate states from EB Kenya: none.

Final note. Decalo's (1998, 177, 179) description coincides with absence of ethnic groups coded as PCS: "A distinctive feature of Kenya's peoples is the absence of strong chiefs, internal unity or historic states ... Unlike neighboring Uganda, Kenya did not emerge at independence with kings and chiefs and primordial mass allegiances" (Decalo 1998, 177, 179).

References

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A.2.20 Liberia

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB Liberia: none.

A.2.21 Madagascar

Candidate states from maps: Merina.

- *Merina. EPR group: Highlanders.* The Merina created a state whose army was equipped with firearms (Oliver and Atmore 2005, 101) that "had nearly completed the unification of Madagascar into a single, centralized state" (EB Merina) at the onset of colonization. During this process they displaced many

older states on the island, as shown in Ajayi and Crowder's (1985) map of changes over time of states in Madagascar. The Merina are the **Highlanders**, who were distinguished from the non-centralized coastal Cotiers, the other EPR ethnic group in Madagascar (Schraeder 1995).

References

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A.2.22 Malawi

Candidate states from maps: Jumbe, Ngoni, Yao.

- *Jumbe. EPR group: none.* Jumbe was the chief of Nkhotakota, a group of villages that served as a depot for Swahili-Arab slave and ivory trading (Decalo 1997, 55; EB Nkhotakota). Nkhotakota corresponds with the EPR polygon for Chewa (Central), but there is no apparent connection between Jumbe and the Chewa ethnic group.
- *Ngoni. EPR group: none.* EPR does not code Ngoni as politically relevant. The scattered Ngoni settlements depicted in Ajayi and Crowder's (1985) map correspond with EPR's Chewa polygon, discussed below.
- *Yao. EPR group: Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao).* "The Yao were never united but lived as small groups ruled by chiefs who were predominantly military and commercial leaders" (EB Yao).

Candidate states from EB: Maravi Confederacy, Ngonde.

- *Chewa. EPR group: Chewa (Central).* The Chewa are descendants of the former Maravi Confederacy. This state had disintegrated by 1720 (EB Maravi Confederacy) and the Chewa did not subsequently achieve centralized political organization. "Peaceful farmers, the Chewa lived in decentralized federations of chiefdoms that in the 19th century fell to aggressive new arrivals—the Ngoni from the southwest, and Yao and Swahili slavers from the east" (Decalo 1998, 52).
- *Ngonde. EPR group: Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde).* The Ngonde created a state with central institutions: "though the Ngonde state was atypical in the Malawi-Tanginyika corridor, it had many similarities with some of the Luba states in modern Zaire and with most of the interlacustrine states of East Africa. That of Ungonde was smaller in size compared to these, neither was its bureaucracy developed to the same extent as these or even some West African states such as Oyo or Asante" (Kalinga 1979, 2). However, Ngonde compose too small a percentage of the EPR group "Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde)" to code that EPR group as PCS, considering that Tumbuka and Tonga were not centrally organized (see EB Tumbuka, EB Tonga, and Decalo 1998, 53-4). Ethnologue provides recent estimates of 300,000 Nyakyusa-Ngonde, 2,200,000 Tumbuka, and 170,000 Tonga speakers in Malawi, putting Ngonde at 11% of these three groups.

References

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A.2.23 Mali

Candidate states from maps: Tukulor.

- *Tukulor. EPR group: Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.).* The Tukulor empire stretched across most of territory where **Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.)** reside. This state conquered the Bambara (Mande) states of Segu and Kaarta and the Fulani state of Masina and lasted from 1850 until defeat by France (EB Tukulor empire, Oliver and Atmore 2005, 68). Warner (1999, 241) summarizes historians who argue the Tukulor empire "was the largest and most powerful state in Western Sudan . . . Its political system resembled a nascent state; due to the great size of the empire and the difficulties of communication, administration was decentralized but not absent: local power was held by emirs (either religious leaders or military commanders) who were 'vested with wide powers to rule the territories under them as long as they recognized the Shaikh's sovereign powers.' The government was financed by tribute from conquered polities and from foreign trade, predominantly France." It also had a large standing army and levied taxes as prescribed by the Koran (Kanya-Forstner 1971, 56-7).

References

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A.2.24 Mauritania

Candidate states from maps: Aderer.

- *Aderer*. "The population of the Adrar (Berber for "mountain") formerly was nomadic" (EB Adrar).

Candidate states from EB Mauritania: Trarza and Brakna.

- *Trarza and Brakna*. There is no evidence of centralized organization within these emirates. "At the time of the French conquest, the tribe was the basic socio-political unit at the local level . . . most Saharan tribes have historically formed independent desert confederacies known as emirates or have been loosely linked to regional state and multi-ethnic empires. They all tended to share a common culture, language, and history. Mauretania was no exception. It was ruled after the eighth century by

various emirs whose capital shifted from Adrar to Trarza" (Bennoune 1977, 4). The emirates ruled over nomadic or semi-nomadic populations (Eagleton 1965, 47, 49; Taylor 1995).

References

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A.2.25 Mozambique

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB Mozambique: Gaza.

- *Gaza. EPR group: none.* Ngoni migrants that originated from outside Mozambique founded Gaza in the 1830s (Omer-Cooper 1977, 349-50). EPR does not code Ngoni as a politically relevant ethnic group in Mozambique. The location of the Gaza state near Mozambique's modern-day capital Maputo is located in EPR's polygon for Tsonga-Chopi, who are distinct ethnic groups from Ngoni and were not centrally organized: "The Tsonga were formerly organized as independent peoples, each occupying its own territory and named for a powerful, dominant patrilineage. Early in the 19th century, however, they were conquered by other Nguni-speaking peoples" (EB Tsonga).

References

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A.2.26 Namibia

Candidate states from maps: Herero and Nama.

- *Herero. EPR group: Herero, Mbanderu.* The Herero "were originally divided into autonomous political units under local headmen" (EB Herero). Grotpeter (1994) does not mention anything about centralized states in his "Herero" entry.
- *Nama. EPR group: Nama.* "The Nama were formerly reasonably prosperous sheep or cattle pastoralists" (EB Nama). Grotpeter (1994) does not mention anything about centralized states in his "Nama" entry.

Candidate states from EB Namibia: Ovambo.

- *Ovambo. EPR group: Ovambo.* According to EB Namibia, "In the north the Ovambo people developed several states on both sides of the Kunene River," which separates Namibia from Angola. However, like their fractured northern Angolan neighbors Ovimbundu-Ovambo—also not coded as PCS—the Ovambo in Namibia "had no single political authority, but several small states emerged in the 19th century" (Historical Dictionary of Pre-Colonial Africa, 337). One of the states, Ondonga, exhibited evidence of central institutions (Eirola 1992, 45), but it only composed between 10% to 25% of Ovamboland on the eve of colonization (31).

References

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A.2.27 Niger

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: Takedda, Agadez, Bornu, Songhai empire, Fulani jihad states

- *Takedda and Agadez. EPR group: Tuareg.* Both states were controlled by the nomadic Tuareg in the north (Decalo 1990, 245; EB Niger; EB Tuareg).
- *Preface for remaining candidate states*. Referring to the sedentary ethnic groups in the south, "At the time of the colonial conquest, the disparate regions the French molded into an entity known as Niger may be best described as an assemblage of peripheral borderlands" (EB Niger). The following candidates are characterized as contributing refugees to Niger rather than to being native Nigerien states, but are examined for thoroughness.
  - *Bornu. EPR group: Kanouri.* The Kanouri compose "remnants of Bornuan outposts from the days when Bornu controlled one-third of contemporary Niger" (Decalo 1990, 245). The capital of Bornu is in present-day Nigeria.
  - *Fulani jihad states and Hausaland. EPR groups: Peul, Hausa.* EPR codes Niger's Fulani as politically irrelevant. Notably, Niger's Fulani are distinguished from Nigeria's Fulani (who controlled the Sokoto Caliphate) because Britain and France purposely drew the northern border of Nigeria to correspond with the upper boundary of the Sokoto Caliphate (Touval 1966, 289), which is located in Nigeria. Regarding Hausa, most earlier Hausa states were destroyed during the Fulani jihads that created states such as Sokoto in Nigeria. Newer Hausa states that reestablished themselves beyond Fulani control "were hardly free and independent, however, but rather subject to another power; in the case of Maradi and Zango, to Damagaram (Zinder), which was in turn a vassal to Borno" (Miles 1994, 65).
  - *Dendi. EPR group: Djerma-Songhai.* Songhai are concentrated in the Dendi province of the ancient Songhai Empire. Although the lineage of the Songhai dynasty escaped to Dendi after the empire fell, it "was unable to regain the core of the empire that fell in due course to Tuareg arms. Dendi itself disintegrated into five or six mini-kingdoms . . . In the nineteenth century the area came under intense Tuareg military pressure, later also from the Fulani and lost much of its autonomy to one or the other of the two" (Decalo 1990, 244).

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A.2.28 Nigeria

Candidate states from maps: Sokoto, Bornu, Benin, Yoruba states.

- *Sokoto. EPR group: Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt.* The Sokoto caliphate was controlled by and covered the territory occupied by **Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt**. "By the standard of political units in precolonial sub-Saharan Africa, Sokoto would rank among the most centralized, stable, and sizable. The rulers of the caliphate exercised some semblance of control over large parts of what is now northern Nigeria, with political units sharing a common religion, Islam. Over time, norms and practices developed to govern the relationship between the caliphs and the emirs, the underlings who exercised actual power over smaller territories. Political organization was inspired by the more complex political units of northern Africa, and written language was used to maintain records. The resulting political stability allowed for economic expansion, including the production of some luxury goods for export across the Sahara to North Africa" (Kohli 2004, 297).
- *Bornu. EPR group: none.* Bornu broke off from the ancient Kanem empire in the 14th century and later recaptured Kanem as a protectorate. Despite turmoil in the 19th century, it lasted until Sudanese slaver Rabih az-Zubayr defeated the state in 1893 (EB Bornu). Maps show that this state existed in the northeast corner of Nigeria, which does not correspond to an EPR ethnic group polygon (there is some intersection with the Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt EPR ethnic group polygon, but the Sokoto Caliphate covers almost that entire EPR group).
- *Benin. EPR group: none.* Benin was the historical state of the Edo people, and it lasted until Britain destroyed the capital in 1897 (EB Benin). However, Edo do not correspond with any ethnic group in the EPR dataset, and the capital of the Benin Empire, Edo (now called Benin city), is not located within the polygon of any EPR ethnic groups in Nigeria.
- *Yoruba states. EPR group: Yoruba.* The Yoruba were fractured into "some two dozen more or less autonomous political collectivities of varying sizes" (Kohli 2004, 293). The most powerful Yoruba state, Oyo, fell in the early 19th century to Fulani jihadists (EB Oyo empire), which preceded constant warfare among the Yoruba states (Kohli 2004, 295). Sklar and Whitaker (1966, 16) contrast pre-colonial states in Nigeria. "The political systems of Benin and Hausaland rest primarily on principles of stratification. Among both peoples the idea of a centralized state is well established." By contrast, "The traditional systems of both the Yoruba and Ibo nationalities rest primarily on principles of segmentation."

