Globalization and the National Determinants of Violent and Nonviolent Ethnic Conflict

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The intensification of globalization may be altering the ways in which ethnic groups engage in conflict with the state. Existing research has focused on the most severe form of ethnic conflict—ethnic civil war—at the expense of querying the determinants of other forms of violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict. In addition, research on civil war finds conflicting effects for different facets of globalization—political, cultural, and economic—on armed conflict. Using the Minorities at Risk dataset, we examine the effects of globalization and other national conditions on violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict in 106 countries between 1985 and 2002. These data allow us to introduce measures of both average and maximum intensity of both violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict—rebellion and protest. We draw from the literatures on ethnic fractionalization as well as modernization at the national level and world polity and world-systems theories at the global level. While all four theoretical approaches suggest predictors that pattern nonviolent ethnic conflict (ethnic protest), modernization and world polity theory provide the most relevant predictors for the severity of violent ethnic conflict against the state (ethnic rebellion). Our findings illustrate the utility of considering how both globalization and national development pattern both violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings and suggesting directions for future research.1
The waning of the Cold War sparked increased interest in ethnic conflict, both because of the alleged increase in ethnically based conflict following the collapse of the Soviet Union and because of the very serious possible consequences of the escalation of ethnic tension—ethnic cleansing, genocide, and civil war. More recently, globalization has challenged scholars to consider how increased economic and political interconnectedness may encourage or inhibit ethnic conflict.

The literature on ethnic conflict has examined its correlates at the national and group levels. The correlates at the national level focus on the relationship between national conditions and civil war (De Soysa and Oneal 1999; De Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Lacina 2006), while another body of literature examines the determinants of ethnic conflict at the intrastate group level (Fox 2002; Olzak 2006; Cederman et al. 2011; Rustad et al. 2011). Recently, scholars have begun to theoretically and empirically highlight the global processes associated with differing levels of both violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict (Appadurai 1998; Barbieri and Rueveny 2005; Cederman et al. 2009; Olzak and Tsutstui 1998; Olzak 2006, 2011). Their insights challenge scholars to complicate our understanding of processes of ethnic conflict by incorporating cultural and economic globalization into the analysis of ethnically based conflict. Namely, how do increased integration into the world economy and countries’ ties to international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organization (INGOs) affect ethnic conflict?

In this article we examine how various facets of globalization affect ethnic groups’ actions toward the state. Our study fills two important gaps in the literature: first, by considering globalization’s effects—both cultural and economic—on ethnic conflict during and after the end of the Cold War; and, second, by examining levels of both violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict rather than the conventional measure of civil war. Ethnic conflict that does not necessarily escalate to violence deserves separate treatment as it may signal a healthy airing of grievances by marginalized groups and has been argued to follow different dynamics (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013; Cunningham 2013). Olzak (2006) suggests that political exclusion may result in violent conflict, while the extension of liberal citizenship rights and norms may generate nonviolent conflict. Gurr (1993), however, argues that the key distinction is between political/autonomy grievances (motivating violence) and economic grievances (motivating nonviolent conflict). As such, we examine how domestic
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factors and countries’ global interconnectedness affect levels of both violent and nonviolent conflict.

**Ethnic Conflict**

Ethnic conflict has been most commonly studied in the context of civil war—one of the most extreme forms of violent ethnic conflict (Cederman et al. 2010, 2011; Sambanis 2004a; Rustad et al. 2011). In these and other cross-national studies, ethnicity typically denotes a group whose members identify with the group and have a shared history or homeland, or shared beliefs, race, religion, or language. Definitions are often subjective and rely on identification by members and nonmembers (Carment 1994). We adopt the same definition of ethnicity in this paper.

Ethnic conflicts may warrant particular attention as they have been found to be more “protracted, formidable and potentially more violent than non-ethnic conflicts” (Carment 1993: 140). Empirically, research indicates that determinants of the prevalence and duration of ethnic civil war differ from determinants of general civil war (Sambanis 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003). The increased prevalence of ethnic conflict in the post-Communist era raises questions about the national conditions associated with ethnic conflict, as the end of the Cold War highlighted the nature of civil wars as important domestic phenomena, rather than simply the reflection of superpower competitions (Kalyvas 2003; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). Research on ethnic conflict highlights group factors (e.g., group resources) and contextual factors, including state characteristics (e.g., democracy score), driving ethnic conflict (Ellingsen 2000; Fox 2002; Lindstrom and Moore 1995; Saideman et al. 2002; Vanhanen 1999). Our study draws from four theoretical perspectives to examine the determinants of ethnic conflict: at the national level, modernization theories and the ethnic fractionalization literature; and at the global level, world-systems and world polity theory.

**National Determinants of Ethnic Conflict**

*Modernization Theory*

Classic modernization theory assumes that all nations follow a similar evolutionary progression toward liberal economic and democratic political institutions (Parsons 1964; Deutsch 1961; Rostow 1960). More recent work suggests a less linear process that allows for regional and national variation (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Although not originally concerned
with conflict, work by modernization theorists has implications for the study of ethnic conflict (Moaddel 1994). According to existing accounts, countries undergoing the political and economic changes associated with modernization are most likely to experience heightened levels of conflict. Conflict is driven by expectations for increased political access among disadvantaged groups as well as the expectation that state responses to these demands for rights will be less severe (Davies 1962; Huntington 1968; Gurr 1970; McAdam et al. 2001; Moaddel 1994; Robison et al. 2006).

