

Development of Cultural Perspectives on Verbal Deception in Competitive Contexts

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Abstract

Verbal deception may be considered morally reprehensible or acceptable depending on culturally relevant contextual factors and ethical perspectives. In the current study, Euro-Canadian ($n = 180$) and Han Chinese ($n = 180$) children ages 8 to 16 were recruited to investigate their moral evaluations of lying and truth-telling in competitive situations. The participants classified a story character’s statement told to either harm or help themselves or collectives of various group sizes (i.e., their class, school, or country) as a lie, the truth, or something else. Participants then made moral judgments regarding the statements and provided justifications for their evaluations. Chinese children’s evaluations became more nuanced with age: They evaluated lies told to benefit a collective as less negative than Canadian children, and truths told to harm a collective as more negative. These evaluations became more pronounced with the increasing size of the collectivity. Cultural and contextual factors relevant to evaluations and justifications of verbal deception are discussed.

Keywords

moral development, verbal deception, competition, cross-cultural, social cognition, child/adolescent, values

Immanuel Kant asserted that individuals have the “perfect duty not to lie to oneself or to others” (Mahon, 2006, p. 655). From this absolutist position, verbal deception is morally reprehensible, based on moral duty and universal law (Mahon). However, utilitarian ethicists like John Stuart Mill claim that lying in certain contexts is acceptable if the benefit outweighs the harm. From this perspective, the moral evaluation of lying and truth-telling is context-dependent. Utilitarians argue that lying is “right” if it is justifiable and if a decision to benefit the greater good is made accordingly (Ewing, 1948). For example, white lies, untruthful statements intended to protect the listener from negative reactions, and blue lies, lying intended for collective benefit, have been morally justified (Fu, Evans, Wang, & Lee, 2008; Talwar & Lee, 2002). Furthermore, potential

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negative social consequences may render truth-telling in public situations socially unacceptable (Ma, Xu, Heyman, & Lee, 2011; Xu, Bao, Fu, Talwar, & Lee, 2010).

Piaget's (1932/1965) conclusion that children's understanding of verbal deception undergoes developmental advances has repeatedly been supported (Bussey, 1992, 1999; Lee & Ross, 1997; Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983). In the early years children typically define objectively false statements as lies regardless of the speaker's intentions, but between ages 6 and 10, they begin to evaluate statements according to prototypic definitions of lies and truths. Strichartz and Burton (1990) also found that as children age, they modify their prototype rules and find it difficult to label a statement as a truth or a lie when the factuality of the statement and the intent of the speaker conflict.

Contrary to an absolutist perspective, children do not evaluate all lies equally negatively (Bussey, 1999). Antisocial lies, those related to socially unacceptable behaviors, were rated most negatively whereas white lies, used to maintain interpersonal relationships, were rated least negatively. Bussey also reported that whether children lie or tell the truth depends both on their evaluative reactions to lying and to telling the truth. Lee and Ross (1997) further emphasized that children are less likely to label false statements as lies when told in a politeness setting, as opposed to an informational one. In politeness settings where a speaker's main goal is to maintain positive social relations, cooperation becomes more important than the factual relay of information. These findings support utilitarian notions that moral evaluations of verbal deception are dynamic and context-dependent.

Cultural Differences

Contrary to Kohlberg and Piaget's universalistic theories of moral judgment, there is growing recognition that the development of moral ideas varies across cultures (Ferns & Thom, 2001; Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, & Lee, 2007; Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997). Cross-cultural studies provide insight into the social and contextual factors that affect judgments of verbal deception. Parents, teachers, and peers contribute to socialization and convey moral ideas through the organization of social practices, verbal exchanges, and emotional reactions (Shweder & Much, 1991). In these ways, culture shapes socialization processes and determines evaluations of socially relevant behaviors.

In a study of White and Black South African girls' and boys' moral development, Ferns and Thom (2001) found that although White adolescents typically developed through all five stages in Kohlberg's theory, Black adolescents did not, suggesting that progression through these stages is characteristic of an individualistic cultural orientation. Black South African adolescents tended to skip Kohlberg's Stage 3 ("good boy/girl orientation") and did not surpass Stage 4 ("law and order orientation"). Ferns and Thom attributed the differences to the differential socio-cultural environments in which the youth were socialized: Traditional Black South African culture emphasizes conforming to the welfare of the group and interdependent behavior whereas White South African culture values Western ideals of self-actualization, individualism, and independent behavior. The Black South African cultural emphasis of interdependent behavior with an ultimate goal of becoming an ideal member of the community affects the development of moral values resulting in a different trajectory from that of White South African teens.

Lee et al. (1997) also reported moral judgments to depend on social and contextual factors in that although both Chinese and Canadian children rated truth-telling positively and lie-telling negatively in antisocial contexts, Chinese children rated truth-telling less positively and lie-telling more positively in prosocial contexts than Canadians, and this effect increased with age. Developmental advances of moral judgment of lies in prosocial contexts for Chinese children revealed the growing impact of Chinese values of self-effacement, as exposure to cultural

values increased over time (Lee et al., 1997). A modesty effect was also found in Lee, Xu, Fu, Cameron, and Chen's (2001) study of Chinese and Canadian children's judgments about lying or truth-telling in relation to their own good deeds. With age, Chinese children evaluated lies about their own good deeds more positively, and truths were rated increasingly less positively. In contrast, Canadian children of all ages were most likely to view lying about their own good deeds negatively and truth-telling positively. These findings suggest that Chinese culture endorses a context-dependent utilitarian perspective on lie- and truth-telling. Canadian culture, however, tends toward a more absolutist view of the morality of verbal deception.

Many studies have highlighted differences between Eastern and Western children's evaluation of lie- and truth-telling, indicating socio-cultural factors to be key determinants of these differences (Fu et al., 2010; Fu et al., 2007; Lee et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2001). Western cultures are considered generally to emphasize individual rights and personal autonomy rather than interdependence (Hofstede, 1980; Oyserman, Coon, & Kimmelmeier, 2002). Personal goals are typically prioritized over those of the group, and primary concerns involve the individual and their immediate family (Oyserman et al., 2002; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). Eastern cultures have been characterized as emphasizing community-oriented activities, interdependence, and group goals over those of the individual, and derive identity from group harmony over personal achievements (Hofstede, 1980; Oyserman et al., 2002).

