Party relevance and party survival in new democracies

William Bianco
Department of Political Science, Indiana University, USA

Christopher Kam
Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Canada

Itai Sened
Deparment of Political Science, Washington University—St Louis, USA

Regina Smyth
Deparment of Political Science, Indiana University, USA

Abstract

We argue that the move to free and fair elections is only the first step in a democratic transition. With this change, competition moves into the legislative arena, where interests are defined not in terms of support or opposition to the old regime, but over competing visions of what government should do. Thus, examining legislative behavior and legislative outcomes helps us to understand the long-term political and policy trajectory of democratic transitions. Building on game-theoretic analysis of majority-rule decision-making, our hypothesis is that, after controlling for factors such as seat share, party survival depends on party relevance—the organization's influence over legislative outcomes. Using legislative roll call data from Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, we show that relevance is a major influence on party survival, even after controlling for seat shares and other factors. The last section of the paper discusses the implications of these results for democracy assistance programs.

Keywords

Democratic transitions, democratic consolidation, legislative process, majority rule, uncovered set

Corresponding author:
William Bianco, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Woodburn Hall 210, Bloomington, IN 47401, USA.
Email: wbianco@indiana.edu

Political parties play a crucial role in new democracies, linking citizen demands with governmental actions through electoral competition and subsequent legislative action. However, existing theories do not explain why some parties flourish during democratic consolidation while others vanish. This paper looks to legislative interactions to explain the survival of political parties across the first few elections in post-communist democracies. In doing so, we describe a new analytic tool for measuring a party's influence over legislative deliberations, one that moves beyond a party's share of legislative seats to account for the preferences held by the party's backbenchers and those held by others in the chamber.

The underlying premise of our work is that the move to free and fair elections is only the first step in a democratic transition. With this change, competition moves into the legislative arena, where interests are defined not in terms of support or opposition to the old regime, but over competing visions of what government should do. Thus, examining legislative behavior and legislative outcomes helps us to understand the long-term political and policy trajectory of democratic transitions.

More specifically, our hypothesis is that, after controlling for factors such as seat share, party survival depends on party relevance—informally, the organization's influence over legislative outcomes. A party's relevance depends on its share of legislative seats, but also on the number, size and preferences of other parties in the legislature. Using legislative roll call data from Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, we show that relevance is a major influence on party survival, even after controlling for seat shares and other factors. The last section of the paper discusses the implications of these results for democracy assistance programs.

Explaining party and party system development

A starting point for a theory that links party development to regime outcomes is to understand how democratic processes shape party durability. The source of theory on the question of party durability is suggested by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 62) in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, where they argued: "founding elections seem to have a sort of freezing effect upon subsequent political developments. Where they are followed by successive iterations of the electoral process, a few new parties get into the game, and many minor ones are likely to drop out." This dictum assigned a key role to party organizations in the shaping of successful democratic transitions, consistent with Schattschneider's (1942: 6) well-cited statement that "political parties created democracy, and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties". Despite variations in approach, the general assumption of the early work on political parties and democratization was that, if a party formed, it would somehow emerge as integral to the political system and, moreover, that the development of a party system—several organizations competing for political power—would be the foundation for the evolution of a stable democratic system.

Despite this expectation, few studies directly explored the mechanisms underpinning the freezing effect in order to better understand when winnowing occurred. Moreover, scholars hardly examined the types of parties, or party systems, that would produce democratic regime change. Nor did they clearly address the mechanisms that linked party function to regime outcomes in the predominant model of democratization. This so-called "transitions paradigm" argued that repeated electoral competition would spawn political parties that "practiced" democracy in the period of political consolidation and, in turn, that this practice would shape democratic regimes. In fact, little attention was paid to the question of how parties might practice democracy and how those practices would shape regime trajectories.

By the end of the first decade of the post-communist era, the empirical facts of party instability and variation in many countries challenged the transition paradigm (Carothers, 2002). Many

Figure 1. Parties in the Russian Duma.

countries evidenced a bewildering pattern of party formation and demise over a series of elections that defied systematic explanation. Moreover, in many cases parties seemed irrelevant to the policy process or the evolution of stable democracy, and therefore not worthy of sustained study. Stymied by limited data and inadequate theory, the scholarly community abandoned the study of parties before they provided strong theoretic and empirical findings to link party and party system development to the wide range of outcomes observed across the post-communist states and elsewhere.

