

Report: Roundtable on “Peace and Reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)” on July 29, 2015

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On July 29, 2015, the Institute of Regional Studies (IRS) organized a Roundtable on “Peace and Reforms in FATA.” The Roundtable was organized to review the current situation in FATA, analyze the reform proposals for its administration, and discuss its future in light of the ongoing developments. Working papers are attached as Annexes I, II, III, and IV. Interim Report of FATA Reforms Commission Report attached as Annex V, and FATA Sustainable Return and Rehabilitation Strategy attached as Annex VI. President IRS introduced the subject and thanked Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Raza Muhammad Khan, former President National Defence University (NDU) for facilitating the roundtable.

2. Following were the participants of the round-table:

- i. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Raza Muhammad Khan, former President National Defence University (NDU) and Chairperson Pakistan People’s Forum (PPF)
- ii. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai, former Governor Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP), former Corps Commander Peshawar, and Member PPF
- iii. Mr. Farid Rehman, former Minister of Finance, KP.
- iv. Mr. Khalid Aziz, former Chief Secretary, KP.
- v. Mr. Ejaz Qureshi, former Chief Secretary, KP.
- vi. Mr. Shakeel Durrani, former Chief Secretary, KP.
- vii. Brig. (Retd.) Zahid Zaman, former Director General Pakistan Armed Forces Services Board (PASB).
- viii. Mr. Hussain Zada Khan, Member FATA Tribunal, and Member PPF.
- ix. Amb. Arif Ayub, President, IRS.
- x. Brig. Bashir Ahmed, Senior Fellow, IRS.

- xi. Mr. Aarish Khan, Research Analyst, IRS.
- xii. Mr. Yasir Masood, Research Analyst, IRS.
- xiii. Mr. Shahid Ilyas, Research Officer, IRS.

Executive Summary

3. There was a broad consensus that restoration of peace and rehabilitation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from FATA should be the priority. It was observed that although the military had assumed a prominent role in administration in FATA owing to the ongoing War on Terror, the civilian administration needed to gradually take charge of administrative functions. While there was no unanimity on whether the old system in FATA needed to be revived, or it should be made into another province, or amalgamated into KP, but there was complete unanimity that a drastic administrative overhaul needed to be carried out only after thorough consultations with the people of FATA. It was also observed that any reformed administrative system would have to be clearly documented and the responsibilities of various stakeholders clearly laid out to avoid confusion, that usually comes in with the introduction of a new system especially in a backward area like FATA, where rural people might take a long time in adjusting to reform. It was further observed that any reform would have to be backed by substantial financial resource allocations to FATA to ensure a smooth transition.

Discussion

Mr. Khalid Aziz, former Chief Secretary KP

4. While introducing Working Paper I “10 Years Governance Program for FATA, 2015-2025 (Annex I), Mr. Aziz said that the simplistic solution to reform in FATA was that of integrating it with the rest of the country with the

introduction of police, *thanas*, and state judicial system (CPC / CrPC) etc. but there was a need to understand the reality of the tribal society better before taking such a simplistic approach to a dynamic and complex area with a complex set of problems. He argued that the people of FATA had gotten used to being responsible for themselves for a long time. He called for recognition of FATA's distinct identity and history. He said that during the ten years of Jihad there was peace and security in FATA without the military and FC. "Only the tribes alone were maintaining the peace," he said. He added, however, that afterwards the tribal society was transformed by the economy of war. "The presence of the Army was only one factor," he said.

5. Mr. Aziz said that the tribes had traditionally been responsible for themselves. He added that Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had told them that the army was being withdrawn and they had to administer themselves (there was also the problem of having no security manpower due to the tensions with India over Kashmir; a brigade was kept in Waziristan and in Bannu). Mr. Aziz further said, "The British had done a disservice to us by not providing security curtain into Central Asia. FATA was also not a part of British India and was not covered by the Government of India Act of 1935. FATA's own identity and features, therefore, need to be recognized."
6. Mr. Aziz shared that he had contributed to the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment Report on FATA, and said that FATA had been radicalized in the last 15 years by the Taliban who also became the main cause of militancy in Swat. He said that as Chief Secretary he once asked why Sufi Muhammad was allowed to raise a Lashkar of 8,000 to support the Afghan Taliban but had received no reply. He was of the view that the government was in violation of its international obligations and this policy had reverberations in FATA and began to change its nature. "Of course the state had its compulsions due to the Indian factor in Afghanistan, but when the people were allowed to cross over to Afghanistan for jihad, Pakistan, in a way, acknowledged the artificiality of the Durand Line," said Mr. Aziz.

