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**A HISTORY OF
MARINE CORPS ROLES AND MISSIONS
1775 - 1962**



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A HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS ROLES AND MISSIONS: 1775-1962

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Introduction

When an American thinks of the United States Marine Corps today, he most likely visualizes Leathernecks swarming ashore from landing craft to assault a fire-swept beach. His vision would be accurate as far as it goes, for the Marine Corps is primarily responsible for the development of amphibious doctrine for landing forces and is among the leading practitioners of landing operations. The amphibious operation, however, has been and continues to be just one skill, albeit a most important one, of the Marine Corps. Versatility is a well-known attribute of the Corps, and dating from the Revolutionary War, United States Marines have performed a wide variety of roles and missions in the national interest.

A clear understanding of the meaning of "roles" and "missions" is essential to an analysis of assignments that have been given to the Marine Corps by higher authority. But neither the word "role" nor "mission" appears in existing law or executive directive pertaining to the Marine Corps. Instead, the words "duty" and "function" are employed. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, (1) the basic law providing for the National Military Establishment and the coordination of all government agencies contributing to the national security, uses both terms indiscriminately and synonymously. As examples of this interchange of terminology, the Act states: "It shall be the function of the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization ..." while "The Joint Staff shall perform such duties...." (2)

Section 206(c) of the amended National Security Act of 1947, as codified and re-enacted into law as 10 USC 5013, reads in part:

(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet

in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.

(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

It is noted that the word "duty" appears in connection with but one of the above items. In section V, paragraph B, of Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," (3) all items pertaining to the Marine Corps are described as "functions," as follows:

(1) To provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. These functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land Army.

(2) To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, and security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases.

(3) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The Marine Corps shall have primary interest in the development of those landing force doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

In addition to these three functions taken generally from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, DoD 5100.1 lists two others:

(4) To train and equip, as required, Marine Forces for airborne operations, in coordination with the other Services and in accordance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(5) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment of interest to the Marine Corps for airborne operations and not provided for in section V, paragraph A.1.c. Army responsibilities for airborne operations (4)

From the time these functions were promulgated, there has been a general acceptance of the terms "roles" and "missions" as substitutes for the official language. The Marine Corps has manifested no aversion to these terms. General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps 1944-1947, wrote in 1948 that "The roles and missions of the Marine Corps are now affirmed in law.... These roles and missions...can best be stated in the very language which the Congress saw fit to use when enacting them." He then quoted Section 206(c) of the National Security Act of 1947.(4a)

These same five functions are set forth among the specific responsibilities of the Marine Corps in Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), (5) the purpose of which is stated, in part, as follows:

It provides military guidance governing both exercise of command by unified, specified, joint task force and other joint force commanders and doctrine for unified operations and training. It also provides military guidance for use by the Military Departments and the Armed Forces as needed in the preparation of their respective detailed plans.(6)

The Marine Corps Manual, under the heading "Functions," lists the functions of the Marine Corps as given in DoD 5100.1 plus two more, derived from Article 10, United States Code, paragraphs 5013 (c) and (a), respectively:

(6) To be prepared, in accordance with the integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components to meet the needs of war.

(7) To perform such other duties as the President may direct.(7)

Turning to the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, we find the following definitions:

Functions: The appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions or tasks of an individual, office or organization. As defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the term "function" includes functions, powers, and duties. (5 USC 171n (a))

Mission: 1. The objective; the task, together with the purpose, which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task.(8)

It is apparent from the foregoing, that the terms "roles" and "missions" are synonymous with "duties" and "functions" when they refer to tasks assigned to the Marine Corps by higher authority. It is in this sense that these terms will be used in this paper.

CONTINENTAL MARINES

Actions of the Continental Congress

On 10 November 1775, the Continental Congress resolved: "That two battalions of Marines be raised" and "that particular care be taken that no persons be appointed to office or enlisted into said Battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea, when required."(9) This was the first specific authorization of Marines by Congress, but it was not the first reference to Marines. In a resolution of 5 October 1775, Congress instructed General Washington, commanding the Continental forces investing Boston, to secure two vessels "on Continental risk and pay" and to "give the Commander or Commanders such instructions as are necessary and also proper encouragement to the Marines & Seamen that shall be sent on this enterprize." Additional vessels were authorized on 13, 27, and 30 October and on 2 November with provisions for their manning. Although Marines were not specifically mentioned, Congressional intent to include them is apparent from the fact that Marines were commissioned and enlisted to serve aboard these vessels.(10)

Service on Board Armed Vessels of the Navy

By these actions, the Continental Congress provided for Marines, but it did not specify a mission for them, except to say that they should be able "to serve to advantage by sea." Perhaps this omission came about because the customary duties

of Marines were so generally understood as to require no explanation. "It is so much a matter of course, to identify marines with the ship in which they serve," wrote James Fenimore Cooper, one of the earliest historians of the American Navy, "that we have not hitherto thought it necessary to digress from the course of events to speak particularly of this body of men." (11)

Cooper depicted the role of Marines aboard a man-of-war in the first half of the 19th century as follows:

The marines are strictly infantry soldiers, who are trained to serve afloat; and their discipline, equipments, spirit, character, and esprit de corps, are altogether those of an army. The marines impart to a ship of war, in a great degree, its high military character. They furnish all the guards and sentinels; in battle they repel, or cover the assaults of boarders; and at all times they sustain and protect the stern and necessary discipline of a ship by their organization, distinctive character, training, and we might add, nature. (12)

Amphibious Operations

The duties of the Marines raised for service in naval vessels were the conventional ones performed afloat. But the intent of Congress in authorizing the two battalions of Marines on 10 November 1775 was quite different. Although not specifically stated, there is little doubt that the mission Congress had in mind for these battalions was to carry out a landing operation in Nova Scotia. Such an operation was originally proposed by citizens of the border town of Machias, in the Maine district of Massachusetts. The Continental Congress established a Committee on Nova Scotia to study the proposal. It was this committee which reported out the resolution to raise two battalions of Marines. Tied to this resolution were two others, one directing Washington to conduct, if feasible, a raiding operation to seize or destroy British stores and fortifications in Nova Scotia, the other to send two spies there to gather intelligence on enemy strength and dispositions. (13)

Expeditionary employment of permanently organized tactical units of Marines, as distinct from ships' landing parties, was an established practice in the British service. During the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), England raised ten regiments of Marines, seven of them serving as the landing force in an amphibious operation to seize Cartagena on the Spanish Main (Colombia). One of these regiments was raised in North America as early as 1740. With the founding of the British Corps of Marines, later the Royal Marines, in 1755, permanent regiments of Marines were no longer maintained, but provisional battalions were organized from time to time for landing operations or service on shore. At Boston, in 1775, two such battalions were present, having been specially organized for the purpose of reinforcing the British garrison. (14)

