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“Socializing” Music Education

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In the planning stages for this special issue, Wayne Bowman suggested that we probe the theoretical complexities of social justice to deepen our philosophical foundations in ways that might have a “transformative and durable” impact on the music education profession. I took this as an invitation to explore ways to “socialize and justice(!)” music education, theoretically and practically. While educators in other fields have made significant strides in incorporating issues of social justice in their foundations and curricula, and while a few music education theorists have labored to move us in this direction (e.g., Roberta Lamb, Julia Koza, Elizabeth Gould, and Deborah Bradley), music education lags behind. Hence my plan for this paper. First, I reflect on the concept of social justice in terms of several facets, strands, or dimensions. Second, I discuss this concept in relation to selected social movements. Third, I examine the work of two music educators/community musicians whose efforts illustrate aspects of music education as-and-for social justice. Lastly, I offer some suggestions for rethinking and “practicizing” music teaching and learning as/for social justice. (Due to space limitations, and with apologies to international readers, I usually take a U.S. perspective on the issues and examples below).

First Thoughts

What qualifies human actions or human situations as “socially just”? Let us begin by considering instances of social injustice. In an open lecture at the University of Toronto in 2003, Stephen Lewis, Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations (1984-1988) and Deputy Director of UNICEF (1995-1999), spoke passionately about what he has witnessed in his work.

Had it not been for the position of the United States of America and France in *preventing* the UN Security Council from intervening in Rwanda, we might have saved several hundred thousand human lives. I remind you that 800,000 people were mercilessly slaughtered between April and mid-July 1994, while the entire world looked on and did nothing!

Africa is a continent of funerals. Because in many of these countries, the oppression of women is so intense, HIV/AIDS is a gender-based disease. Until the world wakes up and understands that if one does not move on prevention and protection for women and girls, we will never defeat HIV/AIDS.

... More than one billion people on this planet live on less than one dollar a day. I want to know the meaning of the phrase *social justice* in the face of that reality.

(Lewis 2003, 3-5)

Compare these horrific situations to the ideals of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* that was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. Article 3: “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person” (General Assembly of the United Nations, 1948). Article 25: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself [*sic*] and of his [*sic*] family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his [*sic*] control.” And Article 26. 2: “Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.”

Maxine Greene (1998) puts it this way: Social justice is about “what we believe ought to be—not merely in terms of moral frameworks, but in material arrangements for people in all spheres of society” (*xxix*). Cohen (1986) makes the point still more forcefully when he argues that civilized societies must insure “that each person receives what she or he is due” (1), meaning that each person *deserves*—or “is due”—the fullest range of legal, material, and all other personal and societal “goods.” Alwin (2000) looks at social justice from a slightly different perspective: Social justice is “the realm of status, respect, and the sense of worth given and received in social interaction or in relation to society” (2696).

So, although we might trace “social” to the Latin *socialis*, meaning united, living with others, or companion (*socius*), these senses can mislead when paired with “justice” because of the huge range of problems that arises when human beings attempt to live together. Matters of justice—in each of the senses I attempt to explain in a moment—are inherently

social matters, and most social issues ultimately involve some aspect of justice. But justice is not only a social matter: It is simultaneously personal. In personal terms, Sadurski (1984) follows Aristotle in suggesting that justice is a “part of virtue,” rather than “a complete virtue” (332). Justice is a basic human value, but it is not equivalent to the whole value of a person or his/her actions.

There are good actions which are unrelated to the virtue of justice (such as those displaying courage, generosity, truthfulness) and there are morally reprehensible actions which cannot be described as unjust (for example, deceit). Justice, then, occupies only a part of our moral landscape, although it is an extremely important part. (332-333)

As we begin to look more closely, it becomes clear that social justice has many facets. It is plural because it is central to all aspects of human life. Not surprisingly, then, while social justice is a central concern in all fields of scholarship it is interpreted differently in each: in law, for example, or in medicine, philosophy, political science, sociology, education, psychology, and so forth. For these reasons and others I will explore below, I will not attempt to provide a concise definition or a singular concept of social justice. I believe that to aim so narrowly would be misguided and unhelpful. What I propose here instead is an open, provisional, and multidimensional concept of social justice. And while I discuss each strand separately, I believe that, theoretically and practically, each one interweaves with the others in daily life to constitute a complex whole. Moreover, depending on the needs and values of an individual, a community, a social group, or a nation, one or more dimensions of social justice may need to be “moved to the head of the line.” Thus the need to avoid concepts that are “partial, exclusionary, and tied to particular ways of behaving and particular attitudes” (Vincent 2003, 3).

Forms of Justice

Perhaps the most familiar sense of justice relates to fair, impartial, reasoned, and equitable processes in the domain of law. *Legal justice* concerns the application of laws and procedures to individuals and social organizations through a system of rules, formulated by a culture and/or a state such that penalties exist for disobedience. In law, the concept of “due process” refers to legal limitations that give judges, not legislators, the power to guarantee people fairness, justice, and liberty. Governments create and enforce laws (often called “legal rights”) for a variety of reasons and on several bases. Without laws that protect people from

harm, and without legal procedures for enforcing such laws, a society will descend into chaos. Without laws that protect legal property rights, people cannot depend on keeping what they earn from their labors. Some legal rights, called constitutional rights, prevent governments from creating new laws or policies that would prevent citizens from objecting to government actions. The First Amendment gives Americans a legal right to be free from political censorship: that is, people have a political right to speak their minds. The Constitution also gives Americans legal rights to a fair trial. Legal fairness is usually tied to careful, “objective” deliberations and informed judgments. However, legal justice is ultimately decided by human beings—judges—who (knowingly or unknowingly) *interpret* laws, legal precedents, and sentencing guidelines in relation to their personal views on a wide range of variables: race, gender, religion, political ideology, personal history, socio-economic status, and so forth.

For example, with the recent appointment of Chief Justice John Roberts in 2006, the United States Supreme Court has taken a radical “right turn” in its decision-making. As a recent editorial in *The New York Times* reports, “in the 1960s, the court of Chief Justice Earl Warren interpreted the Constitution in ways that protected the powerless in American society—radical and religious minorities, consumers, students, and criminal defendants” (“Justice,” 2007). However, the Roberts court has consistently ruled in favor of large corporations and against consumers. In a recent abortion case, the court supported a major plank in the anti-abortion platform: the Partial-Abortion Ban Act. In another decision, the Roberts court struck down two school desegregation plans, choosing to interpret the 14th Amendment’s equal-protection clause, which was created for the express purpose of integrating blacks into society via affirmative action, “as a tool to protect white students from integration” (“Justice,” 2007). Thus *The New York Times* suggests:

It has been decades since the most privileged members of [American] society—corporations, the wealthy, white people who want to attend school with other whites—have had such a successful Supreme Court term. Society’s have-nots were not the only losers. The basic ideals of American justice lost as well. (“Justice,” 2007)

Inherent in the above is a point I emphasized earlier: We must never assume that one form of justice or social justice is unrelated to the others. Still, common sense and many scholarly writings in law and philosophy posit a strict distinction between legal justice and social justice. Just because certain rulings are “legally just” does not mean that they meet

criteria of social justice. Several rulings of the Robert's court are good examples; they could be easily described as socially unjust. As Sadurski (1984) argues:

The only correct uses of the notion of legal justice are derivative from the notion of social justiceThe arguments that the concerns of "legal justice" may sometimes override the considerations of social justice are morally unsound. Legal justice is ... at the mercy of social justice: it cannot do any independent job. (330)

Scholars of social justice theory often place *distributive justice* near the center of discussions. Distributive justice involves two related questions: Who gets what, and how? and Who should get what, and how? Distributive justice thus involves a wide range of social benefits, "social goods," or "primary goods" that people expect, want, and need (or believe they do). These social goods include legal due process; democratic freedoms and political enfranchisement; education and employment opportunities; fair wages, housing, health care; and so forth. Of course, *economic justice* (concerned with the distribution of financial benefits) is implicit in most concepts of distributive justice. Additionally, many sociologists include "deeper goods" in discussions of social goods: goods that "have inherent satisfaction value ... [or] that bring other extrinsic and intrinsic satisfactions to the individual" (Alwin 2000, 2696).