Fu et al. (2007) reported that Canadian and Chinese children categorized lies and truths similarly and rated deceptive statements as lies and factual statements as truths, but Chinese children's moral evaluations of lying and truth-telling were group-oriented, consistent with other Chinese cultural values such as group harmony and prioritized collective goals (Oyserman et al., 2002). Children took into consideration whether lying or truth-telling would help or harm the collective and favored the collective even at the expense of sacrificing a friend's or their own interests. Canadian children's judgments, on the other hand, tended to protect and enhance self-interests. These effects increased with age, and Chinese children's evaluations became increasingly group-oriented while the Canadian children increasingly protected the individual. The moral evaluations of lying and truth-telling were context- and culture-dependent and became more salient with an increased exposure and identification with cultural values.

Although North American and many European countries have been characterized as individualistic and East Asian countries, such as China, as collectivistic, variability exists within each culture, among individuals, and between differing contexts. Thus, indices of individualism and collectivism are more informative when interpreting specific socio-ecological behaviors rather than global cultural classifications. Fu et al. (2010), for example, found that Chinese children of parents who scored higher in collectivism evaluated modest lies more positively than those whose parents scored lower. Furthermore, immodest truths were rated more negatively when told in public than in private, suggesting that moral evaluation of lie- and truth-telling depends on context, and more specifically, on the level of collectivism inherent in the context.

Collectivism emphasizes the values and priorities of the group, but groups can take many forms and levels of significance. Nationalism, for example, involves a strong sense of identification and loyalty by individuals to their nation that can be viewed as a relatively high-level collective. Chinese samples in Echter et al.'s (1998) cross-cultural study of human values rated prestige as the least important among a list of values and nationalism as the most important, indicating a relationship between collectivism and nationalism. Lower level collectives take various forms, including socio-political organizations, religious groups, educational institutions, and family units. The present study examines the ways in which consideration of varying levels of collective groups in terms of size and distance from the individual affect moral evaluations of lying and truth-telling and the ages at which these differences may become salient.

The Current Study

To explore further Fu et al.'s (2007) findings that Chinese children's moral evaluations are based on in-group consequences, whereas Canadian children's evaluations highlight self-interest, the current study investigates the role of collective-group size in moral evaluations. Differing contextual effects on moral evaluations based on collective-group size may further support the utilitarian notion of moral evaluation in collectivistic cultures and may highlight differing pressures for group harmony based on importance of group membership. The larger the collectivity and the greater the distance from an individual (e.g., a national group vs. a school class) should represent a call for greater long-standing commitment of loyalty, especially for collectively oriented participants.

In the current study, various competitive scenarios at differing group levels of collectivism (i.e., individual, class, school, and nation) are used to investigate cross-cultural differences in moral classifications, justifications, and evaluations of lies and truths. Competitive scenarios are used to make the moral dilemma more salient, and to highlight the contrast between a utilitarian notion of lying and that from an absolutist standpoint. Based on the existing literature, we predicted that (a) Chinese participants, belonging to a culture that values collective group harmony, would evaluate lies told to benefit the collective group more favorably than self-serving lies and truths that harm the collective less favorably than truths against self-interest. Conversely, Canadian participants, belonging to a culture that values autonomy and independence, would do the opposite. Furthermore, (b) as Chinese cultures emphasize social hierarchy, conformity, and social-role fulfillment (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), we expected that Chinese participants would evaluate lies told to benefit the collective group more favorably with increasing age. Furthermore, the cultural differences between Chinese and Canadian participants would become more salient implicating greater exposure to their respective cultural values.

Method

Participants

A total of 360 children and youths participated in this study: 180 participants were from Zhejiang, China, and the other 180 were from New Brunswick, Canada. The relatively small communities in which the data were collected were chosen as most suitable for locating the study, as they were stable communities with little migration, thus receiving relatively minimal extra-cultural influences.

The Chinese sample of 180 consisted of 60 children aged 8 years (M age = 7.99, SD = 0.96, 30 male), 60 children aged 12 years (M age = 11.92, SD = 1.16, 30 male), and 60 youths aged 16 years (M age = 15.79, SD = 1.09, 30 male). Participants were all Han Chinese, and they attended schools in which Mandarin is the primary language. Participants' parents were professionals (e.g., civil servants), merchants, or non-professionals (e.g., farmers) according to parental reports. The median level of education attained by parents was middle school.

The Canadian sample of 180 included 60 children aged 8 years (M age = 8.21, SD = 1.09, 30 male), 60 children aged 12 years (M age = 12.19, SD = 1.19, 30 male) and 60 youths aged 16 years (M age = 16.12, SD = 1.53, 30 male). Of the Canadian participants, 88.8% were Caucasian and 3.3% were Chinese. The remaining 7.9% were non-Chinese Asians and members of other ethnic groups. Participants attended schools where 97.5% of students were English speakers. Family backgrounds varied, and 69% of participants had parents who were both born in Canada. According to the Statistics Canada census in 2006, 41% of the population in New Brunswick has attended some college or university or has attained a university degree. In all, 68% of the workforce is in management, business, sales and service, or trade sectors.

Communities involved in this study had similar socio-economic status, in that they were located in medium-sized cities that were provincial industrial and economic centers in their respective countries. Participants were recruited from public schools in communities largely comprised of working- and middle-class families though no specific information regarding each participant's parental education, occupation, or family income was obtained.