The two battalions of Continental Marines, whether intended for a Nova Scotia operation or not, were not organized when first authorized because of personnel shortages. Continental Marines of ships' detachments, however, did participate in a similar operation of smaller scale. On 3 March 1776, Marines and seamen of an American naval squadron formed a landing party and seized New Providence in the Bahamas, carrying off a large quantity of arms and ammunition. In 1779, another provisional force of Marines played a major role in the amphibious operation carried out against a British advance naval base on Penobscot Bay. (15)

Land Warfare in Support of the Army

A new Marine mission evolved in 1776 when a battalion of three companies of Continental Marines were assigned to Washington's hard-pressed army. These Marines served throughout the Trenton-Princeton campaign as infantry troops. Thus began a practice, which continues until the present day, for Marines to reinforce the Army for land operations when additional well-trained and ready troops are needed.(16)

Following the signing of a peace treaty with Great Britain in 1783, the Marines were disbanded along with the Navy. During their eight years of existence, the Continental Marines had discharged three missions--service afloat, amphibious operations, and land warfare in support of the Army. Each of these missions was performed with great credit. Each set a precedent for the traditional roles played by Marines, and each, even at the present time, is still a mission of the United States Marine Corps.

ROLES AND MISSIONS UNDER THE LAW OF 1798

The outbreak of the Wars of the French Revolution, wherein both sides violated the neutral rights of America, led to the creation of a new United States Navy beginning in 1794. Marines served aboard the new warships from the first, and in 1798, Congress directed their organization into a distinct Service by establishing the Marine Corps.

"An Act for the Establishing and Organizing a Marine Corps" was signed into law by President John Adams on 11 July 1798. Two passages of this law provided the basis for assigning duties to the new Corps, and for 149 years, with minor changes, remained the only legal authority for Marine Corps missions. These two passages read as follows:

Section 3: That the detachments of the corps of marines hereby authorized, shall be made in lieu of the respective quotas of marines, which have been established or authorized for the frigates, and other

armed vessels and galleys, which shall be employed in the service of the United States; and the President of the United States may detach and appoint such of the officers of the marine corps, to act on board the frigates, and any of the armed vessels of the United States, respectively, as he shall, from time to time, judge necessary.

Section 6: That the marine corps, established by this act, shall, any time, be liable to do duty in the forts and garrisons of the United States, on the seacoast, or any other duty on shore, as the President, at his discretion, shall direct.(17)

The language of the law itself does not indicate which of these duties, if any, was to be the primary mission of the Corps, nor does it specify the extent of the duty on shore. Judging by the debates in the House of Representatives, the Congress created the new Marine Corps primarily to serve at sea on board warships.

While the resolution of 10 November 1775 merely provided for the raising of "two battalions of Marines," the Act of 1798 specifically assigned duties to the young Marine Corps. Justification for these assignments to duty on both land and sea, as noted in sections 3 and 6 of the Act quoted above, was based on a congressional desire to usefully employ the Marines when they were "occasionally" on shore. As the Chairman of the House Committee for the Protection of Commerce and Defense of the Country stated: "...the detachments...will be kept in proper discipline, and may be rendered useful in the fortifications, or elsewhere, as the public services may require."(18)

ACTS AND DIRECTIVES AMPLIFYING THE ACT OF 1798

Under these broad provisions of the Law, roles and missions of the Marine Corps gradually evolved through necessity. In 1834, Congress, by the "Act for the Better Organization of the United States Marine Corps," recognized that Marines could be "detached for service with the Army" when authorized by the President.(19)

It was not until 1908, however, that any attempt was made to define more specifically the general passages of the Act of 1798 by executive directive. In that year, a dispute between the Marine Corps and the Navy as to the roles and missions of the Marine Corps led President Theodore Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 969, which assigned the following duties to the Marine Corps:

- (1) To garrison the different navy-yards and naval stations, both within and beyond the continental limits of the United States.

(2) To furnish the first line of the mobile defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.

(3) To man such defenses, and to aid in manning, if necessary, such other defenses as may be erected for the defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.

(4) To garrison the Isthmian Canal Zone, Panama.

(5) To furnish such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as may be necessary in time of peace.(20)

Executive Order 969 was incorporated wholly into that section of Navy Regulations, 1909, dealing with the duties assigned the Marine Corps. That same section of Navy Regulations contained the following additional provisions:

(1) The Marine Corps shall be liable to do duty in the forts and garrisons of the United States on the seacoast, or any other duty on shore, as the President, at his discretion, may direct.

(2) Marines may be detached for service on board the armed vessels of the United States.(21)

From that time on, Navy Regulations contained similar duty assignments. Roles and missions of the Marine Corps were also specified, beginning in 1927, in Joint Action of the Army and Navy (JAAN)(22), the forerunner of today's Unified Action Armed Forces.

Study of the pertinent Congressional enactments and executive actions provides valuable insight into the development and character of the roles and missions of the Marine Corps. The following roles and missions, derived from Navy Regulations for 1909, are to be taken up in turn:

Service on Armed Vessels of the Navy

Intervention in Foreign Countries

Training Foreign Military Forces

Operations in Support of other Services

Marines as Security Forces

Defense of Advance Naval Bases

Amphibious Operations

Most of these historic roles and missions can be identified today in Unified Action Armed Forces.(23)

Service on Armed Vessels of the Navy

During the days of sail, the duties of a Marine afloat remained much as James Fenimore Cooper had depicted them. Admiral Farragut described the Marine Guard as "one of the great essentials of a man-of-war for the preservation of order and maintenance of discipline. They work and fight their guns well. It is next to impossible to maintain the efficiency of the ship and proper discipline without the restraints of the soldiers over the sailors."(24)

In 1866, the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives had this to say about Marines afloat:

Their discipline, equipment, character, and esprit de corps being that of the soldier, they necessarily give to the ship-of-war its military character. As sentinels they watch over the magazines, store-rooms, gangways, galleys, and all lights and fires required for the use of the ship; they guard all the public property and all prisoners of war...and at all times sustain and protect the discipline of a man-of-war by their organization, distinctive character, and peculiar training.(25)

With the building of the new steam-powered navy of armored ships and long-range guns, the attitude of officers of the Navy towards Marines afloat changed. Marines were no longer considered to be essential to the efficiency and discipline of a ship. Lieutenant William F. Fullam, USN, in 1890, described Marines afloat as harmful to the bluejackets, preventing their development of a military spirit and depriving them of the opportunity to develop trustworthiness by taking responsibility.(26)

Efforts to remove Marines from ships were made by a group of Navy officers in 1894 and 1895, but they were rejected by the Secretary of the Navy. These efforts continued, however, and were culminated in 1908 in Executive Order 969 which caused the removal of Marines from naval vessels.(27)

In the following year, the removal became a subject of Congressional investigation. Speaking for the Navy, Rear Admiral John E. Pillsbury, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, testified as follows:

