

## Online Appendix A: Data and coding procedures

### Data source and processing

The federal corruption prosecution data come from the 2009 edition of the National Caseload Statistical Data (NCSD), an anonymized database that is regularly released by the Offices of the United States Attorneys at the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act.<sup>1</sup> This dataset includes the universe of federal prosecution files and is effectively a snapshot of the DOJ database of cases (including cases filed and closed in previous years) as of the end of the 2009 fiscal year. We retain the non-appellate criminal cases within the fifty states<sup>2</sup> that were categorized by DOJ as pertaining to state, local, or other public corruption (i.e., federal public corruption cases were excluded<sup>3</sup>). We excluded the 171 charges listed as “opened in error.” In order to avoid double-counting charges that were either superseded by a new filing or included in another case, we used the record from the final case that included the defendant in question.<sup>4</sup> Legally, public corruption can range from a government employee stealing office supplies to embezzlement and bribery. To focus on cases that are high-profile enough to have the potential for political repercussions, we follow Gordon (2009, 551) and restrict our attention to the cases coded as national priorities.<sup>5</sup> We therefore exclude 977 defendants whose cases were coded as only district priorities, which Gordon (2009, 551) reports “are typically clerical

---

<sup>1</sup>Gordon (2009) uses data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse and the Bureau of Justice Statistics but these secondary sources should be drawn from the raw data we accessed directly.

<sup>2</sup>Cases filed in territories such as Guam and Puerto Rico were excluded because partisan politics might be less salient or operate differently in those areas. Those filed in Washington, D.C. were also excluded because of the differing political environment (cases in D.C. might, for instance, have less direct effects on Congressional or state campaigns than those in the fifty states) and the possibility that cases filed there might come under closer scrutiny from or be more influenced by “Main Justice,” the central administration of the Department of Justice.

<sup>3</sup>It is of course possible that U.S. attorneys are also biased in deciding whether to prosecute federal corruption cases that could damage their party. However, few members of the opposition party are presumably charged in such cases. We thus do not examine them here.

<sup>4</sup>The record includes each defendant’s full case history. The charges that were eventually superseded are visible in the later case and are still used when analyzing the initial charges filed against the defendant.

<sup>5</sup>These were coded as either a national priority or as both national and district priorities.

workers,” as well as the 2041 defendants whose cases were coded as neither a national or district priority or whose priority was undetermined.<sup>6</sup>

## **Defendant identification**

Defendants were identified using the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) website ([www.pacer.gov](http://www.pacer.gov)), a fee-based service provided by the federal courts to offer public access to electronic court records. Research assistants initially searched PACER for cases in which the United States was a party that were filed within two calendar days of the case filing date provided in the Department of Justice (DOJ) data. If no matches were found, they expanded the window to four days on either side of the case filing date.

They then matched cases in the DOJ data to PACER when possible using the case filing date, the number and type of charges against the defendant, the case closing date (if any), and the punishment (fine amount and/or months of probation/incarceration).<sup>7</sup> Additional steps were taken to match defendants in the DOJ data to PACER records in multiple defendant cases, including using separate spreadsheets to record information from PACER on all defendants and then match them to the DOJ records. A second research assistant blindly double-coded the most difficult cases, including multiple defendant cases and those for which defendants matched on two identifying variables, and resolved any discrepancies with the first coder and/or the authors

---

<sup>6</sup>We were concerned that some districts did not appear to use the national or national/district priority codes. As a validation step, we coded all 250 defendants from this group who were charged within 24 weeks of an election in a district that did not use the national or national/district priority codes for any public corruption defendants during an entire presidential administration (either Clinton or Bush). All but twenty of these 250 defendants were charged in New Jersey during the Bush years when then-U.S. attorney Chris Christie launched an unprecedented anti-corruption crusade (e.g., Sampson 2007). Of these, 80 were partisans and all were from New Jersey during the Bush administration. However, we observe no clear partisan patterns in case timing or severity around elections, which likely reflects the intense scrutiny that Christie received due to allegations that his efforts were politically motivated (e.g., Conte 2012).