The Russian case illustrates this problem. As Figure 1 shows, the freezing hypothesis accurately describes Russian political party competition. By 2003, both the total number of parties in the Russian Duma and the effective number of parties significantly declined.[1] Yet in Russia, the winnowing process produced authoritarian rather than democratic regime outcomes. After the 2011 elections, only two of the original 12 parties from 1993 (KPRF and LDPR) remained in the Duma. The dominant party after 2003, United Russia, did not exist before 2000. Clearly, the winnowing process has reduced the number of choices available to Russian voters and concentrated political power across the surviving organizations—and, possibly, contributed to the establishment of an electoral authoritarian regime dominated by United Russia. Our analysis works backward from this outcome, seeking to explain why most parties in early Russian elections failed to attract the popular and elite support needed to gain political power through elections.

This pattern is not unique to Russia: in many post-communist democracies, initial elections were contested by a large number of parties, with a marked reductions in both the total number and the effective number after five or six elections. In most of these cases, competition led to relatively democratic systems—but in other cases, such as Russia and even Hungary, the outcome has fallen far short of a functioning democracy. In other cases, large numbers of parties continue to contest elections more than 20 years after the collapse of communism.

The first task, we assert, is to explain the variation in party survival across these cases—why did some parties disappear while others flourished? The existing literature provides a valuable starting point. A startling finding from the first wave of party literature was that the congruence of interests between parties and voters and the evolution of partisan ties did not yield good predictions of party durability (Brader and Tucker, 1998; Colton, 2000; Miller and Klobucar, 2000; Rose and Mischler, 1998). Institutional and structural differences across regimes also did not predict the subsequent

changes in either party development or regime trajectory (Tavits, 2005; Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2009). Likewise, the cleavage-based analysis of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) had limited reach in the post-communist context, where social cleavages appear to have had little impact on party development (Whitefield, 2002).

Our investigation begins with a focus on the role that parties play in governance, specifically legislative decision-making. One thing all emerging democracies have in common is a policy process rooted in a legislature, where parties and individual politicians make decisions about policy outcomes using some form of majority rule. We argue that a party's durability is linked to its capacity to influence policy outcomes consistent with their voters' preferences and campaign promises. Such parties are likely to win sustained vote support by their constituents. In this way, as predicted by the transition paradigm, such parties are also likely to practice democracy—creating institutionalized linkages to voters, developing activists and policy expertise, and strengthening legislative institutions—and thereby deepen democratic consolidation.

Measuring party relevance

Drawing on the game theoretic literature that seeks to predict the outcome of group decision-making under majority rule, we have developed a unique measure of partisan capacity to shape legislative outcomes (for a review, see Bianco and Sened, 2005). For our purposes, this theory frames our fundamental hypothesis: a party's prospects for continued electoral success hinge on its relevance to legislative deliberations that generate policy outcomes. That is, when a party can deliver policies, goods and services to its constituents, it is more likely to endure multiple election contests. Influence over outcomes also shapes other aspects of party organization and operation that are central to both democratic governance and the survival prospects of the party.

Our measure of party relevance is drawn from the majority rule program, an extended effort by many scholars to predict the outcome of group decision-making under majority rule. This program is a fundamental tool for understanding legislative proceedings and related consequences, including the rise and fall of party organizations and the success or failure of the democratic enterprise itself. If a party's prospects for continued electoral success hinge on its ability to shape legislative outcomes, explaining party survival requires a theory that relates preferences to outcomes—including how the impact of one individual's or party's preferences on legislative outcomes is shaped by the distribution (number and content) of preferences held by others. This is the role we assign to the majority rule program as our fundamental theoretical framework for our investigation of the factors that explain party survival and impact in democratization processes.

A generation ago, the majority rule program appeared to be at a dead end, as then-current results suggested that, much of the time, the outcomes of majority rule proceedings were indeterminate in all but the simplest settings (and McKelvey and Schofield, 1986, 1987). Subsequent work identified the uncovered set (UCS) as the expected result of majority decision-making (Cox, 1987; McKelvey, 1986;Miller, 1980; Shepsle and Weingast, 1984). Building on this work, the authors of this paper and others developed a method for estimating UCSs (Bianco et al., 2004), tested their predictive power using experiments (Bianco et al., 2006, 2008) and real-world data (Jeong et al., 2009a, b; Kam et al., 2010; Smyth et al., 2011). In this paper we use the UCS to measure a key concept: a party's relevance, or its influence on legislative outcomes.

