Ethnic Violence in Africa:
Destructive Legacies of Pre-Colonial States

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Abstract

Despite endemic ethnic violence in post-colonial Africa, minimal research has analyzed historical causes of regional variance in civil wars and military coups. This paper argues that ethnic differences gained heightened political salience in countries with an ethnic group organized as a pre-colonial state (PCS). Combining this insight with a model on post-colonial rulers' tradeoff between coups and civil wars implies PCS groups and other groups in their country should more frequently participate in ethnic violence. Regression evidence using original data on pre-colonial African states demonstrates that ethnic groups in countries with at least one PCS group have participated in either ethnic civil wars or coups more frequently than ethnic groups in other countries, with the modal type of violence for different groups mediated by how pre-colonial statehood affected ethnopolitical inclusion. Before 1989, 34 of 35 ethnic groups that participated in major civil wars belonged to countries with a PCS group.

Keywords: African politics, Civil war, Coup d'etat, Ethnic politics, Historical statehood

Political violence such as civil wars and military coups has plagued Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, "Africa") since independence, causing millions of battle deaths and contributing substantially to the region's poor overall economic performance. Prior to 1990, 53 African rulers lost power via violent overthrow whereas only one stepped down after losing an election (Reno, 2003, 324). Violent perpetrators have often organized support around ethnic identity and have frequently espoused ethnic aims (Horowitz, 1985; Decalo, 1990), and almost every major civil war between 1945 and 2005 involved distinct ethnic claims and recruitment.[1] However, African ethnic groups also exhibit considerable variance. Seventy-nine percent of politically relevant ethnic groups did not participate in any ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2005, and 80 percent did not participate in any successful coup attempts.[2]

Although considerable research has advanced our understanding of the ethnicity-violence relationship, existing theories have trouble accounting for variation within Africa. By focusing primarily on post-colonial causes, they overlook longer-term factors that may have affected variance in key underlying factors such as the political salience of ethnic differences. Cederman et al. (2010) and Cederman et al. (2013) consider African countries among a broader global sample and show that ethnic groups excluded from power in the central government are more likely to initiate civil wars. They argue that the spread of nationalist ideology to the colonized world explains the prevalence of ethnic exclusion in the post-colonial world (Cederman et al., 2013, 30-54). Roessler (2011) argues that weak institutions across Africa have fostered an internal security dilemma whereby leaders fearful of a coup d'etat follow an ethnic identity logic to exclude individuals from power at the center. Francois et al. (2015) examine a similar tradeoff and highlight the striking pattern—in contrast to earlier characterizations of "big man" rule in Africa—that to prevent both coups and revolutions, African rulers have consistently allocated cabinet posts in proportion to ethnic group size. Horowitz (1985) and Decalo (1990) present numerous case studies in which political factions emerged along ethnic lines in Africa and contributed to violence.

However, factors such as exposure to international ideologies and weak institutions were largely constant across the region. Why has Uganda experienced several major ethnic civil wars whereas Kenya has experienced none? Why did Benin experience a spiral of successful military coup attempts after independence

[1]Using Fearon and Laitin's (2003) and Roessler's (2011) datasets, plus the data used in the present paper, yields a count of 35 out of 36.

[2]Figures calculated from data described below.

but not Cote d'Ivoire? Elusive answers to key questions such as these have engendered prominent critiques alleging that ethnic differences offer little explanatory power for political violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fearon et al., 2007).

This paper provides a new perspective on ethnicity and conflict by taking a longer-term historical perspective. It examines post-colonial legacies of ethnic groups organized as a state prior to colonization ("PCS groups") in Africa and provides three main contributions: (1) a new theory showing how pre-colonial statehood exacerbated the internal security dilemma that African rulers faced after independence, (2) a novel dataset on pre-colonial states in Africa, and (3) empirical evidence that this factor can explain considerable variance in post-colonial ethnic civil wars and military coups—in fact, almost every major civil war in the region prior to 1989 occurred in a country with a PCS group.

First, the theory explains why ethnic differences were more politically salient at independence in countries with a PCS group and why PCS groups tended to gain political ascendancy. PCS groups were, on average, distinguished from non-PCS groups through diverse historical channels: pre-colonial warfare and slaving, privileges in colonial governance (indirect rule), and incentives to create regionally rather than nationally oriented policies during the post-World War II decolonization era. These mechanisms contributed to divisive inter-ethnic relationships while also increasing PCS groups' likelihood of capturing the state at independence.

The theory then explains how these historical legacies affected rulers' internal security dilemma to produce specific patterns of ethnic violence. A game theoretic model formalizes a post-independence government's tradeoff between coups and civil wars: whereas including other ethnic groups in power at the center improves the government's ability to commit to a deal, this strategic choice also enables the challenger to potentially overthrow the incumbent through a military coup. By contrast, excluding the group from access to political power in the capital forces the group to mobilize an outsider rebellion if it wants to overthrow the incumbent. Greater political salience of ethnic differences in countries with a PCS group worsened rulers' ability to commit to deals at the center, which encouraged ethnopolitical exclusion. PCS groups' historical privileges frequently enabled them to control the government, which generated strong civil war incentives for *non-PCS* groups within their country because they tended to be excluded. Less frequently, upheaval at the center caused by PCS groups resulted in their own exclusion, creating civil war incentives for some PCS groups. Finally, weak commitment ability and frequent political turmoil in countries with a PCS group also created

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incentives for included groups to attempt coups. Incentives for violence tended to be weaker in countries without a PCS group, especially in the immediate post-independence period.

Second, the paper presents an original dataset on pre-colonial states in Africa integrated with the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman et al., 2010). Continent-wide historical maps and numerous additional secondary sources (96 in total) were used to code a binary PCS variable for each EPR ethnic group, based on the following working definition for pre-colonial statehood: co-ethnics governed a substantial percentage of members of the EPR ethnic group through a single or small number of political organizations that exhibited some degree of centralized rule on the eve of colonization. This dataset improves upon the widely used Murdock (1967) dataset by (1) coding pre-colonial statehood for a list of politically relevant ethnic groups with available data on participation in violence, (2) reducing measurement error by assigning different PCS scores to far-flung ethnic groups whose level of political organization differed across space, and (3) providing more detailed and easily replicable information for each ethnic group (Appendix A provides lengthy country-by-country scoring justifications).

Third, statistical evidence using a panel of ethnic groups between independence and 2005 provides the main contribution. The results suggest that pre-colonial states are among the most important contributors to political violence in Africa, contrasting with the predominant focus of the civil war literature on more contemporary correlates. The most striking finding is that before 1989 during the Cold War period, civil wars were almost entirely confined to "PCS countries": 34 of 35 ethnic groups that participated in major civil wars belonged to countries with a PCS group. This correlation is also strong in the full temporal sample, and—as the theoretical framework anticipates—the estimated effect is especially pronounced for the stateless groups in PCS countries, which are more than four times more likely to participate in a major ethnic civil war than are groups in non-PCS countries. Additionally, PCS groups participate in successful coup attempts more than twice as frequently as groups in non-PCS countries. The statistical significance of these findings is robust to controlling for a rich set of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial covariates, and the estimated substantive magnitude of the effects is consistently large. Qualitative evidence demonstrates that PCS groups frequently were central to ethnic violence.

The new perspective offered here on civil wars contributes to broader research on historical roots of African institutional weakness (Akyeampong et al., 2014; Nunn, 2014), historical causes of modern civil war and related political outcomes (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014; Dincecco et al., 2016; Fearon and Laitin, 2014;

Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016; García-Ponce and Wantchékon, 2017), and legacies of pre-colonial statehood. Many have linked pre-colonial statehood to stronger economic performance in Africa (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013) and elsewhere (Bockstette et al., 2002; Dell et al., 2017). Higher economic development is supposed to depress civil war propensity, which, intriguingly, yields the theoretical prior that pre-colonial statehood should reduce political violence.

The argument and findings depart from two related studies on pre-colonial statehood and post-colonial civil war. Wig (2016) and Depetris-Chauvin (2015) both reach the opposite conclusion as the current paper: ethnic groups organized as a pre-colonial state *decrease* post-independence civil war prospects. Below I discuss differences in data and statistical models that likely yield these divergent findings. Briefly, a core element of the present theory is that PCS groups create within-country spillovers, which implies the conflict propensity of stateless groups differs systematically depending upon whether or not there is a PCS group in their country. All the statistical results in Wig (2016) and Depetris-Chauvin (2015) are premised on within-country comparisons (more technically, every model contains country fixed effects) and therefore compare the conflict propensity of—using the language of the current paper—PCS groups to non-PCS groups within their country. However, their approach will yield incorrect results if PCS groups caused within-country spillovers. Furthermore, compared to these two contributions, the current theory and results offer insight into a wider range of outcomes, such as ethnopolitical inclusion and military coups.

The present emphasis also differs from many classic works that downplay the importance of the diverse forms of political organizations in pre-colonial Africa. They instead focus primarily on generic challenges that rulers across time have faced in a region that, on average, is characterized by low population density (Herbst, 2000), or on how European colonial administrators responded to a lack of extant political organizations by "inventing" chiefly traditions to facilitate centralized tax collection in previously acephalous communities and by granting widespread despotic powers to appointed leaders (Ranger, 2012; Mamdani, 1996).

Finally, the conclusion discusses possible implications outside of Africa. Compared to other regions of the world, Africa is unique because few countries contain a dominant ethnic majority group. By making ruling ethnic groups vulnerable, this may explain the prevalence of organization around ethnic identity in Africa, whereas modern states derived from older Asian empires with numerically preponderant groups may exhibit different dynamics.

1 Politicizing Ethnic Differences: Effects of Pre-Colonial Statehood

Why do ethnic differences sometimes compose an important political cleavage? What causes ethnic violence? These questions have received considerable attention in recent research on horizontal inequalities[3] and ethnic conflict (Cederman et al., 2010; Roessler, 2011; Cederman et al., 2013; Wucherpfennig et al., 2016) and in ethnicity research more broadly (Bates, 1981; Chandra, 2006; Fearon, 2006). The present theoretical framework builds off their insights to explain why ethnic groups with pre-colonial states should be more likely to create politicized ethnic differences (this section) and to spark ethnic civil wars and military coups (next section).

1.1 Existing Literature

Recent political science research such as Cederman et al. (2013) and Wucherpfennig et al. (2016) has primarily concentrated on three historical factors to explain the emergence of horizontal political inequalities: historical warfare, modernization and the spread of nationalism to the Third World, and strategies of European colonial rule. First, the pre-colonial era in Africa also coincided with a pre-nationalist era. Historically, before nationalist ideas spread outside Europe, warfare was an important cause of group-level inequality and domination (Cederman et al., 2013, 33). Second, emergent nationalism additionally contributed to hardening ethnic identities, facilitating inter-ethnic inequalities, and recognizing grievances. Whereas many pre-modern societies lacked the ability to translate macro-cleavages into political action, modernization and nationalism created new boundaries and inter-group differences that engendered nascent politicized distinctions (Cederman et al. 2013, 34; Gellner 1983). Because most post-colonial countries in Africa combine many nations—specifically, *ethnic* nations—into a single political unit, politicized ethnic differences translated into politically salient horizontal inequalities after independence. Third, colonizer identity and distance from the capital also influenced possibilities for gaining power at the center (Wucherpfennig et al., 2016). Britain tended to cede greater political authority to indigenous political units in its colonies whereas France sought to centralize colonial rule to a greater extent. More indirect British ruling strategies created greater

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[3]As used here, horizontal inequalities refer mostly to inequality in political status between ethnic groups, although more broadly corresponds to political, economic, and social inequalities across any culturally defined groups (Cederman et al., 2013, 31).

opportunities for groups located farther from the capital to gain access to power at independence.

1.2 Pre-Colonial Statehood

These theories, however, do not explain *which* types of groups within Africa were most likely to contribute to horizontal ethnopolitical inequalities and, consequently, politicized ethnic grievances. Examining consequences of pre-colonial states through different historical periods—pre-colonial, high colonial, and decolonization—addresses this gap. The following historical discussion grounds two key assumptions about PCS groups and their within-country spillover effects that underpin the model of post-colonial ethnic violence in the next section. First, ethnic differences were more politically salient in PCS countries than non-PCS countries, which increased the difficulty of committing to bargains at the center after independence in PCS countries. Second, within PCS countries, historical factors privileged PCS groups over stateless groups in their country to gain political inclusion in the central government at independence. Appendix B provides additional citations for individual cases.

Pre-colonial period. Pre-colonial Africa featured diverse forms of political organization, ranging from stateless societies such as the Maasai in Kenya to hierarchically organized polities with standing armies such as the Dahomey in Benin.[4] Centralized states tended to create more salient identities for the peoples they governed and engendered more pronounced inequality across groups. Reid (2012) argues that Africa experienced a military revolution during the 19th century that enlarged the scale and vision of political violence in many parts of the continent (109). Ethnic groups organized as centralized states were well-positioned to create the war economies needed to profit from European guns and slave trading. The Dahomey in Benin and Baganda in Uganda gained political dominance by defeating rival states. Earlier, between 1400 and 1700, territories that contain a PCS group were more than twice as likely (29% to 14%) to experience at least one war.[5] Many PCS groups also participated in the continent's widespread slave trade, as in Chad, Madagascar, Mali, and Sudan, which created inequalities between the raiders and the raided. These interactions often created durable and divisive identities, as in Sudan between elite riverine Arabs and previously enslaved Africans. The salient identities of PCS groups contrasted with the many non-PCS groups that "recognized

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[4]Throughout, for clarity, I use modern country names even when discussing pre-independence political units.

[5]Calculated by author using data presented below.

no common name and had no feeling that they belonged to a common polity," such as the Tonga in Zambia (Colson, 1969, 29).

High colonial period. European colonial rule perpetuated—and perhaps enhanced—horizontal ethnic inequalities created by divergent political histories, in particular by elevating PCS groups in the colonial governance hierarchy. Although the British most frequently preserved traditional hierarchies to enable "indirect" rule, other empires pursued a similar strategy, if to a lesser extent. Many PCS groups in British (e.g., Asante in Ghana, Buganda in Uganda, Hausa and Fulani in Nigeria, Lozi in Zambia, and riverine Arabs in Sudan), French (e.g., Fon in Benin, Muslim Sahelian groups in Chad), and Belgian (Tutsi in both Rwanda and Burundi) colonies were either ruled as de facto autonomous colonies or heavily privileged in the colonial administration. PCS groups provided natural allies because colonizers attempted to minimize colonial administrative costs by ruling through extant local political hierarchies. Famed British administrator Frederick Lugard originally developed the Native Authorities system—i.e., indirect rule—in northern Nigeria because the remains of the Sokoto caliphate provided a suitable bureaucratic infrastructure for governing the territory with few British officials on the ground. Gerring et al. (2011) provide statistical evidence from a sample of British colonies that a longer history as a pre-colonial state covaries with less direct colonial rule. This strategy of colonial rule often enabled PCS elites to control valuable resources such as land tenure allocation and funds from Native treasuries (Herbst 2000, 173-198; Posner 2005, 26-41).[6] Additionally, native self-governance frequently prevented cultural influences that would have undermined traditional elites, such as Britain's policy of not allowing Christian missionaries to operate in northern Nigeria, or France's similar policy in northern Chad.

By contrast, European colonizers often ruled stateless groups more directly than PCS groups, exemplified by France's divergent ruling strategies in northern and southern Chad. And even when non-PCS groups were ruled indirectly, invented colonial authorities tended to have low legitimacy and mobilization ability. In Nigeria, "[w]hen the British seized power in the north, they merely modernized an already accepted political institution. In the south, however, taxation was introduced to support a new order, which the people were prone to regard as tyrannical and antithetical to revered traditions" (Sklar and Whitaker, 1966, 21).

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[6]These instrumental motives for ethnic identification among PCS groups relate to Bates's (1981) argument that distributional conflicts over political goods can incentivize political organization around ethnic identity.

Decolonization period. Finally, different patterns of political party formation that emerged during decolonization reinforced the political salience of differences between PCS and stateless groups and engendered the fractured political arena that most PCS countries inherited at independence. In the decade and a half after 1945, Britain and France (and, hastily before granting independence, Belgium) introduced elections in their African colonies. This spurred political parties to form, some of which were organized around nationalist ideals whereas others mirrored ethnic splits. Factions formed during the decolonization era were consequential for post-independence coalitions because political parties that won power in the final colonial elections usually controlled the government at independence.

Uganda exemplifies PCS groups' privileges and the difficulty of forming broad nationalist parties during the decolonization era in colonies with a large PCS group, in contrast to non-PCS colonies like Cote d'Ivoire where a single nationalist party dominated the political landscape at independence. At the inception of Uganda's colonization, Britain bestowed the powerful state of Buganda with significant self-governance privileges. "The special status of Buganda in Uganda was the most important legacy of the colonial era" (Rothchild and Rogin, 1966, 341). Their founding treaty with Britain in 1900 "appeared to the Baganda as in some sense at least an agreement between equals" (341). Therefore, Buganda's later "integration within the rest of Uganda posed serious problems first to colonial officials and subsequently to nationally oriented African politicians [because] Buganda could not be dethroned from its dominant position without seriously compromising the viability of Uganda as a whole" (Doornbos, 1977, 241). In response to Britain's attempt to unify colonial administration after World War II, Buganda attempted to secede from the rest of Uganda to "safeguard the traditions, Kabakaship, and the customs of Buganda in an independent Uganda" (Kyeyune and Nsibambi, 1962). The king—known as the *kabaka*—cited Buganda's distinct status in the Uganda Agreement of 1900 to promote his claim.

Consequently, "the power of traditional groups ...precluded the success of a centralized, ideological mass party" among all Ugandans (Rothchild and Rogin, 1966, 389). Supporters of the *kabaka* instead created the Kabaka Yekka (KY; meaning "king only") party after the *kabaka* led a highly successful boycott of the 1961 Legislative Council elections in which less than 2% of eligible Baganda voted. KY provided "a practical avenue through which Buganda could enter national politics and yet preserve its own autonomy and unity" (358). The ethnically rooted party received 38% of total votes in the final pre-independence parliamentary elections (Schmidt, 1999). This enabled the *kabaka* to become Uganda's first post-independence president

in Uganda's unstable coalition government.

Other PCS countries that experienced electoral competition prior to independence exhibited similar patterns of politicized inter-ethnic differences generating locally oriented parties. In Nigeria, an aspiring sultan of Sokoto (pre-colonial state) led the Northern People's Congress. The party's platform emphasized "the integrity of the north [and] its traditions" whereas "support for broad Nigerian concerns occupied a clear second place" (Lovejoy, 1992). Benin's three hegemonic regional parties split among the former Dahomey kingdom—whose leader descended from the former royal house—the Porto Novo kingdom, and the north. A divide between PCS and non-PCS groups also occurred in the form of north/south splits in Chad and in Sudan, and a coastal/highlanders split in Madagascar.

PCS groups also caused politicized ethnic factions in colonies/countries that did not experience electoral competition. In Ethiopia (essentially uncolonized) and Rwanda and Burundi (ruled as appendages of the German and then Belgian empires), the monarchy *was* the state and naturally provided the main source of political cleavages. In two cases of violent transitions to independence, African rebel groups split along PCS lines: in Angola, Mbundu (PCS) for MPLA, Bakongo for FNLA, and Ovimbundu for UNITA; and in Zimbabwe, Shona for ZANU and Ndebele (PCS) for ZAPU.

Relating PCS groups to politicized ethnic differences yields two key assumptions for the theory of post-colonial ethnic violence presented next.

> **Assumption 1. Distinguishing PCS countries from non-PCS countries.** Ethnic differences were more politically salient in PCS countries than non-PCS countries, which made it more difficult to commit to bargains at the center after independence in PCS countries.

> **Assumption 2. Distinguishing ethnic groups within PCS countries.** Within PCS countries, historical factors privileged PCS groups over SLPCS groups to gain political inclusion in the central government at independence.

2 A Theory of Ethnic Violence: The Coup-Civil War Tradeoff

Existing contributions explain how horizontal ethnopolitical inequalities can cause post-colonial ethnic civil wars and military coups, but do not clearly explain variation across Africa. A simple model formalizes a government's tradeoff between coups and civil war: including other ethnic groups in power at the center im-

proves the government's ability to commit to a deal but also enables the challenger to potentially overthrow the incumbent through a military coup—whereas excluding the group forces it to use the more tenuous strategy of initiating a civil war if it tries to violently overthrow the incumbent. Examining how the considerations just presented about pre-colonial statehood affect this core tradeoff generates hypotheses about three types of ethnic groups: pre-colonial state groups (PCS), stateless groups in countries with at least one PCS group (SLPCS), and stateless groups in countries without any PCS groups (SL).[7] Table 1 summarizes the abbreviations.

Table 1: Summary of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Description
PCS group	Ethnic group organized as a state prior to European colonization, i.e., pre-colonial state (PCS).
PCS country	Country in which at least one ethnic group was organized as a state prior to European colonization.
Non-PCS country	Country in which no ethnic groups were organized as a state prior to European colonization.
SLPCS group	Ethnic group that was stateless prior to European colonization (hence "SL") in a PCS country (hence "PCS").
SL group	Ethnic group that was stateless prior to European colonization (hence "SL") in a non-PCS country. Therefore, the terms SL groups and non-PCS countries are interchangeable.