Though the relationship between conflict and development is not straightforward, research indicates that development patterns intrastate conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Existing scholarship indicates there is a negative linear relationship between economic and political modernization and conflict (De Soysa 2002; Ellingsen 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch 1997; Hegre et al. 2001; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Lindstrom and Moore 1995; Mosseau 2001). We expect both violent (rebellion) and nonviolent (protest) ethnic conflict to increase as the modernization process begins. While an initial spike in economic grievances following liberalization is expected, in the long term these grievances are expected to decrease, though not disappear entirely (Markoff 1996). Existing findings on the relationship between level of democracy and civil war, however, have recently been problematized, as levels of violence often factor into the construction of democracy measures rendering them endogenous to the outcome. This issue has only recently been empirically addressed with the development of new measures of level of democracy (Vreeland 2008).

**Ethnic Fractionalization**

Other scholars contend that cultural and social factors such as a society’s ethnic composition are more important in determining national conflict than economic or political conditions (Bhavnani and Miodownik 2009; Easterly 2001; Easterly and Levine 1997; Mousseau 2001; Wimmer 1997). One strain of the literature indicates that high levels of ethnic fractionalization increase the opportunity cost for engaging in rebellion by reducing the potential recruitment pool (assuming that rebellious organizations draw recruits from a single ethnic or religious group), and thereby reduce the likelihood of violent conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 2004; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). A second strain of the literature suggests that increased ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization are associated with higher prevalence and likelihood of
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Modernization theory and country-level theories provide important insights, but, as theories of cultural and economic globalization underscore, nations can no longer be conceptualized as modernizing in isolation. The interconnected nature of states, both economically through trade and culturally via international organizations, may have important implications for ethnic conflict.

World-Systems Theory

The world-systems perspective provides a useful analytic frame through which to conceptualize economic globalization, classifying countries as core, semiperipheral, or peripheral. In this categorization, core nations occupy the most advantageous position and peripheral nations occupy the least advantageous position. Traditionally, world-systems theory has focused on the historical economic processes that led to the construction, expansion, and rigidity of the hierarchy in the global capitalist system (Wallerstein 2006; Arrighi and Silver 1999). However, more germane to ethnic conflict is world-systems theory’s understanding of the implications of global trade, and the exploitation therein, for social groups within both core and peripheral states.

Integration into the economic system for peripheral states (which constitute the majority of the world’s countries) is associated with the export of few low-value natural resources, rendering them vulnerable to fluctuations in the global economy (Moaddel 1994). Increased economic integration into the world system may negatively impact countries in the lower economic strata in core and semiperipheral states as well, as less profitable means of production are exported to less economically powerful states. This process generates the observed deindustrialization among the core states (and the replacement thereof with a service-driven economy, argued by some scholars to be a major source of rising economic polarization since the 1970s in the OECD countries) (see Pressman [2007]).
for a review on the polarization debate\textsuperscript{3}. At the same time, the process ensures that peripheral states will, for the most part, develop only less profitable and dying industries (Gereffi 1994; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). Indeed, existing research points to the increase in economic globalization in the post-1970 period as driving deindustrialization and increased inequality within OECD states, which may result in increased conflict in these nations as well (Portez 1997).

Among peripheral states, the effect of the export of one primary good in particular—oil—has been widely debated among the researchers in the armed conflict literature (Humphreys 2005; Di John 2007; Alasken and Torvik 2006; Smith 2004; Basedau and Lay 2009). Theoretical expectations of a positive relationship between oil and conflict are based on either greed/rent-seeking by rebels and marginalized groups or grievance in rentier states, where states rely primarily on oil revenue rather than levying taxes, making them less accountable to groups and individuals (the so called “political ‘Dutch Disease’” [Fearon and Laitin 2003]). Low accountability coupled with underdeveloped bureaucratic infrastructure in turn renders rentier states more vulnerable to insurgency (Alasken and Torvik 2006; Di John 2007). An opposite rentier state argument posits that states’ high income and lack of accountability enables them to maintain a strong and repressive security apparatus, hence suppressing rebellion (Ross 2001). Empirical examinations find oil exportation is associated with increased likelihood of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003). More recent research challenges this finding on theoretical and empirical grounds, arguing that countries’ level of democracy is an important intermediary factor (Alasken and Torvik 2006; Di John 2007; Smith 2004; Basedau and Lay 2009).

Beyond oil, increased trade openness, especially in developing countries, may increase conflict as it negatively affects the economic situation of people in these countries. Extending this to ethnic minorities in particular, inasmuch as these minorities are already repressed, this deterioration in conditions may “trickle down” most adversely to already-disadvantaged ethnic minorities and differentially benefit advantaged ethnic minorities, increasing the likelihood of ethnic conflict.\textsuperscript{4} However, previous research has not always identified a relationship between income inequality and national conflict levels (Muller 1985, 1986, and 1988; Weede 1986; Hartman and Hsiao 1988; London and Robinson 1989; Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004b). That said, as discussed above, it may be the case that this is due to the fact that it is the inequality between ethnic groups (as highlighted by the ethnic fractionalization approach) rather than inequality more broadly that motivates ethnic conflict.
From this perspective, we expect poor economic performance and a high degree of integration into the world economic system to be associated with higher levels of within-state ethnic conflict (Barbieri and Schneider 1999). Previous world-systems research finds that peripheral status is associated with more serious forms of rebellion (Olzak 2006). Some have found a negative or curvilinear relationship at the country level between trade and civil war (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Gissinger and Gleditsch 1999), while additional research suggests a negative relationship between trade and armed conflict at the dyadic level (Hegre 2000). In addition, higher economic integration may lead to some ethnic minorities doing worse, while other minorities may fare better. However, this too bolsters the expectation of higher levels of conflict associated with states’ increased integration into the economic system, as previously similar groups and individuals see an economic gap emerge with integration.