A comparison of two UCSs, one calculated for the whole chamber and one for the chamber with a given party's legislators omitted, measures the degree to which the party's legislators' preferences, given the preferences held by other legislators, change the size, shape and location of the UCS. Figure 2 shows an example of both UCSs and our relevance measure using ideal points calculated for the 2004 Ukrainian Rada. The *x*-axis marks a legislator's position on the

Figure 2. The 2004 Ukranian Rada.

canonical left–right policy dimension. The *y*-axis captures attitudes towards Russia and the West, with pro-West legislators at the top and pro-Russia at the bottom of the plot. The various symbols denote ideal points for the four largest parties, with the remaining legislators' ideal points denoted with "+".

Two UCSs are shown in the figure: one, the chamber uncovered set, shows the range of feasible outcomes for the entire legislature. The second, denoted "uncovered set less Our Ukraine", shows a counterfactual UCS for the legislature with the members of the Our Ukraine party omitted. As the two UCSs are different, we see that Our Ukraine was a relevant party—that is, the party shaped the set of possible outcomes that could be reached through legislative bargaining.[2] In other words, the legislators' presence in the chamber changed the set of policies that the Ukrainian legislature could enact. In contrast, if the two UCSs (chamber and hypothetical) were identical, as they are for the communists in this legislature, the party is irrelevant: whether or not the communist legislators showed up has no bearing on what policies the legislature could enact. This measure of relevance captures a party's power in terms of the product of the legislative process—policy outcomes. If legislative outcomes hinge on how a party's cohort casts its votes, the party is relevant; different outcomes are feasible depending on its presence or absence from the legislature.

It is important to understand that a party's legislative relevance is only somewhat related to its legislative seat share. Figure 3 compares relevance scores and seat shares for legislative parties in Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine across a series of elections.[3]

As the figure shows, smaller parties tend to have relevance scores that are lower than their percentage of seats, while larger parties tend to have a higher relevance share than seat share. However, there are small parties with disproportionately high relevance shares, and large parties with disproportionately low shares. This is because a party's relevance depends not only on its size but also on the party's cohort preferences and how and where they stand relative to the preferences and strength of other parties, allowing them to partake in different coalitional structures that may emerge in the legislative process of policy decision making.

Figure 3 also hints at a preliminary insight into our argument about party survival. After the 2007 parliamentary elections, Bloc Tymoshenko (whose leader, Yulia Tymoshenko, served as

Prime Minister in a coalition government) held about 35% of the legislature's seats, but only about 10% of total relevance in the Rada. In contrast, the Party of Regions held over 45% of seats but nearly 75% of total relevance (these points are labeled in the figure). Part of the problem for Tymoshenko's coalition was the closeness of its issue positions to those held by another party, Our Ukraine, which reduced the Bloc's relevance. The Regions party, on the other hand, held relatively unique policy stands and was very disciplined. This example foreshadows our hypothesis about the impact of party relevance: the governing coalition had enormous trouble enacting its preferred policies, and almost a third of Bloc Tymoshenko's elected members defected to another party by the next election. Tymoshenko lost the 2010 presidential elections; her faction within the party disbanded. The neighboring party, Our Ukraine, also disbanded. This process essentially upended the party-based outcomes of the Orange Revolution and paved the way for the Revolution's anti-hero, Victor Yanukovych, to win the presidential election.

Party relevance and party survival

We argue that party relevance is especially important in explaining the survival of legislative parties in new democracies, such as those that emerged in the post-communist cases. As we discussed earlier, analyses of these cases show that articulating clear issue positions is not enough to attract supporters, motivate candidates and ensure a party's survival. Rather, it is a party's ability to deliver policies, goods and services to its constituency that is crucial for building citizen and elite support. We argue that the influence (or lack thereof) that a party's legislative cohort has over policy outcomes—its relevance—affects the party's ability to win votes and seats, build a stable base of citizen support, attract qualified candidates and maintain the loyalty of its office-holders.