<sup>7</sup>Due to a lack of case summary information in PACER, it was not possible to identify defendants in the following districts: California Central, Indiana South, Louisiana Middle, Nevada, New York East, Oregon, Texas West, and Virginia West. A lack of case summaries also precluded defendant identification for cases filed between December 16, 1993 and July 20, 1995 in Maryland.

to ensure that defendants were matched properly.<sup>8</sup> After matching the defendant, research assistants copied and pasted a series of fields from the PACER case summary into the data.

### **Defendant partisanship**

Research assistants searched for the defendant in Lexis-Nexis Academic, Google, Google News, Proquest, and the list of federal candidates compiled by Open Secrets. When possible, they identified each defendant's job title or position, city, county, state, and the level of government in which they worked: federal government, state executive branch/bureaucracy, state legislative, local government, private/nonprofit, relative/personal relationship with accused, or a military or postal worker (excluded from federal category).

The research assistants also coded the public partisanship of each defendant and any supervisor, associate, or ally of the defendant who was mentioned in news accounts or official documents about the case using the same data sources used to identify the defendant. When possible, partisan codings were corroborated using data from Gordon (2009). It is important to note that partisan codings do *not* reflect party registration or other private behavior by defendant or their associates. Individuals were only coded as partisans if they were publicly identified as members of the Democratic or Republican party in news accounts or public documents or as associates of prominent partisans.

The data employed in the analysis above classifies as partisans both defendants in public corruption cases who were publicly identified with one of the major parties as well as defendants with ties to prominent partisan figures.


---

<sup>8</sup>Matches were allowed when minor discrepancies existed between the DOJ and PACER data if the PACER defendant data matched the DOJ defendant data on at least two identifying variables either and no other defendant in PACER did so. When too many discrepancies existed or a match could not be found, the identity of the defendant in the DOJ data was coded as missing. Minor date variation (e.g., five days or less) between the DOJ and PACER data was considered to reflect normal bureaucratic imprecision and delays in data entry. Charge/count variation between the DOJ and PACER data sometimes occurs and appears to reflect differences between charges filed (PACER) and those sustained (DOJ at least in some cases). The fact that a charge is listed in PACER but not DOJ is therefore relatively common.

## Defendant data: Match rate and reliability

We were able to identify 1931 of the 2544 qualifying defendants (76%) spread across 1177 cases (out of 1336 total).<sup>9</sup> Of the 1932 identified defendants, 489 (25%) were publicly identified with one of the major parties (352 Democrat, 137 Republican) either individually (152), as an associate of a publicly-identified partisan (314), or as both a publicly-identified partisan and an associate of a partisan (23).<sup>10</sup> We illustrate the steps in this process of identifying partisan defendants from the set of qualifying public corruption prosecutions in Figure A1.

Figure A1: Partisan defendant identification procedure



Sample: All federal criminal cases targeting state and local public corruption filed by U.S. attorneys between February 1993 and December 2008 and coded as national priorities or national and local priorities.

As a validation step, we merged our data with the replication files from Gordon (2009) and resolved any unintended discrepancies in defendant identification, party affiliation, or position among partisan defendants. After this step, we matched 94% of his defendants, including 99.4% of the partisans (one defendant appears to be omitted from our DOJ data). The sentencing data corresponds almost perfectly between datasets as

---

<sup>9</sup>These defendants represented 1903 unique individuals (27 were charged in two cases and one was charged in three). Defendants who could be identified faced more charges and counts, were more likely to be found guilty, were convicted of more severe crimes, and received longer sentences than those who could not be identified (results available upon request).

<sup>10</sup>There are a total of 480 unique partisan defendants — nine appear in two separate cases.

well (98% on incarceration, probation, and fines among matching defendants). Finally, our coding matches Gordon's very closely on party identification (90% of those defendants who match across datasets) and public/private sector positions (95% of matching defendants).<sup>11</sup> A comparison of defendants we could identify with those that we could not indicates find that the defendants whom we could not identify faced fewer charges and counts and were found guilty less often and of less severe crimes (details available upon request).

One potential concern is that the availability or quality of information on defendants may vary over time. We find no significant relationship between year and the probability of defendant identification once we exclude the apparently anomalous outlier of 1994, which had a 45% match rate (details available upon request). A linear time trend does exist in the probability of partisan identification among the defendants whose names could be identified ( $\beta = .01, p < .01$ ), which could reflect the growing availability of media sources in electronic form during the 1993–2008 period, increasing partisanship in the population of public corruption defendants, and/or partisans being more likely to be targeted by prosecutors in public corruption cases. However, unless partisan identification rates by year are correlated with individual case timing around elections, this time trend should not affect our results.

