

**AN UNSOLICITED
PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REVIEW
OF DoD'S NEW DPAA/JPAC MISSION.**

**BY
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THIS REVIEW WAS PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF CERTAIN PRIVATE PERSONS, NOT IN GOVERNMENT, WHO AFTER A HALF CENTURY OBSERVING A FAILED AND INDIFFERENT DoD PROGRAM, PREFER TO REMAIN ANONYMOUS IN HOPES CONGRESS WILL MANDATE A FINAL SOLUTION FOR ALL OF AMERICA'S STILL MISSING 83,000 POW/MIAS, AND NO LONGER – JUST A SELECT FEW.

AMERICA'S CURRENT POW/MIA ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAM, AS NOW ORGANIZED AND IMPLEMENTED BY DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION ACCOUNTING AGENCY, (DPAA) IS AGAIN A FAILURE. GIVEN THIS BUREAUCRACY'S PAST DYSFUNCTIONAL PERFORMANCE, THE NEW REALIZATION IS NOT A SURPRISE. THIS PROGRAM, AFTER A HALF CENTURY WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT RESULTS, IS DEFINITELY NOT A POSTER CHILD FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S BELIEF, OR DEFINITION, OF WHAT A SUCCESSFUL GOVERNMENT PROGRAM SHOULD LOOK LIKE. ESPECIALLY ONE WITH A HIGHLY SENSITIVE MISSION OF 'LEAVE NO MAN BEHIND,' WHEN IN FACT, AND AFTER FIFTY YEARS, OVER NINETY PERCENT OF THOSE ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED AS MISSING ARE STILL CATEGORIZED AS MISSING AND STILL OUT THERE SOMEWHERE. THIS REALITY MUST NOW SERVE AS A WAKE-UP CALL FOR EVERYONE AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT: CONGRESS, DoD, THE PENTAGON, AND PARTICULARLY THE DPAA BUREAUCRACY: FOR WHOM THE HANDWRITING IS CLEARLY ON THE WALL.

THE HAND WRITING DEFINES INEFFICIENCY, INEFFECTIVENESS, UNACCOUNTABILITY, AND WORSE, AN IRRESPONSIBLE ENTRENCHED BUREAUCRACY INCAPABLE OF SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMING ITS VITAL HIGH VISIBILITY MISSION ANY TIME SOON. SEVEN IN TEN AMERICANS BELIEVE DoD'S THIRD ENDEAVOR TO PRODUCE A VIABLE POW/MIA RECOVERY PROGRAM, HAS AGAIN FAILED AND NOW NEEDS TO BE CLOSED. A CONSENSUS IS NOW EMERGING THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS DoD'S REMOVAL FROM ALL HISTORIC POW/MIA WORK OVER A DECADE OLD, AND TO PLACE THIS MISSION INTO THE PUBLIC SECTOR, AND ALLOW INTERESTED NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) TO ADDRESS THIS RECOVERY AND IDENTIFICATION RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

THE PROBLEM

A TROUBLING EARLIER FAIRFIELD REPORT, DATED JUNE 2014, AND ENTITLED, "MILITARY TOURISM:" WASHINGTON'S FAILED RECOVERY PROGRAM FOR AMERICA'S 83,000 POW/MIAS, 2005-2012 AND BEYOND," SURFACED SERIOUS HISTORIC PERFORMANCE FAILURES WHICH WERE THEN BEING DELIBERATELY COVERED UP BY THE DoD ORGANIZATION TASKED TO RESOLVE AMERICA'S HALF-CENTURY OLD POW/MIA PROGRAM. THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION INVOLVED WAS DPMO/JPAC. THIS REPORT THEN SURFACED OTHER REPORTS BY THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) AND DoD INSPECTOR GENERAL (IG), BOTH OF WHICH WERE EVEN MORE PROBLEMATIC. THE LATTER TWO CONFIRMED THAT THE DPMO/JPAC ORGANIZATION HAD NOT ONLY CONSISTENTLY FAILED ITS MISSION IN RECENT DECADES, BUT IN FACT, BOTH ORGANIZATIONS, AND THEIR BUREAUCRACIES WERE DYSFUNCTIONAL. THESE REPORTS RESULTED IN CONGRESS AND DoD ONCE AGAIN TRYING TO REORGANIZE THE TWO DYSFUNCTIONAL BUREAUCRACIES INVOLVED, THIS TIME INTO A NEW AGENCY TO BECOME KNOWN AS DPAA. IT CAME INTO EXISTENCE IN THE 2015/2016 TIMEFRAME.

