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## They will (not) deceive us! The role of agentic and communal national narcissism in shaping the attitudes to Ukrainian refugees in Poland<sup>☆</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

Even though Poles accept war refugees from Ukraine, the refugees could represent a realistic threat (via economic competition), which could create anti-refugee attitudes. However, they are unlikely to represent a symbolic threat toward ingroup values, given that they are culturally like Poles. Agentic and communal national narcissists differ in their sensitivity toward realistic and symbolic threats but agentic ones are more sensitive to realistic threats whereas communal ones react more to symbolic ones. Therefore, we expect their different reactions toward Ukrainian refugees along with accepting relevant justifications of such reactions, that is, Russian anti-Ukrainian narration. Therefore, we examined ( $N = 402$ ) the attitudes of Polish national agentic and communal narcissists toward Ukrainian refugees, both directly and indirectly, through belief in Russian narration. Agentic national narcissism was associated with less favorable attitudes toward Ukrainians both directly and indirectly through stronger beliefs in Russian narration. Communal national narcissism was correlated with more favorable attitudes toward Ukrainians and weaker beliefs in Russian narration. The results align with the idea that national narcissists react stronger to the kind of threat relevant to the domain that satisfies their narcissistic needs. Therefore, national narcissism is not necessarily accompanied by more anti-refugee prejudice.

On February 24th, 2022, Russia invaded the Ukraine. Poles, who live in a neighboring state, felt directly threatened by this (Bartkiewicz, 2022). Simultaneously, Poland accepted numerous Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war (The United Nations Refugee Agency, 2022). Such favorable attitudes, expressed by Poles, may be different from those expressed toward Syrian refugees (Łaciak & Frelak, 2018; Piotrowski, Różycka-Tran, Baran, & Żemojtel-Piotrowska, 2019; Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2020). Indeed, Poles appear willing to help Ukrainian refugees (Bachman, 2016) but such willingness is more common in people with particular personality traits (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009; Piotrowski et al., 2019; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009).

Anti-refugee attitudes are mostly based on seeing refugees as a threat (Landmann, Gaschler, & Rohmann, 2019; Stephan et al., 2009; Vallejo-Martín, Canto, San Martín García, & Perles Novas, 2020). While many traits could be important in understanding individual differences in how these threats are evaluated (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala

& Lantos, 2020; Hodson & Dhont, 2015), we focus on so-called “dark” traits (Jonason, Underhill, & Navarrete, 2020; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2020), in this case narcissism. Specifically, we draw on the distinction of national collective narcissism, as a specific, person-level “risk” factor for holding anti-Ukrainian attitudes toward war refugees in Poland.

Collective narcissism (i.e., the unrealistic investment in ingroup greatness with the constant fear of a lack of recognition), is associated with prejudice toward refugees (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2020). Such inflated ingroup identification makes collective narcissists particularly sensitive to threats posed by others (Golec de Zavala, Peker, Guerra, & Baran, 2016). Therefore, national narcissistic identification is broadly studied in the context of intergroup relations, being particularly relevant for attitudes toward refugees, representing a different set of national and cultural values, being a source of threat of ingroup security (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2016).

Ingroup self-enhancement can be satisfied via agentic (e.g., being

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exceptionally powerful) and communal means (e.g., being exceptionally friendly; Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021). Agentic collective narcissists are characterized by inflated views of their ingroup in the agentic domain, and they are sensitive to agency-related threats for ingroup. Simultaneously, communal collective narcissists are characterized by inflated views of their ingroup in the communal domain, and they are sensitive to communion-related threats (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sedikides, et al., 2021).

According to the intergroup threat theory (Stephan et al., 2009), there are two kinds of perceived threats, realistic (e.g., to the ingroup's power or safety) and symbolic (e.g., to group values), which could lead to intergroup conflicts. Refugees can be seen as a source of both (Landmann et al., 2019; Vallejo-Martín et al., 2020). A realistic threat is agentic, while a symbolic threat is communal (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021; Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sedikides, et al., 2021). Both agentic and communal collective narcissists are sensitive to ingroup threats (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021) and prejudiced toward refugees (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2020). If an outgroup is perceived as a symbolic threat, communal collective narcissists desire to maintain a greater distance from them (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021). Communal (but not agentic) narcissists indicate more intergroup prosocialness (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021; Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sedikides, et al., 2021), but only to those who do not represent symbolic threats (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021; Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sedikides, et al., 2021).