7. Mr. Aziz was of the view that the entry of military into FATA for the War on Terror has disturbed the existing system of “hybrid sovereignty” order with which Pakistan shared sovereignty with the Maliks and tribes. He added that the entry of the army into FATA had resulted in the shifting of the system of tribal responsibility to a system of military responsibility, which had never been the case before. Mr. Aziz was of the view that adopting the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Clear, Hold, and Build” principle was not effective in FATA as it required understanding of the Pashtun nature. Mr. Aziz maintained that the system of PA and Pashtunwali was a more effective instrument for containing the insurgency, which was not the job of the army than the clear, hold, build strategy, because the social cohesion in the tribal areas of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan is very much intact. “The civil society was functioning with Jirgas and Maliks without corruption and there was a balance of clans and tribes who were ensuring peace and security. This system broke down with the entry of the army and the area was put into the straitjacket by military force,” said Mr. Aziz.
8. Mr. Aziz was of the view that Pashtunwali was on the path to revival in the tribal areas. He said that although 2,000 Maliks had been killed in FATA by terrorists, their children were proving to be even better in assuming leadership roles and resolving disputes. Mr. Aziz called for a consultative process to revive the tribal system. He argued that the tribal system should not have been disrupted in the first place.
9. Mr. Aziz said that there were three proposals for reform:
 - a. Merger with KP;
 - b. FATA as an independent province; and
 - c. Continuation of the present system with some reforms.
10. Mr. Aziz added that Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had laid down two conditions for Government policy on FATA:

- d. The government would not interfere in the area and the Army would be withdrawn, so the tribes were responsible for maintaining the security; and
 - e. There would be no change in this system of governance without consultation with the tribes.
11. Mr. Aziz said, “Some Maliks recently told me that they were in favor of merger with KP, because they said that there would be somewhere to go to for redressal of their problems. They said that at the moment they were left to their own devices.” He added that the Maliks also did not want FATA to become a separate province because it would become part of the existing problems of federalism in the country with taxes, custom duties etc. KP instead would provide them with the cover and support they required. This, he argued however, could not be done unilaterally and required a consultative process, rebuilding of FATA institutions and renewal of the tribal system. Mr. Aziz shared that the U.S. Department of Defense’s Stability Index Report showed higher social stability in Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost as compared to FATA because their social cohesion was higher despite their problems and the war as the tribal administration had not changed. He maintained that the grievance redressal system was still working through their elders. “Even the PDPA treated these areas different from the rest of Afghanistan, therefore, its civil society continued to grow,” he said.
12. Mr. Aziz said that whatever administrative reform was adopted it would have to be clearly documented with responsibilities of various actors clearly laid out. This he believed was essential because it would take a long time for people to actually get a handle on a reformed system in the area. “It takes about 80 years for the rural population to understand a new administrative system,” he said. For instance, he said, in Malakand, at the local level, people were now satisfied as their grievances were being addressed by the courts, MPAs, elders, and MNAs; and there were tiers for redressal. This, he suggested was the path to open up political reforms, legal reforms etc. and it had to be set up at the meta level by the tribesmen themselves.

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Raza Muhammad Khan, former President National Defence University (NDU) and Chairperson Pakistan People's Forum (PPF)