IN THE THREE YEARS THAT HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THIS REORGANIZATION, IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE EARLIER ORGANIZATION (DPMO/JPAC) HAVE NOW ESTABLISHED A NEW DoD AGENCY (DPAA) ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEIR EARLIER DYSFUNCTIONAL ONE. THE FACT THAT THE NEW ORGANIZATION IS NOT MEETING ANY OF ITS ESTABLISHED GOALS OR OBJECTIVES SHOULD NOT SURPRISE ANYONE IN GOVERNMENT, ONLY THE AMERICAN PUBLIC - WHO ARE IN FACT CUSTOMERS AND ARE NOW GETTING EVEN LESS SERVICE THAN THEY HAVE IN THE PAST. WERE DPAA A PUBLIC CORPORATION, SERVING A PUBLIC NEED, THEY WOULD HAVE BECOME BANKRUPT A LONG TIME AGO.

THEREFORE, THOSE IN AN OUT OF GOVERNMENT, AND RELYING ON AN ORGANIZATION WITH SUCH A DISMAL RECORD MUST DEMAND SERIOUS ACTION. IF NOT, THEN AMERICA'S STILL LISTED 83,000 POW/MIAS, THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WATCHING, WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT THE REALITY THAT ONLY A SELECTED FEW, MAYBE NOT EVEN SOME 1,500 POW/MIAS FROM THE MOST RECENT WAR, WHICH IS ALREADY A HALF CENTURY OLD, MAY BE LOOKED FOR, BUT ONLY AT THE EXPENSE OF IGNORING AND FORGETTING ALL THE OTHERS.

THE NEW RECOVERY PROGRAM

The new DPAA program, as currently designed and administered, regrettably among other more systemic problems, is in fact intended once again, as it did in the past, only to pay lip service to the need to find these long lost servicemen, but not to actually find them and certainly not to bring them all home, but to convince those now serving, and others serving in the future, that if captured, America will not leave them behind. However, few in America's military or the public today are fooled by the expensive bureaucracy involved in this half-century old program which after spending billions, have only accounted for a few thousand of the original 93,000 listed by the DoD. In fact, in a half century has only resolved approximately ten percent of those missing.

The confused debate about how such an outcome came to pass emerged several decades ago when a small minority of Vietnam-era families insisted it was only their loved ones then listed (2583) as POW/MIA, who insisted government must still actively search for them to the exclusion of others: because if even one of them may still be alive in captivity, the government's effort should be focused on the last known alive. At the time, they could make this case despite the fact that the United States government also knew that many times this amount were probably still alive somewhere in captivity from the Korean War and World War two. The Vietnam POW/MIA family lobby, for the two decades since the 1992 Senate Select Committee POW/MIA hearings in Washington, D.C., Chaired by then Senator John Kerry, has been able to focus those leading the search, almost exclusively on the POW/MIAs from Vietnam, in the belief that they might still be alive.

Even as late as the spring of 2017, the National League of POW/MIA Families (the League) has been working hard behind the scenes to get the DPAA leadership to dedicate all its resources to SE Asia. In fact, the League's chairwoman has been very critical of DPAA's latest increased focus on WWII and Korean war unknowns. The League has caustically pointed to the fact that the 150 new recoveries from WWII and Korea have now significantly offset the only 3 identifications made from SE Asia in the last 18 months, falsely suggesting that the 150 have come at the expense of more emphasis on SE Asia recoveries. The League's allegations are un-American, mean spirited, and shameful to say the least. Virtually all the 150 recoveries have come from private NGO sources, and some from walk in's: and all at insignificant pennies on the dollar compared to DPAA's astronomical millions of dollars spent for each SE Asia recovery. Despite this, the League's leadership insist that annual DPAA budget allocations go their way, even if it means dollars spent per SE Asia ID's are so high that it cripples DPAA's efforts elsewhere.