Greater political salience of ethnic differences and a more pressing internal security dilemma in PCS countries implies that all groups in PCS countries—even the stateless ones—should exhibit an elevated risk of ethnic violence. The theoretical model also shows that the expected type of violence depends on trends in groups' access to power at the center (H2, H3, H4). The legacies of pre-colonial statehood throughout the colonial era frequently enabled PCS groups access to power at the center but also increased their incentives to exclude other groups. This implies low inclusion rates for SLPCS groups (H1). Overall, compared to SL groups, PCS groups should be more likely to use an "insider" violence technique—because they tend to be included in power—and to initiate military coups (H6). Conversely, compared to SL groups, SLPCS groups should be more likely to use the "outsider" technology of mass rebellion/civil war because SLPCS groups tend to be excluded from power (H5).

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[7]For example, the Baganda in Uganda were organized under the Buganda kingdom before colonization and are a PCS group. Therefore, any stateless ethnic groups in Uganda, such as northern groups, are SLPCS. By contrast, there are no PCS groups in Kenya, and therefore all its groups (such as the Kikuyu) are SL. See Appendix Figure A.1.

2.1 Existing Literature

Cederman et al. (2013, ch. 4) emphasize that many post-colonial states face the problem of multiple nations contained in a single political unit. The post-colonial state does not provide a neutral arena for competing group interests, and ethnic groups instead view the state as a prize. Only by entering and exerting influence in the political arena can ethnic groups articulate their social, cultural, and economic interests. This institutional logic generates Cederman et al.'s key hypothesis: if the incumbent regime blocks access for challenging groups, then the excluded groups face incentives to violently rebel. Roessler (2011) builds on this theory by addressing a key question: why would a ruler exclude ethnic groups if this raises the likelihood of a costly activity, violent rebellion? He argues that leaders in post-colonial Africa have faced a tradeoff between military coups and civil wars. The surprising feasibility of executive removal by a military faction—given expectations at independence—has caused leaders to fear overthrow by political insiders. Many rulers have responded by prioritizing co-ethnics in central government positions and excluding members of other ethnic groups, triggering the types of incentives for outsiders to launch civil wars on which Cederman et al. (2013) focus. Roessler posits that these leadership security fears often provoke conflict specifically along ethnic lines because ethnic identity provides an easy information shortcut in countries where ethnicity is believed to be politically salient. This logic yields Roessler's (2011) core hypothesis that ethnopolitical exclusion substitutes civil war risk for coup risk.

Despite offering compelling logic for ethnic civil wars and military coups in post-colonial Africa, these theories do not address historical factors that explain variance in politicized ethnicity across ethnic groups and countries, nor why the internal security dilemma was more pernicious in some countries than others. Modeling a simple interaction between an incumbent governing faction (G) and a challenging faction (C) yields the main hypotheses, some of which are subtle and difficult to think through without formal structure. The text briefly describes the setup and intuition for the theoretical results. Appendix E formally presents and solves the complete and perfect information game solved using subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, as well as distinguishes the present model from others in the formal conflict bargaining literature.

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2.2 Model Setup and Equilibrium Analysis

The game begins with a series of Nature moves that determine G's commitment ability, C's strength, and whether G is able to make a strategic ethnopolitical inclusion choice. The Nature moves enable discussing possible outcomes of the model in probabilistic terms. With probability $1 - \beta_j \in (0, 1)$, the first strategic move in the game involves G making an ethnopolitical inclusion choice, i.e., "including" or "excluding" C from power at the center. With complementary probability β_j, this move does not occur because Nature exogenously requires G to include C. The subscript $j \in \{p, sp, s\}$ indicates that this probability differs depending on whether C is a PCS, SLPCS, or SL group. Next, a bargaining stage occurs. G offers a share $x \in [0, 1]$ of government revenues to C, and C responds by either accepting or fighting. If C accepts, G can commit to deliver x to C with probability $\theta_k \in (0, 1)$, and this probability depends on C's ethnopolitical inclusion status $k \in \{i, e\}$. With probability $1 - \theta_k$, C receives nothing if it accepts. Finally, C wins a fight with probability $p_{k,l} \in (0, 1)$ that depends on its ethnopolitical inclusion status k and on its exogenous strength $l \in \{s, w\}$ ("strong" or "weak," introduced below), and a fight destroys $\phi \in (0, 1)$ of revenues. A fight initiated by an included C is denoted as a coup attempt and a fight by an excluded C is denoted as a civil war. Appendix Figure E.1 presents the game tree.

This setup formalizes the countervailing consequences of ethnopolitical inclusion—the coup-civil war tradeoff—in a straightforward manner. On the one hand, including C at the center improves G's ability to commit to a deal. Specifically, C receives G's offer with probability θ_i if C is included and $\theta_e < \theta_i$ if excluded. On the other hand, C's probability of succeeding at a coup exceeds its probability of winning a civil war. Additionally, C is exogenously either a strong type or a weak type,[8] yielding four probability of winning terms and an ordering: $0 < p_{e,w} < p_{e,s} < p_{i,w} < p_{i,s} < 1$. These terms express (1) an included challenger wins a fight with higher probability than an excluded challenger (i.e., coup attempts succeed with higher probability than civil wars) and (2) conditional on ethnopolitical inclusion status, strong types win with higher probability than weak types.

Table 2 summarizes equilibrium behavior for different values of G's commitment ability and C's fighting

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[8]In the baseline model, C's strength is unrelated to whether C is a PCS group, although an extension summarized below (also see Appendix Section E.5) assumes PCS groups positively covary with the strong type.

strength.[9] If G will not be punished with a rebellion if it excludes C, then if possible G will exclude C—explaining why the weak type is always excluded if not exogenously included by Nature. By contrast, strong C will punish G with a civil war if excluded. If θ_i is low enough, then G faces a tradeoff between coups and civil wars. In this circumstance, if possible, G will exclude C and substitute civil wars for coups because rebellions succeed with lower probability than coup attempts. If instead θ_i is high enough, then G can prevent fighting by including the strong type at the center, the only circumstance in which G will choose to include C if not forced by Nature.

Table 2: Coups, Civil Wars, and Strategic Inclusion/Exclusion

	Weak C	**Strong C**
Low enough θ_i	If C included: No coup If C excluded: No civil war $\implies$ G prefers exclusion	If C included: Coup If C excluded: Civil war $\implies$ G prefers exclusion
High enough θ_i	If C included: No coup If C excluded: No civil war $\implies$ G prefers exclusion	If C included: No coup If C excluded: Civil war $\implies$ G prefers inclusion

2.3 Key Assumptions about Pre-Colonial Statehood

The model formalizes Assumptions 1 and 2 (see previous section) as follows. First, G is less able to commit to a deal with an included C in a PCS country because of factors discussed with Assumption 1. Appendix E formalizes this idea which, loosely, states that θ_i in expectation is higher in non-PCS countries than in PCS countries. This assumption generates the broad distinctions in conflict propensity between groups in PCS countries and SL groups.

This assumption offers an important consideration for weakly institutionalized environments. Even in settings where the rule of law and constitutions are not well-established, there are alternative ways for political leaders to commit to bargains. In many non-PCS countries, such as Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya, rulers created nationalist parties that facilitated inter-ethnic cooperation after independence. This relates to broader contentions from the authoritarian politics literature about how parties can alleviate commitment problems (Svolik, 2012). By contrast, the disruptive influence of PCS groups inhibited creating such institutions during the decolonization era. This inhibited any rulers' ability in a PCS country to commit to deals—regardless of whether or not a PCS group controlled the executive branch.

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[9]Appendix E presents sufficient assumptions for this behavior.

There are other, related, plausible microfoundations for this assumption. Ethnicity is defined by descent rules and therefore is difficult to change (Fearon, 2006). The more important is ethnic identity for defining ones' political identity, the more difficult it is to switch political identities to peacefully join the winning coalition—one possible mechanism to facilitate commitment over time. Therefore, in a dynamic interaction, if a citizen is on the losing side at any one point in time in a PCS country, then they will also expect to be on the losing side in the future, which can contribute to violence (Denny and Walter, 2014, 206-7).

Second, the exogenous inclusion probability β_j is higher if C is a PCS group than an SL group. Additionally, because PCS groups' domination at the center should crowd out stateless groups in their countries, β_j is lower for SLPCS groups than for SL groups. This assumption enables differentiating PCS from SLPCS groups with regard to expected type of ethnic violence.

Assuming the exogenous inclusion probability is highest for PCS groups follows from two aspects of Assumption 2. First, PCS groups' prominence in colonial governance often enabled them to be represented at the center in countries where SLPCS groups had gained prominence through elections—even if incorporating the PCS group created an unstable power-sharing coalition. For example, in Uganda, Milton Obote belonged to an SLPCS group and became the first post-independence prime minister via electoral success. However, due to the popularity of the PCS group Baganda's party, the two formed an electoral alliance out of political necessity—which later spiraled into ethnic violence. Second, the political ascendancy of PCS groups should also make them more likely to dominate all government positions. This implies G and C would belong to the same PCS group, which precludes G from excluding C along ethnic lines. Although the theory focuses primarily on *inter*-ethnic interactions, this consideration highlights the additional possibility of *intra*-ethnic power struggles. PCS groups' destabilization of the political arena could plausibly increase the likelihood of in-fighting amongst themselves, as could ongoing high-stakes events such as civil wars. For example, in Sudan, riverine Arabs (PCS group) have dominated power at the center since independence but successful military coups have rotated power between civilian and military regimes. Successful coup attempts in 1958, 1969, 1985, and 1989 were all related to failures by the incumbent government to eliminate southern rebels (Appendix B provides citations).

Notably, both the two main assumptions about pre-colonial statehood relate to commitment ability at the center rather than to the internal organization and capacity of PCS groups. Appendix Section E.5 extends the model to incorporate the plausible additional consideration that a history of political hierarchy made PCS

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groups more likely to be the strong type of challenger, and shows that all the main hypotheses are unchanged. This extension incorporates the idea from earlier research that pre-colonial statehood strengthens institutions and coordination (Bockstette et al., 2002; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Wig, 2016)—but, crucially, only within the PCS group and not for the country as a whole. The many examples presented above, especially during the decolonization era, ground the present argument that PCS groups created a fractured political scene at the country level—in part because of their greater internal coherence.

2.4 Hypotheses

The first four hypotheses are the building blocks for the two main hypotheses, H5 and H6, that unconditionally relate groups in PCS countries to elevated rates of either civil wars or coup attempts. These hypotheses also highlight the importance of disaggregating stateless groups by whether or not there are any PCS groups in their country because PCS groups should create within-country spillover effects.

H1. SLPCS groups should be included in power at the center less frequently than SL groups.

H1 follows from two considerations about SLPCS groups relative to SL groups. First, greater politicization of ethnicity in PCS countries than in non-PCS countries provides stronger *strategic* incentives for G to exclude C. This is formalized by assuming G's ability to commit to a deal with an included group, θ_i, tends to be higher in non-PCS countries than PCS countries (Assumption 1), and Table 2 shows that G prefers to exclude C if an included C will attempt a coup. Second, because PCS groups crowd out stateless groups in their country from power (Assumption 2), the *exogenous* inclusion parameter β_j is also lower for SLPCS groups than for SL groups. There is no similar implication as H1 for PCS groups relative to SL groups. Despite strategic incentives to exclude PCS groups, they are more frequently protected than SL groups by the exogenous inclusion parameter, which follows from Assumption 2.

H2. Among excluded groups, PCS groups should initiate civil wars more frequently than SL groups.

H3. Among excluded groups, SLPCS groups should initiate civil wars more frequently than SL groups.

To explain H2 and H3, weaker commitment ability at the center in PCS countries (Assumption 1) strengthens

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G's incentives to exclude a strong C because there is a higher chance that a strong C will attempt a coup if included. Therefore, a larger percentage of excluded groups in PCS countries than non-PCS countries are the strong type and, as Table 2 shows, a strong type will initiate a civil war if excluded. This logic is identical for PCS groups and SLPCS groups.

> **H4.** Among included groups, PCS groups should participate in military coups more frequently than SL groups.

H4 follows from two considerations about PCS groups. First, conditional on ethnopolitical inclusion, Assumption 1 implies that any group in a PCS country is more likely to attempt a coup than an SL group because G's commitment ability tends to be lower in PCS countries. Second, G prefers to strategically exclude a challenger that would attempt a coup if included (see Table 2). However, the exogenous inclusion parameter β_j is highest for PCS groups (Assumption 2). Therefore, among parameter values in which G prefers C to be excluded—because a coup will occur if included—PCS groups are more likely than SL groups to be exogenously included. There is no analog of H4 for SLPCS groups because they did not share the historical advantage of PCS groups. Instead, Assumption 2 states that β_j is lower for SLPCS groups than for SL groups.

> **H5.** SLPCS groups should initiate civil wars more frequently than SL groups.

> **H6.** PCS groups should attempt military coups more frequently than SL groups.

The two main, unconditional, hypotheses follow from these building blocks. H5 and H6 are the most important hypotheses because rather than conditioning on a strategic factor (ethnopolitical inclusion), they assess the unconditional historical legacy of pre-colonial states—the main intervention of interest—on ethnic violence. The civil war hypothesis, H5, applies to SLPCS groups because these groups should tend to be excluded and therefore more reliant on outsider rebellions to address grievances with the state. The coup hypothesis, H6, applies to PCS groups. Their historical advantages should help them to gain ethnopolitical inclusion and to facilitate insider coups d'etat.

More specifically, H5 follows directly from H1 and H3: SLPCS groups, relative to SL groups, are (1) more likely to be excluded and (2) more likely to initiate civil wars conditional on being excluded. Without additional assumptions, the model does not yield a clear prediction for the unconditional likelihood of civil war for PCS groups relative to SL groups. Conditional on exclusion, PCS groups rebel more frequently

than SL groups (H2). However, PCS groups may be included in power more frequently than SL groups (see the discussion of H1), which would decrease PCS groups' relative likelihood of using an outsider rebellion technology. Given H2, it is certainly consistent with the theoretical framework for PCS groups to unconditionally initiate civil wars more frequently than SL groups. However, without additional assumptions, the model does not directly yield this implication.

Regarding H6, coup attempts occur in equilibrium if and only if (1) C is strong, (2) G's commitment ability θ_i is low enough that a strong C will attempt a coup if included, and (3) C is exogenously included at the center. H6 follows because the second and third factors are more likely for PCS groups than SL groups (Assumptions 1 and 2). By contrast, there is no analog of H6 for SLPCS groups because their exogenous inclusion probability is lower than SL groups' (Assumption 2).

3   Data and Statistical Models

The remainder of the paper empirically assesses these hypotheses. This section describes the data, followed by results in the following section.

3.1   Sample

The unit of analysis in every regression specification is ethnic group-years. The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) database (Vogt et al., 2015) provides ethnic group units. The sample includes almost all group-years between each countries' year of independence and 2005 for politically relevant ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 2005 end date is chosen because of temporal constraints on some of the dependent variables. Robustness checks analyze only pre-1980 years, only ex-British colonies, or only groups with co-ethnics in a neighboring country. Appendix C lists African countries missing EPR data, which are mostly small countries that do not meet key scope conditions of the theory by lacking an indigenous population or by lacking multiple ethnic groups that can compete for power.

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3.2 Pre-Colonial States

Defining states has posed difficulties for social scientists, including anthropologists that have long debated how to classify states in pre-colonial Africa (Southall, 1974; McIntosh, 2005). Even pre-colonial African polities that exhibited hierarchical organization pose classification challenges when using "stateness" traits used by social scientists to explain historical state formation in other regions. African rulers and the African state system as a whole placed lower emphasis on territorial sovereignty then did early modern Western Europe (Warner, 2001). Even highly centralized states by African standards usually possessed rudimentary political institutions compared to contemporary Asian agrarian empires (Kohli, 2004, 297).

Coding PCS groups. Acknowledging these difficulties, an EPR ethnic group is coded as belonging to a pre-colonial state if co-ethnics governed a substantial percentage of members of the EPR ethnic group through a single or small number of political organizations that exhibited some degree of centralized rule on the eve of colonization.[10] Although the working definition of a state is minimal, the paucity of reliable historical information for most pre-colonial African political organizations makes it difficult or perhaps impossible to operationalize a conceptual definition that requires more nuanced information about centralization for each group.

Constructing the dataset proceeded in three main steps that Appendix A discusses in detail, including presenting country-by-country coding justifications. First, I consulted 11 continent-wide maps of historical states and other sources to generate a list of candidate states. Second, I used additional secondary sources to match candidate states with EPR ethnic groups to generate a list of candidate PCS groups. Third, I examined four conditions that correspond with the working definition of pre-colonial states to determine which candidate groups were coded as PCS: (1) co-ethnic governance requires the state was independent rather than tributary, (2) some evidence of central authority such as acknowledged hierarchy of authority in regions outside the capital and centralized tax collection, as opposed to nomadic confederations or trading centers, (3) one (or a small number of) states governed a substantial percentage of members of the EPR ethnic group, as opposed to groups such as Yoruba in Nigeria or Bamileke in Cameroon fractured into dozens or hundreds of mini-states, and (4) these conditions held on the eve of colonization. In total, I consulted 96 sources to

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[10]I restrict attention to states that existed at the eve of colonization because the theory posits that pre-colonial states' influence on colonial policies is a key persistence mechanism.

code the PCS variable. Figure 1 depicts every PCS group in dark gray, non-PCS group in light gray, and country borders in black. Appendix Table A.2 lists every PCS group and PCS country.

Figure 1: PCS Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa

A robustness check considers an alternative PCS measure that changes the third operational criterion. For the main measure, groups like the Tswana in Botswana that were not organized into a single state but exhibited characteristics of centralized rule are coded as PCS if only a small number of states governed people within the modern ethnic group, especially if one state was clearly ascendant. However, additional regression results use an alternative operationalization in which groups like the Tswana are not coded as PCS, and all such groups are denoted by an asterisk in Appendix Table A.2.

Two reasons motivate using a binary variable rather than an ordinal or continuous PCS measure. Theoretically, having at least one PCS group or not is the key distinction. Conditional on having at least one, the number of PCS groups should be unimportant because even one PCS group should create conditions for ethnic violence. The theory does not suggest that multiple PCS groups would necessarily yield more permissive conditions for violence. Furthermore, conditional on a PCS group being large enough to be able to disrupt nationalist political organization,[11] the theory does not offer clear predictions for how the size

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[11]Only in DRC is the largest PCS group less than 10% of country's population (Luba-Kasai is 7%), and

of PCS groups should matter. Perhaps larger PCS groups linearly imply less ability to cooperate, or perhaps there is a non-linear effect in which very large PCS groups can achieve sufficient support to mitigate the sources of bargaining failure described above. This could possibly be true in the mostly peaceful PCS countries Botswana, Guinea, Senegal, and Zambia (see Appendix F), all of which feature a PCS group of at least 40% of the population. This is an intriguing consideration for future research—especially to compare Africa to other world regions, which tend to feature larger PCS groups—although is not addressed here to focus the analysis on the core theoretical hypotheses. Also, notably, the main regression tables (and most robustness tables) contain a specification that controls for ethnic group size.

Improvements over existing measures. Despite the numerous important research questions to which existing measures of historical political centralization such as Murdock (1967) and Bockstette et al. (2002) have contributed, a new measure is needed to properly assess the present hypotheses. Bockstette et al. (2002) code a territory's history of state-like institutions dating back to 0 CE. Their dataset uses modern country boundaries as the unit of analysis and therefore uses too high an aggregation level for ethnic group-level analysis.

Murdock (1967) codes a political "jurisdictional hierarchy" variable at the ethnic group-level on the eve of colonization that is widely used in the literature. However, his ethnic group units cannot directly be used for conflict analysis because no dataset codes civil wars and military coups to correspond with his dataset.[12] Furthermore, existing research on ethnic conflict has demonstrated the importance of focusing on *politically relevant* ethnic groups (Posner, 2004; Cederman et al., 2013), and many of Murdock's groups have never been politically relevant in the post-independence period. Although it is possible to geo-match Murdock's 826 Africa ethnic group polygons with EPR's 272 Africa ethnic group polygons, this procedure would likely introduce considerable measurement error in the key independent variable because the two datasets differ vastly in their ethnic group units.[13]

the median size of the largest PCS group in PCS countries is 27%.

[12]ACLED's (Raleigh et al., 2010) highly disaggregated civil war data, which could be matched with Murdock's (1967) ethnic groups, is available only since 1997 and therefore is not useful for assessing a historical factor posited to have its strongest effects closer to independence.

