

1 landscaping or gravel placed on it by Lewis' or their predecessors, although there is some
2 blending of the boundaries in certain areas where the Lewis' claimed area adjoins the
3 common areas around Hilton Lake.

4 In 1997, the legislature enacted RCW 36.70A.165, which reads:

5 The legislature recognizes that the preservation of urban greenbelts is an
6 integral part of comprehensive growth management in Washington. The
7 legislature further recognizes that certain greenbelts are subject to adverse
8 possession action which, if carried out, threaten the comprehensive nature
9 of this chapter. Therefore, a party shall not acquire by adverse possession
property that is designated as a plat greenbelt or open space area or that is
dedicated as open space to a public agency or to a bona fide homeowner's
association.

10 Since the land in question is within a greenbelt or open space, it may not be subject to an
11 adverse possession claim. However, nothing is as easy as it seems and that statute must be
12 construed in light of case law. It appears there is only one case dealing with the statute,
13 *Nickell v. Southview Homeowners Association*, 167 Wash.App. 42 (2012).

14 In *Nickell*, the claim of the Nickells was that their claim of adverse possession
15 against HOA property was not barred by the statute because their period of adverse
16 possession was completed prior to the statute being enacted in 1997. The Court of Appeals
17 agreed and the rule now is that the statute does not apply retroactively, and if an adverse
18 period is completed prior to the enactment of the statute, a party may still adversely
19 possess greenbelt or open space. Hence one of the questions in this case is whether the
20 Lewis' adverse claim period, when tacked onto the any adverse claim period of the Kantias,
21 was completed prior to 1997. In this case, the entire adverse claim would be during
22 Kania's ownership. What the court is expected to hear is that when Kantias purchased their
23 property, they really had no idea where the actual boundaries were. All Mr. Kania knew
24 was that his predecessor in ownership had been a landscaper and had landscaped a lot of
25
26

1 the area around his house. In fact, in his deposition, Mr. Kania regrettably admitted that he
2 only found out after he agree to purchase that the area he considered his side yard was
3 actually a separate piece of property being sold to someone else. He had no idea where his
4 property boundaries were. The property next to the Lewis' belongs to David Flaming. He
5 purchased his property in 1988 and will testify that at that time, a small concrete wall later
6 installed by Kania did not exist. Obviously then at least some changes occurred to the
7 property after 1988 with the result that at least some changes to the property occurred after
8 the necessary beginning of the adverse period.
9

10 Mr. Kania also acknowledges that when the original plat was recorded, portions of
11 the property were intended to remain as HOA property and be used for the benefit of all
12 property owners within the HOA. Those include pathways, benches, tennis court, picnic
13 areas, ball field, an area around the lake, etc.

14 Kania further agrees and others will testify that there were at least annual work
15 parties where neighbors got together and improved, cleaned up and helped with
16 landscaping in the common areas around Hilton lake and that at such times, people were
17 not actively watching to insure whether they remained just on common area or at times
18 wandered onto areas owned by individuals; it was a group effort to beautify the lake area.
19 Kania also agrees that it was at least not unheard of, if not common, that people would
20 blend in their landscaping to that of the common area to create a pleasing overall
21 appearance. None of that was done with the idea that property owners would be usurping
22 parts of the greenbelt or common area. In fact, Kania goes so far as to acknowledge
23 authoring a handwritten document which contains the following:
24
25

26 "First, there was absolutely no contact between the Lewis's & us until after the sale

1 of the property, therefore no understood and described boundaries of the property was
2 conveyed by us.” He went on to write, ”There was never any established boundary inter
3 the lake and the back of the property. The west property line was the only one in
4 contention.” That west line was between his house and the Flaming house and had nothing
5 to do with the disputed area. Finally he notes: “Any work or improvements done in that
6 area were not done to establish property lines inter the lake and the property, but strictly
7 for aesthetics.”

8
9 Considered as a whole, it is clear that Mr. Kania never voiced an opinion on what
10 property lines he was conveying to Lewis, had no real idea himself what his boundaries
11 were, and acknowledges that much of what is done around the lake and homes is done for
12 aesthetics, in other words, as a neighborly accommodation. In short, Mr. Kania never
13 asserted ownership of the property in question. Mr. Lewis then comes along and now
14 asserts ownership of property, based on the prior ownership of people who make no such
15 claim.