World Polity Theory

Globalization, however, is not limited to economic integration; it also involves countries’ incorporation into a global political culture. World polity theory posits that cultural and political (in addition to economic) global processes influence conflict. The increased interconnectedness of states has created pressures toward convergence in cultural norms (Meyer 2000). Scholars employing world polity theory typically use a measure of ties to IGOs and INGOs to examine global integration, arguing that these organizations diffuse global scripts to countries. Consistent with world-systems theory and contrary to the original formulation of world polity theory of a relatively equitable distribution of ties, much inequality exists in the organizational memberships of countries (Beckfield 2003).

Both IGOs and INGOs may directly influence state policymaking (Hafner-Burton et al. 2008) but may also create indirect pressure as disadvantaged ethnic minority groups in countries with links to IGOs and INGOs may be more likely to make collective demands for rights (Gurr 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1999; Olzak 2006). In both cases, the mechanism is the diffusion of norms of human rights, universalism, and multiculturalism, which ethnic minorities employ in their quest for parity within states (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Olzak 2006; Olzak and Tsutsui 1998; Dunaway 2003; Schneider et al. 2003). World polity theory, however, does not necessarily specify a unitary effect of INGO and IGO ties, arguing that these organizations are often diffusing different scripts and prescriptions due to their differential memberships. IGOs have been argued to privilege state sovereignty
and INGOs to privilege human rights, indicating that IGO ties may be associated with lowered levels of ethnic conflict while INGO ties may increase ethnic conflict (Matua 2007; Tsutsui 2004). It is important to note that some international organizations, especially IGOs, work specifically in states and areas experiencing conflict in an effort to intervene and broker ceasefires and peace agreements and/or to ameliorate the effects of conflict. That is, more IGO memberships may be associated with higher levels of violent ethnic conflict, but these ties may be the result rather than the cause of ethnic rebellion. Taken together, we still expect that more IGO memberships will be associated with violent but not necessarily nonviolent ethnic conflict.

In differentiating between violent and nonviolent conflict, Olzak (2006) points to economic and cultural globalization having differential effects. From this perspective exclusionary political policies and higher rates of poverty should generate violent conflict, while the extension of citizenship rights to ethnic groups and ties to the international cultural community should increase nonviolent conflict. To the extent that economic globalization negatively affects the economic situation of citizens, openness to the global economic system should be associated with higher levels of violent conflict. The extension of a liberal global culture through ties to international organizations should affect nonviolent conflict.

Data

We use data from 106 countries from 1985 to 2002 where the unit of analysis is a country-year and the research design is cross-section time-series analysis.

Outcome Variables

We draw our dependent variables from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The MAR project provides data on ethnopolitical minority groups within countries that have a population of at least five hundred thousand and that collectively suffer or benefit from systematic discriminatory treatment and/or collectively mobilize in defense or promotion of their self-destined interests. While not without its limitations, the MAR dataset is the only dataset that provides detailed information on the severity of violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict over time cross-nationally. The MAR data have been criticized for their sampling, which do not capture all ethnic groups (Cederman et al. 2009). Nonetheless, it is a reputable and heavily utilized dataset and is well suited to our analysis since we are not seeking to explain why particular ethnic
groups do or do not engage in conflict with the state but rather explain
the contextual correlates of the severity of ethnic conflict—something
for which the dataset is uniquely suited. As such, our analysis provides
information on how global and national conditions and processes are
related to violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict.

We draw our outcome measures from two variables in the dataset: the
severity of protest and rebellion activity engaged in by each MAR group.
The values on the protest scores range from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates no
protest was reported, 1 indicates verbal opposition, 2 indicates symbolic
resistance, 3 indicates a small demonstration (fewer than ten thousand par-
ticipants), 4 indicates a medium demonstration (fewer than one hundred
thousand participants), and 5 indicates a large demonstration (more than
one hundred thousand participants). The values on rebellion range from
0 to 7, where 0 indicates that no rebellion was reported, 1 indicates politi-
cal banditry, 2 indicates campaigns of terrorism, 3 indicates local rebel-
lion, 4 indicates small-scale guerrilla activity, 5 indicates intermediate
guerrilla activity, 6 indicates large-scale guerrilla activity, and 7 indicates
protracted civil war. The score for each group in a particular country in
a given year is the most serious occurrence of either protest or rebellion
(for example, if an ethnic minority group engaged in both verbal opposi-
tion and symbolic resistance in protest, it would be coded as a 2). It is
important to reiterate that these are actions aimed at the state. Protest and
rebellion activities are defined as “actions initiated by members of the
group on behalf of the group’s interests and directed against those who
claim to exercise authority over the group” (MAR 2009).