[13]Wig (2016) uses this coding procedure. Inspecting jurisdictional hierarchy scores for the set of ethnopolitically excluded EPR ethnic groups in his dataset highlights numerous scorings that, given the evidence presented in Appendix A, seem problematic. For example, stateless or fractured groups such as Niger's

Another contributor to measurement error from combining Murdock (1967) and EPR ethnic groups is that many African ethnic groups are located in multiple countries. Whereas Murdock assigns one score per ethnic group, empirically, many historically important and far-flung groups' level of political organization differed across space. For example, Britain and France purposely drew the border between Nigeria and Niger to correspond with the upper limits of the Sokoto caliphate, splitting centrally organized Fulani in Nigeria from fractured Fulani states in Niger (Touval, 1966, 289). Additional examples from the present dataset include Malinke in Guinea and Senegal (each PCS) as opposed to Gambia (non-PCS), Ngoni in South Africa and Zimbabwe (each PCS) as opposed to Mozambique and Malawi (each non-PCS), and Yoruba in Benin (PCS) as opposed to Nigeria (non-PCS).

These problems with combining Murdock (1967) and EPR data could be addressed by using a large volume of secondary sources to verify the matches, but then the coding procedure would closely resemble the present one. A final advantage of the present measure is that the country-by-country scorings presented in Appendix A allow researchers to easily examine every coding decision made for the current PCS variable, as opposed to Murdock's (1967) terse coding justifications and reference list.

3.3   Dependent Variables

The EPR database provides ethnic representation data. A group-year is coded as 1 on the ethnopolitical inclusion variable if it scores "monopoly," "dominant," "senior partner," or "junior partner" on EPR's political status variable; and 0 otherwise.

Group-level ethnic civil war onsets draw from Roessler (2011), whose coding procedure is nearly identical to assigning EPR ethnic groups to civil wars from Fearon and Laitin's (2003) database, ending in 2005.[14] This variable has two advantages over the ACD2EPR dataset (Vogt et al., 2015) commonly analyzed with EPR ethnic units. First, it distinguishes civil wars from military coups, whereas ACD2EPR—like its parent dataset UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Gleditsch et al., 2002)—conflates civil wars with coup attempts that feature at least 25 battle deaths. The present theoretical framework necessitates distinguishing

Kanouri, Nigeria's Yoruba, Central African Republic's and Chad's Sara are coded as having "large states," and groups such as Guinea's Malinke and Madagascar's Highlanders are coded as having "petty chiefdoms" despite their large and powerful empires on the eve of colonization.

[14]Appendix C provides additional information. Ongoing years are set to missing.

coups from civil wars. Second, Fearon and Laitin (2003) provide an explicit scheme for distinguishing distinct civil war episodes, which is crucial for analyzing conflict onset. The Armed Conflict Database does not code distinct civil war episodes. Instead, as Paine (2016) describes, scholars typically use a two-year lapse rule when coding conflict onsets using the Armed Conflict Database, meaning that any year with at least 25 battle deaths is coded as a civil war onset if battle deaths have been below the 25 death threshold for at least two previous years for that country or ethnic group. This is problematic as an onset rule for long-running, low-level conflicts that occasionally reach the 25 battle deaths, and therefore often yield many "onsets" when using the two-year lapse rule. Fearon and Laitin's (2003) coding procedure avoids this problem. I refer to this dependent variable as major ethnic civil war onset because Fearon and Laitin use a 1,000 battle death threshold during the course of the conflict.

The military coup variable also draws from Roessler (2011), who coded the ethnic identity of groups that participated in coups from McGowan's (2003) database. As in Roessler's (2011) statistical models, the coup variable analyzed here only includes successful coup attempts. This relates both to concrete data limitations—Roessler's (2011) dataset has full coverage for the ethnicity of groups that participated in successful coups but exhibits considerable missing data for failed coups—and to inherent constraints for measuring failed coups (Kebschull, 1994). Many failed coups will not produce sufficient evidence to know that it occurred and to code the ethnicity of the main participants.

3.4 Alternative Explanations

In addition to presenting a specification with no substantive covariates, almost every regression table in the paper considers eight additional specifications. The covariates draw extensively from existing research on historical causes of post-colonial political and economic outcomes, and the broader civil war literature. Appendix Table C.2 discusses the covariates and their sources in more depth.

Existing research uses an ethnic group's logged percentage of the country's population and distance from the capital to predict ethnopolitical inclusion. The historical geography covariates are ecological diversity, thousands of years since a territory transitioned to agricultural production, and tsetse fly prevalence. The geography/geology covariates are an ordinal version of Herbst's (2000) measure for the geographical difficulties of broadcasting power, country-level oil income per capita, and an indicator for oil-rich ethnic groups. The

historical violence covariates are an indicator for wars between 1400 and 1700 and slave exports divided by area. The colonizer identity covariates are a series of colonizer fixed effects for British, French, Belgian, and Portuguese colonial rule. The colonial actor covariates are logged European country-level population share at independence and logged Christian mission stations per capita in 1924 measured at the ethnic group level. The artificial border controls are a group-level measure for partition across international boundaries, and country-level measures of straight/squiggly international borders and ethnic fractionalization. The standard post-colonial covariates are annual country-level GDP per capita, population, and democracy level.

Appendix Table C.1 provides summary statistics for all variables in the full sample.

3.5 Statistical Models

Tables 3 and 4 assess all six hypotheses. Every column estimates a logistic regression of the following form:

$$\ln\left(\frac{Y_i}{1-Y_i}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_P \cdot P_i + \beta_S \cdot S_i + \boldsymbol{X}_i'\beta_X + \boldsymbol{T}_i'\beta_T + \epsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

where Y_i is an indicator variable for either ethnopolitical inclusion, ethnic civil war onset, or successful coup attempt; P_i is an indicator for PCS groups; S_i is an indicator for SLPCS groups; β_P and β_S are the main parameters of interest; $\boldsymbol{X}_i$ is a vector of covariates that differs by column; and ϵ_i is a random error term. Every regression specification clusters standard errors at the ethnic group level. Appendix Section C.4 discusses the temporal dependence controls in each specification.

Importantly, no specifications include country fixed effects. A key premise of the theory is that PCS groups cause within-country spillovers, which necessitates comparing groups in PCS countries to SL groups, as the hypotheses state.[15] The main hypothesis about civil wars (H5), for example, concerns *stateless* groups in PCS countries because PCS groups tended to exclude SLPCS groups from power. Therefore, the within-country comparisons generated by modeling country fixed effects would not provide a valid test of the hypotheses. This distinguishes the present analysis from existing statistical studies on pre-colonial statehood and civil war such as Wig (2016) and Depetris-Chauvin (2015), which use a subnational unit of analysis and include country fixed effects in every regression model.

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[15]This also makes uninformative country random effect models, which estimate a mixture between the fixed effect (within-country) and pooled (between-country) estimators.

Finally, with one exception, no models include ethnic group fixed effects because the PCS, SLPCS, and SL indicators are time invariant.[16] A robustness check models ethnic group intercepts as random effects.

4   Empirical Analysis

Statistical evidence supports the hypotheses, shown by first assessing the building-block conditional hypotheses and then the two main hypotheses. Appendix Table D.1 provides cross-tabulations that relate to the six hypotheses. Crucially, a coherent alternative theory would need to explain away the six patterns demonstrated in Tables 3 and 4. Given current theoretical knowledge, it is not clear what type of confounding factor would be able to explain away these findings—especially considering the numerous control variables and robustness checks.

4.1   Conditional Results

Table 3 demonstrates support for all four preliminary hypotheses. The dependent variable is ethnopolitical inclusion in Panel A, major ethnic civil war onset in Panel B, and successful coup attempt in Panel C. Column 1 in every panel presents a regression with no additional substantive covariates. SLPCS groups are 42% less likely to be included at the center than are SL groups, 39% compared to 68%, which supports H1. Among excluded groups, PCS groups are 4.8 times more likely to initiate a civil war than are SL groups in a particular year, 4.4% to 0.9%, which supports H2.[17] Also among excluded groups, SLPCS groups are 2.2 times more likely to initiate a civil war than are SL groups in a particular year, 2.1% to 0.9%, which supports H3. Finally, among included groups, PCS groups are 2.7 times more likely to participate in a successful coup attempt than are SL groups in a particular year, 2.4% to 0.9%, which supports H4. The findings for H1, H2, and H4 are each statistically significant at 1%, and the finding for H3 is statistically significant at 10%.

Columns 2 through 9 in each panel control for the various sets of covariates described above. The magnitude

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[16]One set of models includes transnational ethnic group fixed effects to compare partitioned ethnic groups to their cross-border co-ethnics.

[17]This and the next two predicted probabilities fix the temporal dependence controls at their mean values, and the other PCS country category at 0.

Table 3: Ethnopolitical Inclusion and Conditional Ethnic Violence Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
				Panel A. DV: Ethnopolitical inclusion					
PCS group	0.300	0.338	0.499	0.611	0.158	0.480	0.356	0.341	0.539
	(0.380)	(0.367)	(0.386)	(0.407)	(0.392)	(0.396)	(0.367)	(0.433)	(0.375)
SLPCS group	-1.169***	-0.736**	-1.108***	-0.747**	-1.247***	-0.859***	-1.070***	-1.062***	-0.954***
	(0.284)	(0.312)	(0.300)	(0.310)	(0.292)	(0.301)	(0.287)	(0.290)	(0.343)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	6,761	7,054
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
				Panel B. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset. Sample: Excluded ethnic groups.					
PCS group	1.603***	1.660***	1.539***	1.651***	1.547***	1.919***	1.891***	1.851***	1.710***
	(0.489)	(0.495)	(0.483)	(0.476)	(0.489)	(0.548)	(0.586)	(0.519)	(0.488)
SLPCS group	0.818*	0.938**	0.777*	0.850*	0.774*	1.079**	1.035**	1.153***	1.037**
	(0.431)	(0.443)	(0.413)	(0.460)	(0.443)	(0.464)	(0.516)	(0.433)	(0.474)
Group-years	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,639	2,696
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
				Panel C. DV: Successful coup attempt. Sample: Included ethnic groups.					
PCS group	0.999***	0.927**	1.154**	0.994***	0.863**	0.825**	0.937***	0.863**	0.720**
	(0.373)	(0.396)	(0.458)	(0.362)	(0.410)	(0.377)	(0.334)	(0.416)	(0.356)
SLPCS group	0.0309	0.0375	0.265	0.0375	-0.0382	-0.221	0.0287	-0.0882	-0.101
	(0.410)	(0.410)	(0.402)	(0.406)	(0.402)	(0.434)	(0.397)	(0.428)	(0.426)
Group-years	3,958	3,958	3,958	3,836	3,958	3,958	3,958	3,738	3,958
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 3 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the PCS group indicator and SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The "predicting inclusion" covariates in Column 2 are group % of population and distance from capital. The "historical geography" covariates in Column 3 are tsetse fly, agricultural transition, and ecological diversity. The "standard geography" covariates in Column 4 are Herbst geography, and country-level and group-level oil production variables. The "historical violence" covariates in Column 5 are slave exports/area and historical warfare. The "colonizer identity" covariates in Column 6 are fixed effects for British, French, Belgian, and Portuguese colonial rule. The "colonial actor" covariates in Column 7 are ln(European population %) and ln(Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop.). The "artificial border" controls in Column 8 are partitioned groups, straight/squiggly international borders, and ethnic fractionalization. The "standard post-colonial" covariates in Column 9 are polity2, ln(GDP/capita), and ln(population). Appendix Table C.2 details the covariates. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

of the coefficient estimates tends to remain stable across the specifications, and in some cases even increases relative to the Column 1 specification. The significance levels are also mostly unaltered.

An additional notable observation from Table 3 is that the magnitude of the coefficient estimate for PCS groups is larger than that for SLPCS groups in the conditional civil war regressions (Panel B). To avoid a proliferation of hypotheses, H1 through H6 only compare groups in PCS countries to SL groups, but adding one assumption to the model can explain the difference in magnitude (Appendix Section E.5 provides a formal derivation). Suppose a larger fraction of PCS groups than SLPCS groups are the strong type

of challenger. Then, conditional on exclusion, PCS groups are more likely to rebel than SLPCS groups. Considering how pre-colonial statehood could enhance political organization, this assumption seems substantively plausible.

The Table 3 results relate to three findings from the literature. First, whereas Roessler (2011) shows that ethnopolitical exclusion covaries positively with civil war onset and negatively with successful coups, the present findings show that pre-colonial statehood can explain variance in ethnic violence even when stratifying on ethnopolitical inclusion status. Therefore, historical conditions matter even when accounting for more contemporary strategic decisions such as central power access. Second, for reasons explained above, the findings yield an opposing finding from Wig (2016) by showing that, conditional on exclusion, PCS groups rebel more often than SL groups. Third, few studies have attempted to endogenize ethnopolitical inclusion status. Wucherpfennig et al. (2016) examine colonizer identity, and the present findings contribute to this small but important research agenda.

4.2 Main Results: Unconditional Civil War and Successful Coup Hypotheses

Table 4 demonstrates support for the two main hypotheses. The dependent variable is major ethnic civil war onset in Panel A and successful coup attempt in Panel B. In both panels, Column 1 contains a specification with the two PCS indicators and no substantive covariates. Supporting H5, Panel A demonstrates that SLPCS groups initiate civil wars 4.4 times more frequently than SL groups, 1.4% to 0.3%.[18] Additionally, PCS groups initiate civil wars 3.2 times more frequently than SL groups, 1.0% to 0.3%. The two coefficient estimates in Column 1 of Panel A, both of which are statistically significant at least at the 5% level, are similar across the specifications with different covariate combinations.

Analyzing raw trends in the data demonstrates that, quite simply, SL groups rarely initiate civil wars. Only one group in a non-PCS country, Shona-Ndau in Mozambique in 1976—largely a continuation of Mozambique's decolonization war with Portugal via a proxy battle with its white neighbors—participated in a civil war before 1989. Seven more occurred between 1989 and 2005. This compares to 34 distinct group-level civil war onsets in PCS countries before 1989 and 23 afterwards.

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[18]All these predicted probabilities fix the temporal dependence controls at their mean values, and the other PCS country category at 0.

Table 4: Main Results: Unconditional Hypotheses for Civil Wars and Coups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset
PCS group	1.156**	1.129**	1.003**	1.077**	1.177**	1.313***	1.169**	1.224**	1.054**
	(0.481)	(0.499)	(0.477)	(0.489)	(0.489)	(0.494)	(0.490)	(0.542)	(0.467)
SLPCS group	1.492***	1.376***	1.412***	1.343***	1.500***	1.708***	1.515***	1.564***	1.466***
	(0.406)	(0.424)	(0.394)	(0.419)	(0.410)	(0.434)	(0.447)	(0.414)	(0.416)
Group-years	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,305	6,582
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PCS group	0.835***	0.799**	1.113***	0.901***	0.669**	0.745**	0.800***	0.790**	0.643**
	(0.313)	(0.317)	(0.385)	(0.309)	(0.336)	(0.333)	(0.278)	(0.362)	(0.308)
SLPCS group	-0.595	-0.366	-0.509	-0.457	-0.699*	-0.602	-0.703*	-0.462	-0.733
	(0.400)	(0.398)	(0.450)	(0.413)	(0.401)	(0.423)	(0.409)	(0.435)	(0.458)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	6,761	7,054
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 4 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the PCS group indicator and SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The note for Table 3 lists the substantive covariates in each column. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

Although none of the six hypotheses link PCS groups to unconditionally higher civil war frequency, this finding is consistent with the theoretical framework under an additional assumption about the magnitude of two countervailing effects. On the one hand, groups that tend to be included are less likely to use outsider rebellion techniques. On the other hand, if PCS groups rebel frequently enough when excluded (see H2), then PCS groups should be unconditionally more likely to initiate civil wars than SL groups—as the Panel A finding suggests.

Supporting H6, Panel B of Table 4 shows that PCS groups participate in successful coup attempts 2.3 times as frequently as SL groups, 2.0% to 0.9%. This difference is statistically significant at 1%. The coefficient estimates are similar across the various specifications in Panel B of Table 4, although the magnitude of the coefficient estimate for PCS groups does diminish somewhat when controlling for either the historical violence or standard post-independence covariates. By contrast, SLPCS groups participate in successful coup attempts less frequently than SL groups, which is consistent with two considerations from the theory: (1) there are strategic incentives to exclude SLPCS groups from power and (2) SLPCS groups do not share the same historical advantages as PCS groups that help them to gain or to remain in power.

4.3 Robustness Checks for Main Results

Five robustness checks demonstrate similarly supportive evidence for the two main, unconditional hypotheses, H5 and H6. First, Appendix Table D.2 models ethnic group intercepts as random effects and shows the results are nearly identical to those in Table 4.

Second, many scholars have touted the artificiality of Africa's borders (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016), which have contributed to civil war and other adverse outcomes either by "dismembering" ethnic groups across international boundaries or by "suffocating" incompatible ethnic groups into the same country (Englebert et al., 2002). However, artificial does not mean random, and there is considerable evidence that groups' statehood influenced the colonial border drawing process (Englebert et al. 2002, 1096-7 provide several examples). One possible confounding concern that relates to dismemberment is that perhaps more belligerent non-PCS groups were placed into PCS countries, maybe because colonizers were more likely to partition these groups across international boundaries.[19] The results presented thus far have accounted for this concern because every regression table includes a specification that controls for a partitioned groups dummy variable, and the findings are unaltered. Further scrutinizing this consideration, Appendix Table D.3 examines a sample that only includes partitioned groups. Column 1 includes all groups with at least one co-ethnic neighbor in another country within this paper's core sample, and examines the relationship between being in a PCS country and ethnic civil war onset. Column 2 excludes all PCS groups. These regressions show that when examining correlations for pre-colonial statehood only among partitioned groups, the civil war results remain strong.

Generating even more rigorous counterfactual comparisons, Columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table D.3 demonstrate that members of the same transnational ethnic group exhibit different civil war behavior depending on whether they are located in a PCS country or not. These two specifications add transnational ethnic group fixed effects to Columns 1 and 2, yielding estimates generated solely by comparing groups across international borders that share the same ethnicity. The magnitude of the PCS country coefficient

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[19]Even if true, however, this would not explain away the correlations for PCS groups. Other factors related to endogenous border formation include constructing the borders to maximize PCS groups' population share (perhaps in part by not partitioning them across international boundaries) and placing the capital closer to PCS groups, but Column 2 in every regression controls for these two factors.

estimates remain large and statistically significant, although these regressions are somewhat lower-powered given the smaller sample size. Appendix D discusses additional considerations about suffocation.

The third robustness check evaluates the alternative PCS and SLPCS measures discussed on page 18 for which the PCS distinction is restricted to groups organized under a single pre-colonial polity. Appendix Table D.4 shows that, compared to Table 4, the coefficient estimates tend to be somewhat smaller in magnitude for both PCS and SLPCS groups in the civil war regressions, and somewhat larger for the estimated relationship between PCS groups and successful coup attempts. The statistical significance levels are similar for all the regressions.

The next two tables alter the sample. If the theory is correct, then the estimated conflictual effects should be pronounced in British colonies. Indirect rule through PCS groups is a posited persistence mechanism, and Britain was the most willing to rule through existing hierarchies. Supporting this implication, no ethnic civil war has ever occurred in a non-PCS country that Britain colonized, compared to 21 distinct group-level civil war onsets in PCS countries that Britain colonized. Technically, Equation 1 cannot be estimated with civil war as the dependent variable among the sample of British colonies because controlling for the two PCS indicators induces perfect separation in the models. Appendix Table D.5 shows the coefficient estimates for the correlation between PCS groups and successful coup attempts among only ex-British colonies are larger in magnitude than in Table 4, Panel B.

We might also expect the coefficient estimates to be particularly large closer to independence. The theory focuses on historical factors culminating at the end of colonial rule that created strong politicized ethnic differences in PCS countries and incentives for political violence shortly after independence. Additionally, poor economic performance across the region and destabilizing conditions caused by the end of the Cold War—including renewed electoral competition after 1989, which created prospects for new political cleavages—could create new sources of ethnic tension in non-PCS countries. Appendix Table D.6 shows that the coefficient estimates for the main civil war and coup specifications are indeed larger in magnitude in a sample that includes only pre-1990 years, which corresponds with the Cold War era.

4.4 Qualitative Evidence

Appendix F demonstrates that in 14 of 18 PCS countries, PCS groups dominated the government at or shortly after independence and/or participated in at least one civil war or successful military coup between independence and the end of the Cold War era. This evidence shows that ethnic violence occurred in most PCS countries and that, where it occurred, PCS groups frequently were involved. Process tracing evidence from Uganda and Nigeria demonstrates additional support for the posited theoretical mechanisms.

5   Conclusion

Despite endemic ethnic violence in post-colonial Africa, minimal research has analyzed historical causes of regional variance in civil wars and military coups. This paper argues that ethnic differences gained heightened political salience in countries with an ethnic group organized as a pre-colonial state (PCS). Combining this insight with a model on post-colonial rulers' tradeoff between coups and civil wars implies PCS groups and other groups in their country should more frequently participate in ethnic violence. Regression evidence using original data on pre-colonial African states demonstrates that ethnic groups in countries with at least one PCS group have participated in either ethnic civil wars or coups more frequently than ethnic groups in other countries, with the modal type of violence for different groups mediated by how pre-colonial statehood affected ethnopolitical inclusion. Before 1989, 34 of 35 ethnic groups that participated in major civil wars belonged to countries with a PCS group.