Ukrainian refugees, originating from a neighboring country that is culturally like Poland (e.g., predominantly Christian, post-Communist), pose a relatively low symbolic threat (Winiewski, Bulska, & Świdarska, 2018). Furthermore, the current Polish response toward Ukrainian refugees is getting worldwide praise (Morales, 2022), making such prosocialness particularly rewarding for communal narcissists (Gebauer, Sedikides, Verplanken, & Maio, 2012; Nacheva, 2019). Therefore, communal national narcissists should not perceive Ukrainian refugees (referred further as "Ukrainians") as a threatening outgroup. However, agentic national narcissists are not interested in communal self-enhancement, so they are not motivated to help others. Moreover, refugees (Piotrowski et al., 2019; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2020) and Ukrainians (Winiewski et al., 2018) are seen by Poles as a realistic threat. Therefore, the attitudes of agentic collective narcissists toward Ukrainian war refugees should be less favorable than communal ones.

People's attitudes toward refugees also result from the information which they are exposed to and accept as being true (Schäfer & Schadauer, 2018). This natural readiness to rely on external sources of information is intentionally exploited by people spreading disinformation, that is, information that turns out to be false that is spread deliberately to harm and deceive (Ecker et al., 2022). Disinformation influences attitudes toward refugees (Schäfer & Schadauer, 2018), elections (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017), and persecution of minority groups (Whitten-Woodring, Kleinberg, Thawngmung, & Thitsar, 2020). There are many reasons why people believe disinformation (Ecker et al., 2022), like greater anxiety (Pan, Liu, & Fang, 2021), lack of control (Nyhan & Reifler, 2012), or greater cognitive closure (Kaufman, Haupt, & Dow, 2022). Given that collective narcissists are more sensitive toward threats (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2016), experience more feelings of powerlessness (Cichočka et al., 2017), and they are characterized by more cognitive closure (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018), such features predispose them to accept disinformation (Kaufman et al., 2022). The Russian narration about the Russian-Ukrainian war could be considered a kind of disinformation—created purposely by Russians to legitimize invasion—containing no verified information, like allegations toward NATO about sending weapons to Ukraine before the invasion (Bodnar et al., 2022).

As the domain of self-enhancement does not influence basic cognitive processes of individual narcissists' (Sedikides, 2021), there is no a

priori reasons for predicting different ways of processing of information in agentic and communal collective narcissists (Cichočka, Marchlewska, & Bridgestone, 2022; Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021). However, the domain of ingroup enhancement affects the motivation to accept that information (e.g., Russian narration), which is relevant for agency or communion, as this domain affects the sensitivity to specific threats (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2020). Accepting misinformation could in turn lead to intergroup conflicts (Nyhan & Zeitzoff, 2018), amplifying unfavorable attitudes toward refugees.

## 1. The current study

In this study, we examined, in a Polish sample, how beliefs in the Russian narration facilitates the relationship between agentic and communal collective national narcissism with attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees. We expected that Polish participants are generally not ready to accept this narration because of the sense of threat posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Bartkiewicz, 2022) and the general attitude among Poles toward Ukrainians is positive (YouGov, 2022).

At the same time, we expected agentic collective narcissism to be related to less favorable attitudes toward Ukrainians, and stronger beliefs in the Russian narration. This may be caused by Ukrainian refugees representing a realistic threat (Winiewski et al., 2018) and activating the self-protection motivation of agentic collective narcissists, with belief in disinformation serving as a way of coping with such kind of threat (Ecker et al., 2022; Nyhan & Reifler, 2012). As the Ukrainians are not perceived to be a symbolic threat (Winiewski et al., 2018), they are not a source of threat for communal national narcissists, so that communal national narcissists are not motivated to not accepting Ukrainian refugees.

Helping the refugees is a way for communal collective narcissists to satisfy their self-promotion needs through intergroup prosocialness (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021), reflecting narcissistically motivated helping (Konrath, Ho, & Zarins, 2016; Nacheva, 2019). Furthermore, collective action focused on helping refugees can also serve as a coping mechanism (Schwartz et al., 2022). Therefore, we expected that agentic national narcissism predicts less favorable attitudes toward refugees, both directly and indirectly, through *belief* in the Russian narration, communal national narcissism predicts more favorable attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees, both directly and indirectly, through *disbelief* in Russian narration.