The bluejacket of today is an entirely different character from the old-time sailor who was drafted into the service with the aid of a press gang, and who needed soldiers over him to enforce discipline and prevent lawless acts. The present enlisted force

of the navy does not, in the bureau's opinion, require a different force to maintain order in it any more than the soldiers of an army garrison need a differently uniformed and paid class of men to act as police over them. That the great majority of the enlisted force of the navy are self-respecting and law-abiding, and that they resent the suggestion that a different force is needed to maintain order among them, are well-known facts.(28)

The Marine Corps, however, did not share the Navy's opinion. Some, such as Colonel L. W. T. Waller, believed that Marines were still needed to preserve discipline aboard ship. The Commandant, Major General George F. Elliott, stressed the importance to the Marines of service afloat. "The advantage of having them aboard ship is the fact that they learn the ship's way....," he informed the House Subcommittee in rebuttal to Admiral Pillsbury. "They also...learn aboard ship to obey the orders of any officer They come quickly to military calls and they are obedient and under excellent discipline. If they are taken out and landed ashore for an expeditionary force, they can be easily transported in vessels or landed in small boats, and they are absolutely equipped with everything that the infantry needs to live on shore except draft animals."(29)

By attaching a rider to the naval appropriation bill, Congress prevented the removal of Marines from ships. But sea duty as a mission for the Marine Corps rapidly dwindled in importance as fewer and fewer Marines were assigned to it. In 1898, nearly half of the Marine Corps' strength had been engaged in sea duty, but by the end of World War I, only two per cent of the Corps was serving afloat. Other duties, even more difficult and responsible, were now occupying the energies of the Marine Corps.

Executive Order 969, of 12 November 1908, was the first written directive from higher authority to specify what missions were included in "any other duty on shore, as the President, at his discretion, shall direct." When Marines had been ordered off the ships, General Elliott had protested to President Theodore Roosevelt that "all the Marine officers I could reach believed it would be the death knell of the Marine Corps." The President had asked General Elliott whether he personally believed removal would be the death knell of the Corps, to which the Commandant replied "that I did not; that we were overworked now, and that they could be assigned duties of great importance." (30) The President then requested General Elliott to draft a paper setting forth what these important duties should be. Such a paper was submitted, and the missions enumerated in it were incorporated verbatim in Executive Order 969.

The Navy Regulations issued in 1920 retained, exactly as stated, that portion of the 1909 edition of the Regulations dealing with the Marine Corps' assigned missions. Service on board armed vessels of the United States was specifically stipulated in article 552 (3): "Marines may be detached for service on board the armed vessels of the United States, and the President may detach and appoint, for service on said vessels, such officers of said Corps as he may deem necessary." (31) This article, additionally forceful in that it had been enacted into law as Section 1616 of the Revised Statutes, remained in the Navy Regulations until 1948, when passage of the National Defense Act of 1947 called for rewriting the Regulations to conform to the new statute.

Interventions in Foreign Countries

As noted earlier, the Act of 1798 provided that the Marine Corps should be liable to perform "any other duty on shore, as the President, at his discretion, shall direct." Neither the language of the law itself nor the existing records of the debates concerning it provide any clue as to what the framers of the legislation intended these "additional duties" to be. But only two years were to elapse before a Marine force from the Constitution landed on foreign soil at Puerto Plata, Santo Domingo to spike the guns of a fort, while seamen from the American frigate seized a French letter of marque in the harbor. Justification for the act was that the United States was then engaged in an undeclared naval war with France to protect American commerce on the high seas. This intervention on foreign soil in time of peace was the first of many since carried out by the Marine Corps. Interventions are of two general types--political, to support a national interest; and nonpolitical, to protect the persons and property of individual citizens. Marines have been employed in both types. After 1848, Marines were involved in the various applications of force employed by the United States in establishing relations with oriental countries, particularly Japan, China, and Korea. (32)

After the building of a new Navy in the nineties, and the acquisition of world power status resulting from the Spanish-American War, incidents of United States political as well as nonpolitical intervention became more frequent. Marines saw service in China and in such Latin American countries as Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico.

The United States has resorted to nonpolitical intervention, for the protection of U. S. citizens and their property aboard, probably more often than any other nation. (33) Marines have been engaged in such operations all over the globe. Efforts to suppress piracy in the Mediterranean and Caribbean were among the first instances of nonpolitical intervention. However, landings to protect our citizens where the local government was unwilling or unable to do so have been the most frequent. In scope, such

interventions have ranged from the landing of a handful of Marines and sailors from a warship, such as the operation at Qualla Battoo, Sumatra, in 1831, to the employment of a provisional regiment of about 500 Marines from the 1st Marine Regiment in the Boxer Relief Expedition of 1900.

Until the 1880's, Marine interventions were carried out by the Marine detachments of warships. In 1885, however, two specially organized battalions went ashore at Colon in what is now the Panama Canal Zone. Interventions following the Spanish-American War became more frequent, requiring the use of more and more troops. Reflecting, at least in part, this increasing use of Marines in foreign operations, Executive Order 969 of 1908 provided a specific directive for the Marine Corps to "furnish such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as may be necessary in time of peace." The same language was repeated in Navy Regulations beginning in 1909. It is interesting to note that in 1927, the Marine Corps maintained forces of brigade size in China, Nicaragua, and Haiti. These troops added up to about 9,000 Marines, and accounted for approximately 50 per cent of the Marine Corps' strength.(34)

Training Foreign Military Forces

A by-product of the Marine occupations of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua was the necessity to organize and train military forces for these countries. There were two purposes behind this subsidiary mission; a short-range goal, to relieve Marines by utilizing native manpower; and a long-range one, to provide stability through indigenous police and military forces capable of preserving internal law and order. The local government would then be able to discharge its international obligations and avoid the danger of European intervention.

Two misunderstandings as to the status of the Marine Corps as an intervening force need to be clarified. First, the use of Marines rather than Army forces does not classify an operation as legitimate intervention rather than an act of war. No such distinction was made by the Department of State in Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces. One of the basic principles laid down in that publication is that "The use of the forces of the United States in foreign countries to protect the lives and property of American citizens ...does not constitute an act of war." *[Italics supplied]*.(35) In practice, this principle has been upheld by the employment of Army troops as well as Marine units as intervening forces on various occasions.

Second, the phrase "any other duty on shore, as the President...shall direct" does not confer on the President a special power to employ Marines in situations where he could not employ the other Services.(36) Right to Protect Citizens states that

"The President, as the chief executive of the nation charged with the responsibility of conducting our foreign intercourse, including the protection of our citizens abroad, has the authority to use the forces of the United States to secure such protection in foreign countries."(37)

Operations in Support of Other Services

Another Marine Corps mission under "any other duty on shore, as the President...shall direct," has been service in support of the Army and Air Force in land and air warfare. Foreshadowed by the participation of Continental Marines under Washington in the Trenton-Princeton campaign, the United States Marine Corps first served in this capacity in the Creek and Seminole Wars of 1836-1842. A battalion of Marines was in General Winfield Scott's army which captured Mexico City in the Mexican War, and another was present at the First Battle of Bull Run in the Civil War. In World War I, two brigades saw service with the American Expeditionary Force in France, although only one of them saw action.