13. Gen. Raza said that he agreed with Mr. Khalid Aziz that it was important to restore peace and bring about prosperity in the region as the top priority for FATA. He said that before the onset of the War on Terror there was a reasonable amount of prosperity in FATA and the Army was not even needed. He added that the internal and external dynamics of the area were altered after 1979 and the external dynamics compelled the induction of the Army. Gen. Raza also blamed the "Allaqa Ghair" and "Allaqa Sarkar" dichotomy (73 percent and 27 percent of the total area, respectively) for the deprivation of a large number of people from FATA from enjoying basic state services like roads, schools, and hospitals.
14. Gen. Raza maintained that although Durand Line is not recognized by Afghanistan, its recognition is essential for controlling the border because it would be based on mutual trust and cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. President IRS interjected that with our own hands, during the jihad, we had shifted our border to the Oxus and Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Asad Durrani, former Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was also of this view. Gen. Raza said that many other people also believed this, but it was not the right approach to the issue.
15. Gen. Raza also emphasized that the existing system in FATA would have to be reformed for the better future of its people. "It is vital that the Constitution of Pakistan is made completely applicable to FATA. It would not in the end matter whichever option of the three reforms suggested was adopted for that," he said. He said that the Maliks / Khasadars and Peace Committees had to be given weapons that matched those used by the Taliban. He argued that peace had to precede reforms, and that there had to be a constitutional approach to the issue and the G-B option was also a possibility.

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai, former Governor, KP, and former Corps Commander Peshawar.

16. Gen. Aurakzai was of the opinion that FATA had become very complicated after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He said that FATA was one of the most neglected parts of the country. He shared that the total budget for FATA at the time he was governor of KP was only around Rs. 7.2 billion (\$ 72 million), and now was around Rs. 18 billion (\$ 180 million). Gen. Aurakzai also maintained that the Government was only administering 27 percent of FATA directly since 1947 up to 2001. The rest of the 73 percent of the area, he maintained, was left to its own devices to govern itself under the rubric of "Allaqa Ghair," which used to comprise 5,000 square kilometers of inaccessible territories of Bajaur, one-third of Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, and North and South Waziristan. He added that Shawal was a no-go area in 2001. He termed that state of affairs as a violation of human rights, and a wrong approach to the people of FATA and for the security of the rest of the country, as there were no road, development, health, or education facilities.
17. Gen. Aurakzai singled out the lack of peace as the main problem requiring an urgent need to address. He argued that since bringing peace was more important than implementing administrative reform at the moment, the latter could wait until the writ of the state was established and peace restored in the area. "At this stage peace is a more pressing need than reform," he said. He argued that the policy for bringing about peace in FATA would have to have an internal as well as external angle because, in his view, as long as Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan remained strained and Afghanistan remained unstable, it would be impossible to bring peace to FATA. He called or considering both the issues concurrently.
18. Gen. Aurakzai added, however, that in the medium term reforms are required because the people of the tribal areas need to be brought into the mainstream. However, he cautioned against reviving the status quo of ruling

FATA under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), through the Maliks as intermediaries. “Let us give up our romance with the past because the tribal areas have changed for good, and the people can never be the same again,” he said. He called for taking FATA out of its deprivation and backwardness and educating the people of FATA by altering the status quo. He called attention towards the plight of the more than 1.5 million tribesmen from FATA living as IDPs, and expressed his disappointment over the lack of interest of the national political leadership in alleviating them from their miseries. “Not a single of their representative MNAs or Senators or anyone from the federal government visited them, and the people were not allowed to meet the Prime Minister when he visited, except a select few,” he said.

19. Gen. Aurakzai strongly underscored the importance of taking the people of FATA on board for any administrative measures in the areas. Giving examples from his term as Corps Commander 11 Corps in Peshawar, and later as Governor, KP, Gen. Aurakzai shared that consulting the tribesmen was a key element in giving the Pakistan Army access to FATA. “We negotiated with the tribesmen to allow the army into FATA after 9/11 to block the routes for Al-Qaeda during Operation Tora Bora, in Kurram and Khyber, and we were welcomed and garlanded there. Shakeel Durrani as Chief Secretary had done a good job and motivated them. The young tribesmen would carry the luggage of the soldiers with them and would sit with them in bunkers and trenches. When foreigners infiltrated into Kurram agency, the local people helped us identify them, and they actually went in with the troops to capture them. Mr. Khalid Aziz added here that these were the Parachhamkanis. The people of Mohmand and Bajaur also invited the army to come in. They provided a vanguard to it when the army went in there. There was some resistance in Salala by some elements from across the border in Afghanistan, supported by the Governor of Kunar, but that was minimal,” he said. He added that after the army went into several different parts of FATA, the people of Shawal Valley (now considered a last refuge for militants), came to him asking for a military presence in their area as well for development, in order to build roads, health clinics, schools, and water supply schemes. He

added that since Operation Anaconda was in progress by the U.S., the Army and Frontier Corps (FC) was withdrawn from Shawal, Tirah, and Orakzai, in order to provide backup for the U.S.

