AJPS AMERICAN JOURNAL of POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Dictator's Power-Sharing Dilemma: Countering Dual Outsider Threats

Jack Paine University of Rochester

Abstract: *Dictators face a power-sharing dilemma: Broadening elite incorporation mitigates prospects for outsider rebellions (by either elites excluded from power or the masses), but it raises the risk of insider coups. This article rethinks the theoretical foundations of the power-sharing dilemma and its consequences. My findings contrast with and provide conditionalities for a "conventional threat logic," which argues that large outsider threats compel dictators to create broader-based regimes, despite raising coup risk. Instead, I analyze a game-theoretic model to explain why the magnitude of the elite outsider threat ambiguously affects power-sharing incentives. Dictators with weak coup-proofing institutions or who face deeply entrenched elites take the opposite actions predicted by the conventional logic. An additional outsider threat from the masses can either exacerbate or eliminate the power-sharing dilemma with elites, depending on elite affinity toward mass rule. Examining the elite-mass interaction also generates new implications for how mass threats affect the likelihood of coups and regime overthrow.*

A highly consequential choice that dictators make is whether to share power and spoils with rival elite factions. Rulers face a *power-sharing dilemma* because broadening elite incorporation in the central government mitigates the risk of an outsider attack (e.g., rebellion or civil war), but it exacerbates the threat of an insider coup. If excluded from access to power and rents at the center, elite actors face incentives to organize a private military that can overthrow the government in an outsider rebellion (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Goodwin 2001). Excluded rivals may constitute former members of the regime (e.g., dismissed military officers or former ministers), leaders of opposition political parties, or marginalized ethnic groups. To prevent civil war, rulers can share power and spoils. Power-sharing arrangements entail distributing cabinet positions, such as the Minister of Defense (Arriola 2009; Meng 2019), or incorporation into the ruling party. But sharing power at the center does not eliminate the threat posed by rival elites. Instead, it upgrades these elites from outsiders to insiders. Insider elites can leverage their access within the state apparatus to stage coups d'état, which succeed with higher probability than outsider rebellions (Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015; Roessler 2016; Roessler and Ohls 2018).

Dictators face survival threats not only from other elites, but also from the masses—less-privileged members of society such as unionized workers, students and unemployed youth, and rural peasants. A mass outsider threat generates a qualitatively similar power-sharing dilemma as when excluded elites pose an outsider rebellion threat, although existing research studies them separately. Authoritarian rulers can strengthen the military (e.g., incorporating additional elite factions into the officer corps) to enhance repressive capacity. However, rulers face a "guardianship dilemma" because any elites included in a military strong enough to defend the government against a mass outsider threat themselves pose an insider coup threat (Acemoglu, Vindigni, and Ticchi 2010; Besley and Robinson 2010; Greitens 2016; Svolik 2012, chap. 5).[1]

[1]In this article, the consequential distinction between *elites* and *masses* is that the dictator can share power with an elite faction and still maintain the incumbent authoritarian regime, but sharing power with the masses would implicitly require democratizing and

Jack Paine is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, 333 Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY 14627 (jackpaine@rochester.edu).

For helpful comments on previous drafts, I thank the editors, three anonymous referees, Emiel Awad, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Alex Debs, Tiberiu Dragu, John Duggan, Wiola Dziuda, Jacque Gao, Mike Gibilisco, Gretchen Helmke, Brenton Kenkel, Mayya Komisarchik, Mary Kroeger, Alex Lee, Anne Meng, Andrea Morris, Bob Powell, Xiaoyan Qiu, Greg Sasso, Konstantin Sonin, Milan Svolik, Scott Tyson; and seminar participants at APSA 2017, MPSA 2019, and the Harris School of Public Policy.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 00, No. 00, xxxx 2020, Pp. 1–18

 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12547

When do rulers share power with rival elite factions? How does this choice affect outcomes such as coup risk and regime survival? Many scholars propose a variant of the following *conventional threat logic* in which the coercive capacity of outsiders (either elites excluded from power or the masses) determines the power-sharing decision. When facing low-capacity outsiders—for example, the rival elite faction is numerically small, or the masses lack political organization—the dictator should exclude rival elites from power in the central government. The ruler accumulates more rents from personalizing power and, given the minimal outsider threat, including more elites would raise the risk of overthrow by enabling them to stage a coup. However, a large outsider threat makes the dictator more willing to risk insider coups. Thus, to counter a strong outsider threat, the dictator (1) switches from excluding rival elites to sharing power, which also (2) raises the likelihood of an insider coup attempt. Collectively, the direct effect of a stronger outsider threat and the indirect effect of a heightened insider threat (3) decrease the overall likelihood of regime survival.[2]

This article rethinks the theoretical foundations of the power-sharing dilemma and its consequences. I analyze a formal model in which a dictator faces dual outsider threats from elites and the masses. Three main findings contrast with and provide conditionalities for the conventional threat logic. First, I isolate the dictator's interaction with a representative elite actor and show that the elite's coercive capacity ambiguously affects the dictator's incentives to share power. Factors such as size of the elite faction affect not only the elite's ability to rebel if excluded, but also its ability to succeed in a coup attempt if included in power. The conventional logic is incorrect in either of two circumstances. If *coup-proofing institutions* are weak (i.e., coup attempts succeed with high probability), then the dictator excludes large elite factions despite generating an ominous rebellion threat. Alternatively, if the elite faction is small but deeply *entrenched in power* (i.e., exclusion yields a high probability of triggering a fight), then the dictator shares power. Second, adding in the mass threat can either eliminate or exacerbate the dictator's power-sharing dilemma with elites. The inextricable link between the elite and mass threat causes the conventional logic to break down if *elite affinity toward mass rule* (i.e., how much the elite actor consumes under mass rule) is either too low or too high. Third, if elite affinity toward mass rule is low and *returns to elite coalitions* are high—that is, the probability of mass takeover drops considerably when the dictator and elite band together—then larger mass threats facilitate rather than undermine authoritarian regime survival. Collectively, these findings help us to better understand the strategic logic underpinning authoritarian power sharing, coups, and regime survival. The next section motivates these key concepts and provides a nontechnical overview of the main results. I then present the formal setup and analysis, followed by qualitative evidence.

delegating policy control (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). To isolate the dictator's decision over sharing power with elites, I assume the dictator consumes zero upon losing power, which eliminates any incentives to transition to mass rule.

[2] As discussed later, some reject this logic (McMahon and Slantchev 2015) or find a non-monotonic relationship between outsider threats and coup attempts.

Overview: Key Concepts and Findings

The Power-sharing Trade-off

The game features two strategic actors: a dictator and a representative elite actor. The dictator moves first and makes two choices: whether to share power with the elite (include) or not (exclude), and a continuous choice over distributing "pure spoils" to the elite. The elite responds by accepting or fighting, and its probability of winning depends on both its endowed coercive capacity and inclusion/exclusion from power. Finally, Nature determines whether an exogenous masses actor takes over, and this probability depends on the dictator's and elite's prior actions.

The standard component of this interaction is to allow the dictator to distribute spoils to the opposition. For example, Arriola (2009, 1345–46) discusses how cabinet ministers in Africa allocate public resources to their home districts. Rulers can also distribute spoils through political institutions such as parties, legislatures, and elections; public employment; control over state-owned enterprises; and decentralized land control.

The present innovation is to distinguish sharing *power* with elites—which also concedes spoils—from pure spoils transfers that concede no power, which correspond respectively with the dictator's two sequential choices. In the real world, which modes of co-optation also improve elites' ability to challenge the ruler? A broad-based military that incorporates elites beyond the dictator's family members and coethnics exemplifies sharing power, in addition to rents earned from controlling state-owned enterprises and other sources of spoils that top officers enjoy in many countries. Discussing cabinet positions in Africa, Roessler (2016) argues that incorporation at the center provides opportunities for violence specialists and other power brokers to construct a network of followers who can pressure the ruler. Creating an institutionalized party carries a similar trade-off: Rulers distribute spoils to other elites through party membership, which also improves their ability to overthrow the dictator (Magaloni 2008). By contrast, one mode of distributing spoils that *does not* affect elites' ability to overthrow the dictator is allowing peripheral regions wide leeway in governance, as in many African countries in which chiefs enjoy considerable discretion over neocustomary land tenure systems (Boone 2017). Similarly, welfare systems for citizens in oil-rich regimes serve the explicit purpose of distributing spoils in return for eschewing political organization or criticizing the government. These arrangements distribute spoils while *excluding* elites from political power at the center.

The following assumptions encompass the key tensions in the dictator's power-sharing trade-off. The drawback of sharing power at the center is increasing the elite's probability of winning a fight. I assume that coups (the available fighting technology for included elites) succeed with higher probability than outsider rebellions (the analog for excluded elites). This assumption incorporates Roessler's (2016, 37) core premise that "conceive[s] of coups and rebellions, or insurgencies, as analogs; both represent anti-regime techniques that dissidents use to force a redistribution of power." They differ in their organizational basis because "coup conspirators leverage partial control of the state (and the resources and matériel that comes with access to the state)...rebels or insurgents lack such access and have to build a private military organization to challenge the central government and its military." Consequently, "coups are often much more likely to displace rulers from power than rebellions."