## 2. Method

### 2.1. Participants and procedure

This study was a part of a larger, longitudinal project on attitudes and behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic in a Polish community sample [BLINDED]. Data for this part of the survey were collected between 2nd and 9th of March 2022. Participants were recruited online through the Ariadna research panel (<http://www.panelariadna.com>). The order of scales was randomized. The sample consisted of 482 participants, from which only 402 answered attention check questions correctly (i.e., "Please select third option."). The final sample ranged in age from 21 to 80 ( $M_{age} = 52.01$ ,  $SD_{age} = 14.11$ ), 54 % of participants were women. Participants also rated their political orientation (1 = *strongly left-wing*; 9 = *strongly right-wing*); they were mostly centrists (30.35 % provided the middle answer;  $M = 4.64$ ,  $SD = 2.19$ ). This sample had adequate power ( $\alpha = 0.05$ ; power = 0.80) to detect direct medium effects of narcissism on predicted variables ( $\beta > 0.28$ , according to simulation). The Ethics Committee at the [BLINDED] approved the study (KEiB32/2020). Prior to participation in the survey, participants were informed about the topic and terms of participation. Informed consent was obtained by clicking the "accept" button after reading the information about the study topic, length, possibility to withdraw at any

moment, and anonymity. Participants received remuneration in the form of loyalty points in the research panel reward system that they could later exchange for various rewards. The study was not preregistered. Supplemental materials, database, and syntaxes are available on the Open Science Framework.<sup>1</sup>

### 2.2. Measures

Two forms of national narcissism were assessed as predictors, the mediator was Russian disinformation. The dependent variable was a composite measure of attitudes toward Ukrainians created for this study from three strongly related constructs — social distance toward war refugees, acceptance of Ukrainian values and politics, and prosocialness toward war victims where higher levels indicate more favorable attitudes. Averaging answers for relevant items created indicators of each variable (see Table 1 for Cronbach’s  $\alpha$ s).

Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) measures agentic collective narcissism. The scale contains eight items (e.g., “I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of my group”). Participants reported how much they agreed (1 = *definitely disagree*; 7 = *definitely agree*) with each referring to Polish nation.

Communal Collective Narcissism Scale (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2023) measures communal collective narcissism. The scale contains seven items (e.g., “My group is extraordinarily friendly toward other groups”). Participants reported how much they agreed (1 = *definitely disagree*; 7 = *definitely agree*) with each referring to Polish nation.

The belief in Russian narration was assessed with an ad hoc measure that contained 12 items about the common content of pro-Russian narration based on the Alliance for Securing Democracy analysis of Russian propaganda (Bodnar et al., 2022). The scale taps the topics of perceptions of the Ukrainian state as illegitimate (e.g., “Many Ukrainians are neo-Nazis”), blaming the West for the conflict (e.g., “Western countries sent weaponry to Ukraine to provoke conflict.”), framing Russia as innocent (e.g., “Russia is simply trying to protect its borders from NATO”), and describing potential sanctions as pointless (e.g., “Imposing sanctions on Russia will hurt the West more than Russia”). Participants reported how much they agreed with each (1 = *definitely disagree*; 7 = *definitely agree*).

Attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees were measured with three scales. First, we used Bogardus’ Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1925, Polish version by Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), consisting of five items. Participants reported how likely (1 = *definitely yes*; 5 = *definitely not*)

**Table 1**  
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlation of all assessed variables.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Agentic NN						
2. Communal NN	0.82**					
3. Russian narration	0.24**	0.11*				
4. Social distance	0.31**	0.17**	0.62**			
5. Acceptance	0.05	0.17**	-0.57**	-0.48**		
6. Prosocialness	-0.05	0.09	-0.59**	-0.56**	0.61**	
<i>M</i>	3.91	4.12	2.44	2.00	5.07	5.38
<i>SD</i>	1.27	1.45	1.21	0.82	1.31	1.09
Cronbach’s $\alpha$	0.96	0.93	0.95	0.96	0.95	0.87

Note. NN = national narcissism; Russian narration = belief in the Russian narration.

\*  $p < .05$ .

\*\*  $p < .01$ .

they would accept Ukrainian refugees in given roles (e.g., “Would you accept a refugee as a close neighbor?”). Second, the scale of acceptance of Ukrainian values and politics (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sedikides, et al., 2021), consisting of three items, was used. Participants reported (on a scale from 1 = *definitely disagree* to 7 = *definitely agree*) general acceptance of the Ukrainian policies, the extent to which the Ukrainian values are worth following, and their propensity to defend Ukrainian values. Third, prosocialness toward Ukrainians was assessed using a scenario-based measure of individual differences in intentions to help war victims (see Vollhardt & Staub, 2011; Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sedikides, et al., 2021). Participants were asked how much they agreed (1 = *definitely disagree*; 7 = *definitely agree*) with four opinions (e.g., “The Polish government is responsible for helping the people from Ukraine who have been affected by the war”). The target country in the scenario from the original was the U.S., and they were victims of a tsunami. It was adapted to the current situation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The target country was changed from the U.S. to Poland and the target of help from tsunami victims to Ukrainian war victims. All measures were strongly correlated with each other, loading into a single factor representing general favorable attitudes toward Ukrainians.