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A.2.29 Rwanda

Candidate states from maps: Rwanda.

- *Rwanda. EPR group: Tutsi.* The Rwanda **Tutsi** empire lasted from the 15th or 16th century until the end of colonial rule (EB Rwanda). "By the end of the nineteenth century the Rwandese polity had achieved a remarkable degree of centralization" through the "twin processes of territorial expansion and consolidation" facilitated by "a strongly centralized state system—of a reliable corps of centrally appointed chiefs and an efficient military organization—[that] replace[d] the more or less autonomous kinship and clan structures on which the monarchy had initially relied to establish its rule" (Lemarchand 1977, 72). Tutsis monopolized power in the monarchy and dominated the more numerous Hutu (Lemarchand 1977, 68).

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A.2.30 Senegal

Candidate states from maps: several traditional monarchies and jihad states.

- The once-powerful Jolof Empire collapsed in the 16th century and broke into constituent **Wolof*** states of Walo, Kajor, Bawol, Jolof, and **Serer*** states of Sin and Salum (Clark and Phillips 1994, 278).
- Two of the earliest Fulani jihads occurred in Senegal (EB Western Africa), establishing the **Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur)*** states of Bondu and Futa Toro.
- Evidence of centralization for both: "In terms of both military strength and economic resources, the strongest states were on the river banks and fertile plains between the Senegal and Gambia Rivers; in estimated ranked order, beginning with most powerful, these were: Kajoor, Saalum, Futa Toro, and, until its decline at the turn of the nineteenth century, Waalo. Population density and agricultural productivity were greater on these plains than in the Sahel and desert north of the Senegal, in the rain forest south of the Gambia, or on the highlands of the upper rivers area. Military power depended on infantry and cavalry armed with lances, spears, and muzzle-loading muskets, all of which could be acquired more readily by the plains states than by their neighbors" (Colvin 1977, 30-31).

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A.2.31 Sierra Leone

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB Sierra Leone: none.

A.2.32 South Africa

Candidate states from maps: Zulu.

- *Zulu. EPR group: Zulu.* "By the 1820s, a powerful **Zulu** state, one of the most dominant polities in southern Africa, had emerged under the control of Shaka . . . He built a militarized, centralized state in this region, a core state surrounded by vassal communities in varying degrees of subordination who paid him tribute" (Saunders and Southey 2000, 286-7).

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A.2.33 Sudan

Candidate states from maps: Funj sultanate, Mahdist state, Fur.

- *Funj sultanate and Mahdist state. EPR group: Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin, and Danagla (Arab).* States that perpetuated Sudan's long history of statehood along the Nile include the Funj Sultanate of Sinnar (1504-1821) and the Mahdist State (1881-1898), separated by a period of Egyptian colonial rule known as the Turkiyah. The capitals of Funj (Sinnar), Turkiyah (Khartoum), and Mahdist (Omdurman) were each located within territory inhabited by **Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin, and Danagla (Arab)**, also known as riverain Northern Sudanese (O'Fahey 1996, 259) or Arabized Nubians (Collins 2008, 4). "The riverain Sudanese are overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking (with the exception of some Nubians), wholly Muslim and to a greater or lesser degree identify themselves genealogically and culturally as Arab" (O'Fahey 1996, 259). Shaygiyya played a key role during the Turkiyah (Collins 2008, 11-12) and Ja'aliyyin did in the Mahdist state (Collins 2008, 22, 24, 29; O'Fahey 1996, 260), each of which exercised their greatest power along the Nile (Collins 2008, 14, 20, 31). Regarding central institutions, "The Khalifa [ruler from 1885 through 1898 after the Mahdi's death] had transformed the theocracy of the Mahdi into an Islamic state with a centralized administration under his personal rule supported by a bureaucracy" (Collins 2008, 31).
- *Fur. EPR group: Fur.* The **Fur** created a polity in which "the sultan exerted absolute authority . . . a centralized bureaucracy developed to aid the sultan with a *vizir*, council of state, system of taxation, and regulation of foreign affairs" (Lobban et al. 2002, 105).

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A.2.34 Togo

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: none.

Final note. "Until 1884 Togoland was an indeterminate buffer zone between the warring states of Asante and Dahomey" (EB Togo). Decalo (1990, 207-8) provides additional details on the decentralized polities of pre-colonial Togo.

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A.2.35 Uganda

Candidate states from maps: Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, and Toro.

- *Buganda. EPR group: Baganda.* The state of the **Baganda** "was founded in the late 14th century, when the kabaka, or ruler, of the Ganda people came to exercise strong centralized control over his domains, called Buganda. By the 19th century Buganda had become the largest and most powerful state in the region. The local chiefs of conquered areas ruled as personal appointees of the kabaka, who had a sizable army at his disposal" (Ingham 1958, 17).
- *Bunyoro, Ankole, and Toro. EPR group: South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro).* Regarding **South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro)***, "Bunyoro's sphere of influence was even more far-flung [compared to Buganda]: the Mukama (king) ruled through appointees who were kept loyal through family and clan ties, and by being required to return annually to the Mukama with their royal insignia" (Pirouet 1995, 7). Similarly, "The Nkole maintained a centralized state, headed by the mugabe (king)" (EB Ankole; see also Doornboos 1977) and Toro, which seceded from Bunyoro in 1830, also achieved "centralized political organization" (EB Toro) although "appears to have [been] a principality rather than a fully independent state" (Pirouet 1995, 77). Ankole compose 8% of the country's population, Banyoro 2.4%, and Toro 3.2% (Fearon 2003), and therefore the two that unambiguously qualify as states compose more than half of the population of the EPR ethnic group.
- *Final note on regional trends.* "A chain of new polities was emerging in the lacustrine region in the course of the sixteenth century—including Bunyoro, Buganda, Toro, Nkore, Rwanda, and Burundi—which had in common hierarchical systems, centralised kingship with important symbolic and ritual functions, and provincial governorships responsible for military mobilisation and resource extraction. They arose in one of the most fertile belts in sub-Saharan Africa, characterised by rich volcanic soil and good rainfall, sustaining a denser population than was possible elsewhere; this combination awarded these polities a level of stability and permanence lacking in other areas" (Reid 2012, 66-7). Buganda and Bunyoro receive the most attention in the literature as powerful states.

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A.2.36 Zambia

Candidate states from maps: Barotse and Kazembe.

- *Barotse. EPR group: Lozi (Barotse).* Caplan (1970) describes the "extremely complex structure of this highly centralized state" (2) of the **Lozi (Barotse)** in which "struggles for power were largely concentrated at the capital" (2).
- *Kazembe. EPR group: Bemba speakers.* The Kazembes (kings) controlled a "centralized and ethnically heterogeneous state . . . Many of the Lunda adopted the Bemba language of their conquered subjects . . . During the hundred years from the mid-18th to the mid-19th centuries, the state of Kazembe dominated trade routes and much of the political life from Katanga to at least Lake Bangweulu and actually much of northeastern Zambia" (Simon et al. 2007, 189-90). Separately, the Bemba ethnic group also formed "an extensive and relatively unified political system [distinct from Kazembe], in which a number of chiefs were subordinated to a single paramount" (Roberts 1973, xxvi; see also EB Bemba). Furthermore, "there is no doubt that Chitimukulu was, and is, a 'divine king' in the sense that his office is believed to carry with it supernatural control over the life and welfare of the land and people" (Roberts 1973, xxx). Kazembe and the Bemba composed the two major states in northeastern Zambia (Roberts 1973, xxvi), where the EPR group **Bemba speakers*** reside. Note that the Lunda group explicitly coded by EPR, Luanda (NW Province), is distinct from the Lunda in northeastern Zambia that ruled the Kazembe state.

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A.2.37 Zimbabwe

Candidate states from maps: Ndebele and Shona.

- *Ndebele. EPR group: Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga).* The Ndebele of the EPR group **Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)** established a "highly formalized, pre-industrial, non-monetary, bureaucratic administration" (Chanaiwa 1976, 57). All state revenues—from conquest tribute to foreign trade—went directly to the king, the king directly appointed all administrators, and owned all the land and cattle in the country. The central institution of the Ndebele was its standing conscription army, which the king also controlled directly (Chanaiwa 1976, 57). Using 2010 language population figures from Ethnologue, the Ndebele compose 89% of Ndebele, Kalanga, and Tonga. This figure does not include an estimate for Tonga, which Ethnologue does not provide because the overwhelming majority of Tonga speakers are in Zambia rather than Zimbabwe (also see EB "Tonga (African people)").
- *Shona. EPR group: Shona.* The Shona were not centrally organized: "In the late 17th century the Changamire state rapidly developed into an empire that dominated more of the country than did any other precolonial state system . . . The Rozvi empire, like its predecessor states, was really more a confederation than a centralized polity. It comprised a collection of tribute-paying chiefdoms with their

own dynasties. The tendency toward local autonomy was persistent, and by the late 18th century the 'empire' was disintegrating. The Mfecane invasions of the 1830s accelerated this process. Afterwards there were more than 100 independent Shona chiefdoms, many of which had to struggle for autonomy against the raids and tribute extractions of the newly arrived Ndebele and Gaza [NB: Gaza was in Mozambique] states" (Rubert and Rasmussen 2001, 298).

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B Additional Information on Cases

B.1 Additional References for Cases Mentioned in Text

- Angola: Le Billon (2007, 101-2) for rebel group splits
- Benin: Decalo (1990, 91) for pre-colonial war, Thompson (1963, 169) for indirect rule, Decalo (1973) for decolonization party splits, Hargreaves (1969, 216) for Dahomey leader descending from the former royal house
- Chad: Decalo (1980a, 483) for slave trade, Decalo (1980b, 31) and Nolutshungu (1996, 29) for indirect rule, and Nolutshungu (1996) for decolonization party splits
- Ethiopia: Clapham (1977) for ruling monarchy
- Ghana: Boone (2003, 159) for indirect rule
- Madagascar: Minorities at Risk "Merina" (2006) for slave trade, Thibaut (1999) for decolonization party splits
- Mali: Krings (1995, 58) for slave trade
- Rwanda and Burundi: Young (2006, 309) for indirect rule, Lemarchand (1977a,b) for ruling monarchy
- Sudan: Ofcansky (1992) for slave trade, indirect rule, and decolonization party splits; Sharkey (2008, 29) for durable and divisive identities
- Uganda: Reid (2012, 116) for pre-colonial war, Rothchild and Rogin (1966, 341) for indirect rule
- Zambia: Caplan (1970) for indirect rule
- Zimbabwe: Wilson (1994, 191) for rebel groups splits

B.2 Modal Paths of PCS Countries

Qualitative evidence provides additional support for the plausibility of the proposed theoretical mechanisms. Examining countries individually demonstrates that in 14 of 18 PCS countries, PCS groups dominated the government at or shortly after independence and/or participated in at least one civil war or successful coup between independence and the end of the Cold War era. This evidence shows that ethnic violence occurred in most PCS countries and that, where it occurred, PCS groups frequently were involved. The next section provides process tracing evidence from Uganda and Nigeria to demonstrate additional support for the posited theoretical mechanisms.