20. Gen. Aurakzai said that for the future, the status quo was not an option, as it had broken down. He was of the view that FATA had to be brought out of its deprivation and backwardness mainly through education. He said that peace in FATA was essential before the options of reform of joining KP or becoming a province could be considered. He gave the example of the withdrawal of Army and FC from Khyber in 2009 for the Swat military operation, which left a vacuum that was filled by Mangal Bagh and company plus Taliban from Waziristan. "We have to be pragmatic and serious, and realize that it is time for change, otherwise, it would be a perpetual problem," he said.

Mr. Ejaz Qureshi, former Chief Secretary KP

21. Mr. Qureshi shared that he had talked to a cross-section of people from different walks of life in FATA like the Maliks, lawyers, parliamentarians, ulema, media, civil society, civil servants, army officers, and youth etc. and looked for options and suggestions for a recent report called the Interim FATA Reforms Commission Report (attached as Annex V). He shared that while the parliamentarians, Maliks, and Ulema wanted improvement in the current setup, there was another group which wanted merger with KP, and yet another group wanted a separate provincial status. Mr. Qureshi warned against imposing a solution on the people of FATA. He said, "For any solution, there will have to be wider consultation with various FATA stakeholders."

22. Mr. Qureshi explained that there were pros and cons for each of the administrative reforms suggested for FATA (Interim Report of the FATA Reforms Commission attached as Annex V). He was of the view that although keeping the status quo would be problematic because of the changed environment and a vocal minority's allegations on human rights etc., merger

with KP would result in its own administrative and political implications by upsetting the ethnic balance in the province. He added that the third option of granting a provincial status to FATA through a referendum would also be difficult to manage politically since various other areas like Hazara, Seraiki, and Karachi would also demand separate provincial status. He further argued that giving FATA a provincial status would require a huge amount of homework and financial resources. He shared that the administrative cost of running a tribal agency in late 1990s was one-fifth of a district, and therefore making all the tribal agencies districts of a separate province would entail transfer of equivalent amounts of resources to them for running the various affairs such as police, courts, etc. He added that the land revenue system would also have to be recorded because except for Kurram it was based on verbal agreements which could not be accepted by our courts. He added that the police could also not function in FATA and the proposal would create a fiasco worse than Malakand. He further argued that turning FATA into a province or merging it into KP could also disturb people's expectations. He said, "If the mainstream judicial system was introduced resolving a murder case would take 7 years on the average, which was unacceptable in a Pashtun society."

23. He said that in Pakistan there had always been knee-jerk policies like the one-unit, or placing of the B areas in Baluchistan into A areas which were later reverted back to B, appointing a naval commander as head of levies in Baluchistan, Yahya Khan amalgamating the states without thinking or planning and improvising the administrative system, which led to the Shariah movements in Swat. He said, "The FC and IG could not provide a criminal justice system to PATA due to various decisions by the superior courts."

24. Mr. Qureshi maintained that instead of replicating the civilian administrative in FATA, there should be greater focus on its improvement all over the country. "In many other areas of Pakistan jirgas are taking place, because the normal justice system is very expensive and time-consuming. The court system of Pakistan is not ideal, so wanting to replace the old system in FATA

with it might not be desirable to begin with,” he said. Therefore, although generally expressing his agreement with the idea of getting rid of the old system, Mr. Qureshi called for holding of extensive Jirgas before finalizing administrative reform proposals. He said that Instability in Afghanistan, entry of militants, and the army had all destroyed the existing structures in FATA. The new system, however, would have to be evolved from within the Pashtun tribal society rather than being imposed over them. Any imposed solution, he stated, would not work.