One benefit of sharing power is enabling the dictator to distribute more spoils, which increases prospects for striking a peaceful bargain with the elite. Dictators face impediments to credibly committing to share spoils, and one means of improving commitment ability is to enable elites to defend their spoils. Thus, it is natural to conceive important positions in authoritarian regimes, such as the Minister of Defense or high-ranking positions in the party, as simultaneously conferring higher guaranteed spoils and enabling the insider coup technology.

A mass threat creates another benefit to sharing power. I assume that a unified front by the strategic players—that is, if the dictator shares power and the elite accepts the spoils offer—discretely lowers the probability of mass takeover. This is a standard assumption in the guardianship dilemma literature if we conceive of sharing power specifically as creating a larger military. More broadly, disruptions at the center as well as narrowly constructed regimes with minimal societal support create openings for mass takeover (Goodwin 2001, 49), whereas the dictator and other elites can counteract these opportunities by banding together.[3]

Elite Threat: Coup Proofing and Elite Entrenchment

To assess the conventional threat logic, we need to take comparative statics on the coercive capacity of the elite and mass threats. I begin with a baseline case: zero probability of mass takeover.

Contrary to the conventional logic, the magnitude of the elite threat ambiguously affects how the dictator resolves its power-sharing trade-off. In the model, in addition to the power-sharing choice, the elite's endowed coercive capacity affects its ability to overthrow the ruler. It is natural to conceptualize this as the size of the elite faction, for example, the size of the elite's ethnic group if ethnicity is a politically important cleavage. Elites with greater coercive capacity are more likely to win a rebellion because of greater manpower to challenge the government, which Roessler (2016) and Roessler and Ohls (2018) discuss as "threat capabilities." I depart by assuming that the elite's coercive capacity *also* affects its ability to stage a successful coup. Larger factions contain more people who can mobilize in support of a coup, and can better defend against challengers in the (unmodeled) future. Consequently, the same underlying coercive capacity that improves the elite's ability to challenge the dictator in an outsider rebellion *also* enhances the elite's ability to challenge via a coup, which reduces the dictator's rents and enhances prospects for elite conflict. To understand when the conventional logic holds or fails, we need to incorporate conditioning factors that determine, at both low and high levels of elite coercive capacity, whether the pros of power sharing outweigh the cons. This produces the first new finding.

The conventional logic for elite power sharing fails under either of two circumstances. First, the conventional expectation that the ruler will share power with large elite factions does not hold if *coup-proofing institutions* are weak. Various factors affect a regime's coup-proofing ability: political control over promotions, the presence of counterbalancing institutions against the conventional military (e.g., presidential guard), and

[3]Overall, there are two main departures from standard conflict bargaining models. First, the power-sharing choice in essence enables the dictator to choose between two institutional settings in which to bargain, as opposed to taking this as given. Second, analyzing how the exogenous mass threat affects the dictator–elite interaction departs from the standard bilateral interaction.

broader political institutions that affect opportunities for the military to intervene in politics (Finer 1962; Quinlivan 1999). With weak coup-proofing institutions, the probability of a coup attempt by an included elite is intolerably high, and the dictator excludes even if the group is large and poses a stark civil war threat. For example, in Angola, a decolonization war with split rebel factions prevented the ruling party from forging interethnic institutions that could have mitigated coup risk, which caused postindependence rulers to exclude rival ethnic factions that posed a strong rebellion threat.

Second, the conventional expectation that the dictator will exclude elites with low endowed coercive capacity (e.g., small ethnic groups) does not hold for elites who are deeply *entrenched in power* at the center. For example, if a dictator tries to exclude members of a group that dominates the officer corps, these military elites might trigger a countercoup (Sudduth 2017). This consideration was salient in many postcolonial countries where a particular ethnic minority group was privileged in the colonial military (Harkness 2018). An existing foothold in power in the central government substitutes for small numerical size to generate a strong threat if the dictator excludes. In this circumstance, the dictator fears the consequences of exclusion more than those of inclusion even for numerically small groups, contrary to the conventional logic.

Mass Threat and Elite Affinity

How does a mass threat affect this interaction? A strong mass threat can either eliminate or exacerbate the dictator's power-sharing trade-off with the elite, depending on *elite affinity toward mass rule*—which existing models of the guardianship dilemma do not consider.[4] By affinity, I mean how much the elite would consume if the masses take over. The main implications from the conventional threat logic hold only under *intermediate* affinity, yielding the second new finding.

To explain why, at one extreme, some elites anticipate dire consequences under mass rule (low affinity), such as business elites in Malaysia vis-à-vis communists in the 1940s through 1970s as well as whites in apartheid South Africa vis-à-vis the African majority. In these cases, elites feared widespread redistribution if the masses gained control. If elite affinity is low and the mass threat is strong, then there is no power-sharing *dilemma.* An included elite wants to minimize prospects for mass takeover, which it achieves by not challenging the ruler. A strong enough mass threat reduces the coup probability to zero. This contrasts with the conventional implication that stronger outsider threats should make coups more likely. Instead, only one aspect of the conventional logic is correct: A strong enough mass threat causes the dictator to switch from exclusion to sharing power. Thus, in the low-affinity case, the overall effect of mass threats on the equilibrium probability of a coup attempt is inverted U–shaped: increasing at the point where the dictator switches to sharing power, and decreasing afterward.[5]

At the other extreme, some elites can prosper under mass rule (high affinity). For example, top-ranking Egyptian generals facing pro-democracy protesters in 2011 expected considerable influence in a new regime, as did Rwandan Tutsis in the 1990s when coethnic Tutsis organized in Uganda posed the main external threat. In high-affinity cases, a strong mass threat makes the ruler's power-sharing dilemma intractable—it cannot buy off a coup attempt because elites care more about picking the winning side rather than who wins. Contrary to the conventional logic, a strong mass threat *does not* induce the dictator to share power.

Combining these contrarian findings for low and high affinity shows that only *intermediate* elite affinity recovers conventional implications.

Regime Survival: Elite Affinity and Returns to Elite Coalitions

The third main finding is that stronger mass threats *enhance* regime durability if elite affinity toward mass rule is low and *returns to elite coalitions* are high, contrary to the conventional implication that outsider threats imperil regime survival. This is striking when considering that, in the model, the only direct effect of a stronger mass threat is to increase the probability of takeover. The importance of low elite affinity follows from the logic discussed above: The dictator and elite band together in an internally peaceful power-sharing regime when facing a strong mass threat. If returns to elite coalitions are high, then banding together blunts the direct effect of a strong mass threat and causes the overall probability of regime overthrow (by either elites or the masses) to

[4]Beyond the conflict setting, parameterizing affinity relates to Zakharov's (2016) analysis of how elites' outside options affect a dictator's loyalty–competence trade-off for subordinates.

[5]This result builds off McMahon and Slantchev (2015), who also reject the implicit assumption in previous models of the guardianship dilemma that the mass threat disappears following elite takeover (although their model does not produce this inverted U–shaped effect). My model also differs by parameterizing elites' utility under mass rule (rather than implicitly assuming low affinity) and by incorporating a permanent elite threat, which underpin the logic in the following paragraphs.

decline.[6] Empirically, mass threats likely contributed to durable regimes in Malaysia and apartheid South Africa. Elite affinity toward the masses was low, and tax collection and military conscription yielded strong states and high returns to elite coalitions.

Model Setup

Two strategic actors, a dictator D and distinct elite faction E, engage in a one-shot interaction with the following moves: (1) D sequentially decides power and spoils for E, (2) E accepts or fights, and (3) Nature determines whether mass overthrow occurs.

Sharing Power and Spoils. D has two policy instruments, chosen sequentially with a Nature move in between, that determine what percentage of the government spoils (normalized to 1) E receives. First, for the binary power-sharing choice, if D *includes* E in power, then E is guaranteed a total transfer of at least $\underline{x}$, an exogenous parameter that satisfies $\underline{x} \in (0, \hat{\underline{x}})$.[7] Alternatively, D can *exclude* E, thereby denying this basement level of spoils.

Second, D's choice of pure spoils determines how the remainder of the budget is distributed. This decision is continuous and subject to an exogenously determined upper bound over which D has incomplete information when making its power-sharing choice. Specifically, after choosing inclusion/exclusion, Nature determines the maximum amount of spoils beyond $\underline{x}$ that D can transfer, $\overline{x} \sim U(0, 1 - \underline{x})$.[8] Modeling an upper bound on possible transfers expresses in reduced form that rulers face limitations to the total spoils they can credibly commit to transfer, perhaps because of possibilities to renege on promises in the (unmodeled) future. After learning $\overline{x}$, D proposes the additional spoils transfer to E, denoted as $x_{in} \in [0, \overline{x}]$ if included and $x_{ex} \in [0, \overline{x}]$ if excluded.[9] Thus, the first effect of sharing power is to raise the maximum feasible transfer from $\overline{x}$ to $\underline{x} + \overline{x}$.

[6]The importance of modeling a permanent elite threat is readily apparent here. If instead an excluded elite could not rebel against the dictator (as in existing models of the guardianship dilemma), then the probability of regime survival is obviously maximized if the only outsider threat—the masses—lacks any coercive capacity.

[7]Assumption A.1 in the supporting information (SI) defines $\hat{\underline{x}} \in (0, 1)$. Note 12 discusses the purpose of this upper bound.

[8]The Nature move makes D uncertain when making its power-sharing choice about whether it can buy off E with the pure spoils transfer (under either inclusion or exclusion).

[9]Equivalently, suppose D makes its two choices simultaneously, followed by the Nature move; and if D's proposed pure spoils transfer exceeds $\overline{x}$, then the *realized* spoils transfer equals $\overline{x}$.