Materials

Participants were shown eight different illustrated scenarios involving individuals and various levels of collectivity (i.e., from individual to class, school, and country levels) via a PowerPoint presentation on a Macintosh laptop computer. The scenario story orders were counterbalanced. Six of the eight scenarios depicted a main story character as an observer of a competition in which their group participated. The other two scenarios depicted an individual character only. The collective groups varied ranging from larger group size to smaller (i.e., country, school, and class). In each of the scenarios, a main character notices that members of their group have cheated to win the competition. A story character from the opposite team questions the main character as to whether their group has cheated or not, and the main character is faced with a dilemma in which they must decide to tell a lie in support of their group or tell the truth against their group. In half of the scenarios, the story characters chose to lie for their country, school, or class. In the two individualistic control scenarios, the main character had committed a wrongdoing and then must decide to lie to cover up their own transgression or to admit their transgression to another story character. The scenarios were constructed in collaboration between the experimenters in China and Canada to ensure their ecological validity in both locations. Each of the scenarios was developed to represent a situation typical to its culture and context, and only scenarios that represented those contexts common to both locations were chosen to be used in this research. The scenarios were translated and back-translated by the collaborators in each country.

Procedure

Research assistants who had received prior ethical and data collection training interviewed each participant for 15 to 20 min. Participants in China were interviewed in Mandarin and those in Canada were interviewed in English. Participants under 12 years of age were interviewed individually, and participants over 12 years were interviewed within small groups of four. First, the interviewers explained that participants would be read the stories and then asked to answer a few questions and to judge what the main character in the story said. Participants were trained to use a 7-point Likert-type scale when responding to the moral judgment questions (i.e., *very, very bad* [XXX], *very bad* [XX], *a little bad* [X], *not good, not bad* [O], *a little good* [★], *very good* [★★], and *very, very good* [★★★]). Participants were then presented the eight hypothetical scenarios. An example of one of the stories in which the character lies to benefit his national team is as follows:

Matthew loves soccer. One day, he went to watch an international soccer tournament. He was excited because a national team made up of high school students from across Canada was competing against a national high school team from Australia. During the tournament, Matthew realized that player number two from the Canadian team wasn't really a high school student, but a college student and should not have been on the Canadian team. The Canadian team won the first-place medal. Later, the coach from the Australian team walked up to Matthew and said, "Player number two from the Canadian team was great! Is he really in high school?" Matthew thought to himself: If I say he's a high school student, I will have to lie; but the Canadian team will be able to keep the medal, but if I say he's not a high school student, I will not have to lie; but the Canadian team will lose the medal.

Table 1. Percentage of Chinese and Canadian Participants' Classifications of Story Characters' Statements in Lying Scenarios.

| Scenario by culture | Age (years) | | | Age (years) | | | Age (years) | | |
|---------------------|-------------|----|-----|----------------|----|----|-------------|----|----|
| | 8 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 12 | 16 |
| | Lie | | | Something else | | | Truth | | |
| Lie for country | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 92 | 87 | 72 | 2 | 5 | 25 | 6 | 8 | 3 |
| Canadian | 83 | 92 | 95 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 12 | 8 | 3 |
| Lie for school | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 92 | 88 | 83 | 2 | 7 | 12 | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| Canadian | 82 | 93 | 97 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 16 | 2 | 3 |
| Lie for class | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 85 | 82 | 75 | 2 | 8 | 18 | 13 | 10 | 7 |
| Canadian | 80 | 87 | 90 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 15 | 3 | 5 |
| Lie for self | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 92 | 90 | 90 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5 |
| Canadian | 88 | 95 | 100 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 0 |

After reading out the story, the interviewer told participants how the story character responded in the dilemma:

Matthew thought about it for a moment, and answered, "Yes, he's a high school student."

The students then classified the character's response as a "lie," the "truth," or "something else." This latter option was offered as previous studies with similar scenarios and older (particularly Chinese) participants indicated that their situational complexities had resulted in participant discomfort with a forced choice between "truth" and "lie." Next, the interviewer asked the participants to make a judgment about what the character said: ("Is what [the story character] said good or bad? How good/bad was it?"). Participants answered the question by using the Likert-type scale. Finally, participants were asked to justify their answer: ("Why do you think what [the story character] said is [good/not good, not bad/bad]?"). After the participants answered all three questions, the interviewer followed the same procedure for the other seven stories (please see the appendix).

Results

Participants' Classifications of Story Characters' Statements

No differences were found in any of our demographic (i.e., gender or ethnicity) or methodological control factors (e.g., scenario problem orders) so these variables are ignored in all subsequent analyses. Table 1 presents the percentages of participants' classifications of story characters' lie-telling and truth-telling statements. With respect to both lie- and truth-telling, as expected, participants accurately classified story characters' statements: The accuracy rate varied between 72% and 97%. With respect to lie-telling, a few cultural differences emerged in that 25% of 16-year-old Chinese children classified lies-for-country as "something else," whereas only 2% of Canadians did so, $\chi^2(2, n = 120) = 14.21, p = .001, \phi = .344$. Similarly, 12% of 16-year-old Chinese participants classified lies-for-school as "something else" while none of the Canadians did, $\chi^2(2, n = 119) = 8.58, p = .014, \phi = .269$.

Table 2. Percentage of Chinese and Canadian Participants' Classifications of Story Characters' Statements in Truth-Telling Scenarios.

| Scenario by culture | Age (years) | | | Age (years) | | | Age (years) | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-----|-----|----------------|----|----|-------------|----|----|
| | 8 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 12 | 16 |
| | Truth | | | Something else | | | Lie | | |
| Lie for country | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 93 | 92 | 85 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Canadian | 78 | 93 | 92 | 10 | 3 | 0 | 12 | 4 | 8 |
| Lie for school | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 90 | 100 | 87 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 5 |
| Canadian | 88 | 97 | 98 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 2 |
| Lie for class | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 90 | 98 | 87 | 0 | 2 | 10 | 10 | 2 | 3 |
| Canadian | 82 | 93 | 97 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 11 | 2 | 1 |
| Lie for self | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 97 | 100 | 98 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| Canadian | 97 | 98 | 100 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 |

With respect to truth-telling (see Table 2), 78% to 100% of participants accurately classified the truths as true. However, small cultural differences emerged again in both country- and school-related scenarios. Eight percent of 16-year-old Chinese students called truths against both country and school as "something else" as opposed to none of the Canadian 16-year-olds, $\chi^2(2, n = 120) = 5.96, p = .051, \phi = .223$, and $\chi^2(2, n = 120) = 6.44, p = .040, \phi = .232$, respectively. Overall, 16-year-old Chinese were more inclined to categorize collective-related statements as "something else" than did 16-year-old Canadians.