All but one PCS country fits into one of four modal paths based on ethnopolitical inclusion patterns and ethnic violence. The present analysis focuses only on events up to 1989 under the premise, discussed in context with Appendix Table D.14, that changes stemming from the end of the Cold War opened new political cleavages in Africa. Cases following the first path correspond most closely with theoretical expectations: a PCS group dominated the government at or shortly after independence. Specifically, a PCS group had achieved either "dominant" or "monopoly" status at the center within five years of independence (according to EPR) in Angola, Burundi, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia (EPR covers non-colonized Ethiopia since 1946, and codes the PCS Amhara group as dominant between 1946 and 1991). In five of the six countries, at least one excluded non-PCS group had initiated a civil war by 1975, and the same occurred in the sixth, Mali,

in 1989. Additionally, in every case except Angola, the dominant PCS group staged a successful coup. In some cases these were strikes against rival ethnic groups, such as a successful coup attempt led primarily by Hausa-Fulani officers in Nigeria in 1966 to reverse a coup led primarily by Igbo officers earlier that year. In other cases, the coups rotated power among members of the PCS group. The theory section discussed how riverine Arabs in Sudan launched numerous coups in reaction to the incumbent's perceived poor handling of ongoing civil wars with non-PCS groups in the south.

The second path features a non-PCS group dominating the government at or shortly after independence. In all four cases, an excluded PCS group participated in a civil war either shortly after independence (Chad, Rwanda, Zimbabwe) or after further ethnic narrowing at the center (Uganda). The theory correctly anticipates ethnic violence in these PCS countries—specifically, that PCS groups often rebel against the government when excluded—although these cases go against the trend of PCS groups controlling the government. (Although Zimbabwe's Shona did not achieve "dominant" status until 20 years after independence in 1980, between 1982 and 1987 they shared power only with Europeans, i.e., were dominant among all African groups.)

The third path features ethnopolitical inclusion and in-fighting at the center. The theory correctly anticipates the coups that occurred in these PCS countries (Benin, Ghana, Madagascar), although it cannot explain why leaders did not resort to ethnopolitical exclusion to prevent future coups. Once again, PCS groups either participated in or were central to the violence that occurred. In Benin, two of the three groups that rotated into and out of power via a series of coups in the 1960s were PCS, Fon and Yoruba/Nagot and Goun, as Decalo (1990) discusses. In Ghana, the leader of the country's first coup in 1966 explicitly denounced president Kwame Nkrumah's attempts to undermine traditional Asante (PCS) organizations (Owusu 1989, 381)—a rivalry that began during the colonial era after Nkrumah attempted to undermine Asante planter-chiefs (Boone 2003, 159-163). In Madagascar, EPR codes the PCS group Highlanders as excluded. However, they retained a strong presence in the military (Schraeder 1995, 18-19), which EPR does not reflect by primarily using information on executive and cabinets positions to code political status. Highlanders launched a successful coup in 1972.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is an idiosyncratic case that does not fit neatly into any three of these modal patterns of ethnic violence, although two PCS groups did initiate civil wars. There was, in essence, no central government during the country's first five years of independence. Correspondingly, EPR codes all politically relevant ethnic groups in the country as enjoying regional autonomy between 1960 and 1965. However, within the first year of independence, PCS groups Luba Kasai and Lunda-Yeke had initiated civil wars to secede, the latter led by their king (Vogt et al. 2015, specifically, page 343 of the EPR Atlas).

Of the 18 PCS countries, only four are theoretical anomalies. Therefore, the fourth path involves relative peace. Botswana, Guinea, Senegal, and Zambia defy the general pattern by each exhibiting a long period of stable civilian rule in ethnically inclusionary regimes, although in the 1980s a successful coup occurred in Guinea and a civil war began in Senegal. PCS groups such as the Barotse in Zambia and Peul in Guinea created regional parties during the decolonization era to contest nationalists (Caplan 1970; Cowan 1962, 201), but ultimately failed to prevent a dominant national party from taking power at independence—although the Barotse king did secure a regional autonomy agreement at independence.

B.3 Qualitative Evidence from Uganda and Nigeria

More detailed process tracing evidence from Nigeria (which followed the first path characterized in Section B.2) and Uganda (second path) additionally supports theoretical implications. In Nigeria, the PCS group controlled power at the center, retained power via a military coup, and an excluded non-PCS group

launched a civil war. (The references in this paragraph come from Lovejoy (1992).) Nigeria's federal formula—a legacy of Frederick Lugard's invention of the Native Authority System for the Sokoto Caliphate (pre-colonial state) in the north—dictated that each of the country's three regions would be apportioned seats in the national legislature based on population share. As a result, the constitutionally mandated dicennial census in 1962 carried huge consequences for the distribution of power. "The Northern Region's political strength, marshaled by the NPC, had arisen in large measure from the results of the 1952-53 census, which had identified 54 percent of the country's population in that area." Despite conducting the census twice, experts estimated the total count for northerners was wildly inflated and Igbo (SLPCS group) leaders publicly charged the northern (PCS) government with fraud. Igbo officers led a successful coup attempt in 1966. Despite stating that they aimed to create a unitary government without ethnic bias, deep-seated regional cleavages caused northern leaders to perceive the coup "not so much as an effort to impose a unitary government as a plot by the Igbo to dominate Nigeria." This led to a northern-dominated countercoup in 1966, followed by ethnopolitical exclusion of Igbo and an Igbo secession attempt in 1967.

Uganda's pattern resembles Nigeria's, although in Uganda a coup dislodged the PCS group from power. The theory section explained how the Buganda kingdom's favored colonial position prevented Ugandan politicians from forming a broad nationalist party. In response to political deadlock created by Buganda's large vote share, an inter-ethnic ruling coalition formed at independence that composed an "alliance of complete opposites" (Decalo 1990, 152) between Buganda's KY party and Milton Obote's UPC party. Consistent with the theoretical expectation that such circumstances facilitate an internal security dilemma, "It is hard to determine at what stage Prime Minister Obote made up his mind to confront the Kabaka and the State of Buganda . . . but it is tempting, from the small amount of evidence available and his careful preparing of the ground, to think that he had intended it all along" (Dinwiddy 1981, 514).

A key event occurred in 1964 that set the stage for future violence. To provide background, in 1900 Buganda became the first group in contemporary Uganda to sign a treaty with Britain. This treaty awarded territory, subsequently called the "Lost Counties," to Buganda that a British-Baganda alliance had recently captured from rival pre-colonial state Bunyoro that was also incorporated into Uganda. In 1964, Obote attempted to undermine Buganda by allowing a referendum to occur over control of the Lost Counties. After its residents voted to join Bunyoro, a political crisis occurred. "As *President*, the Kabaka should have ratified the transfer; as *Kabaka*, such an act was an impossibility" [emphasis in original] (Dinwiddy 1981, 514) because the transfer would erode the king's support from his main constituency. The Lost Counties referendum soon "shifted the balance of power back from Buganda to the central government" (Decalo 1990, 155). Capitalizing on his improved bargaining position, Obote arrested key Baganda ministers before they could appeal for British military assistance. The crisis culminated in 1966 when Obote militarily suppressed a Baganda secession attempt, staged a coup to become the undisputed head of state, and unilaterally terminated the Baganda monarchy (Tripp 2009, 45). After continued turmoil at the center including Idi Amin's kleptocratic reign in the 1970s, the then-politically powerless Baganda participated in civil wars that removed Amin and, subsequently, Obote after he had become president for a second time.

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C Additional Data Information

Table C.1: Summary Statistics for Main Sample

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Major ethnic civil war onset	0.007	0.082	7360
Successful coup attempt	0.01	0.1	7054
Ethnopolitical inclusion	0.572	0.495	7791
PCS group	0.165	0.371	7791
SLPCS group	0.446	0.497	7791
Ecological diversity	0.395	0.223	7791
Historical warfare	0.12	0.325	7791
Slave exports	4.988	2.868	7791
Tsetse fly	0.446	0.141	7791
Neolithic transition	3050.468	1005.263	7791
ln(GDP/capita)	7.319	0.788	7791
ln(Population)	15.924	1.246	7791
Democracy	-2.527	5.908	7791
Herbst geography	1.482	1.242	7791
Group % of pop.	0.169	0.173	7791
Distance from capital	3.91	3.187	7791
Giant oil field	0.054	0.227	7791

Notes: Each covariate has full data coverage for every ethnic group-year in the sample described below. There are fewer observations for the major ethnic civil war onset variable because years with an ongoing civil war are set to missing, following the advice from McGrath (2015). There are also fewer observations for the successful coup attempt variable relative to the covariates because the full sample goes through 2009 whereas Roessler's (2011) ethnic group-specific coup data only runs through 2005.

Table C.2: Summary Statistics for Ethnically Excluded Group-Years

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Major ethnic civil war onset	0.015	0.122	2961
PCS group	0.098	0.297	3333
SLPCS group	0.622	0.485	3333
Ecological diversity	0.439	0.211	3333
Historical warfare	0.092	0.288	3333
Slave exports	4.915	2.936	3333
Tsetse fly	0.451	0.134	3333
Neolithic transition	3275.413	1203.148	3333
ln(GDP/capita)	7.171	0.733	3333
ln(Population)	16.176	1.27	3333
Democracy	-3.263	5.618	3333
Herbst geography	1.899	1.283	3333
Group % of pop.	0.119	0.159	3333
Distance from capital	5.177	3.392	3333
Giant oil field	0.082	0.274	3333

Notes: See note for Table C.1.

Table C.3: Summary Statistics for Ethnically Included Group-Years

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Successful coup attempt	0.014	0.119	3958
PCS group	0.216	0.411	4458
SLPCS group	0.314	0.464	4458
Ecological diversity	0.363	0.226	4458
Historical warfare	0.142	0.349	4458
Slave exports	5.043	2.815	4458
Tsetse fly	0.442	0.145	4458
Neolithic transition	2882.29	786.096	4458
ln(GDP/capita)	7.429	0.810	4458
ln(Population)	15.736	1.193	4458
Democracy	-1.976	6.057	4458
Herbst geography	1.171	1.114	4458
Group % of pop.	0.206	0.174	4458
Distance from capital	2.963	2.656	4458
Giant oil field	0.034	0.181	4458

Notes: See note for Table C.1.

Table C.4: Summary Statistics for Cross-Section

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Major ethnic civil war onset (total)	0.201	0.461	159
Major ethnic civil war onset (binary)	0.176	0.382	159
Successful coup attempt (total)	0.434	0.925	159
Successful coup attempt (binary)	0.245	0.432	159
% years w/ ethnopolitical inclusion	0.534	0.411	159
PCS group	0.17	0.377	159
SLPCS group	0.403	0.492	159
Ecological diversity	0.406	0.227	159
Historical warfare	0.101	0.302	159
Slave exports	4.412	3.32	159
Tsetse fly	0.427	0.15	159
Neolithic transition	2800	1090.465	159
ln(GDP/capita)	7.363	0.793	159
ln(Population)	15.228	1.247	159
Democracy	0.409	6.514	159
Herbst geography index	1.365	1.26	159
Group % of pop.	0.184	0.182	159
Distance from capital	3.778	3.121	159
Giant oil field	0.044	0.206	159

Notes: The cross-sectional sample contains all politically relevant ethnic groups in the first year each country enters the sample (for most countries, this is the year of independence).