Elite Fighting Decision. After observing D's choices over sharing power and spoils, E either accepts—hence, consuming $\underline{x} + x_{in}$ if included or x_{ex} if excluded—or fights. Two distinct factors affect E's probability of winning a fight: (1) the inclusion/exclusion choice, and (2) E's endowed coercive capacity $\theta_E \in [0, 1]$. If D excludes, then E's available fighting technology is a rebellion, which succeeds with probability $p_{ex}(\theta_E) \in (0, 1)$. If instead D includes, then E's available fighting technology is a coup, which succeeds with probability $p_{in}(\theta_E) \in (0, 1)$. Coups are more likely to succeed than rebellions: $p_{in}(\theta_E) > p_{ex}(\theta_E)$ for all $\theta_E \in [0, 1]$. Thus, the second effect of sharing power is to shift the distribution of power toward E.

The probability that either a coup or civil war succeeds strictly increases in θ_E. I assume that the probabilities satisfy the strict monotone likelihood ratio principle, and evaluate positive-signed and negative-signed likelihood ratios as separate cases.

Assumption 1 (**Strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Principle**).

$$\textbf{Case 1.} \quad \frac{d}{d\theta_E}\left[\frac{p_{ex}(\theta_E)}{p_{in}(\theta_E)}\right] > 0$$

$$\textbf{Case 2.} \quad \frac{d}{d\theta_E}\left[\frac{p_{ex}(\theta_E)}{p_{in}(\theta_E)}\right] < 0$$

As introduced above and discussed in more depth below, the probability that a coup succeeds for high-capacity elites, $p_{in}(1)$, corresponds with the strength of *coup-proofing institutions*, and the probability of rebellion success for low-capacity elites, $p_{ex}(0)$, corresponds with the depth of *elite entrenchment*.

Mass Takeover. Finally, Nature determines whether the nonstrategic masses (M) overthrow the regime. This probability depends on whether D and E banded together. If D excluded and/or E fought, then the probability of no mass takeover is $1 - \theta_M$. If instead D shared power and E accepted, then the probability of no mass overthrow equals $1 - (1 - \sigma) \cdot \theta_M$. M's coercive capacity is $\theta_M \in [0, 1]$, and $\sigma \in [0, 1]$ expresses *returns to elite coalitions*: the extent to which the probability of mass takeover decreases when the dictator and elites band together.[10] Thus, the third effect of sharing power is to (potentially) lower the probability of mass takeover.

[10]Implicitly, this setup assumes that allying with E discretely lowers the probability of mass takeover. Alternatively, if the probability of no mass overthrow was $1 - (1 - \theta_E \cdot \sigma) \cdot \theta_M$, then it would explicitly increase in θ_E, and at $\theta_E = 1$ reduces to the simpler expression that I use. SI Assumption A.3 imposes a tighter lower bound on σ.

TABLE 1 Summary of Notation

Stage	Variables/Description
1. Sharing power and spoils	• $\underline{x}$: Basement level of spoils for E if D shares power; D cannot transfer this portion of the budget if it excludes • x: D's pure spoils offer, denoted x_{in} if E is included and x_{ex} if excluded • $\overline{x}$: Maximum pure spoils that D can offer to E (Nature-drawn after D chooses inclusion/exclusion); maximum possible spoils are $\overline{x}$ for excluded E and $\underline{x}+\overline{x}$ for included E
2. Elite fighting decision	• θ_E: E's coercive capacity; increases its probability of winning a rebellion or a coup • $p_{in}(\theta_E)$: E's probability of winning a fight (i.e., coup) if included; I denote $p_{in}(1)$ as the strength of *coup-proofing institutions* • $p_{ex}(\theta_E)$: E's probability of winning a fight (i.e., rebellion) if excluded; I denote $p_{ex}(0)$ as the depth of *elite entrenchment* • ϕ: Surplus destroyed by fighting
3. Mass takeover	• θ_M: M's coercive capacity; this is the probability of mass overthrow if D and E do not band together (D excludes and/or E fights) • σ: Higher values indicate greater *returns to elite coalitions*; the probability of mass overthrow equals $(1-\sigma)\cdot\theta_M$ if D and E band together • κ: *elite affinity toward mass rule*

By construction, these survival probabilities satisfy the strict monotone likelihood ratio principle and create easily interpretable boundary conditions: If $\theta_M = 0$, then M takes over with probability 0; and if $\theta_M = 1$ and D and E do not band together, then M takes over with probability 1.

Consumption. Suppose no mass takeover. If E accepts D's offer, then E consumes $\underline{x} + x_{in}$ if included and x_{ex} if excluded; and D consumes $1 - (x_{in} + \underline{x})$ and $1 - x_{ex}$, respectively. If E fights, then the winner of the coup or civil war consumes $1 - \phi$ and the loser consumes 0, and $\phi \in (0, 1)$ expresses fighting costs.

If mass takeover occurs, then D consumes 0. E's consumption under mass rule depends on whether it accepted D's offer. If it did, then E consumes 0 because it implicitly formed an alliance with D to uphold the incumbent regime (which would be necessary to consume the spoils granted by D). By contrast, by fighting D, E implicitly allies with M. This enables E to consume $\kappa \cdot (1 - \phi)$ under mass rule, where $\kappa \in [0, 1]$ expresses *elite affinity toward mass rule.* Table 1 summarizes the notation.

Equilibrium Analysis

Spoils Transfer and Fighting

I solve backward on the stage game to derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. If D shares power, then E accepts any spoils transfer x_{in} that satisfies

$$\underbrace{[1-(1-\sigma)\cdot\theta_M]\cdot(\underline{x}+x_{in})}_{\text{Accept}} \geq \underbrace{p_{in}(\theta_E)\cdot[1-\theta_M\cdot(1-\kappa)]\cdot(1-\phi)}_{\text{Coup}}, \quad (1)$$

and E is indifferent between acceptance and a coup if $x_{in} = x_{in}^*(\theta_E, \theta_M)$, for

$$x_{in}^*(\theta_E,\theta_M) \equiv \underbrace{(1-\phi)\cdot p_{in}(\theta_E) - \underline{x}}_{x_{in}^*(\theta_M=0)} + (1-\phi)\cdot p_{in}(\theta_E)\cdot\frac{\theta_M}{1-(1-\sigma)\cdot\theta_M}\cdot\Bigg(\underbrace{\kappa}_{\uparrow\text{ leverage}}\ \underbrace{-\sigma}_{\downarrow\text{ leverage}}\Bigg). \quad (2)$$

One component of E's calculus is its bilateral interaction with D, in which E considers the transfers it will receive relative to the probability of coup success and the costs of fighting, expressed by $x_{in}^*(\theta_M = 0)$. Additionally, θ_M creates countervailing effects on E's bargaining leverage. Although acceptance lowers the probability of mass takeover, summarized by the down arrow under σ, it also implies that E consumes 0 rather than κ if M overthrows the regime, expressed with the up arrow under κ. The uniform distribution for $\overline{x}$ implies

$$Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) = \frac{x_{in}^*(\theta_E,\theta_M)}{1-\underline{x}}, \quad (3)$$

and the complement is $Pr(\text{deal} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) = 1 - Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M)$. If instead D excludes, then the acceptance constraint is

$$\underbrace{(1-\theta_M) \cdot x_{ex}}_{\text{Accept}} \geq \underbrace{p_{ex}(\theta_E) \cdot [1 - \theta_M \cdot (1-\kappa)] \cdot (1-\phi)}_{\text{Rebellion}}, \quad (4)$$

and E is indifferent between acceptance and rebelling if $x_{ex} = x^*_{ex}(\theta_E, \theta_M)$, for

$$x^*_{ex}(\theta_E, \theta_M) \equiv \underbrace{(1-\phi) \cdot p_{ex}(\theta_E)}_{x^*_{ex}(\theta_M=0)} + (1-\phi) \cdot p_{ex}(\theta_E) \cdot \frac{\theta_M}{1-\theta_M} \cdot \underbrace{\kappa}_{\uparrow \text{ leverage}}. \quad (5)$$

There are three differences from Equation (2). First, E does not receive the basement power-sharing transfer $\underline{x}$, and therefore only the probability of winning and fighting costs affects $x^*_{ex}(\theta_M = 0)$. Second, E's probability of winning equals $p_{ex}(\theta_E)$ rather than $p_{in}(\theta_E)$. Third, θ_M exerts only one effect. As with inclusion, acceptance implies that E consumes 0 rather than κ if M takes over. However, if E is excluded, then accepting does not lower the probability of mass takeover, which equals θ_M regardless of E's response. The uniform distribution for $\overline{x}$ implies

$$Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) = \frac{x^*_{ex}(\theta_E, \theta_M)}{1 - \underline{x}}, \quad (6)$$

and the complement is $Pr(\text{deal} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) = 1 - Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M)$. SI Appendix A.1 imposes sufficient conditions for interior solutions if $\theta_M = 0$, and SI Proposition A.2 characterizes the corner solutions for higher values of θ_M.

If θ_M is "low," then D optimally proposes $x_{in} = x^*_{in}(\theta_E, \theta_M)$ if E is included, and $x_{ex} = x^*_{ex}(\theta_E, \theta_M)$ if excluded. As is standard in conflict bargaining models, D wants to buy off E because D makes the offers and fighting is costly, but it does not want to offer more than needed to guarantee acceptance. However, if θ_M and κ are "high," then D prefers to trigger a fight rather than compensate E for high κ, as SI Proposition A.3 shows, in which case we set the probability of a deal to 0.