Participants' Judgment Ratings of Lie-Telling and Truth-Telling Scenarios

The means and standard deviations of moral judgment ratings of lie- and truth-telling scenarios are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Two 2 (Culture: China, Canada) \times 3 (Age: 8, 12, and 16 years of age) \times 4 (Context: country, school, class, and self) mixed factors ANOVAs with culture and age as between-subjects variables and context as within-subjects variable were performed to analyze children's moral judgment ratings in the eight hypothetical scenarios. The lie- and truth-telling scenarios were analyzed separately.

Judgments in lie-telling scenarios. For lie-telling scenarios, a significant main effect of age emerged, $F(1, 354) = 3.784, p = .024, \eta_p^2 = .021$, along with a significant context effect, $F(3, 354) = 31.83, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .215$. The interaction between age and context was significant, $F(6, 354) = 2.105, p = .051, \eta_p^2 = .018$, but these effects were all qualified by a three-way interaction between culture, age, and context, $F(6, 354) = 2.313, p = .032, \eta_p^2 = .019$.

Post hoc univariate ANOVAs with Fisher's Least Significant Difference (LSD) post hoc comparisons were performed separately for each culture to identify how moral judgment ratings differed within cultures across age groups and contexts. For Chinese participants, the post hoc LSD tests revealed that 16-year-olds evaluated the story character's lies-for-country less negatively than the 8- and 12-year-olds ($p = .016; p = .054$, respectively). Among the three age groups, only 16-year-old Chinese youth rated all three lie-for-collective scenarios less negatively than lies-for-self (all $p < .001$).

Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Chinese and Canadian Participants' Judgment Ratings in Lying Scenarios (Maximum = 3, Minimum = -3).

| Scenario by culture | Age (years) | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|------------|------|
| | 8 | | 12 | | 16 | | Total ages | |
| | M | SD | M | SD | M | SD | M | SD |
| Lie for country | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | -1.47 | 1.67 | -1.33 | 1.55 | -0.82 | 1.32 | -1.21 | 1.54 |
| Canadian | -1.40 | 1.84 | -1.46 | 1.39 | -1.05 | 1.47 | -1.30 | 1.58 |
| Lie for school | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | -1.43 | 1.71 | -1.47 | 1.37 | -1.17 | 1.18 | -1.36 | 1.44 |
| Canadian | -1.22 | 2.02 | -1.73 | 1.16 | -1.03 | 1.31 | -1.33 | 1.56 |
| Lie for class | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | -1.40 | 1.75 | -1.68 | 1.51 | -1.05 | 1.31 | -1.38 | 1.55 |
| Canadian | -1.38 | 1.72 | -1.13 | 1.24 | -0.75 | 1.44 | -1.08 | 1.50 |
| Lie for self | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | -1.87 | 1.44 | -1.83 | 1.53 | -2.17 | 1.09 | -1.96 | 1.37 |
| Canadian | -2.16 | 1.18 | -2.00 | 1.14 | -1.68 | 1.46 | -1.94 | 1.27 |
| Total collective scenario | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | -1.43 | 1.45 | -1.49 | 1.04 | -1.01 | .98 | | |
| Canadian | -1.33 | 1.44 | -1.44 | 1.04 | -.94 | 1.16 | | |

Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of Chinese and Canadian Participants' Judgment Ratings in Truth-Telling Scenarios (Maximum = 3, Minimum = -3).

| Scenario by culture | Age (years) | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------------|------|
| | 8 | | 12 | | 16 | | Total ages | |
| | M | SD | M | SD | M | SD | M | SD |
| Truth against country | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 1.97 | 1.58 | 1.50 | 1.51 | 0.63 | 1.79 | 1.37 | 1.72 |
| Canadian | 1.83 | 1.64 | 1.97 | 1.24 | 1.45 | 1.73 | 1.75 | 1.56 |
| Truth against school | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 1.95 | 1.38 | 1.70 | 1.37 | 1.13 | 1.57 | 1.59 | 1.47 |
| Canadian | 1.88 | 1.54 | 2.07 | 1.06 | 1.92 | 1.36 | 1.96 | 1.33 |
| Truth against class | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 1.73 | 1.55 | 1.75 | 1.41 | 1.43 | 1.36 | 1.64 | 1.44 |
| Canadian | 1.58 | 1.78 | 1.90 | 1.07 | 1.70 | 1.45 | 1.73 | 1.46 |
| Truth against self | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 2.37 | .90 | 2.13 | 1.44 | 2.52 | .81 | 2.34 | 1.09 |
| Canadian | 2.08 | 1.49 | 2.57 | .79 | 2.52 | .97 | 2.39 | 1.14 |
| Total collective scenario | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 1.88 | 1.18 | 1.65 | 1.21 | 1.07 | 1.28 | | |
| Canadian | 1.77 | 1.36 | 1.98 | .91 | 1.69 | 1.25 | | |

Post hoc LSD tests showed that the Canadian participants' judgment ratings did not differ significantly among the three age groups in the lie-for-country scenario. A post hoc LSD test also showed that overall, 8- and 16-year-old Canadians rated all lies-for-collective scenarios

less negatively than lies-for-self (all $p < .021$), whereas the 12-year-olds rated only the lie-for-country and lie-for-class statements less negatively than the lie-for-self ($p = .044$; $p = .001$, respectively).

Judgments in truth-telling scenarios. In truth-telling scenarios, the culture and context main effects were both significant, $F(1, 354) = 3.961, p = .047, \eta_p^2 = .011$, and $F(3, 354) = 40.94, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .104$, respectively, as were the interactions between age and context, $F(6, 354) = 6.861, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .037$. Marginally significant interactions between culture and context and a culture by age interaction were also documented, $F(3, 354) = 2.480, p = .060, \eta_p^2 = .007$, and $F(2, 354) = 3.005, p = .051, \eta_p^2 = .017$, respectively.