C.1 Sample

The civil war sample contains almost all ethnic group-years from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR; Vogt et al. 2015) dataset for Sub-Saharan African countries from their year of independence until 2009, and the coup sample runs through 2005. The current version of EPR (2014 Update 2) does not provide data for Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, or Swaziland. Most of these countries fail to meet either of two scope conditions for the theory, and therefore their exclusion from the statistical results is not problematic. First, many of the islands lacked an indigenous population prior to colonization, eliminating the possibility of pre-colonial states (which is why Mauritius is also excluded). Second, three of the mainland countries effectively have only one ethnic group, which obviates the theory's focus on pre-colonial statehood creating politicized ethnic differences in countries with multiple ethnic groups. The theory does not offer clear predictions for countries with only one ethnic group because the key considerations about country-level spillovers to other ethnic groups and incentives to exclude by ethnicity at the center do not arise. Tanzania is also excluded for this reason because EPR codes "Mainland Africans" as over 96% of the country's population, hence effectively one ethnic group. Notably, Tanzania and Mauritius were not included in earlier versions of EPR and are not included in Roessler's (2011) dataset, either. Finally, because the hypotheses about ethnic violence only pertain to post-European colonial polities, the sample excludes foreign settler-dominated South Africa before 1994, Liberia before 1980, and Zimbabwe before 1980—therefore only focusing on years in which indigenous Africans held power. Ethiopia's first year in the dataset corresponds with the first year in which a colonized country in the dataset, Sudan, gained independence, 1956.

C.2 Civil War Data

The main civil war variable matches EPR ethnic groups to major civil wars from Fearon and Laitin's (2003) dataset. Their civil war list provides a careful coding scheme for distinguishing civil wars. By contrast, the main alternative in the literature is to use the ACD2EPR dataset (Vogt et al. 2015), which distinguishes civil war episodes by using a fighting lapse rule. Procedures based entirely on lapse rules tend to overcount onsets. However, despite the conceptual advantages of the present ethnic group civil war measure, robustness checks show that the results are similar when using either ACD2EPR or Roessler's (2011) data.

Present measure. More specifically, the main civil war data used for this paper draw from Fearon and Laitin's (2003) updated civil war data through 2009. I assigned wars to EPR ethnic groups using the following procedure. First, I matched each Fearon and Laitin (2003) conflict and each post-2009 conflict to the corresponding conflict in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (ACD; Gleditsch et al. 2002). Because Fearon and Laitin use a higher death threshold than the 25 battle deaths per year needed to be included in the ACD, the ACD contains almost all their civil wars. This facilitated using the ACD2EPR dataset (Vogt et al. 2015), which links rebel groups in the ACD to EPR groups and codes whether the rebel group made ethnic claims and recruited within an ethnic group. Ethnic claims and recruitment are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for ACD2EPR to code the ethnic group as involved in an "ethnic" conflict. For Fearon and Laitin wars not included in the Armed Conflict Dataset, the author used Fearon and Laitin's coding of whether or not it was an ethnic civil war and consulted secondary sources to code ethnic participation.

In Fearon and Laitin conflicts with only a single corresponding rebel group and ethnic group in ACD2EPR, that ethnic group was coded as participating in a civil war during the years coded by Fearon and Laitin. Assigning Fearon and Laitin civil wars to EPR ethnic groups was more complicated for conflicts involving multiple rebel groups and/or multiple ethnic groups. In most cases with multiple ethnic groups participating

in the same conflict, I used the PRIO Battle Deaths dataset (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005) to assess whether that ethnic group was responsible for at least 1,000 battle deaths. This was not possible, however, for center-seeking conflicts featuring multiple ethnic groups because all rebel groups participating in a center-seeking civil war are coded as part of the same conflict in ACD and the PRIO Battle Deaths dataset. (By contrast, in countries with multiple separatist civil wars, such as Ethiopia, the dataset provide battle death estimates for each distinct territorial conflict.) For these center-seeking conflicts, any participating EPR group coded by ACD2EPR as having ethnic claims and recruitment was coded as involved in a conflict. I use the years that ACD2EPR code the rebel group as in conflict rather than Fearon and Laitin's years because in some conflicts featuring multiple ethnic groups, individual ethnic groups only participated in a subset of the years of the overall conflict.

Advantages relative to existing ethnic group civil war measures. The major advantage of using data based off Fearon and Laitin's (2003) coding procedure rather than ACD is that ACD does not provide a coherent scheme for coding distinct civil wars, and hence civil war *onsets*. Scholars use a lapse rule, typically two years, for translating ACD's incidence data into distinct conflict onsets. If the 25 or 1,000 death threshold (ACD codes both thresholds) is not met for at least two years after being met in the past, then any future year that meets the death threshold is coded as a new civil war. Problematically, such a procedure often leads to either undercounting or (more likely) overcounting a country's civil war onsets, especially when used for the 25 battle death threshold that is standard in EPR studies. Fearon and Laitin (2013, 25) summarize:

> "They apply a criterion of one year (or two, or ten, for different codings) with no conflict above their 25 death threshold. This has the advantage of being relatively definite, but the disadvantage of making many long-running, low level conflicts that flit above and below the 25 dead threshold look like many distinct civil wars. In our view they often are more naturally seen as a single, long-running but low level civil conflict, that happens often by chance to get above or below the threshold in some years" (25). (Also see Sambanis 2004, 818-9.)

For example, using the standard two-year lapse coding in ACD2EPR, the Bakongo in Angola fought four different civil wars in the 1990s and 2000s even though the same rebel group was operative during the entire period. Solely using a lapse rule to distinguish conflicts can also lead to undercounting in some cases. For example, consider the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia's description of civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s: "In 1996-1997 an armed rebellion led by AFDL and supported by Rwanda and Uganda managed to topple President Mobutu in May 1997. However the new regime was soon at war again [in 1998], this time against RCD and MLC." Although distinct rebel groups fought what are naturally considered two different wars, using a two-year lapse rule does not yield a new onset in 1998 for the Tutsi-Banyamulenge because they participated in conflict in the previous year.

Although it is possible to use lapse rules besides two years, coding civil war episodes solely by using lapse rules does not address these problems of undercounting and overcounting. Two of Fearon and Laitin's (2003) coding rules help to guard against these issues. First, "War ends are coded by observation of a victory, wholesale demobilization, truce, or peace agreement followed by at least two years of peace" (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 76, fn. 4; see this page and footnote for their full set of rules). This directly addresses the concern about overcounting onsets for periodic conflicts, such as the Bakongo in Angola, because war ends are marked by clear signals of intent to end the current episode of fighting. Importantly, this rule still allows for the possibility of repeated civil wars with the same rebel group. Second, "If a main party to the conflict drops out, we code a new war start if the fighting continues (e.g., Somalia gets a new civil war after Siad Barre is defeated in 1991)." This addresses the problem of undercounting onsets in cases such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s.

Although in principle the ACD could be recoded into distinct episodes, in practice, this is particularly hard

to do at the ethnic group level. From examining ACD2EPR data, there are frequent gaps in fighting for individual ethnic groups. To measure distinct conflict episodes, it is more sensible to start with a list like Fearon and Laitin's that distinguishes civil wars, and then to code ethnic affiliation—rather than starting with ACD2EPR and trying to classify fighting years into unique civil wars.

C.3 Alternative Explanations

Table C.5: Description and Sources for Covariates

Covariate	Description
Ecological diversity	Fenske (2014) provides evidence that states were more likely to arise in areas with higher ecological diversity because they could more easily trade across ecological regions. I calculated ecological diversity for each EPR ethnic group by using Fenske's spatial vegetation data, which is derived from White (1983). The measure is standard deviation of the area of vegetation types (of which there are 18) within an EPR ethnic group's location polygon.
Historical warfare	Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) and Dincecco et al. (2016) demonstrate a strong positive relationship between historical and modern wars in Africa. The variable scores a 1 if at least one war between 1400 and 1700 occurred within the group's EPR polygon, and 0 otherwise. Calculated by author by merging Besley and Reynal-Querol's (2014) coordinates for warfare location with GeoEPR spatial data.
Slave exports	Although slave wars destroyed historical states such as the Kongo state (Nunn 2008, 143), states able to monopolize trade routes benefited greatly (Lloyd 1965, 70) and states such as the Asante declined after West African slave exports decreased (Hopkins 2000, 314-318). I use Nunn's (2008) country-level variable that divides number of slave exports by land area to account for this. For the present purposes, the country-level data has two advantages over more disaggregated slave export data. First, pre-colonial statehood is argued to cause violence through country-wide spillover effects, making country-level variables relevant even in regressions that use ethnic groups as the unit of analysis. Second, if slave exports impact subsequent political violence, it should be because neighboring groups raided each other, which is better captured by country-level measures rather than by measuring the number of slaves exported from each ethnic group (which is not available, anyway, for EPR ethnic group units). Data point for Eritrea is imputed using Ethiopia's data.
Tsetse fly	Alsan (2015, 395) shows that groups residing in territory with greater tsetse fly prevalence tended to have lower levels of political centralization by decreasing population density and by eliminating the possibility of using pack animals to move armies and to conduct long-distance trade. Calculated by author using Alsan's spatial data to calculate the average value on her tsetse fly sustainability index for EPR ethnic group polygons.
Neolithic transition	Putterman (2008) shows in a global sample that territories experiencing earlier transitions to agricultural production tended to experience higher levels of statehood in the second millennium, a variable measured at the country level. The measure is thousands of years elapsed since an ethnic group's (modern-day) country experienced a transition to agricultural production. Data imputed for Djibouti (average of Ethiopia and Somalia) and Eritrea (Ethiopia).
GDP per capita	Annual logged country-level data from Maddison (2010). Data for Eritrea imputed from Ethiopia.
Population	Annual logged country-level data from Maddison (2010). Because he provides a joint data point for Ethiopia and Eritrea, for these two countries I multiply his estimates in all years by each country's percentage of their joint population in 2017.
Democracy	Annual country-level data from Polity IV's *polity2* variable (Marshall and Gurr 2014).
Herbst geography	Herbst (2000) classifies the difficulty of broadcasting power in different African countries as a proxy for the geographic difficulty of preventing civil war. Herbst classifies countries as easy (0), neutral (1), hinterland (2), and difficult geography (3), which I turned into an ordinal variable using the values in parentheses. He is missing data for Djibouti and Madagascar, which I coded.
Population %	Ethnic group's share of the population, coded by EPR (Vogt et al. 2015).
Distance from capital	Distance between centroid of ethnic group's EPR polygon and the country's capital. Calculated by author by combining GeoEPR spatial data with CShapes data (Weidmann et al. 2010).
Giant oil field	Ethnic group coded as 1 if it has at least one giant oil field within its EPR polygon, or within 250 kilometers offshore and within the group's country's maritime borders. Giant oil field data from Horn (2003).

