

# Rebel Regimes in Africa: Military Powersharing and Authoritarian Durability

Anne Meng

Jack Paine

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## **Abstract**

Dictators face a powersharing tradeoff: sharing power more credibly delivers spoils to elites, but also lowers organizational hurdles to staging a coup against the ruler. We argue that origins in violent conflict create favorable conditions for peaceful powersharing with military elites. Fighting enables rulers to place allies in key military positions and to learn about who poses the greatest threat. Using original data on African regimes from 1960 to 2010, we first establish that rebel regimes are significantly less likely to fall than others, even when instrumenting for the endogeneity of rebel regimes. We then show evidence that rebel regimes are significantly more likely to share power with important military elites from the guerrilla struggle, less likely to face coup attempts, and frequently transform the military. Finally, African rebel regimes do not create stronger states that dominate society, contrary to existing theories about revolutionary regimes.

# 1 INTRODUCTION

Choosing how much power to share with other elites is one of the most consequential decisions that dictators make. Most dictators are vulnerable to challenges by excluded elites that seek greater access to spoils. The ruler may attempt to lengthen his tenure in office by distributing rents and power, often through the appointment of key governmental positions (Haber 2008; Arriola 2009; Svobik 2012; Boix and Svobik 2013; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015; Meng 2019). However, bringing other elites closer to the center of power also lowers the organizational costs to overthrowing the regime via a coup. This downside risk of powersharing is somewhat underappreciated in scholarship on authoritarian institutions, although is a focus of research on ethnic conflict and on civil-military relations (Finer 1962; Roessler 2011; McMahon and Slantchev 2015; Paine 2019a). The downside risk of sharing power is particularly acute in regimes where *coercive actors* are best-positioned to pressure the ruler for incorporation into the inner circle. Military elites are particularly good at deposing leaders, which creates a seemingly intractable dilemma. If the leader does not share power with military elites, he risks overthrow by excluded elites who seek to gain a share of the spoils. But sharing power with military elites may simply heighten the risk of overthrow by newly empowered members of the inner circle. How do rulers navigate this tradeoff? Under what conditions can leaders share power with coercive actors without creating their own demise?

In this article, we argue that origins in violent conflict create favorable conditions for peaceful powersharing with military elites. Leaders share power with elites who can *credibly* threaten overthrow them, and fighting enables rulers to transform the military—therefore placing allies in key military positions—and to learn about which elites possess a credible threat of rebellion for the leader. In rebel regimes, military elites who held important posts during the war are best equipped to overthrow the leader once the regime gains power. Therefore, rebel regime leaders have a clear sense of *which elites* they need to share power with in order to avert coups. For these reasons, conditional on sharing power, rebel regime rulers face a low risk of being deposed by military elites. By contrast, most other regimes do not replicate these conditions. Most African rulers inherited ethnically stacked militaries from the colonial era that posed threats to their survival, and coup leaders also tended to face limited opportunities to transform the military and to learn about their main enemies.

We show evidence of our theory using original data from Africa between 1960 and 2010. Africa provides a

hard case for the theory, as the prevalence of “weak institutions” in the region (Zolberg 1966; Bienen 1978; Jackson and Rosberg 1982) would seem to make the dilemma of sharing power with military elites particularly acute. Additionally, as discussed later, Africa provides a setting in which an alternative explanation for durable rebel regimes—greater control of the countryside—is unsubstantiated. We use Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) civil war dataset to code regimes that came to power by winning a violent conflict. This includes ten regimes that gained independence by fighting against a colonizer (colonial liberation regimes), and eight additional post-colonial rebel regime cases. We first establish the aggregate pattern: both types of rebel regimes (colonial liberation and not) exhibit a significantly lower probability of regime failure, and these findings are mostly unaltered under numerous robustness checks. Our baseline specification estimates that rebel regimes have a 72% chance of surviving at least 20 years, compared to 26% for non-rebel regimes. We also improve upon research designs from related studies. We demonstrate robustness to a source of exogenous variation in rebel regimes based on climatic factors that affected where Europeans could settle during the colonial period—the actors who precipitated most of the region’s colonial liberation wars.

We then provide evidence for the importance of powersharing: rulers of rebel regimes more frequently and peacefully share power with military elites. We compiled original time-varying data on cabinet appointments, which shows that leaders in rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in 88% of years in office. We also compiled biographical information on these ministers and show that in 85% of cases, the Minister of Defense was an important member of the rebellion. By contrast, non-rebel regimes appoint an independent Minister of Defense in only 57% of years. Presidents in non-rebel regimes commonly appointed *themselves* as Minister of Defense and, in some cases, shut military elites out of the cabinet entirely. We also show that many rebel regimes either created their own military from scratch or fundamentally overhauled the existing military with the rebel military. Finally, rebel regimes also face fewer coup attempts, which suggests that these powersharing strategies are successful at maintaining regime stability.

Overall, we offer three main contributions. First, we offer a *unified theory* of powersharing by reconciling two surprisingly disparate literatures. According to authoritarian regimes scholarship, leaders gain a security guarantee by sharing power with elites who can credibly threaten to unseat them. According to these studies, conditional on facing a strong challenger, rulers should always *want* to share power with elites. However, according to the conflict literature, leaders hesitate to share power with strong challengers because bringing these elites into the inner circle empowers them and elevates their ability to depose the ruler. According to

these studies, leaders should typically *not want* to share power with other elites. We develop a theory that takes into account the tradeoffs of sharing power from both of these perspectives, and identify how the conditions that bring rebel regimes into power alleviate risks associated with co-opting coercive actors. Moreover, while existing studies generally assume that elites are identical, our theory *disaggregates* different types of elites. We highlight the risk of sharing power with coercive actors, who are particularly good at deposing leaders compared with civilian elites and, consequently, are more dangerous to try to buy off. Finally, we show empirical evidence of our theoretical argument using original data on cabinet appointments—one of the few studies to provide *detailed measures of powersharing* beyond commonly used aggregate indicators, such as POLITY scores.

As a second main contribution, we contribute to scholarship on African politics. The political history of Africa since independence has been and largely continues to be authoritarian: since independence, 84% of regime-years in Africa are coded as authoritarian, including 73% since 1990.<sup>1</sup> Between 1946 and 2010, 40% of autocratic regimes across the world were located in Africa.<sup>2</sup> However, most research on contemporary Africa analyzes democratization or variation in democratic institutions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Riedl 2014; Cheeseman 2015), whereas variation in the durability of authoritarian regimes is considerably less studied. Between 1960 and 2010, eleven African autocracies failed within two years. By contrast, in eleven other African countries, the first post-colonial regime is still in power as of 2019 (Angola, Botswana, Djibouti, Gabon, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe) or fell within the last decade (Tunisia).<sup>3</sup> Given that the vast majority of African countries are non-democratic, understanding why some of these autocracies are durable but others are not remains an important but understudied question.

Third, we contribute to research on the durability of revolutionary regimes. There is considerable qualitative and, more recently, statistical, evidence that authoritarian regimes with revolutionary origins are particularly

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<sup>1</sup>Data from Przeworski et al. (2000).

<sup>2</sup>Data from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014).

<sup>3</sup>Despite many democratic attributes of the contemporary regimes in Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, none has experienced a turnover in parties, which Przeworski et al. (2000) and follow-up datasets (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010) consider necessary for a democratic transition. Later we explain why precisely distinguishing authoritarian from democratic regimes is largely irrelevant given our theoretical framework.

long-lasting (Huntington 1968, 1970; Levitsky and Way 2010, 2013; Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way 2019; Lyons 2016; Miller 2019). We agree with this general premise. However, we depart by focusing specifically on elite powersharing mechanisms while rejecting an alternative explanation: revolutionary regimes are durable because they transform society, embodied by Huntington’s (1968, 292) famous phrase “he who controls the countryside controls the country.” Our concept of rebel regimes encompasses *all regimes that come to power via civil war*, not only those that meet particular criteria of “revolutionary” aims. For example, Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way (2019) focus on cases in which the violent overthrow of the existing regime is accompanied by “mass mobilization and state collapse, which triggers a rapid transformation of the state and the existing social order.” We argue that the scope conditions of social transformation are unlikely to hold in Africa. In many cases, historical factors such as low population density, legacies from colonial rule, and high ethnic fractionalization impeded rebel regimes from consolidating strong control over the entire national territory. In fact, many African rebel regimes simply did not aim to transform society. Thus, these regimes persist *despite* state weakness, rather than because of state power. To sum, we show that the durability of regimes that emerge out of conflict is rooted *primarily* in elite powersharing, regardless of the transformation of state or society.

## 2 THEORY

### 2.1 THE RULER’S POWERSHARING TRADEOFF

Any dictator would, ideally, rule alone as a personalist or “sultanistic” autocrat that consumes all rents and power (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Chehabi and Linz 1998). In African countries where the first leader led large-scale but peaceful independence movements, such as Sekou Toure in Guinea or Felix Houphouët-Boigny in Cote d’Ivoire, the ruler was often highly popular upon taking power (Collier 1982). Such leaders did not need to share power with other elites because they had already consolidated power and lacked credible elite challengers, and some of these rulers survived for several decades after independence despite creating personalist regimes.

However, most dictators are vulnerable to challenges from excluded elites that seek to gain a share of the spoils. Thus, the ruler may share power in an attempt to lengthen his tenure in office (Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013). Empirically, in African regimes, powersharing often takes the form of cabinet appoint-

ments in which elites are given access to the highest levels of government (Arriola 2009; Roessler 2011; Meng 2019, *Forthcoming*). Cabinet appointments provide elites with a steady stream of patronage: cabinet ministers are paid lucrative salaries, and are often provided with private luxury cars, houses, first-class travel, and control over government contracts (which they often reward to family members). In addition, these cabinet appointments provide elites with access to key state functions. For powersharing with military elites specifically, a key consideration is whether the president names a separate Minister of Defense, who controls the armed forces and is the highest ranking military position in the regime. Appointing an elite to this position is a substantial handout: in addition to receiving all the benefits and salaries of other cabinet ministers, the Minister of Defense determines the creation and implementation of military policy, including the appointment, management, and mobilization of all security forces.