Power Sharing

When choosing inclusion/exclusion, D is unsure of the maximum possible "pure spoils" transfer, $\overline{x}$, it can make. D compares its expected utility under inclusion to that under exclusion. Each term depends on the optimal offer, conditional on buying off E; the probability of elite fighting; and the probability of surviving the mass threat. D shares power if and only if the power-sharing incentive-compatibility constraint, $\mathcal{P}(\theta_E, \theta_M) > 0$, is met, for

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{P}(\theta_E, \theta_M) \equiv\ & Pr(\text{deal} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \\ & \times \underbrace{\left[1 - \underline{x} - x^*_{in}(\theta_E, \theta_M)\right] \cdot [1 - (1-\sigma) \cdot \theta_M]}_{\mathbb{E}[U_D(\text{inclusion} \mid \text{deal}, \theta_E, \theta_M)]} \\ & + Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \\ & \times \underbrace{\left[1 - p_{in}(\theta_E)\right] \cdot (1-\phi) \cdot (1-\theta_M)}_{\mathbb{E}[U_D(\text{inclusion} \mid \text{coup}, \theta_E, \theta_M)]} \\ & - Pr(\text{deal} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \\ & \times \underbrace{\left[1 - x^*_{ex}(\theta_E, \theta_M)\right] \cdot (1-\theta_M)}_{\mathbb{E}[U_D(\text{exclusion} \mid \text{deal}, \theta_E, \theta_M)]} \\ & - Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \\ & \times \underbrace{\left[1 - p_{ex}(\theta_E)\right] \cdot (1-\phi) \cdot (1-\theta_M)}_{\mathbb{E}[U_D(\text{exclusion} \mid \text{rebel}, \theta_E, \theta_M)]}. \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

If D includes, then with probability $Pr(\text{deal} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M)$, D can buy off E by offering x^*_{in}. With complementary probability, Nature draws $\overline{x} < x^*_{in}$ and E attempts a coup in response to any feasible offer. In this case, the probability of defeating the coup attempt and the costliness of fighting determine D's expected utility. Exclusion yields similar expressions. Each term is weighted by the probability of surviving mass overthrow. This equals $1 - \theta_M$ in all cases except if D shares power and E accepts, when it is higher: $1 - (1-\sigma) \cdot \theta_M$.

We can equivalently state the power-sharing constraint as follows. D will share power if and only if the *actual* probability of a coup attempt under inclusion, $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M)$, is less than the *maximum* probability of a coup under inclusion for which D will *choose* to share power:

$$Pr(\text{coup} \mid \theta_E, \theta_M)^{\max} \equiv$$
$$\max\left\{\frac{\mathbb{E}[U_D(\text{inclusion} \mid \text{deal}, \theta_E, \theta_M)] - \mathbb{E}[U_D(\text{exclusion} \mid \theta_E, \theta_M)]}{\mathbb{E}[U_D(\text{inclusion} \mid \text{deal}, \theta_E, \theta_M)] - \mathbb{E}[U_D(\text{inclusion} \mid \text{coup}, \theta_E, \theta_M)]}, 0\right\}. \quad (8)$$

Remark 1. $\mathcal{P}(\theta_E, \theta_M) > 0$ *if and only if* $Pr(\textit{coup} \mid \theta_E, \theta_M)^{\max} > Pr(\textit{coup} \mid \textit{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M)$.

Equilibrium

Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium strategy profile for "low" θ_M, in which the expressions have interior solutions.[11] Collectively, SI Propositions A.2 through A.4

[11] A continuum of equilibria exist because at the pure spoils stage, D is indifferent among all offers if E rejects any offer. However, all

characterize the equilibrium strategy profile for all parameter values.

Proposition 1 (**Equilibrium**).

- *If $\mathcal{P}(\theta_E, \theta_M) > 0$, then D shares power with E. Otherwise, D excludes.*
- *D offers $x_{in} = \min\{x^*_{in}, 1 - \underline{x}\}$ if E is included and $x_{ex} = \min\{x^*_{ex}, 1 - \underline{x}\}$ if E is excluded.*
- *If included, then E accepts any $x_{in} \geq x^*_{in}$ and attempts a coup otherwise; and if excluded, then E accepts any $x_{ex} \geq x^*_{ex}$ and rebels otherwise.*

Elite Threat

This section considers a baseline case without a mass threat, $\theta_M = 0$. Hence, the elite (if excluded) poses the sole outsider threat. The new insights arise from assuming that the same underlying coercive capacity that improves the elite's ability to challenge the dictator in an outsider rebellion also enhances its coup ability.

The Power-Sharing Trade-Off: Rents versus Conflict

Before assessing the conventional threat logic, we need to uncover the mechanisms that underpin the dictator's power-sharing decision. If $\theta_M = 0$, then D's power-sharing incentive-compatibility constraint $\mathcal{P}(\theta_E, \theta_M) > 0$ (see Equation 7) reduces to

$$\mathcal{P}(\theta_E, 0) = \underbrace{\phi \cdot [\Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, 0) - \Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, 0)]}_{\text{1 Elite conflict mechanism } (+/-)} \underbrace{-(1-\phi) \cdot \left[p_{in}(\theta_E) - p_{ex}(\theta_E)\right]}_{\text{2 Rent-seeking mechanism } (-)}$$

$$= \underbrace{\frac{\phi}{1-\underline{x}}}_{\text{1a}} \cdot \underline{x} - (1-\phi) \cdot \left[p_{in}(\theta_E) - p_{ex}(\theta_E)\right] \cdot \left(\underbrace{\frac{\phi}{1-\underline{x}}}_{\text{1b}} + \underbrace{1}_{2} \right) > 0. \tag{9}$$

Equation (9) demonstrates that D's power-sharing dilemma can be restated as a *trade-off between rents and the likelihood of elite conflict.* On the one hand, sharing power provides guaranteed rents of $\underline{x}$ for E. This mechanism decreases $\Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, 0)$ relative to $\Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, 0)$ by increasing the range of $\overline{x}$ draws large enough that D can buy off E. This is the *conflict-prevention mechanism* (term 1a in Equation 9).[12] On the other hand, sharing power shifts the distribution of power by raising E's probability of winning from $p_{ex}(\theta_E)$ to $p_{in}(\theta_E)$. Enabling E to credibly demand more spoils yields two mechanisms that diminish D's incentives to share power: a *conflict-enhancing mechanism* because E wins a fight with higher probability (term 1b in Equation 9) and a *rent-seeking mechanism* from diminishing D's rents for a fixed probability of fighting (term 2). Combining terms 1a and 1b implies that sharing power can either raise or diminish the probability of elite conflict, depending on the magnitude of $p_{in}(\theta_E) \cdot (1 - \phi) - \underline{x}$ relative to $p_{ex}(\theta_E) \cdot (1 - \phi)$. The strictly negative rent-seeking mechanism implies Lemma 1.

Lemma 1 (**Necessity of Positive Conflict Mechanism for Power Sharing**). *At $\theta_M = 0$, a necessary condition for D to share power is*

$$Pr(rebel \mid exclusion, \theta_E, 0) > Pr(coup \mid inclusion, \theta_E, 0).$$

Recovering Conventional Implications

The conventional threat logic predicts that hypothetically increasing E's coercive capacity θ_E should (1) cause D to switch from exclusion to inclusion, (2) raise the likelihood of a coup attempt, and (3) increase the overall likelihood of regime overthrow. Here, I focus on the first two implications, and SI Appendix A.3 analyzes the third.

The trade-off between rents and conflict implies that D shares power if and only if the net conflict mechanism is positive (i.e., conflict-prevention mechanism dominates conflict-enhancing mechanism) and large in magnitude relative to the rent-seeking mechanism. Equation (9) shows that, at any θ_E, this requires small $p_{in}(\theta_E) - p_{ex}(\theta_E)$. Therefore, to yield the conventional implication that D shares power with high-capacity elites, we need small $p_{in}(1) - p_{ex}(1)$. To yield the conventional implication that D excludes low-capacity elites, we need large $p_{in}(0) - p_{ex}(0)$. I denote these respectively as the *strong coup-proofing institutions* and *non-entrenched elites* conditions. Specifically, the conventional threat logic requires the following:

$$\underbrace{p_{in}(1) - p_{ex}(1)}_{\textbf{Strong coup-proofing}} < \frac{\phi \cdot \underline{x}}{(1-\phi) \cdot (\phi + 1 - \underline{x})} < \underbrace{p_{in}(0) - p_{ex}(0)}_{\textbf{Non-entrenched elites}}. \tag{10}$$

equilibria strategy profiles in which elite fighting occurs along the equilibrium path are payoff equivalent.

[12] SI Assumption A.1 restricts the power-sharing transfer such that D prefers transferring $\underline{x}$ to fighting.

FIGURE 1 Elite Threat: Power Sharing and Coup Attempts



Note: Table 2 provides the legend. Figure 1 uses functional forms $p_{in}(\theta_E) = (1-\theta_E)\cdot p_{in}(0) + \theta_E \cdot p_{in}(1)$ and $p_{ex}(\theta_E) = (1-\theta_E)\cdot p_{ex}(0) + \theta_E \cdot p_{ex}(1)$. Panel a sets $\theta_M = 0$, $p_{ex}(0) = 0$, $p_{ex}(1) = 0.65$, $p_{in}(0) = 0.5$, $p_{in}(1) = 0.7$, $\underline{x} = 0.2$, and $\phi = 0.4$. Panel b raises $p_{in}(1)$ to 0.95, Panel c raises $p_{ex}(0)$ to 0.45, and Panel d imposes both changes. Consequently, Panels a through c satisfy Case 1 in Assumption 1, and Panel d satisfies Case 2.