The analysis suggests two future research directions. First, the theory raises broader considerations about ethnopolitical exclusion and civil wars. Although simple, the present model highlights one possible reason—based on a commitment problem logic—that a ruler would exclude other ethnic groups even if this raises the likelihood of a costly activity, civil war. The relationship between commitment problems and war has been widely studied in the formal international relations literature (e.g., Powell, 2004), and many factors besides historical statehood affect the ability of different ethnic groups to commit to deals with each other. Compared to most existing ethnic conflict research, this paper makes a more concerted attempt to understand strategic (but also see Roessler 2011 and Francois et al. 2015) and historical causes of ethnopolitical inclusion (also see Wucherpfennig et al. 2016), and the mechanisms highlighted here likely apply more broadly.

Second, considerable research on Sub-Saharan Africa seeks to understand if this region is unique and, if so, why. The present findings raise the question of whether the violent effects of pre-colonial statehood are confined to Africa. One distinctive aspect of this region is that most countries lack a majority ethnic group. Thus, even though PCS groups in Africa tended to have historical advantages that enabled them to dominate other ethnic groups after independence, many PCS groups' hold on power was tenuous because they were not numerically preponderant. In some cases, like Uganda, non-PCS groups dislodged PCS groups from power. By contrast, in many Asian countries with historical states, the ethnic group that controlled the state during decolonization composed a large majority of the country's population. On the one hand, this may prevent violence by discouraging other groups from attempting to control the government. One the other hand, this may encourage ethnically exclusionary policies that spark civil wars. Future work that assesses how well the present theory exports to other regions will contribute to our understanding of African uniqueness and to our emerging knowledge of how historical factors have affected prospects for modern ethnic violence.

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Online Appendix

Contents

A Coding Pre-Colonial States

The following elaborates upon the coding rules described in the paper, followed by country-by-country coding discussions.

A.1 Coding Rules

Definition A1. An EPR group is coded as belonging to a pre-colonial state if co-ethnics governed a substantial percentage of members of the modern ethnic group through a single or small number of political organizations that exhibited some degree of centralized rule on the eve of colonization.

The following three steps operationalized this definition:

1. *Generate a list of candidate states.* First, I consulted a uniform set of sources, 11 continent-wide maps of historical states, to generate a list of candidate states. If none of these candidate states yielded any EPR ethnic groups in the country to be coded as PCS (see next two steps), then I additionally consulted the pre-colonial history section of the country's *Encyclopaedia Britannica* page, the source used by Putterman (2015). Consulting numerous different sources on historical states makes it unlikely that the data will fail to incorporate any major states in pre-colonial Africa. Table A.1 summarizes the 11 different maps used in the coding. I found three of the maps because they are used by Depetris-Chauvin (2015): Ajayi and Crowder (1985), Barraclough and Parker (1993), and McEvedy (1996). Although useful for identifying candidate states, none of these sources explicitly say what they mean by states, and often list notable peoples alongside states. This emphasizes the importance of gathering additional information about the candidate states.

Table A.1: Maps of Historical States

Source	Notes
Ajayi and Crowder (1985; Section 55)	Includes all states from the map "European Colonies and African States on the Eve of the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference."
Atmore (1985; 12, 63)	Includes all states from his maps "Northern Africa on the eve of partition" and "Southern Africa on the eve of partition."
Barraclough and Parker (1993; 235)	Includes all states and other selectively labeled empires from the map "Africa before the partition by European powers 1800 to 1880."
Gailey (1971)	Includes all indigenous states in the map "European Territory - 1884."
Griffiths (1995, 39)	Includes all states from his map "19th Century AD."
Johnston (1884; xvi-1)	Includes all states in the map.
Kasule (1998; 83, 85)	Includes all states from his map in either 1880 or 1885.
McEvedy (1996; 107, 111, 113, 115)	Includes all states identified in at least one of his maps from 1878, 1885, 1890, or 1900.
Oliver and Atmore (2005; 124-5)	Includes all states from the map "Africa on the eve of partition: African states and European settlements."
Pakenham (1991; 19, 280)	Includes all states from the maps "Africa before the scramble: indigenous and alien powers in 1876" and "Africa in 1886: the scramble half complete."
Reid (2012; xix)	Includes all states with demarcated territories in the map "Nineteenth-century military revolution."

2. ***Match candidate states with EPR ethnic groups and countries.*** Second, I used additional secondary sources to match candidate states with EPR ethnic groups to generate a list of candidate PCS groups. In many cases, descriptions of the candidate state listed an ethnic group that corresponded to an EPR ethnic group. I also compared the location of the candidate state (in particular its capital) with EPR ethnic group polygons from Vogt et al. (2015). Candidate states without a corresponding politically relevant EPR ethnic group were not scrutinized further. For example, the Benin empire in Nigeria governed members of the Edo ethnic group, but this is a not a politically relevant ethnic group in the EPR dataset.

   The capital of the candidate state must be located within the same modern country borders as the EPR ethnic group. This consideration ensures groups are not coded as PCS simply because a pre-colonial state governed ethnic kin located far away. The text provides several examples of ethnic groups split among multiple countries that are coded as PCS in one country but not another.

3. ***Code pre-colonial state (PCS) groups.*** Third, given a list of candidate PCS groups, I assessed whether the group met the criteria in Definition A1. These four criteria are necessary and sufficient to code a group as PCS.

   (a) *Co-ethnic governance.* The candidate state was independent rather than a tributary state to another empire, such as the Adamawa emirate that was subordinate to the Sokoto Caliphate.

   (b) *Some degree of centralization.* There is evidence that the state actually exhibited some degree of centralized rule (i.e., government above the local level). In addition to relying on historians' statements about the state's level of centralization, when possible I compiled information about central administrative institutions. Dahomey (in modern-day Benin) was a paradigmatic state: "The state was a form of absolute monarchy unique in Africa. The king, surrounded by a magnificent retinue, was the unchallenged pinnacle of a rigidly stratified society of royalty, commoners, and slaves. He governed through a centralized bureaucracy staffed by commoners who could not threaten his authority" (*Encyclopaedia Britannica* Dahomey).

   Overall, the required level of centralization to satisfy this criterion is fairly low, with the justification that even modest forms of pre-colonial ethnic-wide hierarchical political organization would likely trigger the theoretical mechanisms. Additionally, higher standards for centralization would lead only a handful of groups to be coded as PCS. For example, after stating that "by the standard of political units in precolonial sub-Saharan Africa, Sokoto would rank among the most centralized, stable, and sizable," Kohli (2004, 297) continues: "The political structure of the Sokoto Caliphate was nevertheless rudimentary, especially when compared with other non-Western agrarian monarchies of the period . . . Sokoto attained high levels of neither political stability nor stateness: There was no centralized army; centralized administration was weak, if nonexistent; the quality of rule varied across emirates, as well as over time," among other considerations.

   Although the bar for "some degree of centralization" is low, two types of groups failed this criterion: nomadic and/or pastoralist groups (for example, the Maasai in Kenya), and groups that governed trading centers but without evidence that a central organization existed or exhibited any degree of control, for example, the Bateke in Republic of Congo.

   (c) *One or a small number of political organizations governed a substantial percentage of members of the EPR ethnic group.* The group was ruled by one or a small number of distinct political organizations. This rules out groups fractured into a large number of distinct states, ranging from dozens (e.g., Yoruba in Nigeria) to hundreds (e.g., Bamileke in Nigeria) of separate states.

The easiest cases are ones in which there was only a single state, like the Buganda kingdom for the Baganda in Uganda. However, for the primary PCS measure, a group split into several states could be coded as PCS if there were either a small number of states or if one state was clearly ascendant. For example, Angola's Mbundu-Mestico had two historical states and are coded as PCS. (Table A.2 distinguishes all such cases. Appendix Table D.4 re-runs the results when the only groups coded as PCS meet all the criteria and were governed by a single pre-colonial state.) Tswana in Botswana are also coded as PCS despite being split into eight chiefdoms because Ngwato governed nearly half the Tswana population and the Tswana demonstrated their ability to collectively organize.

Furthermore, in some cases secondary sources highlighted only a single state, but either (1) the secondary sources also indicated considerable diversity in political organization among that ethnic group (e.g., Myene in Gabon) or (2) the EPR politically relevant ethnic group composes more than one ethnic group and the state ruled only one of these groups (e.g., Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga) in Zimbabwe). In such cases, I assessed whether or not the state governed a substantial percentage of the EPR ethnic group, measured by comparing a map of the state to the EPR ethnic group polygon or by examining population estimates. Although there is no bright line for "substantial," in the only three cases for which a state exhibited evidence of centralized institutions but was deemed too small relative to the size of the whole EPR ethnic group to code the group as PCS, rough population estimates suggest less than 20% (Myene in Gabon, Northerners in Malawi, Ovambo in Namibia).

(d) *On the eve of colonization.* Finally, the ethnic group exhibited these characteristics at the onset of European colonization—even if its state had declined from its zenith—under the justification that groups' influence on colonial policies is a key mechanism in the present theory. For example, whereas Malawi's Chewa were organized under the Maravi Confederacy that may have once met the criteria for centralization, it fell in 1720. By the time British colonial rule began in the late 19th century, Chewa were not centralized under either one or several states. In most cases, this criterion implies the state had to exist in the 1880s—when Europe began conquering most of the interior territory of Africa—to count. This is also the time period covered by most of the maps. However, some ethnic groups in Senegal are coded as PCS despite their states falling to France in the 1860s because France began conquering the interior of Senegal prior to the broader "scramble for Africa." Similarly, pre-1880s Portuguese penetration into Angola weakened Mbundu kingdoms, although they still meet the PCS criteria.

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A.2   Figures and Tables Referenced in Paper for PCS Groups

Figure A.1: Select Ethnic Groups in Uganda and Kenya

Notes: Baganda (PCS group) are black. Northerners in Uganda (SLPCS group) and Kikuyu in Kenya (SL group) are both light gray. Country borders are thick black lines.

Table A.2: List of PCS Groups

Country	EPR ethnic group	Historical state(s)
Angola	Mbundu-Mestico*	Kasanje/Matamba
Benin	South/Central (Fon)	Dahomey
Benin	Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun)	Porto Novo
Botswana	Tswana*	Tswana chiefdoms
Burundi	Tutsi	Burundi
Chad	Muslim Sahel groups	Ouaddai
DRC	Luba Kasai	Luba
DRC	Luba Shaba	Luba
DRC	Lunda-Yeke	Lunda
Ethiopia	Amhara	Ethiopia
Ghana	Asante (Akan)	Asante
Guinea	Malinke	Samori
Guinea	Peul	Futa Jalon
Madagascar	Highlanders	Merina
Mali	Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.)	Tukulor
Nigeria	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	Sokoto
Rwanda	Tutsi	Rwanda
Senegal	Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur)*	Bondu/Futa Toro
Senegal	Serer*	Sin/Salum
Senegal	Wolof*	Walo/Kajor/Bawol/Jolof
South Africa	Zulu	Zulu
Sudan	Fur	Darfur
Sudan	Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin and Danagla	Mahdist
Uganda	South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro)*	Ankole/Bunyoro/Toro
Uganda	Baganda	Buganda
Zambia	Bemba speakers*	Kazembe/Bemba
Zambia	Lozi (Barotse)	Lozi
Zimbabwe	Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)	Ndebele

*All groups ruled by more than one pre-colonial state are coded as non-PCS for the alternative PCS coding.

A.3 Country-by-Country Coding Discussions

Country-by-country coding discussions follow. EPR ethnic groups coded as PCS for the primary PCS measure are stated in bold red, and groups that are not coded as PCS for the alternative PCS measure (because there was more than one state) additionally have an asterisk next to their name. When citing *Encyclopaedia Britannica* online (academic edition), I list the specific article from which I drew the information as "EB [title of article]."

A.3.1 Angola

Candidate states from maps: Kasanje, Ovimbundu, Kongo.

- *Kasanje. EPR group: Mbundu-Mestico.* The **Mbundu-Mestico**[*] belonged to two major states, Kasanje and Matamba (Warner 1991a, 12-13). Imbangala invasions created the Kasanje state, which was populated by Mbundu. "By the time Ndongo was extinguished as an independent state, Kasanje had grown to be one of the most powerful states in West Central Africa" (Birmingham 1966, 126). Furthermore, "Lower-ranking Imbangala officials had no independent authority which might detract from the power concentrated in the position of the single titled king," reflecting the "near-total centralization in the Imbangala *kilombo*" (Miller 1976, 236, 268). The "Imbangala kingdom of Kasanje ...flourished in northwestern Angola between ca. 1620 and 1912" (Miller 1979, 51), although earlier Portuguese incursions weakened the kingdom throughout the nineteenth century (NB: Portugal began colonizing Angola much earlier than most European colonies in Africa, 1750 by Ertan et al.'s (2016) list of European colonial onsets). The sister of a monarch from the older Mbundu state of Ndongo founded the Matamba state. The kingdom lasted throughout the 19th century, although its once-peaceful relations with Portugal became increasingly hostile as they encroached on Matamba territory, and was destroyed by a Portuguese expedition in 1909 (EB Matamba).

- *Ovimbundu. EPR group: Ovimbundu-Ovambo.* There were 22 distinct Ovimbundu states that "were not politically unified" (Heywood 2000, 1-2). They even faced difficulties projecting power within their own domain: "The legacy of the Imbangala mentality of pillage, the history of incessant warfare between the states, the [low] population density, the persistence of local identities, and the almost total absence of state bureaucracies also limited the power that Ovimbundu rulers exercised" (4).

- *Kongo. EPR group: Bakongo.* The Kongo Kingdom disintegrated in the 17th century, leaving the Bakongo politically fractured on the eve of colonization. "Their former political unity long broken, the various segments of the ethnolinguistic category [of Bakongo] in Angola experienced quite different influences in the colonial period" (Warner 1991b, 72).

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A.3.2   Benin

Candidate states from maps: Dahomey, Porto Novo, Borgu.

- *Dahomey. EPR group: South/Central Fon.* The Dahomey state of the **South/Central (Fon)** "was a form of absolute monarchy unique in Africa. The king, surrounded by a magnificent retinue, was the unchallenged pinnacle of a rigidly stratified society of royalty, commoners, and slaves. He governed through a centralized bureaucracy staffed by commoners who could not threaten his authority …Dahomey was organized for war, not only to expand its boundaries but also to take captives as slaves …From approximately 1680, a regular census of population was taken as a basis for military conscription" (EB Dahomey).

- *Porto Novo. EPR group: Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun).* Although information about Porto Novo is more scarce, it appears to meet the criteria to code **Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun)** as PCS. The Yoruba kingdom Porto Novo was a distinct kingdom from Dahomey whose capital was the eponymous city on Benin's coast, situating it at the center of the slave trade. Dahomey experienced continual warfare throughout the 19th century with Porto Novo (Decalo 1990, 91), whose native dynasty remained independent during the 19th century (Hargreaves 1963, 54; see also EB Benin). Its king list stretches from 1688 to 1913, when France ended the kingdom (Decalo 1995, 295). Yoruba-Nagot are more populous than Goun (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999), implying that the Yoruba/Nagot's kingdom covered more than half of the amalgamated EPR group "Yoruba/Nagot and Goun." Furthermore, many Goun also lived in Porto Novo and were "strongly affected by Yoruba cultural influences" (Decalo 1995, 189).

- *Borgu. EPR group: Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchma).* Among groups in northern Benin, "No centralized protostates had emerged among the Bariba, Pila Pila, and other groups, though small powerful states existed in Nikki, Kouande, Djougou, Parakou, and Kandi" (Decalo 1990, 92). Parakou was the administrative center, and Nikki was the most important city on the Dahomey side of the border of the former Borgu state of the Bariba people that was partitioned between British Nigeria and French Dahomey. Borgu, however, did not even rule over all the Bariba and was tributary: "During the pre-colonial era the population was organized into several quasi-feudal semi-autonomous states hierarchically linked and owing traditional allegiance to that of Bussa in Nigeria" (Decalo 1995, 95).

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A.3.3 Botswana

Candidate states from maps: Tswana.

- *Tswana. EPR group: Tswana.* Coding the **Tswana*** as PCS is a borderline coding decision because Tswana were fractured. There were eight main separate Tswana tribes, with the following population breakdowns calculated using population data from each of their native reserve territory in 1936: Ngwato (47%), Tawana (19%), Kwena (12%), Ngwaketse (11%), Kgatla (6%), Malete (3%), Rolong (1%), and Tlokwa (1%) (Schapera 1955, 2). Each tribe "manages its own affairs under the direction of a chief (*kgosi, morena*), who is independent of the rest" (Schapera 1940, 56). However, the chiefdoms achieved centralized political institutions. Lange (2009, 142) describes their political organization as "centralized chiefdoms" in which "the chieftaincy was a powerful position, having executive, judicial, and legislative power as well as a high level of discretion over chiefdom lands and cattle." Furthermore, the Tswana as a whole demonstrated some cohesion by collectively fighting against South African Boers and, under the leadership of the predominant chief, Khama III of the Ngwato, requested British protection in the 1870s (144).

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A.3.4 Burundi

Candidate states from maps: Rundi.

- *Rundi. EPR group: Tutsi.* The Rundi **Tutsi** state lasted from the late 16th century until the end of colonial rule. The state incorporated all the regions that eventually composed modern Burundi during the reign of Ntare Rugamba between 1796 and 1850 (Newbury 2001, 265-6). Although political conflict among Ntare Rugama's sons decreased the extent of centralized rule relative to the neighboring Rwandan state, politics were centered around the state. "This was political struggle, not anarchy: Baganwa often fought over recognized positions, including that of kingship itself—the control of royal rituals ...kingship in Burundi was in many cases not strong enough to suppress political conflict; nonetheless, it was often central to political struggle in Burundi and influential in the forms those struggles assumed" (285).

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A.3.5 Cameroon

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: Kotoko, Bamum.

- *Kotoko. EPR group: Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples).* Kotoko was not an independent state, and was instead incorporated into Borno, whose capital was in Nigeria (DeLancey and De-Lancey 2000, 118). The secondary sources consulted also mention that Kotoko was part of a broader grouping of political entities in northern Cameroon. Germany (Cameroon), Britain (Nigeria), and France (Chad) partitioned the former states of Adamawa, Borno, and Mandara, all of which occupied territory in northern Cameroon (Barkindo 1985, 29). The imperial capitals of the Adamawa emirate of the Sokoto empire (EB Adamawa) and Borno were located in Nigeria. Mandara, located in the polygon of the EPR group "Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders)" in Cameroon, had become a weak tributary state by the onset of colonization. After reaching its zenith in the late 18th century, "The beginning of the nineteenth century, however, saw Mandara at the nadir of its fortunes when the *Jihad* of Modibbo Adama and the creation of the Emirate of Fombina (Adamawa) detached much of its territory and forced the Sultan to seek the aid of Borno" (Barkindo 1985, 31). The kingdom was located in the Mandara mountains, and EB's entry for "Mandara Mountains" mentions peoples "living in dispersed homesteads or villages of small, circular huts" and nothing about a history of political centralization.

- *Bamum. EPR group: Bamileke.* Farther south, "The Fulani expansion [NB: the Fulani are widespread across western Africa and controlled states such as Sokoto and Adamawa] reached its southernmost point with the conquest of Bamum, a state founded in the 17th century by Nshare, the son of a Tikar chief. Bamoum was one of the largest of numerous states that emerged in the grassland areas of Cameroon at that time" (EB Cameroon). The historical capital of the Bamum, Foumban, is located in EPR's Bamileke polygon. However, the Bamileke were politically fractured: "Bamileke is a collective term referring to a loose aggregation of some 100 states or chiefdoms of the eastern Grassfields in the western province of Cameroon . . . [a] history of shifting borders, alliances, and the influx of refugees from neighboring states makes each Bamileke state a political composite of diverse peoples owing allegiance to the king and the established royal institutions. During the precolonial era, the Bamileke fought wars among their constituent states as well as with the neighboring Nso and Bamoun" (La Famille Bamileke 2016; see also Firmin-Sellers 2001).

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A.3.6 Central African Republic

Candidate states from maps: Bobangi.

- *Bobangi. EPR group: Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.).* The Bobangi were among the riverine peoples that escaped enslavement, and settled on and monopolized trade along the Oubangui river for two centuries prior to French colonization (Decalo 1998, 191; Kalck 2004, 26), but the sources do not suggest this trading center developed centralized institutions across Central African Republic's various riverine groups (more on this below).

Candidate states from EB: Dar al-Kuti, Zande, Bandi.

- *Preface for the remaining candidate states.* In Central African Republic: "Many of the ethnic groups in the region were organized in the precolonial era into small sultanates, but all were of minor geographical scope and little political and military weight" (Decalo 1998, 191). In the broader region of central Africa: "In the forests of Gabon and Middle Congo and the savannas of Oubangui-Chari and southern Chad, were small tribal groups whose traditional social organization had in many cases been upset by migrations and invasions coincident with the spread of the coastal slave trade and Muslim slave-raiding in the north" (Ballard 1965, 233-4).

  - *Dar al-Kuti. EPR group: Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula).* Tributary to the Wadai kingdom in Chad (Kalck 1992, 48; Bradshaw and Fandos Rius 2007).