Our measures of country-year levels of protest and rebellion are
constructed by calculating the mean and maximum protest and rebellion
scores within any given country-year. The use of the mean and maximum
allows for two comparable measures across country-years, in a similar
metric, and captures both the average and highest level of ethnic minority
activity in each country-year. While we present the results for both the
maximum level and the average of all ethnic groups’ activity in a given
country-year, we note that the use of the average measure may reduce
variation in the outcome measure if there are numerous cases for which
only a few of the many ethnic groups in the state are engaged in conflict.
That said, the measure of the average level of conflict within a state is
still a theoretically important measure, as it incorporates the experience
of all ethnic groups, and not just that of the group engaged in the most
severe form of conflict in a given country-year. As such, in the interest of
examining the robustness of our results, we present both outcomes. Table 1
provides the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the models.
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Used in the Analysis for 1,730 Observations in 106 Countries between 1985 and 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest (Mean)</td>
<td>Mean and maximum levels of protest for each country-year, aggregated from:</td>
<td>1.376</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 None Reported</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Verbal Opposition</td>
<td>1.943</td>
<td>1.405</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Symbolic Resistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest (Maximum)</td>
<td>3 Small Demonstration (less than 10,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Medium Demonstration (less than 100,000)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Large Demonstration (greater than 100,000)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(source: MAR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rebellion (Mean)</td>
<td>Mean and maximum levels of rebellion, for each country-year, aggregated from:</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>1.505</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 None reported</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Political banditry</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Campaigns of terrorism</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebellion (Maximum)</td>
<td>3 Local rebellion</td>
<td>1.564</td>
<td>2.314</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Small-scale guerrilla activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Intermediate guerrilla activity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Large-scale guerrilla activity</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Protracted civil war (source: MAR)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Variables</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>6706.511</td>
<td>8261.037</td>
<td>179.992</td>
<td>39769.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>------------------------------------------</td>
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<td><strong>Modernization Theory</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in constant international dollars, in hundreds (source: PWT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>Vanhanen democracy index (source: Polyarchy dataset, PRIO 2012)</td>
<td>12.715</td>
<td>11.910</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Fractionalization Literature</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization (source: Rustad et al. 2011)</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Exclusion</td>
<td>Ethnic exclusion (source: Rustad et al. 2011)</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Systems Theory</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Openness</td>
<td>Trade openness as a proportion, calculated by dividing import and exports by GDP, in hundreds (source: PWT)</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>3.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Exporter</td>
<td>1 if oil exports make up more than 33% of their total merchandise export(source: Sambanis 2004a)</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Polity Theory</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Government Organization (IGO) Membership</td>
<td>Count of the number memberships in IGOs, in tens (source: COW)</td>
<td>6.029</td>
<td>1.845</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Nongovernment Organization (INGO) Membership</td>
<td>Count of the number memberships in international INGOs, in tens (source: Yearbook of International Associations)</td>
<td>78.502</td>
<td>69.237</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>389.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>1 for the first and second year of independence (source: COW)</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous Terrain</td>
<td>Proportion of the country’s terrain that is mountainous (source: Sambanis 2004a)</td>
<td>19.569</td>
<td>18.883</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Population in millions (source: Norris)</td>
<td>50.349</td>
<td>151.832</td>
<td>1.079</td>
<td>1292.721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Explanatory Variables

Our explanatory variables are derived from the four theoretical approaches as discussed above: at the national level, modernization theories and the ethnic fractionalization literature; and at the global level, world-systems and world polity theory.

Modernization

We use GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant international dollars as a measure of economic development (Heston et al. 2009). We utilize a measure of democracy based on electoral competition and degree of electoral participation, developed by Vanhanen (2000) and recently extended by Wilhelmsen (2006) to the year 2002 (PRIO 2012). A higher score indicates a more democratic state. We use this measure rather than the more commonly used Freedom House or Polity IV measures of democracy because these two measures factor in violence, which then become endogenous to our outcome (see Vreeland 2008).

Hypothesis 1A: Economic growth, and in particular higher GDP per capita, will be associated with lower levels of ethnic conflict, especially rebellion, as the motivation for violent conflict is lower.

Hypothesis 1B: Higher levels of democracy will be associated with lower levels of violent conflict but higher levels of protest, as democracies are more responsive to nonviolent petitions by ethnic and other disadvantaged groups.

Ethnic Fractionalization

In keeping with the classic and more recent theorization on how ethnic diversity may influence conflict, we include measures of both ethnic fractionalization and ethnic exclusion. First, we include a measure of ethnic fractionalization developed by Alesina et al. (2003), which represents the probability that any two individuals in a nation will belong to different ethnolinguistic groups (Alesina et al. 2003). Because this measure is static (that is, time invariant) and because recent literature has pointed to the importance of ethnic exclusion (rather than simply diversity) for conflict, we also include a measure of ethnic exclusion. We utilize a measure of ethnic exclusion recently developed by Cederman and Girardin (2007) and Rustad et al. (2011)
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where higher values indicate larger portions of the population excluded from access to national power.11

**Hypothesis 2A:** Higher levels of ethnic fractionalization will be associated with higher levels of both ethnic protest and rebellion, as increased diversity drives more demands by ethnic groups on the state, by both violent and nonviolent means.

**Hypothesis 2B:** Higher levels of ethnic exclusion will be associated with higher levels of rebellion, as ethnic minorities may feel this is a more effective avenue for airing grievances given discrimination by the state.

**World-Systems Theory**

World-systems theory is concerned with countries’ economic relationships, especially in the form of trade. We use trade openness (total imports and exports divided by GDP) as a measure of economic globalization, extracted from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2009), to account for economic globalization and integration into the global economic system. Second, to examine the impact of oil production, given its theoretical importance as discussed above, we include a binary measure of being an oil exporter. Nations whose oil exports make up more than one-third of their total merchandise exports are considered oil exporters (Rustad et al. 2011).

**Hypothesis 3A:** Trade openness is expected to be associated with higher levels of rebellion, as ethnic minorities may be further disadvantaged by this economic interconnectedness. Together with this, increased trade openness may promote or depress protest—ethnic minorities may also pursue nonviolent ways to petition the state or may engage in violent conflict to the exclusion of nonviolent ethnic conflict.

**Hypothesis 3B:** Oil exporting countries may experience higher levels of rebellion in an effort to capture some of the revenues associated with oil sales. However, the authoritarian and repressive nature of oil exporting regimes may dissuade violent conflict and, instead, promote protest and nonviolent petitions by ethnic minorities.

**World Polity Theory**

We also include two measures of cultural integration into the world polity. To construct these measures, we use data summing the number of IGOs of which a country is a member from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset and ties to INGOs from the Yearbook of
International Associations, published by the Union of International Associations.\textsuperscript{12}

**Hypothesis 4A:** We expect IGO memberships, because they privilege state sovereignty, to be associated with higher levels of both rebellion and protest.