### 3. Results


Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for examined variables are presented in Table 1. Social distance toward Ukrainian refugees was negatively correlated with acceptance of Ukrainian values and politics, and prosocialness toward Ukrainians, which are positively correlated with themselves. These three scales were then combined into one latent factor of general attitudes toward Ukrainians and used in further analyses. The relationship between agentic and communal national narcissism was highly positive, it is congruent with former studies (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, & Sedikides, 2023). Both forms of national narcissism were positively correlated with accepting Russian narration and social distance toward Ukrainian refugees, being unrelated to prosocialness. However, communal national narcissism was also positively correlated with acceptance of Ukrainian politics and values. Russian narration was highly positively correlated with social distance and negatively with prosocialness and acceptance of Ukrainian politics and values.

The proposed mediation model was tested with Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Analysis was conducted with MPlus 7.2 software (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2017) with the Robust Maximum Likelihood estimation. Two forms of collective narcissism were independent variables. Attitudes toward Ukrainians was the dependent variable, and the belief in Russian narration was the mediator. In accordance with the common cutoff for good fit recommended by Byrne (1994): comparative fit index (CFI) > 0.900, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) < 0.080, and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) < 0.100. The proposed mediation model fit the data well ( $\chi^2[693] = 1397.04$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 2.02$ , CFI = 0.944, RMSEA = 0.050, 90 % CI [0.046, 0.054], SRMR = 0.074). Fig. 1 presents a simplified model with only standardized path coefficients. The full model with information about error terms and factor loadings is available in Supplemental Materials.

The indirect effect of agentic national narcissism on attitudes toward Ukrainians was negative ( $\beta = -0.46$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and sums up with the direct effect on the total effect of ( $\beta = -0.64$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The indirect effect of communal national narcissism on attitudes toward Ukrainians was positive ( $\beta = 0.29$ ,  $p = .003$ ) and sums with the direct effect on the total effect ( $\beta = 0.60$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The full model explains 67.1 % of the variance in attitudes toward Ukrainians.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The model fit the data the same in both men and women analyzed separately (see Table S1 and Figs. S2–5 in Supplemental Materials).

<sup>1</sup> [https://osf.io/xq3gj/?view\\_only=4fdeeb1f71c54d89adc48bffb1999ac3](https://osf.io/xq3gj/?view_only=4fdeeb1f71c54d89adc48bffb1999ac3).



**Fig. 1.** Relationships between national narcissism (agentic and communal), accepting the Russian narration, and attitudes toward Ukrainians. Note. Standardized path coefficients. \* $p < .01$ .

**4. Discussion**

The Russian invasion of Ukraine made most Poles feel threatened, yet, at the same time, Poles have accepted millions of war refugees into their country, showing solidarity with their neighbors. While welcomed, the refugees escaping from the war to Poland could be perceived as a threat. Despite substantial support toward the victims of the Russian invasion by Polish society, there still are people whose personal traits make them less ready to accept refugees into their country. The people most sensitive to the threats posed by outgroups are collective narcissists, perhaps perceiving the Ukrainian war refugees as dangerous. Also, the sense of insecurity evoked by threat makes them more vulnerable to accepting any beliefs, which could help them deal with insecurity. The Russian narration about the war, purposely spread over mass media, might enhance the sense of insecurity, thereby increasing hostile attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees, especially among people who are prone to accept such beliefs stemming from their self-protection motives. Therefore, in the current study, we investigated attitudes toward Ukrainian war refugees among agentic and communal Polish national narcissists. Based on the integrated threat theory (Stephan et al., 2009) and prior studies (Winiewski et al., 2018), we predicted that Ukrainian refugees would be perceived as a realistic (but not symbolic) threat, leading to some unexpected paradoxical reactions among national narcissists. Following the agency-communion model of collective narcissism (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021), we predicted that attitudes toward war refugees among agentic and communal national narcissists are distinct, as a function of how they enhance their inflated ingroup views. Specifically, we expected that agentic national narcissists would be more sensitive to realistic threats, manifest a more hostile attitude toward war refugees, and these attitudes are additionally affected by accepting the Russian narration targeted toward Ukrainians. At the same time, we expected that communal national narcissists indicate more favorable attitudes toward Ukrainians, both because there are not sensitive toward the realistic threat but also because favorable attitudes toward Ukrainians are aligned with the communal ingroup image, as Poles being extraordinarily helpful and compassionate (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sedikides, et al., 2021). Therefore, the Russian-Ukrainian war created a unique opportunity to test the predictions of the agency-communion model of national narcissism along with predictions of integrated threat theory on intergroup relations, indicating that national narcissism not necessary leads to greater prejudice toward refugees (Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2020).