The League leadership regrettably is also not a proponent of the wider involvement of private NGO's working in SE Asia, and as a matter of fact it strenuously objects to it, even when shown that future recoveries could be significantly increased and accomplished for pennies on the dollar compared to the millions spent by DPAA. The basis for their objection is so DPAA can continue to expend all its annual budgets in support of the League's insistence on this matter. The League's earlier influence on DPMO's leadership in the last two decades, and now DPAA's has been incredibly unfortunate, and has led to the continuing criticism for both organizations abysmal performance noted in numerous IG reports, the media, and the military in general.

The League's leadership challenges all who counter that the last war search should not be the Government's principle policy, because it ignores the fact that, while the Vietnam conflict ended in 1973, there have been repeated sightings of American POW/MIAs reported to still be alive in North Korea from 1953, some in China from the same era, and many still alive in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The reality is that it has been forty four years since the Vietnam War ended, sixty-four years since Korea, and over seventy years since World War Two. And of the 82,318 still missing (73,000 from WWII, 7,700 from Korea, and 1,618 from Vietnam), at least three DOD bureaucratic reincarnations tasked to look for all of them (DIA's POW/MIA office, DoD's DPMO, and now DoD's DPAA), have systematically ignored the fact that only a few percent were missing from Vietnam. It is also worth noting that the Vietnam effort has involved over ninety percent of the cumulative several billion POW/MIA program dollars spent in South East Asia, and that the 230 Vietnam identification/recoveries realized in the twenty

three years (between 1993 to 2016), represents a per individual recovery cost approaching two million dollars each.

The two million per recovery is also significantly understated by DPAA. It does not include the cost of DoD payroll for either DPAA or a multitude of associated DoD field support staff for JPAC field work during 2014-2016. It also does not include support service from other DoD agencies such as aircraft, crew, and fuel costs. If all these were included the real cost for the 230 Southeast Asia recoveries surpasses \$2 million each.

The American POW/MIA families of WWII, Korea and Cold had repeatedly challenged DPMO's performance and pleaded with DoD, the Pentagon, and congress, to "fix DPMO's, and now DPAA's highly focused mission." POW/MIA families, and those watching DPMO and now DPAA, have also pleaded with DoD to correct their inefficiencies and unaccountability. For the third time in recent decades, bureaucratic scandals and expenses associated with this unproductive recovery program led to yet more Senate hearings in 2015. Uncovered in those hearings, once again, as in earlier hearings, were serious cases of personnel misconduct, significant mission abuse, officials deliberately misleading the public, mock public recovery events when none had occurred, and probably worst of all... a total lack of confidence among scores of government and private organizations familiar with their performance. As a result the Senate, GAO, DoD IG were successful in convincing Secretary of Defense Hagel to close down DPMO/JPAC organizations and create yet a new DoD Agency to be fully operationaby early 2016.

Regrettably DOD allowed the existing dysfunctional DPMO/JPAC bureaucracy to reorganize themselves, select their new leader who was already among them, and then resume their earlier course which had brought about DPMO/JPAC's closure in the first place. Also, demanded by the existing DPMO leadership as the reorganization took place, were bigger budgets, more facilities, more personnel, and a new captain to command their new ship. But the new captain quickly became disillusioned with his bureaucracy and, despite initial assurances that he would remain with the program for a decade, he abruptly quit after serving less than a year.

DOD, and the former POW/MIA bureaucracy creating the new Agency, allege they conducted an exhaustive search for a new Director, only to choose someone who had already been associated with the DPMO bureaucracy for a year. When announced, the new director publicly assured everyone in government, the private sector, and the National League of Families that he would stay the course, remain with the program and make everyone proud. Why this director resigned is still unclear. Some allege it was for a larger retirement check with an extra year of federal service. Others for more challenging employment.