**Hypothesis 4B:** INGOs, which more often privilege human rights discourses and may work to reduce conflict after it has started, will be associated with lower levels of rebellion and higher levels of protest, promoting nonviolent airing of grievances against the state by ethnic groups.

Finally, we include three control variables. First, a measure of mountainous terrain (from Sambanis 2004a) is included as a predictor of ethnic rebellion, as it may have consequences for certain types of violent mobilization, particularly guerilla warfare. Second, given previous indication that small and large states may be fundamentally different (Horowitz 1985), and as it is conceivable that large protests and gatherings can occur more often in more populous nations, we use population as a control for country size (extracted by Norris [2009] from the Arthur Banks Cross National Time Series Database [2008]). Third, we include a measure of whether the country is a new state, indicating that countries are in their first or second year of independence, following Fearon and Laitin (2003). This is an important measure to include, as new states are uniquely vulnerable to increased levels of conflict (both violent and nonviolent) because independence creates a political opening in which groups vie for power.

We limit our analyses to the years between 1985 and 2002 for two reasons: first, theoretically, we examine the tail end of the Cold War and the years immediately following it because this period is believed to be qualitatively different than previous periods in that ethnic violence (and perhaps conflict more generally) and globalization are on the rise; second, because of data availability—the annual MAR data on ethnic protest and rebellion only begin in 1985, and the Vanhanen democracy measure is unavailable after 2002. As mentioned, using other available measures of democracy (e.g., Freedom House, Polity IV) is untenable as they are endogenous to our outcome given that they factor conflict into their construction.

**Analytic Strategy**

We analyze our unbalanced panel data set with 1,730 observations in 106 states from 1985 to 2002 using cross-section time-series (CSTS) analysis, which is well suited to the analysis of country-level data over time. The estimation of CSTS data requires us to account for complex
correlation patterns between and across panels (Beck and Katz 1995; Plümper et al. 2005). Since our data are unbalanced, in that some countries do not have data for all years of the analysis, the standard version of the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) cannot be used. We estimated our models using random effects and fixed effects, and employed the Hausman test, which indicated that the fixed effects were the preferred model.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, we found evidence of panel-level autocorrelation for mean levels of protest and rebellion and use models with an AR(1) disturbance using Stata12. We used GLLAMM (Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models) in Stata12 to produce ordinal logistic regression models of maximum levels of rebellion and protest, as this is an ordinal outcome (see table 1).

\textbf{Results}

Modernization theory and the literature on ethnic fractionalization as well as world-systems and world polity theory suggest that countries’ levels of economic development, political openness, ethnic diversity and exclusion, and degree of economic and cultural globalization may differentially affect the severity and intensity of violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict. Table 2 reports the results from models of mean and maximum levels of ethnic protest and rebellion.

Higher national wealth—per capita GDP—is associated with lower average and maximum levels of rebellion (see Models 1 and 2), as predicted by modernization theory. In addition, more democratic countries also exhibit lower average and maximum severity of ethnic rebellion (Models 1 and 2). Being an oil exporter is associated with lower maximum levels of severity of ethnic rebellion, though this effect is only marginally significant (Model 2). This is consistent with one variety of the rentier state argument: countries that receive substantial oil revenues may “buy off” minority and opposition groups, which are then less likely to rebel (Alasken and Torvik 2006). Governments in oil exporting rentier states are also more likely to possess the resources to effectively (and sometimes violently) quell uprisings, providing an additional disincentive for rebellion (Ross 2001).

More IGO ties are associated with a higher maximum severity of ethnic rebellion, whereas INGO ties are associated with less severe maximum forms of ethnic rebellion, holding all else constant (Model 2 in table 2). However, at the bivariate level (results not shown) both INGO and IGO ties reduce the severity of violent conflict. It is only upon the inclusion of INGO ties and the time trend that we find a positive effect for IGO
### Table 2
Cross-Section Time-Series Models for Mean and Maximum Levels of Ethnic Protest and Rebellion in 106 Countries, 1985–2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic Rebellion (Mean)(^1)</td>
<td>Ethnic Rebellion (Maximum)(^2)</td>
<td>Ethnic Protest (Mean)(^1)</td>
<td>Ethnic Protest (Maximum)(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modernization Theory</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>−0.008(^*)</td>
<td>−0.003(^**)</td>
<td>−0.010(^***)</td>
<td>−0.007(^***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>−0.025(^***)</td>
<td>−0.055(^***)</td>
<td>0.015(^*)</td>
<td>0.044(^***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Fractionalization Literature</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>1.474(^***)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.132(^**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Exclusion</td>
<td>−0.36</td>
<td>−0.226</td>
<td>−0.154</td>
<td>−1.728(^***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World-Systems Theory</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Openness</td>
<td>−0.033</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>−0.164</td>
<td>−0.951(^***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Exporter</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>−0.392(^+)</td>
<td>0.389(^*)</td>
<td>0.523(^**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.228)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Polity Theory</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO Membership</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>1.129(^***)</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>−0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.363)</td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO Membership</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>−0.411(^**)</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.898(^***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>(&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.004(^***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(&lt;0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous Terrain</td>
<td>0.007(^*)</td>
<td>0.039(^***)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State Indicator</td>
<td>−0.247</td>
<td>2.295(^***)</td>
<td>−0.253</td>
<td>1.410(^*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
<td>(0.682)</td>
<td>(0.367)</td>
<td>(0.602)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>−0.052(^***)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>−0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>1730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Standard errors included in parentheses below the coefficient, constant included, but coefficients not reported.  
\(+, *, **, ***\) significant at .10, .05, .01 and .001 level, results for two-tailed tests.  
\(^1\) Fixed effects models with AR(1) in Stata12.  
\(^2\) Ordinal Logistic Regression Models (using GLAMM) in Stata12, cut points were calculated but coefficients not reported.
Globalization and the National Determinants