Yet sharing power may fail to solve the problem of elites seeking to overthrow the ruler. Instead, sharing power may *exacerbate* the risk of overthrow because, by bringing rival elites closer to the center of power, they enjoy lower mobilization hurdles to overthrowing the leader (Roessler 2011; Svobik 2012; Paine 2019a). This risk is particularly acute with military elites, who are *especially good* at deposing leaders. Coercive actors have a considerable advantage in leveraging their access to the state to mount a coup d'état. Moreover, this coup threat is not trivial: coups are the most common way in which authoritarian leaders are deposed (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2018, 179). Between 1950 to 2014, a total of 471 coups were attempted worldwide, and 42% of those attempts occurred within Africa.<sup>4</sup> Many rulers in post-colonial Africa “came to fear that their professed allies, especially those with a foothold in the army, police, or security services, might exploit their regime access and coercive capacity to seize power on their own” (Roessler 2011, 307). Exemplifying this fear of coup plotters, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire sidelined his military politically. Throughout his entire reign, Mobutu was the commander-in-chief and Minister of Defense. No military officer ever held a cabinet post and regional military commanders were subordinate to regional civilian leaders. Within the military, Mobutu routinely shuffled elites in key positions so that no officer could develop an independent base of support (Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

This generic powersharing dilemma is especially pressing for regimes that achieved power via force. No one can forcefully overthrow the government alone, implying that other military elites almost inevitably pose a credible threat to remove the leader in such regimes. Specifically, a ruler's co-conspirators—the

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<sup>4</sup>Authors' calculation using data from Powell and Thyne (2011).

coercive agents who helped launch the leader into power—possess a unique ability to depose the leader due to their expertise in technologies of violence (Haber 2008; Roessler 2011). Under what conditions can rulers navigate this dilemma and use cabinet appointments as a tool for promoting rather than undermining regime survival?

## 2.2 KEY CONDITIONING FACTORS

We identify two key factors that affect the magnitude of the threat that elites pose when included in power. These factors distinguish rebel regimes from either civilian regimes or those that come to power via coups.

### 2.2.1 Transforming the Military

The generic powersharing dilemma focuses solely on *whether* the ruler shares power with other elites. However, another important consideration is *with whom* the ruler shares power. If the ruler has the opportunity to place allies in top positions, then he may be able to mitigate the dilemma of sharing power—even if military officers pose the gravest threat.

This consideration distinguishes rulers of rebel regimes from either civilian regimes or coup regimes—despite common origins in forcibly removing the incumbent. The process of gaining power via a prolonged rebellion (the average rebel regime in our dataset fought for 12.4 years before gaining power) offers a unique opportunity for rebel regime leaders to shape the military to favor known allies. In most cases, these rulers originally created the military from scratch, and upon gaining power either completely replaced the existing state military or fundamentally transformed it while prioritizing its supporters (we provide numerous examples in Section 4.3.1). Thus, although the main elites are military leaders that can coercively threaten the regime, if the ruler shares power with them, he should be able to mitigate the threat of a coup because he has previously reshaped the military in his favor.

Outside the rebel setting, rulers typically face considerably greater constraints to moving allies into top military positions. Instead, most rulers trade off between leaving in place possibly disloyal subordinates and risking countercoups if they attempt to move allies into top positions. A brief recap of the colonial creation of African militaries clarifies the predicament in which most post-independence rulers found themselves. Most inherited a military created by the colonial power, who had starkly different goals from African rulers

(Lugard 1922; Horowitz 1985; Ray 2013; Harkness 2018). For most of the colonial period, Europeans monopolized the officer corps and were not worried about protecting against coups. Nor, given post-1884 agreements to not fight inter-imperial wars over African territories, were Europeans concerned about creating particularly effective fighting forces in the sense of military competence. Instead, their primary objective was to choose rank-and-file soldiers that would loyally follow commands to repress. Since colonial officials anticipated that the greatest need for force would be in the capital city, they often turned to groups of people in the periphery that lacked ethnic ties to the capital (and had not previously revolted against the colonizer), and ascribed “martial” qualities to them. After World War II, most colonizers pivoted to recruiting Africans for the officer corps, where their objectives differed given the need for higher education levels among officers. As with earlier “martial race” recruitment policies, ethnic considerations predominated, which elevated ethnicity to a highly salient political cleavage.

In many cases, the most highly educated groups who gained control of the officer corps were distinct from the numerically largest groups, who often gained control of the government at independence. “Split domination” between civilian political and military officials created difficult tradeoffs for many post-independence rulers.<sup>5</sup> They could acquiesce to the status quo, perhaps by following inclusive nationalist strategies for military recruitment. However, this strategy risked leaving officers in place who, due to ethnic differences, might perceive a threat to their power (even if none in fact existed). Instead, the alternative strategy of attempting to alter the composition of the military toward the ruler’s own ethnic group risked triggering countercoups in which marginalized groups would leverage “whatever tactics and resources they have to fight against their declining status” (Harkness 2018; see also Sudduth 2017).<sup>6</sup>

These problems are also acute in coup regimes. Despite gaining power via force, leaders of coup regimes lack the opportunity to restructure their military. Successful coups are generally conducted quickly, within a couple of days or even hours. Knowledge of successful coup plots is almost always contained to a handful of people until the event happens, and often the exact roles of different members of the junta are unspecified until after they take power (Singh 2014; Luttwak 2016). It is fairly common for rulers to engage in widespread

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<sup>5</sup>This problem was particularly pressing in countries that contained a major ethnic group with a precolonial history of statehood, which usually undermined the formation of broad-based parties (Paine 2019b).

<sup>6</sup>Roessler (2011) and Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) additionally discuss the rebellion incentives for ethnic groups excluded from power.



purges of the military following a successful coup, but this simply generates a high risk of countercoups, as just described.

### **2.2.2 Information Revelation**

Another factor that affects the magnitude of the powersharing dilemma is the information that the ruler has about his main enemies. Our discussion of shaping the military implicitly assumes that the dictator has perfect information about who is loyal (at least conditional on being offered top cabinet positions) and who cannot be bought off. However, in reality, rulers face an information deficit: “how are they to identify disloyalists when these individuals have a strong incentive to conceal their true loyalties?” (Roessler 2011, 313).

Rulers of rebel regimes are privileged on this dimension as well. The process of fighting enables rulers to gain valuable information about the loyalty of their subordinates. This is in part because rulers know who the main rivals are: military elites who held important posts during the war, based on their positions in the military hierarchy and commanding key units during the war. Fighting helps to *reveal* which elites possess a credible threat to remove the leader. In turn, rebel regime leaders have a clear sense of which elites they need to share power with in order to avert coups.

By contrast, many post-independence African leaders in non-rebel regimes lacked information about who their primary rivals were. The region had experienced a shallow history of political competition during the colonial period. As of 1945, less than 1% of Africans could participate in elections, and in many cases, electoral contestation was introduced very rapidly prior to independence (Collier 1982).<sup>7</sup> Nor does staging a successful coup solve information problems. As discussed, coups are typically short and secretive. As a result, the process of launching a coup does not reveal information about which elites pose the greatest

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<sup>7</sup>There were some instances where the leader did come into power with a clear sense of their political rivals. In Kenya, the British had implemented a federal system that gave regional leaders territorial control under colonial rule. Therefore, upon independence, Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, knew that his primary rival was Oginga Odinga, leader of the Luo strongholds. Kenyatta appointed Odinga as his Vice President as part of a powersharing agreement. However, this type of clarity about political rivals was unusual.

threat to the leader, making it difficult for the leader to assess with which elites he should share power. Additionally, having officers make political decisions disrupts the standard *esprit de corps*, which requires hierarchical command, meritocratic promotion, and discipline among subordinate officers and the rank and file (Finer 1962). This disruption creates further confusion about who is best-situated to stage a coup. The frequency of coups by junior officers against military juntas exemplifies this information problem.

### 2.3 HYPOTHESES

Table 1 summarizes the powersharing tradeoff for different types of regimes. Leaders in coup regimes face a high risk of overthrow whether they share power or marginalize military elites. Leaders in rebel regimes, similarly, face high coup risk if they exclude military elites given the power of these actors. However, unlike in coup regimes, sharing power should greatly diminish the risk of a coup because the violent struggle enables transforming the military and reduces information problems. By contrast, civilian regimes exhibit greater heterogeneity. In cases with popular decolonization leaders, coup risk tended to be low regardless of the powersharing choice, leading to durable personalist regimes. In cases of split domination or ethnic groups with precolonial states, coup risk tended to be high regardless of the powersharing choices, creating similar theoretical implications as for coup regimes. This logic yields three testable hypotheses.<sup>8</sup>

**Table 1: Logic of Powersharing by Regime Origins**

	<b>Rebel regime</b>	<b>Coup regime</b>	<b>Civilian regime</b>
<b>Coup risk if marginalize military elites</b>	High	High	Varies
<b>Coup risk if share power</b>	Low	High	Varies
<b>Rulers shares power?</b>	Yes	No	Varies
<b>Expected regime durability</b>	High	Low	Varies

*H1. Rebel regimes should fail less frequently than other regimes.*

*H2. Rulers in rebel regimes should share power with military elites more frequently than rulers in other regimes.*

*H3. Rulers in rebel regimes should face coup attempts less frequently than rulers in other regimes.*

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<sup>8</sup>In Section 4.1, we explain why the advantages of rebel regimes should be limited to military powersharing and why they should not necessarily share power more frequently with civilian elites or with a broader range of ethnic groups.