Post hoc univariate ANOVAs with LSD tests were conducted to examine how Chinese and Canadian participants evaluated the truthful statements and how the three age groups rated the truths differently in each context. All age groups rated all three truth-against-collectives more negatively than the truth-against-self (all $p < .033$). LSD tests also revealed the interaction between culture and context to be influenced by Chinese participants of all ages' ratings of the story characters' truth-against-country and truth-against-school that were more negative than Canadian participants' ($p = .027$; $p = .015$, respectively). Both Chinese and Canadian participants judged all three truths-against-collectives more negatively than truths-against-self (all $p < .001$), but only Chinese participants rated truths-against-country less favorably than truth-against-school and truth-against-class (both $p < .038$). Post hoc LSD tests of culture by age showed the interaction to be mainly driven by 16-year-old Chinese youths who rated all three truth-telling statements more negatively than 8- and 12-year-old Chinese children ($p = .022$ and $p = .003$, respectively). Consistent with our hypotheses, the 16-year-old Chinese participants gave more negative ratings to all truth-against-collective statements than did 16-year-old Canadians.

Participants' Justifications of Their Judgment Ratings

Coded justifications were classified into one of four central categories, namely, *Moral Judgment*, *Consideration for Self*, *Consideration for Others*, and *Consideration of Context*. When participants justified their scores by the goodness or immorality of the characters' statements, their justifications were categorized as *Moral Judgment*. Participants' justifications emphasizing the benefits of and the consequences to the main story characters over others were categorized as *Consideration for Self*. Participants' justifications demonstrating concerns about the consequences to others or highlighting the importance of the group, such as collective benefit and loyalty to the group, were categorized as *Consideration for Others*. Justifications referring to the importance of winning the medal or the competition itself were grouped as *Consideration of Context*. Depending on their contents, justifications could be coded into more than one category. Tables 5 and 6 present the percentage of justifications representing each category by cultures and ages in both lie- and truth-telling scenarios.

To investigate whether culture and age were associated with the types of participants' justifications, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was computed with age and culture as predictors and types of justifications (*Moral Judgment*, *Consideration for Self*, *Consideration for Others*, and *Consideration of Context*) for each scenario as the predicted. A priori comparisons with the *Moral Judgment* justification type as the reference for the predicted variable category, and 8-year-olds and Canadians as the reference for the predictor variable category were performed.

Justifications in lie-telling Scenarios. The lie-for-country scenario model was significant, $\chi^2(9, n = 360) = 48.18, p < .001$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .154$. Likelihood ratio chi-square analyses revealed significant age and culture effects on participants' justifications, $\chi^2(6, n = 360) = 30.38, p < .001$, and $\chi^2(3, n = 360) = 18.51, p < .001$, respectively. The 16- and 12-year-olds used the *Consideration for*

Table 5. Percentage of Justifications Representing Each Category by Cultures and Ages in Lying Scenarios.

| Scenario by culture | Justification categories | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|--------------------------|----|----|------------------------|----|----|--------------------------|----|----|--------------------------|----|----|
| | Moral judgment | | | Consideration for self | | | Consideration for others | | | Consideration of context | | |
| | 8 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 12 | 16 |
| Lie for country | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 79 | 55 | 53 | 0 | 9 | 13 | 7 | 21 | 30 | 14 | 15 | 4 |
| Canadian | 81 | 67 | 48 | 6 | 7 | 14 | 2 | 5 | 11 | 11 | 21 | 27 |
| Lie for school | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 72 | 68 | 69 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 19 | 25 | 20 | 7 | 4 |
| Canadian | 79 | 53 | 54 | 4 | 12 | 9 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 17 | 28 | 30 |
| Lie for class | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 68 | 72 | 69 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 16 | 20 | 25 | 8 | 3 |
| Canadian | 78 | 59 | 59 | 11 | 12 | 10 | 2 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 26 | 19 |
| Lie for self | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 57 | 60 | 65 | 36 | 34 | 31 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 2 |
| Canadian | 72 | 39 | 37 | 17 | 30 | 37 | 3 | 20 | 18 | 8 | 11 | 8 |

Table 6. Percentage of Justifications Representing Each Category by Cultures and Ages in Truth-Telling Scenarios.

| Scenario by culture | Justification categories | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|----|----|------------------------|----|----|--------------------------|----|----|--------------------------|----|----|
| | Moral judgment | | | Consideration for self | | | Consideration for others | | | Consideration of context | | |
| | 8 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 12 | 16 |
| Truth against country | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 77 | 64 | 59 | 6 | 11 | 2 | 4 | 15 | 34 | 13 | 10 | 5 |
| Canadian | 88 | 71 | 72 | 5 | 10 | 9 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 12 | 14 |
| Truth against school | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 73 | 72 | 73 | 7 | 4 | 9 | 6 | 16 | 14 | 14 | 8 | 4 |
| Canadian | 90 | 70 | 75 | 5 | 15 | 5 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 13 |
| Truth against class | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 84 | 78 | 81 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 13 | 10 | 11 | 0 |
| Canadian | 86 | 69 | 75 | 6 | 14 | 11 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 14 | 10 |
| Truth against self | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chinese | 62 | 65 | 58 | 35 | 28 | 40 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Canadian | 64 | 58 | 42 | 22 | 32 | 49 | 4 | 10 | 7 | 10 | 0 | 2 |

Others justification more frequently than did 8- year-olds, $\beta = 2.07$, Wald = 15.12, $p < .001$, odds ratio = 7.88, $\beta = 1.36$, Wald = 6.11, $p = .013$, odds ratio = 3.88, respectively. The 16- and 12-year-olds also made more frequent use of *Consideration for Self* than did 8- year-olds, $\beta = 2.00$, Wald = 10.10, $p = .001$, odds ratio = 7.38, $\beta = 1.26$, Wald = 3.67, $p = .055$, odds ratio = 3.53, respectively. Furthermore, Chinese participants were more inclined to use *Consideration for Others* justifications than Canadian participants, $\beta = 1.28$, Wald = 10.38, $p = .001$, odds ratio = 3.58.