25. Mr. Qureshi argued that administrative reforms would be meaningless without restoration of peace in FATA. He maintained that the civilian administrative machinery had been destroyed after the War on Terror in the area. He cautioned against the approach of the army taking responsibility for everything, like running schools and hospitals etc. “When the military takes over jobs that it is not trained to do, it is counter-productive,” he said. He added, however, that the army had assumed charge of all the responsibilities it should not have, because it had to fill the political vacuum left by the militants. He was of the view that the Government would have to release extra funds for replacing the army in FATA with civilian administrators, and important priority areas such as rehabilitation of IDPs, and reconstruction of state infrastructure like schools, hospitals, etc. He said, “We should learn from the failed experiences of NATO in Afghanistan. Coordination was crucial and steps like the ones taken by the former Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Safdar, in which he signed an agreement with Nek Muhammad without informing the Governor, Chief Secretary and the Political Agent (PA), should be avoided. When the army was inducted into Swat, there were estimated to be only 700 militants. Despite a 4,000 to 5,000 forces, MI, and ISI presence, the militant strength increased to 7,000 by 2007.

26. Mr. Qureshi called for early rehabilitation of the 1.8 million IDPs (one-third of the population) and restoration of normal lives for the war-affected people of FATA. He said that all this would need financial resources, which the state should prioritize to release, but in the last 20 years, nothing was provided for

development and governance. Mr. Qureshi also called for an effective system of checks and balances for managing government finances to be spent in FATA in order to make the money accountable and stop the pilferage by the PAs.

27. Mr. Qureshi suggested constituting a regular Consultative Body from FATA for the Governor of KP. He was of the view that a census and establishment of a local government could follow after the formation of the Governor's Consultative Body. Mr. Qureshi favored strengthening of the existing Apex Committee. He added that the practice of the PAs being appointed by the Prime Minister must stop and that there was a need to control the controllers. He also suggested removal of check-posts.
28. Mr. Qureshi was of the view that the "Allaqa Ghair" was not completely devoid of Government control, and that it used to be controlled through the Maliks and FC, and furthermore, it was not as high percentage of the total as mentioned by other participants in the discussion.
29. Mr. Qureshi said that the state of Pakistan was suffering from cancer and no chemotherapy or surgery would cure it. He said that every public institution had been corrupted, which had led to the breakdown of governance. Therefore, he suggested that there was a need for reliance on the indigenous systems of the tribal areas.

Mr. Shakil Durrani, former Chief Secretary KP

30. Mr. Durrani strongly cautioned against altering the existing administrative setup in FATA. He was of the view that having areas in the country with a different administrative setup from the rest of the country was not necessarily a bad thing. He cited the example of India where there were eight special areas under the Federation. He said that 60 percent of our tribesmen were already living in the settled areas.

31. Mr. Durrani argued that instead of reforming the existing administrative arrangement in FATA, other essential requirements for its development needed to be prioritized. He said, “Those who talk of FCR as a black law don’t know about FCR. The difference between the U.S. jury system and FCR Jirga was very minimal, and the Jirga members could introduce evidence, which the jury could not. Now we also have an appellate system in place against the FCR Jirga decisions. 40 FCR (Preventive Detention) had not been as misused as many other legal instruments in the rest of the country.” Therefore, he argued that instead of blaming all ills of FATA on FCR there was a need for a more nuanced approach with right prioritization, and in that he called for prioritizing two areas.

32. First, he maintained, was the establishment of the writ of the state. Mr. Durrani said that the presence of the military in the area was essential for establishment of the writ of the state. “Establishment of the writ of the state would mean functioning of the civil administration rather than establishment of military and Khassadar piquets,” he said. He added that establishment of the writ of the state would mean functioning state justice system, schools, hospitals, etc. but the presence of the Army was essential for the establishment of the writ of the state. Alongside Army, he argued that there was a need for political leadership’s interest in the area for establishment of the writ of the state. He shared that Bhutto was the only PM who was very keen on FATA and would visit each tribal agency at least once a year and was endeavoring to extend the writ of the state to the Durand Line before Afghan President Daud could do so in Afghanistan. He was of the view that since then Pakistan’s political leaders had only visited FATA for photo ops. He added that Bhutto was assisted by two exceptional officers, Nasru Minallah as Chief Secretary and Maj. Gen. Naseerullah Babar as IG FC. Mr. Durrani said, “Minallah used to hold weekly meetings to monitor follow-up on Bhutto’s instructions. Nowadays the PAs are bagging their posts by paying up to Rs. 180 million.” He shared that he had recently met a Brigade

Commander who boasted that he had kept the PA waiting for 20 minutes “to show him his place.”