### 3 EVIDENCE OF REBEL REGIME DURABILITY

Despite considerable qualitative evidence on the durability of revolutionary regimes, scholars have only recently compiled data to assess the relationship statistically (Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way 2019; Miller 2019). Because our concept of rebel regimes and our sample differ, it is important to first establish that, in Africa, rebel regimes are less likely to experience regime failure than non-rebel regimes. We also improve upon research designs from related studies by showing robustness to a source of exogenous variation in rebel regimes based on climatic factors that affected where Europeans could settle during the colonial period—actors who precipitated most of the region’s colonial liberation wars.

#### 3.1 DATA

Our sample consists of annual observations for each African country between 1960 and 2010, excluding years with warlord or provisional regimes.<sup>9</sup> Countries that gained independence after 1960 enter the dataset upon the first year of independence, and 2010 is the last year with data on the dependent variable. We include all African countries with a population of at least 100,000 at independence, including North Africa and several islands. We exclude South Africa before 1994 and Zimbabwe before 1980 because white-dominated quasi-colonial regimes are not viable counterfactual comparisons for African-controlled regimes.

The dependent variable is an indicator for regime failure, equaling 0 in any year that the regime persists and 1 if it fails. This variable draws mostly from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), although we coded it ourselves for several countries that fall below their population threshold. They code a regime change if there is turnover in the leadership group, “the small group that actually makes the most important decisions” (315).

The main explanatory variable is rebel regimes. We count any regime that came to power by winning a civil war that generated at least 1,000 battle deaths. We coded this variable by drawing information from Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) civil war dataset and Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) coding of regimes that experienced major violence upon collapse. Some specifications additionally distinguish between colonial liberation regimes, those that emerged from a violent struggle to gain independence and/or majority rule, and other rebel regimes. Table 2 lists every rebel regime in our dataset.

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<sup>9</sup>We briefly address warlord regimes in our discussion of state collapse at the end of the paper.

**Table 2: List of Rebel Regimes**

Colonial liberation	Other rebel
Algeria 62-92*	Burundi 05-NA
Angola 75-NA*	Chad 90-NA
Cape Verde 75-91	DRC 97-NA
Eritrea 93-NA*	Ethiopia 91-NA
Guinea Bissau 74-80*	Liberia 97-03
Mozambique 75-NA*	Rwanda 62-73
Namibia 90-NA	Rwanda 94-NA*
South Africa 94-NA	Uganda 86-NA
Tunisia 56-NA	
Zimbabwe 80-NA	

In the table, we denote with an asterisk cases that Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way (2019) code as revolutionary regimes. They code only six African cases as revolutionary (all of which meet our standards for a rebel regime), compared to 18 rebel regimes in our dataset. This is in part because we code a broader class of regimes than them, and thus it is unsurprising that many cases in Table 2 clearly do not meet their additional criterion—beyond violence—that the regime attempts a revolutionary transformation of society. However, given our argument about the difficulties of social revolution in Africa, we question whether there is a clear dividing line between the “revolutionary” cases in Table 2 and many of the “non-revolutionary” ones. For example, despite proclaiming Marxist aims, Angola (coded as revolutionary) was essentially a failed state at independence, whereas the ZANU party in Zimbabwe (coded as non-revolutionary) exhibited strong control over much of the country. Rebel groups in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda built strong grassroots parties during their struggles (Lyons 2016), yet Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way (2019) code only Rwanda as revolutionary. Coding regimes based on prior rebellion enables a clearer operational standard for African cases, in addition to comporting more closely with our theoretical discussion.

### 3.2 RESULTS

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 estimate logistic regressions of the following form:

$$\ln\left(\frac{Y_{it}}{1 - Y_{it}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_R R_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{X}'_{i,t-1} \beta_X + \mathbf{T}'_{it} \beta_T + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{it}$  is regime failure,  $R_{i,t-1}$  is the rebel regimes indicator (lagged by one year),  $\beta_R$  is the main parameter of interest,  $\mathbf{X}_{i,t-1}$  is a vector of covariates included in Columns 2 and 4 (also lagged by one year),  $\mathbf{T}_{it}$  is standard temporal dependence controls (years since last regime change and cubic splines), and

$\epsilon_{it}$  is a random error term. Columns 3 and 4 disaggregate rebel regimes into colonial liberation and other rebel regimes, but are otherwise identical to Columns 1 and 2, respectively. Every model in Table 3 clusters standard errors by regime.

**Table 3: Explaining Regime Failure**

	DV: Regime failure			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-1.462*** (0.447)	-1.613*** (0.499)		
Colonial liberation regime			-1.586*** (0.562)	-1.392** (0.692)
Other rebel regime			-1.242* (0.705)	-1.890*** (0.722)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.772*** (0.185)		-0.784*** (0.186)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-0.112 (0.239)		-0.108 (0.240)
Regime-years	2,234	1,925	2,234	1,925
Regimes	156	155	156	155
Countries	50	49	50	49
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

*Notes:* Table 3 presents a series of logistic regression estimates by presenting the coefficient estimate and standard error estimates (clustered by regime) in parentheses. Every column contains years since the last regime change and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Column 1 shows that rebel regimes are significantly correlated with a lower likelihood of regime failure. Whereas the predicted probability of regime failure for non-rebel regimes in a particular year is 6.5%, the corresponding estimate for rebel regimes is 1.6%. The figures are similar when we disaggregate rebel regimes in Column 3: 1.4% for colonial liberation regimes and 2.0% for other rebel regimes, again compared to the baseline of 6.5% for non-rebel regimes.<sup>10</sup> Based on the Column 1 estimates, rebel regimes have a 72% chance of surviving at least 20 years, compared to 26% for non-rebel regimes. Columns 2 and 4 add year fixed effects as well as several substantive variables standard in the regimes literature: income per capita (logged, measured annually), oil and gas income per capital (logged, measured annually), and an indicator for former British colonies. Comparing the columns with and without covariates shows not only that the covariates do not eliminate the statistically significant relationship between rebel regimes and regime failure, but also that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates changes minimally. Using information from these observed covariates shows that the magnitude of bias from unobserved covariates would need to be large in

<sup>10</sup>Both of these estimates set years since last regime failure and the cubic splines to 0.

order to explain away the results, as Appendix Table [A.1](#) shows more formally using a metric from Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005). Table [A.2](#) estimates the models with OLS and Table [A.3](#) estimates double-clustered standard errors by regime and country, yielding similar findings. The appendix also discusses sensitivity to jackknife sample alterations.

In our theory, we distinguished rebel regimes not only from all non-rebel regimes, but also specifically from coup regimes. Although both types of regimes achieve power by force, coup regimes generally lack similar sources of elite unity as rebel regimes. Appendix Table [A.4](#) shows evidence consistent with this argument. The sample consists only of regimes that gained power via force, therefore isolating the comparison of rebel regimes to coup regimes. In all specifications, rebel regimes are less likely to suffer regime failure than coup regimes.

### 3.3 INSTRUMENTING FOR COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES

Assessing the causal effect of rebel regimes on stability poses difficult endogeneity problems. Despite controlling for commonly used covariates in the regimes literature and performing various forms of sensitivity analysis, rebel regimes clearly do not emerge randomly. To address this concern, we exploit a source of plausible exogeneity in colonial liberation regimes: percentage of a country's territory that was suitable for colonial European settlement. We briefly summarize the results here and present supporting details in Appendix Section [A.2](#).

One of the most important predictors of decolonization wars in Africa was the presence of European settlers. After World War II, officials in most imperial metropolises introduced decolonization reforms, but these reforms were blocked in colonies with large European settler populations (and, similarly, in independent South Africa and quasi-independent Rhodesia). Thus, we can use climatic factors that influenced prospects for European settlement to provide an exogenous instrument for colonial liberation regimes. We use a variable from Paine (2019c) that combines GIS data for climate, rainfall, elevation, and tsetse fly prevalence. The 2SLS results are qualitatively similar to the results found above, hence more convincingly establishing a negative causal relationship.

## 4 EVIDENCE OF ELITE POWERSHARING AND COUP ATTEMPTS

We now provide evidence for two contributing factors to regime stability in rebel regimes: high frequency of powersharing (H2) and low frequency of coups (H3). We also provide supportive evidence for the two key conditioning factors.

### 4.1 MILITARY POWERSHARING

Appointing elites to key cabinet positions endows them with the ability to control the entire ministry and to target material resources to their supporters and constituents. Thus, we use appointments of elites to key power positions within government to measure powersharing. We compiled data on two positions within the presidential cabinet: the Minister of Defense and Office of the Vice President/Prime Minister. The office of the Vice President and the office of the Prime Minister are functionally equivalent positions and countries may have *either* a Vice President or a Prime Minister, but never both. These positions represent the highest military and civilian powersharing posts within the government: the Minister of Defense is the highest military position, while the Office of the Vice President/Prime Minister ranks second only to the President.

To code cabinet appointments, we use the Europa World Year Book (1960-2005), which contains annual records of the names and positions of all ministerial posts for all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. From these records we created a dummy variable called “Defense Minister Appointed” that takes a value of 1 if an elite was appointed as the Minister of Defense and a 0 if the position was left vacant, if the position was eliminated from the cabinet, or if the president named himself the head of that office. We repeated the process for the Office of the Vice President/Prime Minister.

We also code alternate versions of these variables that take into account the stability of the appointment. Accounting for cabinet rotation rates is particularly important in the context of elite politics in Africa. Leaders routinely practiced the “revolving door policy” of rotating cabinet ministers to try to prevent any one elite from consolidating power within a particular ministry (Dickie and Rake 1973; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Hassan 2017). We therefore interpret cabinet appointments with *low* rotation rates as a stronger signal of powersharing. To account for rotation, we created a dummy variable called “Defense Minister Appointment Stable” that takes a value of 1 if the person appointed to the Minister of Defense position was the same person as the previous year, and a 0 otherwise. We repeated this process for the Office of the Vice

President/Prime Minister.

To assess H2, in Table 4 we estimate identical logistic regression models as Equation 1 while using either of the two defense minister dependent variables: *Defense Minister Appointed* in Columns 1 through 4, and *Defense Minister Appointment Stable* in Columns 5 through 8. The sequence of specifications for each dependent variable is identical to those in Table 3.