The lie-for-school scenario model was significant, $p < .001$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .147$. Participants' justifications differed across age groups and cultures (both $p < .003$). The 16- and 12-year-olds used the *Consideration for Others* justification more frequently than did 8-year-olds (both $p < .006$, odds ratio > 9.57). The 12-year-olds also used the *Consideration for Self* more than did 8-year-olds, $p = .052$, odds ratio = 3.49. Chinese participants justified their ratings more frequently with *Consideration for Others* justifications than did Canadians, $p = .008$, odds ratio = 3.25, but less frequently with *Consideration of Context* than did Canadians, $p = .002$, odds ratio = .37.

The lie-for-class and lie-for-self scenario models were also significant (both $p < .043$), Nagelkerke $R^2 > .119$) with significant age and cultures effects (all $p < .025$). In the two scenarios, both 16- and 12-year-olds used the *Consideration for Others* justification more frequently than did 8-year-olds (all $p < .015$, odds ratio > 6.09). Compared with Canadians, Chinese participants justified their ratings more frequently with *Consideration for Others* in the lie-for-class scenario, $p = .008$, odds ratio = 3.25.

Justifications in truth-telling scenarios. The truth-against-country scenario model was significant, $p < .001$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .153$; the truth-against-school scenario model was only marginally significant, $p = .060$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .058$. Significant age and culture effects were found in both models (all $p < .001$). In the two scenarios, the 16- and 12-year-olds used the *Consideration for Others* justification more frequently than did 8-year-olds (all $p < .021$, odds ratio > 5.26). Similarly, Chinese participants justified their ratings more frequently with *Consideration for Others* justifications than did Canadian participants in both truth-telling scenarios (all $p < .027$, odds ratio > 2.66).

Relationship between judgments and justifications. An additional two-step hierarchical regression analysis was also conducted to examine the relationship between participants' judgment ratings and their justifications of the story characters' statements in each scenario. Participants' ratings were entered as the predicted variable, and their respective cultures and age groups were entered as the predictors, followed by type of justifications, which was dummy coded as Predictor 1 (*Moral Judgment* vs. other three responses), Predictor 2 (*Consideration for Self* vs. other three responses), and Predictor 3 (*Consideration for Others* vs. other three responses). After controlling culture and age effects, the type of justification was significantly related to participants' ratings in all scenarios (all models $p < .001$) except the lie-for-self scenario ($p = .17$).

Table 7 presents the means and standard deviations of all participants' judgment ratings by each type of justification. The results illustrated that participants' justifications generally cohered to their judgment ratings. Regardless of culture and age, participants who emphasized *Moral Judgment* when justifying their ratings were relatively judgmental; they were inclined to give highly negative ratings in lie-for-collective scenarios and highly positive ratings in all truth-telling scenarios. Participants who justified with *Consideration for Others* and *Considerations for Context* showed the greatest leniency and tolerance for lies-for-collectives, the least favoritism toward truths-against-collectives, and tended to give near-neutral ratings when judging all collectives-related statements.

Discussion

The present study investigated Chinese and Canadian children's moral evaluations of lying and truth-telling in contexts that would either harm or help various collective groups ranging from a student's class, to their school, or their country in contrast to a self-interested context. In support of our hypotheses, the socio-cultural environment in which children and youth were socialized related to their moral evaluations, and both the moral judgments and justifications of Chinese

Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations of Participants' Judgment Ratings by Each Type of Justification in All Eight Scenarios.

| Scenario by justification type | Judgment scores | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|
| | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> |
| Lie for country | | |
| Moral judgment | -1.68 | 1.39 |
| Consideration for self | -1.18 | 1.45 |
| Consideration for others | -0.56 | 1.70 |
| Consideration of context | -0.50 | 1.53 |
| Lie for school | | |
| Moral judgment | -1.74 | 1.32 |
| Consideration for self | -1.48 | 1.29 |
| Consideration for others | -0.63 | 1.23 |
| Consideration of context | -0.89 | 1.58 |
| Lie for class | | |
| Moral judgment | -1.52 | 1.40 |
| Consideration for self | -1.50 | 1.43 |
| Consideration for others | -0.85 | 1.56 |
| Consideration of context | -0.49 | 1.67 |
| Lie for self | | |
| Moral judgment | -2.09 | 1.15 |
| Consideration for self | -1.85 | 1.50 |
| Consideration for others | -2.15 | 1.15 |
| Consideration of context | -1.82 | 1.37 |
| Truth against country | | |
| Moral judgment | 2.03 | 1.33 |
| Consideration for self | 1.47 | 1.95 |
| Consideration for others | 0.090 | 1.87 |
| Consideration of context | 0.75 | 1.66 |
| Truth against school | | |
| Moral judgment | 2.10 | 1.22 |
| Consideration for self | 1.41 | 1.73 |
| Consideration for others | 0.76 | 1.72 |
| Consideration of context | 0.85 | 1.30 |
| Truth against class | | |
| Moral judgment | 2.00 | 1.19 |
| Consideration for self | 1.81 | 1.38 |
| Consideration for others | 0.30 | 1.46 |
| Consideration of context | 0.62 | 1.44 |
| Truth against self | | |
| Moral judgment | 2.42 | 0.98 |
| Consideration for self | 2.30 | 1.21 |
| Consideration for others | 2.84 | 0.38 |
| Consideration of context | 0.64 | 2.30 |

students reflected the cultural values of their more communitarian society. Chinese participants, compared with their Canadian counterparts, were more contextually sensitive in their moral evaluations which fluctuated more in relation to type or size of the collective. Cultural differences between Canadian and Chinese participants in classifications not found in many previous studies

(and notably not in those of Lee et al., 2001, and Fu et al., 2007) emerged with older participants, illustrating the more nuanced development of the moral perspectives of the Chinese adolescents.