membership on maximum levels of ethnic rebellion. We hypothesize that the negative effect of INGO membership (and IGO membership at the bivariate level) is driven by both country and ethnic group factors. On the one hand, ethnic groups in countries with more ties to the world polity might find other—legislative and nonviolent—avenues to air grievances and are less likely to resort to more severe violence. In addition, governments that are more integrated into world culture might be more receptive to groups’ demands given the diffusion of good governance norms, further reducing groups’ need to rebel. We find that new states in their first and second years of independence experience higher severity of rebellion and intensity of protest, all else being equal (Models 2 and 4). This may be because newly independent countries are more unstable and in a unique political situation in which the expected opportunity costs for noninstitutional political participation is lowered.

Overall, we find the strongest empirical support for modernization and world polity theory as relevant for national levels of ethnic rebellion (Models 1 and 2). Countries in which ethnic groups feel they have political recourse, as in more democratic countries, and in which governments are members of IGOs and INGOs experience a lower severity of ethnic rebellion (it is only when controlling for INGO membership that IGO membership has a positive effect on ethnic rebellion). In addition, richer countries experience lower average and maximum severity of ethnic rebellion, all else being equal. The source of wealth also matters: oil exporting countries experience less severe ethnic rebellion, all else being equal. We also find that there is a higher likelihood of severe ethnic conflict in more ethnically diverse countries (while ethnic exclusion does not have a significant effect on rebellion).

Similar to the results for ethnic rebellion, we find that higher GDP is associated with lower levels of both average and maximum ethnic protest (Models 3 and 4 in table 2). However, the opposite pattern is apparent when looking at countries’ democracy scores. While more democratic countries experience less ethnic rebellion, higher democracy scores are associated with more intense ethnic protest—both on average and overall (Models 3 and 4). Therefore, political opportunities appear to depress violent ethnic conflict but promote nonviolent ethnic protest. This is consistent with the notion that the opening of the political opportunity structure creates nonviolent avenues for grievances that might otherwise result in violent conflict.

Trade openness is associated with lower intensity of ethnic protest (Model 4), while being an oil exporter is associated with higher levels
of ethnic protest (Models 3 and 4). Being an oil exporter might drive up nonviolent ethnic conflict (but depress ethnic rebellion [see Model 2]) because rentier states are often characterized by a weak, underdeveloped legislative system, often coupled with a repressive regime. Therefore, ethnic groups might protest in an effort to capture rents, while not going so far as to engage in violence against the state. The fact that the effect for rebellion is only (marginally) significant for the maximum levels, while the positive effect is significant for both mean and maximum ethnic protest, provides further support for this interpretation. That is, ethnic groups in oil exporting countries engage in a higher maximum and average intensity of protest but lower levels of only maximum (not average) severity of rebellion, as discussed previously.

The negative effect of trade openness on maximum levels of ethnic protest (Model 4) is consistent with the effects observed in the literature on trade and armed conflict (Hegre 2000). This effect suggests that, net of being an oil exporter and the additional indicators in our models, trade openness is actually associated with a reduced likelihood of more intense ethnic protest. These results suggest that while negative terms of trade may help to solidify between-country inequalities, if we hold economic status constant, integration into the global economy reduces nonviolent conflict.

Turning to political and cultural globalization, we find that ties to the international community in the form of INGO membership are associated with higher intensity of nonviolent ethnic conflict. This is consistent with the global culture and identity politics literature, which argues that ties with the international community empower groups to demand rights and recognition from the state (Olzak 2006; Olzak and Tsutsui 1998). These results (Model 4) are consistent with the idea that INGOs in particular might provide support for nonlegislative petitioning of rights from the state (ethnic protest) because of their focus on human and equal rights but reduce violent conflict (Model 2), as they urge nonviolent measures.

Finally, higher levels of ethnic diversity are associated with higher maximum levels of ethnic protest, while ethnic exclusion is associated with lower maximum levels of ethnic protest (Model 4). Upon further investigation we found that while the overall trend for the effect of ethnic exclusion on ethnic protest is negative, the relationship is actually curvilinear—in the form of an inverse-U. This is largely owing to the construction of this measure. The measure, developed by Rustad et al. (2011) is based on the Ethnic Power Relations database and builds on the
work of Cederman and colleagues (2007, 2010). In this measure higher values denote a larger share of the population excluded from access to national power, but “ethnically homogenous countries (e.g., North Korea) and countries in which ethnicity bears no real political significance (e.g., Scandinavian countries) are by default assigned a value of 0” (Rustad et al. 2011: 21). Therefore, it makes sense that countries in which there are medium levels of ethnopolitical exclusion would experience high levels of ethnic protest as compared with countries in which there is no exclusion and countries in which there are very high levels of ethnic exclusion—largely repressive regimes.

Modernization, world polity and world-systems theory, and the literature on ethnic fractionalization all help account for the intensity of national levels of ethnic protest (Model 4). In particular, higher GDP per capita and trade openness reduce the severity of ethnic protest, while more democratic countries, oil exporting countries, and higher ethnic diversity are associated with higher maximum levels of ethnic protest. Additionally, ethnic exclusion generally decreases the severity of ethnic protest, although this relationship is complicated by an initial positive association, owing to the construction of the measure. The relationship between democratization and ethnic protest is consistent with modernization theories that posit that as countries democratize and undergo political changes, identity groups use this opening to lobby for increased recognition and rights. Existing scholarship also indicates that identity groups use international validation, rhetoric, as well as organizational and other ties to rally and organize for rights vis-à-vis the state (Olzak 2006; Olzak and Tsutsui 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998), and we find this is the case for ethnic groups as well. Our findings suggest that in countries with increased INGO ties, local groups feel empowered to lobby governments for rights and resources in a nonviolent manner.