## **U.S. attorneys**

The public corruption cases in our sample were matched to the U.S. attorney who was serving on the date that the case was filed using data on U.S. attorney tenures during the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush from the Department of Justice. We observe case filings by 220 U.S. attorneys who took office during the Clinton and Bush administrations in 75 judicial districts.<sup>12</sup> More than 1,000 were filed in ten judicial districts (California East: 81, Florida South: 85, Pennsylvania East: 88, Indiana North: 90, Mississippi South: 93, Michigan East: 104, Massachusetts: 105, Arizona: 115, New York South: 137, and Illinois North: 274). The 489 publicly identified partisans in the data are distributed somewhat more evenly across 60 judicial districts. The most cases against partisans were filed in Illinois North (102), Pennsylvania East

---

<sup>11</sup>The remaining differences appear to reflect slight variations in coding procedures.

<sup>12</sup>The supervising U.S. attorney could not be identified in 52 cases out of a total of 2545. These cases were filed before the first U.S. attorney nominated by the Clinton administration took office in that district (our data on U.S. attorneys begin with the Clinton administration).

(38), and Indiana North (37). The 483 cases that could be matched to U.S. attorneys<sup>13</sup> were filed by 98 U.S. attorneys, but nearly half (48 of 98) filed cases against only one or two partisan defendants. The remaining 50 U.S. attorneys filed 420 cases against partisan defendants. The most prolific U.S. attorneys were Scott Lassar in Illinois North (43 partisan defendants from 1998–2001), Patrick Fitzgerald in Illinois North (33 from 2001–2010), Joe Van Bokkelen in Indiana North (30 from 2001–2007), Pat Meehan in Pennsylvania East (28 from 2001–2008), and Jim Burns in Illinois North (26 from 1993–1997).

### **Assistant U.S. attorneys and federal judges**

We extract the set of assistant U.S. attorneys (AUSAs) listed in the PACER judicial database as representing the United States in the set of cases that constitute our sample (federal criminal cases targeting state and local public corruption filed between February 1993 and December 2008 that were coded as national priorities and for which the defendant could be determined). For each AUSA who prosecuted a public corruption case, we determined the number of cases they prosecuted against defendants who were publicly identified as a member of a major party or a prominent associate of a well-known partisan. We then compared the balance of prosecutions by party among those cases filed against partisans within 24 weeks of a federal or state election, counting each case for each AUSA who represented the federal government (often more than one was listed). An identical procedure was employed for each U.S. attorney who took office during the Clinton and Bush administrations (see above). Specifically, we compared the partisan balance of all public corruption cases meeting the above criteria that were filed by the U.S. attorney's office under their supervision within 24 weeks of a federal or state or federal election. Data on federal judges was derived from Federal Judicial Center (N.d.). Name matching was used to link individuals across datasets; official biographies and *Who's Who* were consulted to resolve any remaining ambiguities (e.g., inconsistent use of nicknames).

---

<sup>13</sup>Six were filed before the first Clinton administration U.S. attorneys took office (five in California East, one in Kentucky East).

## Election timing

For each case, we calculated the electoral distance variable to the closest election before or after the case filing date in the DOJ data (i.e., the minimum absolute value), which is the one we expect to be most salient.<sup>14</sup> Since most state elections coincide with federal elections, this variable measures the number of weeks until or since the closest federal election except for a subset of cases in the five states with off-year electoral cycles (Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia). For those five states, the closest election was a state gubernatorial or legislative election for 153 of 200 defendants. The resulting electoral distance variable ranges from -365 (a case filed on November 8, 1999 in West Virginia South — approximately one year before the 2000 federal elections) to 366 (two cases, including one filed in Missouri East on November 4, 1993— one year and one day after the 1992 federal elections). As described in the main text, we round our electoral distance variable down to the nearest complete week from the election. This week variable ranges from -52 to 52. Cases filed less than 7 days before and after the election were classified as 0.5 and -0.5, respectively.