The reason for assignment of Marines to this mission has usually been one of simple expediency--to reinforce the Army with trained regular troops when necessary. Marines, if not engaged in some more important duty, have been made available for service with the Army when reinforcements have been required. In 1836, a force of about 1,000 regular Army troops was attempting to subdue more than three times that number of Seminoles. Fighting then broke out with the Creeks, making reinforcement urgent, and President Jackson eagerly accepted the offer of a Marine regiment by the Commandant, Colonel Archibald Henderson. President Polk was similarly motivated in 1847 when he ordered Marines to reinforce General Winfield Scott's army in Mexico. "General Henderson stated that 6 companies of marines could be spared from the navy for land service," wrote the President in his diary. "I have written an order to the Secretary of the Navy to transfer them to the land forces under the immediate command of General Scott. I deemed it important that Gen'l Scott's column should be reinforced by all our available forces with as little delay as possible."(38)

For the Battle of Bull Run, the Union commanders needed every available man and pressed into service the 348 Marines then at the Marine Barracks in Washington.(39) Marines participated in no other land campaigns with the Army, nor were the Civil War Commandants particularly vigorous in pressing for such a mission. Unlike Henderson, they were apparently content to tend to routine administration from a Washington desk. Significantly, an effort was made to abolish the Marine Corps in 1866. Evidently, the Corps had not made enough of an impression either on the people or the Congress to make its position unchallengeable.

Major General Commandant George Barnett acted in 1917 as though he had benefited by this Civil War experience. From the first, he urged Marine participation in the AEF in France, in spite of the fact that all available Marines were required for naval missions. A strength estimate of 30 September 1916, forecast a requirement for 20,800 Marines to meet purely naval obligations in time of war. On that date, the Marine Corps numbered only 11,241, a figure which increased to about 14,500 by 6 April 1917, when the United States entered the war.(40) Of the four regiments sent to France, only one had any claim to existence on 6 April 1917. The 5th Marines, although not then organized as a regiment, was hastily put together using existing companies brought up to strength by newly recruited Marines. Personnel for the other three regiments, however, had to be recruited from civilian life, trained, equipped, and organized into units. Why, then, was the Marine Corps so eager to send Marines to fight in France?

Some Marines, including Brigadier General John A. Lejeune, the Assistant Commandant, realized that there was no chance for combat in any of the naval missions. The only chance for combat service was to join the AEF in France. "When the United States entered the World War, the Allied fleets had already obtained control of the sea except for the submarine menace," recalled Lejeune. "There was no available naval mission, therefore, for an advanced base or expeditionary force. At that time, our officers and men were clamoring for service. Their adventurous spirit would brook no delay. Their thoughts were constantly turned toward France."(41)

Combat service in France was of inestimable value to the Marine Corps. Marines fought well in a number of crucial operations, particularly Soissons and Blanc Mont. As a result, the American people developed "a boundless admiration for the Marine Corps," which has been evident ever since.(42)

In World War II, Marines, in addition to contributing in a major way to the naval campaign in the Pacific, served with the Army in land warfare during two Philippine campaigns--Bataan and Corregidor during the defense of the islands and again during their reconquest in 1944-1945. Marine aircraft and artillery supported Army forces in the latter operation. Marine flyers also participated in such air campaigns as the reduction of Rabaul along with flyers from the Army, Navy, and British Commonwealth. In the early summer of 1945, III Amphibious Corps served as part of Tenth Army in the conquest of Okinawa. That operations in support of other services will continue to be a mission of the Marine Corps is implicit in the "Principle of Support" prescribed in Unified Action Armed Forces, which states:

The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions assigned to one Service by the Functions Paper shall be employed to support and supplement the other Services in carrying out their primary functions wherever and whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objective.(43)

Marines as Security Forces

The guarding of Federal property at home and abroad and assistance to domestic civil authorities have been Marine Corps missions since the passage of the Act of 1798. These missions were derived from the catch-all passage, "to do duty in the forts and garrisons of the United States, on the sea-coast, or any other duty on shore, as the President, at his discretion, shall direct." One of the ways in which Marines lived up to the intent of Congress in establishing their Corps was by making themselves "useful in the fortifications, or elsewhere, as the public service may require," when "occasionally on shore." (44)

Marines, being the military force of the naval service, were naturally assigned to guard valuable naval property. In 1908, as previously noted, their designation for this mission was affirmed by Executive Order 969 "To garrison the different navy-yards and naval stations, both within and beyond the continental limits of the United States."

Over the years Marines have also turned out to support domestic civilian authorities in maintaining law and order. Early in the 19th century, civilian police forces were rudimentary, at best, which resulted in frequent calls to the Federal Government for assistance. Marines supported municipal and state authorities during such disorders as the election riots in Washington in 1857, the New York draft riots of 1863, and the nationwide railroad strikes of 1877. On other occasions, Marines have assisted Federal agents in enforcing Federal law, such as the frequent raids on illicit distilleries in New York and Philadelphia during the 1860's and '70's, and the protection of the U. S. mails in 1921-1922 and 1926-1927.

The basic legal authority for the employment of Marines to support civil authorities is in the Constitution of the United States and a number of amplifying statutes. Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution makes it the duty of the Federal Government to protect any state against domestic violence at the request of its legislature or governor when the legislature cannot be convened. Section 3, Article II makes it the duty of the President to enforce the laws of the United States by force if, in his judgment, normal judicial proceedings are inadequate.

Long-term protection of United States property abroad at embassies, legations, and consulates has also been a duty of the Marine Corps. In addition to forces put ashore during times of crisis, Marines maintain permanent security detachments at most overseas diplomatic posts. "Any other duty on shore, as the President, at his discretion, shall direct," was the only authority in law for this mission until 1946. The Foreign Service Act of that year provided that "The Secretary of the Navy is authorized upon the request of the Secretary of State, to

assign enlisted members of the Naval Service to serve as custodians, under the supervision of the principle officer at an embassy, legation or consulate."(45)

Defense of Advance Naval Bases

A Marine Corps mission greatly emphasized as a result of the Spanish-American War was the defense of advance naval bases. Emerging from the war a great power, the United States urgently needed such installations to support the fleet operations necessary to maintain its new position. Protection of these bases was a natural role for those "soldiers of the sea," the United States Marines.