33. The second desirable priority area, he argued, was socio-economic development which, he thought, could come about within the existing administrative arrangement, as was proved by Minallah and Babar
34. Mr. Durrani disagreed with the idea of constituting a Permanent Consultative Body for the Governor KP. He said that it would inevitably lead to FATA becoming another province and that was not desirable. Mr. Durrani favored the merger of FATA with KP because he believed that the FATA was not internally as cohesive as the different tribal agencies were with the adjacent districts of KP. He said that FATA was never vertically one but bilaterally it was one.
35. Mr. Khalid Aziz said that Mr. Durrani was being paternalistic. He was of the view that the choices had to be made by the tribes and not by the CSP. He opined that a broken system could not bring reform but FATA society had a high angularity and social cohesion. He said that the Army had failed in enforcement and the civil authorities had no control over the police and the courts, which meant that a resolution would be coming. Mr. Aziz argued that the civil administration had failed. “The FIR on internet was not working and no attention and no attention was being paid to dispute resolution, except through gimmicking and games,” he said.

Brig. (Retd.) Zahid Zaman, former Director General Pakistan Armed Forces Services Board (PASB)

36. Starting with a statement attributed to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad that India is a country while Pakistan was an experiment, Brig. Zahid said that Pakistan would remain an experiment. He shared that although former Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was about to succeed in doing away with the

Sardari system after military operations in Baluchistan, when the tribal elders were invited, the system was revived. He maintained that the same could be the outcome of the ongoing consultative process on FATA.

37. Brig. Zahid argued that wherever the army was able to subdue the insurgency, the civil administration had to step in and operate very closely with the military commander of the time.

38. Brig. Zahid was of the view that the tribal areas could not be peaceful as long as there was war in the adjacent areas of Afghanistan. "Peace will have to be brought about on both sides of the border," he said.

39. Brig. Zahid was of the view that since the current wave of militancy was based on religion, it needed to be countered with the same instrument. He added that the best part of the tribal Jirga was that no mullah participated in it. The reason for that, he said, was that the Jirga was conducted under Riwaj (Pashtun custom) rather than Shariah. He said that mullahs had been made ascendant in FATA, because it was thought that they would be easier to control, but that the mullah achieved his own objectives out of the arrangement.

40. Brig. Zahid explained that the Army had to go in to the tribal areas because of the failure of the civil administration. He hoped, however, that it would be a passing phase. Brig. Zahid said that Fazlullah was created by the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), the Army, Musharraf, and the then Governor of KP. He called for keeping religion and militancy out of the political process.

Mr. Hussain Zada Khan, Member FATA Tribunal

41. Mr. Khan was of the opinion that the mistakes committed by the government in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of KP for their integration in the mainstream should not be repeated in FATA. He

particularly mentioned the knee-jerk reactions of the Government to various incidents of unrest in the area leading to policy decision that were inimical to the interests of the region.

42. He shared that the FATA tribunal was established three years ago as an appellate court, against the decisions of the tribal Jirgas organized by the Political Administration of tribal agencies, but it had still not received any cases whatsoever from Waziristan. He further shared that majority of the cases the tribunal had received in the three years pertained to civil disputes coming from Kurram and Bajaur agencies.

43. Mr. Hussain Zada informed that Malakand suffered from insurgency and the floods, and was now suffering from a flood of NGOs who were making flimsy structures out of tin sheets for Rs. 120,000 (\$ 1200) each while claiming Rs. 1 million (\$ 10,000) from the donor.

Mr. Farid Rehman, former Minister of Finance KP

44. Mr. Farid Rehman asked Mr. Ejaz Qureshi about the role of the Army, which in the past had undertaken hundreds of campaigns but always restored the political system. He asked about the method in which the civil administration would be resurrected after the end of the ongoing military operations in FATA.

45. Mr. Ejaz Qureshi replied that only political will and finances were required, to be spent initially on return and rehabilitation of IDPs and later on development. The military, he maintained, had realized that the civil administration had to carry the burden. He argued that the PA, FC, IB, ISI, and the Army had to work together to ensure coordination. Mr. Ejaz Qureshi said that there was a vacuum at the Federal level due to lack of good governance. He, therefore, called for depending on the tribes and Maliks since they reflected their social values and pressures.