Figure A2 summarizes the distribution of public corruption case filings over the electoral cycle for those defendants whom we identified as partisans.<sup>15</sup> For visual clarity, we use bins of thirty days (approximately one month) where -1 represents the month before Election Day and +1 represents the month after Election Day.<sup>16</sup>

Figure A3 presents the distribution of these cases for all defendants.

We also construct placebo election dates on the first Tuesday of November in off-years for partisan defen-


---

<sup>14</sup>The DOJ data only provide one case filing date. For cases with superseding indictments, the filing date may be the date of the most recent filing in the case. These are a relatively small proportion of the sample — 22% of all identified defendants and 24% of partisans have a superseding count in the charges listed in PACER. We expect that the incentives that affect the filing of new charges around an election should also apply to filing additional or updated charges in the period around an election. To the extent that the superseding indictments are otherwise not sensitive or consequential, however, their presence should add noise to the data and make it more difficult for us to find significant results.

<sup>15</sup>An equivalent figure showing the distribution of case timing over the election cycle for the full set of defendants is included in Online Appendix A.

<sup>16</sup>The bins for -12 and 12 include cases filed 361–366 days from an election — the maximum electoral distance observed in our data.

Figure A2: Partisan public corruption prosecution case filings over the electoral cycle



Sample: All federal criminal cases targeting state and local public corruption filed by U.S. attorneys between February 1993 and December 2008 and coded as national priorities in which the defendants were publicly identified as a member of a major party or a prominent associate of a well-known partisan. For each case, we calculated the number of weeks from the date the case was filed to the closest election (before or after) at the federal or state level. See Online Appendix A for further details.

dants charged with public corruption in the 45 states that hold state elections on the federal election calendar (excludes Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia) and estimate the number of weeks to the closest placebo election for these defendants. This measure is constructed analogously to the main electoral distance measure.

### **Weeks to file**


We calculate the number of days elapsed from the date the case was recorded as being received by DOJ to the date that the prosecutor filed charges. A histogram of this measure, which is rounded to the nearest complete week, appears below (the 19 cases in which more than 300 weeks elapsed are collapsed in the rightmost bin).

### **Charge severity**

In both government databases and court documents, criminal charges are recorded using the exact section of the U.S. Code that the defendant is accused of violating. For example, a charge of 18:1347A refers to Title



Figure A3: Public corruption prosecution case filings over the electoral cycle (all defendants)




Sample: All federal criminal cases targeting state and local public corruption filed by U.S. attorneys between February 1993 and December 2008 and coded as national priorities. For each case, we calculated the number of weeks from the date the case was filed to the closest election (before or after) at the federal or state level.

(18), Section (1347), Subsection (A) of the U.S. Code. When the relevant code has numerous subsections and paragraphs, the exact reference will be indicated in the charge by an additional series of lower case letters and numbers enclosed in parentheses. Lastly, the category (F for felony or M for misdemeanor) indicates whether the individual was charged with the felony or misdemeanor version of the offense when both exist for that crime. The severity of the individual charges filed against a defendant, the lead charge in the defendant's case, and the individual charges sustained against each defendant were quantified by matching each charge to the charge severity measures developed by Rehavi and Starr (2014), which provide the maximum potential sentence under the law for every criminal charge used by DOJ since 2000 (i.e., the statutory maximum; see the data appendix in Rehavi and Starr 2014 for a detailed description).

### **All charges filed/sustained**

The NCSD includes detailed information on every charge ever filed against a defendant (including those that were dropped or superseded). Using the charge severity matrix from Rehavi and Starr (2014), we calculated the maximum potential sentence among all charges filed against each defendant as well as the potential

Figure A4: Time to case filings



Sample: All federal criminal cases targeting state and local public corruption filed by U.S. attorneys between February 1993 and December 2008 and coded as national priorities or national and local priorities.

maximum among all charges that were sustained. Because most federal sentences are served concurrently, this measure calculates the maximum severity of the charges filed against each defendant as well as the maximum sustained charge.