**Table 4: Military Powersharing**

	DV: Defense Minister Appointed				DV: Defense Minister Appointment Stable			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	1.781*** (0.516)	1.415*** (0.449)			1.322*** (0.264)	1.088*** (0.252)		
Colonial liberation regime			2.197*** (0.629)	2.009*** (0.478)			1.574*** (0.272)	1.440*** (0.237)
Other rebel regime			1.330* (0.731)	0.686 (0.610)			0.971** (0.396)	0.603 (0.381)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0301 (0.177)		-0.0901 (0.177)		0.0454 (0.125)		-0.0131 (0.124)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-1.025*** (0.322)		-1.034*** (0.322)		-0.687*** (0.244)		-0.694*** (0.242)
Country-years	1,893	1,873	1,893	1,873	1,887	1,854	1,887	1,854
R-squared	0.0535	0.137	0.0557	0.141	0.0615	0.101	0.0637	0.104
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by regime. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Leaders in rebel regimes are significantly more likely to share power with military elites using either measure of the dependent variable, whether or not controlling for covariates and/or disaggregating rebel regimes. The differences in the raw data are striking: rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in 88% of regime-years, and half of the rebel regime cases appointed a Defense Minister *every* year. By contrast, non-rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in only 57% of regime-years. Appendix Table A.11 shows similar results when comparing rebel regimes only to coup regimes.

For example, President Samuel Nujoma of Namibia, who ruled from independence in 1990 until 2004, never personally held the Defense Minister portfolio. The identity of the Defense Minister changed only twice during this fifteen-year period, indicating that this was not a mere case of shuffling weak elites. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, another colonial liberation regime, elites from the ruling ZANU-PF party were appointed to the Minister of Defense position for 29 of the 30 years in our dataset, despite the strong-



man reputation of Robert Mugabe. By contrast, in Gambia, a non-rebel regime, President Dawda Jawara appointed himself as Defense Minister from independence in 1965 until 1992. Similarly, President Hastings Banda of Malawi held the Defense portfolio throughout his tenure, from independence in 1964 until 1993.

Another consideration is whether patterns of powersharing in rebel regimes extend beyond military elites. We do not expect rulers in rebel regimes to necessarily face heightened incentives to share civilian positions, such as naming a vice president. Any ruler gains some benefits by distributing spoils more widely (Arriola 2009; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015), but it is unclear why these benefits would systematically differ in rebel regimes—in which *military* elites pose the gravest threat. For similar reasons, we do not expect that rebel regimes would be more likely to offer cabinet positions to a broader range of ethnic groups than in other regimes. In the appendix, we provide empirical evidence that powersharing between rebel regimes and non-rebel regimes is restricted to *coercive dimensions only*. Appendix Table A.12 shows that leaders in rebel regimes are *not* significantly more likely to appoint a Vice President or Prime Minister. Appendix Table A.13 demonstrates that rebel regime cabinets do *not* consist of representatives from ethnic groups that compose a larger percentage of the country’s population.

## 4.2 COUP ATTEMPTS

Next, we provide evidence that these powersharing efforts are effective at promoting elite cohesion by showing that rebel regimes are less likely to face coup attempts. We use Powell and Thyne’s (2011) data, who provide yearly data from 1960 to 2010 of successful and failed coup attempts in all countries. *Successful coups* is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a coup attempt that successfully removed the incumbent occurred in a particular year, and 0 otherwise. *All coup attempts* equals 1 if a country faced any coup attempt, successful or not, in that particular year, and 0 otherwise.

To assess H3, we estimate identical logistic regression models as Equation 1 except the dependent variable is either successful coup attempt (Columns 1 through 4) or any coup attempt (Columns 5 through 8). The sequence of specifications is identical to those in Table 3. The results show that rebel regimes are significantly less vulnerable to coups than non-rebel regimes. In fact, only four of the 18 rebel regimes have ever experienced a successful coup attempt, compared to more than half of the non-rebel regimes. Columns 1 and 2 show that rebel regimes are significantly less likely to experience successful coups, and this result is

robust to including controls. The results hold when we disaggregate rebel regimes into colonial liberation regimes and other rebel regimes (Column 3). The strength of the correlation weakens somewhat when we include controls (Column 4), but Appendix Table A.9 shows that this is mostly an artifact of the outlying case of Algeria. The results are similar for all coup attempts (Columns 5 through 8). Consistent with our theoretical distinction among regimes that gain power by force, Appendix Table A.10 shows similar results when comparing rebel regimes only to coup regimes.

**Table 5: Coup Attempts**

	DV: Successful coups				DV: All coup attempts			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.161** (0.487)	-1.106** (0.530)			-0.811** (0.372)	-0.819** (0.383)		
Colonial liberation regime			-0.966* (0.544)	-0.778 (0.626)			-0.856* (0.471)	-0.819* (0.485)
Other rebel regime			-1.695* (0.974)	-1.899** (0.965)			-0.734 (0.583)	-0.818 (0.624)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.612*** (0.207)		-0.643*** (0.209)		-0.301** (0.138)		-0.301** (0.140)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-0.187 (0.275)		-0.179 (0.277)		-0.302 (0.223)		-0.302 (0.223)
Country-years	2,234	1,608	2,234	1,608	2,234	2,119	2,234	2,119
R-squared	0.0288	0.0773	0.0294	0.0790	0.0506	0.0979	0.0506	0.0979
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by regime. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

### 4.3 EVIDENCE OF KEY CONDITIONING FACTORS

In Section 2, we identified two key factors that affect the magnitude of the threat that elites pose if included in power: (1) opportunities to transform the military and (2) information revelation during fighting. We argued that the conditions that bring rebel regimes advantage them on both factors. We now provide supportive empirical evidence by showing that rebel regimes have the opportunity to remake their militaries and that long and protracted fighting does indeed reveal information about the ruler's main rivals.

#### 4.3.1 Transforming the Military

Leaders of rebel regimes enjoy a unique opportunity to remake their military, in contrast with many civilian regimes that inherited the colonial military. Of the eighteen rebel regimes in our dataset, ten completely re-

placed the existing state military with their rebel army upon gaining power.<sup>11</sup> For instance, in Mozambique, the guerrilla forces that fought Portugal in the liberation war became the new national army upon independence. In fact, FRELIMO even refused to integrate into their ranks black soldiers who had previously fought for the Portuguese Army. Following the defeat of the military government in Ethiopia in 1991, the new regime disbanded the national army and replaced the armed forces with their own fighters. In Eritrea, the rebel forces became the new military when the regime gained independence in 1993. Since Eritrea had previously been a territory of Ethiopia, the state did not have an existing independent military when the regime came into power.

For the remaining eight cases, the rebel regimes largely overhauled the existing state military after taking power and inserted their own fighters into the existing armed forces. In Rwanda, following independence from Belgium in 1962, the new regime led by Hutu forces replaced the former colonial armed forces with only Hutu officers. When Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the rebel regime replaced the former white-settler army with forces drawn from the two rebel groups, ZANLA (composed mainly of ethnic Shona fighters) and ZIPRA (mainly Ndebele). Similarly, in South Africa following the end of apartheid, the new regime replaced the South African Defense Forces—officered entirely by whites during the previous regime—with fighters from the military wing of the African National Congress (largely ethnic Xhosa), the Inkatha Freedom Party (mostly Zulu), and home guard forces from the tribal reserves.

#### **4.3.2 Information Revelation: Minister of Defense Biographies**

Many African rulers lacked information about their political rivals, as a result of little political competition under colonization. Since leaders share power with elites who can threaten to unseat them, effective powersharing requires the leader to know which elites actually possess a credible threat of rebellion. This dilemma is alleviated in rebel regimes because fighting reveals information about which military elites can credibly threaten to overthrow the leader once the regime comes into power. Fighting creates and identifies war heroes, who then become the leader's primary challengers. An observable implication of this argument is that the elites who were appointed to the Minister of Defense position should be *important figures from the war*, rather than the leader's cronies or relatives. To verify this argument, we collected biographical details

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<sup>11</sup>These cases are Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Rwanda 94-NA, and Uganda.

about elites that served as Minister of Defense in rebel regimes, paying particular attention to the role they played in the war that brought the regime to power.

The biographical information confirms that elites who served as the Minister of Defense were influential leaders and co-combatants from the conflict that brought the regime into power. Therefore, they could credibly threaten the leader if he attempted to personalize power. Within the first 20 years of each regime, 85% of Defense Ministers were important figures from the war. Most of the remaining appointments who were *not* from the war tended to be career politicians, rather than the leader's relatives, which also suggests that rulers were not simply giving key portfolios to their cronies. For instance, Iko Carreira, the Angola's first Minister of Defense, served as head of security during the liberation war against Portugal. During that time, Carreira built the the army that would become the state military force after independence. Pedro Sebastiao, who was the third Minister of Defense in Angola, was a commander of the armed wing of the MPLA. He led the MPLA forces in the Battle of Nto, which was decisive in Angola's path to independence. Phillemon Malima, who was the second Minister of Defense in Namibia, had served as the SWAPO Representative to the USSR during the liberation war.

In Cape Verde, Silvino da Luz was appointed as the Minister of Defense from independence in 1975 until 1981. He had been the commander of the armed wing of the ruling PAIGC and was a ranking committee member of the party who had participated in secret negotiations during the war. In Eritrea, Petros Solomon was appointed as the first Defense Minister following independence. Solomon was a leading figure during the armed struggle. He was one of three members of the party's military committee, the head of the military intelligence unit, and a member of the political bureau of the party's Central Committee. Guinea-Bissau's first Defense Minister, Joao Bernardo Vieira, a celebrated guerilla commander, had been the police commissar and military chief in southern Guinea-Bissau during the war. In Mozambique, Tobias Joaquim Dai, who was the Minister of Defense from 2000-2008 had been the Commander of the FRELIMO Army during the civil war. Biographical information for the Minister of Defense in all rebel regimes is summarized in Appendix Table [A.18](#).