16
17 It is expected that the court will hear additional testimony from other witnesses
18 who will confirm that the HOA does not actively monitor the boundaries of its common
19 areas, that residents of the community often blend in their property lines with those of the
20 HOA to beautify the whole area and that despite such blending of the lines, the folks at
21 Hilton Lake treat the area with what can only be described as neighborly acquiescence or
22 accommodation. The testimony will be that despite such blurring of property lines over
23 the years, no one in the past has attempted to assert ownership over HOA greenbelt. The
24 testimony will be that if the landscaping, mowing, irrigation and maintenance look
25 presentable and enhance the overall appearance of the community, so much the better.
26

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1 This complaint was prepared in July of 2013. The answer, affirmative defenses and
2 counterclaim were filed on August 28, 2013. Plaintiffs reply, or answer to the
3 counterclaims was filed in September, 2013. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a a motion for
4 summary judgement in December, 2014. Pleadings were exchanged and oral hearing was
5 held on February 26, 2015 which resulted in the matter being referred for mediation. That
6 mediation occurred on May 1, 2015 and failed to achieve settlement. The court then
7 entered its order denying summary judgment, without further argument or briefing, on
8 June 18, 2015. The issue remaining was whether “neighborly accommodation” existed
9 such that adverse possession was precluded.
10
11

LEGAL ANALYSIS

12 Adverse possession requires ten years of actual and uninterrupted, open and
13 notorious, exclusive and hostile use of property. *Timberlane v. Homeowners Assn. v.*
14 *Brame*, 79 Wash.App. 303, 309, 901 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1995). “As the presumption of
15 possession is in the holder of legal title, the party claiming to have adversely possessed the
16 property has the burden of establishing the existence of each element.” *ITT Rayonier, Inc.*
17 *v. Bell*, 112 Wash.2d 754, 757, 774 P.2d 6, 8 (1989) (citations and quotations omitted). As
18 indicated above, Washington’s statute to protect greenbelts, RCW 36.70A.165 was enacted
19 in 1997. That, when coupled with the decision *NICKELL* supra requires that the adverse
20 period predate the enactment of the statute in 1997.
21
22

23 While Mr. Kania’s landscaping might create the appearance of exclusive
24 possession, the reality at Hilton Lake is somewhat different. The testimony will be that not
25 only did many of the owners blend their property lines with the land belonging to the
26

1 HOA, but also that Mr. Kania himself did not intend to establish property lines with his
2 landscaping. This is precisely the type of activity which prompted the enactment of RCW
3 36.70A.165. As the court indicated in *Bell*, supra “Possession itself is established only if it
4 is of such a character as a true owner would make considering the nature and location of
5 the land in question.” *Bell*, 112 Wash.2d at 759, 774 P.2d at 9. If the evidence confirms
6 that Mr. Kania never intended to establish property lines with his landscaping, it is hard to
7 suggest that he is acting as a true owner. Kania landscaped the disputed area, but so do
8 many other owners at Hilton Lake. Those actions made for a more appealing area around
9 the lake and many of the neighbors joined in that effort, by serving in work parties to keep
10 the area looking presentable. Both the Kania’s and their neighbors frequently joined in
11 those work parties. Nothing in his use was any different then the use of many of his
12 neighbors. From the perspective of the HOA, what he was doing did not in any way foster
13 a belief by the HOA that Kania was “possessing” its property.
14

15 As a result of the common efforts to maintain the greenbelt and the general
16 acquiescence by homeowners to the blending of property lines without objection from
17 owners or the HOA, it is hard to establish that the Kania’s use of the disputed property was
18 hostile. *Chaplin v. Sanders*, 100 Wash.2d 853, 857-58, 676 P.2d 431, 434 (1984). “The
19 ‘hostility/claim of right’ element of adverse possession requires only that the claimant treat
20 the land as his own as against the world throughout the statutory period. The nature of his
21 possession will be determined solely on the basis of the manner in which he treats the
22 property.” *Id.* at 860-61. While maintaining landscaping might, in other circumstances
23 satisfy the hostility requirement, when everyone around you is doing the same thing, it
24 doesn’t suggest hostility. To the contrary it suggests neighborliness.
25
26

1 For the same reasons that Mr. Kania's use of the disputed property was not hostile, it
2 was also not open and notorious. The "open and notorious" requirement is satisfied "if the
3 title holder has actual notice of the adverse use throughout the statutory period." *Chaplin*,
4 100 Wash.2d 853, 862, 676 P.2d 431, 437 (1984) (citing *Hovila v. Bartek*, 48 Wash.2d
5 238, 242, 292 P.2d 877 (1956)). As the testimony will indicate, the HOA has dealt with
6 the blending of property lines and landscaping for decades with no prior efforts to take
7 property by adverse possession. The Kania's use of the property was consistent with others
8 and Mr. Kania is expected to testify that he never gave any notice to the HOA that he was
9 making a claim on their property.