### **Election-related offenses**

According to the federal handbook for prosecuting election-related crime (Donsanto and Simmons 2007), the following statutes can be used to charge election-related offenses: conspiracy against rights (18 U.S.C. § 241), deprivation of rights under color of law (18 U.S.C. § 242), false information in and payments for registering and voting (42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c)), voting more than once (42 U.S.C. § 1973i(e)), voter intimidation (42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10(1), 18 U.S.C. § 594, 18 U.S.C. § 610, 18 U.S.C. § 241 and § 242, 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(1)(A)), fraudulent registration or voting (42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10(2)), voting by non-citizens (42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10(2)), false claims to register to vote (18 U.S.C. § 911), and campaign “dirty tricks” (2 U.S.C. § 441d and 2 U.S.C. § 441h). While used to charge election-related crimes, these statutes can also be applied to non-election-related offenses. The frequencies presented in the main text are thus likely to overestimate the number of public corruption cases stemming from election-related crimes.

## Online Appendix B: Robustness checks and additional results

### McCrary (2008) density test

The McCrary test is typically used to examine whether the distribution of the “running” variable in regression discontinuity (RD) designs is continuous at the discontinuity. In typical RD applications, finding a discontinuity in the running variable would indicate that agents are sorting around the cutoff or otherwise manipulating the running variable and would invalidate the identification assumptions necessary for causal inference. In our setting, however, such a finding constitutes *evidence* for manipulation of case timing. The null hypothesis for the test is that the log difference in heights of the estimated density is zero at the potential discontinuity. The density estimates are computed by binning the data in histograms on either side of the discontinuity and then smoothing those estimates using local linear regression.

### Prosecutorial resources

Offices with more resources might bring more corruption cases (including against opposition defendants), but these resource differentials should not vary sharply according to the electoral calendar and thus would not confound our effect estimates.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, we show in column 2 of Table B1 that there is no evidence that our event study results vary by office resources (the results from Table 2 are presented for comparison in column 1). Specifically, we find no evidence that the relationship between case timing and defendant partisanship varies by whether offices have above-median levels of financial resources in FY 2007–2008 data.<sup>18</sup>

### Other case timing robustness tests

The results in Table B2 are virtually identical to Table 2 if we cluster the logistic regression results on criminal cases rather than election cycle weeks or use 200% of the optimal bandwidth for local linear regression to

---

<sup>17</sup>Federal spending changes each fiscal year, but our falsification test provides no evidence of a seasonal effect (see main text).

<sup>18</sup>Due to data limitations, we are forced to use the only publicly available measures of U.S. attorney office resources for the period of our data, which cover fiscal years 2007 and 2008 (Wilber 2012). We expect that the resource differentials between offices we observe during this period are relatively persistent over time. (We are unable to use the resources measure in Alt and Lassen 2014 because it is proprietary.)

address possible overfitting of outliers near the discontinuity.


Neither the non-partisan case filings in Figure B1(a) nor filings around placebo off-year election dates in Figure B1(b) show a discontinuous change in density at Election Day.

### **Additional time to charge results**

One particularly interesting subset of cases are those filed on the same day that they are recorded as being received, which we call “immediate” case filings. Prosecutors either rushed to file these cases after receiving them or the charges were the result of a prosecutor-led investigation. Figure B2 presents a simple bar graph demonstrating how the proportion of immediate case filings varies dramatically around elections by defendant partisanship. For opposition defendants who were immediately charged within 24 weeks of an election, 83% ( $n=24$ ) were charged before an election — the time when such charges could be most damaging to their party. By contrast, only 24% of the comparable group of same-party defendants ( $n=17$ ) and 60% of the comparable non-partisan defendants ( $n=138$ ) were charged in the pre-election period. These dramatic differences easily allow us to reject the null of independence between timing and partisanship (Fisher’s exact test:  $p < .01$ ).

### **Testing for partisan disparities in case content and outcomes**


Figure B1: Falsification tests for discontinuity in opposition corruption case timing  
 (a) *Non-partisan defendants*      (b) *Opposition: Weeks to placebo elections*



Plots calculated using the McCrary (2008) density test in Stata with default bin size and bandwidth calculations; thick lines represent density estimates, while thin lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Sample: All federal criminal cases targeting state and local public corruption filed by U.S. attorneys between February 1993 and December 2008 within 24 weeks of an election. The sample for subfigure (a) consists of all defendants who could not be publicly identified as a member of a major party or a prominent associate of a well-known partisan. For each case in this sample, we calculated the number of weeks to the closest election (before or after) the case was received at the federal or state level. The sample for subfigure (b) consists of all defendants in states that hold state elections on the federal election calendar (all but Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia) who could be publicly identified as opposition party members or as prominent associates of well-known opposition partisans in state or local politics. For each case in this sample, we calculated the number of weeks to the closest placebo election (early November in off-years) before or after the case was received.