TABLE 2 Legend for Figures 1 and 2

Solid black	Equilibrium probability of a coup attempt, denoted as Pr(coup*); equivalent to Equation (3) for parameter values in which *D* shares power (see Equation 7 and Remark 1), and equals 0 otherwise.
Dashed black	Counterfactual probability of a coup attempt under inclusion, for parameter values in which *D* excludes (also Equation 3).
Solid gray	Probability of a rebellion under exclusion (see Equation 6)
Dotted gray	*D*'s coup tolerance: the highest probability of a coup attempt under inclusion for which *D* will share power (see Equation 8 and Remark 1)

Finally, the conventional threat logic requires that θ_E monotonically improves prospects for rebellion success relative to coup success, which corresponds to Case 1 in Assumption 1.

Figure 1 depicts different theoretical possibilities. The thick black line is the equilibrium probability of a coup attempt, Pr(coup*), which is positive for parameter values in which *D* shares power and 0 otherwise. Table 2 provides the legend. In Panel a, the aforementioned assumptions for the conventional threat logic hold. At low θ_E, there is no trade-off between rents and conflict because inclusion is worse for each. Low $p_{ex}(0)$ implies $\Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, 0) > \Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, 0)$, shown with the dashed black line exceeding the solid gray line. The negative net conflict mechanism reinforces rent-seeking incentives to exclude. *E* is too weak to punish *D* for exclusion, and Lemma 1 implies that *D* excludes.

The positive likelihood ratio combined with the boundary conditions from Equation (10) imply that higher θ_E raises $p_{ex}(\theta_E)$ considerably more than $p_{in}(\theta_E)$. This creates a threshold such that if $\theta_E > \theta'_E$,[13] then D's trade-off between rents and conflict has bite. The rent-seeking mechanism is always negative, but for $\theta_E > \theta'_E$, the net conflict mechanism is positive because $\Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, 0) > \Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, 0)$. Despite this, for θ_E only slightly larger than θ'_E, D excludes because it tolerates a higher probability of conflict to gain larger expected rents.[14]

Large θ_E increases the magnitude of the elite conflict mechanism sufficiently relative to the rent-seeking mechanism that D's willingness to tolerate coup risk, shown with the dotted gray line for $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \theta_E, 0)^{\max}$, strictly increases and intersects the dashed black line for $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, 0)$. At $\theta_E = \theta_E^{\dagger}$, D switches to sharing power, and the equilibrium probability of a coup attempt, $\Pr(\text{coup}^*)$, jumps from 0 to positive. Consistent with the conventional implication for coup attempts, further increases in θ_E strictly raise $\Pr(\text{coup}^*)$, which equals $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, 0)$ for $\theta_E > \theta_E^{\dagger}$. Independent of the specific assumptions for Panel a, $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, 0)$ strictly increases in θ_E because higher elite coercive capacity increases the probability that a coup attempt succeeds.

Violating the Conventional Threat Logic

The first main finding for the model analysis establishes that if either part of Equation (10) fails, so do conventional implications for power sharing and coups. In Panel b, the strong coup-proofing condition fails because $p_{in}(1)$ is higher than in Panel a. Although Case 1 of Assumption 1 holds, the conflict mechanism is negative except for high θ_E, at which point the rent-seeking mechanism is large enough in magnitude to prevent power sharing. Consequently, D excludes for all θ_E, and $\Pr(\text{coup}^*) = 0$. This case highlights the importance of evaluating how θ_E, as opposed to $p_{ex}(\theta_E)$, affects equilibrium outcomes. Equation (9) shows that increasing $p_{ex}(\theta_E)$ encourages D to share power by lowering its expected utility under exclusion. However, to assess the effects of elite coercive capacity, we cannot hypothetically increase $p_{ex}(\theta_E)$ while holding $p_{in}(\theta_E)$ fixed because θ_E affects both. In Panel b, high probability of rebellion success does not engender power sharing because the same increases in θ_E that undergird rebellion success also considerably raise $p_{in}(\theta_E)$.

In Panel c, the non-entrenched elites condition fails because $p_{ex}(0)$ is not much smaller than $p_{in}(0)$. The conflict mechanism is positive and large enough in magnitude at $\theta_E = 0$ to induce D to share power.

In Panel d, Case 2 of Assumption 1 holds and the relationships oppose the conventional logic: D switches from inclusion to exclusion for large enough θ_E, and $\Pr(\text{coup}^*)$ drops at that point. Proposition 2 formalizes the different cases, which correspond respectively to the four panels in Figure 1.

Proposition 2 (**Elite Threat, Power Sharing, and Coup Attempts**). *Assume $\theta_M = 0$ and, for parts a through c, Case 1 in Assumption 1 holds.*

Part a. Conventional threat logic for power sharing and coups. *If Equation (10) holds, then a unique $\theta_E^{\dagger} \in (0, 1)$ exists such that*

- *If $\theta_E < \theta_E^{\dagger}$, then D excludes and $Pr(coup^*) = 0$.*
- *If $\theta_E > \theta_E^{\dagger}$, D shares power and $Pr(coup^*) = Pr(coup \mid inclusion, \theta_E, 0)$, which strictly increases in θ_E.*

Part b. *If only the strong coup-proofing condition in Equation (10) fails, then D excludes for all $\theta_E \in [0, 1]$ and $Pr(coup^*) = 0$.*

Part c. *If only the non-entrenched elites condition in Equation (10) fails, then D shares power for all $\theta_E \in [0, 1]$ and $Pr(coup^*) = Pr(coup \mid inclusion, \theta_E, 0)$.*

Part d. *Assume Case 2 in Assumption 1 holds. Then a unique $\theta_E^{\dagger} \in \mathbb{R}$ exists such that*

- *If $\theta_E < \theta_E^{\dagger}$, then D shares power and $Pr(coup^*) = Pr(coup \mid inclusion, \theta_E, 0)$.*
- *If $\theta_E > \theta_E^{\dagger}$, then D excludes and $Pr(coup^*) = 0$.*

Mass Threat

How does a mass threat affect this interaction? Setting $\theta_M > 0$ can either eliminate or exacerbate the dictator's rents–conflict trade-off with the elite, depending on the elite's affinity toward mass rule, κ. Existing models of the guardianship dilemma do not consider this possibility. These models constitute one version of the conventional threat logic by positing that larger outsider rebellion threats induce rulers to build a stronger military—which in turn raises the coup threat. Existing accounts also overlook that soldiers not hired for the military can

[13]The implicit characterization is $\Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta'_E, 0) = \Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta'_E, 0)$.

[14]This is the same rationale for why D does not minimize the probability of elite overthrow, discussed in SI Appendix A.3.

still challenge the ruler. By contrast, modeling a permanent elite threat carries key implications for whether rulers face a guardianship dilemma and whether mass threats imperil or enhance regime survival.

The Power-Sharing Trade-Off: Effects of the Mass Threat

The mass threat alters D's trade-off between rents and elite conflict, which Equation (9) introduced for $\theta_M = 0$.[15] Directly, higher θ_M raises D's incentives to share power by widening the discrepancy between its probability of surviving the mass threat if it includes rather than excludes E. The probability of preventing mass takeover equals $1 - \theta_M$ under exclusion but increases to $1 - (1 - \sigma) \cdot \theta_M$ under inclusion if E accepts the offer. For this reason, unlike in the baseline case, the rent-seeking effect might *encourage* power sharing. Thus, Lemma 1 does not hold if $\theta_M > 0$, and D may share power even if $\Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) > \Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M)$; see, for example, Panel b in Figure 2.

Higher θ_M also indirectly affects D's power-sharing choice by altering E's calculus, as Equations (2) and (5) indicate, although the sign of the effects depends on elite affinity toward mass rule, κ. Low κ undercuts the bargaining leverage of an included elite because D knows that E fears mass takeover and that E can discretely lower the probability of mass overthrow by accepting. This encourages power sharing through both the rent-seeking mechanism (since an included elite accepts smaller rent transfers) and the elite conflict mechanism (by decreasing the probability that $\overline{x}$ is low enough that D cannot buy off an included elite). In fact, if $\kappa < \underline{\kappa}$ (see SI Equation A.11), then $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) = 0$ for large θ_M. Thus, low κ and high θ_M *eliminate* the coup risk from sharing power.

By contrast, if κ is high, then higher θ_M *enhances* an included elite's bargaining leverage. The specific threshold is $\kappa > \sigma$ because, then, the extent to which E does not fear mass rule outweighs the returns to elite coalitions, σ, meaning that E cares more about picking the winning side than about which side wins. Consequently, the aforementioned effects flip in sign, which discourages power sharing. In fact, if $\kappa > \overline{\kappa}$ (see SI Equation A.12), then $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) = 1$ for large θ_M. Thus, the power-sharing dilemma is intractable, and D cannot buy off E.

[15]SI Appendix A.4 provides formal details for the following.