The General Board of the Navy took the first step toward the creation of such a Marine force when it recommended to the Secretary of the Navy in 1900, "that a force of 1,000 Marines be detached...for the defense of an advanced base..." This recommendation was related to the situation in the Far East at that time, and the fact that a Marine brigade was stationed in the Philippines at Cavite made the recommendation particularly feasible. Even though this brigade performed many of the functions of an advance base force, it was not so designated. Despite the repeated suggestions over the next decade by the General Board, that such a force be organized, it was not until 1913 that the first Marine unit trained and designated as an advance base force was formed at Philadelphia.(46)

As noted previously, President Theodore Roosevelt had assigned the mission of defending advance naval bases to the Marine Corps in his Executive Order 969 of 1908.(47) This Marine Corps mission was included in Navy Regulations, 1909, and it was repeated in subsequent editions of the Regulations until 1948.(48)

Amphibious Operations (49)

By far the most important mission of the Marine Corps today is to maintain combat ready air-ground landing forces of combined arms which are thoroughly trained in amphibious tactics and techniques. Even since the Continental Marines went ashore on New Providence in 1776, American Marines have carried out landing operations. But they were all of small scale and limited purpose until 1898, when a battalion landed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to seize an advance naval base. The purely defensive mission of protecting advance naval bases preoccupied the Marines until after World War I. The acquisition by Japan of the former German islands in the Pacific under the Versailles Treaty, however, drastically changed the strategic balance of power in that area. Japan now possessed a deep zone of island outposts. Fortified and supported by a first class fleet, they would constitute a serious obstacle to the operations of the United States Fleet in the Pacific.

In recognition of this strategic shift, Major Earl Ellis, USMC, in 1921, drafted his famous Operation Plan 712, calling for the amphibious assault of key Central Pacific Islands. His ideas were incorporated in 1926, in the Navy's Orange Plan, the basic war plan for hostilities with the Japanese. This plan constituted the first directive from higher authority assigning the Marine Corps a mission of amphibious assault.(50)

This offensive role for the Marine Corps in amphibious operations was elaborated on in 1927, in Joint Action of the Army and Navy. Prepared by the Joint Board, this document was the first attempt by the Services to define and delimit their respective responsibilities in joint operations. The general functions assigned the Marine Corps in landing operations merely gave approval to the responsibilities already implied by the approval of the Orange Plan. According to Joint Action the Marine Corps was to be prepared for "land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign."(51)

A broader mission in landing operations was assigned the Marine Corps under the section of Joint Action defining Army functions in a "landing attack against shore objectives." "Marines organized as landing forces," reads this section, "perform the same function as...the Army, and because of the constant association with naval units will be given special training in the conduct of landing operations."(52)

This broadly stated mission of the Marine Corps in amphibious operations was short-lived, and did not survive the first revision of Joint Action. In this revision (1935), all reference to a separate Marine Corps function was dropped. Only the following passage under "General Functions of the Navy" appears to refer to a Marine role in landing operations: "To seize, establish, and defend, until relieved by Army forces, advanced naval bases; and to conduct such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign."(53)

Marine amphibious operations in World War II expanded far beyond this limited concept. Although many island positions were seized for use as naval bases, particularly in the Central Pacific, others were captured and utilized primarily for the strategic bombing of Japan and for troop staging areas. Characteristic of the latter were the many areas from which a final and decisive amphibious assault was to place Marine and Army troops on Japanese soil for the land fighting which would end the war. Thanks to the success of the naval and air phases, these landing operations did not have to be carried out.

By the end of World War II, assault amphibious operations had become by far the most important Marine mission. Service afloat, which had been the reason for being of the Marine Corps

in 1798, engaged relatively fewer personnel. Interventions in foreign countries, of particular importance for most of the first three decades of the 20th century, were not conducted. Less hazardous but persistent missions continued to be security duty at navy yards and protection of diplomatic missions abroad.

ROLES AND MISSIONS UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

The Act and its Elaboration

As originally introduced, the National Security Act of 1947 contained only the broadest statement of what each Service was to do. It was intended that an executive order would be promulgated following enactment of the legislation, spelling out the functions of each Service. But at the suggestion of General Vandegrift, the part of this order dealing with the Navy and Marine Corps was inserted, in modified form, in the law.(54)

Elaborating on the basic law, the Department of Defense published a directive known as the "Functions Paper." First issued in 1948 as the "Key West Agreement," it was revised in 1953 and 1958, to adjust to changes in the National Security Act of 1947.(55) These changes in the National Security Act of 1947 and the Functions Paper did not affect the functions assigned the Marine Corps. Similarly, functions assigned the Marine Corps were not changed by Joint Action Armed Forces or its successor, Unified Action Armed Forces.(56)

Under "Objective," UNAAF states that:

The principles set forth in this publication shall be applied so as to accomplish the intent of the Congress as expressed in the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.(57)

UNAAF further points out the specific and common functions of the Military Departments and Services, while emphasizing the principle of "Unity of Effort."(58)

Missions assigned the Marine Corps under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and as amplified by Department of Defense directives, fall into three categories: those assigned specifically to the Marine Corps; those assigned to all Services; and, those derived from the broad catch-all provisions of the law. The various Marine Corps roles and missions will be taken up under these three categories.

SPECIFIC MARINE CORPS MISSIONS

Amphibious Operations

The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, contains the following missions which also appear in the Functions Paper:

The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, ...shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.(58a)

This passage might appear to restrict the Marine Corps solely to responsibility for operations incident to the seizure or defense of advance naval bases and to land operations essential to a naval campaign. Yet, amphibious operations conducted by Marines since 1947 have not been related to purely naval undertakings.(59) At Inchon in Korea in 1950, the assault landing was incident to the naval phase of a major land campaign. At Lebanon in 1958, Marines were landed to assist in accomplishing national political objectives. Authority for the assignment of such missions is found in the previously noted passage of the Law, which states "...and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct...."

In keeping with its primacy in the landing force aspects of amphibious operations, the Marine Corps has three related assignments. Both the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and the Functions Paper assign to the Marine Corps the specific function of developing, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The Marine Corps also has been assigned primary interest in the development of those landing force doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps. The Functions Paper confers an additional responsibility on the Navy and the Marine Corps, in coordination with the other Services, of developing the doctrines, procedures, and equipment of naval forces for amphibious operations, and the doctrines and procedures for joint amphibious operations.(60)

Marines have been engaged in amphibious development since 1902, but authority for such work was found for many years only in the directives for the execution of landing operations. These directives to carry out a mission assumed the necessity to prepare for it.