Figure B2: Immediate public corruption prosecutions by election timing



Sample: All federal criminal cases targeting state and local public corruption filed by U.S. attorneys between February 1993 and December 2008 within 24 weeks of an election and coded as national priorities in which charges were filed on the same date that the case was received. Opposition party case frequencies: 20 before, 4 after; non-partisan: 82 before the election, 55 after; same party: 4 before, 13 after. Partisan defendants are those who publicly identified as a member of a major party or a prominent associate of a well-known partisan. For each case, we calculated the number of weeks from the date the case was filed to the closest election (before or after) at the federal or state level. See Online Appendix A for further details.

Table B1: Probability of opposition party defendant by election timing: Robustness tests

	Window around election (weeks)			
	24	24	24	24
Post-election	-0.18*	-0.20+	-0.19*	-0.24+
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)
High office resources		0.01		
		(0.07)		
Post-election × high office resources		0.03		
		(0.13)		
State A.G. from president's party			-0.01	
			(0.07)	
Post-election × state A.G. party match			0.03	
			(0.13)	
Non-presidential election				-0.07
				(0.15)
Post-election × non-presidential election				0.15
				(0.18)
Constant	0.18	0.16	0.19	0.16
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
N	250	250	250	250
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

+, \*, and \*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors from OLS are in parentheses.

Sample: All federal criminal cases targeting state and local public corruption filed by U.S. attorneys between February 1993 and December 2008 and coded as national priorities in which the defendants were publicly identified as a member of a major party or a prominent associate of a well-known partisan. For each case, we calculated the number of weeks to the closest election (before or after) the case filing at the federal or state level. See Online Appendix A for further details. Budgets are the logged average of U.S. attorney office budgets for FY 2007–2008 data obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request (Wilber 2012).

Table B2: Post-election change in probability of opposition-party case

	Window around election (weeks)			
	24	20	16	12
<u>Local linear regression</u>				
Election discontinuity	-0.40*	-0.43*	-0.48*	-0.49*
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
LLR 200% optimal bandwidth	9.56	9.25	9.02	8.90
<u>Flexible polynomial RD (logit)</u>				
Election discontinuity	-0.59*	-0.68**	-0.60*	-0.45
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.45)
N	250	207	151	113

+, \*, and \*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Local linear regression estimated in Stata 11 using rd (Nichols 2011) with 200% of bandwidth calculated using the approach in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Flexible polynomial estimator includes third order polynomials estimated using logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by criminal case for logit models).

Sample consists of all federal criminal cases targeting state and local public corruption filed by U.S. attorneys during the February 1993–December 2008 period and coded as national or national and local priorities in which the defendants were publicly identified as a member of a major party or a prominent associate of a well-known partisan. For each case, we calculated the number of weeks from the date the case was filed to the closest election before or after at the federal or state level.



Table B3: Conviction rates (found guilty of one or more charges)

	Window around election (weeks)			
	24	20	16	12
Opposition party	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.10)
Post-election	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.11)	0.04 (0.13)
Opposition party $\times$ post-election	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.15)
Constant	1.04 (0.08)	1.02 (0.10)	0.99 (0.11)	0.78 (0.23)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.14	0.12	0.10
N	250	207	151	113
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

+, \*, and \*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors from OLS are in parentheses.

Sample: All federal criminal cases targeting state and local public corruption filed by U.S. attorneys between February 1993 and December 2008 and coded as national priorities in which the defendants were publicly identified as a member of one of the major parties or as a prominent associate of a well-known partisan in state or local politics. For each case, we calculated the number of weeks from the date the case was filed to the closest election (before or after) at the federal or state level. See Online Appendix A for further details.