  - *Zande and Bandi. EPR group: Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.).* Two Bandi (also spelled Bandia) sultanates existed on the rivers that compose Central African Republic's southern border: Bangassou and Rafai (Kalck 1992, 16), which correspond with their eponymous modern towns. The Zande (also called Azande) people divided between Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan also carved out small but fractured states: "During their conquests, scions of the royal clan carved out kingdoms for themselves, and wars between these various kingdoms were frequent" (EB Zande). The evidence for Bobangi, Zande, and Bandi is consistent with Decalo's (1998, 191) argument that riverine peoples in Central African Republic were fractured among many small sultanates.

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A.3.7 Chad

Candidate states from maps: Ouaddai, Bagirmi, Bornu.

- *Historical background on these states.* These are the three traditional states in Chad according to the literature: Ouaddai (also spelled "Wadai"), Bagirmi, and Bornu (also referred to as Kanem-Bornu; Bornu broke off the former Kanem empire before subsequently conquering Kanem). These states created a wide gulf between themselves and neighboring stateless societies. "The nearly stateless societies of the South, smaller and less well armed, could not simply be absorbed by the great states of the Sahel that emerged at various points in the thousand years preceding colonization. One principal reason was that they served as hunting grounds for slaves, a role they could not fulfill if, by incorporation into the Sahelian states of Ouaddai, Baruirmi, and Kanem, they became a part of Dar-el-Islam" (Nolutshungu 1996, 27-8). Similarly, Decalo (1980, 28-9) argues "the recorded history of the country is very much the story of the tug-of-war between the Muslim slave-states of the Sahel (Baguirmi, Ouadai, and Kanem-Bornu) and their deep razzias in the animist and disorganised Sara south."

- *Ouaddai. EPR group: Muslim Sahelian groups.* Ouaddai "developed an elaborate hierarchical structure with a powerful absolute monarchy" (Decalo 1997, 326). The **Muslim Sahelian group** Maba founded the Ouaddai state (Decalo 1997, xxv, 276), which included most of the territory spanned by the EPR Muslim Sahelian groups' group-location polygon. After 1982 in the EPR dataset, Muslim Sahelian groups split into Hadjerai and Zaghawa/Bideyat, and both are coded as PCS groups.

- *Bornu. EPR group: none.* The capital of Bornu is in Nigeria.

- *Bagirmi. EPR group: none.* Bagirmi was not independent in the 19th century, and instead was "under nearly continuous military pressure from—and [was] frequently tributary to—both the Kanem-Bornu Empire and the Ouadai state" (Decalo 1997, 78).

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A.3.8 Congo, Democratic Republic

Candidate states from maps: Luba, Lunda, Kuba, and Azande.

- *Luba. EPR groups: Luba Kasai and Luba Shaba.* The Luba were organized into a large state in which "the king retained a great deal of power over appointments and tribute" over the empire's provinces (Bobb 1999, 261). EB "Luba-Lunda states" refers to the Luba state as centralized and describes its expansion. This state corresponds with **Luba Kasai** and **Luba Shaba**, which renowned historian Jan Vansina also identifies as two of the major Luba clusters (Bobb 1999, 261).

- *Lunda. EPR group: Lunda-Yeke.* The Lunda organized a large state that "consisted of a centralized core, a ring of provinces closely tied to the capital, an outer ring of provinces that paid tribute but were otherwise autonomous, and a fringe of independent states that shared a common Lunda culture" (EB Lunda Empire). EB "Luba-Lunda states" refers to the Lunda state as centralized and describes its expansion. This state corresponds with **Lunda-Yeke**.

- *Kuba. EPR group: none.* Kuba does not correspond with any EPR ethnic groups. Comparing a map of the Kuba state (Vansina 1978, 8) with GeoEPR polygons, eastern parts of Kuba overlap with western

parts of the GeoEPR polygon for Lulua. However, the Lulua were not ruled as part of Kuba: "In the 19th century, rebellions in the east and Lulua invasions in the south weakened Kuba to the point of civil war" (EB Kuba).

- *Azande. EPR group: Azande.* EPR codes Azande as politically irrelevant.

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A.3.9 Congo, Republic

Candidate states from maps: Teke.

- *Teke. EPR group: Bateke.* The kingdom of Teke (also called the Tio kingdom or the kingdom of Anziku) was a trading center. "The political structure was unique. A state without a central army or a unified set of courts, central councils, central administration, delegation of authority from top down, where at least two ideologies competed (kingship based on *nkira* and lordship on *nkobi*), where rule at each level was most reminiscent of leadership in a kinship unit. The state did not even present a unified policy towards the outside, e.g. towards the Europeans" (Vansina 1973, 431-2). The "sub-chiefdoms nominally ruled in the name of the Makoko who retained the prerogative of appointing them [but] were virtually autonomous" (Decalo et al. 1996, 48). Instead, the capital Mbe served as the trading center of the Pool region, which was an "economic and trade hub" (48).

Candidate states from EB: Loango, Kongo.

- *Loango. EPR group: Vili.* This was an ancient kingdom of the Vili people. However, "By the 18th century, power had become fragmented. A long interregnum began in 1786, and when a king was finally enthroned he lacked any real authority" (EB "Kingdom of Loango"). Martin (1972, 158-174) provides additional details on the "dismemberment of the old Vili kingdom" (174) and offers concurring summarizing statements such as: "The fragmented scene of 1870 was a far cry from the powerful, unified kingdom described by European traders in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries" (158).

- *Kongo. EPR group: Bakongo.* The capital of the Kongo kingdom was in Angola (also see Angola's Kongo entry).

- *Final note.* Coding no PCS groups in Congo is consistent with the general contention that "in the forests of Gabon and Middle Congo and the savannas of Oubangui-Chari and southern Chad, were small tribal groups whose traditional social organization had in many cases been upset by migrations and invasions coincident with the spread of the coastal slave trade and Muslim slave-raiding in the north" (Ballard 1965, 233-4).

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A.3.10   Cote d'Ivoire

Candidate states from maps: Kong.

- *Kong. EPR group: Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur).* Kong was a trading center that briefly expanded in the mid-18th century (Saul 1998, 549-50) but "was unstable and failed to endure as a centralized state" (Perinbam 1988, 453). Its capital, Kong, corresponds with the EPR polygon for "Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)." Until defeat by Samori at the end of the 19th century, Kong served as the core of a decentralized trading empire that featured alliances by independent states and houses (Perinbam 1988, 455; Saul 1998, 564). Mundt (1995) refers to Kong specifically as a "trading center" (119) and Oliver and Atmore (2005, 70) label Kong as tributary to Asante.

Candidate states from EB Cote d'Ivoire: several small eastern states.

- *Small eastern states. EPR group: Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur).* EB Cote d'Ivoire mentions small eastern states of Gyaman, Ndenye, Sanwi, and Baule that were related to the Asante empire in contemporary Ghana either because they were formed by migrants from Asante or because the states were tributaries to Asante (Mundt 1995 explicitly states that the two main ones, Gyaman and Sanwi, were tributaries). EB also mentions Bouna, which was founded by Dagomba migrants from contemporary Ghana (Mundt 1995, 44-5). None of the states were large and therefore did not govern a sizable portion of Cote d'Ivoire's northern ethnic groups. For example, Boone (2003, 232) estimates Sanwi's population at 40,000 in 1956. Combining Maddison's (2010) population estimate for Cote d'Ivoire in 1956 with EPR's figure for "Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)" as a percentage of the country's total population yields an estimate that Sanwi composed less than 4% of this ethnic group's population, consistent with the claim of this group being fractured among numerous small kingdoms and other types of polities. Boone (2003, 181-2) cites different historical sources claiming "the absence of an Ashanti-type [as in Ghana] federal monarchy with a supreme chief anywhere in the Ivory Coast" and "at the time of colonial contact, 'there were no large-scale political entities in the Ivory Coast . . . comparable with the Ashanti in Ghana, Mossi in Upper Volta, or with the resurgent Muslim states of Mali and Senegal.'"

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A.3.11 Djibouti

Candidate states from maps: none. EB does not have a section on pre-colonial Djibouti (which perhaps reflects the lack of pre-colonial statehood). Examining Alwan and Mibrathu's (2000) entries for Djibouti's two EPR ethnic groups, Afar and Somali (specifically, the Issa clan), do not indicate any pre-colonial states.

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A.3.12 Eritrea

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: none.

A.3.13 Ethiopia

Candidate states from maps: Ethiopia and Oromo.

- *Ethiopia. EPR group: Amhara.* After Ethiopia declined in power and territorial scope in the 17th and 18th centuries, "the second half of the nineteenth century, by contrast, saw a still sharper swing in the opposite direction. The fragmented polity was pulled together, its territory was more than doubled, and its independence was assured in the face of European invasion" (Clapham 1977, 37-8). The monarch personally commanded the state's army, and the government extracted regular taxes from its regions (44). The **Amhara** controlled the monarchy.

- *Oromo. EPR group: Oroma.* Reid's (2012) map includes the Oromo. However, the Oromo belonged to "political organisations without kings" and whose " 'non-state' system [was] characterized by pastoral militarism" (Reid 2012, 68; see also EB Oromo).

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A.3.14 Gabon

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB Gabon: Orungu.

- *Orungu. EPR group: Myene.* Orungu is one of the six Myene clans that are "linked by language though historically fractured into tiny entities" (Decalo 1998, 117). Although its kings "grew rich and powerful from taxing and regulating the slave trade" in the first half of the 19th century, they numbered only 5,000 (Gardinier and Yates 2006, 251; Decalo 1998, 118) and did not compose a large enough percentage of the Myene to code the EPR ethnic group Myene as a whole as PCS. Dividing 5,000 by Rich's (2010, 208) estimate that "perhaps 30,000 or so belonged to Omyènè-speaking clans, although the lack of firm statistics makes this only a rough estimate" yields 17%. Furthermore, the Orungu's centralized structures distinguished them from other Myene groups (Gardinier 1983, 501; Bucher 1975, 544). This coding supports the general contention that, "in the forests of Gabon and Middle Congo and the savannas of Oubangui-Chari and southern Chad, were small tribal groups whose traditional social organization had in many cases been upset by migrations and invasions coincident with the spread of the coastal slave trade and Muslim slave-raiding in the north" (Ballard 1965, 233-4).

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A.3.15 Gambia

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: Malinke.

- *Malinke. EPR group: Mandinka.* Malinke states were tiny and highly fractured. Hughes and Gailey (1990, 102) refer to "states," but then proceed to list 15 separate Malinke states along the Gambia river.

References

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A.3.16 Ghana

Candidate states from maps: Asante and Fante.

- *Asante. EPR group: Asante (Akan).* In the Asante empire of the **Asante (Akan)**, central political power was organized around a monarch that presided over a standing army and bureaucracy (EB Asante Empire; Apter 1972, 23) and was "one of the most highly organized military and political systems on the west coast of Africa" (Apter 1972, 25).

- *Fante. EPR group: Other Akans.* Although the coastal Akan group Fante created states, their various chiefdoms/states were autonomous from each other—and at times subordinate to Asante—and only occasionally banded together, when threatened (Owusu-Ansah 2005, 119-20). "Among the Fanti and other coastal states we find an almost endless process of fragmentation of authority. For instance, the people now know as the Fantis are in fact a surprisingly large number of sovereign and independent states" (Agbodeka 1964, 85).

<div align="center">References</div>

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A.3.17 Guinea

Candidate states from maps: Futa Jalon and Samori's empire.

- *Futa Jalon. EPR group: Peul.* Futa Jalon emerged as part of the wider West African Fula jihads in the early 18th century and survived until it was incorporated by France in 1896 (Oliver and Atmore 2005, 64; EB Fouta Djallon). This "centralized state" of the **Peul** "maintained a dominant position in the area through independence in 1958" (O'Toole 2005, 96) and collected tribute from the villages and administered a legal system (Cowan 1962, 150).

- *Samori's empire. EPR group: Malinke.* The **Malinke** warlord Samori Toure conquered territory and created an independent state in modern-day Guinea in the late 19th century (O'Toole 2005, 161). He was "an able administrator. He divided his empire into provinces and cantons; each was ruled by one of his faithful appointed representatives" (Cowan 1962, 151). Boone (2003, 247-8) refers to Samori as "an ambitious centralizer and state builder."

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A.3.18   Guinea-Bissau

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: Kaabu.

- *Kaabu. EPR group: none.* The Kaabu state was centered in Guinea-Bissau and extended into Senegal. It was a Mandinka state that originally broke away from the Mali Empire and lasted in some form until being destroyed by Futa Jalon in 1867 (Lobban and Mendy 1997, 219). However, EPR does not code Mandinka as a politically relevant ethnic group in Guinea-Bissau. Lobban and Mendy's (1997) map of Kaabu shows the state was located in the northeast part of the modern country, where EPR does not map any politically relevant ethnic groups.

<div align="center">References</div>

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A.3.19   Kenya

Candidate states from maps: Maasai.

- *Massai. EPR group: Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu.* The Maasai were a nomadic warrior group (EB Maasai).

Candidate states from EB Kenya: none.

Final note. Decalo's (1998, 177, 179) description coincides with absence of ethnic groups coded as PCS: "A distinctive feature of Kenya's peoples is the absence of strong chiefs, internal unity or historic states . . . Unlike neighboring Uganda, Kenya did not emerge at independence with kings and chiefs and primordial mass allegiances" (Decalo 1998, 177, 179).

<div align="center">References</div>

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A.3.20   Liberia

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB Liberia: none.

A.3.21   Madagascar

Candidate states from maps: Merina.

- *Merina. EPR group: Highlanders.* The Merina created a state whose army was equipped with firearms (Oliver and Atmore 2005, 101) that "had nearly completed the unification of Madagascar into a single, centralized state" (EB Merina) at the onset of colonization. During this process they displaced many

older states on the island, as shown in Ajayi and Crowder's (1985) map of changes over time of states in Madagascar. The Merina are the **Highlanders**, who were distinguished from the non-centralized coastal Cotiers, the other EPR ethnic group in Madagascar (Schraeder 1995).

References

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A.3.22 Malawi

Candidate states from maps: Jumbe, Ngoni, Yao.

- *Jumbe. EPR group: none.* Jumbe was the chief of Nkhotakota, a group of villages that served as a depot for Swahili-Arab slave and ivory trading (Decalo 1997, 55; EB Nkhotakota). Nkhotakota corresponds with the EPR polygon for Chewa (Central), but there is no apparent connection between Jumbe and the Chewa ethnic group.

- *Ngoni. EPR group: none.* EPR does not code Ngoni as politically relevant. The scattered Ngoni settlements depicted in Ajayi and Crowder's (1985) map correspond with EPR's Chewa polygon, discussed below.

- *Yao. EPR group: Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao).* "The Yao were never united but lived as small groups ruled by chiefs who were predominantly military and commercial leaders" (EB Yao).

Candidate states from EB: Maravi Confederacy, Ngonde.

- *Chewa. EPR group: Chewa (Central).* The Chewa are descendants of the former Maravi Confederacy. This state had disintegrated by 1720 (EB Maravi Confederacy) and the Chewa did not subsequently achieve centralized political organization. "Peaceful farmers, the Chewa lived in decentralized federations of chiefdoms that in the 19th century fell to aggressive new arrivals—the Ngoni from the southwest, and Yao and Swahili slavers from the east" (Decalo 1998, 52).

- *Ngonde. EPR group: Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde).* The Ngonde created a state with central institutions: "though the Ngonde state was atypical in the Malawi-Tanginyika corridor, it had many similarities with some of the Luba states in modern Zaire and with most of the interlacustrine states of East Africa. That of Ungonde was smaller in size compared to these, neither was its bureaucracy developed to the same extent as these or even some West African states such as Oyo or Asante" (Kalinga 1979, 2). However, Ngonde compose too small a percentage of the EPR group "Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde)" to code that EPR group as PCS, considering that Tumbuka and Tonga were not centrally organized (see EB Tumbuka, EB Tonga, and Decalo 1998, 53-4). Ethnologue provides recent estimates of 300,000 Nyakyusa-Ngonde, 2,200,000 Tumbuka, and 170,000 Tonga speakers in Malawi, putting Ngonde at 11% of these three groups.

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A.3.23   Mali

Candidate states from maps: Tukulor.

- *Tukulor. EPR group: Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.).* The Tukulor empire stretched across most of territory where **Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.)** reside. This state conquered the Bambara (Mande) states of Segu and Kaarta and the Fulani state of Masina and lasted from 1850 until defeat by France (EB Tukulor empire, Oliver and Atmore 2005, 68). Warner (1999, 241) summarizes historians who argue the Tukulor empire "was the largest and most powerful state in Western Sudan ... Its political system resembled a nascent state; due to the great size of the empire and the difficulties of communication, administration was decentralized but not absent: local power was held by emirs (either religious leaders or military commanders) who were 'vested with wide powers to rule the territories under them as long as they recognized the Shaikh's sovereign powers.' The government was financed by tribute from conquered polities and from foreign trade, predominantly France." It also had a large standing army and levied taxes as prescribed by the Koran (Kanya-Forstner 1971, 56-7).

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A.3.24   Mauritania

Candidate states from maps: Aderer.

- *Aderer.* "The population of the Adrar (Berber for "mountain") formerly was nomadic" (EB Adrar).

Candidate states from EB Mauritania: Trarza and Brakna.

- *Trarza and Brakna.* There is no evidence of centralized organization within these emirates. "At the time of the French conquest, the tribe was the basic socio-political unit at the local level ... most Saharan tribes have historically formed independent desert confederacies known as emirates or have been loosely linked to regional state and multi-ethnic empires. They all tended to share a common culture, language, and history. Mauretania was no exception. It was ruled after the eighth century by

various emirs whose capital shifted from Adrar to Trarza" (Bennoune 1977, 4). The emirates ruled over nomadic or semi-nomadic populations (Eagleton 1965, 47, 49; Taylor 1995).

References

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A.3.25 Mozambique

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB Mozambique: Gaza.

- *Gaza. EPR group: none.* Ngoni migrants that originated from outside Mozambique founded Gaza in the 1830s (Omer-Cooper 1977, 349-50). EPR does not code Ngoni as a politically relevant ethnic group in Mozambique. The location of the Gaza state near Mozambique's modern-day capital Maputo is located in EPR's polygon for Tsonga-Chopi, who are distinct ethnic groups from Ngoni and were not centrally organized: "The Tsonga were formerly organized as independent peoples, each occupying its own territory and named for a powerful, dominant patrilineage. Early in the 19th century, however, they were conquered by other Nguni-speaking peoples" (EB Tsonga).

References

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A.3.26 Namibia

Candidate states from maps: Herero and Nama.

- *Herero. EPR group: Herero, Mbanderu.* The Herero "were originally divided into autonomous political units under local headmen" (EB Herero). Grotpeter (1994) does not mention anything about centralized states in his "Herero" entry.

- *Nama. EPR group: Nama.* "The Nama were formerly reasonably prosperous sheep or cattle pastoralists" (EB Nama). Grotpeter (1994) does not mention anything about centralized states in his "Nama" entry.

Candidate states from EB Namibia: Ovambo.

- *Ovambo. EPR group: Ovambo.* According to EB Namibia, "In the north the Ovambo people developed several states on both sides of the Kunene River," which separates Namibia from Angola. However, like their fractured northern Angolan neighbors Ovimbundu-Ovambo—also not coded as PCS—the Ovambo in Namibia "had no single political authority, but several small states emerged in the 19th century" (Historical Dictionary of Pre-Colonial Africa, 337). One of the states, Ondonga, exhibited evidence of central institutions (Eirola 1992, 45), but it only composed between 10% to 25% of Ovamboland on the eve of colonization (31).

References

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A.3.27 Niger

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: Takedda, Agadez, Bornu, Songhai empire, Fulani jihad states

- *Takedda and Agadez. EPR group: Tuareg.* Both states were controlled by the nomadic Tuareg in the north (Decalo 1990, 245; EB Niger; EB Tuareg).

- *Preface for remaining candidate states.* Referring to the sedentary ethnic groups in the south, "At the time of the colonial conquest, the disparate regions the French molded into an entity known as Niger may be best described as an assemblage of peripheral borderlands" (EB Niger). The following candidates are characterized as contributing refugees to Niger rather than to being native Nigerien states, but are examined for thoroughness.

    - *Bornu. EPR group: Kanouri.* The Kanouri compose "remnants of Bornuan outposts from the days when Bornu controlled one-third of contemporary Niger" (Decalo 1990, 245). The capital of Bornu is in present-day Nigeria.

    - *Fulani jihad states and Hausaland. EPR groups: Peul, Hausa.* EPR codes Niger's Fulani as politically irrelevant. Notably, Niger's Fulani are distinguished from Nigeria's Fulani (who controlled the Sokoto Caliphate) because Britain and France purposely drew the northern border of Nigeria to correspond with the upper boundary of the Sokoto Caliphate (Touval 1966, 289), which is located in Nigeria. Regarding Hausa, most earlier Hausa states were destroyed during the Fulani jihads that created states such as Sokoto in Nigeria. Newer Hausa states that reestablished themselves beyond Fulani control "were hardly free and independent, however, but rather subject to another power; in the case of Maradi and Zango, to Damagaram (Zinder), which was in turn a vassal to Borno" (Miles 1994, 65).