In table 3 we summarize the expected and observed effects of our theoretically important explanatory variables on mean and maximum levels of ethnic protest and rebellion. Overall, we find that the maximum level of ethnic conflict in a given country-year is influenced more by these national and globalization indicators than the mean levels of ethnic conflict. Though the effects of these predictors largely retain their direction across the mean and maximum ethnic conflict level, their effects are more often statistically significant for the maximum levels of conflict (table 3).
Conclusions and Discussion

In this article we explore the effects of globalization and national characteristics on ethnic conflict, measured as the average and maximum severity of both violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict by minority groups at risk vis-à-vis the state within a country-year. We find empirical support for all four theoretical approaches. Interestingly, we find that all four of our theoretical approaches suggest statistically significant predictors for ethnic protest. On the other hand, the results for ethnic rebellion provide the strongest support for world polity theory and modernization theory, with ethnic fractionalization also significantly patterning violent ethnic conflict. This suggests that economic and political factors at the national level and cultural globalization may be most important in patterning the severity of ethnic rebellion rather than economic globalization, and that economic globalization’s impact is limited to nonviolent ethnic conflict.

The effect of economic globalization on protest severity is particularly interesting when compared to our hypotheses. Rather than driving up nonviolent conflict severity, trade openness is associated with lower levels of protest severity. However, there is no evidence that this owes to a process through which conflict is channeled toward violent conflict at the expense of nonviolent alternatives, as suggested in hypothesis 3A. The results then suggest a possible stabilizing effect of non-oil global trade. On the other hand, it is possible that increased integration into the economic world-system provides ethnic minorities with new transnational corporations against which to mobilize, significantly reducing the severity of activity against the state. Unfortunately, the study presented here lacks the data necessary to distinguish between these two possible processes.

Beyond this, the relationship between two other independent variables and conflict merits additional attention in light of our expectations. First, countries’ IGO membership has a unique relationship with ethnic groups’ rebellion severity. At the bivariate level, higher IGO membership is associated with lower levels of rebellion severity. However, once controlling for INGO memberships and the time trend, this association becomes positive and statistically significant. We believe the negative bivariate result owes to IGO membership absorbing the effects of INGO membership when that variable is excluded. Once we account for INGO memberships in the model and the general tendency toward more memberships over time, we observe the positive association expected by the perspective that IGOs’ support of state sovereignty may be associated with a higher severity of ethnic violence. Another mechanism, however,
Table 3
Summary of the Predicted and Observed Effects of the Explanatory Variables on Ethnic Protest and Rebellion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rebellion</th>
<th>Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Predicted Effects</td>
<td>Observed Effects – Mean Levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Theories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization Literature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Exclusion</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization Theories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World-Systems Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Openness</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Exporter</td>
<td>(+/−)</td>
<td>(−)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Polity Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO Membership</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO Membership</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Summary of predicted and statistically significant effects (two-tailed tests at the .05 level, coefficients significant at the .10 level shown in parentheses) and their direction from Table 3.
may also account for this relationship whereby IGO membership is more likely among countries experiencing conflict. Second, while ethnic exclusion is not associated with increased severity of rebellion (as expected by hypothesis 2B), it is associated with lower severity of protest. This suggests that, as further discussed in hypothesis 2B, in instances where groups are excluded politically, they are less likely to see protest as a viable means of engaging with the state, all else being equal.

Existing research, as reviewed above, has thoroughly examined the group-level and national dynamics of both civil war and violent ethnic conflict. Recent research has examined the effects of globalization on fatalities as the result of ethnic violence (Olzak 2011) and the geographic intra- and international determinants of ethnic conflict (Cederman et al. 2009), while other research has examined the effects of globalization on civil war (Barbieri and Rueveny 2005). Most existing studies discuss the determinants of civil war or ethnic violence (rather than ethnic protest), and only recently has research examined the effects of globalization (largely economic) on ethnic conflict, again, focusing on its violent forms.

Our research therefore makes several contributions to theorization and empirical scholarship on ethnic conflict:

First, examining ethnic conflict toward the end of the Cold War and during the initial post–Cold War era provides us with information about the dynamics of ethnic conflict before and in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which is widely viewed as a catalyst for ethnic conflict. Furthermore, economic globalization is intensifying during the post–Cold War period as is the influence of nonstate actors, namely IGOs and INGOs, rendering it a particularly interesting time period to examine the effect of economic and cultural globalization on ethnic conflict.

Second, we examine the ramifications of economic globalization for ethnic conflict. While previous analyses, namely Olzak (2006) and Olzak and Tsutsui (1998), have queried how world-systems position may impact the dynamics of ethnic conflict (and Barbieri and Reuveny [2005] examine the effects of economic globalization on civil war), we include a direct measure of economic globalization—trade openness—rather than a static country categorization.

Third, by integrating measures of cultural globalization, we assess the impact of ties to both INGOs and IGOs on ethnic conflict net of national characteristics and economic globalization. As noted, the prevalence of nonstate actors in the post–Cold War era and their documented influence on state policy and group strategies for petitioning states makes this a particularly important aspect of globalization to consider in terms of its
influence on ethnic conflict (Keck and Sikkink 1998; 1999; Tsutsui 2004; Murdie and Bhasin 2011).