Service Aboard Armed Vessels of the Navy

The responsibility to "provide detachments and organizations for service on board armed vessels of the Navy,"(61) which is the oldest Marine mission, continues to be a mission of the Marine Corps today. Based on the authorized Marine Corps strength of 190,000 projected for the end of Fiscal Year 1962, this mission will employ 2,847 Marines as of 30 June 1962.(62)

Security of Naval Installations

Another traditional mission assigned specifically to the Marine Corps by the National Security Act of 1947 and the Functions Paper is to "provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases."(63) This mission, as of 30 June 1962, will require the services of 10,227 Marines.(64)

Airborne Operations

An additional mission assigned to the Marine Corps by the Functions Paper is to train and equip, as required, Marine forces for airborne operations, in coordination with the other Services. The Marine Corps also has been assigned a responsibility to develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment of interest to the Marine Corps for airborne operations, if not provided for in the related responsibilities assigned to the Army.(65)

Although the Marine Corps organized a few paratroop and glider units in World War II, they had been disbanded by March 1944.(66) The paratroops were used only as ground infantry and the glider units were never developed beyond the training stage. Since that time, Marine activities in the airborne field have been concerned primarily with the development of vertical envelopment tactics and techniques utilizing helicopters for assault amphibious operations.

In 1957, the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company was formed at Camp Pendleton by redesignation of the 1st Amphibious Reconnaissance Company.(67) In addition to the amphibious reconnaissance mission of its predecessor, this company was designed to conduct pre-assault and post-assault parachute reconnaissance and other pathfinder missions in support of a landing force. Currently, this company supports the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, while the 2d Force Reconnaissance Company, with a similar mission, supports the 2d Marine Division.

Otherwise since World War II, the Marine Corps has continued its interest in the training of conventional units for movement by both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft and for the air delivery of supplies and equipment.

Air Support and Air Defense Operations

The Marine Corps has collateral functions with the Navy to train forces:

1. To interdict enemy land and air power and communications through operations at sea.
2. To conduct close air and naval support for land operations.
3. To furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes.
4. To be prepared to participate in the over-all air effort, as directed.(68)

With respect to air defense operations, the Navy and/or the Marine Corps, as appropriate, has the specific responsibility for:

1. Providing naval (including naval air) forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Providing sea-based air defense and sea-based means for coordinating control for defense against air attack, coordinating with the other Services in matters of joint concern.
3. Participating with the other Services in joint air defense training and exercises as mutually agreed by the Services concerned, or as directed by competent authority.(69)

MARINE MISSIONS DERIVED FROM FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED ALL SERVICES

Training Foreign Military Forces

The missions described above have all been derived from passages of the Law or from the Functions Paper. There are, in addition, two missions which the Marine Corps is now performing, based on a specific provision of the Functions Paper applying to all services. One of these is to "assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations." (70) Such assistance is rendered under the Military Assistance Program provided for by the Mutual Security Act. Marines have participated in the program by assigning personnel to Navy sections of Military Assistance Advisory Groups in a number of countries, by furnishing a Military Assistance Advisory Group to Haiti, and by providing special training teams to train the Marine Corps of such allies as the Governments of the Republics of China and Korea.(71)

Security Functions for Diplomatic Missions

The other mission derived from the Functions Paper relating to all the Services is security for United States embassies and legations abroad. The authority for performing such missions is contained in the passage "to provide, as directed, such forces, military missions, and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interests of the United States," while additional specific authority for such missions is contained in the Foreign Service Act of 1946.(72)

The need for adequate security for diplomatic missions was graphically illustrated in 1948, when the Consul General at Jerusalem was killed by a sniper's bullet. Since then, the number of diplomatic missions guarded by Marines has been gradually increased; on 31 March 1962, a total of 91 detachments, in 80 different countries, were serving such duty around the globe.(73)

Research and Development

The Functions Paper assigns a research and development responsibility to the Marine Corps, along with the other Services, as follows:

6. Conduct research, develop tactics, techniques, and organization, and develop and procure weapons, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions hereinafter assigned.(74)

MARINE MISSIONS DERIVED FROM THE "CATCH-ALL" PROVISION

The General Provision

The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, repeats, in somewhat modified form, the catch-all provision of the Act of 1798. According to the more recent law, the Marine Corps "... shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized...."(75) Two traditional missions, operations with other Services and interventions in foreign countries are considered under this category.

Operations with Other Services

As noted previously, UNAAF assigns to the Marine Corps a mission of supporting other Services in their operations in order to increase the effectiveness and contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives.(76) During the

Korean War, the 1st Marine Division was assigned to the Army's I, IX, and X Corps', while the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force.

Interventions

The traditional employment of Marines as an intervening force whenever a foreign government is unable or unwilling to protect United States citizens or property in its country is another mission authorized under "such other duties." As noted in Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces, (77) there have been numerous instances in which Marines have been employed for such purposes. Since World War II, however, no clear-cut intervention has actually been carried out. At Alexandria, Egypt, Marines helped evacuate American citizens during the Suez Crisis of 1956, but no intervention was involved because the Egyptian government cooperated in the operation. In May 1958, Marines were deployed to an advance base, prepared to protect Vice President Nixon in Venezuela, in what could have resulted in an intervention. As indicated earlier, Marines landed in Lebanon in 1958, in support of national political objectives. No intervention was involved, as United States forces were landed in response to a request by the Lebanese government. (78)

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958

The practice, which began in 1947, of specifying roles and missions in legislation was seriously challenged only 11 years later. In 1958, the President, seeking to streamline the Department of Defense machinery for the rapid response required in the missile age, presented a number of reorganization proposals to Congress. (79)

Included in these proposals was one giving the Secretary of Defense the power to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate functions authorized by law. Speaking for the Administration, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy explained the purpose of the proposal as follows:

There is no desire for authority to emasculate any of the four services. The desire is simply for the President and the Secretary of Defense to have authority to eliminate overlap and duplication in the application of the statutory language to specific instances or situations so that two services will not be claiming that each is entitled to do the same thing. (80)

General Randolph McC. Pate, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, opposed the proposal, saying that "Prescribing the basic roles of the services in the law insures the stability that is essential to an orderly administration of our national defense. It permits logical and systematic assignment of the basic tasks inherent in preparing and maintaining forces for war." (81) General Clifton B. Cates, a former Commandant, put it much more bluntly. "Unless the power of the Secretary of Defense to transfer, consolidate, reassign, or abolish combatant functions is restricted about as it is in the existing law, ...we may well wake up some morning and discover that the Marine Corps has been reorganized and consolidated and reassigned into nonentity." (82)

The Marine Corps was only partially successful in its objections. The law, as enacted by Congress, granted, in part, the powers requested by the President for the Secretary of Defense. (83) The language of the Defense Reorganization Act, however, did provide for the integrity of the Departments and Services. Congress described the basic policy embodied in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, in part, as follows:

Section 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to...provide a Department of Defense, including the three military departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own Secretary...; to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services;... (84)

Force in Readiness as a Mission

The Communist practice of limited aggression in "brush-fire wars" at sensitive spots around the periphery of the free world has given rise to a Marine Corps mission not specifically covered by the National Security Act of 1947, or DoD 5100.1. To meet such aggression, a highly efficient, balanced military force, capable of rapid movement to any threatened point, is considered to be necessary. The Marine Corps, operating as a partner in the Navy-Marine Corps team, is particularly well fitted for such operations. Over the years, the Marine Corps has maintained a high degree of readiness to perform its assigned missions, and it has continually emphasized its readiness to execute them.