Moreover, the process of legislative governance provides strong incentives for parties to develop key elements of representative functions such as policy expertise through party and committee institutions, ties between the legislative cohort, partners in civil society and mechanisms to check executive power. Thus, when a party is relevant, citizens know that the party's electoral fate has policy consequences—having the party's legislators present in the legislature, casting votes on policies, yields different outcomes than would be obtained if the party did not exist and the seats were filled by legislators from other parties.[4] Thus, voting for the party and its candidates has a positive value. Conversely, absent affective partisan ties, which rarely existed in the post-communist cases, there is little reason for citizens to support an irrelevant party as it cannot affect policy outcomes and hence cannot deliver on its promises, even at the margin. It is even possible that, when one party has a very high relevance scores, other parties have strong incentives to abandon programmatic competition and resort to practices that undermine democracy, including electoral manipulation, state capture and patronage—this pattern seems to be exemplified in Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decision to rule by decree in the face of the legislative opposition from the Communist Party in the 1990s.

These arguments about the importance of party relevance to many different aspects of party organization and legislative proceedings imply that relevance should be related to party survival, which we codify as the Survival Hypothesis:

> **The Survival Hypothesis**: In new democracies, holding other factors such as seat shares constant, relevant political parties are more likely to perform better in elections and survive over time compared with irrelevant or less relevant parties.

The next section tests this hypothesis using data from the four countries depicted in Figure 3. While our focus in this paper is on party survival, we believe that the impact of relevance extends beyond

Figure 3. Seats and relevance.

elections. We speculate that, insofar as legislators switch their party affiliations, they should be more likely to depart irrelevant parties and move to organizations that have a significant relevance share. Their power over legislative outcomes should also translate into a higher chance of being included in governing coalitions, and a larger share of cabinet positions.[5] In addition, because relevance equals influence over outcomes, parties with a significant share of their chamber's relevance should have more interest in legislating and in developing policy expertise compared with parties with minimal or no relevance. Irrelevant parties have no interest in policy because they have no say in which policies are enacted. They may advocate for or against proposals, but they have no reason to develop (or hire) the skills needed to develop a legislative agenda or produce proposals that translate this agenda into law. Along these lines, we argue that countries with legislatures containing a range of parties with roughly equal relevance shares are more likely to have stable, functional democratic institutions compared with states where relevance is concentrated in one party.

Testing the survival hypothesis

To test the survival hypothesis, we use a party's seat share (%) from election *t* as the dependent variable, and two independent variables: the party's squared seat share from election t − 1, and the party's relevance share in the legislature resulting from election *t* − 1.[6] Because the dependent variable is censored (some parties with seats from t − 1 did not win any seats in t), we use a Tobit regression to correct for the possible bias. We include the effective number of parties as an additional control variable—while it is significant, omitting it does not change the parameters for seat share or relevance share. The parameter estimates are shown in Table 1.

The parameters show that a party's performance in election *t* is shaped by its underlying seat share and by its relevance share. These results are entirely consistent with the Survival Hypothesis. In particular, Figure 4 shows that the impact of relevance on election outcomes can be substantial.

Table 1. Parameters for party survival regression.

Independent variables	Dependent variable:	
	Party i's seat percentage post-election t	
(Party i's seat percentage post-election $t-1$)^2	0.013*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)
Party i's relevance percentage post-election $t-1$	0.29** (0.13)	0.26** (0.13)
Effective number of parties post-election $t-1$	−1.2** (0.52)	—
Constant	0.87 (3.7)	−6.27 (2.14)
Sigma	17.09*** (1.50)	17.24*** (1.53)
Model χ^2	66.89	61.8
N (total, censored)	154, 79	154, 79

Significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.01, two-tailed.

Figure 4. Relevance and electoral success.

The figure plots a party's expected seat share in election t as a function of seat share in the last election and its relevance score. The effective number of parties is held at the sample mean. The top line is calculated using the assumption that relevance share is twice the seat share (one of the higher ratios observed in the data), while the bottom line assumes a relevance share of zero. As the figure shows, seat shares vary widely depending on relevance. Small irrelevant parties are predicted to vanish, while larger ones will lose a substantial number of seats. Conversely, parties whose relevance share exceeds their seat share will lose far fewer seats, or even gain seats from election to election.