Other rumors pointed to his inability to work with DPAA's well-entrenched dysfunctional bureaucracy who had other ideas. None of them could not be fired, could not be transferred, nor forced to retire. So, the new captain, former Lieutenant General, Michael Linnington, US Army, quit. But there may have been other motives. A month before he quit, in May 2016, this highly decorated officer publicly 'wrote off' thousands of former American POW/MIA servicemen who'd been taken into China and the Soviet Union during WWII, Korea and Vietnam. At a May 2016 meeting with his Russian counterparts in Moscow, Mr. Linnington assured them the Pentagon had "no evidence" that any missing American troops ever ended up in the Soviet Union by way of China. Experts observing his performance at the time are convinced his statement, as with others repeatedly in the past, was once again a clear-cut message to the

Kremlin's leaders, that America did not wish to reopen a long-forgotten legal problem concerning the disposition or whereabouts of tens of thousands of Americans lost in the former Soviet Union or China during the 20th Century.

Despite this possibility, senior Russians listening to Mr. Linnington's reassurances at the May 2016 meeting, must have shaken their heads: both concerning his naivete of the reality, but also his agency's mission statement 'to leave no man behind.' To have so "conveniently written off and abandoned" so many thousands of his fellow countrymen, who he and his bureaucracy knew were summarily written off decades ago surprised thousands of America's still waiting POW/MIA families. They were aware of numerous official DPMO Gulag Studies, made public by DPMO in the 1990s, which documented the presence of some four thousand American POW/MIA prisoners in various prison camps across the former Soviet Union: their inmates not only from WWII, but Korea and Vietnam as well. Families were also aware of other reports still under lock and key which indicated hundreds of American prisoners were shipped alive into Russia from Hanoi in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Mr. Linnington and his DPAA bureaucracy when challenged by families, conveniently disparage these reports 'by characterizing them as a "survivor myths," being naively perpetuated by the families as a hopeless "coping mechanism." The reader might enquire what type of bureaucrats these are that inhabit the DPAA offices, and how do they sleep at night? Mr. Linnington and many of those around him are ill suited to their mission and undeserving of their well-paid jobs and comfortable retirement benefits, to say nothing of DPAA possibly hollow motto, 'to leave no one behind and bring them all home?' DPAA's performance must be held accountable before the bar of history.

Confusing and obfuscating clarification of the real goals and intended operations of the earlier DPMO/JPAC organizations, or the new agency known as DPAA, has been, and continues to be, the leadership of the National League of POW/MIA families. For the last quarter century the League Chairman for many years after 1993 was believed to have had a classified clearance (and may still today) which made her privy to all POW/MIA work being done by DPMO/JPAC in Southeast Asia. League board members have also accompanied all, or almost all, official DPMO/JPAC senior leadership visits to Southeast Asia in the last two decades. Other POW/MIA family groups from WWII, Korea and the Cold War enjoy no such advantage. Other POW/MIA groups from WW II, Korea and the Cold War have silently stood by, outraged by what they consider a conflict of interest problem, as the League represents only the Vietnam POW/MIA families and not those of other conflicts, and has consistently led the government and DOD's bureaucracy around by the nose for decades now, demanding DoD focus only on those from the Vietnam Conflict.

The National League of POW/MIA families has also stirred-up resentment among the other family groups by continuously lobbying behind the scenes at DOD, the Congress, and veteran organizations, to insure DPMO's budgets, and now those of DPAA as well, are focused exclusively on Vietnam. This problematic mission bias for DPMO/JPAC was finally brought to a head in the 2015 Senate hearings, who noted the cumulative four billion dollars spent in recent years – only focused on searching in Vietnam, but not for the rest of the other 82,000 POW/MIAs still listed for Korea and WWII.