Most scholars pair distributive justice with *procedural justice*, which refers to "how"—that is, the principles and procedures used in deciding the allocation of goods and the societal systems that distribute those goods (Sadurski 1984; Michelli & Keiser 2005; Hochschild 1981; Alves & Rossi 1978; Cook & Hegtvedt 1983). Evaluations of procedural justice pivot on five competing principles: equity, equality, equality of opportunity, entitlement, and need (Alwin 2000). Parker (2003) cites a metaphor from John Rawls (1999) that illustrates *some* of these issues:

The just citizen who is put in the role of cake cutter would cut it knowing that he or she would ask another person to distribute the pieces, thus placing himself or herself on the receiving end of any indiscretions in the cutting. Knowing that the distribution of pieces of the cakes would be blind, it makes no sense to be anything but scrupulously fair in the cutting. (65)

Implicit in matters of legal justice, and in concern for the equitable distribution of social goods, is *associational justice*. Just societies ensure that there are institutional mechanisms for the political representation of different social associations and groups in deciding how "distribution" should be defined, carried out, or restored (*restorative justice*

redresses past injustices or inequities of distributive and procedural justice). For example, workers in a democracy should have the right to assemble and/or create associations (e.g., unions) to improve their wages, benefits, and working conditions, or rights to sue unjust employers. But in many cases, unions and other associations encounter stiff opposition. For example, when I began teaching at NYU in 2002, adjunct (part-time) professors, most of whom are women, had no legal rights to organize for better pay, working conditions, job protection, and so forth. After battling and negotiating with the NYU administration for some time, the powerful United Auto Workers Union (UAW) organized the adjuncts, won the right to represent them, and dramatically improved their professional benefits.¹

Obviously, there are serious problems with conceiving social justice strictly in terms of legal, distributive, economic, procedural, and associative justice. For although these are fundamental dimensions of our concern, they are not sufficiently inclusive or subtle. They tend to relate to “a single model of justice for all analyses: all institutions in which justice is at issue are analogous to the situation of persons dividing a stock of goods and comparing the size of the portions individuals have” (Young 1990, 18). This point can be clarified by thinking about punishments. As Sadurski (1984) points out, societies dispense legal consequences of varying weight to people who harm others, “just as in the distribution of rewards and prizes we distribute goods to people in proportion to what we regard as their desert” (335). Punishment “fits” a crime, then, not in the sense that it is equal to it, but only in the sense that it is proportionate to punishments for other offences. Consider the example, offers Sadurski, of “a parent who punishes one of his [or her] children and forgives another for the same misbehavior. No one has lost anything, but injustice was committed because the proportion of guilt and punishment was not respected” (344). Related to this, distributive (and/or procedural) justice is sometimes equated with *retributive justice*, which usually refers to “the extent of fairness or unfairness people *experience* [italics added] with the consequences of breaking social rules” (Gitterman 2003, 29). Indeed, people’s *perceptions* of “just outcomes” depend on a range of *feelings* about fairness in things like interpersonal relations, contracts, and the treatment of their racial/cultural group by other groups or society as a whole.

The next facet of social justice is what I will call *cultural justice* (for want of a better term). Cultural justice involves many crucial matters of identity, such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and the many forms of oppression that often attend them. While I cannot

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explore cultural justice here in the detail it warrants, it is important to note that identity issues implicate multiple forms of expression, impression, and oppression. Issues of equity and equality often figure centrally in discussions of cultural justice—concerns stemming from discrimination against groups like ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, women, the poor, the homeless, the mentally and physically challenged, or “illegal immigrants.” Here we encounter classic examples of the severe disconnect between principles of social justice and the workings of society. While the U.S. has made progress in cultural justice by passing laws to prohibit racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination in education, employment practices, and the like, serious inequities persist. For example, in effort to redress inequalities, affirmative action policies are often accompanied by anti-discrimination laws—with the intent of restoring equity to social groups, rather than individuals. Affirmative action policies aim to remedy the effects of past discrimination by mobilizing legal and social action for minority access to education, employment, career promotion, government contracts, small business loans, and for more equitable representations of women and minorities in public institutions, such as universities and police forces.

Affirmative action is highly controversial, however, and under attack from many sides, “including educational and legal scholars utilizing critical race theory, whose research has shown that it is actually white women and by extension white families who have benefited the most . . . and [that] affluent black families have benefited more than other minorities.”² Moreover, while legislation now guarantees the right of equal pay for equal work (i.e., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act), serious gaps remain between men’s and women’s earnings in the global workplace (Loutfi 2001; Joshi 1998; Wright, Baxter & Gunn 1995; Mueller & Wallace 1996).

Forms of Oppression

Since each and every aspect of cultural justice and social justice arise from individual or group situations of intolerance, abuse, deprivation, discrimination, inequity, and other forms of injustice, many scholars argue that theorizing about and taking action for social justice should begin with reflections on *oppression*. Young (1990), for example, proposes “five faces of oppression”: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. To Bell (2007), theoretical and practical refinements of social justice follow from reflections on “the myriad ways oppression can alternatively seduce our minds and hearts or

inspire us to further learning and activism” (2). Bell analyzes several types of oppression, beginning with *pervasive oppression*.

We use the term *oppression* rather than discrimination, bias, prejudice, or bigotry to emphasize the *pervasive nature* [italics added] of social inequality woven throughout social institutions as well as embedded within individual consciousness. The term *oppression* encapsulates the fusion of institutional and systemic discrimination . . . in a complex of relationships and structures that shade most aspects of life in our society. (3)

Restrictive oppression includes societal constraints on people’s aspirations and opportunities—things that limit their capacities for self-improvement or self-determination, and in extreme cases their personal survival.

140 years after the abolition of slavery, African Americans as a group have still not achieved full equality and cannot even rely on their government for basic human treatment and aid in a time of crisis, as in the recent scandalous government desertion of the victims of Hurricane Katrina. (3)

Hierarchical oppression refers to the ways socially privileged, authorized, empowered, or unrestricted groups suppress and undercut the rights of specific groups. For example, whites in Canada, the U.S., the U.K., and Scandinavia often (usually) dominate public institutions of health care and education, private sources of wealth (e.g., corporations), and government bodies (e.g., parliaments, congresses, senates, and councils).

All types of oppression impact the personal self. *Internalized oppression* occurs when oppressed people come to accept unintentionally the beliefs of “authorities” (Bell, 4). Repeated exposure to “media or educational discourses of deficit,” for instance—discourses that reflect white middle class norms—often come to “pathologize black youth as delinquent.”³ When this happens, pervasive assumptions that poor, black young people in urban areas are likely to be “delinquents” may become absorbed and shared by teachers, police, and even by parents and black youths themselves. In such circumstances, individuals adopt a stereotypical view of blacks, and therefore of themselves, as delinquents or people with deficits, and act accordingly. Thus, acts of resistance or transgression are effectively precluded, as the oppressed become complicit in their own continued oppression.

It is important to recognize, then, that cultural justice is always contextually *situated*: It has temporal and geographical dimensions, such that what is considered socially or culturally just in one historical period, or in one place, or by one social group, may be considered unjust in others (Griffiths 1998). Moreover, even the idea that a specific collection

of people should be considered “a social group” (e.g., Asian Americans) can become highly problematic. Because matters of social class and education cut across boundaries, social groups are inherently fluid, with boundaries that are porous.