This analysis provides a concrete answer to the question raised earlier: what parties are likely to survive the early winnowing? The answer is, those that are relevant to legislative decision-making. These parties are advantaged in subsequent elections, because they can deliver on their promises, because they can attract well-qualified candidates, or both.

Discussion

Implications for theories of democracy and for democracy assistance programs

Our findings direct attention to the mechanisms that drive party relevance and in turn party survival. These findings have clear policy implications: while government and nongovernmental assistance to party organizations in newly democratized states has moved from a focus on recruiting good candidates and developing campaign expertise to efforts to improve the policy-making and legislating abilities of party organizations and legislatures, our work suggests that party relevance is a crucial intervening variable. If a party is irrelevant or minimally relevant, attempts to build policy or legislative expertise will probably fail, as party leaders will see little value in these capabilities. Conversely, the leaders of relevant parties should welcome (and will benefit from) such assistance. It is on these organizations that such efforts should be focused.

In essence, our work problematizes the assumption that a transition to democracy, marked by establishment of democratic electoral and governance institutions, will drive the formation of political parties that link citizens to government actions. To be sure, if parties do not exist prior to the transition period, they almost always form soon thereafter—and some will survive through the consolidation process. However, to say that parties are inevitable does not imply that they will serve as linking institutions. The experience of democratization in many post-communist nations demonstrates that elections do not ensure that parties will have the capacity to translate election promises into government policy—even leaving aside questions of implementation.

Looking to the factors that shape relevance, preliminary work suggests, that at the margin of party size, parties with similar issue stands (behavior in the legislature) tend to have lower relevance scores. Similarly, relevance scores tend to decline as a party's stands become more extreme relative to other parties—again, at the margin. Moreover, if relevance matters more than size, then even a relatively small niche party can have considerable influence over legislative outcomes—bigger, that is, may not always be better. These findings can be translated into concrete advice for party leaders and elected officials in new democracies, and advice about how to build policy-making expertise and how to ensure the survival of party organizations.

These findings also suggest focusing efforts to build policy expertise in legislatures themselves rather than working through party organizations. Some party organizations may have no interest in expertise—but on any legislature, there will be relevant parties or even individuals that will want such capabilities. We suspect that the best prospects for viable legislative institutions and a successful democratic transition is if several party organizations manage to remain relevant over time, thereby giving voters real choices in elections and a basis for retrospective evaluations, as well as a collective incentive within the legislature to build institutions such as professional staff and independent research services.

These findings also have implications for the kinds of issue stands taken by new parties. Information on proposed platforms can be used to determine whether a party's elected legislators will be relevant or irrelevant—that is, whether they will be able to deliver on their campaign promises. Thus, in a case such as Women of Russia, party leaders can be given a menu of policy options to ensure their relevance to legislative deliberations, increasing their long-term electoral and

policy-making prospects (for a study of the demise of women's parties across the post-communist space using this technique, see Smyth et al., 2011).

Finally, our analysis highlights the importance of collecting roll call data for new democracies. Aside from its utility as a source of legislator ideal points and relevance scores, this data offers a way to determine whether a party's promises are consistent with the behavior of their elected officials. Given the high level of uncertainty that pervades new democracies, information on roll calls would be a vital piece of information for citizens, giving them a way to monitor what legislators do as well as what they say. Even historical data is useful, as it can be used to develop overall measures of legislators' preferences, and assess trends in relevance over time.

Funding

Notes

1. The effective number of parties is a measure of the number of parties in a political system that over-weights larger parties and under-weights smaller ones (Taagapera and Shugart, 1989). It is presumed to calculate the number of parties that really matter as opposed to the actual number of parties that may or may not make much of a difference. The *effective number of parties* is computed by the following formula: $N = 1 / \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2 \right)$, where *n* is the number of parties and p_i^2 is the square of each party's proportion or share of seats in the legislature.

2. Formally, we determine a party's relevance score as follows. First, we calculate the average distance between party *j*'s legislators and the chamber uncovered set (in Figure 2, this is the UCS labeled "Chamber UCS"). Then, using the hypothetical uncovered set for the legislature with party *j*'s members removed, we calculate the average distance from party *j*'s members to the hypothetical UCS (in Figure 2, this is the UCS labeled "UCS less Our Ukraine"). The difference between these two average distances is our measure for the party's relevance, capturing the difference party's legislators make in determining the location of outcomes in the actual legislature.