Fourth, we contribute to the literature on ethnic conflict that has focused on national and group-level determinants and outcomes of ethnic civil war—the most extreme outcome. This focus in the literature has been at the expense of broadening our understanding of the national determinants of less severe violent ethnic conflict. Ethnic violence that falls short of civil war is an important arena for separate inquiry, as guerilla warfare, rioting, and other forms of ethnic violence against the state are important to consider as they too have important economic (for example, tourism) and social implications.

Fifth, by considering ethnic conflict in both its violent and nonviolent forms, we query the determinants of escalating conflict, noting that protest is often discussed as a healthy, productive way by which ethnic minorities bring grievances to the attention of government. In this way, we compare which country-level determinants may foster protest—a nonviolent means of grievance expression by ethnic groups, as compared with violent conflict.

While modernization theory provides important insights about the ways in which national conditions may impact conflict, globalization is changing the way in which ethnic groups and governments negotiate rights, identity, and borders. Additionally, the malleability of borders, with the intensification of globalization, suggests that ethnicity will continue to be a central locus of identity-based mobilization. Ethnic mobilization is a central axis of interstate conflict, especially since the Cold War, as the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the creation of new countries, and intrastate conflict took center stage in many world regions. The continued salience of communal conflict across world regions from Europe to Africa highlights the importance of interrogating the ways in which global processes may constrain or enable groups to pursue violent as compared to nonviolent strategies.

Governments and ethnic groups are increasingly influenced by global economic and cultural dynamics. Nonstate actors, such as international organizations, become increasingly important as they inspire mobilization strategies, often imported across borders, and sometimes pressure governments to work toward ethnic equality. Furthermore, increased economic interdependence across borders provides ethnic groups with more global resources (cultural and economic) in their struggle against the state, but, simultaneously, increased economic interdependence may limit the ability of the state to redistribute resources and enforce equality (even
as it may grant it on paper). Future work should therefore explore how ethnic groups mobilize international and cross-national resources in their protests and rebellions but also how increased economic interdependence may affect the ways in which states address ethnic groups’ concerns at the national level. Finally, future research should aim to further clarify the relative importance of how political, global, cultural, and national economic factors pattern ethnic protest and rebellion vis-à-vis the state as well as state responses to these efforts.

Notes

1. We thank Patricia McManus, Art Alderson, Brian Powell, Steve Benard, Jaime Kucinskas, three anonymous reviewers, and the participants of the Politics, Economics and Culture Research Workshop at Indiana University for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

2. An additional strain of research has argued that the negative association between violent conflict and GDP per capita is evidence that violence is spurred by greed (as opposed to grievance) on the part of ethnic groups, as the relative economic benefits of rebellion are higher when average incomes are lower (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This interpretation of the association between economic performance and violence has been recently problematized, by contending that it is not greed that generates conflict, but that poor economic performance may disproportionately impact particular ethnic groups, generating between-group inequalities that motivate grievances and violence (Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2011). Regardless, the implication is that poor economic performance should increase conflict levels.

3. Notably, Pressman (2007), looking only at middle class decline and using a contentious definition of the middle class, finds that state welfare policies play the largest role in determining inequality outcomes. This may be taken as evidence of a core state’s ability to protect its workers against negative consequences of globalization.

4. That economic inequality between ethnic groups is correlated with violent conflict is supported by innovative analyses of the relationship between horizontal inequalities and civil war conducted by Ostby (2008) and Cederman et al. (2011).

5. That is, Hegre (2000) finds that trade between two developed nations is associated with a lower likelihood of armed conflict between those two nations.

6. Tsutsui’s (2004) results, however, do not show a statistically significant effect of IGO membership on ethnic conflict levels.

7. For detailed information see the website of the Minorities at Risk Project: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/definition.asp.

8. There are a total of 1,730 ethnic minorities at risk-year observations, where the number of minority groups per country-year range from 1 to 11.

9. Another possible measure would be a summed measure of protest and rebellion activity in a given country-year. Summing the scores for a given country-year makes it unclear if a value of 7 on the rebellion measure represents seven different MAR groups engaged in political banditry or one MAR group engaged in protracted civil war.

10. The Penn World Tables construct two measures for China’s GDP per capita. The first is based on the official purchasing power parity estimate. The authors of the Penn World Tables, however, argue that this measure is based on urban prices and, as such, is not representative of China. They provide a second GDP per capita PPP
measure that adjusts for this issue. The same is done for the trade openness measure. We utilize the adjusted versions of both measures in our analysis. Supplementary analyses reveal that the results are virtually identical with the use of the original measures of GDP and trade openness. Additional details can be found at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/Downloads/pwt71/PWT%207.1%20Web.doc.

11. The measure is based on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) database (Cederman et al. 2010). For more information on its construction see: Cederman and Girardin (2007), Cederman et al. (2010), and Rustad et al. (2011). In addition, because this measure is skewed, we added one and took the natural log when including it in our analysis. While we would like to also include a measure of between-group economic inequality, existing measures of this sort (Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2011) are too limited in their coverage of countries and time to be included in our analysis.

12. We thank Evan Schofer for sharing the INGO data with us. Because these measures are highly skewed, we added 1 (to retain countries that had a score of zero) and took the natural log of the IGO and INGO count in our own regression.

13. The Hausman test yielded a nonpositive definite matrix, which indicates that we should use the unbiased (though less efficient) fixed effects model. Fixed effects models cannot estimate the effects of time-invariant components, and therefore the effect of ethnic fractionalization is not estimated in Models 1 and 3. The results from the random effects model do not change our conclusions—ethnic fractionalization is not a significant predictor of mean levels of either ethnic protest or rebellion. Therefore, we present only the fixed effects models’ results, but the results for the random effects models are available from the authors on request.

References


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Appendix A:
List of Country-Years Included in the Sample
Table A1. List of the 1,730 Country-Years Included in the Analysis, 106 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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