An important distinction needs to be drawn here between social groups and associations. An *association* is a group created by individuals who join voluntarily for a variety of reasons: occupational, political, recreational, religious, and so on (Graham 2000, 210). A *social group*, on the other hand, is usually not something one elects to join, but something one “discovers” one already belongs to. This is often the case with groups defined by race, ethnicity, and/or gender. I am not saying that all members of a social group think, act, or feel the same way, or desire the same social goods. I only mean that membership in a social group may impact how others see and treat a “member,” for good or ill. In North America, one of the clearest examples of this is racial grouping. “A person has no choice about what race he [or she] belongs to, and the deep, persistent racism of North American society ensures that race will play an extremely important role in his [or her] social identity” (Graham, 211). But of course, this begs the question of where people of mixed race “fit into” the concept of social groups as racial groups.

Graham draws another distinction: members of *threatened minority* groups—the Inuit people of Nunavut in Northern Canada, for instance—often rely upon group identity as “the context of choice in which they develop their moral powers, and develop and pursue their conceptions of the good” (213). In fact, says Graham, the term social group is too simplistic in reference to *threatened minority* groups. The appropriate term is *threatened culture*.

If all members of a threatened minority culture are to satisfy what Rawls calls their higher-order interests, they must have the chance to live out their lives as members of this culture, which significantly shapes their social identities. If their culture is to continue to exist and to avoid complete assimilation into the dominant culture of the majority that surrounds them, then this culture will require special protections against assimilation. (214)

While these concepts are useful to certain ends and for certain purposes, they are not without problems. As one of the anonymous reviewers³ of this essay cautions,

The terminology of *threatened minority* and *threatened culture* seems rooted in colonial attitudes based upon rescuer tropes or salvation discourses. While such discourses acknowledge how various forces have damaged the culture, they also seem to suggest these same forces are the only ones with the capacity or agency to improve conditions. (This is different than acknowledging an

ethical responsibility for retribution for the damage done) ... The term *threatened minority* seems alarmingly like *endangered species* to me.

Social Movements

If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and deprecate agitation are men [*sic*] who want crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without thunder and lightning... Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did, and it never will.

--Frederick Douglass (1857)

In this section, I discuss social justice in relation to issues and actions in the African American civil rights movement and related movements. I do so for three reasons. First, civil rights movements concern each of the facets of social justice I have advanced above. And second, if we wish to rethink and revitalize music teaching and learning by incorporating social justice into our aims and strategies, it may be useful to re-vision our profession as a social movement. Music educators may learn important lessons by reflecting on how “real” social movements work (or not) as catalysts for the enactment of social justice in government policy, court decisions, education, and other areas.

If this strikes you as utopian, ask yourself: What group of people could be more utopian than music educators? We devote our lives to reflecting on and working ceaselessly to create and maintain music programs for people of all kinds in schools and communities everywhere. In many (or perhaps most?) cases, we do so without adequate state and federal commitments (in terms of policy and funding), and often without the support of fellow teachers, administrators, and parents. Consider what Jean Anyon⁴ (2005) says:

The utopian thinking of yesteryear becomes the common sense of today. Imagine the late 19th century/early 20th century dreams of workers and labor organizers, and know that those utopian schemes for an eight-hour workday, a minimum wage, and some sort of financial assistance when fired, became federal policy in the 1930s, and are accepted as common sense by most Americans today. (6)

Utopian dreams of freedom were in the minds and hearts of enslaved black people in the early 1800s. Sixty years later, Anyon reminds us, “slavery was abolished, and Black freedom was inscribed in the U.S. Constitution. I conclude from examples such as these that, far from useless, visionary thinking may be a necessary, prescient prelude to social progress” (6). Is visionary thinking any less a necessary, prescient prelude to progress in music education as/for social justice?

Social movements range across a spectrum—from very positive and beneficial to extremely destructive. It is important that we acknowledge and learn from both. The fact that Hitler’s Third Reich and Stalin’s communism were initially “social” movements should remind us of the need for critical perspectives. A less extreme and more contemporary example of the adverse consequences that often attend seemingly well-intended social initiatives is America’s *No Child Left Behind* (NCLB) legislation. As Apple (2001) suggests, we have much to learn from this Rightist (neo-conservative, neoliberal, market-driven) educational movement that has done significant damage to American educational justice, and arts education, during the last twenty years. Many critics agree.⁵ It is important to understand, says Apple, that NCLB was planned and “packaged” as an urgent social movement to “save” (“reform”) U.S. education, thereby guaranteeing America’s future economic dominance. This shows that

It is possible to build an alliance of disparate groups and in the process to engage in a vast social and pedagogic project of changing a society’s fundamental way of looking at rights and (in)justice. Radical policies that only a few years ago would have seemed outlandish and downright foolish are now accepted as commonsense. (xi)

Now let us turn our attention to the positive end of the spectrum: the African American civil rights movement. This is a movement with a very long history. It did not arise in the 1960s with Martin Luther King, Jr. Rather, it grew slowly, putting down roots and growing branches during the first half of the 20th century. It progressed in waves; but it was always “there” (Anyon 2005). African Americans’ political protests against segregation, and their quest for all forms of social justice, extended throughout the 20th century, and are still ongoing today. Each step forward in social justice policy (whether favorable Supreme Court decisions or Presidential proclamations) renewed the movement’s determination and activism, which led to further advances (Anyon 2005; Fairclough 1995; Fairclough 2001; Payne 1995). As Fairclough explains, in the early 1900s the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and activism by black women’s civic groups led to the end of “legal apartheid” (legally drawn black and white zones of living). Voter drives by African American civic leagues, the NAACP, and southern black youth groups in the 1930s led to a Supreme Court decision (1944) that resulted in an increase in black voter registrations in the South from a few thousand in 1940 to about a million in the early 1950s (Fairclough 2001; Anyon 2005; Bates 2001). In the 1940s, blacks began achieving higher

incomes. This advance in distributive-procedural justice (which was also redistributive or restorative) gave the movement increased economic leverage. Social activists created local, “social crises” to force concessions in all categories of social justice. Mass boycotts of white-owned companies, such as Southern bus companies dependent on black ridership, resulted in far greater gains and quicker results than talks with local officials.

In Birmingham in 1963 black strategists mobilized a massive protest to paralyze the city. So many black protestors were arrested that jails were filled to overflowing. This caused civil disorder, destabilized the local government, and brought black Americans significantly closer to desegregation. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s famous “Letter from Birmingham City Jail” emphasized his belief that without forceful, civil disobedience like the Birmingham protest, meaningful changes in civil rights could never be achieved. We are morally bound, he asserted, to disobey unjust laws.

Meaningful changes also required fresh infusions of dedicated leaders, a need to which the Citizenship School movement contributed directly and significantly. The movement began in the 1920s and was led by African American women’s groups whose original purpose was to teach civics and literacy for voter registration. But they soon engaged in preparing local community leaders (Kelly 1990, 1994), and became so successful that they were eventually taken over by several civil rights groups and churches. There were almost one thousand of these schools in the South in the 1960s. Rouse (2001) notes that Andrew Young and *Sweet Honey on the Rock* singer Beatrice Reagon moved into civil rights activism from these schools.

What we can generalize so far is that successful civil rights movements build organizational strength through linkages, focus on specific grievances of social justice, plan and carry out targeted public protests, capitalize on the courts, create educational opportunities for youth, and develop strategies for contention (strikes, marches, sit-ins, media events, and cultural appropriation). Today, the civil rights movement continues in court actions over matters of legal, distributive, and procedural justice, including affirmative action, decent wages, educational justice, funding, and voting rights. But civil rights protests can burst out in loud, angry, and sustained public protests at any moment. This occurred recently in New York when police fired fifty bullets at a group of three unarmed black men, killing one (Sean Bell, 23) on his wedding day.