Recovering Conventional Implications

Recall the power-sharing and coup implications from the conventional logic about outsider threats, which here is parameterized by θ_M: (1a) D excludes E for low θ_M, (1b) D includes E for high θ_M, and (2) $\Pr(\text{coup}^*)$ increases in θ_M. Implication 1a requires:

$$\mathcal{P}(\theta_E, 0) < 0. \tag{11}$$

This holds under either of two distinct sufficient conditions for D to exclude: The conventional logic for the elite threat holds and θ_E is low, or the strong coup-proofing condition fails and D excludes for all θ_E (respectively, parts a and b of Proposition 2).

Jointly satisfying implications 1b and 2 requires *intermediate affinity*. Implication 1b requires *low*-enough κ. If $\kappa > \overline{\kappa}$, then D will not share power at high θ_M because $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) = 1$. By contrast, implication 2 requires *high*-enough κ. The overall effect of θ_M on E's bargaining leverage depends on κ, as discussed above: $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M)$ increases in θ_M only if κ is high (see Equation 2).[16] Implications 1b and 2 are jointly satisfied if[17]

$$\kappa \in (\sigma, \sigma + \epsilon), \qquad \text{for small } \epsilon > 0. \tag{12}$$

Figure 2 illustrates substantively important combinations of Equations (11) and (12) holding or not. It plots the same terms as in Figure 1 but as a function of θ_M. In Panel a, both conditions hold, and the overall relationships resemble those in Figure 1a: D switches from exclusion to inclusion at a unique threshold $\theta_M^\dagger$, and $\Pr(\text{coup}^*)$ discretely increases from 0 to positive. This is often referred to as the guardianship dilemma mechanism, which Corollary 1 formalizes, because D tolerates a higher probability of an elite coup attempt to deter mass takeover. And, $\Pr(\text{coup}^*)$ strictly increases in θ_M for all $\theta_M > \theta_M^\dagger$, consistent with conventional implications.

Violating the Conventional Threat Logic

Figure 2 also highlights cases that reject the conventional threat logic, yielding the second main finding for the model analysis. In Panels b and c, Equation (12)

[16]This contrasts with the effect of elite coercive capacity on coups, discussed in the previous section: Higher θ_E empowers E to succeed at a coup attempt, which unconditionally raises $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, 0)$.

[17]Although "intermediate" as just motivated encompasses $\kappa \in (\sigma, \overline{\kappa})$, restricting the upper bound to an open neighborhood of σ is sufficient to establish that $\mathcal{P}(\theta_E, \theta_M)$ is monotonic in θ_M, which I use to prove Proposition 3.

FIGURE 2 Mass Threat: Power Sharing and Coup Attempts



Note: Table 2 provides the legend. Figure 2 uses the same functional forms for the contest functions as Figure 1. Panel a sets $\theta_E = 1$, $p_{in}(1) = 0.95$, $p_{ex}(1) = 0.25$, $\sigma = 0.6$, $\underline{x} = 0.18$, $\phi = 0.4$, and $\kappa = 0.8$. Panel b lowers κ to 0, Panel c lowers κ to 0 and raises $p_{ex}(1)$ to 0.9, and Panel d raises $p_{in}(1)$ to 1, $p_{ex}(1)$ to 0.95, and lowers σ to 0.3.

fails because κ is too low. Low elite affinity toward mass rule undermines the conventional implication that strong mass threats raise coup propensity. In Panel b, the overall relationship between θ_M and $\Pr(\text{coup}^*)$ is inverted U–shaped. Some components are the same as in Panel a: Equation (11) holds, and κ is low enough that D switches from exclusion to inclusion at $\theta_M = \theta_M^\dagger$. Here, $\Pr(\text{coup}^*)$ discretely increases, again recovering the guardianship dilemma logic. However, because $\kappa < \sigma$ in Panel b, $\Pr(\text{coup}^*)$ *decreases* in θ_M over $\theta_M > \theta_M^\dagger$. This yields the non-monotonic relationship. Furthermore, $\kappa < \underline{\kappa}$ implies that $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) = 0$ for large enough θ_M, hence eliminating coup risk under power sharing.

Panel c is identical to Panel b except D shares power with E for all θ_M (i.e., E's coercive threat is sufficient to induce power sharing). Here, there is no guardianship dilemma. The only effect of increasing θ_M is to make E less likely to stage a coup, and $\Pr(\text{coup}^*)$ strictly decreases in θ_M until hitting 0.

In Panel d, Equation (12) fails because κ is too large, and hence the mass threat exacerbates D's rents–conflict trade-off with E. Because $\kappa > \overline{\kappa}$, a strong mass threat disables D from buying off E; that is, $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) = 1$ for high θ_M. Contrary to conventional threat implications, D excludes if θ_M is large. Proposition 3 formalizes the different cases, which correspond respectively to the four panels in Figure 2.[18]

Proposition 3 (Mass Threat, Power Sharing, and Coup Attempts). *For parts a through c, assume affinity does not exceed the intermediate threshold,* $\kappa < \sigma + \epsilon$, *for small* $\epsilon > 0$.

If Equation (11) holds, then a unique $\theta_M^\dagger \in (0, 1)$ *exists such that D shares power if and only if* $\theta_M > \theta_M^\dagger$. *If* $\theta_M < \theta_M^\dagger$, *then* $Pr(coup^*) = 0$. *If* $\theta_M > \theta_M^\dagger$, *then* $Pr(coup^*) = Pr(coup \mid inclusion, \theta_E, \theta_M)$. *There are two possibilities:*

Part a. Conventional threat logic for power sharing and coups. *If* $\kappa > \sigma$, *then* $Pr(coup \mid inclusion, \theta_E, \theta_M)$ *strictly increases in* θ_M.

Part b. *For any* $\kappa < \sigma$, $Pr(coup \mid inclusion, \theta_E, \theta_M)$ *weakly decreases in* θ_M. *If* $\kappa < \underline{\kappa}$, *then a unique*

[18]The discussion of SI Figure A.3 addresses parameter values omitted in Proposition 3.

$\underline{\theta}_M^{in} \in (\theta_M^\dagger, 1)$ *exists such that if* $\theta_M > \underline{\theta}_M^{in}$, *then* $Pr(coup \mid inclusion, \theta_E, \theta_M) = 0$. *SI Proposition A.2 defines* $\underline{\theta}_M^{in}$.

Part c. *If Equation (11) fails, then D shares power for all* $\theta_M \in [0, 1]$ *and* $Pr(coup^*) = Pr(coup \mid inclusion, \theta_E, \theta_M)$ *for all* θ_M. *The effect of* θ_M *on* $Pr(coup \mid inclusion, \theta_E, \theta_M)$ *depends on* κ *and* σ, *as just described.*

Part d. *Assume high affinity,* $\kappa > \overline{\kappa}$. *There exists* $\theta_M^\dagger < \hat{\theta}_M^{in}$ *such that if* $\theta_M > \theta_M^\dagger$, *then D excludes and* $Pr(coup^*) = 0$. *SI Proposition A.3 defines* $\hat{\theta}_M^{in} \in (0, 1)$.

Corollary 1 (**Guardianship Dilemma Mechanism**). *Assume* $\kappa < \sigma + \epsilon$, *for small* $\epsilon > 0$.

- *If Equation (11) holds, then the guardianship dilemma mechanism holds: Pr(coup*) exhibits a discrete increase at* $\theta_M = \theta_M^\dagger$.
- *If Equation (11) fails, then the guardianship dilemma mechanism fails: Pr(coup*) does not exhibit a discrete increase at any* $\theta_M \in [0, 1]$.

These findings differ from existing theories because my model assumes (1) variance in elite affinity to mass rule and (2) the dictator faces a permanent threat from elites. The first assumption implies that increasing θ_M affects not only *D*'s incentives to share power—as the conventional logic contends—but also *E*'s incentives to stage a coup, a largely novel consideration for this literature. Even the specific finding of a non-monotonic relationship between θ_M and Pr(coup*), shown in Figure 2b, rests on a distinct mechanism from some existing variants of the guardianship dilemma argument that produce a seemingly similar prediction. Acemoglu, Vindigni, and Ticchi (2010) show that strong threats induce rulers to choose large militaries, and assume that governments can commit to continually pay large militaries but not small or intermediate-size militaries. Svolik (2012, chap. 5) shows that the contracting problem between a government and its military dissipates if the military is large—which the government will choose when facing a strong outsider threat—because the military can control policy without actually intervening. He calls this a "military tutelage" regime. Both these models assume that more severe outsider threats increase the military's bargaining leverage relative to the government, and that the magnitude of the outsider threat does not affect the military's consumption. By contrast, here, a non-monotonic relationship arises if κ is low enough that higher θ_M *decreases E*'s expected utility to attempting a coup, which, combined with the guardianship dilemma mechanism, generates the non-monotonicity. These considerations also highlight that even in Figure 2a, which supports the conventional logic, the mechanism is distinct because *E* internalizes its expected consumption under mass rule.

Additionally, I build on McMahon and Slantchev's (2015) critique of the guardianship dilemma logic. They also consider how θ_M affects *E*'s incentives for a coup, but the two assumptions just highlighted account for my different findings. First, they implicitly assume $\kappa = 0$; hence, $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M)$ necessarily decreases in θ_M in their model. However, I show that high κ generates the opposite relationship, given *E*'s incentives to join the winning side. Second, if κ is low, then a permanent elite threat—which their model does not contain—is necessary to eliminate the guardianship dilemma mechanism. In existing models of coups, the ruler will never share power absent a mass threat, implying that an analog of Equation (11) always holds.[19] I show that under this condition, the guardianship dilemma mechanism holds. At the power sharing-switching point, $\theta_M = \theta_M^\dagger$, there is a discrete jump upward in Pr(coup*) (Corollary 1; Figure 2b), contrary to McMahon and Slantchev's (2015) rejection of a guardianship dilemma. However, my model allows elites to challenge even if excluded from power, which may induce *D* to share power at $\theta_M = 0$ (hence, Equation 11 fails). In this case, Pr(coup*) monotonically decreases in θ_M because *D* shares power for all θ_M (Figure 2c), and there is no guardianship dilemma.