10 However, the real key to this issue lies in the meaning of "neighborly accommodation".
11 Not only was it used by the court in the order on summary judgment, but it is also a
12 common theme in cases involving adverse possession and prescriptive easements. As the
13 court knows, the elements of prescriptive easements are nearly identical to those of adverse
14 possession.

15 To establish a prescriptive easement, the person claiming the easement
16 must use another person's land for a period of 10 years and show that (1)
17 he or she used the land in an "open" and "notorious" manner, (2) the use
18 was "continuous" or "uninterrupted," (3) the use occurred over "a uniform
19 route," (4) the use was "adverse" to the landowner, and (5) the use
20 occurred "with the knowledge of such owner at a time when he was able
21 in law to assert and enforce his rights." *Northwest Cities*, 13 Wash.2d 75,
22 123 P.2d 771.

23 As in the case with adverse possession, the claimant bears the burden of proving
24 the elements. Adverse use implies lack of permission. While there is no requirement that
25 the claimant believes he owns the property to establish adverse use, there is nevertheless a
26 presumption that when someone enters onto another's land, the person entering does so
with the true owner's permission. *Northwest Cities* p. 84

1 An excellent discussion of “neighborly acquiescence” and how it applies is found
2 in *Gamboa v. Clark*, 183 Wash 2d 38, an April, 2015 case. Although dealing with a
3 prescriptive easement, the analysis is nearly identical to cases involving adverse
4 possession. The key issue was whether, when two parties both used a road way, one for a
5 drive entrance and the other to farm grapes, and neither party objected and both were
6 aware of the others’ use, such uses were merely neighborly sufferance or acquiescence that
7 did not ripen into an adverse use. The adverse claimant failed in that case because they
8 could not demonstrate a use that was adverse and hostile to the rights of the original
9 owners. In the current case, when the original owners (the HOA) use is such that it fosters
10 overall beautification of the area, has group work parties that do not adhere to strict
11 property lines, allows landscaping, watering and general maintenance by home owners of
12 property that includes HOA property, the use made by the Kantias is certainly not hostile
13 and adverse to that of the HOA. If anything, it confirms how the HOA has treated residents
14 since it was formed. Put another way, the issue of hostile use is contextual and in the
15 context of life at Hilton Lake, the use of property by Kania is similar to, not hostile to the
16 use of many of their neighbors.
17

18
19 “Regarding the “adverse use” element in prescriptive easement cases, our precedent
20 supports applying an initial presumption of permissive use to enclosed or developed land
21 cases in which there is a reasonable inference of *53 neighborly sufferance or
22 acquiescence.” *Gamboa v. Clark*, 183 Wash. 2d 38, 52-53, 348 P.3d 1214, 1221 (2015)
23

24 “Thus in Washington, the presumption is that use by adjoining neighbors is
25 permissive and it falls on the claimant to overcome that permission use. [p]ermissive use
26 is not hostile and does not commence the running of the prescriptive period. Use that is

1 permissible in its inception cannot ripen into a prescriptive right *unless the claimant has*
2 *made a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner. Timberlane*
3 *Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Brame*, 79 Wash. App. 303, 310-11, 901 P.2d 1074, 1078
4 (1995). While Plaintiff asserts the Timberlane case as supporting of their claims, the
5 contrast with the current case is significant. First, in Timberlane, the court indicated that
6 the HOA lacked standing because the CC&R's did not specifically grant the HOA the
7 authority to enforce the members' covenant of enjoyment in common areas. In this case,
8 there is such authority found to maintain open spaces for the members in Article 4.
9 Moreover, in Timberlane, the encroachment was not just landscaping, it included fencing
10 and a poured patio. "Although the use was originally permissive because the owners of lot
11 210, as members of the Association, had a nonexclusive easement right to the common
12 area, the construction of a fence and a concrete patio on the property far exceeded a
13 reasonable exercise of that easement right. "*Timberlane Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v.*
14 *Brame*, 79 Wash. App. 303, 311, 901 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1995).
15

16 CONCLUSION

17
18 While under other circumstances at a different location, the way the Kania's and
19 later Lewis' treated the property adjacent to theirs in the common areas of Hilton Lake
20 might give rise to an adverse possession claim, when the case is put into context; where all
21 members have an easement to the common areas for their own use and enjoyment i.e.
22 permissive use; where many members do precisely the same type of landscaping as Kantias
23 albeit perhaps not to the same extent; and were the pervasive attitude among the residents
24 is a desire to have a pleasing overall look to the entire community by reason of the concept
25
26

1 of neighborly accommodation, the claim for adverse possession must fail.

2 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ____ day of November, 2015

3
4
5 ANTONI FROEHLING, WSBA #8721
6 Attorney for Defendant
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26