Classifications

Consistent with previous studies (Fu et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2001), most participants in both cultures, and especially the younger children, classified lies told in the lie scenarios as “lies” and the truths as “the truth”. In the current study however, when the participants failed to confirm these categories, they were also reluctant to judge the statements as morally reprehensible. If a scenario character lied to protect his or her country or school, Chinese youths were more likely than their Canadian counterparts to call the lies “something else” and to judge the statement as less culpable than participants calling the statement a lie. They also had a greater tendency to classify truths that harmed the character’s country or school as “something else” which is similar to participants’ hesitancy to classify modesty-motivated untruths as “lies” in a previous study (Fu, Lee, Cameron, & Xu, 2001). The current findings, similar to Fu et al. (2001), also suggest that with age, Chinese participants develop less rigid perspectives of lie- and truth-telling compared with younger Chinese children and Canadian participants, as they focus less on statement factuality. Canadian children and youth, for their part, were inclined to be more categorical in their classifications, tending toward a more absolutist position: a lie was a lie, to be sanctioned, and justified by moral strictures, and less dependent on a situation.

Judgments

As predicted, Chinese participants mostly rated communitarian lies more positively than self-serving lies, confirming the findings of several previous studies (cf. Fu et al., 2007; Lee et al., 1997). Canadian students also evaluated lies for collectives less negatively than lies-for-self. Chinese students, however, rated truths-against-country and truths-against-school less positively than Canadian students. It is possible that Canadian students are more inclined than Chinese students to view telling truths, regardless of who benefits, more positively, regardless of possible negative social repercussions.

One way to interpret older Chinese students’ strong and more consistently positive evaluation of lying and truth-telling to benefit their country in comparison with Canadian students’ indifference may relate to the construct of nationalism and varying cultural emphases on nationalistic values and national pride. In a cross-cultural study of human values (i.e., universalism, family, nationalism, prestige, and autonomy) in China, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United States (Echter et al., 1998), Chinese participants valued nationalism the most, whereas North American samples rated nationalism as the least important value. Our current findings concurred with these. Canadians may, similar to the Americans studied by Echter et al., place less value on national pride than Asians. In further support, Cheung and Kwok (1997) found that post-secondary Chinese social sciences students in Mainland China tended to rate nationalism higher as their study duration increased. Fong (2008) discussed Chinese nationalism as a type of filial devotion portrayed and promoted in popular culture, represented in Chinese media analogies of the motherland during Macau’s return to Chinese rule in 1999. Increased valuation of nationalism with age in Chinese samples implicates nationalism as a cultural construct that becomes increasingly salient with exposure to cultural messages.

Justifications

As in the Lau et al. (2013) cross-cultural study of verbal deception, participants’ justifications in making their moral judgments clarified and amplified their perspectives on their moral

evaluations. Their foci on the “goodness” or moral value of a statement, which were classified as *Moral Judgments*, as opposed to a more relativistic *Consideration for Self, Others, or the Context*, interestingly delineated judgment differences between both ages and cultures. Participants who were more absolutist and more morally judgmental emphasized moral rectitude justifications: Those who justified with *Consideration of Self*, however, were less critical, and those justifying with *Consideration of Others* or *Contexts* offered the most neutral judgments, reflecting the most relativistic perspectives. These results also support previous findings that lies motivated by self-interest were less acceptable than lies that primarily benefited others (Mealy, Stephan, & Urrutia, 2007; Seiter, Bruschke, & Bai, 2002).

Chinese participants justified their evaluations of the collective-related statements with *Consideration of others* (e.g., loyalty to country/school/friends, to avoid negative consequences for others) more than did Canadians, and those who justified with *Consideration of others* gave more positive ratings to lies-for-collectives and less favorable ratings to truths-against-collectives. Apart from justifications related to moral convictions however, older Canadians reflected less concern with maintaining social relations consistent with individualistic ideology and tended to justify with *Consideration of the Context* instead, which includes consideration of the level of the competition (e.g., national vs. class teams) and of the intention of the competition (e.g., “the medal doesn’t matter,” “it’s about having fun”). The judgments and justifications of Chinese participants were consistent with the Chinese cultural values that prioritize the social good over personal interest and stressed loyalty as one of five “prime virtues” in Confucian Chinese society (Hwang, 1999).

In the lie-for-self scenarios, a large proportion of Canadian participants justified with *Consideration for Self* (i.e., to avoid negative consequences for himself/herself; to avoid getting himself/herself in trouble) rather than *Consideration of Context*, reflecting the promotion of self-interest, which is more common in individualistic cultures. Furthermore, when Canadian participants justified with *Consideration of Others*, they primarily stated they did not want others to suffer the consequences for actions that were not their fault, emphasizing the individualistic cultural value of taking personal responsibility (Hofstede, 1980; Oyserman et al., 2002).

These findings support expectations that Chinese children would differentiate more than Canadian children between contexts when making moral evaluations of verbal deception (Fu et al., 2010; Fu et al., 2001; Fu et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2013). Increased exposure to their respective cultures likely contributes to a corresponding increase in identification with the moral values of the culture in which the child or youth is socialized (Shweder & Much, 1991; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Moral education in secondary school in China, for example, explicitly promotes patriotism, collective cohesion and interest, and self-sacrifice—the “Lei-Fung’s spirit”—(Ho, 2010; Wansheng & Wujie, 2004). Further to Lee et al. (1997) and Cameron, Lau, Fu, and Lee’s (2012) discussions of the growing impact of Chinese cultural values of modesty and self-effacement, the current study revealed similar age-related increases in Chinese children’s consideration of the size of the collective when making moral evaluations of lying and truth-telling illustrating the increasing salience of Chinese cultural values particularly in the oldest Chinese sample.

Limitations and Future Directions

Differences in both the Chinese and Canadian students’ moral evaluations must take into account both cultural factors and developmental changes in moral understanding. As Strichartz and Burton (1990) suggested, younger children tend to hold a more absolutist perspective of verbal deception and categorize objectively false statements as lies. Absolutist moral perspectives of verbal deception, however, vary and are culturally construed, passed on through

socialization processes (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). Cultural messages influence children at early ages, and children as young as six begin shifting to a more utilitarian understanding of verbal deception (Bussey, 1999; Strichartz & Burton, 1990). The tendency of the Chinese students to rate lies told to benefit collectives less negatively with increasing age may illustrate both developmental advances in moral understanding, as well as the growing impact of cultural values on the moral reasoning process. These variables cannot be disentangled in the present study.