Regime-Enhancing Mass Threats

The third main finding from the model analysis is that stronger mass threats enhance regime durability if κ is low and σ is high, contrary to the conventional implication that outsider threats imperil regime survival. The importance of *low elite affinity* follows from the logic just discussed, and the present result additionally highlights the importance of *high returns to elite coalitions* (i.e., high σ). Equation (13) states the equilibrium probability of regime overthrow, $\rho^*(\theta_M)$, if $\kappa < \underline{\kappa}$. For each range of θ_M values, the first term is the probability of elite overthrow and the second is the probability of mass overthrow (conditional on no elite overthrow). Figure 3 depicts the probability of regime overthrow (rather than of a coup attempt, as in previous figures). Panel a depicts the equilibrium probability of overthrow

[19] In McMahon and Slantchev (2015), this would entail the ruler not delegating national defense to a military specialist. They explicitly only analyze outsider threats large enough that the ruler delegates to a military agent—creating positive coup risk for all parameter values that they analyze—but my argument applies to their model under the full range of θ_M.

FIGURE 3 Mass Threat and Overthrow Risk



Note: The functional form assumptions and parameter values are the same as in Figure 2b except $p_{ex}(1) = 0.65$ and $\sigma = 0.7$. In Panel a, the black curve equals $Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \cdot p_{in}(\theta_E)$, and the gray curve equals $Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{exclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \cdot p_{ex}(\theta_E)$. In Panel b, the curve for $\theta_M \in (\theta_M^\dagger, \underline{\theta}_M^{in})$ equals $[Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) + Pr(\text{deal} \mid \text{inclusion}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \cdot (1-\sigma)] \cdot \theta_M$. This differs from Equation (13) because it is the *unconditional* probability of mass overthrow. For Panel c, Equation (13) defines $\rho^*(\theta_M)$.

by E (coup or rebellion), Panel b by M, and Panel c by either.

$$\rho^*(\theta_M) = \begin{cases} Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{excl.}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \cdot p_{ex} & \\ \quad + \left[Pr(\text{rebel} \mid \text{excl.}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \cdot (1 - p_{ex}) + Pr(\text{deal} \mid \text{excl.}, \theta_E, \theta_M)\right] \cdot \theta_M & \text{if } \theta_M < \theta_M^\dagger \\ Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{incl.}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \cdot p_{in} & \\ \quad + \left[Pr(\text{coup} \mid \text{incl.}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \cdot (1 - p_{in}) + Pr(\text{deal} \mid \text{incl.}, \theta_E, \theta_M) \cdot (1-\sigma)\right] \cdot \theta_M & \text{if } \theta_M \in \left(\theta_M^\dagger, \underline{\theta}_M^{in}\right) \\ 0 + (1-\sigma) \cdot \theta_M & \text{if } \theta_M > \underline{\theta}_M^{in} \end{cases} \tag{13}$$

For the parameter values in the figure, the regime is more likely to survive at $\theta_M = \underline{\theta}_M^{in}$ than at $\theta_M = 0$. To see why, for $\theta_M < \theta_M^\dagger$, we get the conventional relationship: $\rho(\theta_M)$ increases in θ_M. Throughout this range, D excludes E and the probability of mass overthrow equals θ_M. The increasing relationship shown in Panel c reflects this direct effect. However, at $\theta_M = \theta_M^\dagger$, D switches to inclusion. This generates a discrete drop in the probability of mass takeover (Panel b), which causes the overall probability of overthrow to discretely drop (Panel c). For $\theta_M \in (\theta_M^\dagger, \underline{\theta}_M^{in})$, the probability of elite overthrow decreases in θ_M (Panel a) for the same reasons as discussed for Panels b and c of Figure 2. Because returns to elite coalitions, σ, are high, the negative indirect effect of θ_M—which arises from lowering E's probability of staging a coup—blunts the positive direct effect of θ_M on the probability of mass overthrow (Panel b). Because $\kappa < \underline{\kappa}$, Pr(coup*) hits 0 at $\theta_M = \underline{\theta}_M^{in}$, hence, eliminating coup risk under power sharing. Panel c shows that $\theta_M = \underline{\theta}_M^{in}$ minimizes the overall probability of overthrow.[20]

[20] A permanent elite threat is necessary for this result. If instead $\theta_E = 0$ and $p_{ex}(0) = 0$, then $\rho^*(0) = 0$; therefore, $\theta_M = 0$ would necessarily minimize overthrow risk.

Proposition 4 (**Regime-Enhancing Mass Threats**). *Suppose affinity is low,* $\kappa < \underline{\kappa}$*. If* $\theta_E > 0$*, then a unique* $\sigma' < 1$ *exists such that if* $\sigma > \sigma'$*, then* $\rho^*(\underline{\theta}_M^{in}) < \rho^*(0)$.

Implications for Empirical Cases

The following examples suggest how to operationalize key conditioning factors in the model—coup proofing, elite entrenchment, elite affinity, and returns to elite coalitions—in real-world cases. This discussion also suggests that these theoretical conditioning factors help to explain, empirically, why outsider threats sometimes yield outcomes consistent with the conventional threat logic and sometimes not.

Large Elite Factions and Coup-Proofing Institutions

The conventional logic requires the dictator to share power with a high-capacity elite. This is more likely if *coup-proofing institutions* are strong, that is, low $p_{in}(1)$ (see Equation 10). For example, in cases such as the Soviet Union and Communist China, a strong party and army were created jointly during a mass revolutionary struggle during which the vanguard group transformed societal structures and eliminated rival organizations, followed by subsequent institutionalization of elite competition (Levitsky and Way 2013, 10–11; Svolik 2012, 129). Strong parties also aid with surveillance duties typically performed by internal security organizations, which coup-proof the regime by collecting intelligence about coup plots before they occur. Similarly, overlapping security agencies can check each other to counterbalance against coup attempts (Quinlivan 1999).[21]

By contrast, if coup-proofing institutions are weak, that is, high $p_{in}(1)$, then D will not tolerate the considerable coup risk posed by a high-capacity elite (Figure 1b). In Angola, multiple rebel groups participated in a lengthy liberation war to end Portuguese rule. In January 1975, Portugal finally set a date for independence while negotiating with a transitional government that incorporated the three main rebel groups—MPLA (D), and UNITA and FNLA (E)—each primarily associated with a different ethnic group. UNITA and FNLA posed credible rebellion threats, that is, high θ_E and $p_{ex}(1)$, given prior fighting and intact military wings. However, rather than compelling MPLA to share power, Angola's fractured process of gaining independence meant that MPLA could not integrate other rebel groups into the regime without exacerbating coup risk, yielding high $p_{in}(1)$. This contrasted with African countries that experienced electoral competition before independence, which—in some cases—engendered durable interethnic parties. Armed ethnic factions caused Angola's transitional government to collapse in August 1975, just before independence. "Inevitably, the delicate coalition came apart as the leaders of the three movements failed to resolve fundamental policy disagreements or control their competition for personal power" (Warner 1991, 38–39).

Unfortunately, Angola is not unique, as attempts at military integration following civil war often fail (Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008), likely because of high $p_{in}(1)$. For example, in Chad in 1979, integrating the rebel army FAN "into the national army … was not accomplished. When the prime minister demanded that he should be protected by the FAN rather than the national army, the FAN forces were already in the [capital city]; thus, amid the political and constitutional wrangling, there were de jure two armies" (Nolutshungu 1996, 105–6). Strong outside threats would also create strong inside threats if included, and rulers will exclude if they cannot solidify internal security.

Small Elite Factions and Entrenchment

The conventional logic also requires the dictator to exclude a low-capacity elite, which is more likely if their ability to win if excluded, $p_{ex}(0)$, is low (see Equation 10). Retaining the conceptualization of low θ_E as numerically small ethnic groups, why would $p_{ex}(0)$ ever be high? In reality, rulers do not inherit a blank slate. For example, if a group dominates the officer corps of the military prior to D gaining power, then attempting to purge these elites may trigger a countercoup by elites "before losing their abilities to conduct a coup" (Sudduth 2017, 1769) in which they leverage "whatever tactics and resources they have to fight against their declining status" (Harkness 2018, 8). Alternatively, recently fired military officers may be able to organize a particularly effective rebellion.[22] Thus, prior *entrenchment in power* substitutes

[21] The strong coup-proofing condition stated in Equation (10) is also more likely to hold if there is a high threat of a rebellion under exclusion, that is, high $p_{ex}(1)$. Existing research connects this condition to ethnic groups located *close to the capital* (Roessler and Ohls 2018). In such cases, rebels face lower hurdles to organizing an insurgency that can effectively strike at the capital.