    - *Dendi. EPR group: Djerma-Songhai.* Songhai are concentrated in the Dendi province of the ancient Songhai Empire. Although the lineage of the Songhai dynasty escaped to Dendi after the empire fell, it "was unable to regain the core of the empire that fell in due course to Tuareg arms. Dendi itself disintegrated into five or six mini-kingdoms . . . In the nineteenth century the area came under intense Tuareg military pressure, later also from the Fulani and lost much of its autonomy to one or the other of the two" (Decalo 1990, 244).

References

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A.3.28 Nigeria

Candidate states from maps: Sokoto, Bornu, Benin, Yoruba states.

- *Sokoto. EPR group: Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt.* The Sokoto caliphate was controlled by and covered the territory occupied by **Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt**. "By the standard of political units in precolonial sub-Saharan Africa, Sokoto would rank among the most centralized, stable, and sizable. The rulers of the caliphate exercised some semblance of control over large parts of what is now northern Nigeria, with political units sharing a common religion, Islam. Over time, norms and practices developed to govern the relationship between the caliphs and the emirs, the underlings who exercised actual power over smaller territories. Political organization was inspired by the more complex political units of northern Africa, and written language was used to maintain records. The resulting political stability allowed for economic expansion, including the production of some luxury goods for export across the Sahara to North Africa" (Kohli 2004, 297).

- *Bornu. EPR group: none.* Bornu broke off from the ancient Kanem empire in the 14th century and later recaptured Kanem as a protectorate. Despite turmoil in the 19th century, it lasted until Sudanese slaver Rabih az-Zubayr defeated the state in 1893 (EB Bornu). Maps show that this state existed in the northeast corner of Nigeria, which does not correspond to an EPR ethnic group polygon (there is some intersection with the Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt EPR ethnic group polygon, but the Sokoto Caliphate covers almost that entire EPR group).

- *Benin. EPR group: none.* Benin was the historical state of the Edo people, and it lasted until Britain destroyed the capital in 1897 (EB Benin). However, Edo do not correspond with any ethnic group in the EPR dataset, and the capital of the Benin Empire, Edo (now called Benin city), is not located within the polygon of any EPR ethnic groups in Nigeria.

- *Yoruba states. EPR group: Yoruba.* The Yoruba were fractured into "some two dozen more or less autonomous political collectivities of varying sizes" (Kohli 2004, 293). The most powerful Yoruba state, Oyo, fell in the early 19th century to Fulani jihadists (EB Oyo empire), which preceded constant warfare among the Yoruba states (Kohli 2004, 295). Sklar and Whitaker (1966, 16) contrast pre-colonial states in Nigeria. "The political systems of Benin and Hausaland rest primarily on principles of stratification. Among both peoples the idea of a centralized state is well established." By contrast, "The traditional systems of both the Yoruba and Ibo nationalities rest primarily on principles of segmentation."

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A.3.29 Rwanda

Candidate states from maps: Rwanda.

- *Rwanda. EPR group: Tutsi.* The Rwanda **Tutsi** empire lasted from the 15th or 16th century until the end of colonial rule (EB Rwanda). "By the end of the nineteenth century the Rwandese polity had achieved a remarkable degree of centralization" through the "twin processes of territorial expansion and consolidation" facilitated by "a strongly centralized state system—of a reliable corps of centrally appointed chiefs and an efficient military organization—[that] replace[d] the more or less autonomous kinship and clan structures on which the monarchy had initially relied to establish its rule" (Lemarchand 1977, 72). Tutsis monopolized power in the monarchy and dominated the more numerous Hutu (Lemarchand 1977, 68).

References

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A.3.30 Senegal

Candidate states from maps: several traditional monarchies and jihad states.

- The once-powerful Jolof Empire collapsed in the 16th century and broke into constituent **Wolof**[*] states of Walo, Kajor, Bawol, Jolof, and **Serer**[*] states of Sin and Salum (Clark and Phillips 1994, 278).

- Two of the earliest Fulani jihads occurred in Senegal (EB Western Africa), establishing the **Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur)**[*] states of Bondu and Futa Toro.

- Evidence of centralization for both: "In terms of both military strength and economic resources, the strongest states were on the river banks and fertile plains between the Senegal and Gambia Rivers; in estimated ranked order, beginning with most powerful, these were: Kajoor, Saalum, Futa Toro, and, until its decline at the turn of the nineteenth century, Waalo. Population density and agricultural productivity were greater on these plains than in the Sahel and desert north of the Senegal, in the rain forest south of the Gambia, or on the highlands of the upper rivers area. Military power depended on infantry and cavalry armed with lances, spears, and muzzle-loading muskets, all of which could be acquired more readily by the plains states than by their neighbors" (Colvin 1977, 30-31).

References

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A.3.31 Sierra Leone

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB Sierra Leone: none.

A.3.32 South Africa

Candidate states from maps: Zulu.

- *Zulu. EPR group: Zulu.* "By the 1820s, a powerful **Zulu** state, one of the most dominant polities in southern Africa, had emerged under the control of Shaka . . . He built a militarized, centralized state in this region, a core state surrounded by vassal communities in varying degrees of subordination who paid him tribute" (Saunders and Southey 2000, 286-7).

<p align="center">*References*</p>

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A.3.33 Sudan

Candidate states from maps: Funj sultanate, Mahdist state, Fur.

- *Funj sultanate and Mahdist state. EPR group: Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin, and Danagla (Arab).* States that perpetuated Sudan's long history of statehood along the Nile include the Funj Sultanate of Sinnar (1504-1821) and the Mahdist State (1881-1898), separated by a period of Egyptian colonial rule known as the Turkiyah. The capitals of Funj (Sinnar), Turkiyah (Khartoum), and Mahdist (Omdurman) were each located within territory inhabited by **Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin, and Danagla (Arab)**, also known as riverain Northern Sudanese (O'Fahey 1996, 259) or Arabized Nubians (Collins 2008, 4). "The riverain Sudanese are overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking (with the exception of some Nubians), wholly Muslim and to a greater or lesser degree identify themselves genealogically and culturally as Arab" (O'Fahey 1996, 259). Shaygiyya played a key role during the Turkiyah (Collins 2008, 11-12) and Ja'aliyyin did in the Mahdist state (Collins 2008, 22, 24, 29; O'Fahey 1996, 260), each of which exercised their greatest power along the Nile (Collins 2008, 14, 20, 31). Regarding central institutions, "The Khalifa [ruler from 1885 through 1898 after the Mahdi's death] had transformed the theocracy of the Mahdi into an Islamic state with a centralized administration under his personal rule supported by a bureaucracy" (Collins 2008, 31).

- *Fur. EPR group: Fur.* The **Fur** created a polity in which "the sultan exerted absolute authority . . . a centralized bureaucracy developed to aid the sultan with a *vizir*, council of state, system of taxation, and regulation of foreign affairs" (Lobban et al. 2002, 105).

<p align="center">*References*</p>

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A.3.34 Togo

Candidate states from maps: none. Candidate states from EB: none.

Final note. "Until 1884 Togoland was an indeterminate buffer zone between the warring states of Asante and Dahomey" (EB Togo). Decalo (1990, 207-8) provides additional details on the decentralized polities of pre-colonial Togo.

<div align="center">*References*</div>

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A.3.35 Uganda

Candidate states from maps: Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, and Toro.

- *Buganda. EPR group: Baganda.* The state of the **Baganda** "was founded in the late 14th century, when the kabaka, or ruler, of the Ganda people came to exercise strong centralized control over his domains, called Buganda. By the 19th century Buganda had become the largest and most powerful state in the region. The local chiefs of conquered areas ruled as personal appointees of the kabaka, who had a sizable army at his disposal" (Ingham 1958, 17).

- *Bunyoro, Ankole, and Toro. EPR group: South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro).* Regarding **South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro)**[*], "Bunyoro's sphere of influence was even more far-flung [compared to Buganda]: the Mukama (king) ruled through appointees who were kept loyal through family and clan ties, and by being required to return annually to the Mukama with their royal insignia" (Pirouet 1995, 7). Similarly, "The Nkole maintained a centralized state, headed by the mugabe (king)" (EB Ankole; see also Doornboos 1977) and Toro, which seceded from Bunyoro in 1830, also achieved "centralized political organization" (EB Toro) although "appears to have [been] a principality rather than a fully independent state" (Pirouet 1995, 77). Ankole compose 8% of the country's population, Banyoro 2.4%, and Toro 3.2% (Fearon 2003), and therefore the two that unambiguously qualify as states compose more than half of the population of the EPR ethnic group.

- *Final note on regional trends.* "A chain of new polities was emerging in the lacustrine region in the course of the sixteenth century—including Bunyoro, Buganda, Toro, Nkore, Rwanda, and Burundi—which had in common hierarchical systems, centralised kingship with important symbolic and ritual functions, and provincial governorships responsible for military mobilisation and resource extraction. They arose in one of the most fertile belts in sub-Saharan Africa, characterised by rich volcanic soil and good rainfall, sustaining a denser population than was possible elsewhere; this combination awarded these polities a level of stability and permanence lacking in other areas" (Reid 2012, 66-7). Buganda and Bunyoro receive the most attention in the literature as powerful states.

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A.3.36 Zambia

Candidate states from maps: Barotse and Kazembe.

- *Barotse. EPR group: Lozi (Barotse).* Caplan (1970) describes the "extremely complex structure of this highly centralized state" (2) of the **Lozi (Barotse)** in which "struggles for power were largely concentrated at the capital" (2).

- *Kazembe. EPR group: Bemba speakers.* The Kazembes (kings) controlled a "centralized and ethnically heterogeneous state . . . Many of the Lunda adopted the Bemba language of their conquered subjects . . . During the hundred years from the mid-18th to the mid-19th centuries, the state of Kazembe dominated trade routes and much of the political life from Katanga to at least Lake Bangweulu and actually much of northeastern Zambia" (Simon et al. 2007, 189-90). Separately, the Bemba ethnic group also formed "an extensive and relatively unified political system [distinct from Kazembe], in which a number of chiefs were subordinated to a single paramount" (Roberts 1973, xxvi; see also EB Bemba). Furthermore, "there is no doubt that Chitimukulu was, and is, a 'divine king' in the sense that his office is believed to carry with it supernatural control over the life and welfare of the land and people" (Roberts 1973, xxx). Kazembe and the Bemba composed the two major states in northeastern Zambia (Roberts 1973, xxvi), where the EPR group **Bemba speakers**[*] reside. Note that the Lunda group explicitly coded by EPR, Luanda (NW Province), is distinct from the Lunda in northeastern Zambia that ruled the Kazembe state.

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A.3.37 Zimbabwe

Candidate states from maps: Ndebele and Shona.

- *Ndebele. EPR group: Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga).* The Ndebele of the EPR group **Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)** established a "highly formalized, pre-industrial, non-monetary, bureaucratic administration" (Chanaiwa 1976, 57). All state revenues—from conquest tribute to foreign trade—went directly to the king, the king directly appointed all administrators, and owned all the land and cattle in the country. The central institution of the Ndebele was its standing conscription army, which the king also controlled directly (Chanaiwa 1976, 57). Using 2010 language population figures from Ethnologue, the Ndebele compose 89% of Ndebele, Kalanga, and Tonga. This figure does not include an estimate for Tonga, which Ethnologue does not provide because the overwhelming majority of Tonga speakers are in Zambia rather than Zimbabwe (also see EB "Tonga (African people)").

- *Shona. EPR group: Shona.* The Shona were not centrally organized: "In the late 17th century the Changamire state rapidly developed into an empire that dominated more of the country than did any other precolonial state system . . . The Rozvi empire, like its predecessor states, was really more a confederation than a centralized polity. It comprised a collection of tribute-paying chiefdoms with their

own dynasties. The tendency toward local autonomy was persistent, and by the late 18th century the 'empire' was disintegrating. The Mfecane invasions of the 1830s accelerated this process. Afterwards there were more than 100 independent Shona chiefdoms, many of which had to struggle for autonomy against the raids and tribute extractions of the newly arrived Ndebele and Gaza [NB: Gaza was in Mozambique] states" (Rubert and Rasmussen 2001, 298).

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B   Additional References for Cases Mentioned in Text

- Angola: Le Billon (2007, 101-2) for rebel group splits

- Benin: Decalo (1990, 91) for pre-colonial war, Thompson (1963, 169) for indirect rule, Decalo (1973) for decolonization party splits, Hargreaves (1969, 216) for Dahomey leader descending from the former royal house

- Chad: Decalo (1980a, 483) for slave trade, Decalo (1980b, 31) and Nolutshungu (1996, 29) for indirect rule, and Nolutshungu (1996) for decolonization party splits

- Ethiopia: Clapham (1977) for ruling monarchy

- Ghana: Boone (2003, 159) for indirect rule

- Madagascar: Minorities at Risk "Merina" (2006) for slave trade, Thibaut (1999) for decolonization party splits

- Mali: Krings (1995, 58) for slave trade

- Rwanda and Burundi: Young (2006, 309) for indirect rule, Lemarchand (1977a,b) for ruling monarchy

- Sudan: Ofcansky (1992) for slave trade, indirect rule, and decolonization party splits; Sharkey (2008, 29) for durable and divisive identities; Tartter (1992, 234-7) and Bechtold (1990, 582, 592) for southern civil wars contributing to military coups in riverine Arab regimes.

- Uganda: Reid (2012, 116) for pre-colonial war, Rothchild and Rogin (1966, 341) for indirect rule

- Zambia: Caplan (1970) for indirect rule

- Zimbabwe: Wilson (1994, 191) for rebel groups splits

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C Additional Information on Data and Models

Table C.1: Summary Statistics for Whole Sample

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Major civil war onset (drop ongoing)	0.009	0.097	6582
Successful coup attempt	0.01	0.1	7054
PCS group	0.167	0.373	7054
SLPCS group	0.446	0.497	7054
Group % of pop.	0.171	0.173	7054
Distance from capital	3.908	3.19	7054
Tsetse fly	0.447	0.14	7054
Ag. transition	3061.596	998.977	7054
Ecological diversity	0.396	0.222	7054
Herbst geography	1.487	1.238	7054
Group-level oil	0.053	0.225	7054
Country-level oil	1.247	2.285	7054
Slave exports	5.032	2.837	7054
Historical warfare	0.122	0.327	7054
British col.	0.413	0.492	7054
French col.	0.352	0.478	7054
Portuguese col.	0.049	0.215	7054
Belgian col.	0.094	0.292	7054
ln(Eu. pop %)	-0.984	1.27	7054
ln(Protestant miss./10,000)	-1.451	1.682	7054
Partitioned group	0.461	0.499	7054
Straight/squiggly borders	0.029	0.012	6761
Ethnic fractionalization	0.755	0.151	7054
Polity	-3.026	5.779	7054
ln(GDP/capita)	6.890	0.597	7054
ln(Population)	15.882	1.26	7054

C.1 Sample

The sample contains almost all ethnic group-years from the EPR dataset for each Sub-Saharan African country from their year of independence until 2005. The current version of EPR (2014 Update 2) does not provide data for Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, or Swaziland. Most of these countries fail to meet either of two scope conditions for the theory, and therefore their exclusion from the statistical results is not problematic. First, many of the islands lacked an indigenous population prior to colonization, eliminating the possibility of pre-colonial states (which is why I also excluded Mauritius). Second, three of the mainland countries effectively have only one ethnic group, which obviates the theory's focus on *inter*-ethnic political interactions. Tanzania is excluded for this reason also because EPR codes "Mainland Africans" as over 96% of the country's population, hence effectively one ethnic group. Notably, Tanzania and Mauritius were not included in earlier versions of EPR and are not included in Roessler's (2011) dataset, either. Finally, because the hypotheses about ethnic violence only pertain to post-European colonial polities, the sample excludes foreign settler-dominated South Africa before 1994, Liberia before 1980, and Zimbabwe before 1980—therefore only focusing on years in which indigenous Africans held power. Ethiopia's first year in the dataset corresponds with the first year in which a colonized country in the dataset, Sudan, gained independence, 1956.

C.2 Dependent Variables

The appendix to Roessler (2011) lists every coup and civil war in his dataset, which is identical to the list used here with the following exceptions. For two countries for which Roessler (2011) does not have data, I coded the coup and civil war variables in consultation with ACD2EPR's ethnic civil war dataset and Powell's (2012) coup dataset: Botswana and Djibouti. Additionally, Roessler (2011) is missing two civil wars from the updated version of Fearon and Laitin's (2003) dataset that I added: the territorial rebellion in Angola's Cabinda enclave in 1992, and a civil war featuring multiple ethnic groups in Ethiopia after a successful rebellion in 1992. I also recoded Guinea-Bissau's "civil war" in 1998 to a successful coup attempt because it featured a military faction.

C.3 Alternative Explanations

Table C.2: Description and Sources for Covariates

Covariate	Description
Population %	Ethnic group's share of the population, coded by EPR (Vogt et al. 2015).
Distance from capital	Distance between centroid of ethnic group's EPR polygon and the country's capital. Calculated by author by combining GeoEPR spatial data with CShapes data (Weidmann et al. 2010).
Ecological diversity	Fenske (2014) provides evidence that states were more likely to arise in areas with higher ecological diversity because they could more easily trade across ecological regions. I calculated ecological diversity for each EPR ethnic group by using Fenske's spatial vegetation data, which is derived from White (1983). The measure is standard deviation of the area of vegetation types (of which there are 18) within an EPR ethnic group's location polygon.
Neolithic transition	Putterman (2008) shows in a global sample that territories experiencing earlier transitions to agricultural production tended to experience higher levels of statehood in the second millennium, a variable measured at the country level. The measure is thousands of years elapsed since an ethnic group's (modern-day) country experienced a transition to agricultural production. Data imputed for Djibouti (average of Ethiopia and Somalia) and Eritrea (Ethiopia).
Tsetse fly	Alsan (2015, 395) shows that groups residing in territory with greater tsetse fly prevalence tended to have lower levels of political centralization by decreasing population density and eliminating the possibility of using pack animals to move armies and to conduct long-distance trade. Calculated by author using Alsan's spatial data to calculate the average value on her tsetse fly sustainability index for EPR ethnic group polygons.
Oil and gas income per capita	Logged country-level data, from Ross' (2012) dataset.
Oil-rich ethnic group	Ethnic group coded as 1 if it has at least one major oil field within its EPR polygon, or within 250 kilometers offshore and within the group's country's maritime borders. Major oil field data from Horn (2003).
Herbst geography	Herbst (2000) classifies the difficulty of broadcasting power in different African countries as a proxy for the geographic difficulty of preventing civil war. Herbst classifies countries as easy (0), neutral (1), hinterland (2), and difficult geography (3), which I turned into an ordinal variable using the values in parentheses. He is missing data for Djibouti and Madagascar, which I coded.
Historical warfare	Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) and Dincecco et al. (2016) demonstrate a strong positive relationship between historical and modern wars in Africa. The variable scores a 1 if at least one war between 1400 and 1700 occurred within the group's EPR polygon, and 0 otherwise. Calculated by author by merging Besley and Reynal-Querol's (2014) coordinates for warfare location with GeoEPR spatial data.