Table B4: Case outcomes before and after *Booker* omitting cases charged afterward

	Sentence (months)		Convicted without plea		Govt. departure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Opposition party	-9.80**	-9.66**	-0.18**	-0.15*	0.15**	0.15**
	(3.01)	(3.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Post- <i>Booker</i>	-4.34	-4.51	-0.20**	-0.23**	0.02	0.02
	(4.98)	(5.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Opposition party $\times$ <i>Booker</i>	7.95	8.29	0.27*	0.34**	-0.25**	-0.25**
	(6.24)	(6.36)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Democrat	-3.13	-3.02	0.07	0.09	0.10*	0.10*
	(2.69)	(2.70)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Bush	7.64**	7.83**	0.07	0.11*	0.18**	0.18**
	(2.69)	(2.71)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Proportion same-party judges		-1.83		-0.35**		0.00
		(6.45)		(0.10)		(0.08)
Constant	21.83**	22.49**	0.28**	0.41**	-0.05	-0.05
	(2.85)	(3.90)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.10
N	321	321	321	321	321	321
Constant	21.83**	22.49**	0.72**	0.59**	-0.05	-0.05
	(2.85)	(3.90)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.10
N	321	321	321	321	321	321

+, \*, and \*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors from OLS are in parentheses.

Table B5: Case outcomes before and after *Booker* omitting cases charged after U.S. attorneys scandal began

	Sentence (months)		Convicted without plea		Govt. departure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Opposition party	-9.25**	-9.52**	-0.18**	-0.16*	0.15**	0.14*
	(2.93)	(3.00)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Post- <i>Booker</i>	-6.92	-6.57	-0.22**	-0.24**	0.01	0.02
	(4.33)	(4.39)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Opposition party $\times$ <i>Booker</i>	11.22*	10.64*	0.25**	0.28**	-0.26**	-0.26**
	(5.25)	(5.31)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Democrat	-2.17	-2.35	0.06	0.07	0.10*	0.10*
	(2.46)	(2.46)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Bush	7.07**	6.72**	0.06	0.07	0.17**	0.17**
	(2.46)	(2.47)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Proportion same-party judges		3.71		-0.19*		0.04
		(5.77)		(0.09)		(0.07)
Constant	21.13**	19.77**	0.29**	0.36**	-0.04	-0.06
	(2.71)	(3.68)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.08
N	412	412	412	412	412	412

+, \*, and \*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors from OLS are in parentheses.

## References

- Alt, James E., and David Dreyer Lassen. 2014. "Enforcement and public corruption: evidence from the American states." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 30 (2): 306–338.
- Conte, Michaelangelo. 2012. "Former Jersey City pol says corruption charges against him part of effort to elect Christie governor." *The Jersey Journal*, January 26, 2012. Downloaded September 13, 2013 from [http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2012/01/former\\_jersey\\_city\\_pol\\_says\\_co.html](http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2012/01/former_jersey_city_pol_says_co.html).
- Donsanto, Craig C., and Nancy L. Simmons. 2007. *Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses*. U.S. Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section.
- Federal Judicial Center. N.d. "History of the Federal Judiciary." <http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/export.html>.
- Gordon, Sanford C. 2009. "Assessing partisan bias in federal public corruption prosecutions." *American Political Science Review* 103 (4): 534–554.
- Imbens, Guido, and Karthik Kalyanaraman. 2012. "Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression Discontinuity Estimator." *The Review of Economic Studies* 79 (3): 933–959.
- McCrary, Justin. 2008. "Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test." *Journal of Econometrics* 142 (2): 698–714.
- Nichols, Austin. 2011. "rd 2.0: Revised Stata module for regression discontinuity estimation." <http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456888.html>.
- Rehavi, M. Marit, and Sonja Starr. 2014. "Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences." *Journal of Political Economy* 122 (6): 1320–1354.
- Sampson, Peter J. 2007. "Corruption on the run in N.J." *The Hackensack Record*, September 23, 2007.
- Wilber, Del Quentin. 2012. "District U.S. Attorney's budget no longer secret." *Washington Post*, August 7, 2012. Downloaded January 23, 2015 from [http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/crime-scene/post/district-us-attorneys-budget-no-longer-secret/2012/08/07/d0fdf98e-e0a3-11e1-a421-8bf0f0e5aa11\\_blog.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/crime-scene/post/district-us-attorneys-budget-no-longer-secret/2012/08/07/d0fdf98e-e0a3-11e1-a421-8bf0f0e5aa11_blog.html).