3. For this preliminary analysis, our cases are the legislatures elected in Hungary (1994– 2006), Poland (1991– 2005), Russia (1993–2003) and Ukraine (1994–2007).

4. While citizens cannot calculate relevance scores, they observe the affiliation and defection decisions of ambitious politicians and a party's success or failure at enacting its preferred policies. Both factors are directly related to relevance.

5. This hypothesis is supported by data on cabinet seat shares in Hungary and Poland. Data available on request.

6. While our work focuses on party survival, the nature of our data makes it impossible to use a standard duration analysis setup, where a party's lifetime (measured in days or some other interval) is the dependent variable and various independent variables capture its relevance score and other controls. However, our analysis defines survival in terms of legislative seats and control over policy outcomes, not a party's formal existence as an organization. Following from this construction, the question of a party's survival or demise is resolved only at election time (and in terms of how many seats it wins), not in-between elections, making our specification in terms of elections *t* and *t* − 1 the appropriate model.

References

Bianco WT and Sened I (2005) Uncovering conditional party government: Reassessing the evidence for party influence in congress and state legislatures. *American Political Science Review* 99: 361–372.

Bianco WT, Jeliaskov I and Sened I (2004) The uncovered set and the limits of majority rule. *Political Analysis* 12: 256–276.

Bianco WT, Lynch M, Miller G and Sened I (2006) A theory waiting to be discovered and used: A reanalysis of canonical experiments on majority rule decision making. *The Journal of Politics* 68(4): 837–850.

Bianco WT, Lynch MS, Miller GJ and Sened I (2008) The constrained instability of majority rule: Experiments on the robustness of the uncovered set. *Political Analysis* 16: 115–137.

Brader T and Tucker JA (1998) Pathways to partisanship: Evidence from Russia. *Post-Soviet Affairs* 24(3): 263–300.

Carothers T (2002) The end of the transition paradigm. *Journal of Democracy* 13: 5–21.

Colton TJ (2000) *Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Cox G (1987) The uncovered set and the core. *American Journal of Political Science* 31/2: 408–422.

Jeong G-H, Miller GJ and Sened I (2009a) Closing the deal: Negotiating civil rights legislation. *American Political Science Review* 103(4): 588–606.

Jeong G-H, Miller GJ and Sobel AC (2009b) Political compromise and bureaucratic structure: The political origins of the federal reserve system. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 25: 442–471.

Kam C, Bianco W, Sened I and Smyth R (2010) Ministerial selection and intraparty organization in the contemporary British Parliament. *American Political Science Review* 104: 289–306.

Levitsky SL and Way LA (2002) The rise of competitive authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 13:2(April): 51–65.

Lipset SM and Rokkan S (eds) (1967) *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction*. In Lipset SM and Rokkan S (eds) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press, pp. 1–64.

McKelvey RD (1986) Covering dominance and institution free properties of social choice. *American Journal of Political Science* 30: 283–314.

McKelvey RD and Schofield N (1986) Structural instability of the core. *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 15: 179–198.

McKelvey RD and Schofield N (1987) Generalized symmetry conditions at a core. *Econometrica* 55(4): 923–933.

Miller AH and Klobucar T (2000) The development of party identification in post-Soviet Societies. *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 667–686.

Miller N (1980) A new solution set for tournaments and majority voting. *American Journal of Political Science* 24(1): 68–96.

O'Donnell G and Schmitter P (1986) *Transitions from Authoritarian: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.

Rose R and Mishler W (1998) Negative and positive party identification in post-communist countries. *Electoral Studies* 17: 217–234.

Schattschneider EE (1942) *Party Government*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart.

Shepsle KA and Weingast BR (1984) Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions. *American Journal of Political Science* 28(1): 49–74.

Smyth R, Bianco W, Kam C and Sened I (2011) Explaining transitional representation: The rise and fall of women of Russia, *Journal of East European and Asian Studies* 2: 137–162.

Taagepera R and Shugart M (1989) *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Tavits M (2005) The development of stable party support: Electoral dynamics in post-communist Europe. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 283–298.

Whitefield S (2002) Political cleavages and post-communist politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 181–200.

Whitefield S and Rohrschneider R (2009) Representational consistency: Stability and change in political cleavages in Central and Eastern Europe. *Politics & Policy* 37(4): 667–690.