The National League of POW/MIA Families has also consistently involved itself in lobbying and influence peddling behind the scenes to achieve its objectives in other ways. When Korean and WWII families sought to obtain legislation to declassify POW/MIA records to speed up recoveries for WWII

and Korea, the League's chairwoman, along with senior associates at then DPMO, interfered behind the scenes to rewrite the legislation so as to make it still born. One former senior DPMO bureaucrat contacted by the League and who was involved in making changes to the proposed declassification bill, noted in private correspondence with other officials, that the original declassification bill request, had it been approved, would have been like 'Manna from heaven' concerning detailed information still unavailable to the POW/MIA families of WWII and Korea. When other family groups asked for funding allocations for WWII and Korean recoveries, the League informed everyone in its newsletters, "*This information was a serious blow to confidence in DPAA's commitment to pursuing Vietnam War accounting as a continuing priority.*" (1) **National League of POW/MIA families. Update: January 25, 2017. Vietnam JFA dramatically cut back.** And when DPAA annual budget authorizations were less than expected, as in FY-2017, and planned Vietnam recoveries allocations might be impacted, the League again asked everyone to lobby Congress and DPAA to, "*request approval of increased FY17 DPAA funding to expand field operations as requested by Vietnam years ago. Also, to request exemption of DPAA funding from any/all reductions.*" (2) **Ibid. Your help is urgently needed!**

The League was involved in the original approvals for DPAA's first director, Mr. Michael Linnington, only to then begin to oppose him as he sought to expand DPAA work (as directed by Congress and DoD) to be inclusive for the recovery and identification of POW/MIAs from all 20th Century wars and not only Vietnam. When he quit, the DoD advertised for a new director and it is believed the League was able to monitor the selection of a new Director who was or might not be sympathetic to their objectives. When offered the position, this candidate, for still unknown reasons, initially accepted then declined the offer! And now that DoD is searching for the third time in less than two years... for yet another Director, the League's leadership caustically had this criticism concerning the latest DoD search, "*Sadly, there also is no indication that serious qualifications – experience, character, commitment and dedication to the mission – were given high priority consideration, nor were crucial factors such as having earned the trust and respect of affected families, veterans and foreign officials whose willingness to authorize necessary cooperation is critical to success.*" (3) **Ibid. DPAA Director Selection Process.**

Consequently, the DPAA Director position, nine months later remains empty. Some cognoscenti opine that the explanation is that the word is out on the street that whomever accepted, would be expected to follow DoD and Congresses instructions to expand DPAA's mission, while DPAA bureaucracy's is being told what to do by the League – continue for the next half decade to concentrate only on Vietnam recoveries, or else?

Supporting this belief is the March 2017 comment regarding their focus which, to an enquiry, he replied, "General Spindler responded that DPAA's main effort in FY-17 and FY-18 remains Vietnam. (4) (DPAA Quarterly Teleconference, with Family Groups, Thursday, March 2, 2017, 2:00 pm 'Fullfilling our Nation's Promise.') Also that, in accordance with the League of POW/MIA Families policy that last known alive from Vietnam take precedence over others from other wars, that DPAA's focus continues to be South East Asia, where, according to research some 44 American POW/MIA may still be LKA, or Last Known Alive.

Despite the League's observation about the selection process, there is evidence that the finalists selected by DoD for Mr. Linnington's replacement, were provided to DPAA's leadership for final evaluation and ranking along lines that would suit their mission as they viewed it.

An unwillingness of DPAA's rank and file to openly discuss their ongoing and future plans with the National League, may now be annoying the League. In its December 2016 newsletter to its members the League's chairwoman stated: (5)

"I wish I could say the League is ending 2016 on a positive note. Such is not the case. Serious turbulence and uncertainty have arisen due to the first DPAA Director having abruptly walked out, leaving a huge gap."

She went on to say:

"Truthfully, I'm relieved and thankful that the repressive, antagonistic, even hostile attitude toward the League is greatly reduced, though the Acting Director clearly does not intend to reverse policies, regulations or practices established by the former director."

And then concluded:

"There has been a total lack of transparency and strict guidance NOT to share information outside the bureaucracy. We're hoping a new DPAA Director will be named and that he will reverse the repressive, restrictive practices imposed on the DPAA workforce so we all can work together toward the common accounting goals we share."