The confound between the maturation associated with chronological age and that from experience within a culture requires further study. A sample of children and youth in an immigrant community wherein number of years that Chinese participants have lived within a new Euro-Canadian culture was documented to reflect amount of exposure to traditional versus mainstream values with respect to modesty (Cameron et al., 2012). More studies using this strategy for exploring family and larger community values are called for. For this type of research, a large community with a significant population with multiple generations of immigrants resident there is required. Furthermore, a more detailed exploration of the home backgrounds including the socio-economic status of participants' families and the disparate parental education levels between the two cultural groups could shed light on sources of their moral judgment differences.

In conclusion, both Chinese and Canadian participants in the current study reflected moral perspectives on verbal deception that were both absolutist and utilitarian in nature. Although moral evaluations of all participants became more utilitarian with age, Chinese participants' classifications, judgments, and justifications were more nuanced, highlighting the significance of cultural and contextual factors in moral development.

Appendix

Scenarios Used for Judgments

Scenario 1: Lie for country. Matthew loves soccer. One day, he went to watch an international soccer tournament. He was excited because a national team made up of high school students from across Canada was competing against a national high school team from Australia. During the tournament, Matthew realized that player number two from the Canadian team was not really a high school student, but a college student and should not have been on the Canadian team. The Canadian team won the first-place medal. Later, the coach from the Australian team walked up to Matthew and said, "Player number two from the Canadian team was great! Is he really in high school?" Matthew thought to himself:

1. If I say he is a high school student, I will have to lie; but the Canadian team will be able to keep the medal, but
2. If I say he is not a high school student, I will not have to lie; but the Canadian team will lose the medal.

Matthew thought about it for a moment, and answered, "Yes, he's a high school student."

Scenario 2: Lie for school. Samantha loves science. One day, she went to watch a competitive science fair between her school and another school. During the competition, Samantha realized that Amy, who was one of the smartest kids on her school's team, was not really from her school and should not have been on her school's team. Samantha's school won the first-place medal. Later, a teacher from the other school walked up to Samantha and said, "Amy from your school was great! Does she really go to your school?" Samantha thought to herself:

1. If I say she goes to my school, I will have to lie; but my school will be able to keep the medal, but
2. If I say she does not go to my school, I will not have to lie; but my school will lose the medal.

Samantha thought about it for a moment, and answered, “Yes, she goes to my school.”

Scenario 3: Lie for class. Nicholas loves spelling. One day, he went to watch a spelling bee between a team from his class and a team from another class. During the competition, Nicholas realized that Jeff, who was one of the best spellers on his class’s team, had actually transferred to a different class a while ago. As Jeff was not in Nicholas’s class anymore, he should not have been on his class’s team. Nicholas’s class won the first-place medal. Later, the teacher from the other class walked up to Nicholas and said, “Jeff from your class’s team was great! Is he really in your class?” Nicholas thought to himself:

1. If I say he is in my class, I will have to lie; but my class will be able to keep the medal, but
2. If I say he is not in my class, I will not have to lie; but my class will lose the medal.

Nicholas thought about it for a moment, and answered, “Yes, he’s in my class.”

Scenario 4: Lie for self. Amanda was playing with a ball inside her classroom and she accidentally broke a window. Her teacher asked her, “Do you know who broke the window?” Amanda thought to herself:

1. If I say I do not know, I will have to lie; but then I will not get in trouble, but
2. If I admit to breaking the window, I will not have to lie; but I will get in trouble.

Amanda thought about it for a moment, and answered, “No, I don’t know who broke it.”

Scenario 5: Truth against country. Joshua loves basketball. One day, he went to watch an international basketball tournament. He was excited because a national team made up of high school students from across Canada was competing against a national high school team from Australia. During the tournament, Joshua realized that player number two from the Canadian team was not really a high school student, but a college student and should not have been on the Canadian team. The Canadian team won the first-place medal. Later, the coach from the Australian team walked up to Joshua and said, “Player number two from the Canadian team was great! Is he really in high school?” Joshua thought to himself:

1. If I say he is a high school student, I will have to lie; but the Canadian team will be able to keep the medal, but
2. If I say he is not a high school student, I will not have to lie; but the Canadian team will lose the medal.

Joshua thought about it for a moment, and answered, “No, he’s not really a high school student.”

Scenario 6: Truth against school. Sarah loves math. One day, she went to watch a math competition between her school and another school. During the competition, Sarah realized that Anna, who was one of the smartest kids on her school’s team, was not really from her school and should not have been on her school’s team. Sarah’s school won the first-place medal. Later, a teacher from

the other school walked up to Sarah and said, "Anna from your school was great! Does she really go to your school?" Sarah thought to herself:

1. If I say she goes to my school, I will have to lie; but my school will be able to keep the medal, but
2. If I say she does not go to my school, I will not have to lie; but my school will lose the medal.

Sarah thought about it for a moment, and answered, "No, she doesn't go to my school."

Scenario 7: Truth against class. Jacob loves singing. One day, he went to watch a singing competition between a choir from his class and a choir from another class. During the competition, Jacob realized that Patrick, who was one of the best singers in his class's choir, had actually transferred to a different class a while ago. As Patrick was not in Jacob's class anymore, he should not have been in his class's choir. Jacob's class won the first-place medal. Later, the teacher from the other class walked up to Jacob and said, "Patrick from your class's choir was great! Is he really in your class?" Jacob thought to himself:

1. If I say he is in my class, I will have to lie; but my class will be able to keep the medal, but
2. If I say he is not in my class, I will not have to lie; but my class will lose the medal.

Jacob thought about it for a moment, and answered, "No, he's not in my class."

Scenario 8: Truth against self. Jennifer was playing with the school's newest computer and she accidentally damaged it. Her teacher asked her, "Do you know who broke the computer?" Jennifer thought to herself:

1. If I say I do not know, I will have to lie; but then I will not get in trouble, but
2. If I admit to damaging the computer, I will not have to lie; but I will get in trouble.

Jennifer thought about it for a moment, and answered, "Yes, I broke the computer."

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