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D Additional Statistical Results

Table D.1: Cross-Tabulations

Outcome	PCS groups	SLPCS groups	SL groups
Civil war onset	0.6%	1.2%	0.2%
	N=1,263	N=3,079	N=3,018
Successful coup	2.3%	0.5%	0.9%
	N=1,287	N=3,472	N=3,032

D.1 Robustness Checks for Table 2

Table D.2: Table 2 with Cross-Sectional Data (Count Outcome Variables)

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset (total)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.230**	0.252**	0.212*	0.294***
	(0.0959)	(0.0973)	(0.119)	(0.107)
SLPCS group	0.330***	0.355***	0.324***	0.383***
	(0.0775)	(0.0701)	(0.0924)	(0.0898)
Ethnic groups	159	159	159	159
R-squared	0.110	0.257	0.201	0.342
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt (total)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.618**	0.597**	0.592**	0.629**
	(0.276)	(0.252)	(0.245)	(0.246)
SLPCS group	-0.132	-0.110	-0.00225	0.0165
	(0.128)	(0.137)	(0.160)	(0.168)
Ethnic groups	159	159	159	159
R-squared	0.081	0.154	0.145	0.199
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.2 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the PCS group indicator and for the SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The dependent variable is the count of the number of times that the event occurred for the ethnic group during the sample time frame (for Panel A, this is the number of years with a civil war *onset*, not the total number of years that a civil war occurred). The cross-sectional sample contains all politically relevant ethnic groups in the first year each country enters the sample (for most countries, this is the year of independence). Section 3.4 describes the covariates. Poisson and negative binomial models (not shown) yield qualitatively identical results. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.3: Table 2 with Cross-Sectional Data (Binary Outcome Variables)

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset (binary)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	2.244***	2.505***	2.539**	8.177**
	(0.857)	(0.853)	(1.012)	(3.809)
SLPCS group	2.708***	2.941***	3.102***	8.262**
	(0.769)	(0.730)	(0.906)	(3.630)
Ethnic groups	159	159	159	159
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt (binary)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	1.105**	1.495**	1.385**	2.844***
	(0.481)	(0.613)	(0.546)	(0.880)
SLPCS group	-0.508	-0.454	0.0923	0.791
	(0.449)	(0.507)	(0.519)	(0.680)
Ethnic groups	159	159	159	159
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.3 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the PCS group indicator and for the SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The dependent variable is whether or not the event occurred for the ethnic group at some point during the sample time frame. The cross-sectional sample contains all politically relevant ethnic groups in the first year each country enters the sample (for most countries, this is the year of independence). Section 3.4 describes the covariates. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.4: Table 2 with Ethnic Group Random Effects

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.903	0.982*	0.787	1.109
	(0.568)	(0.564)	(0.610)	(0.681)
SLPCS group	1.494***	1.536***	1.377***	1.689***
	(0.464)	(0.444)	(0.477)	(0.560)
Group-years	8,049	8,049	8,049	8,049
Ethnic groups	218	218	218	218
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ethnic group RE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.916**	1.057**	1.333***	1.488**
	(0.370)	(0.447)	(0.502)	(0.544)
SLPCS group	-0.685	-0.675	0.0256	-0.0146
	(0.420)	(0.453)	(0.561)	(0.550)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054
Ethnic groups	215	215	215	215
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ethnic group RE?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.4 is identical to Table 2 except it adds ethnic group random effects to each specification. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.5: Table 2 with Rare Events Logit

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.888	0.959*	0.749	1.054
	(0.569)	(0.581)	(0.562)	(0.666)
SLPCS group	1.431***	1.475***	1.281***	1.574***
	(0.455)	(0.439)	(0.482)	(0.577)
Group-years	8,049	8,049	8,049	8,049
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.834**	0.875**	0.839**	0.863**
	(0.327)	(0.394)	(0.333)	(0.408)
SLPCS group	-0.579	-0.606	-0.251	-0.331
	(0.398)	(0.448)	(0.513)	(0.526)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.5 is identical to Table 2 except it uses rare events logistic regression models. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.6: Table 2 with OLS

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.00212	0.00299	0.00233	0.00307
	(0.00256)	(0.00294)	(0.00298)	(0.00306)
SLPCS group	0.00743***	0.00818***	0.00743***	0.00805***
	(0.00213)	(0.00202)	(0.00236)	(0.00231)
Group-years	7,360	7,360	7,360	7,360
R-squared	0.005	0.007	0.007	0.009
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.0137**	0.0141**	0.0129**	0.0145**
	(0.00613)	(0.00582)	(0.00587)	(0.00583)
SLPCS group	-0.00405	-0.00384	-0.00143	-0.000110
	(0.00274)	(0.00300)	(0.00339)	(0.00349)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054
R-squared	0.007	0.009	0.010	0.011
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.6 is identical to Table 2 except it uses OLS regression models. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.7: Table 2 with Year Fixed Effects

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.788	0.848	0.760	1.081
	(0.550)	(0.547)	(0.570)	(0.723)
SLPCS group	1.473***	1.517***	1.321**	1.640**
	(0.466)	(0.445)	(0.516)	(0.650)
Group-years	3,062	3,062	3,062	3,062
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.873***	0.967**	0.770**	0.800**
	(0.321)	(0.380)	(0.328)	(0.375)
SLPCS group	-0.626	-0.582	-0.448	-0.560
	(0.410)	(0.457)	(0.538)	(0.545)
Group-years	4,521	4,521	4,521	4,521
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.7 is identical to Table 2 except every specification contains year fixed effects. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.8: Table 2 with Two-Way Clustered Standard Errors

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.903	0.982*	0.787	1.109*
	(0.663)	(0.547)	(0.533)	(0.652)
SLPCS group	1.494**	1.536***	1.377***	1.689***
	(0.626)	(0.442)	(0.480)	(0.586)
Group-years	8,049	8,049	8,049	8,049
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.836***	0.878**	0.855**	0.878**
	(0.313)	(0.382)	(0.334)	(0.408)
SLPCS group	-0.594	-0.635	-0.254	-0.348
	(0.399)	(0.447)	(0.512)	(0.522)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.8 is identical to Table 2 except every specification estimates the standard errors using two-way clustering by ethnic groups and countries. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.9: Table 2 with Different Dependent Variables

	Panel A. DV: Ethnic civil war onset (ACD w/ 25 b.d.s)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.352	0.363	-0.00919	0.284
	(0.528)	(0.549)	(0.540)	(0.597)
SLPCS group	1.590***	1.599***	1.028***	1.298***
	(0.383)	(0.372)	(0.375)	(0.448)
Group-years	7,942	7,942	7,942	7,942
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset (Roessler 2011)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	1.156**	1.051**	1.308**	1.279**
	(0.500)	(0.507)	(0.509)	(0.538)
SLPCS group	1.491***	1.444***	1.594***	1.603***
	(0.398)	(0.383)	(0.429)	(0.456)
Group-years	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel C. DV: Coup attempt			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.629**	0.658**	0.631**	0.695**
	(0.260)	(0.314)	(0.295)	(0.354)
SLPCS group	-0.441	-0.512	-0.171	-0.217
	(0.277)	(0.314)	(0.349)	(0.380)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table D.9 is identical to Panel A of Table 2 except it changes the civil war measure to ACD2EPR. Panel B of Table D.9 is identical to Panel A of Table 2 except it changes the civil war measure to Roessler (2011) and the sample ends in 2005 (following the temporal scope of Roessler's variable). Panel C of Table D.9 is identical to Panel B of Table 2 except it changes the coup measure to all coup attempts. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.10: Table 2 with Alternative PCS Measure

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group (alt.)	1.094**	0.999*	1.072**	1.123*
	(0.461)	(0.515)	(0.531)	(0.646)
SLPCS group (alt.)	1.407***	1.285***	1.445***	1.517***
	(0.395)	(0.405)	(0.470)	(0.558)
Group-years	8,049	8,049	8,049	8,049
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group (alt.)	1.267***	1.281***	1.325***	1.360***
	(0.314)	(0.382)	(0.352)	(0.410)
SLPCS group (alt.)	-0.205	-0.312	0.106	0.0521
	(0.388)	(0.430)	(0.480)	(0.481)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.10 is identical to Table 2 except it changes the PCS and SLPCS measures to those described on page 20. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$.

D.2 Partitioned Ethnic Groups

One test to account for possible endogeneity problems stemming from non-randomly assigned international borders is to compare groups partitioned across international boundaries in their civil war propensity. Appendix Table D.11 lists every partitioned ethnic group that has initiated an ethnic civil war, showing that 19 of the 24 wars within this sample occurred in PCS countries. Through the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the figure is 12 of 13. Table D.12 runs logit regressions that either truncate the sample to only partitioned groups (Column 1), or include transnational group fixed effects (Column 2), which yields estimates generated solely by comparing members of the same ethnic group to each other across international borders. These are low-powered tests because there are only 32 groups in the Column 2 sample and only 20 during the Cold War era (the fixed effects drop all transnational ethnic groupings in which no civil war occurs). The coefficient estimate for PCS countries is statistically significant in the specifications during the Cold War era (the text discusses the theoretical relevance of this sample), but not in years farther from independence (also see Table D.14). Overall, this provides suggestive evidence of the importance of PCS groups even when changing how the counterfactuals are estimated, although the relative scarcity of partitioned pairs/groups in which a civil war occurred makes the statistical tests somewhat difficult to interpret due to low statistical power.

The specifications do not disaggregate PCS and SLPCS groups because of the already-truncated sample, even though H1 only directly applies to SLPCS groups. This also explains why I do not analyze coups for partitioned groups, given the theoretical rationale and findings that PCS and SLPCS exhibit opposing coup behavior relative to SL groups.

Table D.11: List of Partitioned Ethnic Groups with a Civil War

EPR ethnic group	Country	CW onset year	Type of group
Lunda-Yeke	Congo, DRC	1961	PCS
Tutsi	Rwanda	1962	PCS
Azande	Sudan	1963	SLPCS
Toubou	Chad	1966	SLPCS
Muslim Sahel groups	Chad	1966	PCS
Hutu	Burundi	1972	SLPCS
Somali (Ogaden)	Ethiopia	1976	SLPCS
Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)	Zimbabwe	1983	PCS
Hutu	Burundi	1988	SLPCS
Gio	Liberia	1989	SL
Tuareg	Mali	1989	SLPCS
Diola	Senegal	1989	SLPCS
Zaghawa, Bideyat	Chad	1989	SLPCS
Tutsi	Rwanda	1990	PCS
Afar	Djibouti	1991	SL
Bakongo	Angola	1992	SLPCS
Sara	Chad	1992	SLPCS
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	Congo, DRC	1996	SLPCS
Hutu	Rwanda	1996	SLPCS
Lari/Bakongo	Congo	1998	SL
Tutsi-Banyamulenge	Congo, DRC	1998	SLPCS
Ngbaka	Congo, DRC	1998	SLPCS
Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	Cote d'Ivoire	2002	SL
Southern Mande	Cote d'Ivoire	2002	SL

Notes: Table D.11 lists every ethnic group in the sample that (1) has co-ethnic kin in a neighboring country in the sample and (2) has participated in a major civil war during the sample period.