The movement to establish "force in readiness" as a Marine Corps mission came to a head in 1951, with the debate on Public Law 416, the so-called "Marine Corps Bill," which was designed to provide for a minimum of three divisions and three aircraft wings and "such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein,...."

"The effect.../of this bill/ would be to establish a Marine Corps of such size and organization as to provide a... ready striking force for commitment to campaigns such as that in Korea," testified General Cates before the House Armed Forces Committee. "These forces would be used to withstand the initial phases of whatever action confront this country while our vast defense machinery gains the required momentum. The clear need for such forces has been amply demonstrated beyond question. The capability of the Marine Corps should be fully exploited."
(85)

That the sponsors of the bill intended it to achieve this purpose is clear from their testimony. Senator Irving M. Ives, in a statement typical of many others given by senators and congressmen, said "I have always viewed the Marine Corps as a force in being to be utilized for such actions.... If it is maintained at a proper size, it will provide a force which will act as a deterrent to small aggressors and contain major aggressions until our Army can organize for the major land effort which will be necessitated by large-scale aggression."(86)

S. 677, as amended, was reported favorably by committees of both Houses. Both reports stated as the purpose of the bill the establishment of a force in readiness of the type recommended by Senator Ives. By passing the bill on 28 June 1952, the Congress put itself on record as intending that the Marine Corps should perform such a force in readiness role.(87)

Summary

Today the Marine Corps stands ready to carry out a wide variety of missions assigned by higher authority. First among them is preparation for and execution of assault amphibious operations. Other missions include service afloat, security of naval installations and diplomatic missions, airborne operations as required, interventions in foreign countries, training of foreign military forces, and support of the other services as necessary in carrying out their missions.

Amphibious warfare has not always been the primary mission of the Marine Corps. Before 1900, priority was given to service afloat aboard armed vessels of the Navy. For the first three decades of the 20th century, interventions in foreign countries were the chief employment for Marines in peacetime, while, during World War I, land warfare as part of the American Expeditionary Force constituted the major effort.

Today, the legal authority for Marine Corps missions is the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; it is codified in Title 10, United States Code. Before the passage of the Act of 1947, the basis in law for Marine Corps missions was expressed in very general terms in the Act of 1798, which antedated most of the missions since assigned to the Marine Corps. Initially,

there was no apparent need to define missions by executive directive. In practice, it was not until a major dispute arose as to what the missions should be that they were finally spelled out by an executive directive. After World War II, the Marine Corps worked successfully for a detailed statement of Marine Corps roles and missions in the National Security Act of 1947, its amendments, and Public Law 416. These roles and missions, plus some others not specifically mentioned in law, were stated in detail in the Functions Paper and **were** further elaborated on in additional Department of Defense directives.

No matter how carefully roles and missions have been spelled out in law, necessity has frequently required that the Marine Corps execute operations under the general provision "as the President may direct." The assault amphibious landings made by Marines since World War II have not been executed primarily to seize or defend advance naval bases and related land operations have not been essential to a purely naval campaign. On at least three occasions since 1900, the Marine Corps has made its major effort in support of the Army in land warfare.

Whether its missions are precisely defined or not--amphibious, in support of other Services, or "as the President may direct"--the Marine Corps will continue to carry them out rapidly, efficiently, and decisively.

- (1) National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, 26 Jul 1947 (61 Stat. 495), as amended through 24 Aug 1958; as in part repealed and codified in 10 USC, Pub. Law 1028, 84th Cong., 10 Aug 1956 (70A Stat. 1), and as amended by Pub. Law 599, 85th Cong., 6 Aug 1958 (72 Stat. 514), hereafter National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
- (2) Ibid., secs. 103(b), 212.
- (3) DoD Dir. 5100.1, dtd 31Dec58, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," sec. V, para. B.1.b, pp. 9-10, hereafter DoD Dir. 5100.1, dtd 31Dec58.
- (4) Ibid.
- (4a) Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, "The Marine Corps in 1948," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 74, no. 2 (Feb48), p. 135.
- (5) JCS, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), JCS Pub. 2 (Washington, Nov59), hereafter JCS, UNAAF. Paragraph 20310 pertains to the responsibilities of the Marine Corps.
- (6) Ibid., p. 3.
- (7) NavDept, HQMC, Marine Corps Manual (Washington, Feb61), para. 5400.2.a, hereafter HQMC, MarCorps Manual.
- (8) JCS, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (Short title: JD), JCS Pub. 1 (Washington, 1962), pp. 97, 144, hereafter JCS, JD.
- (9) Continental Congress, Resolution of 10 Nov 1775, quoted in Maj Edwin N. McClellan, History of the United States Marine Corps (Washington: Historical Section, HQMC, 1931) v. I, chap. 3, p. 15, hereafter McClellan, History.
- (10) Ibid., pp. 10-14.
- (11) James Fenimore Cooper, The History of the Navy of the United States of America (London: Richard Bentley, 1839), v. I, p. 292.
- (12) Ibid., pp. 292-293.
- (13) Quoted in Edwin T. Turnblad, "The Committee on Nova Scotia," Leatherneck, v. XLIII, no. 11 (Nov60), p. 35.
- (14) Col Cyril Field, R.M.L.I., Britain's Sea Soldiers, A History of the Royal Marines (Liverpool: The Lyceum Press, 1924), p. 71.

- (15) LtCol Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), pp. 13-15, 20-21, hereafter Metcalf, USMC History.
- (16) McClellan, History, v. I, chap. 4, pp. 24-27.
- (17) "An Act for the Establishing and Organizing a Marine Corps," 1 Stat. 594. In slightly reworded form, these sections were included in the Revised Statutes of the United States (Washington, 1871), secs. 1618, 1619.
- (18) H. Rept. on Resolution to Raise a Battalion to be Called the Marine Corps by Committee on...Protection of Commerce and the Defense of the Country, 5th Cong., 2d Sess., in American State Papers, Naval Affairs (Washington, 1834), v. I, p. 56.
- (19) "An Act for the Better Organization of the United States Marine Corps," 4 Stat. 312.
- (20) U. S. President. E. O. 969, 12 Nov 1908, hereafter E. O. 969.
- (21) U. S. Navy Regulations, 1909, art. 1390, hereafter Navy Reg., 1909.
- (22) The Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and Navy (Washington, 1927), pp. 3, 8, and 12, hereafter The Joint Board, JAAN.
- (23) JCS, UNAAF, paras. 20301-20310.
- (24) Quoted in M. Almy Aldrich, History of the United States Marine Corps (Boston: Henry L. Shepard & Co., 1875), p. 17.
- (25) Quoted in ibid., p. 19.
- (26) Lt W. F. Fullam, "The System of Naval Training and Discipline Required to Promote Efficiency and Attract Americans," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. XVI, no. 4 (1890).
- (27) E. O. 969.
- (28) Hearings, Sub-com. of H. Naval Affairs Com., on the Status of the Marine Corps (1909), p. 46.
- (29) Ibid., p. 224.
- (30) Ibid., p. 217.
- (31) U. S. Navy Regulations, 1920, and changes thereto, art. 552 (3), hereafter Navy Reg., 1920.