Since the 1980s, “quiet protests” by other social movements for legal, economic, distributive, cultural, and associative justice have been building across the U.S. Anyon points out that (a) “Living Wage laws have been passed in 120 cities and counties (with over 70 more campaigns in progress)” (128); (b) among recent organizations now operating for social justice causes are 7.5 million local, community groups and 3000 Community Development Corporations (154); (c) the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) represents 150,000 low and medium-income families in 60 cities (154). Skilled leaders and staff members organize parents and neighborhood residents quickly to assure media coverage that supports their aims. These aims target issues like decent housing, community safety, the prosecution of unscrupulous lenders, community reinvestment, and most recently, improved education.

Interestingly, Apple has been involved in a contemporary variation on the civil rights Citizenship School. The location of this school is the city of Porto Alegre, the capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. The left-of-center Porto Alegre government (the “Workers Party”) came to power in 1989 after years of Brazilian unrest under a military dictatorship and the subsequent establishment of a democratic Republic in 1988. Porto Alegre has participatory assemblies in its sixteen districts, which meet with the city government to create policies and procedures for the equitable distribution of social goods, a process that has significantly improved the lives of its citizens (Baiocchi cited in Tipping 2002). Clearly, this situation is exceptional since people do not have to create social protests for legal or restorative policies: When it came into power, the new government was “the people.” As Baiocchi relates, the assumption was that “the democratic impulse comes from a virtuous citizen.” However, Baiocchi continues, his research on the Porto Alegre context points equally to awareness of “the changes in government that make it possible for people to get involved” (15). Specifically, the positive changes in this city emerged from “participatory budgeting”—to democratic decision-making about the allocation of resources (Gandin and Apple 2002, 261). Many other cities in Brazil are experimenting with the Porto Alegre model, as are cities like Durban, South Africa.

The Porto Alegre Citizen School grew out of this process. The school focuses on social transformation and social justice. Gandin and Apple (2002) cite the words of a former mayor of the city: The Citizen School “institutes the possibility for citizens to recognize themselves as bearers of dignity, to rebel against the commodification of life” (Silva 1999,

10). Administrators, teachers, parents, and students work democratically to determine school processes and curricular principles. Adults are given opportunities to learn democratic, deliberative processes. The curriculum is rooted in the cultures of the people's communities, but "the students are not studying history or social or cultural studies through books that never address the real problems and interests they have . . . [T]hey learn history by beginning with historical experiences of their families" (Gandin & Apple, 267-268). When students eventually study the history of Brazil and other subjects, they do so with culturally informed, personal, and critically aware lenses that give them the chance to "transform their situation of exclusion" (Gandin & Apple, 268). In addition, like the black Citizenship schools, the Porto Alegre school seems likely to inspire the creation of similar schools. If so, these schools may become sources of future social justice leaders in Brazil.

Let us review three crucial aspects of social movements that have come to light in this section. First, Anyon (2005) underlines that "raising people's consciousness about their oppression through reflection and talk is not enough: Physical and emotional support for actual participation in public contention is required" (11). "Intellectualizing," reading and writing, or discussing do not by themselves move people to take meaningful action for social justice. This point is extremely important for educating our students toward participating *for* social justice. To motivate people to join a social movement it is essential that they engage in some kind of action (Anyon 2005; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001; Meyer 2002; Payne 1995). The reason is that "people's personal identities *transform* as they become socially *active*, and actions for social justice create new categories of participants, and political groups: identities modify in the course of social interaction" (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 126). In Anyon's (2005) words, "One develops a political identity and commitment ... from walking, marching, singing, attempting to vote, sitting in, or otherwise demonstrating with others" (142). When the successful Montgomery bus boycott of 1956 resulted in major changes to laws, activists' identities also changed. Martin Luther King, Jr. observed that the courage and effective work of the activists "had rendered the conventional identities ... inadequate descriptors" (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 319). According to King, the protesters found new identities: "[W]e walk in a new way. We hold our heads in a new way" (319). The boycott led to "a new collective identity among Southern Blacks generally" (320).

Second, the success of many social movements depends on major contributions by young people. "It is doubtful that social movements would develop at all without the central

participation of the young” (Anyon, 140). Effective protestors in the 1940s civil rights movement were graduate students in their 20s—like Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1954. Throughout the 20th century, black college and high school students, and youthful supporters from all races became participants (sometimes assuming leadership roles) in sit-ins, boycotts, and “freedom rides” (Olson 2001; Payne 1995). Gamson (1992) argues that the widespread anger of black youth (past and present) and their passionate devotion and solidarity were key elements in their political participation and resistance to oppression. The same holds for youth involved in today’s protests by “illegal immigrants” and the democratic movement in the Republic of China (recall the young protestors of Tiananmen Square, China, in 1989).

Third, the vast majority of social movements appropriate all forms of culture and media (e.g., print, radio, television, recordings, Internet websites, blogs) to focus public attention and press their claims for social justice. It is doubtful that the African American civil rights movement would have succeeded as it did without the poetic eloquence of Martin Luther King Jr., which was powerfully presented (and televised) in Washington, D.C., on August 28, 1963. On the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, King delivered his passionate and moving “I Have a Dream” speech, which is credited with mobilizing massive support for desegregation, and prompted the 1964 Civil Rights Act. King received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1965, focusing world attention on the civil rights movement and America’s culpability in denying African Americans the most basic forms of social justice.

Musically, protest songs and anthems like “We Shall Not be Moved” (an adapted spiritual) and “We Shall Overcome” (from the Baptist hymn, “I’ll Be Alright”) were central to the movement’s identity, motivation, and strong connections with the American public (Noon 2004). Similarly, a group of “social musicians” in 1947, who called themselves People’s Songs, created and performed protest songs intended as artistic weapons for world peace and human rights. People’s Songs included Pete Seeger, Woody Guthrie, Bess (Lomax) Hawes, and Jenny Vincent. Supporters of People’s Songs included Aaron Copland and Leonard Bernstein. Later, Bruce Springsteen (in “Youngstown”) expressed the plight of degraded workers: “... To the coal mines of Appalachia, The story's always the same, Seven-hundred tons of metal a day.” In “Allentown,” Billy Joel depicted the crumbling industrial base of America. The women’s movement of the 1970s embraced music, literature, poetry, and art as basic means of communicating the oppression of women and women’s demands for change. Music festivals by and for women included the First National Women’s Music

Festival in Champaign-Urbana (1974) and the largest women's music festival, the Michigan Women's Music Festival (1976), which continues today (Moravec 2004).

Music in and for Social Justice: Mary Piercey's Example

Free from the restrictions that usually control the aims and processes of school music education, many community music and school-community programs around the world focus on teaching music to achieve facets of social justice. In this section, I describe two such programs in order to highlight the working contexts of the people involved, their motivations, their guiding principles, and something of the potential results of their programs. Let me emphasize that neither of these situations are perfect. Put another way, I know that these music teachers/community music leaders do not seek to “normalize” their practices or have them stand as models for all teachers in similar situations. Indeed, as I stated in a recent paper (Elliott 2007a, following Giroux 1993), I understand that schools and community music programs are more than instructional and social-movement sites. They are cultural/political/moral sites “that are actively involved in the selective ordering and legitimization of specific forms of language, reasoning, sociality, daily experience and style” (xxiv).