Table D.12: Partitioned Ethnic Groups

	DV: Major ethnic CW onset	
	Sample: Partitioned groups	
	(1)	(2)
Group in PCS country	-0.286	0.0163
	(0.729)	(1.056)
Cold War	-1.252	-0.520
	(1.200)	(1.522)
Group in PCS country*Cold War	2.112*	1.545
	(1.269)	(1.421)
Group-years	3,411	1,470
Transnational group FE?	NO	YES
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES
	Marginal effect estimates	
Group in PCS country | During Cold War	0.00806**	0.0191**
	(0.00394)	(0.00878)
Group in PCS country | After Cold War	-0.00135	0.000142
	(0.00343)	(0.00918)

Notes: Table D.12 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for an indicator for any group in a PCS country (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The sample resembles that from Panel A of Table 2 except only ethnic groups that share ethnic kin in a neighboring country in the sample are included. Panel B controls for fixed effects for transnational ethnic groups, and therefore drops all sets of transitional ethnic groups that do not experience a civil war. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}\ p < 0.05,^{*}\ p < 0.1$.

D.3 Tables for Conditioning on British Colonialism and Cold War Era

Table D.13: Table 2 Disaggregated by British Colonialism

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.635	1.013*	0.457	1.458
	(0.612)	(0.578)	(0.564)	(0.939)
SLPCS group	1.340***	1.737***	1.196**	2.182***
	(0.502)	(0.467)	(0.482)	(0.821)
Group-years	4,792	4,792	4,792	4,792
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sample	Excl. Br. col.	Excl. Br. col.	Excl. Br. col.	Excl. Br. col.
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.641*	0.701	0.462	0.459
	(0.348)	(0.501)	(0.424)	(0.507)
SLPCS group	-0.424	-0.480	-0.417	-0.380
	(0.493)	(0.559)	(0.638)	(0.577)
British colony	-0.380	-0.429	-0.604	-0.443
	(0.554)	(0.574)	(0.575)	(0.551)
PCS group*British colony	0.646	0.547	1.177*	1.314*
	(0.696)	(0.783)	(0.714)	(0.735)
SLPCS group*British colony	-0.130	-0.121	0.595	0.383
	(0.840)	(0.894)	(0.900)	(0.825)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Marginal effect estimates			
PCS group | British colony=1	0.0165*	0.0137**	0.0164**	0.0182**
	(0.00859)	(0.00698)	(0.00731)	(0.00727)
PCS group | British colony=0	0.00829*	0.00860	0.00428	0.00341
	(0.00469)	(0.00660)	(0.00385)	(0.00388)

Notes: Panel A of Table D.13 is identical to Panel A of Table 2 except the sample only contains ethnic groups from countries that are not former British colonies. Panel B of Table D.13 is identical to Panel B of Table 2 except it adds an indicator for British colonialism and an interaction term between British colonialism and each of PCS and SLPCS. The bottom part of Panel B contains marginal effect estimates for PCS under different values of British colonialism. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.14: Table 2 Disaggregated by Cold War Era

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	-0.242	-0.135	-0.449	-0.0334
	(0.880)	(0.872)	(0.860)	(1.042)
SLPCS group	0.774	0.847	0.601	1.028
	(0.587)	(0.591)	(0.681)	(0.853)
Cold War	-0.290	-0.324	-0.624	-0.524
	(0.938)	(0.925)	(0.928)	(0.933)
PCS group*Cold War	1.841	1.740	1.945	1.727
	(1.158)	(1.170)	(1.230)	(1.264)
SLPCS group*Cold War	1.320	1.255	1.268	1.026
	(0.950)	(0.935)	(1.005)	(1.041)
Group-years	8,049	8,049	8,049	8,049
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Marginal effect estimates			
SLPCS group | During Cold War	0.0106***	0.00969***	0.00543***	0.00535***
	(0.00373)	(0.00297)	(0.00198)	(0.00196)
SLPCS group | After Cold War	0.00235	0.00250	0.00153	0.00239
	(0.00176)	(0.00171)	(0.00165)	(0.00185)
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PCS group	0.293	0.263	0.272	0.239
	(0.515)	(0.571)	(0.566)	(0.617)
SLPCS group	-2.444**	-2.530**	-2.260**	-2.501**
	(1.040)	(1.055)	(1.068)	(1.099)
Cold War	0.187	-0.103	0.398	0.507
	(0.478)	(0.502)	(0.513)	(0.497)
PCK group*Cold War	0.776	0.897	0.689	0.726
	(0.597)	(0.609)	(0.621)	(0.641)
SLPCS group*Cold War	2.204*	2.295**	2.235*	2.335**
	(1.134)	(1.155)	(1.142)	(1.176)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054
PCS controls?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Violence controls?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Event history controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Marginal effect estimates			
PCS group | During Cold War	0.0180**	0.0165**	0.0129**	0.0117**
	(0.00739)	(0.00707)	(0.00508)	(0.00531)
PCS group | After Cold War	0.00271	0.00255	0.00171	0.00118
	(0.00486)	(0.00566)	(0.00355)	(0.00307)

Notes: Table D.14 is identical to Table 2 except every regression contains an indicator for the Cold War era (1 for all years up to and including 1989) and an interaction term between Cold War and each of PCS and SLPCS. The bottom part of each panel contains marginal effects for the theoretically relevant pre-colonial statehood indicator during and after the Cold War. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

E Formal Model

Section E.1 solves for the equilibria of the model described in the paper. Section E.2 presents the formal propositions that yield the hypotheses tested in the paper. Section E.3 extends the model to account for the possibly greater fighting strength of PCS groups. Section E.4 discusses related formal models. Section E.5 grounds key model assumptions about ethnicity, coups, and civil war.

E.1 Equilibrium Analysis

The analysis solves backwards to derive the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Although there are infinite equilibria (because G is indifferent among all offers in subgames it cannot buy off C), they are all payoff equivalent. The final technical details needed to complete the setup of the game are that $\theta_e \in (\underline{\theta}_e, \overline{\theta}_e)$, for $0 < \underline{\theta}_e < \overline{\theta}_e < 1$ characterized below; and $\theta_i \in (\underline{\theta}_i, \overline{\theta}_i)$, for $\overline{\theta}_e < \underline{\theta}_i < \overline{\theta}_i < 1$ characterized below.

Bargaining. C accepts any offer x such that:

$$E\big[U_C(\text{accept } x)\big] = \theta_k \cdot x \geq (1-\phi) \cdot q_{k,l} = E\big[U_C(\text{fight})\big] \tag{E.1}$$

It cannot be optimal for G to make C strictly accept, and Lemma E.1 shows that G will buy off C at the bargaining stage if possible. Combining these results with Equation E.1 implies that G's equilibrium offer equals:

$$x^* = (1-\phi) \cdot \frac{q_{k,l}}{\theta_k} \tag{E.2}$$

This is feasible if and only if $x^* \leq 1$, which solves to:

$$\theta_k \geq (1-\phi) \cdot q_{k,l} \tag{E.3}$$

Equation E.3 highlights that imperfect commitment ability is the key source of tension in the model that yields the possibility of violence in equilibrium. If $\theta_k = 1$, then Equation E.3 is always satisfied because $\phi < 1$ and $q_{k,l} < 1$.

Lemma E.1. *At the bargaining stage, G always buys off C if possible.*

Proof. Need to show:

$$1 - x^* \geq (1-\phi) \cdot (1 - q_{k,l})$$

Equation E.2 states $x^* = (1-\phi) \cdot \frac{q_{k,l}}{\theta_k}$. Therefore, can solve this to:

$$\theta_k \geq \frac{(1-\phi) \cdot q_{k,l}}{1 - (1-\phi) \cdot (1 - q_{k,l})}$$

Equation E.3 states that if G can buy off C, then $\theta_k \geq (1-\phi) \cdot q_{k,l}$. This enables tightening the upper bound of the inequality:

$$(1-\phi) \cdot q_{k,l} \geq \frac{(1-\phi) \cdot q_{k,l}}{1 - (1-\phi) \cdot (1 - q_{k,l})}$$

Rearranging yields

$$1 \geq (1-\phi) \cdot (1-q_{k,l}),$$

which is true by assumption. ■

Both $q_{k,l}$ and θ_k depend on whether C is included or excluded from power. The following assumption characterizes the magnitude of C's probability of winning if excluded depending on whether C is strong or weak. This assumption yields the substantively relevant implication that heterogeneity in the strength of challenger yields heterogeneity in civil war propensity, specifically, the weak type of C will not stage a civil war if excluded but the strong type will. Additionally, consistent with the idea of C being weak, its probability of winning if included is low enough that it will not stage a coup.

Assumption E.1. *Three parameters characterizing the bounds of θ_e and θ_i are:*

- $\underline{\theta}_e = (1-\phi) \cdot q_{e,w}$
- $\overline{\theta}_e = (1-\phi) \cdot q_{e,s}$
- $\underline{\theta}_i = (1-\phi) \cdot q_{i,w}$.

Lemma E.2 (Possibility of buying off C)**.** *The weak type of C can be bought off regardless of whether it is included or excluded. The strong type of C cannot be bought off if it is excluded.*

Proof. Follows directly from $\theta_e \in \left(\underline{\theta}_e, \overline{\theta}_e\right)$, $\theta_i > \underline{\theta}_i$, Assumption E.1, and Equation E.3. ■

If C is included and strong, then G can buy off C in the bargaining phase if and only if:

$$\theta_i \geq \hat{\theta}_i \equiv (1-\phi) \cdot q_{i,s} \tag{E.4}$$

Ethnopolitical inclusion choice. G makes an optimal ethnopolitical inclusion choice by considering its expected consumption in the bargaining stage, which also depends on whether C will fight in equilibrium. There are four cases: (1) C does not fight regardless of ethnopolitical inclusion status, (2) C will attempt a coup if included but will not initiate a civil war if excluded, (3) C does not attempt a coup if included but will launch a civil war if excluded, and (4) C fights regardless of ethnopolitical inclusion status. The first case is true if C is weak, Lemma E.2 rules out the second case, and either of the last two cases are possible if C is strong.

No further assumptions are needed to show that G will optimally exclude C in Case 4. The potential benefit of inclusion is preventing C from fighting (recall Lemma E.2 shows that if C is excluded and strong, then it will fight). However, if C fights even if included, then there is no benefit for G from including C. Instead, there is only a cost for G because C wins with higher probability if included. Notably, Case 4 is implicitly the focus of Roessler (2011) because he assumes leaders trade off between different types of threats and opt to exclude groups and face civil wars rather than to face removal at the center.