"So we can all work together toward the common accounting goals we share?" What the Chairwoman may have left out was that the League is annoyed that DPAA has in fact been expanding its POW/MIA recovery search area beyond just Vietnam: and this concerns the League's Families who are increasingly being shut out of their former ability to orchestrate how DPAA's annual budgets were allocated.

DPAA's analysis of those recently attending recent POW/MIA Family updates around the United States, oddly, did not comment on, that of the total of 283 families who attended, only one fifth of these were Vietnam related, while the other eighty percent were WW-II and Korean War families. The League's March 17, 2017 newsletter update, again reminded DPAA in bold print - that the League expects, "Priority efforts based on the principle of first addressing the most recent war." (6) National League of POW/MIA Families newsletter of 17 March 2017. The National League of Families may have finally lost its choke-hold on DPAA's bureaucracy to follow its demands.

The League leadership's implied threat is not one to be ignored lightly by the DPAA leadership. The League's leader has accompanied most of the POW/MIA agencies extended annual visits to southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This advantage has not been extended by DPMO or DPAA to any of the other major family groups from WWII, Korea or the Cold War. The League's leadership has also been involved in most DPMO/DPAA's high level political discussions with foreign national military and civilian leadership in the above countries. And as a result uses this to their advantage when lobbying the halls of the Congress and Senate for their position of 'Last war first.'

Among the most frustrating developments in the last decade is that of privately funded and manned NGO organizations, who, concerned about the government's almost non-existent POW/MIA recovery program, its meagre results, and incredible expenses involved, have entered the POW/MIA recovery effort with privately raised funds. These NGOs have produced significant recovery results for Korea and World War Two. In the instance of Tarawa, in the WW-II Pacific campaign, History Flight, a private NGO has

handed over the remains of 150 Marines to DPAA for final notification to the families concerned. However, despite this positive contribution, this and other NGO's have been systematically ignored, discouraged, and even insulted about getting involved. DPAA's leadership have needlessly made disparaging and even rude remarks that everything the NGO's touch is corrupted and useless. The fact is that DPAA's bloated, well paid and entrenched bureaucracy consider these NGO's as a threat to their comfortable job security is noteworthy for two reasons.

1. Successful privately funded NGO recoveries of former POW/MIAs are achieved at a fraction of the cost of those by DPAA. Estimates of this cost per DPAA recovery range from around \$1.5 million, as opposed to less than \$150,000 for Private NGO's. A significant variance of 10/1.
2. Private NGO's, in the last five years, are accounting for the preponderance of new MIA finds, which after recovery and documentation, have all been turned over to DPAA for final notification of the families concerned, and DPAA takes credit for the work.

Despite the above two realities, DPAA now re-entrenched bureaucracy have again convinced DOD that they cannot raise their former meager 60/70 recoveries per year without major new facilities, a larger research staff, and more equipment. This has resulted in the doubling of their earlier 2014 to 2016 annual budgets from around \$72 to \$112 million. Their 2017 budget request was for a contentious \$132 million – of which DOD, because of a tight budget environment, only approved \$112 million to date. Among DPMO and DPAA's multi-year budgets were outlays for some \$202 million for a brand new \$85 million forensic laboratory in Hawaii: refurbishing another new \$85 million laboratory in Omaha, Nebraska, funding for a new \$9 million still unavailable data base for POW/MIA's (which was already provided to DPAA years ago), and \$7 million paid to a private consulting management firm... to inform DPMO's bureaucracy why everyone in Washington wanted them investigated for their sub-standard, misdirected, and failed mission performance through 2014?

A recent example of DPAA's, and the League flawed focus on 'the last war first,' is best illustrated by two very expensive recent large-scale field Vietnam visits in 2015 and again in 2016. The first field visit involved a team of sixteen or more DPAA personnel to what was thought to be a fifty year old American RF-4C crash site at Kon Tum province in Vietnam. The first multi month visit in 2015 produced no results at all. So, DPAA decided to revisit the cite again in 2016. This second visit, also of several months duration, also provided no further evidence, no aircraft parts, serial numbers, or human remains. A financial analysis of the costs involved for the two expeditions suggest salaries and per diem alone probably exceeded three million dollars, while government aircraft, crews, fuel, and team salaries added another million dollars. DPAA's total cost for this event, as has been the case for most of its earlier recovery work, surpassed several million dollars, and with no results.