I begin with the work of Mary Piercey. Piercey is a music educator and community musician in Arviat, an Inuit hamlet with a population of approximately 2000, located on the western shore of Hudson Bay, in the Kivalliq Region of Nunavut, Canada. Arviat is a traditional Inuit community where hunting and fishing are the primary sources of sustenance. Today, it is also well known in northern Canada and abroad for the work of Inuit artists who produce soapstone carvings and sculptures, shaman dolls, paintings, wall hangings, beadwork, and weaving.⁶

Until the 1990s, Canadian government agencies had eroded or destroyed most of the Inuit's indigenous forms of social justice—legal, distributive (including education), procedural, and cultural. The Inuit had become a threatened minority. This situation was reversed dramatically in 1991 when the Canadian government established a Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples to examine the troubled relationships among aboriginal peoples of the Canadian North, the Canadian government, and Canadian society. This effort did not spring from altruism: The Commission was established in “a time of anger and upheaval.” This was, in other words, a long overdue governmental response to an extended

Elliott, D.J. (2007) “ ‘Socializing’ music education” *Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education* 6/4: 60-95. http://act.maydaygroup.org/articles/Elliott6_4.pdf

and sustained social movement for Canadian Aboriginal Rights by determined activists on all sides. As the Commission's authors admit:

It was a time of anger and upheaval. The country's leaders were arguing about the place of Aboriginal people in the constitution. First Nations were blockading roads and rail lines in Ontario and British Columbia. Inuit families were encamped in protest of military installations in Labrador. A year earlier, armed conflict between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal forces at Kanesatake (Oka) had tarnished Canada's reputation abroad—and in the minds of many citizens.... It was a time of concern and distress. Media reports had given Canadians new reasons to be disturbed about the facts of life in many Aboriginal communities: high rates of poverty, ill health, family break-down and suicide. Children and youth were most at risk.

(Dussault & Erasmus 1991, 1)

The Royal Commission's eventual recommendations led to major social and land claim agreements for Aboriginal peoples in all regions of Canada. One of these agreements led to the creation (in 1999) of a new territory called Nunavut, with a population of 29,474 spread over a land area the size of Western Europe. Related results included the revision of federal, regional, and local governance to facilitate the full participation of aboriginal peoples in the application of their indigenous laws, traditions, and knowledge toward creating and instituting local policies of land use, economic development, family rehabilitation, community development, health, and education.

This is an inspiring example of how persistent social activism can help to achieve or restore many facets of social justice. However, this is not to imply that all dimensions of social justice were fully achieved and are now operational in Inuit communities. In fact, Bradley (2006) may well be correct: "Canada's official multicultural discourses do little to dismantle systematic racism, to the degree they are rooted in a center of normative whiteness and framed in language that is racially coded" (8). Still, progress has been made in Nunavut and elsewhere. To a considerable extent, the Inuit are no longer a threatened minority. They now have more (though not all) of the constitutional, democratic, and legal rights needed to protect themselves, their property, and their culture from many injustices. They have opportunities for renewing and revitalizing indigenous systems of distributive and procedural justice. Consequently, Inuit communities are better positioned to organize cultural resistance to a variety of oppressions, including the pervasive, restrictive, and internalized oppressions perpetrated by decades of Canadian social and government abuse. Taken together, I suggest that the renewal of Inuit societies, communities, and the redistribution of social goods has

resulted in some “deeper goods”—the inherent satisfactions that flow from the intrinsic and extrinsic goods of a more just society, and the reversal of internalized oppressions.

Enter Mary Piercey. She begins her story by explaining her work in the context of her community. “The Inuit Elders Society has an important voice in decision making for the [Arviat] community; the Inuit Community Justice Committee makes legal decisions; and Arviat *Pilirgatigit* designs programs that teach traditional cultural knowledge to youth” (Piercey, forthcoming). The Arviat District Education Authority works in terms of local elected committees. On the educational front, Inuit elders, parents, students, and teachers work together to develop and distribute the social goods of culture-based curricula, which operate along side traditional Canadian curricula. Among its other responsibilities, the Arviat Authority hires elders to take senior students “on the land” to experience traditional ways of living, including learning how to survive by navigating the wilderness, reading the landscape, and hunting and preparing caribou meat.

Piercey was hired by the Authority to create a music program in the Qitiqliq High School that would provide her students and the community with indigenous and traditional music programs. “I was to implement *Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit* in the music program.” This meant bringing traditional Inuit music into the classroom and reviving it among the youth of the community. “The term Inuit *Qaujimajatuqangit* encompasses all aspects of traditional Inuit Culture including values, world-view, language, social organization, knowledge, life skills, perceptions, and expectations. *Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit* is as much a way of life as it is sets of information” (Piercey, forthcoming). Over several years, and with the involvement of community music elders, Piercey learned and incorporated Inuit singing, drumming, and dancing in her school program, and linked these activities to community music and social life. Note that this renewing and honoring of Inuit knowledge created another kind of distributive justice in the form of new *employment opportunities* (economic justice) for Elders and for the Inuit musicians and dancers engaged in Piercey’s school-community music program.

I founded a choir called Arviat Imngitingit (singers). This choir is made up of students from Qitiqliq High School and adults from the community... it specializes in the recently revived traditional Inuit music originating from the Kivalliq region of Nunavut. The Arviat Imngitingit have become famous for their expertise in Traditional Inuit Throat Singing, A-ya-ya Singing, and Drum Dancing, and they enjoy singing contemporary Inuit folk songs and gospel songs in Inuktitut [the community language] as well.

Piercey emphasizes that the elders' aim for *Inuit Qaujimagatuqangit* was not to force a return to the past, but to provide "a grounding of education in the strengths of Inuit so that their children will survive and successfully negotiate the world they find themselves in today." Piercey believes that through the combined efforts of the Educational Authority, and the community's elders, parents, and students, her program of traditional Inuit music has created stronger community connections in Arviat: "a connection between elders and youth; a connection with Inuit history," leading to her suggestion that school-community music programs like hers "can create and foster community identity, cohesion and development." Piercey cites this personal communication from her colleague, Jaypeetee Arnakak: "We owe it to the world, and especially to ourselves, to articulate who and what we were in the past, who and what we are today, and who and what we want to become in the future."

What explains Piercey's motivation for including social justice aims and strategies in her program? She was born and educated in the northern Atlantic region of Canada called Labrador. Her early music education stressed Western classical music. She studied for her Master's Degree in music education at the University of Toronto in the late 1990s. During that time, she took courses with my colleagues and me in music education philosophy, multicultural music education, world musics, and so forth. She is very aware of the natures, values, and pedagogies of various social-musical communities. I believe there are strong links between her understandings and valuing of multicultural music education, her embrace of the *social* in music, her efforts in music education for social justice, and her work on behalf of threatened musical cultures. Piercey is currently pursuing PhD work that examines how the Inuit of Arviat, Nunavut have used music to negotiate social diversity since three distinctive groups were settled there in the 1950s. We also need to keep in mind that teachers learn social responsibility and a sense of social justice (or not) during their formative years outside school, in all forms of daily social interactions and associations. Thus, teachers of music for social justice acquire and practice their commitments to social justice in a variety of ways, including their professionally practiced educational ethics and their sense of justice as part of personal virtue.

Music in and for Social Justice: Casey Hayes' Example

My next example of music education as/for social justice is the work of one of my current

doctoral students, Casey Hayes.⁷ Hayes is a former director of the New York City Gay Men's Chorus and currently teaches as head of the creative arts department at The Hewitt School in New York City. As in Mary Piercey's case, it is important to provide some background details that relate Hayes' work to deeply disturbing social injustices and oppressions.

Before coming to New York in 2002 to study at NYU and conduct the New York City Gay Men's Chorus, Hayes was forced to resign his position as a secondary school choral and band teacher in Indiana. He had been teaching in Indiana for nearly twenty years and had received many awards for his exemplary teaching and community service. Before his resignation, Hayes had become depressed and thin after losing his partner. Rumors began to circulate among Hayes' teaching colleagues that he had developed AIDS (he had not). This resulted in complaints to the school's administrators that Hayes was gay. Before being fired for what might be called "apprehension of homosexuality," Hayes resigned and accepted a position at a nearby Catholic school. As Hayes related his experiences to me, his new principal (a priest) told Hayes, "It doesn't matter to me who you sleep with; what matters to me is working with an excellent music teacher who can overhaul this school's awful music program." Hayes accepted the offer and taught at the Catholic school for several years before deciding to move to New York.