Cases 1 and 3 require additional assumptions to characterize G's optimal choice. The analysis imposes assumptions to generate the substantively relevant implications that G excludes if C will not rebel, and includes C if that prevents fighting. The idea behind exclusion in Case 1 is that if C will not punish G by fighting if excluded, then G does not pay a severe penalty to exclusion. Still, as Assumption E.2 and Lemma

E.3 formalize, this result requires the shift in the balance of power based on inclusion/exclusion to be greater than the change in G's commitment ability. This implies that G always excludes weak C. The idea behind inclusion in Case 3 is that if inclusion prevents fighting, then this is optimal for G. Still, as Assumption E.3 and Lemma E.3 formalize, this result requires fighting to be sufficiently costly to compensate G for the increase in C's bargaining leverage induced by inclusion.

Assumption E.2. *The other parameter characterizing the bounds of θ_i is* $\overline{\theta}_i = \min\left\{\frac{q_{i,w}}{q_{e,w}} \cdot \theta_e, 1\right\}$.

Assumption E.3. $\phi \geq \frac{\frac{q_{i,s}}{\theta_i} - q_{e,s}}{\frac{q_{i,s}}{\theta_i} + 1 - q_{e,s}}$

Lemma E.3 (Optimal ethnopolitical inclusion)**.** *If C is weak, then G excludes C. If C is strong, then G includes C if $\theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i$ and excludes otherwise, for $\hat{\theta}_i$ defined in Equation E.4.*

Proof. Because weak C does not fight in equilibrium regardless of ethnopolitical inclusion status (see Lemmas E.1 and E.2), it is optimal to exclude the weak type if:

$$E\big[U_G(\text{exclude})\big] = 1 - \frac{(1-\phi)\cdot q_{e,w}}{\theta_e} > 1 - \frac{(1-\phi)\cdot q_{i,w}}{\theta_i} = E\big[U_G(\text{include})\big],$$

which Assumption E.2 implies is true.

If $\theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i$, then it is optimal for G to include the strong type if:

$$E\big[U_G(\text{include})\big] = 1 - \frac{(1-\phi)\cdot q_{i,s}}{\theta_i} > (1-\phi)\cdot(1-q_{e,s}) = E\big[U_G(\text{exclude})\big],$$

which Assumption E.3 implies is true.

If $\theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i$, then it is optimal for G to exclude the strong type if:

$$E\big[U_G(\text{exclude})\big] = (1-\phi)\cdot(1-q_{e,s}) > (1-\phi)\cdot(1-q_{i,s}) = E\big[U_G(\text{include})\big],$$

which is true from assuming $q_{i,s} > q_{e,s}$. ■

Proposition E.1 (Equilibrium strategy profile)**.** *The following strategy profiles constitute the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game, and all equilibria are payoff-equivalent.*

- *Ethnopolitical inclusion stage:*
  - *If C is strong and $\theta_i \geq \hat{\theta}_i$, then G includes C.*
  - *If C is strong and $\theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i$, then G excludes C.*
  - *If C is weak, then G excludes C.*
- *Bargaining and fighting stages:*
  - *If C is excluded and weak, then $x^* = (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{q_{e,w}}{\theta_e}$. C accepts any offer $x \geq (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{q_{e,w}}{\theta_e}$ and fights otherwise. Along the equilibrium path, no violence occurs.*

- *If C is included and weak, then $x^* = (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{q_{i,w}}{\theta_i}$. C accepts any offer $x \geq (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{q_{i,w}}{\theta_i}$ and fights otherwise. Along the equilibrium path, no violence occurs.*
- *If C is included, strong, and $\theta_i \geq \hat{\theta}_i$, then $x^* = (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{q_{i,s}}{\theta_i}$. C accepts any offer $x \geq (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{q_{i,s}}{\theta_i}$ and fights otherwise. Along the equilibrium path, no violence occurs.*
- *If C is excluded and strong, then $x^* \in [0,1]$ and C fights in response to any offer. Along the equilibrium path, a civil war occurs.*
- *If C is included, strong, and $\theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i$, then $x^* \in [0,1]$ and C fights in response to any offer. Along the equilibrium path, a coup occurs.*

E.2 Comparative Statics for Pre-Colonial States

The following provides the formal theoretic logic behind all the hypotheses presented in the paper. Every proposition first states the relevant terms for all three types of groups, followed by the hypothesis. Finally, for all the propositions for which PCS and SLPCS groups exhibit different behavior, part c shows that assuming β_j is the same for all groups implies that PCS and SLPCS groups are identical. Therefore, the results clearly explain why Assumption 1 (about θ_i) is key for distinguishing the equilibrium behavior of groups in PCS countries from SL groups, and Assumption 2 (about β_j) is key for distinguishing the equilibrium behavior of groups within PCS countries, i.e. PCS versus SLPCS.

To enable interpreting the predictions of the model probabilistically, the comparative statics analysis assumes explicit probability distributions from which two parameters are drawn: whether C is strong/weak and θ_i. Nature draws whether C is strong or weak from a Bernoulli distribution such that γ percent of groups are strong and $1-\gamma$ are weak. Nature draws θ_i from a smooth cumulative density function indexed as F_m, for $m \in \{P, S\}$, with full support over $\left[\underline{\theta}_i, \overline{\theta}_i\right]$. The distribution is F_P for a PCS country and F_S for a non-PCS country, i.e., stateless country. F_S has strict first-order stochastic dominance over F_P, which implies $F_P\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right) > F_S\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)$, for $\hat{\theta}_i$ defined in Equation E.4. This formalizes Assumption 1. Regarding the subscripts, when the distinction is between PCS and non-PCS *countries*, the subscripts are capitalized, $m \in \{P, S\}$. When the distinction is among PCS, SLPCS, and SL *groups*, the subscripts are lower-case, $j \in \{p, sp, s\}$.

Proposition E.2 characterizes equilibrium inclusion likelihood depending on whether C is a PCS, a SLPCS, or an SL group. To calculate the inclusion percentage for each, there is β_j percent chance that the group will be exogenously included. Among the remaining $1-\beta_j$, the $1-\gamma$ percent of types that are weak are excluded (Lemma E.2). Of the remaining $(1-\beta_j)\cdot\gamma$, only in the $1-F_m\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)$ percent of cases with a high enough realization of θ_i that strong C would not stage a coup under inclusion will C be included in equilibrium (Lemma E.3), for $m \in \{P, S\}$. These percentages differ across the three historical types of groups because of the β_j terms and F_m distributions.

Proposition E.2 (Ethnopolitical inclusion)**.**

Part a. *Among PCS groups, $\beta_p + (1-\beta_p)\cdot\gamma\cdot\left[1-F_P\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)\right]$ percent are included in equilibrium and $(1-\beta_p)\cdot\left[\gamma\cdot F_P\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)+1-\gamma\right]$ percent are excluded. Among SLPCS groups, $\beta_{sp} + (1-\beta_{sp})\cdot\gamma\cdot\left[1-F_P\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)\right]$ percent are included and $(1-\beta_{sp})\cdot\left[\gamma\cdot F_P\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)+1-\gamma\right]$ percent are excluded. Among SL groups,*

$\beta_s + (1-\beta_s)\cdot\gamma\cdot\left[1-F_S\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)\right]$ *percent are included and* $(1-\beta_s)\cdot\left[\gamma\cdot F_S\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)+1-\gamma\right]$ *percent are excluded.*

Part b (Hypothesis 3). *SLPCS groups are less likely to be included than SL groups.*

Part c. *Without Assumption 2, i.e., if* $\beta_j = \beta \in (0,1)$ *for all* j*, then SLPCS and PCS groups are both less likely to be included than SL groups.*

Proof of part b. Need to show:

$$\beta_{sp} + (1-\beta_{sp})\cdot\gamma\cdot\left[1-F_P\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)\right] < \beta_s + (1-\beta_s)\cdot\gamma\cdot\left[1-F_S\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)\right]$$

This follows because $\beta_s > \beta_{sp}$ and $F_P\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right) > F_S\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)$.

Proof of part c. Follows from $F_P\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right) > F_S\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)$. ■

Proposition E.3 characterizes equilibrium civil war likelihood for excluded groups. The logic for the different terms is that strong excluded groups initiate civil wars whereas weak excluded groups do not initiate civil wars. This effect is independent of whether a country is PCS or not. However, excluded groups in PCS countries differ in equilibrium from groups in non-PCS countries because a larger percentage of excluded groups are strong in PCS countries (i.e., PCS groups and SLPCS groups) than in non-PCS countries, which follows from $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$.

Proposition E.3 (Civil war propensity conditional on exclusion)**.**

Part a. *Among excluded PCS groups,* $\frac{\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)+1-\gamma}$ *percent initiate civil wars. Among excluded SLPCS groups,* $\frac{\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)+1-\gamma}$ *percent initiate civil wars. Among excluded SL groups,* $\frac{\gamma\cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\gamma\cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)+1-\gamma}$ *percent initiate civil wars.*

Part b (Hypotheses 4 and 5). *Among excluded groups, both PCS groups and SLPCS groups initiate civil wars more frequently than SL groups.*

Proof of part b. Need to show:

$$\frac{\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)+1-\gamma} > \frac{\gamma\cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\gamma\cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)+1-\gamma}$$

Because $F_P\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right) > F_S\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)$, it suffices to show:

$$\frac{d}{dF_m}\left[\frac{F_m}{\gamma\cdot F_m+1-\gamma}\right] = \frac{1-\gamma}{\left[\gamma\cdot F_m+1-\gamma\right]^2} > 0$$

■

Proposition E.4 characterizes equilibrium coup attempt likelihood for included groups. C only attempts a coup in equilibrium if (1) it is strong, (2) θ_i is sufficiently low, and (3) C is exogenously included. (This logic directly implies that if there was no exogenous inclusion parameter, i.e., if $\beta_j = 0$ for all groups, then coups would never occur in equilibrium. G would optimally choose to exclude any challenger that would

attempt a coup if included.) Nature exogenously includes PCS groups more frequently than other groups and θ_i is, in expectation, lower in PCS countries. Therefore, conditional on inclusion, PCS groups attempt coups at higher rates than SL groups (H6). There is no similar prediction for SLPCS groups relative to SL groups (under Assumption 2) because SLPCS groups' exogenous inclusion probability is lower than that for SL groups.