Covariate	Description
Slave exports	Although slave wars destroyed historical states such as the Kongo state (Nunn 2008, 143), states able to monopolize trade routes benefited greatly (Lloyd 1965, 70) and states such as the Asante declined after West African slave exports decreased (Hopkins 2000, 314-318). I use Nunn's (2008) country-level variable that divides number of slave exports by land area to account for this. For the present purposes, the country-level data has two advantages over more disaggregated slave export data. First, pre-colonial statehood is argued to cause violence through country-wide spillover effects, making country-level variables relevant even in regressions that use ethnic groups as the unit of analysis. Second, if slave exports impact subsequent political violence, it should be because neighboring groups raided each other, which is better captured by country-level measures rather than by measuring the number of slaves exported from each ethnic group (which is not available, anyway, for EPR ethnic group units). Data point for Eritrea is imputed using Ethiopia's data.
Colonial dummies	Controlling for colonizer fixed effects eliminates heterogeneity that arises from different strategies of colonial rule, stances toward decolonization, and willingness to prop up friendly post-colonial regimes that may have affected prospects for civil wars and military coups (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 86; Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001; Wucherpfennig et al. 2016). Each colonizer dummy is coded as 1 if the ethnic group is located in a country that was colonized by that European power (either British, French, Belgian, or Portuguese) and 0 otherwise. This leaves uncolonized Ethiopia and Liberia, South African-colonized Namibia, and Italian-colonized Eritrea as the omitted basis countries.
European settlers	Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Hariri (2012) argue that colonies with larger European settler populations achieved higher levels of economic development and democracy after independence. Paine (2017) argues that European settler colonies in Africa were more likely to fight decolonization wars. The measure uses the log of European population share in the year closest to independence with data from Easterly and Levine's (2016) dataset.
Christian missionaries	Another possible path to prominence in the colonial administrative hierarchy was access to education (Ricard-Huguet 2016). Because colonial states invested little in their population before 1945, Christian missionaries were particularly prominent in educating Africans (Woodberry 2012). To account for inter-ethnic group differences in Christian missionary presence, I count the number of colonial missions within the territorial polygon of each EPR ethnic group, divide that by 10,000 ethnic group population, add 0.01, and take the natural log. I follow Nunn (2010) by using Roome's (1924) map of Christian missionary stations in Africa in 1924, and use Frankema and Jerven's (2014) revised population data for African countries in 1924. To generate ethnic group-level population estimates, I multiplied EPR groups' share of the total population by the 1924 country-level population estimate.
Partitioned ethnic groups	Many articles have established a positive correlation between groups partitioned across international boundaries and civil war onset (Cederman et al. 2013), with some focusing specifically on Africa (Englebert et al. 2002; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016). The present data draw from Cederman et al.'s (2013) and Vogt et al.'s (2015) trans-national ethnic kin data. The covariate used in almost every regression table (usually in Column 8) codes any group with ethnic kin in a neighboring country as 1, and 0 otherwise. The sample of ethnic groups in Appendix Table D.3 is slightly different because it excludes ethnic groups that do not have ethnic kin in any countries in the core sample. This implies that every ethnic group in the Appendix Table D.3 sample is a co-ethnic neighbor of at least one other group in that sample, hence facilitating the desired comparisons.
Straight/squiggly international borders	One possible measure of "suffocation" (Englebert et al. 2002) is the artificiality of a country's international borders, with the idea that more artificial countries are more likely to include incompatible groups, however one wants to conceive "incompatible." I control for a measure of straight/squiggly international borders from Alesina et al. (2011). "The basic idea is to compare the borders of a country to a geometric figure. If a country looks like a perfect square with borders drawn with straight lines, the chances are that these borders were drawn artificially. On the contrary, borders that are squiggly lines (perhaps meant to capture geographic features and/or ethnicities) are less likely to be artificial" (253). Their article provides additional details on how they calculated the country-level measure.
Ethnic fraction-alization	Country-level data from Fearon (2003). This variable has been widely scrutinized in the civil war literature, and provides a different proxy for suffocation, with the idea that colonizers could have instead created smaller, more ethnically homogenous political units.
GDP per capita	Annual logged country-level data from Maddison (2010). Data for Eritrea imputed from Ethiopia.
Population	Annual logged country-level data from Maddison (2010). Because he provides a joint data point for Ethiopia and Eritrea, for these two countries I multiply his estimates in all years by each country's percentage of their joint population in 2017.
Democracy	Annual country-level data from Polity IV's *polity2* variable (Marshall and Gurr 2014).

C.4 Temporal Dependence Controls

Regarding the vector of temporal dependence controls in Equation 1, T'_i, the civil war regressions in Panel B of Table 3 and Panel A of Table 4 control for years since the last year in which the group participated in a civil war and associated cubic splines, and a one-year lagged country-level civil war incidence variable. The coup regressions in Panel C of Table 3 and Panel B of Table 4 control for years since the last group-level successful coup attempt, and cubic splines. The political inclusion specifications in Panel A of Table 3 do not contain temporal dependence controls. Leading publications on temporal dependence controls such as Beck et al. (1998) and Carter and Signorino (2010) derive cubic splines and cubic polynomials to translate hazard models into logit models for binary *onset* variables, not for incidence variables such as political inclusion. Post-treatment temporal dependence controls soak up much of the variation in incidence variables such as ethnopolitical inclusion that have a high frequency of both 0's and 1's and that experience infrequent change over time.

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D   Additional Statistical Results

Table D.1: Cross-Tabulations

Outcome (sample)	PCS groups	SLPCS groups	SL groups
Inclusion (full)	73.9%	39.4%	67.7%
	N=1,179	N=3,148	N=2,727
Civil war onset (only excluded group-years)	4.4%	2.2%	0.9%
	N=271	N=1,570	N=855
Successful coup (only included group-years)	3.0%	1.0%	1.0%
	N=871	N=1,241	N=1,846
Civil war onset (full)	1.1%	1.5%	0.3%
	N=1,134	N=2,749	N=2,699
Successful coup (full)	2.5%	0.5%	1.0%
	N=1,179	N=3,148	N=2,727

Table D.2: Ethnic Group Random Effects

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PCS group	1.260**	1.217**	1.084**	1.164**	1.274**	1.606***	1.162**	1.375**	1.114**
	(0.546)	(0.560)	(0.520)	(0.564)	(0.554)	(0.601)	(0.521)	(0.575)	(0.534)
SLPCS group	1.610***	1.438***	1.472***	1.408***	1.615***	1.952***	1.506***	1.724***	1.541***
	(0.437)	(0.449)	(0.409)	(0.450)	(0.439)	(0.481)	(0.433)	(0.425)	(0.447)
Group-years	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,305	6,582
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ethnic group RE?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PCS group	0.913**	0.886**	1.265***	1.113***	0.752*	0.835**	0.855***	0.943**	0.915**
	(0.368)	(0.377)	(0.413)	(0.392)	(0.399)	(0.392)	(0.316)	(0.437)	(0.451)
SLPCS group	-0.685	-0.412	-0.565	-0.486	-0.792*	-0.693	-0.883**	-0.511	-0.695
	(0.420)	(0.415)	(0.447)	(0.430)	(0.425)	(0.460)	(0.418)	(0.456)	(0.509)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	6,761	7,054
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ethnic group RE?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.2 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the PCS group indicator and SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The note for Table 3 lists the substantive covariates in each column. Every specification includes ethnic group random effects. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Appendix Table D.3 provides additional robustness checks to address confounding concerns about dismemberment. The table does not include specifications for successful coups because only PCS groups should be associated with coups, whereas most partitioned groups are SLPCS. Additionally, no additional robustness check specifically addresses suffocation. Instead, *all* the present results correspond in part to suffocation: if a PCS group is placed into a multi-ethnic country, this is "suffocating" for the other groups in the country, and post-colonial ethnic violence should occur. Finally, every regression table contains a specification that includes two control variables that correspond to alternative conceptions of suffocation, and the results are unaltered: the artificiality of international borders proxied by straight lines (with the idea that more artificial countries are more likely to include incompatible groups, however one wants to conceive "incompatible"), and ethnic fractionalization (with the idea that the colonizers could have instead created smaller, more ethnically homogenous political units).

Table D.3: Partitioned Ethnic Groups

	DV: Major ethnic CW onset. Sample: Partitioned groups.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Group in PCS country	1.068**	1.185**	1.460*	1.763*
	(0.459)	(0.509)	(0.747)	(0.943)
Group-years	2,964	2,359	1,766	1,322
Sample includes PCS groups?	YES	NO	YES	NO
Group FE?	NO	NO	YES	YES
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.3 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for an indicator for any group in a PCS country, and ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The Column 1 sample includes every ethnic group in the core sample that has at least one co-ethnic kin group in a neighboring country that is also in the core sample. Column 2 drops PCS groups from the Column 1 sample. Columns 3 and 4, by implication of the group fixed effects, drop any transnational ethnic groups that do not vary on the dependent variable. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.4: Alternative Pre-Colonial State Operationalization

	Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PCS group (alt.)	0.995**	0.969**	0.759*	0.959**	1.034**	1.475***	0.907**	0.994**	0.872*
	(0.441)	(0.456)	(0.444)	(0.433)	(0.484)	(0.493)	(0.444)	(0.484)	(0.457)
SLPCS group (alt.)	1.263***	1.145***	1.109***	1.115***	1.300***	1.840***	1.225***	1.311***	1.260***
	(0.391)	(0.399)	(0.369)	(0.411)	(0.425)	(0.445)	(0.405)	(0.410)	(0.433)
Group-years	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,582	6,305	6,582
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PCS group (alt.)	1.264***	1.238***	1.422***	1.290***	1.163***	1.314***	0.961***	1.300***	1.137***
	(0.313)	(0.314)	(0.381)	(0.326)	(0.325)	(0.349)	(0.292)	(0.360)	(0.343)
SLPCS group (alt.)	-0.206	-0.0209	-0.231	-0.0831	-0.296	-0.0380	-0.508	-0.0564	-0.242
	(0.389)	(0.389)	(0.439)	(0.403)	(0.381)	(0.418)	(0.416)	(0.410)	(0.496)
Group-years	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	7,054	6,761	7,054
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.4 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the alternative PCS group indicator and alternative SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The sample is identical to that in Table 4. The note for Table 3 lists the substantive covariates in each column. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.5: Only Ex-British Colonies

				DV: Successful coup attempt				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
PCS group	1.298**	1.624***	1.569***	0.920*	1.908***	2.144***	2.788***	1.125**
	(0.587)	(0.566)	(0.588)	(0.540)	(0.642)	(0.374)	(0.717)	(0.530)
SLPCS group	-0.486	0.387	-0.564	-0.725	-0.270	0.249	0.736	-0.517
	(0.680)	(0.665)	(0.650)	(0.754)	(0.605)	(0.606)	(0.481)	(0.688)
Group-years	2,914	2,914	2,914	2,914	2,914	2,914	2,798	2,914
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.5 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the PCS group indicator and SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The sample contains all ethnic groups in countries from the Table 4 sample that were formerly British colonies. The note for Table 3 lists the substantive covariates in each column (the colonizer identity specification is omitted because the sample only contains British colonies). $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table D.6: Cold War Era

					Panel A. DV: Major ethnic civil war onset				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PCS group	1.800**	1.797**	1.536**	1.573**	1.773**	1.841***	1.839**	2.231***	1.452**
	(0.703)	(0.707)	(0.666)	(0.736)	(0.701)	(0.709)	(0.715)	(0.853)	(0.686)
SLPCS group	1.976***	1.780***	1.795***	1.649**	1.961***	1.902***	2.035***	2.326***	1.553**
	(0.620)	(0.652)	(0.582)	(0.650)	(0.625)	(0.680)	(0.668)	(0.736)	(0.644)
Group-years	4,017	4,017	4,017	4,017	4,017	4,017	4,017	3,825	4,017
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
					Panel B. DV: Successful coup attempt				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PCS group	1.061***	1.107***	1.433***	1.218***	0.919**	1.096***	1.127***	1.002**	0.985***
	(0.397)	(0.407)	(0.513)	(0.412)	(0.417)	(0.392)	(0.370)	(0.457)	(0.381)
SLPCS group	-0.207	0.186	-0.0432	0.0448	-0.284	-0.119	-0.247	-0.0837	-0.286
	(0.455)	(0.481)	(0.536)	(0.511)	(0.456)	(0.467)	(0.457)	(0.524)	(0.517)
Group-years	4,251	4,251	4,251	4,251	4,251	4,251	4,251	4,046	4,251
Substantive covariates	None	Predicting inclusion	Historical geography	Geography/ geology	Historical violence	Colonizer identity	Colonial actor	Artificial borders	Standard post-colonial
Temporal dependence controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table D.6 summarizes a series of logistic regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the the PCS group indicator and SLPCS group indicator (leaving SL groups as the basis category), and ethnic group-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The sample contains all pre-1990 years from the Table 4 sample. The note for Table 3 lists the substantive covariates in each column. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

E   Formal Model

After setting up and solving the model, this section formalizes the two key assumptions about pre-colonial states: (1) committing to deals is more difficult in PCS countries and (2) PCS groups have a higher exogenous inclusion probability than do SLPCS groups. It then shows how these two assumptions and the equilibrium calculations from the model yield the six hypotheses presented in the text.

E.1   Setup

Figure E.1 presents the game tree that formally summarizes the sequence of moves in this one-period game with complete and perfect information. Several technical details omitted in the body of the paper are needed to complete the definition of the game: the bounds on θ_e and θ_i, the distribution of strong and weak types, and the distribution of θ_i. If C is excluded, then the commitment probability equals $\theta_e \in \left(\underline{\theta}_e, \overline{\theta}_e\right)$, for $0 < \underline{\theta}_e < \overline{\theta}_e < 1$ defined below. If C is included, then it equals $\theta_i \in \left(\underline{\theta}_i, \overline{\theta}_i\right)$, for $\overline{\theta}_e < \underline{\theta}_i < \overline{\theta}_i < 1$ defined below. Whether C is strong or weak is exogenous, and Nature draws this from a Bernoulli distribution such that γ percent of groups are strong and $1 - \gamma$ are weak.

Figure E.1: Game Tree

Notes: For G's probability of committing under ethnopolitical inclusion, the subscript is $m \in \{P, S\}$. For the exogenous inclusion probability, the subscript is $j \in \{p, sp, s\}$. For the probability of winning terms, the subscripts are $k \in \{i, e\}$ and $l \in \{s, w\}$. (Because inclusion/exclusion is decided after the first move of the game, the tree shows the realization of the k subscript for p.)

The following formalizes Assumptions 1 and 2 stated in the paper.

Assumption 1. In the first move of the game, Nature draws the parameter θ_i from a continuous and atomless cumulative density function indexed as F_m, for $m \in \{P, S\}$, with support over $[\underline{\theta}_i, \overline{\theta}_i]$. The distribution is F_P for a PCS country and F_S for a non-PCS country, i.e., stateless country. F_S has strict first-order stochastic dominance over F_P, which implies $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$, for $\hat{\theta}_i$ defined below.

Assumption 2. C's exogenous inclusion probability depends on the group's/country's pre-colonial state status: β_p for PCS groups, β_s for SL groups, and β_{sp} for SLPCS groups, with $0 < \beta_{sp} < \beta_s < \beta_p < 1$.

Assumption 1 distinguishes groups in PCS countries—i.e., PCS and SLPCS groups—from SL groups. In that sense, Assumption 1 is the more consequential assumption because it will generate predictions about which groups should participate in any type of ethnic violence. Correspondingly, the index for the F_m distribution is twofold: P for PCS countries and S for non-PCS (stateless) countries. Assumption 2 will be shown to distinguish the type of equilibrium violence in which PCS and SLPCS groups will participate. Correspondingly, the index for β_j is three-fold: p for PCS groups, sp for SLPCS groups, and s for SL groups. Therefore, when the distinction is between PCS and non-PCS *countries*, the subscripts are capitalized, $m \in \{P, S\}$. When the distinction is among PCS, SLPCS, and SL *groups*, the subscripts are lower-case, $j \in \{p, sp, s\}$.

E.2   Related Formal Literature

The present model relates to two strands of the formal literature. First, many have modeled civil wars and revolutions as a bargaining process (Powell 2004; Fearon 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). This literature provides the key theoretical insight that costly fighting can occur in equilibrium if the government's ability to credibly commit to promises is low. To capture a tradeoff between coups and civil wars, the present model allows the government to choose between two institutional settings in which to conduct bargaining, whereas commitment ability is exogenous in most existing formal work. Analyzing a choice between inclusion and exclusion facilitates studying different types of ethnic violence that occur in equilibrium (as well as the equilibrium likelihood of bargaining breakdown) in response to different parameters—such as those affected by pre-colonial statehood.

Second, several articles explicitly analyze a tradeoff between coups and civil wars. In Francois et al. (2015), the governing actor receives a non-transferable positive rent that generates the possibility of equilibrium fighting. Although introducing similar assumption in the present model would also generate bargaining failure, the commitment parameter θ_k in the present model enables a more substantively compelling connection with pre-colonial statehood. Acemoglu et al. (2009) analyze a government that decides whether to build its military capacity to end a rebellion, but at the cost of causing a coup. Building military capacity bears some conceptual resemblance to ethnopolitical inclusion—by increasing the probability with which another actor wins a fight against the incumbent government—but they assume *all* governments face equal problems at credibly committing to promises toward their military. By contrast, the present framework enables addressing the key question of how governments in countries with a pre-colonial state differed from governments in countries without a pre-colonial state group.

E.3 Equilibrium Analysis

The analysis solves backwards to derive the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Although there are infinite equilibria (because G is indifferent among all offers in subgames it cannot buy off C), they are all payoff equivalent.

Bargaining. C accepts any offer x such that:

$$E[U_C(\text{accept } x)] = \theta_k \cdot x \geq (1 - \phi) \cdot p_{k,l} = E[U_C(\text{fight})] \tag{E.1}$$

It cannot be optimal for G to make C strictly accept, and Lemma E1 shows that G will buy off C at the bargaining stage if possible. Combining these results with Equation E.1 implies that G's equilibrium offer equals:

$$x^* = (1 - \phi) \cdot \frac{p_{k,l}}{\theta_k} \tag{E.2}$$

This is feasible if and only if $x^* \leq 1$, which solves to:

$$\theta_k \geq (1 - \phi) \cdot p_{k,l} \tag{E.3}$$

Equation E.3 highlights that imperfect commitment ability is the key source of tension in the model that yields the possibility of violence in equilibrium. If $\theta_k = 1$, then Equation E.3 is always satisfied because $\phi < 1$ and $p_{k,l} < 1$.

Lemma E1. At the bargaining stage, G always buys off C if possible.

Proof. Need to show:
$$1 - x^* \geq (1 - \phi) \cdot (1 - p_{k,l})$$
Equation E.2 states $x^* = (1 - \phi) \cdot \frac{p_{k,l}}{\theta_k}$. Therefore, can solve this to:

$$\theta_k \geq \frac{(1 - \phi) \cdot p_{k,l}}{1 - (1 - \phi) \cdot (1 - p_{k,l})}$$

Equation E.3 states that if G can buy off C, then $\theta_k \geq (1 - \phi) \cdot p_{k,l}$. This enables tightening the upper bound of the inequality:

$$(1 - \phi) \cdot p_{k,l} \geq \frac{(1 - \phi) \cdot p_{k,l}}{1 - (1 - \phi) \cdot (1 - p_{k,l})}$$

Rearranging yields

$$1 \geq (1 - \phi) \cdot (1 - p_{k,l}),$$

which is true by assumption. ∎

Both $p_{k,l}$ and θ_k depend on whether C is included or excluded from power. The following assumption characterizes the magnitude of C's probability of winning if excluded depending on whether C is strong or weak. This assumption yields the substantively relevant implication that heterogeneity in the strength of challenger yields heterogeneity in civil war propensity, specifically, the weak type of C will not stage a civil war if excluded but the strong type will. Additionally, consistent with the idea of C being weak, its probability of winning if included is low enough that it will not stage a coup.

Assumption E1. Three of the parameters characterizing the bounds of θ_e and θ_i are:

- $\underline{\theta}_e = (1 - \phi) \cdot p_{e,w}$
- $\overline{\theta}_e = (1 - \phi) \cdot p_{e,s}$
- $\underline{\theta}_i = (1 - \phi) \cdot p_{i,w}.$

Lemma E2. Possibility of buying off C. The weak type can be bought off regardless of whether it is included or excluded. The strong type cannot be bought off if it is excluded.

Proof. Follows directly from $\theta_e \in \left(\underline{\theta}_e, \overline{\theta}_e\right)$, $\theta_i > \underline{\theta}_i$, Assumption E1, and Equation E.3. ∎

If C is included and strong, then G can buy off C in the bargaining phase if and only if:

$$\theta_i \geq \hat{\theta}_i \equiv (1 - \phi) \cdot p_{i,s} \tag{E.4}$$

Ethnopolitical inclusion choice. G makes an optimal ethnopolitical inclusion choice by considering its expected consumption in the bargaining stage, which also depends on whether C will fight in equilibrium. There are four cases: (1) C does not fight regardless of ethnopolitical inclusion status, (2) C will attempt a coup if included but will not initiate a civil war if excluded, (3) C does not attempt a coup if included but will launch a civil war if excluded, and (4) C fights regardless of ethnopolitical inclusion status. The first case is true if C is weak, Lemma E2 rules out the second case, and either of the last two cases are possible if C is strong.

No further assumptions are needed to show that G will optimally exclude C in Case 4. The potential benefit of inclusion is preventing C from fighting (recall Lemma E2 shows that if C is excluded and strong, then it will fight). However, if C fights even if included, then there is no benefit for G from including C. Instead, there is only a cost for G because C wins with higher probability if included. Notably, Case 4 is implicitly the focus of Roessler (2011) because he assumes leaders trade off between different types of threats and opt to exclude groups and face civil wars rather than to face removal at the center.

Cases 1 and 3 require additional assumptions to characterize G's optimal choice. The analysis imposes assumptions to generate the substantively relevant implications that G excludes if C will not rebel, and includes C if that prevents fighting. The idea behind exclusion in Case 1 is that if C will not punish G by fighting if excluded, then G does not pay a severe penalty to exclusion. Still, as Assumption E2 and Lemma E3 formalize, this result requires the shift in the balance of power based on inclusion/exclusion to be greater than the change in G's commitment ability. This implies that G always excludes weak C. The idea behind inclusion in Case 3 is that if inclusion prevents fighting, then this is optimal for G. Still, as Assumption E3 and Lemma E3 formalize, this result requires fighting to be sufficiently costly to compensate G for the increase in C's bargaining leverage induced by inclusion.

Assumption E2. The other parameter characterizing the bounds of θ_i is $\overline{\theta}_i = \min\left\{\frac{p_{i,w}}{p_{e,w}} \cdot \theta_e, 1\right\}$.

Assumption E3. $\phi \geq \dfrac{\frac{p_{i,s}}{\theta_i} - p_{e,s}}{\frac{p_{i,s}}{\theta_i} + 1 - p_{e,s}}$

Lemma E3. Optimal ethnopolitical inclusion. If C is weak, then G excludes C. If C is strong, then G includes C if $\theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i$ and excludes otherwise, for $\hat{\theta}_i$ defined in Equation E.4.