Before going on, it is necessary to step back for some perspective on the legal-justice issues involved here. In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that homosexual citizens had no constitutional rights to privacy. Several years later, momentum appeared to be shifting. For example, in 1999, a Vermont ruling compelled the state to offer the legal benefits and responsibilities of civil marriage to same-sex couples. The Massachusetts Supreme Court made a similar ruling in 2004. However, in recent years, a backlash in many states has cancelled previous legal protections, including legal recognition of same-sex marriages and civil unions. Today, legal options available to same-sex couples in the U.S. depend on their state of residency. In a different context, President Clinton introduced "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in 1993—a military policy that prohibits GLBT (gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered) people from revealing their sexual orientations and from having sexual contact with other GLBT people while serving in the U.S. armed forces. Since then, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" has been upheld five times in federal courts and in a recent Supreme Court decision. Thus, while GLBT military people have the right to fight and die for their country, they do not have the First Amendment right of free speech, or equal and just access to the

social goods of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” or the right to free association with anyone they choose—all of which are fundamental aspects of social justice that American citizens deserve and expect.⁸

By way of comparison, twenty-five NATO military forces, including Britain, France, and Canada, have revoked policies that prevent GLBT individuals from serving openly during their military service. These countries also have strict military policies against the sexual harassment of GLBT people. Homosexuality was decriminalized in Canada in 1967. In 1977, the province of Quebec became the first jurisdiction in the world to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. In 2004, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled same-sex marriage constitutional. Today, Canada, Belgium, The Netherlands, Spain, the U.K., and several other countries officially sanction GLBT civil unions or marriage. While Canada is far from perfect, the fundamental human rights guaranteed to all its citizens now make public schools liable for anti-gay name-calling and bullying by students or staff. It is not unfair to say, then, that GLBT rights in the U.S. lag behind many other Western countries: GLBT Americans do not yet have access to most basic forms of legal, distributive, procedural, and cultural justice, which leaves them highly vulnerable to all forms of oppression.

Turning to musical/social matters, during the 1970s large numbers of gay men and women began moving into large American cities and “safe” urban neighborhoods because these areas were perceived as relatively free from several forms of threat. One aspect of this migration and its attendant social circumstances was the formation of GLBT choruses. The AIDS epidemic, and many decades of pervasive, restrictive, hierarchical, and internalized oppression, moved GLBT choruses to “perform” their anger, pain, and fear. As Sparks (2005) recalls, GLBT choruses emerged

not in a climate of welcome but in one of hostility – a climate so frightening at times that hundreds of adult men and women refused to allow their names to be used in a concert program. Social opprobrium, outright discrimination, fears of being found out by one’s co-workers and family, and even threats of violence—these were the dominant, seemingly immutable realities of gay life. In spite of it all, thousands of gay men and women created, joined, and sustained a new kind of performing arts institution. Whatever one’s personal views about sexuality, it cannot be denied that not so many years ago (and still today, in some parts of the country), to join a gay chorus—to sing onstage with other gay men and women—was an act of courage. (1)

In fact, singing with other gay men and women was (and still is) profoundly courageous in an excruciating way: it meant making and listening to music with friends and family who were in the throes of dying from the agonizing and “socially unacceptable” plague of AIDS. (To this day, many victims of AIDS cannot gain access to decent, affordable health care). Many of the older choruses lost nearly as many members to AIDS as they had in their choruses. At one point, The San Francisco Gay Men’s Chorus lost more than 200 members, many in their 30s and 40s; The Turtle Creek Chorale of Dallas, a “purely musical” and closeted group in the 1980s, lost 145 singers (Sparks 2005). Kenneth Cole, who was an executive director of the Gay and Lesbian Association of Choruses (GALA) from 1994 to 2001, says, “Singing in a gay choir is essentially a political act, because society has made it so” (cited in Sparks).

As Hayes (in press) relates, Edward Weaver created the New York City Gay Men’s Chorus in 1979. In 1981, the GALA was formed in Washington, D.C. In the service of GLBT movements for due process, distributive, cultural, and associational justice, “GALA created national mission statements, by-laws, governance rules, and financial strategies to assist fledgling choruses, thereby adding credibility and organization to this new voice of the GLBT community” (Hayes, in press). Also, GLBT choruses quickly became involved in educating young people and adults about GLBT issues through school and community choral outreach programs, as I discuss further in a moment. When the First National Gay Choral Festival took place in 1983 at New York’s Lincoln Center, the singers performed works that they had appropriated from other social movements and compositions they commissioned on themes of peace, tolerance, acceptance, and freedom for GLBT citizens. Libby Larsen and Ned Rorem were among the composers who created commissioned works for this occasion.

While most social movements have embraced music to document, formulate, motivate, and express their missions, GLBT-related repertoire has benefited enormously from contributions by composers and performers across many musical style-communities. As Attinello (2002) explains, popular, rock, and hip-hop composers/performers were especially moved and involved in the struggle of gay men during the peak of the AIDS crisis. Attinello lists several examples:

Prince (“Sign o’ the Times,” 1987), James Taylor (“Never Die Young,” 1988), Lou Reed (“Halloween Parade,” 1989), Linda Ronstadt (“Goodbye My Friend,” 1989), Elton John (“The Last Song,” 1992), Madonna (“In This Life,” 1992), Reba McEntire (“She Thinks His Name Was John,” 1994), Tori Amos (“Not the Red Baron,” 1996), Patti Smith (“Death Singing,” 1997), Janet

Jackson ("Together Again," 1998)," the jazz/rap *Stolen Moments* (1994), and the U2's hip-hop "One" (1992).

(Attinello 2002, 1)

No discussion of popular music and gay rights would be complete without reference to the life of Cole Porter (portrayed in the film, "De-Lovely"), who (to some extent) lived a closet life, knowing that the American public would dismiss his "double-meaning" love songs if they knew he was homosexual. As Attinello also documents, contemporary classical composers have produced many compositions on GLBT themes, among them

"John Corigliano's *Symphony No. 1* (1990); AIDS poetry set by William Bolcom, Libby Larsen, and Ned Rorem (1); ... Meredith Monk's *New York Requiem* (1993), Laurie Anderson's *Love among the Sailors* (1994), and Pauline Oliveros' *Epigraphs in the Time of AIDS* (1994)."

(Attinello 2002, 2)

Returning to GLBT choral history, Hayes points out that today's GLBT choral movement numbers more than 200 community choruses worldwide, involving over 10,000 singers. Within this broad context, GLBT Youth Choirs have developed as educational outreach movements. GLBT choruses in New York, Seattle, Vancouver, and San Francisco have created links with social service organizations to aid GLBT youth with self-identity issues. Hayes writes, "GLBT Youth Choruses provide a safe, nurturing, and closely monitored organization in which members and their families can come to grips with issues previously left for the child alone to deal with." Indeed, without legal protections from violence, verbal abuse, and bullying, students are denied the procedures and protections required for the equitable distribution of educational opportunities and, indirectly (because of internalized oppression), they may fear more injustices if they challenge the legal status quo. Accordingly, more and more centers like the *The Harvey Milk High School of New York City* (2007) are developing across the U.S. The HMHS serves GLBT children at risk of harassment, violence, and/or emotional abuse in traditional schools. However, admission to HMHS is open to all, regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or physical abilities. With a ninety-five percent graduation rate, HMHS offers a rich range of classes in the performing and visual arts. Similar schools include the Frederick Douglas Academy, the Young Women's Leadership School, and the Urban Academy Laboratory School.

One example of GLBT choral outreach programs is the One Voice Mixed Chorus (2005), a Twin Cities' GLBT Community Chorus dedicated to "building community and

creating social change by raising our voices in song.” To expand their mission, the chorus decided to create outreach programs with local public schools that would allow them to “perform their message” of tolerance and acceptance, and meet with teachers and students after concerts to discuss the social justice issues of GLBT youth. One outcome of these discussions was a partnership between the OVMC and a secondary school, the Community of Peace Academy Charter School, of mostly Hmong, African American, and Hispanic students, which has a dedicated and open music staff. The Chorus and the Academy commissioned a composition from Elizabeth Alexander, which the OVMC performed with the Peace Academy students in their *Building Bridges* concert series. The composition was titled *Life is Not a Garden*.