Proposition E.4 (Coup propensity conditional on inclusion)**.**

Part a. *Among included PCS groups,* $\frac{\beta_p \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_p + (1-\beta_p) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]}$ *percent attempt a coup. Among included SLPCS groups,* $\frac{\beta_{sp} \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_{sp} + (1-\beta_{sp}) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]}$ *percent attempt a coup. Among included SL groups,* $\frac{\beta_s \cdot \gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_s + (1-\beta_s) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)]}$ *percent initiate coups.*

Part b (Hypothesis 6). *Among included groups, PCS groups attempt coups more frequently than SL groups.*

Part c. *Without Assumption 2, i.e., if* $\beta_j = \beta \in (0, 1)$ *for all* j*, then among included groups, PCS and SLPCS groups both attempt coups more frequently than SL groups.*

Proof of part b. Need to show:

$$\frac{\beta_p \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_p + (1-\beta_p) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]} > \frac{\beta_s \cdot \gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_s + (1-\beta_s) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)]} \tag{E.5}$$

Both sides of the inequality strictly increase in $F(\cdot)$. Therefore, can tighten the upper bound of the right-hand side by writing:

$$\frac{\beta_p \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_p + (1-\beta_p) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]} > \frac{\beta_s \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_s + (1-\beta_s) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]}$$

Because $\beta_p > \beta_s$, showing that each of these expressions strictly increases in β suffices to prove the claim. Algebraic simplifying yields:

$$\frac{d}{d\beta_j}\left[\frac{\beta_j \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_j + (1-\beta_j) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]}\right] = \gamma^2 \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) \cdot \left[1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)\right] > 0$$

Proof of part c. Follows because both sides of the Equation E.5 inequality strictly increase in F_m. ■

Combining Propositions E.2 and E.3 yields Proposition E.5, which characterizes groups' unconditional civil war propensity (i.e., averaging over inclusion frequency). For each group, this is the equilibrium percentage that is strong and excluded. Hypothesis 1 follows because—compared to SL groups—SLPCS groups are less likely to be exogenously included and, conditional on being strong, more likely to be strategically excluded to prevent a coup attempt. There is no similar prediction for PCS groups relative to SL groups because of higher β_j for PCS groups.

Proposition E.5 (Unconditional civil war propensity)**.**

Part a. *Among PCS groups,* $(1-\beta_p) \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P\left(\hat{\theta}_i\right)$ *percent initiate civil wars. Among*

SLPCS groups, $(1-\beta_{sp})\cdot\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)$ percent initiate civil wars. Among SL groups, $(1-\beta_s)\cdot\gamma\cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$ percent initiate civil wars.

Part b (Hypothesis 1). *SLPCS groups initiate civil wars more frequently than SL groups.*

Part c. *Without Assumption 2, i.e., if $\beta_j=\beta\in(0,1)$ for all j, then PCS and SLPCS groups both initiate civil wars more frequently than SL groups.*

Proof of part b. Need to show:

$$(1-\beta_{sp})\cdot\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > (1-\beta_s)\cdot\gamma\cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$$

This follows from $\beta_s>\beta_{sp}$ and $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)>F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$.

Proof of part c. Follows from $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)>F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$. ■

Combining Propositions E.2 and E.4 yields Proposition E.6, which characterizes groups' unconditional coup attempt propensity. For each group, this is the equilibrium percentage of groups that are strong, exogenously included, and belong to countries where θ_i is sufficiently low that strong and included groups attempt coups in equilibrium. Hypothesis 2 follows because PCS groups—compared to SL groups—are more likely to be exogenously included, and θ_i is more likely to be below $\hat{\theta}_i$ in PCS countries than in non-PCS countries. There is no similar prediction for SLPCS groups relative to SL groups because of lower β_j for PCS groups.

Proposition E.6 (Unconditional coup propensity)**.**

Part a. *Among PCS groups, $\beta_p\cdot\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)$ percent initiate coups. Among SLPCS groups, $\beta_{sp}\cdot\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)$ initiate coups. Among SL groups, $\beta_s\cdot\gamma\cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$ initiate coups.*

Part b (Hypothesis 2). *PCS groups attempt coups more frequently than SL groups.*

Part c. *Without Assumption 2, i.e., if $\beta_j=\beta\in(0,1)$ for all j, then PCS and SLPCS groups both initiate coups more frequently than SL groups.*

Proof of part b. Need to show:

$$\beta_p\cdot\gamma\cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > \beta_s\cdot\gamma\cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$$

This follows from $\beta_p>\beta_s$ and $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)>F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$.

Proof of part c. Follows from $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)>F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$. ■

E.3 Extension: Internal Organization of PCS Groups

The two main assumptions about PCS groups do not address the internal organization and capacity of PCS groups. This section extends the model to incorporate the plausible additional consideration that a history

of political hierarchy made PCS groups more likely to be the strong type of challenger, and shows that the logic is unchanged for all six hypotheses. This extension incorporates the idea from earlier research that pre-colonial statehood strengthens institutions and coordination (Bockstette et al., 2002; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Wig, 2016)—but only within the PCS group *and not* for the country as a whole. The many examples presented above, especially during the decolonization era, ground the present argument that PCS groups created a fractured political scene at the country level—in part because of their greater internal coherence.

This section imposes the additional assumption that PCS groups are more likely to be the strong type of C than are other types of groups. Denote γ_j as the probability a group is strong, for $j \in \{p, s, sp\}$ and $1 > \gamma_p > \gamma_s = \gamma_{sp} > 0$. The following explains why H1 through H6 are unaltered in this extension.

1. This result is unaltered because it concerns a comparison between SLPCS and SL groups, and both have the same value of γ_j (as in the baseline model where all groups have a common γ).

2. The extension enhances the magnitude of the original effect because—compared to excluded SL groups—a larger percentage of excluded PCS groups are the strong type. Formally, now differences in γ_j in addition to F_m generate the result. It suffices to show:

$$\frac{d}{d\gamma_j}\left[\frac{\gamma_j \cdot F_m}{\gamma_j \cdot F_m + 1 - \gamma_j}\right] = \frac{F_m}{\left[\gamma_j \cdot F_m + 1 - \gamma_j\right]^2} > 0$$

3. This result is unaltered because it concerns a comparison between SLPCS and SL groups, and both have the same value of γ_j (as in the baseline model where all groups have a common γ).

4. The extension enhances the magnitude of the original effect because—compared to included SL groups—a larger percentage of included PCS groups are the strong type, yielding greater equilibrium coup frequency. Formally, now differences in γ_j in addition to F_m and β_j generate the result. It suffices to show:

$$\frac{d}{d\gamma_j}\left[\frac{\beta_j \cdot \gamma_j \cdot F_m}{\beta_j + (1-\beta_j) \cdot \gamma_j \cdot (1 - F_m)}\right] = \frac{\beta_j^2 \cdot F_m}{\left[\beta_j + (1-\beta_j) \cdot \gamma_j \cdot (1 - F_m)\right]^2} > 0$$

5. This result is unaltered because it concerns a comparison between SLPCS and SL groups, and both have the same value of γ_j (as in the baseline model where all groups have a common γ).

6. Same logic as the fourth point, and follows directly from $\gamma_p > \gamma_s$.

E.4 Related Formal Literature

The present model relates to two strands of the formal literature. First, many have modeled civil wars and revolutions as a bargaining process (Powell 2004; Fearon 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). This literature provides the key theoretical insight that costly fighting can occur in equilibrium if the government's ability to credibly commit to promises is low. The novel element here is that the ethnopolitical access choice allows the government to choose its commitment ability in equilibrium—and it may be optimal to choose *low* commitment ability. The present model also enables studying how commitment ability affects the *type* of fighting—coups or civil wars—in addition to its occurrence. Finally, it enables examining how parameters, such as those affected by pre-colonial statehood, affect these decisions.

Other models show that building up the military—possibly to deter rebel groups—can trigger coups (Acemoglu et al. 2010; Besley and Robinson 2010). However, these models do not consider the possibility of pacifying the societal threat by sharing power with the opposition, nor the conditions under which that behavior will be optimal. They also assume that *all* governments face equal problems at credibly committing to promises toward their military. By contrast, the present framework enables addressing the key question of how governments in countries with a pre-colonial state differed from governments in countries without a pre-colonial state group, and the consequences for coups and civil wars. Francois et al. (2015) contains elements that more closely resemble the present setup, although the triggering factor for fighting in their model also does not enable capturing the key features of pre-colonial statehood studied here. Whereas in their model the governing actor receives a non-transferable positive rent that generates the possibility of equilibrium fighting, the commitment parameter θ_k in the present model enables a more substantively relevant connection with pre-colonial statehood.

E.5 Key Assumptions about Ethnicity, Civil Wars, and Coups

Two implicit assumptions in much ethnic conflict research are (1) ethnicity is a useful framework for understanding motives for civil wars and for coups, even though these events are rarely couched purely in ethnic terms, and (2) insurgencies and coups are alternative technologies for achieving concessions from governments if bargaining fails, even though these processes also differ in important ways. The present theoretical framework adopts these premises, which this section defends at greater length.

First, scholars have proposed various mechanisms to link ethnicity to different conflict technologies (Fearon 2006 provides a broader overview). Cederman et al. (2010) and Cederman et al. (2013) discuss how the spread of nationalism to the colonial and post-colonial worlds created ideas that "ethnic likes should rule over ethnic likes" (Cederman et al. 2010, 92), and turned the state into an non-ethnically neutral arena for exercising power (Cederman et al. 2013, 26-27). Ethnic exclusion acts as a specific mechanism for enflaming ethnic tensions and triggering civil war organized on ethnic lines. Harkness (2016) focuses on a different historical factor: colonizers recruited their militaries along ethnic lines based on misguided ideas regarding loyal "martial" races. This, in turn, led some post-colonial rulers to organize their militaries along ethnic lines and therefore create an ethnic identity impetus for many military coups. Roessler (2011, 313) posits a more indirect role for ethnicity by claiming that ethnic identity can serve as an "information shortcut" for distinguishing loyalists from disloyal actors, and explicitly does not "argu[e] that competing elites are necessarily motivated by ethnic aims." Therefore, in tenuous post-colonial ruling coalitions, ethnicity could serve as a useful basis for structuring the regime even if actors did not perceive ethnic identity as inherently important. Horowitz instead links ethnicity to coups and civil wars on the basis of perceived group superiority.

The Nigeria example presented in Section B.3 provides an example of the possible salience of ethnic ties during a coup. Igbo officers led a successful coup attempt in 1966. Despite stating that they aimed to create a unitary government without ethnic bias, deep-seated regional cleavages caused northern leaders to perceive the coup "not so much as an effort to impose a unitary government as a plot by the Igbo to dominate Nigeria" (Lovejoy 1992). This led to a northern-dominated countercoup in 1966, followed by ethnopolitical exclusion of Igbo and an Igbo secession attempt in 1967.

Second, Roessler (2016, 37) discusses important similarities in aims between coups and civil wars. "I conceive of coups and rebellions, or insurgencies, as analogues; both represent anti-regime techniques that dissidents use to force a redistribution of power. They can be distinguished, however, by their organizational basis. Coup conspirators leverage partial control of the state (and the resources and matériel that comes

with access to the state) in their bid to capture political power . . . In contrast, rebels or insurgents lack such access and have to build a private military organization to challenge the central government and its military." Emphasizing these similarities does not deny that coups and civil wars sometimes seek divergent military aims (e.g., some civil wars seek to create an autonomous or independent region rather than to capture power at the center). For the present purposes, the key point is that the government can be challenged using either a coup or a civil war—as opposed to the challenger accepting the government's bargaining proposal—which is a useful simplification for thinking about causes of conflict. In the formal theory literature, Fearon (1995) popularized thinking about international war in terms of bargaining breakdown, which many have also applied to studying civil war (Fearon 2004; Powell 2012; Paine 2016) and to coups (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).

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