We have partially confirmed our hypotheses, via SEM, that communal national narcissism was associated with more favorable

attitudes toward Ukrainians and weaker belief in the Russian narration. Agentic national narcissism, in turn, was correlated only with belief in the Russian narration. However, at the zero-order level, those relationships were quite different. While agentic national narcissism was positively correlated with beliefs in the Russian narration and less favorable attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees, communal national narcissism was associated with stronger beliefs in the Russian narration, manifesting ambiguous attitudes toward refugees. The difference between the zero-order and structural path model resulted from controlling for the substantial shared variance between the two forms of collective narcissism (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2023), which is, as a phenomenon, related to prejudice (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2020), but also accepting unverified beliefs on social world stemming probably from general antagonism of national narcissists (Cichočka et al., 2022). Yet, our study provided further evidence that outgroup hostility manifested by collective narcissists results from perceiving outgroups as a threat to ingroup (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016), making collective narcissism distinct from similar phenomena, like nationalism or authoritarianism (Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020).

**4.1. Limitations & conclusions**

Although we were able to confirm most of our hypotheses, this study is not free from limitations. Specifically, we did not ask about the threat posed by refugees, so it is not clear whether they were perceived as realistic or symbolic threats. Also, causal interpretation of the results are difficult, as it is likely that negative attitudes toward Ukrainians and Ukrainian refugees could lead to accepting congruent beliefs, that is, the Russian narration. The attitudes toward refugees were self-reported measures or declarative behavioral intentions. When we collected data, Poles generally exhibited favorable attitudes toward Ukrainians, so any prejudice toward war victims was socially undesirable, potentially affecting declarative measures. To address this shortcoming, future studies should ask about a specific source of threat, employ experimental activations of relevant threats, and use more indirect measures of attitudes. Furthermore, given that the refugees will have a prolonged stay in Poland, future studies should test whether these relationships change over time, reflecting the acculturation process (Berry, 1994). Such prolonged stay would reveal both differences in customs and values, as well as a competition for resources, affecting both the levels of symbolic and realistic threat. Additionally, our study was conducted in Poland, a country like Ukraine, in terms of culture and history of former conflicts with Russia. On the one hand, it makes the Ukrainian-Russian war particularly relevant for Polish society, on the other, the lack of

geographical and psychological distance between both parties to the conflict could affect the results. As such future research should focus on validating our results in other countries. Furthermore, our data were cross-sectional and correlational, and the timing of our data collection probably influenced the results as it happened right after the Russian invasion started. Lastly, agentic and communal national narcissism are highly positively correlated in Poland (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2023), so that their separate effects are difficult to examine in the Polish context.

In summary, we have investigated how agentic and communal national narcissism predicts attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees, both directly and indirectly, through belief in the Russian narration, in a specific historical moment, creating a kind of natural experiment. Our results support the agentic-communal model of collective narcissism (Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sawicki, & Jonason, 2021; Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Sedikides, et al., 2021), indicating the functional difference between the agentic and communal way of ingroup enhancement. National narcissism could lead to greater prosocialness if the target group is seen as not threatening and the helping is socially desirable. It is possible that agentic national narcissism could manifest more in aggressive attitudes toward aggressors instead of supporting victims, yet such possibility should be addressed in the future studies. Future studies could explore the importance of situational factors, revealing the interplay between anxiety-based (i.e., self-protection) and self-enhancement motivations behind attitudes toward refugees. The policy practice could benefit from this study to prevent the costly effects of harmful beliefs (i.e., disinformation or propaganda) and encourage more socially desirable attitudes toward those in need as congruent with a favorable national self-stereotype in a helpful and tolerant society.

#### CRedit authorship contribution statement

Bartłomiej Nowak – conceptualization, methodology, writing original draft.

Paweł Brzośka – formal analysis, visualization, data curation, writing original draft, revision.

Jarosław Piotrowski – supervision, validation, revision.

Magdalena Żemojtel-Piotrowska – supervision, funding, conceptualization, validation, investigation, revision.

Peter Jonason – draft editing & review, revision.

#### Data availability

We provide supplementary data regarding methods, datasets, additional analyses and coding along with submission, available at [https://osf.io/xq3gj/?view\\_only=4fdeeb1f71c54d89adc48bfb1999ac3](https://osf.io/xq3gj/?view_only=4fdeeb1f71c54d89adc48bfb1999ac3)

#### Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2023.112184>.

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