To sum, fighting helps leaders identify military elites who were especially influential during the war or controlled large combat units. After the regime comes into power, these war heroes then become the leader's primary challengers.

## 5 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION: CONTROLLING THE COUNTRYSIDE

One difficulty with studying rebel regimes to isolate the importance of elite powersharing is that existing research focuses on a distinct mechanism: rebel regimes can more effectively project power throughout the countryside. In Huntington's (1970) theory on the evolution of revolutionary regimes, he posits that a key contributor to revolutionary parties consolidating power is to eradicate existing societal cleavages. Similarly, Levitsky and Way (2013) and Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way (2019) argue that gaining power through violence, unleashing a program of social revolution, and defeating counterrevolutionaries eliminates alternative centers of power that underpinned the previous regime. If rebel regimes tend to uproot existing societal organizations and create a strong state, then elite unity may either be irrelevant or simply a byproduct of this more fundamental cause of stability for rebel regimes. We instead argue that this factor does not help to explain the durability of African rebel regimes.

### 5.1 IMPEDIMENTS TO SOCIETAL CONTROL IN AFRICA

Numerous Africa-specific considerations question whether rebel regimes can fundamentally transform society even if they attempt social revolution. Herbst (2000) discusses the generic problem that rulers in Africa throughout history—precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial—have faced to consolidating territorial control. A high land-to-population ratio has typically created incentives for residents to move rather than to submit to the will of an encroaching state. Before European colonialism began, states typically aimed to control people rather than specific territory, given the scarcity of the former. Despite superior military technology, European colonizers failed to solve this problem. They sought to impose “hegemony on a shoestring” and invested only enough to balance the budgets within the colonies (Berry 1992). In fact, by carving up the continent into territorially delineated spheres of influence—which later engendered the international borders for postcolonial African states—European rule likely exacerbated the problem of establishing effective territorial control. At independence, African rulers typically faced considerable difficulties to broadcasting power across their entire territory, not only because of the large size of many countries (Herbst 2000; Green 2012), but also because European rule typically failed to develop effective tax systems (Gardner 2012). These conditions pose daunting challenges for would-be revolutionaries to create an effective state that can transform society.

Salient ethnic divisions in many African countries have exacerbated these impediments to state consolida-

tion. Prior to European colonial rule, African ethnic groups tended to be small because of factors such as higher geographic variability (Michalopoulos 2012) and, at least in certain areas, heavy participation in the transatlantic slave trade (Whatley and Gillezeau 2011). Although European colonial governance increased the size of politically relevant ethnic groups,<sup>12</sup> European rule also hardened the political salience of ethnic differences by rigidly assigning ethnic identities to every individual. In an extreme case, Belgian officials distributed identification cards to distinguish Hutu and Tutsi in Ruanda-Urundi. Thus, at independence, most African rulers inherited European-drawn borders that contained numerous small and geographically segregated—as well as politically salient—ethnic groups that lacked a shared national identity or a history of common statehood (Englebert, Tarango and Carter 2002). Would-be revolutionaries face large hurdles to transforming these ethnic cleavages.

These conditions distinguish the typical African country from other areas in the world where existing hypotheses about revolutionary regimes establishing social control are more plausible. Consider, for example, three classic cases in which social revolutions preceded long-lasting authoritarian regimes: China, Russia, and Vietnam. Prior to the episode of state collapse that created an opportunity for revolutionary takeover, all three cases exhibited a long history of statehood across much of their modern country. Thus, state weakness was the exception rather than the rule in these countries.<sup>13</sup> Additionally, each country contains a large ethnic majority group that governed the historical state.<sup>14</sup> Although these factors did not preordain that the revolutionary group would consolidate control over the countryside, they created more favorable conditions than in African states that lack a similar history. For these reasons, we do not expect existing hypotheses about rebel regimes—revolutionary or otherwise—controlling the countryside to apply to Africa.

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<sup>12</sup>For example, British governing strategies generated incentives for individuals to identify with ethnic groups designated as Native Authorities (Posner 2005), and other empires initiated similar schemes.

<sup>13</sup>The specific episodes of state weakness that preceded revolutionary regimes were: in China, the fall of the Qing dynasty before World War I and the warlord period under Chiang Kai-shek; in Russia, the fall of the Romanov dynasty during World War I; and in Vietnam, the temporary collapse of French rule in Indochina during World War II.

<sup>14</sup>See also Taylor and Botea's (2008) analysis of the conditions in which Tilly's (1992) bellicose state theory applies to the post-colonial world. They compare Vietnam and Afghanistan and argue that "the existence of a core ethnic group that had served as the basis for a relatively long-standing political community in the past" (27) explains why war facilitated state-building in Vietnam but not Afghanistan.

Although this argument is somewhat difficult to test empirically, available evidence suggests that rebel regimes do not exhibit greater control over society than other regimes. We consider multiple measures given the difficulty of measuring this concept. The most informative results are perhaps those that use V-Dem’s Core Civil Society Index (Coppedge 2018) as the dependent variable, which is Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way’s (2019) preferred proxy for destruction of alternative centers of power. Higher values indicate a stronger and more autonomous civil society. Appendix Table A.14 shows no statistically significant differences, and in three of four specifications the coefficient estimate is positive, indicating stronger civil societies in rebel regimes. These findings for rebel regimes in Africa differ from the negative correlation that Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way (2019) find when assessing revolutionary regimes in a global sample. Other possible measures proposed in the literature include “stateness” and GDP per capita. We discuss these in Appendix Section A.4 and show null results for each.

## 5.2 COUNTERREVOLUTIONS AND STATE COLLAPSE

Rebel regimes in Africa not only face general challenges to consolidating societal control, but also frequently face armed challengers after gaining power. Of the eighteen rebel regimes, twelve (66%) experienced a major civil war within five years of gaining power. By contrast, this was true for only 18% of non-rebel regimes. Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way (2019) argue that the presence of these counterrevolutionary movements helps to unify elites. This enables the state to develop a strong coercive apparatus that, usually, quickly defeats the counterrevolutionary movement and consolidates control over society.<sup>15</sup> We argue instead, given the scope conditions of most African countries, that armed challengers to the regime can *destabilize* the regime if they persist for long periods, weaken the economy, and enjoy control over large swaths of territory beyond the regime’s reach—all of which are more closely associated with state collapse. When we combine these various countervailing effects of facing armed counterrevolutionary challengers, three possible paths emerge. For reasons just discussed, the first path should occur rarely in Africa. Although we lack a clear expectation for the frequency of the second and third paths, we expect both to occur empirically—contrary to implications of state control over society.

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<sup>15</sup>Their argument about elite unity suggests yet another advantage that rebel regimes enjoy for facilitating peaceful powersharing. See also Slater’s (2010) discussion of how counterrevolutionary movements foster elite unity.

1. Unified elites defeat the armed movement relatively quickly, resulting in a regime that faces few challenges from either elites or society. This is the predominant path that Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way (2019) discuss.
2. The counterrevolutionary struggle unifies elites—which enables the regime to survive for long periods—but also hinders the state’s control beyond the capital. Despite preventing *overthrow* by the insurgents, the regime exhibits tenuous control over its society.
3. The armed movement overthrows the rebel regime, possibly leading to state collapse.

Of the twelve rebel regime cases that faced armed insurgents within five years of taking power, seven endured conflicts that lasted at least a decade. Compared to non-rebel regimes, Appendix Table A.17 shows that rebel regimes are more likely to experience major civil wars. This holds even if we exclude the first five years of each regime, which could potentially correspond—as Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way (2019) suggest—with a short counterrevolutionary movement that subsequently strengthens the revolutionary regime. Although there is a statistically detectable difference in civil war incidence only for non-liberation rebel regimes, the colonial liberation case of Angola (which Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way 2019 code as revolutionary) exemplifies a regime that endures for a long period despite weak societal control. Following a lengthy liberation war with Portugal, the government (MPLA) faced a high-intensity center-seeking challenge from UNITA between 1975 and 2002, which had also participated in the liberation struggle. By the time the post-independence period began, UNITA had become a counterrevolutionary movement funded by South Africa and the United States to counter the Marxist orientation of MPLA, who received military backing from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Angola is a typical rebel regime with regard to the military powersharing mechanisms: MPLA created the state military during the liberation struggle, and it has been immune to coups while consistently sharing power with military elites.

Whatever beneficial effects the presence of the UNITA threat may have had on promoting unity among elites within MPLA and its military, the Angolan regime nearly fell in the 1990s due to the collapse of the state in much of the country. “Cumulatively, four decades of fighting have unmade and reshaped Angola, socially and physically. Most of the conflict took place in the countryside, depopulating rural areas and crippling a once vibrant rural economy. The country, which in 1975 was the world’s fourth largest exporter of coffee, had few commercial coffee farms at all by 2002. Roads and bridges were systematically destroyed and



the soil sown indiscriminately with landmines,” and state weakness also created an opening for rebels in Cabinda to attempt to secede (Le Billon 2007, 104-5). UNITA held territory and mined diamonds outside the government’s stronghold in Luanda. In 1992, as part of a ceasefire, MPLA participated in elections judged free and fair by the international community, thus creating an alternative channel through which UNITA might have gained power. However, MPLA won and UNITA rejected the results, leading to renewed fighting (Fituni 1995, 152).

The inability of MPLA to gain control over the national territory until 27 years after independence is unsurprising when considering factors stressed by Africanists. Herbst (2000) scores Angola as among the African countries with the most difficult political geographies given its large size and scattered population centers, and specifically asserts that “[t]he large territory of Angola has made it extremely difficult for the government to find a military solution to the civil war that began at independence in 1975” (151). The country’s borders are a product of negotiations between Portugal and Britain in the late nineteenth century, and include significant territory beyond the historical Mbundu kingdoms of Kasanje and Matamba. These borders contain several medium-sized and regionally segmented ethnic groups whose historical rivalries ultimately undermined the initial promise in the 1960s that the liberation movement would develop a unified nationalist identity, as opposed to distinct ethnic organizations (Fituni 1995, 149; Le Billon 2007, 102; Reno 2011, 64-78).<sup>16</sup> As in many countries with similar histories, members of an ethnic group that was organized as a state prior to colonization (Mbundu in MPLA) gained control of the government at independence and did not share power with members of other ethnic groups (Paine 2019b). Overall, Angola exemplifies that regime durability and state weakness are not mutually exclusive.