- (32) For a discussion of the policy of intervention, see D. A. Graber, Crisis Diplomacy, A History of U. S. Intervention Policies and Practices (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), hereafter Graber, Crisis Diplomacy; also, U. S. Department of State, Memorandum of the Solicitor, Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces (Washington, 1934, 3d ed. rev.), hereafter Department of State, Memorandum of the Solicitor.
- (33) Graber, Crisis Diplomacy, p. 337.
- (34) Metcalf, USMC History, pp. 424, 533; 1st MarBrig Muster Rolls, 1-30Jun27; CMC Ann Rept, Fiscal 1928.
- (35) Department of State, Memorandum of the Solicitor, p. 38.
- (36) LtGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., "As the President May Direct," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 77, no. 11 (Nov51), p. 1149.
- (37) Department of State, Memorandum of the Solicitor, p. 42.
- (38) Quoted in K. Jack Bauer, "United States Naval Operations During the Mexican War," MS. PhD dissertation, Univ. of Indiana, 1953 (Archives, HistBr, HQMC).
- (39) Bernard A. Nalty, A Brief History of the United States Marines in the Civil War--Marine Corps Historical Reference Series Number 2 (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1960), pp. 2-3.
- (40) Metcalf, USMC History, p. 450; CMC ltr to CNO (Opns), dtd 30Sept16, CF. No. 1.5B-B-AA.
- (41) MajGen John A. Lejeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1930), p. 236.
- (42) Robert Lindsay, This High Name, Public Relations and U. S. Marine Corps (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1956), p. 23.
- (43) JCS, UNAAF, para. 10109.
- (44) "An Act for the Establishing and Organizing a Marine Corps," 1 Stat. 594.
- (45) 22 U. S. C. 801, 1135.
- (46) The material contained in this paragraph is found in: General Board ltr to SecNav, dtd 60Oct00, G.B. No. 51, in General Board Files, Naval Historical Division; "History of U.S. Marine Activities at Subic Bay, P.I., 1899-1955 (MS, Archives, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1956); also see sources listed in footnote 49, infra.
- (47) E. O. 969.

- (48) Navy Reg., 1909, art. 1390; Navy Reg., 1920, art. 552 (3).
- (49) For a general discussion of Marine amphibious operations, see LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal---History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v. I (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1958), pp. 1-22; Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951).
- (50) For a discussion of the development of the Orange Plan, see Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: Turning the Tide, 1941-1943---The War in the Pacific---U. S. Army in World War, MS, n.d. (Washington: OCMH, DA).
- (51) Joint Board, JAAN, p. 3.
- (52) Joint Board, JAAN, p. 12.
- (53) Joint Board, JAAN, p. 3.
- (54) 1stLt Arthur O. Sulzberger, "Unification and the Marine Corps," MS, n.d., (Archives, HistBr, HQMC); Hearings, S. Armed Services Com., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. on S. 758 (1947), pp. 418-432.
- (55) DoD Dir. 5100.1, dtd 16Mar54, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," hereafter DoD Dir. 5100.1, dtd 16Mar54; DoD Dir. 5100.1, dtd 31Dec58.
- (56) Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Action Armed Forces (FM 110-5/JAAF/AFM 1-1, as amended (Washington, Sep51); JCS, UNAAF.
- (57) JCS, UNAAF, p. 3.
- (58) Ibid., pp. 6, 16-25.
- (58a) National Security Act of 1947, as amended, sec. 206(c); DoD Dir. 5100.1, dtd 31Dec58, sec. V, para. B.1.b(1).
- (59) Naval campaign is defined as follows: "An operation or a connected series of operations conducted essentially by naval forces including all surface, subsurface, air, amphibious and Marines, for the purpose of gaining, extending or maintaining control of the sea." JCS, JD, p. 153.
- (60) DoD Dir. 5100.1, dtd 31Dec58, sec. V, para. B.1.b.(3) and sec. V, para. B.1.d., p. 10.
- (61) Pub. Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 206 (c), hereafter Public Law 253.
- (62) These figures obtained from Personnel Allocation Plan, Allowances and Utilization Branch, G-1 Division, HQMC, on 17Apr62.

- (63) Public Law 253.
- (64) See Footnote 62 above.
- (65) DoD Dir. 5100.1, dtd 31Dec58, sec. V, paras. B.1.b(4), (5); sec. V, para. A.1.c(2).
- (66) Maj John H. Johnstone, United States Marine Corps Parachute Units---Marine Corps Historical Reference Series Number 32 (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1961), p. 9.
- (67) Muster Rolls, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, Jun57.
- (68) JCS, UNAAF, para. 20303, p. 21.
- (69) Ibid., para. 20305, p. 22.
- (70) DoD Dir. 5100.1, dtd 31Dec58, sec. V, para. 9, p. 7.
- (71) Further information concerning Marine participation in the Military Assistance Program may be found in: CMC ltr A03B(14), dtd 25Sep61, Subj: Marine Corps Policy Concerning the Military Assistance Program; Clay Barrow, "Korea: Land of the Morning Calm," part 2, Leatherneck, v. XLV, no. 2 (Feb62), p. 48ff.; Henry Checklou, "Thai Marines," Leatherneck, v. XLV, no. 4 (Apr62), p. 36; Carl Strandberg, "Philippine Marines," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 45, no. 11 (Nov61), p. 54.
- (72) 10 U. S. C., 5983.
- (73) See Footnote 62 above.
- (74) DoD Dir. 5100.1, dtd 31Dec58, sec. V, para. 6, p. 7.
- (75) Public Law 85-599.
- (76) JCS, UNAAF, para. 10109, p. 8.
- (77) Department of State, Memorandum of the Solicitor, Appendix, pp. 51-130.
- (78) Graber, Crisis Diplomacy, pp. 296-298.
- (79) Statement of SecDef, Hearings, H. Armed Services Com., 85th Cong., 2d Sess., on Reorganization of the Defense Department, (1958), pp. 5974-5977.
- (80) Hearings, H. Armed Services Com., 85th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 12541 (1958), p. 11.
- (81) Ibid., p. 351.
- (82) Ibid., p. 186ff.
- (83) Public Law 85-599.
- (84) Ibid.

- (85) Hearings, H. Armed Services Com., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 677 (1951), p. 901.
- (86) Hearings, S. Armed Services Com., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 677 (1951), p. 6.
- (87) H. Rept. 666 and S. Rept. 308, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 677 (1951). A portion of Public Law 416 appears in 10 U.S.C. 5013.

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