Proof. Because weak C does not fight in equilibrium regardless of ethnopolitical inclusion status (see Lemmas E1 and E2), it is optimal to exclude the weak type if:

$$E\big[U_G(\text{exclude})\big] = 1 - \frac{(1-\phi)\cdot p_{e,w}}{\theta_e} > 1 - \frac{(1-\phi)\cdot p_{i,w}}{\theta_i} = E\big[U_G(\text{include})\big],$$

which Assumption E2 implies is true.

If $\theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i$, then it is optimal for G to include the strong type if:

$$E\big[U_G(\text{include})\big] = 1 - \frac{(1-\phi)\cdot p_{i,s}}{\theta_i} > (1-\phi)\cdot(1-p_{e,s}) = E\big[U_G(\text{exclude})\big],$$

which Assumption E3 implies is true.

If $\theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i$, then it is optimal for G to exclude the strong type if:

$$E\big[U_G(\text{exclude})\big] = (1-\phi)\cdot(1-p_{e,s}) > (1-\phi)\cdot(1-p_{i,s}) = E\big[U_G(\text{include})\big],$$

which is true from assuming $p_{i,s} > p_{e,s}$. ∎

Proposition E1. Equilibrium strategy profile. The following strategy profiles constitute the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game, and all equilibria are payoff-equivalent.

- Ethnopolitical inclusion:
    - If C is strong and $\theta_i \geq \hat{\theta}_i$, then G includes C.
    - If C is strong and $\theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i$, then G excludes C.
    - If C is weak, then G excludes C.
- Bargaining:
    - If C is excluded and weak, then $x^* = (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{p_{e,w}}{\theta_e}$. C accepts any offer $x \geq (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{p_{e,w}}{\theta_e}$ and fights otherwise.
    - If C is included and weak, then $x^* = (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{p_{i,w}}{\theta_i}$. C accepts any offer $x \geq (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{p_{i,w}}{\theta_i}$ and fights otherwise.
    - If C is included, strong, and $\theta_i \geq \hat{\theta}_i$, then $x^* = (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{p_{i,s}}{\theta_i}$. C accepts any offer $x \geq (1-\phi)\cdot\frac{p_{i,s}}{\theta_i}$ and fights otherwise.
    - If C is excluded and strong, then $x^* \in [0,1]$ and C fights in response to any offer.
    - If C is included, strong, and $\theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i$, then $x^* \in [0,1]$ and C fights in response to any offer.

E.4 Comparative Statics for Pre-Colonial States

The following provides the formal theoretic logic behind all the hypotheses presented in the paper. Every proposition first states the relevant terms for all three types of groups, followed by the hypothesis. Finally, for

all the propositions for which PCS and SLPCS groups exhibit different behavior, part c shows that assuming β_j is the same for all groups implies that PCS and SLPCS groups are identical. Therefore, the results clearly explain why Assumption 1 (about θ_i) is key for distinguishing the equilibrium behavior of groups in PCS countries from SL groups, and Assumption 2 (about β_j) is key for distinguishing the equilibrium behavior of groups within PCS countries, i.e. PCS versus SLPCS.

Proposition E2 characterizes equilibrium inclusion likelihood depending on whether C is a PCS, a SLPCS, or an SL group. To calculate the inclusion percentage for each, there is β_j percent chance that the group will be exogenously included. Among the remaining $1 - \beta_j$, the $1 - \gamma$ percent of types that are weak are excluded (Lemma E2). Of the remaining $(1 - \beta_j) \cdot \gamma$, only in the $1 - F_m(\hat{\theta}_i)$ percent of cases with a high enough realization of θ_i that strong C would not stage a coup under inclusion will C be included in equilibrium (Lemma E3), for $m \in \{P, S\}$. These percentages differ across the three historical types of groups because the β_j terms and F_m distributions differ.

Proposition E2. Ethnopolitical inclusion.

Part a. Among PCS groups, $\beta_p + (1 - \beta_p) \cdot \gamma \cdot \left[1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)\right]$ percent are included in equilibrium and $(1 - \beta_p) \cdot \left[\gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) + 1 - \gamma\right]$ percent are excluded. Among SLPCS groups, $\beta_{sp} + (1 - \beta_{sp}) \cdot \gamma \cdot \left[1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)\right]$ percent are included and $(1 - \beta_{sp}) \cdot \left[\gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) + 1 - \gamma\right]$ percent are excluded. Among SL groups, $\beta_s + (1 - \beta_s) \cdot \gamma \cdot \left[1 - F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)\right]$ percent are included and $(1 - \beta_s) \cdot \left[\gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i) + 1 - \gamma\right]$ percent are excluded.

Part b (Hypothesis 1). SLPCS groups are less likely to be included than SL groups.

Part c. Without Assumption 2, i.e., if $\beta_j = \beta \in (0, 1)$ for all j, then SLPCS and PCS groups are both less likely to be included than SL groups.

Proof of part b. Need to show:

$$\beta_{sp} + (1 - \beta_{sp}) \cdot \gamma \cdot \left[1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)\right] < \beta_s + (1 - \beta_s) \cdot \gamma \cdot \left[1 - F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)\right]$$

This follows because $\beta_s > \beta_{sp}$ and $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$.

Proof of part c. Follows from $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$. ∎

Proposition E3 characterizes equilibrium civil war likelihood for excluded groups. The logic for the different terms is that strong excluded groups initiate civil wars whereas weak excluded groups do not initiate civil wars. This effect is independent of whether a country is PCS or not. Excluded groups in PCS countries, however, differ in equilibrium from groups in non-PCS countries because a larger percentage of excluded groups are strong in PCS countries (i.e., PCS groups and SLPCS groups) than in non-PCS countries, which follows from $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$. Proposition E3 yields H2 and H3, which state that each of PCS and SLPCS groups are more likely to launch a civil war if excluded than a non-PCS group in a PCS country.

Proposition E3. Civil war propensity conditional on exclusion.

Part a. Among excluded PCS groups, $\frac{\gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) + 1 - \gamma}$ percent initiate civil wars.

Among excluded SLPCS groups, $\frac{\gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) + 1 - \gamma}$ percent initiate civil wars. Among

excluded SL groups, $\frac{\gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i) + 1 - \gamma}$ percent initiate civil wars.

Part b (Hypotheses 2 and 3). Among excluded groups, both PCS groups and SLPCS groups initiate civil wars more frequently than SL groups.

Proof of part b. Need to show:

$$\frac{\gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) + 1 - \gamma} > \frac{\gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i) + 1 - \gamma}$$

Because $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$, it suffices to show:

$$\frac{d}{dF_m}\left[\frac{F_m}{\gamma \cdot F_m + 1 - \gamma}\right] = \frac{1 - \gamma}{\left[\gamma \cdot F_m + 1 - \gamma\right]^2} > 0$$

∎

Proposition E4 characterizes equilibrium coup attempt likelihood for included groups. C only attempts a coup in equilibrium if (1) it is strong, (2) θ_i is sufficiently low, and (3) C is exogenously included. (This logic directly implies that if there was no exogenous inclusion parameter, i.e., if $\beta_j = 0$ for all groups, then coups would never occur in equilibrium because G would optimally choose to exclude any challenger that would attempt a coup if included.) Because Nature exogenously includes PCS groups more frequently than other groups and because θ_i is in expectation lower in PCS countries, it follows that conditional on inclusion, PCS groups attempt coups at higher rates than SL groups (H4). There is no similar prediction for SLPCS groups relative to SL groups (under Assumption 2) because SLPCS groups' exogenous inclusion probability is lower than that for SL groups.

Proposition E4. Coup propensity conditional on inclusion.

Part a. Among included PCS groups, $\frac{\beta_p \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_p + (1 - \beta_p) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]}$ percent attempt a coup.

Among included SLPCS groups, $\frac{\beta_{sp} \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_{sp} + (1 - \beta_{sp}) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]}$ percent attempt a coup.

Among included SL groups, $\frac{\beta_s \cdot \gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_s + (1 - \beta_s) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)]}$ percent initiate coups.

Part b (Hypothesis 4). Among included groups, PCS groups attempt coups more frequently than SL groups.

Part c. Without Assumption 2, i.e., if $\beta_j = \beta \in (0, 1)$ for all j, then among included groups, PCS and SLPCS groups both attempt coups more frequently than SL groups.

Proof of part b. Need to show:

$$\frac{\beta_p \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_p + (1 - \beta_p) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]} > \frac{\beta_s \cdot \gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_s + (1 - \beta_s) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)]} \tag{E.5}$$

Both sides of the inequality strictly increase in $F(\cdot)$. Therefore, can tighten the upper bound of the right-hand side by writing:

$$\frac{\beta_p \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_p + (1 - \beta_p) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]} > \frac{\beta_s \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_s + (1 - \beta_s) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]}$$

Because $\beta_p > \beta_s$, showing that each of these expressions strictly increases in β suffices to prove the claim. Algebraic simplifying yields:

$$\frac{d}{d\beta_j}\left[\frac{\beta_j \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)}{\beta_j + (1 - \beta_j) \cdot \gamma \cdot [1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)]} \right] = \gamma^2 \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) \cdot \left[1 - F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) \right] > 0$$

Proof of part c. Follows because both sides of the Equation E.5 inequality strictly increase in F_m. ∎

Combining Proposition E2 with Proposition E3 yields Proposition E5, which characterizes groups' unconditional civil war propensity (i.e., averaging over inclusion frequency). For each group, this is the equilibrium percentage that is strong and excluded. Hypothesis 5 follows because—compared to SL groups—SLPCS groups are less likely to be exogenously included and, conditional on being strong, more likely to be strategically excluded to prevent a coup attempt.

Proposition E5. Unconditional civil war propensity.

Part a. Among PCS groups, $(1 - \beta_p) \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)$ percent initiate civil wars. Among SLPCS groups, $(1 - \beta_{sp}) \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)$ percent initiate civil wars. Among SL groups, $(1 - \beta_s) \cdot \gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$ percent initiate civil wars.

Part b (Hypothesis 5). SLPCS groups initiate civil wars more frequently than SL groups.

Part c. Without Assumption 2, i.e., if $\beta_j = \beta \in (0, 1)$ for all j, then PCS and SLPCS groups both initiate civil wars more frequently than SL groups.

Proof of part b. Need to show:

$$(1 - \beta_{sp}) \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > (1 - \beta_s) \cdot \gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$$

This follows from $\beta_s > \beta_{sp}$ and $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$.

Proof of part c. Follows from $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$. ∎

Combining Proposition E2 with Proposition E4 yields Proposition E6, which characterizes groups' unconditional coup attempt propensity. For each group, this is the equilibrium percentage of groups that are strong, exogenously included, and belong to countries where θ_i is sufficiently low that strong and included groups attempt coups in equilibrium. Hypothesis 6 follows because PCS groups—compared to SL groups—are more likely to be exogenously included, and θ_i is more likely to be below $\hat{\theta}_i$ in PCS countries than in non-PCS countries.

Proposition E6. Unconditional coup propensity.

Part a. Among PCS groups, $\beta_p \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)$ percent initiate coups. Among SLPCS groups, $\beta_{sp} \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i)$ initiate coups. Among SL groups, $\beta_s \cdot \gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$ initiate coups.

Part b (Hypothesis 6). PCS groups attempt coups more frequently than SL groups.

Part c. Without Assumption 2, i.e., if $\beta_j = \beta \in (0,1)$ for all j, then PCS and SLPCS groups both initiate coups more frequently than SL groups.

Proof of part b. Need to show:

$$\beta_p \cdot \gamma \cdot F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > \beta_s \cdot \gamma \cdot F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$$

This follows from $\beta_p > \beta_s$ and $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$.

Proof of part c. Follows from $F_P(\hat{\theta}_i) > F_S(\hat{\theta}_i)$. ∎

E.5 Extension: Internal Organization of PCS Groups

This section imposes the additional assumption that PCS groups are more likely to be the strong type of C than are other types of groups. Denote γ_j as the probability a group is strong, for $j \in \{p, s, sp\}$ and $1 > \gamma_p > \gamma_s = \gamma_{sp} > 0$. The following explains why H1 through H6 are unaltered in this extension.

1. This result is unaltered because it concerns a comparison between SLPCS and SL groups, and both have the same value of γ_j (as in the baseline model where all groups have a common γ).

2. The extension enhances the original result because—compared to excluded SL groups—a larger percentage of excluded PCS groups are the strong type. Formally, now differences in γ_j in addition to F_m generate the result. It suffices to show:

$$\frac{d}{d\gamma_j}\left[\frac{\gamma_j \cdot F_m}{\gamma_j \cdot F_m + 1 - \gamma_j}\right] = \frac{F_m}{\left[\gamma_j \cdot F_m + 1 - \gamma_j\right]^2} > 0$$

3. This result is unaltered because it concerns a comparison between SLPCS and SL groups, and both have the same value of γ_j (as in the baseline model where all groups have a common γ).

4. The extension enhances the original result because—compared to included SL groups—a larger percentage of included PCS groups are the strong type, yielding greater equilibrium coup frequency. Formally, now differences in γ_j in addition to F_m and β_j generate the result. It suffices to show:

$$\frac{d}{d\gamma_j}\left[\frac{\beta_j \cdot \gamma_j \cdot F_m}{\beta_j + (1 - \beta_j) \cdot \gamma_j \cdot (1 - F_m)}\right] = \frac{\beta_j^2 \cdot F_m}{\left[\beta_j + (1 - \beta_j) \cdot \gamma_j \cdot (1 - F_m)\right]^2} > 0$$

5. This result is unaltered because it concerns a comparison between SLPCS and SL groups, and both have the same value of γ_j (as in the baseline model where all groups have a common γ).

6. Same logic as the fourth point, and follows directly from $\gamma_p > \gamma_s$.

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F   Qualitative Evidence for Hypotheses

Examining countries individually demonstrates that in 14 of 18 PCS countries, PCS groups dominated the government at or shortly after independence and/or participated in at least one civil war or successful military coup between independence and the end of the Cold War era. This evidence shows that ethnic violence occurred in most PCS countries and that, where it occurred, PCS groups frequently were involved. Process tracing evidence from Uganda and Nigeria demonstrates additional support for the posited theoretical mechanisms.

All but one PCS country fits into one of four modal types based on ethnopolitical inclusion patterns and ethnic violence. The present analysis focuses only on events up to 1989 under the premise, discussed in context with Appendix Table D.6, that the end of the Cold War opened new political cleavages in Africa. The first type of cases correspond most closely with theoretical expectations: a PCS group dominated the government at or shortly after independence. Specifically, a PCS group had achieved either "dominant" or "monopoly" status at the center within five years of independence (according to EPR) in Angola, Burundi, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia (EPR covers non-colonized Ethiopia since 1946, and codes the PCS Amhara group as dominant between 1946 and 1991). In five of the six countries, at least one excluded non-PCS group had initiated a civil war by 1975, and the same occurred in the sixth, Mali, in 1989. Additionally, in every case except Angola, the dominant PCS group staged a successful coup. In some cases these were strikes against rival ethnic groups, such as a successful coup attempt led primarily by Hausa-Fulani officers in Nigeria in 1966 to reverse a coup led primarily by Igbo officers earlier that year. In other cases, the coups rotated power among members of the PCS group. The theory section discussed how riverine Arabs in Sudan launched numerous coups in reaction to the incumbent's perceived poor handling of ongoing civil wars with non-PCS groups in the south.

The second type of cases feature a non-PCS group dominating the government at or shortly after independence. In all four cases, an excluded PCS group participated in a civil war either shortly after independence (Chad, Rwanda, Zimbabwe) or after further ethnic narrowing at the center (Uganda). The theory correctly anticipates ethnic violence in these PCS countries—specifically, that PCS groups often rebel against the government when excluded—although these cases go against the trend of PCS groups controlling the government. (Although Zimbabwe's Shona did not achieve "dominant" status until 20 years after independence

in 1980, between 1982 and 1987 they shared power only with Europeans, i.e., were dominant among all African groups.)

The third type of cases feature ethnopolitical inclusion and in-fighting at the center. The theory correctly anticipates the coups that occurred in these PCS countries, although cannot explain why leaders did not resort to ethnopolitical exclusion to prevent future coups. Once again, PCS groups either participated in or were central to the violence that occurred. In Benin, two of the three groups that rotated into and out of power via military coups were PCS, Fon and Yoruba/Nagot and Goun, as Decalo (1990) discusses. In Ghana, the leader of the country's first coup explicitly denounced president Kwame Nkrumah's attempts to undermine traditional Asante (PCS) organizations (Owusu 1989, 381)—a rivalry that began during the colonial era after Nkrumah attempted to undermine Asante planter-chiefs (Boone 2003, 159-63). In Madagascar, EPR codes the PCS group Highlanders as excluded. However, they retained a strong presence in the military (Schraeder 1995), which EPR does not reflect by only using information on executive and cabinets positions to code political status. Highlanders launched a successful coup in 1972.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is an idiosyncratic case that does not fit neatly into any three of these modal patterns of ethnic violence, although two PCS groups did initiate civil wars. There was, in essence, no central government during the country's first five years of independence. Correspondingly, EPR codes all politically relevant ethnic groups in the country as enjoying regional autonomy between 1960 and 1965. However, within the first year of independence, PCS groups Luba Kasai and Lunda-Yeke had initiated civil wars to secede, the latter led by their king.

Of the 18 PCS countries, only four are theoretical anomalies. Botswana, Guinea, Senegal, and Zambia defy the general pattern by each exhibiting a long period of stable civilian rule in ethnically inclusionary regimes, although in the 1980s a successful coup occurred in Guinea and a civil war began in Senegal. PCS groups such as the Barotse in Zambia and Peul in Guinea created regional parties during the decolonization era to contest nationalists (Caplan 1970; Cowan 1962, 201), but ultimately failed to prevent a dominant national party from taking power at independence, although the Barotse king did secure a regional autonomy agreement at independence.

More detailed process tracing evidence from Nigeria (first type of case) and Uganda (second type of case) additionally supports theoretical implications. In Nigeria, the PCS group controlled power at the center, retained power via a military coup, and an excluded non-PCS group launched a civil war. (The references in this paragraph come from Lovejoy (1992).) Nigeria's federal formula—a legacy of Frederick Lugard's invention of the Native Authority System for the Sokoto Caliphate (pre-colonial state) in the north—dictated that each of the country's three regions would be apportioned seats in the national legislature based on population share. As a result, the constitutionally mandated dicennial census in 1962 carried huge consequences for the distribution of power. "The Northern Region's political strength, marshaled by the NPC, had arisen in large measure from the results of the 1952-53 census, which had identified 54 percent of the country's population in that area." Despite conducting the census twice, experts estimated the total count for northerners was wildly inflated and Igbo (a non-PCS challenger) leaders publicly charged the northern (PCS) government with fraud. Igbo officers led a successful coup attempt in 1966. Despite stating that they aimed to create a unitary government without ethnic bias, deep-seated regional cleavages caused northern leaders to perceive the coup "not so much as an effort to impose a unitary government as a plot by the Igbo to dominate Nigeria." This led to a northern-dominated countercoup in 1966, followed by ethnopolitical exclusion of Igbo and an Igbo secession attempt in 1967.

Uganda's pattern resembles Nigeria's, although in Uganda a military coup dislodged the PCS group from power. The Buganda kingdom's favored colonial position prevented Ugandan politicians from forming a broad nationalist party. In response to political deadlock created by Buganda's large vote share, described in

the theory section, Britain compelled an inter-ethnic ruling coalition to form at independence that composed an "alliance of complete opposites" (Decalo 1990, 152) between Buganda's KY party and Milton Obote's UPC party. Consistent with the theoretical expectation that such circumstances facilitate an internal security dilemma, "It is hard to determine at what stage Prime Minister Obote made up his mind to confront the Kabaka and the State of Buganda . . . but it is tempting, from the small amount of evidence available and his careful preparing of the ground, to think that he had intended it all along" (Dinwiddy 1981, 514).

A key event occurred in 1964 that set the stage for future violence. To provide background, in 1900 Buganda became the first group in contemporary Uganda to sign a treaty with Britain. This treaty awarded territory, subsequently called the "Lost Counties," to Buganda that a British-Baganda alliance had recently captured from rival pre-colonial state Bunyoro that was also incorporated into Uganda. In 1964, Obote attempted to undermine Buganda by allowing a referendum to occur over control of the Lost Counties. After its residents voted to join Bunyoro, a political crisis occurred. "As *President*, the Kabaka should have ratified the transfer; as *Kabaka*, such an act was an impossibility" [emphasis in original] (Dinwiddy 1981, 514) because the transfer would erode the king's support from his main constituency. The Lost Counties referendum soon "shifted the balance of power back from Buganda to the central government" (Decalo 1990, 155). Capitalizing on his improved bargaining position, Obote arrested key Baganda ministers before they could appeal for British military assistance. The crisis culminated in 1966 when Obote militarily suppressed a Baganda secession attempt, staged a coup to become the undisputed head of state, and unilaterally terminated the Baganda monarchy (Tripp 2009, 45). After continued turmoil at the center including Idi Amin's kleptocratic reign in the 1970s, the then-politically powerless Baganda participated in civil wars that removed Amin and, subsequently, Obote after he had become president for a second time.

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