Despite long civil wars in many African rebel regimes, it is striking that none fell to armed challengers. However, there are still cases that support our third path proposed above. In three cases, the state entered a “warlord” period following armed overthrow of the government: Liberia from 1990 to 1997, Chad from 1979 to 1982, and Somalia from 1991 onward. Although these are exceptional cases, when combined with

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<sup>16</sup>For MPLA, the main ethnic constituency is the Mbundu, who are primarily located near the capital city of Luanda and compose 20% of the population. For UNITA, it is the Ovimbundu, located in the central highlands and composing 35% of the population. The third major anti-colonial rebel group (defeated several years after independence) was FNLA, represented by Bakongo in the northwest of the country with 15% of the population. Cabindan Mayombe, of the separatist rebel group FLEC, compose 2% of the population.

cases on the second path like Angola, they indicate that the typical result from armed reactions to rebel regimes is weak rather than strong control over society.

## 6 CONCLUSION

This article explains sources of regime durability in Africa by arguing that violent armed conflict produces particularly durable (and usually authoritarian) regimes. Rebel regimes, unlike coup regimes, face lower risks associated with the incorporation of coercive actors. Because military elites are particularly good at deposing leaders, powersharing with these coercive actors can actually enhance their ability to overthrow the ruler. However, rebel regimes benefit from unique opportunities to get their allies in place in the military and to learn information about their main enemies. These factors enable leaders to safely share power with their co-conspirators without risking a high probability of overthrow. Neither coup regimes nor civilian regimes share these advantages, although there is considerable heterogeneity within the latter. Using an original dataset of regime outcomes and powersharing in all African countries from 1960 to 2010, we provide empirical evidence of our argument. First, we show that victorious rebel groups are significantly less likely to experience regime failure, compared with regimes that do not emerge out of conflict. This holds when instrumenting for colonial liberation regimes with the percentage of a country's territory suitable for European settlement. Second, we show evidence that rebel regimes are significantly more likely to share power with military elites (who in most cases were important figures during the guerrilla struggle), significantly less likely to face coup attempts, and always transform the existing state military.

Our study produces new contributions to research on African politics and theories of authoritarian stability. Despite the fact that the vast majority of African regimes have been—and continue to be—authoritarian, the roots of autocratic stability in the region have largely been ignored. Instead, existing studies of African politics have generally focused on democratization, governance, and variation in democratic institutions. Conversely, studies of authoritarian regimes have also largely ignored African cases in theory building, and instead, have focused on cases such as the Soviet Union, China, or Mexico under the PRI—which are outliers among authoritarian regimes. Here, we bridge this gap between African politics and theories of authoritarian durability. This is particularly important when considering that 40% of authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010 are located in Africa.<sup>17</sup> Yet our findings also carry important implications for democratization

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<sup>17</sup>Calculated using data from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014).

in Africa. The stability created by sharing power between rulers and military elites undermines long-run prospects for transitioning to multiparty democracy. Consequently, many exceptions to post-Cold War democratization in Africa had origins in violent conflict. Some of these cases were colonial liberation regimes, whereas other rebel regimes formed later (e.g., Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda). But our findings hold regardless of whether the rebel regime is coded as democratic or authoritarian, although most of these regimes are unambiguously non-democratic. Consider two cases, South Africa and Namibia, that ended white rule in the 1990s. Although each has many democratic characteristics, they—like virtually all rebel regimes in Africa—had not experienced party turnover as of 2019. Overall, our analysis of rebel regimes advances our understanding of theoretical tradeoffs for powersharing, authoritarian stability, and democratization.

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# Online Appendix

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## A SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR REGRESSION TABLES

### A.1 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR TABLE 3

We assessed the robustness of the estimates in Table 3 to jackknife sample alterations. For each column in Table 3, we iteratively dropped each country in the sample. In each of the 99 regressions with the aggregate rebel regimes indicator, the estimate of its negative effect is statistically significant at 1%. (There are 50 countries in the sample for Column 1 and 49 for Column 2, for a total of 99.) Due to the smaller number of rebel regimes in each disaggregated category, those specifications are somewhat more sensitive to dropping long-lasting rebel regimes. In 88 of the 99 specifications with the disaggregated rebel regime indicators, colonial liberation regimes is statistically significant at 5%, and in one (Mozambique in Column 4) the p-value rises above 0.10. In only half of the jackknife specifications is the non-liberation rebel regimes indicator significant at 5%, and dropping any of the following countries in Column 3 (although not in Column 4) leads to a p-value above 0.10: Chad, DRC, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. Thus, taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that even non-colonial liberation rebel regimes are more durable than non-rebel regimes, but the small number of cases in this category necessitates some caution for reaching sharp conclusions.

Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) present a commonly used metric that estimates how large the bias from unobserved covariates would need to be for the true coefficient to be 0 in a statistical model, given information from how much adding observable covariates changes the estimates. To compute this measure, Table A.1 compares the coefficient estimate for rebel regimes in Column 2 to that in Column 1, and the coefficient estimates for colonial liberation regimes and other rebel regimes in Column 4 to the corresponding estimates in Column 3. Their metric is computed for linear models, and therefore I use Table A.2 to generate the estimates. Negative numbers in Table A.1 imply that the coefficient estimate in the specification with covariates exceeds in magnitude the coefficient estimate in the restricted specification. This indicates an estimate highly robust to omitted covariates because the magnitude of the bias of unobserved covariates would need to go in the opposite direction as the bias from omitting observables to drive the coefficient estimate to 0. This occurs for other rebel regimes. In the specification with aggregate rebel regimes, the large positive number in Table A.1 shows that adding covariates only minimally affects the coefficient estimates: the bias from unobservables would need to be 62.1 times larger than the bias from omitting the covariates contained in these specifications to overturn the positive coefficient estimate. The corresponding figure for colonial liberation regimes is smaller (2.7), but still relatively large. For comparison, Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) calculate a corresponding figure of 3.55 for their own analysis, which they interpret as large in magnitude. Overall, the insensitivity of the coefficient estimates to adding covariates implies that—although it is impossible to control for every possible confounder—if the control variables included the tables are substantively relevant, then there is less reason to believe that covariates not included in any of the specifications would overturn the results.

**Table A.1: Assessing Sensitivity to Unobserved Covariates**

Column in Table A.2:	(2)	(4)
Rebel regime	62.1	-
Colonial liberation regime	-	2.7
Other rebel regime	-	-2.7

**Table A.2: Baseline Regressions with OLS**

	DV: Regime failure			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0411*** (0.00756)	-0.0404*** (0.0100)		
Colonial liberation regime			-0.0416*** (0.00800)	-0.0304** (0.0127)
Other rebel regime			-0.0400*** (0.0126)	-0.0629*** (0.0155)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0247*** (0.00600)		-0.0270*** (0.00682)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-0.00382 (0.0108)		-0.00363 (0.0108)
Country-years	2,234	2,214	2,234	2,214
R-squared	0.009	0.044	0.009	0.045
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.2 is identical to Table 3 except it estimates Equation 1 as a linear model. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A.3: Baseline Regressions with Double-Clustered Standard Errors**

	DV: Regime failure			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-1.462*** (0.444)	-1.613*** (0.470)		
Colonial liberation regime			-1.586*** (0.570)	-1.392** (0.695)
Other rebel regime			-1.242* (0.650)	-1.890*** (0.659)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.772*** (0.182)		-0.784*** (0.184)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-0.112 (0.280)		-0.108 (0.281)
Country-years	2,234	1,925	2,234	1,925
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.3 is identical to Table 3 except the standard errors are double-clustered by regime and country. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A.4: Comparing Rebel Regimes to Coup Regimes**

	DV: Regime failure			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-1.732*** (0.464)	-1.856*** (0.581)		
Colonial liberation regime			-1.880*** (0.580)	-1.562** (0.782)
Other rebel regime			-1.466** (0.718)	-2.216*** (0.827)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.860*** (0.271)		-0.898*** (0.273)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		0.704** (0.323)		0.717** (0.323)
Country-years	1,189	847	1,189	847
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.4 is identical to Table 3 except it limits the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes). \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## A.2 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE RESULTS

### A.2.1 Historical Background on African Colonialism

Following decades of relatively peaceful European rule in Africa, the colonial project fell into crisis after World War II. Greater mobilization ability by Africans, weakened European powers with domestic populations more skeptical of overseas rule, and a shift to a bipolar international system with two superpowers hostile to overseas colonialism forced new choices onto European colonists (Young 1994). In most cases, it was clear to both metropolitan officials and major producers that the economic costs of retaining colonial rule outweighed the benefits (Fieldhouse 1986), especially when factoring in the higher likelihood that Africans would revolt without reforms. Consequently, in the two decades following World War II, most of the continent peacefully transitioned to African majority rule and independence.

The main exceptions were territories with sizable European populations. Wherever they settled in large numbers, European settlers usually composed a politically influential interest group—and, in independent South Africa and semi-independent Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), they directly controlled the state. White settlers had considerable vested interests in their domination of the best land, a non-mobile asset they expected to lose under African majority rule. Their control of land also created a cheap and mobile labor supply of Africans that they could exploit (Mosley 1983). Consequently, European settlers fiercely resisted delegating control to the African or Arab majority, which frequently engendered decolonization violence. Using data from Paine (2019c), among the seven territories with the largest European population shares around World War II, 100% experienced a major colonial liberation war; among the next ten-highest, 40%; and among the 25 lowest, 4%. (The highest category contains cases with European population shares between 2.7% and 20.1%, the middle category between 0.4% and 2.5%, and the lowest category no greater than 0.4%.) Although African rebel groups did not gain control of the post-colonial state whenever there was a major decolonization war, the European population percentage was high in every case we code as a colonial liberation regime, except two. Guinea-Bissau's decolonization war was essentially a spillover of Portugal's wars in Angola and Mozambique. Both these colonies, in particular Angola, had significant settler populations. (Paine 2019c discusses how white settler influence over the colonial regime was lesser but still considerable in the Portuguese cases.) Additionally, Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia rather than from a European country.