In Alexander’s interactions with students, they shared with her many concerns about injustice, poverty, war, and prejudice, upon which she drew in the process of composition. The first draft of her piece expressed an optimistic view of the social goods that can arise from tragedy: The students rejected it. Most of them told Alexander that her composition did not reflect the fear, disrespect, and isolation experienced by their families, their friends, and themselves. After struggling with this setback, Alexander re-composed the music and text. “Opening with disillusionment rather than affirmation, the song journeyed through anger and betrayal.” The new version, co-composed with the students, expressed the pervasive, hierarchical, and internalized oppressions suffered by the students and their families, but included musical and textual expressions of the students’ hopefulness.

One way that Hayes has advanced his GLBT mission is through the formation of an outreach choir: The Ambassador Chorus of the New York City Gay Men’s Chorus. The members of the Ambassador Chorus travel locally and nationally to raise public awareness of GLBT issues among youth and adults. They often perform in schools to help teachers and parents understand the abuses suffered by sexual minorities. Among many works the Ambassador Chorus has performed for students is Alan Shorter’s “Oliver Button is a Sissy,” originally commissioned by the Twin Cities Gay Men’s Choir. The subject of “Oliver” is the bullying of gay youth. Hayes also commissioned three works for performance and outreach: “A Great Generation” deals with issues of gays in the military, AIDS, retirement, and loneliness; “A Gay Century Songbook” is a large work detailing various aspects of Gay New York life over the last 100 years; “And When I Thought” is based on Walt Whitman’s poem, *Leaves of Grass*. One critical outcome of GLBT outreach efforts by musical groups is that

more young people are becoming the movement's newest political activists. (Recall the pivotal role of young people in Civil Rights movements). What GLBT associations and musicians are seeing is that effective advocates of GLBT rights are not only GLBT youth, but straight students who are joining them in hundreds in many ways, including high school gay-straight alliance clubs.

What we can learn from Piercey and Hayes is that, like all positive social movements, practices of school and community music education as/for social justice require personal and political persistence over a long period, the skills of building musical community solidarity, specific social and musical-social aims, the “commissioning” of help from local, regional, and national musicians, and the courage to push for legal, distributive, procedural, economic, associational and anti-discriminatory justice.

Toward Socializing Music Education

In order to “socialize and justice(!)” music education theoretically and practically, I believe we first need to re-conceive and mobilize music education as *a social movement*. What this requires, on the broadest level, is that we participate actively in social *coalitions for educational justice* dedicated to reclaiming education *for* democracy and social justice.

Closely related, we need to build coalitions with scholars, teacher educators, and teachers who are already “socializing and justicing”⁹ their fields, with the intent of sharing strategies, building mutual strength, and making our colleagues aware of what we are uniquely able to offer.

Put more directly, at the academic and leadership levels, we write and talk—a lot. Even when our undergraduate and graduate students engage in critical pedagogy or democracy in/for music education, these usually take the form of disembodied, dialogical, intellectualizing processes alone. Such efforts are undeniably important, but they are not the way the American civil rights movement, or most other movements for social change, have progressed. Socializing music education demands more: We need to empower and engage our profession, university students, and school and community music students to participate as assertive, activist music makers and leaders for social justice. We need, for example, to empower our students to make music *for* social justice. If we are serious about developing transformative and durable practices, we need to reconsider our most deeply ingrained assumptions. Are we purely teachers, musicians, academics, and/or public intellectuals? Or

can we “move out into the social world,” developing new ways of educating a critical mass of future music teachers who have the understandings (both theoretical and practical) and the dispositions to infuse their aims and pedagogies with goals of social justice and social activism? If the latter, we need to renounce counterproductive theories and practices and replace them with better ones. What can we do? I have a few suggestions.

To activate music education as and for social change, our profession will need to surrender longstanding theoretical assumptions that, having nothing to do with social justice, block our advance. One such assumption is the aesthetic notion that music consists of works whose value is intrinsic—in the sounds themselves. Of course music involves sonic products, but these are created, maintained, adapted, reinterpreted, and appropriated by people in and across musical *communities*. Accordingly, music and our perceptions of it are always artistic/social/cultural/political/communal—and more. We can learn to conceive of music more broadly and socially by thinking in terms of social *communities* or practices. Our musical-social communities are, in turn, embedded in larger, continuously changing societies, cultures, personal interactions, and political patterns. This is (partly) what praxial and pragmatic music educators are saying. Taken seriously, these ideas can liberate music teachers to include social justice and social activism in their instructional aims and strategies.

Neither Mary Piercey nor Casey Hayes, nor their musical-social communities nor the various social movements I have discussed—none of these conceptualize music as an “aesthetic” phenomenon that isolates us “above” daily life. I dare say that thousands of musician-educators, community musicians, listeners, and students conceive, experience, and embrace music for its *social values*. To these people, music and musical values are not matters of some inherent meaning that resides somehow in patterns of sound, or of perceiving and reacting to aesthetic qualities. As Bowman (2005) puts it,

We owe to modernist aesthetic theory the idea that there exists a “music itself” which manifests itself most authentically in “works”: our legitimate object of disciplinary concern. Musics tainted by extra- or non-musical or processual meanings are less valuable or worthy of our attention. Only, as this act of sorting works by a kind of sleight of hand [or ear] that renders invisible the supposedly extra-musical implications of “our” musics, or, more specifically, by situating their value in structural/formal attributes deemed musically pure. “The rest” is, for legitimately musical purposes, dispensable. (3-4)

Another consequence of the “music itself” theory, then, comes of its binary division of values into those that are inherently or intrinsically musical—those that are grounded in

musical pattern and form—and an extrinsic remainder. In this scheme, claims like ours—that music is or can be “good for” social justice—are merely “utilitarian” (i.e., non-musical), and to that extent of strictly secondary concern. We need to focus, then, on music’s “truly musical” value, which, it has been argued, lies in its capacity to “educate feelings.”¹⁰ On this view, “educated feelings” are basic to a sense of social justice: that by learning to feel more deeply and broadly through aesthetic education, students will be more sensitive and responsive to the feelings and needs of others; they will act more ethically, morally, and charitably towards other human beings; they will be predisposed to challenge cultural oppressions. Unfortunately, numerous examples negate this “educated feelings” claim. Although they might have left Germany during the Third Reich, Herbert von Karajan, Elisabeth Schwarzkopf, and Wilhelm Furtwangler chose to stay in order to maintain and further their careers. Documentation shows clearly (Kater 1997; Evans 2004) that Karajan joined the Nazi Party twice in 1933. In Salzburg, on April 8, 1933—“the very day when Jews in public positions, including municipal orchestras, were notified of their impending dismissal by the German Reich across the border”—Karajan duplicated his Nazi party membership (Kater 1997, 58). He doubtless knew, continues Kater, that “his future professional success might double if he, as a bona fide Party member, were able to profit directly from the consequences” (58). And surely Karajan recognized what a catastrophe it was for a musician to be dismissed from secure employment.

More broadly, Karajan deliberately supported the Nazi cause throughout World War II by conducting continuously throughout Hitler’s Germany, and by conducting countless times for Nazi leaders, with whom he undoubtedly socialized: “Karajan served the Nazi system . . . whether it meant conducting orchestras for party functions, playing in occupied Paris, or performing for Hitler’s birthday” (Kater, 60). Long after the war, when confronted with irrefutable proof, Karajan continued to deny his Nazi party membership. Most of what I have just said applies to Furtwangler, too, only in stronger terms (Evans 2004). And, although she achieved fame quickly, Elisabeth Schwarzkopf made sure to join the Nazi Party early in her life to guarantee success in the Reich. Moreover, she became a leader in the Nazi Student League, “a position with exceptional influence” (Kater, 60).