Conclusion

THE EARLIER 2014 ALEXANDER FAIRFIELD REPORT POINTED OUT THAT DoD'S HISTORIC INVOLVEMENT IN THE RECOVERY OF HALF CENTURY OLD POW/MIA CASES AROUND THE WORLD WAS NO LONGER PRACTICAL, NOT COST EFFECTIVE, NOR THE BEST USE OF TAXPAYERS FUNDS. THE EARLIER

FAIRFIELD REPORT ALSO POINTED OUT THAT DoD'S EFFECTIVENESS IN THIS UNDERTAKING HAD BEGUN TO 'COLLAPSE' MANY YEARS EARLIER, WHEN JPAC'S INTELLIGENCE SECTION ASSUMED CONTROL OF NEW CASES BEYOND 2005. THE REPORT ALSO NOTED THAT IN THE LAST EIGHT YEARS ONLY A FEW OF THE POW/MIA IDENTIFICATIONS THAT DPMO/JPAC HAD TAKEN CREDIT FOR IN RECENT YEARS, WERE ACTUALLY HANDOVERS OF INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED TO THEM AT NO COST FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THESE TURNOVER IDENTIFICATIONS THE REPORT NOTED WERE FROM THIRD PARTIES, INCLUDING AMATEURS, OTHER GOVERNMENTS, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHERS, BIRD WATCHERS, CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES, AND OTHERS. THIS IS STILL THE CASE TODAY.

WHILE PROBABLY NO LONGER A PROBLEM AT DPAA THE UNIQUENESS OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL MISSION INVOLVING CONSTANT WORLD-WIDE TRAVEL TO REMOTE PLACES AROUND THE WORLD, RAISES A CONCERN WORTH BEING CAREFUL OF, "BOONDOGLES AND MILITARY TOURISM." THIS WAS A SERIOUS FORMER DPMO/JPAC PROBLEM, AND MUST BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS TODAY. THE EARLIER REPORT DEFINED BOONDOGGLE AS, "A POINTLESS OR WASTEFUL PROJECT, ESPECIALLY ONE FINANCED BY PUBLIC FUNDS. A PROJECT FUNDED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OUT OF POLITICAL FAVORITISM THAT IS OF NO REAL VALUE TO THE COMMUNITY OR THE NATION." (7)

TO MAKE CERTAIN THOSE READING THE EARLIER REPORT DID NOT MISS THE POINT, THE REPORT TOOK THE UNPRECEDENTED STEP OF DESCRIBING GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY PERSONS INVOLVED IN "MILITARY TOURISM," (8)

"THOSE WHO RELISH SIGHTSEEING, TRANS-NATIONAL ENCOUNTERS, AND PATRONIZING MARKETS, SHOPS, TAVERNS, RESTAURANTS, THEATERS AND SO FORTH. LIKE A CIVILIAN REQUIRED TO TRAVEL IN THE LINE OF WORK, THE MILITARY TOURIST HAS A PRESET "ITINERARY." YET WITHIN THOSE CONSTRAINTS, THE MILITARY CAMPAIGNER MAY FIND OPPORTUNITY TO PROFIT PERSONALLY FROM 'TRAVEL VALUED FOR ITS OWN SAKE. THE INDIVIDUAL'S FINANCIAL RESOURCES, POSITION IN THE MILITARY HIERARCHY, PREFERENCES AND EXPECTATIONS RESULTING FROM EDUCATION WILL DETERMINE THE AIMS AND SCOPE OF THE TOURIST AGENDA."

ON 20 JANUARY 2012, AN EXTREMELY TROUBLING GOVERNMENT POW/MIA REPORT EMERGED. ENTITLED, (8) "JPAC'S INFORMATION VALUE CHAIN: THE IDENTIFICATION OF MISSING PERSONS. WILL YOUR ORGANIZATION'S INFORMATION LEAD YOU DOWN THE RIGHT PATH?"(3)