### A.2.2 Instrumental Variable

Climatic factors that influenced prospects for European settlement provide a plausible instrumental variable for colonial liberation regimes. Historians have discussed conditions required for replicating large-scale European agricultural settlements in Africa (Mosley 1983, 5; Lutzelschwab 2013, 145). Temperate climate, found at the northern and southern tips of the continent, enabled large-scale European-style farming settlements. The remainder of the continent contains tropical climate, which obviates most temperate farming practices. However, Europeans could cultivate similar cereal crops as at home in tropical areas that met three conditions. First, they needed high enough rainfall to grow crops. Second, high enough elevation created moderate temperatures. Third, Europeans needed land without the tsetse fly, which causes sleeping sickness in humans.

We use a variable from Paine (2019c) that combines GIS data for climate, rainfall, elevation, and tsetse fly prevalence. For each country, the variable measures the logged percentage of territory that had either (a) Mediterranean climate, or (b) all three of (1) rainfall of at least 20 inches per year, (2) 3,000 feet in elevation (Mosley 1983, 5), and (3) the lowest quartile on Alsan's (2015) tsetse fly suitability index. We

do not include desert and semi-desert area to eliminate territory where very few people, European or not, would settle. Figure A.1 depicts these conditions. The variable used below takes the natural log to prevent a handful of cases with extreme values of the instrument from driving the results.

**Figure A.1: African Territory Suitable for Large-Scale European Settlement**



Three main considerations motivate why this is a reasonable instrument for studying the effects of colonial liberation regimes. First, all components of the instrument are exogenous in the sense that they are not caused by political factors that could affect regime durability. Importantly, the tsetse fly data comes from Alsan’s (2015) tsetse fly suitability index—which is derived from historical climate data—rather than from colonial or post-colonial maps of tsetse fly prevalence, which may be affected by climate change or by stronger states better able to control the fly (389). It is of course possible that due to finite sample bias there is some degree of imbalance on confounders between colonies with a large versus small percentage of its territory suitable for European settlement, but (1) there is no *a priori* reason to believe this bias artificially supports the main hypothesis, and (2) we use the same groups of covariates as above to demonstrate the robustness of the European settlers coefficient estimate across various specifications.

Second, Appendix Table A.6 demonstrates that the instrumental variable is strongly correlated with rebel regimes. We prefer estimating 2SLS estimates of colonial liberation regimes directly on land suitability rather than a 3SLS specification with an intermediate stage that controls for European population percentage given the difficulty of satisfying and assessing the additional exclusion restrictions. All the specifications control for population density in 1800 to account for several outlying cases (Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda) whose prior history of state development made it difficult for Europeans to settle despite favorable geographical conditions (see also Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002). This covariate strengthens the first stage correlation, although it does not qualitatively alter the 2SLS estimates (results available upon request).

Third, the exclusion restriction seems quite plausible. One would have to construct an alternative explanation for how particular climatic conditions affected regime durability independent of their effect on rebel regimes. Related research examines how these climatic conditions (by affecting the size of the European settler population) generated violence during and after independence (Paine 2019c; Paine and Roessler 2019). However, this is not an independent channel from our main explanatory factor, because this violence generated the colonial liberation regimes. In addition to the lack of existing theory that supports such a con-

nection, Appendix Table A.8 demonstrates that only relatively large violations of the exclusion restriction would overturn the results.

### A.2.3 Results

Columns 1 and 2 of Table A.5 present findings from two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions that estimate simultaneous equation models composed of the linear analog of Equation 1 and:

$$R_{it} = \beta_{0,Z} + \beta_Z \ln Z_i + \mathbf{X}'_{it} \beta_{X,Z} + \mathbf{T}'_{it} \beta_T + \epsilon_{Z,it}, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where  $Z_i$  is the instrument. In Columns 3 and 4, the first-stage equation is:

$$CL_{it} = \beta_{0,Z} + \beta_Z \ln Z_i + \beta_{OR} OR_{it} + \mathbf{X}'_{it} \beta_{X,Z} + \mathbf{T}'_{it} \beta_T + \epsilon_{Z,it}, \quad (\text{A.2})$$

where  $CL_{it}$  indicates colonial liberation regimes and  $OR_{it}$  indicates other rebel regimes. We use the instrument only for colonial liberation regimes given the theoretical justification that climatic factors affected rebel regimes by triggering decolonization conflicts. Although the dependent variable is binary, it is standard to estimate such instrumental variable regressions with 2SLS (Angrist 2001). Additionally, the discreteness of the endogenous regressor—colonial liberation regimes—causes particular problems for nonlinear endogenous regressor models by violating the assumption of additive, independent errors (Wooldridge 2014, 227). Furthermore, linear and nonlinear models tend to produce similar results for non-extreme values of the explanatory variable (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 107) and, as noted, logging the climate instrument guards against horizontal outliers.



**Table A.5: Instrumental Variable Regressions**

	DV: Regime failure			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (IV=land suitability)	-0.111** (0.0424)	-0.106*** (0.0388)		
Colonial liberation regime (IV=land suitability)			-0.116** (0.0483)	-0.111** (0.0447)
Other rebel regime			-0.0662*** (0.0128)	-0.0736*** (0.0151)
ln(pop dens. in 1800)	0.00159** (0.000744)	0.000999 (0.000726)	0.00114 (0.000703)	0.000711 (0.000675)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0166** (0.00808)		-0.0152* (0.00874)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-0.00528 (0.0138)		-0.00549 (0.0139)
Country-years	1,925	1,923	1,925	1,923
R-squared	0.002	0.036	0.002	0.035
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

*Notes:* Table A.5 presents a series of 2SLS estimates with Equation A.1 as the first stage. The sample differs from that in Table 3 because island countries (except Madagascar) and countries that did not gain independence from a European country (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia) are missing data on the climate instrument. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

The estimates in Table A.5 reaffirm those in Tables 3 and A.2. In fact, the magnitude of the estimates is larger in every column of Table A.5 compared to the corresponding OLS estimate in Table A.2. Appendix Table A.6 presents the first-stage regressions using Equation A.1 only, showing in three of the four specifications, the partial F-test for the instrument exceeds the conventional standard of 10 for a weak instrument, and equals 9.7 in the other (Staiger and Stock 1997). Finally, to complement the substantive argument above that the exclusion restriction is reasonable, below, in Table A.8, we formally assess how badly the exclusion restriction would have to be violated for the Table A.5 findings to lose statistical significance. Between 30% and 41% of the effect of the instrument must occur through other channels for the results to fail to be statistically significant at 5%, and between 46% to 50% at 10% significance.

## A.2.4 Additional Technical Details

**Table A.6: First-Stage Regressions for Table A.5**

	DV: Regime failure			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(Potential Eu. settlers)	0.0543*** (0.0158)	0.0620*** (0.0161)	0.0487*** (0.0156)	0.0547*** (0.0158)
Other rebel regime			-0.102** (0.0479)	-0.101* (0.0594)
ln(pop dens. in 1800)	-0.00140 (0.00580)	-0.00186 (0.00605)	-0.00925*** (0.00308)	-0.00853** (0.00363)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0470 (0.0651)		0.0749 (0.0701)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-0.185** (0.0879)		-0.168** (0.0810)
Country-years	1,925	1,923	1,925	1,923
R-squared	0.183	0.270	0.224	0.314
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
F-test for IV	11.8	14.9	9.7	12

Notes: OLS. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A.7: Reduced-Form Regressions for Table A.5**

	DV: Regime failure			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(Potential Eu. settlers)	-0.00601*** (0.00162)	-0.00659*** (0.00167)	-0.00567*** (0.00163)	-0.00608*** (0.00169)
Other rebel regime			-0.0542*** (0.0119)	-0.0624*** (0.0138)
ln(pop dens. in 1800)	0.00174*** (0.000584)	0.00120* (0.000629)	0.00222*** (0.000613)	0.00166** (0.000644)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0216*** (0.00690)		-0.0235*** (0.00705)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		0.0144 (0.0111)		0.0132 (0.0111)
Observations	1,925	1,923	1,925	1,923
R-squared	0.014	0.049	0.017	0.052
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: OLS. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Because the exclusion restriction is unlikely to be perfectly satisfied in any social scientific research, it is important to assess how badly the exclusion restriction would have to be violated for the results presented above to be invalid. Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) provide a suitable method with the stated purpose: “Often the instrument exclusion restriction that underlies the validity of the usual IV inference is suspect; that is, instruments are only plausibly exogenous. We present practical methods for performing inference while relaxing the exclusion restriction” (260). They assume that instead of the linear link for Equation 1, the dependent variable is generated by:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_R R_{it} + \gamma \ln Z_i + \mathbf{X}'_{it} \beta_X + \mathbf{T}'_{it} \beta_T + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (\text{A.3})$$

If  $\gamma \neq 0$ , then the instrument directly affects the outcome, i.e., the exclusion restriction is not perfectly satisfied. Although it is likely that  $\gamma \neq 0$  in any applied research situation, this is only problematic for the present 2SLS estimates of the rebel regime coefficients if  $\gamma$  is large in magnitude. Because  $\gamma$  is unobservable, it is crucial to examine how the results would change for different hypothetical values of  $\gamma$ . Table A.8 states for each specification in Table A.5 the value of  $\gamma$  for which the p-value of the 2SLS estimated effect of rebel regimes (or the disaggregated indicators) would equal either 0.05 or 0.10. If the true  $\gamma$  is negative and smaller in magnitude than the amount stated in the table, then the coefficient estimate for rebel regimes from the stated column in Table A.5 is statistically significant at the stated threshold. If instead the true  $\gamma$  is positive, then the magnitude of the coefficient estimate from the regression table is *downwardly* biased. The numbers in parentheses in Table A.8 state the  $\gamma$  thresholds as a percentage of the reduced form estimated effect of the instrument on regime failure.