As Shusterman (2000) reminds us, “this paradox constantly repeats itself in less extreme forms, as when we emerge from the theater emotionally wrought with concern for society’s victims there portrayed, and then hurriedly bypass the real victims begging for

concern on the frozen streets which are their home” (155). In short, the central value claim of aesthetic education defies reality. But more importantly, taken seriously it actually impedes our transformation to a socially robust and responsible profession.

Becoming a Responsive and Socially Responsible Profession

What might we do practically? Although I have argued some of the next points in a recent issue of this journal (Elliott 2007b), I offer them again because they may be even more directly relevant here. I believe we need to empower music students and music education majors as artistic and *socially just musical citizens*. What this means is that we need to enable our students to develop *musical replies* to the social/moral/political dilemmas of today and tomorrow by creating musical (or hybrid musical/bodily/visual) expressions of social problems. Visual art educators and theatre educators have a long history of doing exactly this. Theater educators and actors *perform* democracy and social justice (see, for example, Haedicke & Nellhaus 2001). Becoming a *musician for social justice* requires all the understandings that make up musicianship, but it also requires that we harness and encourage students’ dispositions for musical-social activism.

To me, performing community concerts (for example) is not nearly enough. We need to prepare music students and music education majors to express their political-social ideas, reactions, feelings, and stories in musical form—through the power of sonic-performative means. The recent “Live Earth” concert appropriated several forms of media and music in a 24-hour, seven-continent concert series (on 7/7/07) that brought together more than 100 musicians and 2 billion people. Its aim was to maintain and energize the global movement to alleviate the climate crisis. Indeed, rock, country, jazz, and folk musicians have worked as musical-social activists for decades.

Schools and universities are supposed to help students develop “new knowledge” to serve their current and future communities. To me, creating new knowledge includes creating music for political-social justice. If we do so, our students will come to realize their musical-public responsibilities and their potentials to create and perform music that helps audiences *hear and feel the sounds* of pervasive oppression, legal and distributive injustices, and so on. Two illustrations of this point come from hip-hop projects. According to Clay (2006), social science research during the last twenty years points to important connections between hip-hop culture and youth, “including identity construction through narrative, and identification

with hip-hop artists and lyrics” (2). Youth find representations of themselves and their community within the lyrics, musical style elements, and musical-dance presentations of their culture. As part of her research, Clay investigated nonprofit organizations in the San Francisco Bay Area, such as Teen *Justice* and Multicultural Alliance. These organizations offer important ways for oppressed youth to learn the skills they need to push back against the social injustices they face: for example, growing up in racially and economically segregated communities where they regularly experience violence. Clay reports one project of Teen *Justice* that used hip-hop in organizing events to support their student-led campaigns. By presenting a poetry slam, “youth members at Teen *Justice* used performance within the parameters of the organization as a strategy for making power structures visible” (6). The performers created poems and rapped about problems in their lives, such as being pulled over by the police, having sex, and experiencing gang violence. The youth and the audience interacted in calls and responses.

Suppose we extend these activities to middle and secondary schools, such that a program of student composing begins with hip-hop (or students’ preferred form of music) and moves to other styles—including, say, 20th century aleatoric music, garage band pop/rock, modal jazz, and so on. If so, then students’ musics, and their social interests, are affirmed. At the same time, their cultural/musical understandings are allowed to “sit beside and rub against” less familiar musics and their social values. In these ways, students’ cultural knowledge is redistributed, allowing them to step back and problematize their own musics, and the musics of others, *in relation to all forms of social justice*. Furthermore, assuming that students can work together on composition projects from time to time—associational justice—and assuming that they do not simply repeat standard musical scripts or follow their teachers’ directions, they can use hip-hop to express, codify, and share common concerns. Thus, they transform their sense of self, power, and that of their audiences. A current documentary film, Chris “Kharma Kazi” Rolle’s *The Hip Hop Project*, is an excellent example of what I have just described.

Music educators have powerful means—music making and musical communities—of raising students’ social consciousness by choosing music past and present that addresses issues of social justice and injustice. Seek out, study, and listen to selected musical examples in terms of their actual and potential relationships with all issues of social justice (not only matters of oppression). I offered several examples in my discussion of Casey Hayes. I might

also mention John Adams's *On the Transmigration of Souls* (dedicated to victims of 9/11), and Philip Glass's *Symphony No. 6*, based on Alan Ginsberg's poem *Plutonium Ode*, a "passionate outcry against nuclear contamination." Students and teachers need examples of composers, performers—musicians—who create music in the service of social justice.

Related to many points I have made, Duncombe (2007) introduces an innovative concept: the "ethical spectacle." An ethical spectacle is a "dream" imagined ("I have a dream," said Martin Luther King) that is made concrete when members of social movements participate democratically in creating the spectacle. Their political aims are expressed in their means of protest (171). Duncombe cites the example of the civil rights movement in which leaders often modeled their interracial "beloved community" in the ways they actually organized and carried out their protests. Here, music was not an escape; it was not "on stage"; its meaning was in the actions of transforming the oppressors and the oppressed. An ethical spectacle "demonstrates" legal, distributive, procedural, and associational justice, and challenges oppressions. Ethical spectacles disrupt cultural hierarchies, build safe communities, promote diversity, and engage with reality while asking what new realities might be possible (126). Our students can engage in music making to create ethical, social-justice spectacles for their schools and communities.

Final Words

I began this essay with the words of Stephen Lewis. Let me end by rephrasing another section of his lectures in our terms. Music educators: Society needs our voices. The music education profession likes to do what it does best, work intensely with students, nurturing their love of music. Our passion and excitement about the musical differences that one person can make is perfectly understandable. Still, it is vital for people like us, people who understand the fragile nature of our societies and recognize the damage wrought by injustices, to put our musical and educational talents to work for social justice.

What I am saying is that there is a need to pronounce on the issues, to take stands, to make voices heard, and to let the community know that thinking, sensitive, decent human beings engage in dealing with people who are vulnerable, isolated, marginalized. Most of us have social justice; it would be nice to share that in more ways with the rest of the world, which does not. (Lewis 2003, 5)

Notes

¹ Interestingly, many senior administrators of NYU are exceptional lawyers and legal scholars. One would think that their sense of legal justice, which should include virtue and social justice, might have motivated them to remedy the unacceptable working conditions of their staff long before 2002.

² I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this article for this statement.

³ I owe this statement to one of this essay's anonymous referees.

⁴ Anyon is a renowned civil rights activist, and a former teacher in the inner-city elementary schools of Washington, D. C. and Bedford Stuyvesant, Brooklyn.

⁵ See, for example: Elliott 2006; Michelli 2005; Earley 2005; Keiser 2005; Meier & Wood 2004; Apple 2001; Meier 2002; Ball, Bowe & Gewirtz 1994; Olssen 1996; Clark & Newman 1997.

⁶ Of course, there is far more "behind" Inuit life in Arviat, and Piercey's work in this community, than I can document here.

⁷ Casey Hayes has granted me full permission to discuss these personal details.

⁸ Also, to cite one of many cases of gay bashing in the American military, Barry Winchell was a young infantry soldier in the United States Army who was murdered by a fellow soldier in 1999 for dating a male-to-female transgendered showgirl (Clines 1999). Winchell's officers were aware of the harassment he was suffering, but they did nothing to protect him. In contrast to the military's discriminatory mindset, several surveys of American public opinion show majority support for gays and lesbians in the military.

⁹ For instance, English teacher educators, science teacher educators, history teacher educators.

¹⁰ Note, however, that this claim itself comes precariously close to being "extrinsic" or utilitarian in nature on the scheme advanced by advocates of the aesthetic rationale.

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