[22] Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) show empirically that "downgraded" ethnic groups (i.e., lost access to power in the central government within the previous 5 years) are relatively likely to fight civil wars. They posit the importance of psychologically inflicted grievances, but a plausible alternative interpretation is

for small numerical size to generate a strong threat if the dictator excludes, which raises $p_{ex}(0)$ and encourages power sharing (Figure 1c).[23]

Upon gaining independence from European powers, rulers in many ex-colonies inherited "split domination" regimes in which different ethnic groups controlled civilian political and military institutions (Horowitz 1985).[24] In Nigeria, the numerical dominance of northern Muslims (D) enabled their party, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), to win a plurality of legislative seats at independence in 1960. However, the officer corps considerably overrepresented eastern Igbos (E) because they achieved higher average education levels. Igbos' entrenched position posed obstacles to marginalizing them, and an eastern-dominated party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), was a junior partner in the governing coalition with the NPC. Although the northern-led government implemented biased military recruitment procedures designed to increase the percentage of northern officers, the Igbo-tilted imbalance remained by 1965. Northerners ended the power-sharing relationship only after reversing an Igbo-led coup in 1966, which manifested the threat posed by the entrenched elites. Subsequent events highlighted their rebellion risk: After Igbos were purged from the army, the military effectively split in half as a civil war erupted in the east in 1967.

Mass Threats and Regime Survival

Another conventional implication is that stronger mass threats should reduce prospects for regime survival. However, this holds only if elites' *affinity for mass rule*, κ, is high, or if *returns to elite coalitions*, σ, are low (Proposition 4). Rwanda exemplifies high κ. Following Hutu overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy in 1959, many Tutsis fled the country. Hutus dominated the Rwandan government (D) into the 1990s, and Tutsis who remained in Rwanda comprised the opposition (E). However, Tutsis living in Rwanda faced incentives to ally with their transnational ethnic kin, which by 1990 had organized as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Uganda (M). Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the RPF invaded with support from Rwandan Tutsis and has governed the country since 1995. Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab Spring in 2011 followed a similar logic. Their armies (E) conceivably could have dispersed mass protesters (M). However, these units were relatively professionalized and ethnically similar to the protesting masses. Although they would lose specific perks of the incumbent regime (D), the strong organizational position of these militaries and their control over important economic sectors led them to anticipate relatively favorable outcomes under a civilian regime. More generally, Egypt and Tunisia highlight how mass protests or ongoing civil wars can create propitious conditions for coup attempts (Bell and Sudduth 2017; Casper and Tyson 2014), although only if κ is high. Otherwise, as discussed in the next case, mass opposition should cause elites to band together against the threat—eliminating coup risk under power sharing.[25]

Malaysia exemplifies low κ and high σ, in which case mass threats should *enhance* regime survival (Figure 3).[26] Japan's occupation of colonial Malaya during World War II enabled the Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (M) to form. The communists sparked the Malayan Emergency between 1948 and 1960, which caused over 10,000 deaths, and M engaged in communal violence after independence. Slater (2010, 92) argues, "Shared perceptions of endemic threats from below provide the most compelling explanation both for the internal strength of Malaysia's ruling parties, and for the robustness of the coalition adjoining them," which differs from guardianship dilemma models in which elites do not fear mass takeover when making their coup decision. Specifically, the major Malayan political party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), allied with a business-led conservative Chinese party, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and this power-sharing coalition governed until 2018. In terms of actors from the model, UMNO is D and MCA is E. Despite shared ethnicity between E and M, κ was low. Communists targeted not only Malays, but also Chinese elites it labeled as conspirators. Communists' actions placed the entire Chinese community in suspicion, causing business leaders to organize the MCA. Prior British colonial efforts bolstered the security forces and created effective taxation institutions, which enabled a unified elite coalition to mitigate the communist threat (high σ). SI Appendix B discusses additional durable regimes

that downgraded groups maintain some connections at the center, which makes launching an outsider rebellion more feasible.

[23] With this motivation, the fighting technology under exclusion could be a "coup." However, the equilibrium probability of a coup attempt in the relevant theoretical statement, Proposition 2c, is unchanged because, in equilibrium for those parameter values, D includes E for all θ_E.

[24] For the following, see Horowitz (1985, 451, 455–56, 465, 504–5).

[25] Also consider contrasting Arab Spring cases of Bahrain, Libya, and Syria in which personalized and ethnically distinct militaries perceived bad fates following regime change (low κ) and violently defended the incumbent regime.

[26] The following draws from Slater (2010).

TABLE 3 Outsider Threats and Power Sharing: New Implications

	Power Sharing	Coups	Regime Survival
Conventional threat logic	Dictator excludes if the outsider threat is small and shares power if the outsider threat is large.	A larger outsider threat raises the equilibrium probability of a coup attempt.	A larger outsider threat raises the equilibrium probability of regime overthrow.
When this fails	**1a.** Weak coup-proofing (Prop. 2b; Fig. 1b) **1b.** Entrenched elites (Prop. 2c; Fig. 1c) **2b.** High elite affinity with masses (Prop. 3d; Fig. 2d)	**2a.** Low elite affinity with masses (Prop. 3b; Fig. 2b/c)*	**3.** Low elite affinity with masses and high returns to elite coalitions (Prop. 4; Fig. 3)**

Notes: *With weak coup-proofing institutions, this aspect of the conventional logic fails even without a mass threat because D excludes for all θ_E.
**SI Proposition A.1 provides a counterexample to the regime-survival implication of the conventional logic absent a mass threat.

that faced strong mass threats, such as apartheid South Africa, as well as cases with low σ, such as Russia in 1917.

Conclusion

This article provides a new theoretical analysis of how dictators share power in response to outsider threats. In contrast to a "conventional threat logic," I explain why dictators do not necessarily share power with elites who pose a considerable rebellion threat. Nor will responding to mass threats by including other elites necessarily raise coup risk or imperil regime survival. To understand the effects of outsiders' coercive capacity, we need to incorporate conditioning factors such as the strength of coup-proofing institutions, the depth of elite entrenchment, elite affinity toward mass rule, and returns to elite coalitions. Table 3 summarizes the three main results and ties them back to the formal propositions and illustrative figures.

This article brings together insights from disparate literatures, including ethnic conflict and authoritarian institutions, to improve our understanding of the strategic logic underpinning authoritarian power sharing, coups, and regime survival. However, incorporating elements from various existing theories required introducing certain simplifications that future research could relax. Following Roessler (2016), I treat coups and civil wars as analogous technologies for capturing the state that differ only in their probability of winning. Future work could consider how other aspects of civil wars, including their greater length and higher overall costs, might affect this trade-off, or how rulers can change strategies during an ongoing civil war. Civil wars can also differ in their aims, and scholars could assess differences in power-sharing strategies when elites' main threat is to create a separate state rather than to capture the center. There are additional considerations for the coup technology as well. This model evaluates interactions with a unified elite, but in reality, there are multiple elite factions distinguished between elites in the inner circle and opposition elites. For example, White (2020) shows that insider military factions are more likely to stage coups following civil war settlements that incorporate members of the rebel military, generating an additional deterrent against incorporating opposition factions. These are fruitful considerations to study within the broader context of the dictator's power-sharing dilemma.

References

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Acemoglu, Daron, Andrea Vindigni, and Davide Ticchi. 2010. "Persistence of Civil Wars." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8(2–3): 664–76.

Arriola, Leonardo R. 2009. "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(10): 1339–62.

Bell, Curtis, and Jun Koga Sudduth. 2017. "The Causes and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(7): 1432–55.

Besley, Timothy, and James A. Robinson. 2010. "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Civilian Control Over the Military." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8(2–3): 655–63.

Boone, Catherine. 2017. "Sons of the Soil Conflict in Africa." *World Development* 96: 276–93.

Casper, Brett Allen, and Scott A. Tyson. 2014. "Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d'État." *Journal of Politics* 76(2): 548–64.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug. 2013. *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Finer, Samuel E. 1962. *The Man on Horseback*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi. 2015. "How Is Power Shared in Africa?" *Econometrica* 83(2): 465–503.

Glassmyer, Katherine, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2008. "Rebel-Military Integration and Civil War Termination." *Journal of Peace Research* 45(3): 365–84.

Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. 2016. *Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harkness, Kristin A. 2018. *When Soldiers Rebel: Ethnic Armies and Political Instability in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2013. "The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes." *Journal of Democracy* 24(3): 5–17.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4–5): 715–41.

McMahon, R. Blake, and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2015. "The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces." *American Political Science Review* 109(2): 297–313.

Meng, Anne. 2019. "Accessing the State: Executive Constraints and Credible Commitment in Dictatorships." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 33(4): 568–99.

Nolutshungu, Sam C. 1996. *Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Quinlivan, James T. 1999. "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." *International Security* 24(2): 131–65.

Roessler, Philip. 2016. *Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa: The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roessler, Philip, and David Ohls. 2018. "Self-Enforcing Power Sharing in Weak States." *International Organization* 72(2): 423–54.

Slater, Dan. 2010. *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sudduth, Jun Koga. 2017. "Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships." *Comparative Political Studies* 50(13): 1768–1801.

Svolik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Warner, Rachel. 1991. "Historical Setting." In *Angola: A Country Study*, ed. Thomas Collello. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1–52.

White, Peter B. 2020. "The Perils of Peace: Civil War Peace Agreements and Military Coups." *Journal of Politics* 82(1): 104–18.

Zakharov, Alexei V. 2016. "The Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off in Dictatorships and Outside Options for Subordinates." *Journal of Politics* 78(2): 457–66.

Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

Appendix A: Supplementary Information for Formal Results

Appendix B: Supplementary Empirical Information