**Table A.8: Sensitivity of IV Results to Exclusion Restriction Violations**

Column in Table A.5:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Stat. sig. at 5% if $\gamma \geq$	-.0022	-.0027	-.0017	-.0019
(% of reduced-form estimate)	(37%)	(41%)	(30%)	(31%)
Stat. sig. at 10% if $\gamma \geq$	-.003	-.003	-.0026	-.0028
(% of reduced-form estimate)	(50%)	(46%)	(46%)	(46%)

Table A.8 demonstrates that the 2SLS estimates are insensitive to relatively large violations of the exclusion restriction. Approximately one-third of the reduced form effect of the instrument on regime failure must occur through channels other than colonial liberation regimes for the liberation regimes coefficient estimate not to be significant at least at the 5% level. The corresponding figure is roughly half for the 10% level. We lack an alternative hypothesis suggesting an alternative channel of this magnitude.

### A.3 SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR TABLES 5 AND 4

**Table A.9: Coup Attempts without Algeria**

	DV: Successful coups				DV: All coup attempts			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.605*** (0.552)	-1.595*** (0.602)			-1.124*** (0.377)	-1.165*** (0.370)		
Colonial liberation regime			-1.546** (0.661)	-1.378* (0.751)			-1.453*** (0.377)	-1.445*** (0.321)
Other rebel regime			-1.715* (0.974)	-1.943** (0.979)			-0.748 (0.583)	-0.847 (0.630)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.681*** (0.215)		-0.691*** (0.215)		-0.348** (0.135)		-0.327** (0.142)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-0.180 (0.279)		-0.178 (0.280)		-0.301 (0.223)		-0.303 (0.222)
Observations	2,185	1,572	2,185	1,572	2,185	2,072	2,185	2,072
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.0344	0.0860	0.0344	0.0864	0.0551	0.105	0.0560	0.106
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.9 is identical to Table 5 except every specification drops Algeria. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A.10: Coup Attempts: Rebel Regimes and Coup Regimes**

	DV: Successful coups				DV: All coup attempts			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.444*** (0.491)	-1.353*** (0.513)			-1.152*** (0.381)	-1.048*** (0.376)		
Colonial liberation regime			-1.285** (0.552)	-1.070* (0.620)			-1.219** (0.478)	-1.206*** (0.450)
Other rebel regime			-1.892* (0.981)	-2.088** (0.973)			-1.038* (0.594)	-0.751 (0.706)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.517* (0.297)		-0.592* (0.317)		-0.108 (0.183)		-0.0609 (0.194)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0 (0)		0 (0)		-0 (0)		-0 (0)
British colony		0.629* (0.324)		0.647** (0.328)		0.414 (0.259)		0.409 (0.259)
Country-years	1,189	759	1,189	759	1,189	1,016	1,189	1,016
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0555	0.112	0.0563	0.114	0.0724	0.124	0.0726	0.125
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.10 is identical to Table 5 except it limits the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes). \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A.11: Military Powersharing: Rebel Regimes and Coup Regimes**

	DV: Defense Minister Appointed				DV: Defense Minister Appointment Stable			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	2.028*** (0.547)	1.678*** (0.530)			1.602*** (0.307)	1.383*** (0.336)		
Colonial liberation regime			2.403*** (0.666)	2.417*** (0.520)			1.864*** (0.317)	1.889*** (0.302)
Other rebel regime			1.645** (0.752)	0.728 (0.788)			1.254*** (0.416)	0.660 (0.477)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0333 (0.305)		-0.244 (0.288)		0.00829 (0.204)		-0.191 (0.201)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-0.567 (0.504)		-0.550 (0.480)		-0.226 (0.347)		-0.215 (0.323)
Country-years	1,014	989	1,014	989	1,014	979	1,014	979
R <sup>2</sup>	0.131	0.200	0.135	0.212	0.118	0.156	0.122	0.167
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.11 is identical to Table 4 except it limits the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes). \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A.12: Vice Presidential Appointment**

	DV: Vice President Appointed				DV: Vice President Appointment Stable			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.288 (0.469)	-0.0252 (0.601)			0.366 (0.330)	0.277 (0.352)		
Colonial liberation regime			-0.119 (0.536)	-0.204 (0.804)			0.224 (0.405)	0.233 (0.486)
Other rebel regime			1.017 (0.785)	0.289 (0.695)			0.577 (0.474)	0.337 (0.485)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.615** (0.300)		0.641** (0.303)		0.303 (0.203)		0.310 (0.212)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0 (0)		-0 (0)		-0 (0)		-0 (0)
British colony		1.040** (0.459)		1.034** (0.458)		0.611** (0.274)		0.610** (0.274)
Country-years	1,893	1,873	1,893	1,873	1,850	1,831	1,850	1,831
R-squared	0.0416	0.241	0.0483	0.242	0.0319	0.100	0.0327	0.101
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A.13: Ethnic Powersharing**

	DV: % pop. included at center			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0696 (0.107)	-0.111 (0.113)		
Colonial liberation regime			-0.0883 (0.141)	-0.166 (0.153)
Other rebel regime			-0.0266 (0.0939)	0.00953 (0.104)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0634 (0.0454)		0.0771 (0.0470)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		0.0147 (0.0769)		0.0137 (0.0771)
Country-years	2,234	2,214	2,234	2,214
R-squared	0.005	0.046	0.006	0.053
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: OLS. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

#### A.4 REGRESSION TABLES FOR CONTROLLING THE COUNTRYSIDE

Measuring a regime’s control over society is particularly difficult. As noted in the text, we following Lachapelle, Levitsky and Way (2019) by using V-Dem’s Core Civil Society Index (Table A.14). Another relevant measure is the Bertelsmann Transformation Index’s (BTI) “stateness” variable, which equals the average of scores on four categories: (1) monopoly on the use of force, (2) state identity, (3) no interference in religious dogmas, and (4) basic administration. Since the third category is irrelevant for our purposes, we computed the average among the other three. The main drawback of this variable is its limited temporal coverage, since it begins in 2006. Table A.15 uses the average value of our adjusted stateness variable for 2006, 2008, and 2010, and shows null correlations for a cross-section of countries in 2006 (i.e., the rebel regime variable is based on the country’s rebel regime status in 2006). We also consulted Hendrix’s (2010) survey of state capacity measures used in the civil war literature. As he discusses, most of these measures do not directly capture state control over society. We present a table with GDP per capita (Table A.16) given its widespread use in the conflict literature (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003), although this is a crude proxy. The only systematic relationship is that non-liberation rebel regimes have lower GDP per capita—which suggests less rather than more state control over society—but this is not surprising given the long civil wars fought by many of the rebel regimes to gain power. Many other measures discussed in Hendrix (2010) discuss the rule of law and natural resources, which are not relevant for our purposes.

**Table A.14: Strength of Civil Society**

	DV: V-Dem Core Civil Society Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.00385 (0.0590)	-0.0269 (0.0368)		
Colonial liberation regime			-0.0375 (0.0699)	0.000184 (0.0464)
Other rebel regime			0.0736 (0.0757)	-0.0869 (0.0547)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0228 (0.0203)		-0.0297 (0.0221)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0 (0)		-0 (0)
British colony		0.153*** (0.0397)		0.153*** (0.0402)
Country-years	2,233	2,213	2,233	2,213
R-squared	0.000	0.447	0.007	0.451
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: OLS. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A.15: Stateness**

	DV: Adjusted BTI stateness			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.153 (0.547)	-0.129 (0.524)		
Colonial liberation regime			0.558 (0.474)	0.509 (0.561)
Other rebel regime			-0.954 (0.741)	-0.745 (0.734)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.476* (0.272)		0.285 (0.285)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0 (0)		-0 (0)
British colony		0.422 (0.561)		0.448 (0.568)
Countries	41	40	41	40
R-squared	0.252	0.330	0.316	0.361
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year	2006	2006	2006	2006

Notes: OLS. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A.16: GDP Per Capita**

	DV: Logged GDP per capita			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	0.0558 (0.255)	0.0760 (0.242)		
Colonial liberation regime			0.421 (0.316)	0.405 (0.307)
Other rebel regime			-0.714*** (0.164)	-0.677*** (0.166)
ln(oil & gas income)		0*** (0)		0*** (0)
British colony		0.0798 (0.174)		0.0804 (0.165)
Country-years	2,213	2,213	2,213	2,213
R-squared	0.147	0.207	0.217	0.267
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: OLS. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .



**Table A.17: Civil War**

DV: Civil war incidence				
Panel A. Sample: all years				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	0.243** (0.100)	0.247*** (0.0922)		
Colonial liberation regime			0.0964 (0.105)	0.114 (0.0999)
Other rebel regime			0.582*** (0.111)	0.543*** (0.114)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0854*** (0.0247)		-0.0518** (0.0205)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-0.0137 (0.0484)		-0.0160 (0.0425)
Country-years	2,234	2,214	2,234	2,214
R-squared	0.071	0.150	0.142	0.197
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Panel B. Sample: years after first five of regime				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	0.221** (0.110)	0.220** (0.104)		
Colonial liberation regime			0.0994 (0.112)	0.103 (0.103)
Other rebel regime			0.570*** (0.161)	0.547*** (0.165)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0847*** (0.0266)		-0.0543*** (0.0198)
ln(oil & gas income)		0 (0)		0 (0)
British colony		-0.0451 (0.0568)		-0.0503 (0.0485)
Country-years	1,548	1,533	1,548	1,533
R-squared	0.062	0.148	0.129	0.199
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: OLS. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .