THE CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

RESTORING SOUL

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JAMES HILLMAN'S ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOLOGY
TO THE STUDY OF RELIGION

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PART II

THE IMPACT OF ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOLOGY

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years, and as former Director of the Eranos Foundation, Jay's first-hand observations have been helpful. I also thank David L. Miller for his astute and prompt responses to questions and requests I have made of him.

Communities of common cause are necessary for the creative process. I acknowledge the opportunities I have had to teach at the C. G. Jung Institute of Chicago and at the Kentucky Psychoanalytic Institute in Louisville. I am grateful as well for the opportunities for leadership and service in the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis and the American Board for Accreditation in Psychoanalysis, Inc. It takes accreditors to teach accreditors so I recognize lessons learned with Prudence Ward Dalrymple who understood the creative enterprise of voluntary peer review and self-regulation in our professional fields.

I have enjoyed opportunities to hear lectures by and participate in seminars with James Hillman at the C. G. Jung Institute of Chicago, the Inter-Regional Society of Jungian Analysts, North American Congresses of Jungian Analysts, the International Association of Analytical Psychology Congresses, and the Pacifica Graduate Institute in Santa Barbara. Following these animating ways of investing in continuing education, I have then appreciated the opportunity to slip a bit of Hillman and archetypal psychology into annual sermons at the Rockford Unitarian Universalist Church as an Affiliate Minister. I also appreciate the engaging encounters with David Miller whose use respect for archetypal psychology brings the analytical into dialogue with the theological.

I thank the women and men who have invested in the soul-making of a Jungian and archetypally informed analysis or have entered discussions with me as students and analytic candidates. In the Hermetic circle, theory informs one's practice but even more significantly, practice with soul informs one's theory. We are in this great adventure together as we face life's realities, explore our imaginal depths and dreams, increase consciousness and compassion, make decisions, befriend our complexities and woes, and respond as well to soul in the world which calls for our creative and peaceful response.

ABBREVIATIONS FOR WRITINGS

Page references to the cited writings of James Hillman, C. G. Jung, and others are included parenthetically in the text. Below is a list of the abbreviations of those of their works that are cited as well as most of the editions of the writings to which they refer. Most citations refer to the more recent date of publication.

Works Cited by James Hillman

AP   *Archetypal Psychology: A Brief Account*, Dallas: Spring, 1983.

ABF   *A Blue Fire: Selected Writings by James Hillman*, Thomas Moore, ed., New York: Harper & Row, 1989.

DA   *Dream Animals: Writings by James Hillman*, San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1997.

DU   *The Dream and the Underworld*, New York: Harper & Row, 1979.

E   *Emotion: A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and The Meanings for Therapy*, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1960/1992.

FC   *The Force of Character and the Lasting Life*, New York: Random House, 1999.

FG   *Facing the Gods*, ed., Dallas: Spring, 1980.

HF   *Healing Fiction*, Barrytown, New York: Station Hill Press, 1983.

IS   *Insearch: Psychology and Religion*, Dallas: Spring, 1967/1991/1994.

IV   *Inter Views: Conversations with Laura Pozzo on Psychotherapy, Biography, Love, Soul, Dreams, Work, Imagination, and the State of the Culture*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1983.

JHUE *James Hillman Uniform Edition I, Archetypal Psychology*, Putnam, Conn.: Spring Publications, Inc., 1983/2004.

LE   *Loose Ends: Primary Papers in Archetypal Psychology*, Dallas: Spring, 1975.

MA   *The Myth of Analysis: Three Essays in Archetypal Psychology*, New York: Harper & Row, 1975.

OP   *On Paranoia*, Dallas: Spring, 1986.

PP   *Puer Papers*, Dallas: Spring, 1979.

RVP   *Re-Visioning Psychology*, New York: Harper & Row, 1975.

SC   *The Soul's Code: In Search of Character and Calling*, New York: Random House, 1996.

SS   *Suicide and the Soul*, New York: Harper & Row, 1974; Dallas: Spring, 1976.

TH   *The Thought of the Heart & the Soul of the World*, Dallas: Spring, 1981/1992.

Works Cited by C.G. Jung

CW   *Collected Works*, in twenty volumes, Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, William McGuire, and Gerhard Adler, eds., London: Routledge, 1953-78. References cite volume and paragraph, not page, unless otherwise indicated.

MDR   *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Aniela Jaffe, ed., Richard and Clara Winston, trans., New York: Random House, 1963.

Other Authors and Works More Frequently Cited

APSD *Archetypal Process: Self and Divine in Whitehead, Jung, and Hillman*, David Ray Griffin, ed., Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1989.

BFM   Thomas Moore ed., *A Blue Fire: Selected Writings by James Hillman*, New York: Harper & Row, 1989.

CCJ   *The Cambridge Companion to Jung*, Polly Young-Eisendrath and Terence Dawson, eds., New York: Cambridge UP, 1997.

FP   *The Fantasy Principle: Psychoanalysis of the Imagination*, Michael Vannoy Adams, New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2004.

JFH   *Jung, Freud, and Hillman: Three Depth Psychologies in Context*, Robert H. Davis, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003.

JH   *Jung and the Humanities: Toward a Hermeneutics of Culture*, Karin Barnaby and Pellegrino D'Acierno, eds., Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990.

JLC   *Jungian Literary Criticism*, Richard P. Sugg, ed., Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1992.

MU   *The Mythological Unconscious*, Michael Vannoy Adams, New York: Karnac, 2001.

PRCC *Psychology of Religion: Classic & Contemporary*, David M. Wulff, 2nd edition, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997.

WWI   *Working with Images: The Theoretical Base of Archetypal Psychology*, Benjamin Sells, ed., Woodstock, Conn.: Spring, 2000.

Works Regarding a Theology of Depth

GG   *Gods and Games: Toward a Theology of Play*, David L. Miller, New York: The World Publishing Co., 1970.

NP   *The New Polytheism: Rebirth of the Gods and Goddesses*, David L. Miller, Dallas: Spring, 1974/1981.

JIB   *Jung and the Interpretation of the Bible*, David Miller, ed. New York: Continuum, 1995.

HHB   *Hells & Holy Ghosts: A Theopoetics of Christian Belief*, David L. Miller, New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2004.

DIF   *Disturbances in the Field: Essays in Honor of David L. Miller*, Christine Downing, ed., New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2006.

TAJ   "Theology after Jung: Holy and Not So Holy Ghosts! Psychopathogenic Shadows in Religious Images and Ideas," *Journal of Jungian Theory and Practice Vol. 8, No. 1* (2006–in press)

PREFACE

Freud invented the term "metapsychology," a counterpart of "metaphysics," to point to the most theoretical understandings and root notions of psychology. Metapsychology would relate underlying concepts and presuppositions from the empirical base of psychology: the generic notions, metatheory, or epistemological framework informing the psychological work with contingent data.

During my Ph.D. work, I had hoped to show that there is a meaningful metatheory informing the archetypal psychology of James HIllman, whose imaginal psychology and *praxis* seem adequate and applicable to my practice of pastoral psychotherapy and Jungian analysis. I believed there was an adequate epistemology, anthropology, vision of human brokenness and healing endeavor, vision of the sacred, salvific or transformational aim, and a meaningful approach to the phenomenon of the dream. However, Professor Robert Moore challenged this reading of Hillman.

Later, I walked up a street in Santa Barbara conversing with James Hillman who was lecturing at Pacifica Graduate Institute. I mentioned Dr. Moore's critique. Hillman noted, "Robert is accurate. There is not a systematic metatheory behind my thought. I come from New Jersey where we have sea gulls who fly right down and get what they want from the oceanside. I am like them, dropping down into the depths of our culture and seizing what I need to understand things and make a point!" In other words, Hillman's methodology appropriates from other cultural thinkers in a somewhat Hermetic manner.

This dissertation will illustrate, however, that even though James Hillman's phenomenology of soul is not systematic, there are significant and cogent understandings to contribute to the psychological understanding of religious experience and spiritual practice.[1] It will argue that Hillman's archetypal psychology is indeed a depth psychology rather than a literary method. As a depth psychologist, Hillman contributes to the psychological understanding of religious experience as Jung's "revisionist successor" but also as a seminal thinker whose challenges already have had implications for the contemporary fields of psychoanalysis and a theology of depth.

The central issues which this dissertation investigates are the notion and phenomenon of soul as primarily articulated by James HIllman and how this theory and practice may contribute to the psychology of religious experience and to how theology might be done differently if informed by archetypal psychology with its emphasis upon the imagination. This dissertation examines the phenomena of Hillman's ideas as well as the appropriations he has made *in lieu* of a systematic metapsychology.

The theoretical perspective informing my approach is psychoanalytic, primarily a "modified archetypal psychology" which informs my practice as a Jungian analyst, a pastoral psychotherapist, and a religious humanist and Unitarian Universalist minister interested in postmodern concerns. This theoretical perspective understands the unconscious as eccentric to consciousness, that there is an inescapable alterity which tears and divides the conscious subject or personality within itself. There is always an unconscious Other addressing the conscious subject or ego. This unconscious dimension, what Hillman calls the imaginal, is represented in the symbols, images, and contextual mood and scene of a dream. This irreducible alterity eludes conceptual comprehension. The dream may leave a trace of where the infinite has incarnated or crossed through human finitude. Reflection on this otherness leads to a "relativizing of the ego" (Jung's individuation) or a saturating of the ego in imaginal realities creating "an imaginal ego" (Hillman's soul-making).

Archetypal psychology has emerged as a reaction to the modern world view which has been colored by Christian tradition and Cartesian philosophy. These traditions view all else as bereft of psyche, as having no soul. These understandings have led psychology into a "souless predicament" due to biases against "personifying." Archetypal psychology is a reaction against this long history of depersonalizing which has been characterized by the beliefs such as subjectivity being confined to human persons, the individual is only one person, the literalism that souls are only in literal bodies, the nominalism that words are only labels and not living realities, and the allegorizing that reduces mythological imagery.

Archetypal psychology has emerged as an attempt to free our vision of the psyche from these narrow constrictions, underlying assumptions, and presuppositions of the modern world view since that view constricts our imaginations. Archetypal psychology

has a desire "to save the phenomena of the imaginal psyche." It is a fundamental shift of perspective out of that soulless predicament we call modern consciousness. (*RVP*, p. 3)

This dissertation concern is relevant because of the major polytheistic revival going on, especially in light of interest in the Goddess traditions in feminist and womens' studies. Individuals want access to all the gods and goddesses. In a gathering of contemporary theologians, William Hamilton noted:

Students coming to the university used to define their religious situation by locating first their inherited tradition, and then asking the university to clarify that tradition for them, so they might better affirm or deny it. Today it appears that fewer and fewer accept a religious self-definition in terms of personal biographies. What they are asking of their teacher of religion is no longer that they serve as a sophisticated or upper-division Sunday School, but that they offer them a massive and total access to all the gods of men: eastern and western, primitive and modern, heretical and orthodox, mad and sane. The gods are there, not to be believed in or trusted, but to be used to give shape to an increasingly complex and variegated experience of life.

Hillman and archetypal psychology can address the questions: What is the contemporary meaning of Greek polytheism? What do theologians have to say about polytheism? The academy is being challenged to become curious about this polytheism discussion.[2]

Hillman's archetypal psychology has contributed meaningful understandings to the psychological study of religious experience. Archetypal psychology continues to show that it can alterity one's way of doing theology yielding what has been called "an imaginal theology" or a "theology of depth."

INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this dissertation is that James Hillman is a phenomenologist of soul whose archetypal psychology is a depth psychology which has made significant contributions to the field of psychoanalysis as well as to an emerging theology of depth. This argument concludes that the thought of Hillman and his archetypal psychology continue to inform psychological understandings of religious experience in psychoanalytic thought as well as in a new theology of depth which has been articulated most in the work of the theologian and professor David L. Miller. Miller concludes that even as Christianity is in our psychology, theology is in depth psychology for good or ill. Such a theology will develop as religious images and ideas continue to have residual unconscious psychopathogenic implications.

There is a clear progression to this argument in the chapters which follow. This thesis initially examines Hillman's development as a phenomenologist of soul. It identifies his evolution as a Jungian psychoanalyst, and it articulates the sources and development of his thought in place of a systematic metapsychology. This led to his brilliant revisioning of C. G. Jung's analytical psychology. The argument, then, emphasizes the implications of archetypal psychology on the practice of analysis, especially noting its import for work with dreams. Since Hillman's imaginal approach suggests that psychopathology, the dream, and imagery extend into the realm of gods and the mythic aspects of life, the thesis highlights the contributions of archetypal psychology towards a psychological understanding of religious experience. This is particularly true in relation to the rehabilitation of the phenomena of soul in psychology, the distinction between soul and spirit, an emphasis on a polytheistic psychology rather than a monotheistic one, the restoration of soul to the world, the root metaphors which inform belief systems, the imagination's challenge to literalism, and the critique of Christianism.

The thesis allows that there have been critiques of Hillman and archetypal psychology. However, it identifies the significant postmodern conversations which have engaged this post-Jungian school of thought. The argument identifies the significant impact and continuing influence of Hillman's thought on the fields of psychoanalysis and

contemporary spirituality. The thesis explores the influence of archetypal psychology upon David L. Miller. The argument emphasizes Miller's acknowledged indebtedness to Hillman's radical revisioning of Jung noting his conclusion that all psychological knowing is imaginal in its ultimate epistemological nature. The thesis also summarizes Miller's valuing of the polytheistic implications in archetypal psychology which continue to challenge the religious community to reexamine its monotheistic ideology. The argument notes that a theology of depth continues to be important as religion, particularly Christianity, can have a psychopathogenic nature if the shadows of its images and ideas are left unexamined.

If the research and perspective of this dissertation could be applied, fresh perspectives on our psychological understandings of religious phenomena might unfold. Hillman has applied archetypal psychology to look more deeply into the experience of revelation. Miller's depth theology has begun to identify psychological shadings and mythical themes in theological ideas, images, and religious narratives concluding that for better or worse, theology is a form of depth psychology. Future applications of archetypal psychology could look at more images and mythical underpinnings in religion.

In conclusion, this dissertation is an appreciative examination of Hillman's archetypal psychology as well as a critical assessment of its implications for a psychological understanding of religious experience. It concludes that Hillman is an original thinker whose ideas and critiques continue to have implications for psychological studies of religious experience by restoring interest in soul whose innate nature and primacy is constituted by images. Hillman's archetypal psychology is a postmodern reminder that the fields of philosophy, theology, religion, and spirituality are grounded upon archetypal presuppositions and root metaphors. Therefore, the work of this phenomenologist of soul deserves wider discussion in the academy, in education for ministry, in pastoral psychology, and in the clinical and pastoral settings where the phenomena of soul is met in practice.

PART I

JAMES HILLMAN–A PHENOMENOLOGIST OF SOUL

The following chapters ground the argument of this work to make the case that James Hillman is an original thinker who can be characterized as a phenomenologist of soul. These initial chapters ask basic questions. Who is James Hillman? Is his archetypal psychology really a depth psychology or a literary critique? How does Hillman articulate a phenomenology of soul? What were the major influences upon Hillman as he developed as a Jungian analyst and emerged as Jung's revisionist successor? What understandings and cultural lineages of thought has Hillman appropriated in place of a systematic metapsychology? What are the major revisionings of Jungian psychology which distinguish Hillman's archetypal psychology from Jung's analytical psychology? What are the implications of this revisioning for the practice of analysis and psychotherapy? What are the unique contributions of archetypal psychology for an understanding of religious experience? What are the significant critiques of Hillman's psychology?

CHAPTER 1

WHO IS JAMES HILLMAN?

Hillman's archetypal psychology is a postmodern school of Jungian depth psychology (later called post-Jungian). Hillman's attempt at re-visioning psychology has been compared to Jacques Derrida's deconstructionism which also decenters the ego.

There are comprehensive summaries of Hillman's psychology. Michael Vannoy Adams', "The Archetypal School" in *The Cambridge Companion to Jung* (1997) is a concise overview. Thomas Moore's chapter introductions in the anthology, *A Blue Fire: Selected Writings by James Hillman* (1989) are succinct and readable. Benjamin Sells has edited and published the first volume in a proposed three volume anthology of essays in archetypal psychology, *Working with Images: The Theoretical Base of Archetypal Psychology* (2000). Hillman wrote an entry for an Italian encyclopedia on archetypal

psychology entitled, *Archetypal Psychology: A Brief Account* (1981). This work summarized the sources of archetypal psychology as well as its key notions, emphases, and ideas along with a detailed bibliography. This has been updated as *James HIllman Uniform Edition I* (2004) with new sections and an updated bibliography of sources and works. Dalrymple (1993) developed an introductory course on archetypal psychology taught at the C. G. Jung Institute of Chicago and the Kentucky Psychoanalytic Institute, which was published as an overview of Hillman's thought, "Befriending the Soul: An Introduction to Imaginal Psychology."

James Hillman was born in 1926 and grew up in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Although it has been said that he was born in a hotel, actually he was born in a hospital but lived with his family in a hotel his father managed in Atlantic City. It is not clear if Hillman ever graduated from high school, but due to the influence of an older brother, he soon preferred to visit Mexico than attend school. However, he was certainly bright enough to enter Georgetown University for awhile taking political science courses. He dropped out to serve in the Navy in WW II where one of his assignments involved the rehabilitation of blind sailors as they readjusted to everyday lives. He was moved by the pain which he observed and "by the system he was part of that pretended everything was fine, that everyone was getting better." (Yoffe, p. 47) In a *New York Times* interview, Hillman's life after some wandering was that:

> ...he went to France to be an intellectual, Ireland to be a writer and India to be a neurotic. Finally, he arrived in Zurich in the 50's. It was at the height of the psychoanalytic culture, a culture divided by two schools—Freudian and Jungian.
>
> For Hillman, arriving in Zurich was like Percival finding the Grail. Jung was still alive, and Hillman, who came to know the Great Man, dedicated himself to becoming a Jungian. (Yoffe, p. 47)

Hillman received a Certificate of Literature from the Sorbonne in Paris, sitting at tables next to Sartre in the cafe Select and being influenced by the romantic, existential climate of thought of that day. Before this he received an M.A. from Trinity College in Dublin, Ireland. Later, after he and his first wife moved to Switzerland, he received a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Zürich.

Hillman became the Director of Studies at the Jung Institute in Zürich from 1961-1967. He was a lecturer (and a member of its Board) at the Eranos Conferences in Ascona, Switzerland from 1966-1987. He gave the Dwight Harrington Terry Lectures at Yale University in 1972 (previous lecturers had included William James and C. G. Jung). He was the Graduate Dean at the University of Dallas from 1978-1980. He was a Founding Fellow of the Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture in 1980. Hillman has held visiting professorships at Syracuse, Yale, the University of Chicago, and Pacifica Graduate Institute. Since 1970, he has been the owner, publisher, and editor of Spring Publications. He was also the editor and publisher of its journal, *Spring* from 1970-1990, then its senior editor until 1997. Hillman has consistently tried to align depth psychology with the phenomena of imagination, including both the aesthetic and cultural sides of it. He has argued that the task of psychology is to treat therapeutically the imagination from the damage done to it by repression.

Hillman's work has been characterized (especially by him) as a "deliteralizing" or a "seeing through" of literal realities to metaphorical or imaginal realities (*RVP*, p. 136). Hillman's thought has been described as heretical, idiosyncratic, eccentric, iconoclastic, revisionistic, discomforting, etc. This is why many analysts consider Hillman to be the most important and original Jungian analyst since Jung himself. If Jung deliteralized aspects of Freudian thought, Hillman has deliteralized or re-visioned aspects of Jungian psychology.

Hillman's Ph.D. dissertation, *Emotion: A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and Their Meanings for Therapy*, was initially published in 1960, and challenged the reader to move beyond reductionistic theories of emotions, thereby placing emotional phenomena into the wider experience of soul, imagination, and the ineffable. In *Suicide and the Soul* (1965), Hillman confronted the medical, moralistic, and legalistic model of suicide as he tried to separate the psychoanalysis of soul from these models; he articulated a unique root metaphor informing analysis—that of sitting with the phenomena of soul.

Hillman became concerned with the problems of psychology and religion following the *Honest to God* debate. Introducing his book, *Insearch: Psychology and Religion* (1967), he noted that he was worried about:

...the implications of a theology that has become a theo-thanatology, or a study of a "dead" God, and which demythologizes religion must be faced since analytical psychology tends to have just the reverse effect. It moves toward "re-mythologizing" experiences with religious implications,... For psychology the issue is not that "God is dead," but in what forms this indestructible energy is now reappearing in the psyche. What can the psyche tell us about the direction religion might take now? In what images will that major emotional idea of God be reborn? (*IS*, pp. 5-6)

Care of soul can be returned to the pastoral counselor as well as those open to the frontiers of contemporary inquiry. Thirty years later, Hillman added a Postscript in which he was a critic of his own work. He noted in his "Preface" that, "...this is primarily a book of soul—soul as conceived and expressed within the traditional language of our Western history, which is inescapably Christian." (*IS*, 1994, p. 3) He admitted a Christianism in this work, which was written to expose the relation of classical Jungian thought and Christian pastoral care. This was in contrast to his eventual dedication to the polytheism of classical Greece and what he called his "Running Engagement with Christianity" (*IV*, 1983) as well as a chapter in *The Dream and the Underworld*. In these later pieces, Hillman critiqued "the unconscious Christian dogmas and fantasies that severely impede deeper psychological understanding—a point made years ago by Nietzsche, Freud, and also Jung." (*IS*, 1994, p. 4)

In *The Myth of Analysis* (1972), Hillman noted the inherent feminine and Dionysian elements in analysis and cautioned about their repression in misogynistic and Apollonic emphases in analytic practice. In *Loose Ends: Primary Papers in Archetypal Psychology* (1975), Hillman emphasized how important pathology is to the psyche as he reflected on shadow themes: abandonment, betrayal, schism, failure, masturbation. His section on "Theories" addressed his association of archetypal psychology with the cultural and psychological visions of Plotinus, Ficino, and Vico. In 1981, James Hillman was awarded the Medal of the City of Florence, Italy, for his contributions to psychology and his original use of ideas from the Italian Renaissance.

Hillman has lectured and lectures frequently in America and abroad. As already mentioned, he was invited to deliver the distinguished Terry Lectures at Yale University in 1972. These lectures became some of the chapters in his best book, *Re-Visioning*

Psychology (1975). This book is essentially about the process of what he termed "soul-making." In it Hillman re-visioned psychology from the point of view of soul and used this re-imagined psychology in his polemic classical understandings of soul. He asked, "What is soul?" and went farther than his earlier notions. This psychology of soul is based in a psychology of image. He posited: "...both a *poetic basis of mind* and a psychology that starts neither in the physiology of the brain, the structure of language, the organization of society, nor the analysis of behavior, but in the processes of imagination." (p. xi) He acknowledged his debt to Jung as an immediate successor, but he noted a lineage back through "Freud, Dilthey, Coleridge, Schelling, Vico, Ficino, Plotinus, Plato to Heraclitis—and with even more branches which have yet to be traced." (p. xi) Hillman noted that this book offered "a way into Jung" but also "a way out of Jung, especially his theology." (p. xii) Hillman understands psychology to be "a necessary activity of the psyche," that "where there is any connection to soul, there will be psychology." If there is no soul, then "what is taking place is better called statistics, physical anthropology, cultural journalism, or animal breeding." (p. xii) This book moved out of a unitary point of view or monotheistic bias toward a psychological polytheism for a more differentiated backdrop to the many-sidedness of human nature.

Many of Hillman's essays became pivotal chapters in works he published and edited. His essays published in his *Spring* journal on "Senex and Puer" (1967), "Peaks and Vales" (1976), and "Pothos" (1975) are at the heart of the book, *Puer Papers* (1979). Essays "On the Necessity of Abnormal Psychology: Ananke and Athene" and "Dionysos in Jung's Writing" are published in Spring's *Facing the Gods* (1980). Hillman's editorial preface to this work noted:

> ... For as the individual in search of his or her soul soon discovers, the soul is entangled in myths so that uncovering the figures of myth becomes more and more psychologically pertinent. We are learning what other cultures always knew: to know ourselves we must know the Gods and Goddesses of myth. We must face the Gods

> ...this book serves to restore to us an awareness of the incredible dominants that affect our attitude, our work, our loves and our sufferings. It serves as well to restore the features of their individual faces after centuries of programmatic iconoclastic disfiguration. (*FG*, p. iv)

Hillman's subsequent works emphasized the *leitmotif* of the phenomena of imagination and with a re-visioned analysis as both an aesthetic and imaginative practice. *The Dream and the Underworld* (1979) was one of Hillman's more metaphysical works as he re-visioned dream interpretation to the archetypal backdrop of dying and the myths of the classical Underworld. In *Healing Fiction* (1983), Hillman summarized how Freud, Jung, and Adler were aware of the fictional nature of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Such fictions, however, were not to be taken literally. Dogmatic understanding actually can lead to sickness.

Inter Views (1983) is a so-called interview with "Laura Pozzo," which is a pseudonym. This book originally started as a series of questions, then became a so-called interview, then was meticulously re-written by Hillman into a book. *Inter Views* is a dialogue on psychoanalysis, mythology, and the imagination. The chapter entitled, "A Running Engagement with Christianity," summarizes his difficulties with Christian culture (Hillman comes from a distinguished Jewish family background). Hillman noted:

> I try to bypass the Christian view by stepping behind it to the Greeks, to polytheism. I have tried to pick up again that great battle between the pagans and the Christians. That battle is not a dead issue at all: it goes on every day inside our Western psyche. What we now call the unconscious are the old Gods returning, assaulting, climbing over the walls of the ego. (*IV*, pp. 75-76)

Hillman's "return to Greece" helped him get out from under "the Christian overlay" and his Reformed Jewish background.

Hillman's respect for but subtle critique of Jung's understanding is embodied in his book *Anima: An Anatomy of a Personified Notion* (1985) where excerpts from the writings of Jung on *anima* appeared on the left hand page while Hillman's commentary about these notions appeared on the right hand page. Hillman was a dominant and controlling presence at the Eranos Lectures in Ascona. In his lecture in 1986 "On Paranoia," Hillman asked the general question, how can we distinguish religious revelation from pathological delusion, since both are attempts to adjust to the unseen order? Hillman's lecture noted ways for loosening the unavoidable elements of paranoia in revelatory religion and visionary experiences. He argued for the importance of

imagination in both psyche and *polis*, soul and city, in contrast to literalism and the politics of paranoia.

Two important essays moved archetypal psychology towards the world and what Hillman called "a depth psychology of extraversion"—"The Thought of the Heart" (1981) and "*Anima Mundi*: The Return of the Soul To the World" (1992). After practicing as an analyst for thirty some years, Hillman announced at the International Congress for Analytical Psychology in 1989 that he would no longer have his private practice. He would continue "...to practice psychology with large groups, in public speaking and teaching, publishing and writing." He came to the understanding that there was a *lacuna* in his consciousness as well as that of analytic training communities. He concluded that there was a defensive maneuver which kept analytical psychology from the body politic. He reacted to ontological assumptions such as the belief "that the psychological and the political can be conceived as two distinct discourses." (1994, *Speculations After Freud*, p. 30) After this Hillman wrote a provocative book with the Californian culture critic Michael Ventura titled, *We've Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy and the World's Getting Worse* (1992). Here Hillman warned about the individualism in contemporary therapeutics interfering with the realities of community— that patients should also be valued as empowered citizens. It was the normalizing of patients by psychotherapy which made the world worse as individuals conformed to conventionally accepted norms thus reducing the abnormal, the deviant, and the eccentric to bland neurotic symptoms.

Kinds of Power: A Guide to Its Intelligent Uses (1995) addressed a depth psychology approach to business and raised ethical questions and values. *The Soul's Code: In Search of Character and Calling* (1996) became a bestseller even as it relativized the reductionist understanding of development. Hillman looked at notions of identity and argued that the "daimon" we are born with lures us toward the meaningful destiny innately given with our birth. *Dream Animals* (1997) was a reflection on animals in waking life, dreams, and imaginings, which was beautifully illustrated with the paintings of his third wife, the artist Margot McLean. In *The Force of Character and the Lasting Life* (2000), Hillman addressed the theme of old age, which he imagined as the fulfillment and confirmation of a person's character. Most recently, Hillman has

published *A Terrible Love of War* (2004), which is based on his long-time preoccupation with and interest in war and his reflections on his personal experiences with it when he served stateside in the Navy in WWII.

Hillman has been prolific as an essayist, speaker, and presenter at conferences throughout the world. Many of his writings have gone into republication a number of times and have been translated into many languages.

Also Hillman has received a number of awards and much recognition. In 1995, the *Utne Reader* honored Hillman as one of its "100 Visionaries Who Could Change Your Life." Named in that issue were such liberal luminaries as Robert Jay Lifton, Michael Lerner, Joan Halifax, Vaclav Havel, Thich Nhat Hanh, Baba Ram Dass, David Abram, Wendell Berry, Robert Bly, Noam Chomsky, Fritjof Capra, Deepak Chopra, Matthew Fox, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Bill Moyers, Theodore Roszak, Rupert Sheldrake, Cornel West, Garry Wills, and others. Hillman received *The Vision Award*[3] in 1997 from the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (NAAP) following publication of *The Soul's Code*. A year or so later, the NAAP presented Hillman with its *Gradiva Award* for his commentary in a film for the BBC (1993), "Kind of Blue: An Exploration of Depression and Melancholy."

On October 21, 2001, Hillman was awarded the Medal of the Presidency of the Italian Republic at a conference in Rimini, Italy. Hillman was introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev who characterized him as "the most impressive theoretician of the late 20th-century archetypal reform of psychology." Archetypal psychology was now re-integrating "the permanent underpinning afforded by the individual's imaginative activity or creative mobility—in a nutshell, his or her spiritual life." Gorbachev noted that Hillman was "the author of this neo-mythical insurrection" of psychology:

> With his extraordinary dismantling of the monocentric, personalistic and nihilistic assumption of reductionist Western knowledge, Hillman has criticized the traditional concepts of psychotherapy, re-establishing a classic Renaissance route, both to the actual world of places and things by personified reanimation and to the archetypal world of myth, the imaginative, narrative, and deiform dimension of the psyche. Thereby he has turned analytical technique inside out, transforming it beyond the subjectivist empiricism of the isolated individual enacting "the myth of analysis," into a form of soul=leavened

psychodramatics. For these outstanding merits, which make him one of the great reformers of our style of knowledge in this period of transition between two eras, the Italian nation is honored to make this award to James Hillman.[4]

This public affirmation supports one of the basic arguments of this dissertation—that James Hillman and archetypal psychology are important as a depth psychology.

CHAPTER 2

IS ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOLOGY A DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY OR A LITERARY METHOD?

The question has been asked to me by Robert Moore as to whether Hillman's archetypal psychology is really a depth psychology." Or is archetypal psychology a literary method as it has a literary genre with its emphasis upon a mytho-poetic basis of soul and a psychology of image? These are important questions to address in this dissertation because they effect the issue of whether archetypal psychology makes an impact on the fields of psychoanalysis and theology.

Why does the question of whether or not Hillman's archetypal psychology is a depth psychology or a literary method come up? Archetypal psychology is an approach which encourages a poetic attitude in contrast to a rational, positivist attitude or a scientific appoach as a way of caring for soul. The writings of Hillman and other archetypalists use words, images, myths, and fantasy in ways which attempt to move the reader out of rigid attitudes, convictions, and understandings and literalisms. They try to evoke the poetic depths and foundations of experience. They attempt to help the reader get a glimpse into soul by moving from literalism toward the imaginal. It has been noted in a collection of essays that:

> Hillman re-visions Jung's psychological method as essentially a literary method. Hillman's Jung, in "The Pandaemonium of Images: Jung's Contribution to 'Know Thyself,'" explores the text of his dream and fantasies, envisioning psychic reality as "poetic, dramatic, literary in nature," and treating the archetypal "daimones" of his inner life as personified images. As an analyst, Hillman suggests that imaginative art plays a central role in therapy. The exercise of active imagination—giving concrete form to dream-images—succeeds, says Hillman, primarily because it lifts the patient out of "the disease of literalism" and restores him to living "fictionally." (*JLC*, p. 129)

Hillman appropriated the term "soul-making" from the English Romantic poet John Keats. Archetypal psychology has principles which inform both theory and practice and can also be used in the reading of a literary text. Archetypal psychology's interest in depth, image, and archetype easily cross-over to be used in literary criticism and the

teaching of literature. There is a long history of depth psychology informing the theoretical foundations of literary criticism. Jung's psychology has influenced writers, scholars, and critics in a recognized relationship between psychology and literature. The book, *Jungian Literary Criticism*, points to an "archetypal depth criticism" (p. 260) as well.

How should psychology be understood as a science? Psychology can be considered to be a human science. However, a precise definition of a human science is elusive because the definitions of human and science involve a diversity of perspectives. Wilhelm Dilthey wrote a treatise called, "Introduction to the Human Sciences" in 1893. He was the first writer to acknowledge psychology as a human science. He concluded that any study of the human mind and its creations needed a different methodology than the experimental and quantitative research methods used in the natural sciences. In the human sciences, there was an attempt to understand human behavior rather than to predict or control such experience. These experimental methods tended to minimize or abolish human subjectivity by explanations in terms of natural processes which go on outside of human subjectivity. A more adequate approach to the human sciences, human behavior, and motivation would attempt to describe human subjectivity in its own terms and meanings. A more adequate approach in the human sciences would explore human subjectivity by examining the contents of consciousness, lived or phenomenological meanings which can be embodied in the unconscious depths of human subjectivity.

Two philosophical movements followed Dilthey on the continent which valued a human science perspective that employed a hermeneutics looking closely at the human situation in its subjectivity, complexity, and depth—phenomenology and existentialism. Phenomenology looked at the world of lived and immediate experience which preceded objectified or abstract inquiry which otherwise would be divorced from the depths of human experience. The nuances of subjective experience and primordial experience were appreciated within an attempt at understanding. Existentialism highlighted the many social, historical, generational, genderized, and concretized aspects of human experience and its basic, existential structures. Self-knowledge and freedom were the goals of philosophical understanding and not the ideology of progress or the positivisms often woven into the natural sciences. There was the development of an existential

phenomenological psychology which used both existential and phenomenological approaches to study and even to treat mental disorders and psychological suffering. The pursuit of psychological understanding became a human science.

Psychology as a human science has been informed by new understandings from the fields of hermeneutics, depth psychology, psychoanalysis, feminist theory, critical theory, and postmodern thought making psychology an unfolding human science. It has come to honor the deeper and multiple meanings of human experience as well as the impact of cultural diversity and the transformation of not only individual persons but also of communities and cultures. Psychology has become an interdisciplinary enterprise with associations connected to literature, mythology, religion, philosophy, and the arts.

The word psychology is increasingly employed in a broader way than it is in clinical or academic psychology. This is especially true when psychology is informed by the tradition of depth psychology, particularly that of Jung's analytical psychology and Hillman's archetypal psychology. The contemporary writer and former university professor, Thomas Moore, acknowledges this broader use of psychology in his bestselling book, *Care of the Soul*:

> You can see already that care of the soul is quite different in scope from most modern notions of psychology and psychotherapy. It isn't about curing, fixing, changing, adjusting or making healthy, and it isn't about some idea of perfection or even improvement. It doesn't look to the future for an ideal, trouble-free existence. Rather, it remains patiently in the present, close to life as it presents itself day by day, and yet at the same time mindful of religion and spirituality. (1992, p. xv)

Eugene Taylor, a Harvard historian of medicine and psychology, has pointed out in his work, *Shadow Culture: Psychology and Spirituality in America*, that there has been a great amount of liberalization of psychology as both an academic discipline and a profession. He sees this as a shift toward a more empathic focus on normal persons as a transcendent move of attention from a lower toward a higher state of consciousness. The existential-humanistic and transpersonal psychologies have now liberalized the definition of psychology itself. This is already relevant for how scientific research is conducted in both the academy and clinical settings as new constructs for understanding overcome the reductionistic habits of psychology. Such new constructs, which are relevant, are the

valuation of the depths of immediate experience, the iconography of the transcendent and self-actualizing dimensions of personality (in other words, any sign, symbol, or image pointing to expanded awareness and depth).

The term depth psychology was suggested by the Zürich psychiatrist, Eugene Bleuler, early in the twentieth century, as a reasonable name for psychoanalysis as a new science.[1] The term is used now for a field or paradigm within the human science of psychology, in contrast to such sub-fields as cognitive psychology, behaviorism, social psychology, etc. Depth psychology is a set of understandings and techniques for exploring underlying motivations, but it is also a theory and practice of treating various mental disorders as well as investigating mental processes which are inaccessible by other means. The aims of depth psychology include the exploration of the levels of the personality, which are deeper than consciousness. Depth psychology is associated primarily with any psychology informed by psychoanalytic understandings of the unconscious.

Depth psychology attempts to see in depth, to have an understanding which is less physically scientific. Hillman suggests that this is once again an ancient image linking depth and psychology. It was Heraclitus who joined *"psyche," "logos,"* and "depth" (*bathun*). This was the insight that the soul and its realm had a unique dimension which is not spatial:

> "Depth psychology," the modern field whose interest is in the unconscious levels of the psyche—that is, the deeper meanings of the soul—is itself no modern term. "Depth" reverberates with a significance, echoing one of the first philosophers of antiquity. All depth psychology has already been summed up by this fragment of Heraclitus: "You could not discover the limits of the soul (*psyche*), even if you traveled every road to do so; such is the depth (*bathun*) of its meaning (*logos*)." Ever since Heraclitus brought soul and depth together in one formulation, the dimension of soul is depth (not breadth or height) and the dimension of our soul travel is downward. (*RVP*, p. xi)

Heraclitus anticipates the unconscious of psychology in the early centuries of Western philosophy. He placed psyche, soul, first as an *archon.* In the *Fragments* of Heraclitus, the reader can see that soul desires to "go beyond," to travel inward, into

greater depth, into the dark, a movement of penetrating which makes soul as it goes deeper in pursuit of those harmonies in the depths of being. Hillman says:

> ... Our familiar term *depth psychology* says quite directly: to study soul, we must go deep, and when we go deep, soul becomes involved. The logos of the soul, *psychology*, implies the act of traveling the soul's labyrinth in which *we can never go deep enough.* (*DU*, p. 25)

Hillman terms this endless activity of going into depth and of soul-making as "psychologizing." The deeper layers of the personality are what we discuss as "the unconscious." C. G. Jung used the metaphor of depth in characterizing the unconscious as:

> ...everything of which I know, but of which I am not at the moment thinking; everything of which I was once conscious but have now forgotten; everything perceived by my senses, but not noted by my conscious mind; everything which, involuntarily and without paying attention to it, I feel, think, remember, want, and do; all the future things that are taking shape in me and will sometime come to consciousness: all this is the content of the unconscious. ... (*CW 8*, §382)

> ...we also find in the unconscious qualities that are not individually acquired but are inherited, e.g., instincts as impulses to carry out actions from necessity, without conscious motivation. In this "deeper" stratum we also find ... the archetypes.... The instincts and archetypes together form the "collective unconscious." (*CW 8*, §270)

> ... The deeper "layers" of the psyche lose their individual uniqueness as they retreat farther and farther into darkness. "Lower down," that is to say as they approach the autonomous functional systems, they become increasingly collective until they are universalized and extinguished in the body's materiality, i.e., in chemical substances. The body's carbon is simply carbon. Hence "at bottom" the psyche is simply "world." (*CW 9i*, §291)

Archetypal Psychology Is a Depth Psychology

Hillman's archetypal psychology has depth as an essential focus as much as image and archetype. Hillman reintroduced classical and romantic notions of soul, and the depth responses which we regard as meaningful. The task of a psychology is not just the strengthening of ego, nor the individuation of the "Self," but also a nurturing of soul. Hillman emphasizes the dimension of depth in his attempt to reorient psychology from

the point of view of soul. This psychology suggests a poetic basis of mind in contrast to other psychologies which may relie more on behavior, neurolinguistics, social organization, and brain physiology. It emphasizes imaginal processes. Psyche is a mytho-poetic phenomenon, so soul is inherently related to language, image, and rhetoric:

> By speaking of soul as a primary *metaphor*, rather than defining soul substantively and attempting to derive it ontological status from empirical demonstration or theological (metaphysical) argument, archetypal psychology recognizes that psychic reality is inextricably involved with *rhetoric*. The perspective of soul is inseparable from the manner of speaking of soul, a manner which evokes soul, brings it to life, and persuades us into a psychological perspective. In its concern with rhetoric, archetypal psychology has relied on literary and poetic devices to expound its vision, all the while working at "seeing through" the mechanistic and personalistic metaphors employed by other psychology so as to recover soul from those literalisms. The polemical foray into others' preserves in necessary to the rhetorical mode. (*AP*, p. 19)

If psychology goes into the metaphorical depths, it will have therapeutic implications. Therapy suggests going into the depths of particular symptoms, an individual's peculiarities, and complexities. A depth psychology will always ask, what does our observation and understanding of depth suggest for soul? Hillman's archetypal psychology is respectful of psychological suffering and its pathologizing, its symptoms, and its complexities. It sees symptoms as manifestations of depth and soul; it does not heroically (here equated with the ego) try to take these difficulties away. In our symptoms Hillman sees that we have the opportunity to discover soul:

> ... Only when things fall apart do they open up into new meanings; only when everyday habit turns symptomatic, a natural function become an affliction, or the physical body appears in dreams as a pathological image, does a new significance dawn. (*RVP*, p. 111)

In a unique way archetypal psychology addresses the phenomena of depression and its possibilities for healing and soul-making. Depression is not merely a symptomatic disability but a means of motion, an essential way of moving into depth. Depression invites us into a special consciousness and into greater depth:

...through depression we enter depths and in depths find soul. Depression is essential to the tragic sense of life. It moistens the dry soul, and dries the wet. It brings refuge, limitation, focus, gravity, weight, and humble powerlessness. It reminds of death. *The true revolution begins in the individual who can be true to his or her depression.* Neither jerking oneself out of it, caught in cycles of hope and despair, nor suffering it through till it turns, nor theologizing it—but discovering the consciousness and depths it wants. So begins the revolution in behalf of soul. (*RVP*, pp. 98-99)

The phenomenon of the image is Hillman's starting point for his re-visioning of analytical psychology (His emphasis upon images is even more evident in his book *The Dream and the Underworld*). Hillman admitted this work is "the main bridge—or tunnel" into his other writings. The psychology of image is connected to a psychology of dreams and the perspective of death. Hillman understands his psychology as a depth psychology but with a shift of perspective:

... A depth psychology which relies upon the shadowy images of fantasy, upon deepening and pathologizing, and upon therapy as a cult of soul is referring mythologically to the underworld. To start with the image in depth psychology is to begin in the mythological underworld, so this book provides the mythical perspective to our psychology of the image. The claim that images come first is to say that dreams are the primary givens and that all daylight consciousness begins in the night and bears its shadows. Our depth psychology begins with the perspective of death. (*DU*, p. 5)

Hillman grounds his psychology of dreams in the mythic backdrop of Underworld mythology. He sees this as a "helpful story" rather than "evidence for anything positive." The mythical images do not stand for anything but are night world phenomena offering depth and background to illustrate the psychic dimension:

...we have to stay within depth psychology. The soul is the only ground of our field.... We have to stay with the dream-soul and look at things its way. Then we can take the research, not in the literal manner of empirical support but as a comparison, a likeness, another way of saying what we are saying, a most helpful story. (*DU*, p. 106)

Hillman understands himself to be articulating a depth psychology. If the Underworld is psyche, then soul is depth. Hillman concludes, "To know the psyche at its basic depths, for a true depth psychology, one must go to the underworld."

Archetypal psychology is a psychology which uses aesthetics and an imaginal methodology. However, the problem is that all psychology which is based in aesthetics could be characterized as archetypal psychology. The imaginal method is an attempt to see through the literal to the imaginal. This is how soul is glimpsed or befriended. Soul is seemingly most appropriately perceived through image and imagination. Hillman argues that the medical positivisms and literalisms of science about the psyche need to be transformed into a psychology more appropriately characterized as archetypal, imaginal and imagistic, poetic and aesthetic.

Depth psychology is still articulating and evolving its models for understanding human experience. It does not need to retreat in current, collective institutional assumptions and notions of just what is science. Currently, Jungian psychology uses a number of models in its approach—phenomenological, typological, archetypal, mythological, symbolical, imaginal—to the phenomena of psyche and its nature. This is particularly true when studying religious experience. These are important contributions to a psychology of religion which is interested in introspective, imaginal study, and the articulation of numinous phenomena which exist and activate within the inner life of the individual. Imagination is of primary importance to a psychological approach to religious experience and a theology of depth.

CHAPTER 3

A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOUL

An aspect of the argument of this dissertation is that James Hillman is a phenomenologist of soul. This chapter begins to articulate what is meant by a phenomenology of soul and to demonstrate the characterization of Hillman as a phenomenologist of soul.

The term soul has not been a popular word in the early years of psychology. It was seen as obfuscating or confusing, especially in scientific circles. Depth psychology rediscovered and rearticulated the notion and phenomena of soul. Yet this field has always been under pressure from academic circles to be more scientific. Thus modern thinkers were uneasy with this term even though it eventually influenced the point of view and concerns of depth psychologists if only in a reaction to it. There is a history of depth psychology which is excluded from the official domains of academic and systematic psychologies. C. G. Jung is credited with reintroducing the word soul into psychoanalytic discussions. However it is the lifelong work of James Hillman which should be characterized as truly reintroducing soul and securing his place as a phenomenologist of soul.

In his doctoral dissertation, *Emotion* (1960), Hillman identified himself with phenomenology as he researched and analyzed the phenomena of ideas about what emotions are. There were various concepts about emotion, an aspect of the psyche which is central in discussions about the body-mind relationship. The concept of emotion is basic to analytical psychology as well as other forms of medical and psychiatric treatments. Hillman asked, "Can a unified theory of emotion be developed which might provide a basis for psychotherapy and find agreement among systematic psychologists?"

As Hillman elaborated his method, he concluded that the phenomenological method was the most direct. He alluded to both Sartre's and Husserl's approaches of going to the thing itself, "...the first and fundamental rule of the phenomenological method." (p. 9) Still the emotion "...appears unique and too personal, too spontaneous, too irrational for the methods which seek to fix it." (p. 12) Hillman used the

phenomenological method by "...turning directly to the theories themselves." (p. 18) He examined the phenomenology of theories of emotion. Hillman alluded to themes of theory and therapy since therapeutic methods emerge from theoretical explanations. Hillman exposed partial theories as well as partial therapies regarding the phenomena of emotion and notions about emotion. Hillman's dissertation concluded:

> ... The phenomenon of emotion is always partly outside consciousness. We can never know ultimately what emotion is, what it achieves or what sets it going. It remains a symbolic event; emotion is a 'gift' said William James. But not, as he said, a gift either of flesh or spirit, but a gift of both flesh and spirit. Thus its danger for a gift can be a curse or a blessing, or a blessing in disguise. It can never be altogether understood because the psyche as a whole is not grasped by consciousness alone. Emotion is always therefore a risk. To be known it must be lived. Perhaps this is why no matter how thoroughly amplified, the problem of emotion, theory and therapy, remains perennial and its solution ineffable. (*E*, p. 289)

When this dissertation was republished in 1992, Hillman wrote a new preface in which he noted the importance of recognizing

> ...that depth psychology begins where reason gives up, where mind is at the end of its tether and the irrational cannot be held at bay regardless of how tight the theory. It is at this point that we are left with the multiplicity of phenomenal reality that demands from us ever more gathering of evidence, hard thought, and imaginative speculation. ... (pp. xvi-xvii)

He described emotions as "states of soul" and as "the passions of the soul." These do not belong only to the field of psychology: "Literature, art, crime, politics, and social education are all theaters of emotion, to say nothing of the daily round of the family household." (*E*, p. ix)

Imagination as the Primary Activity of Soul

Hillman's psychology has been one which recognizes that imagination is an activity of soul and that the phenomena of images is a *sui generis* activity of soul. The phenomena of the image is the data which archetypal psychology attends to. Hillman alludes to Jung's identification of the image with the psyche ("image *is* psyche"—*CW 13*, §75). Soul is made up of images. For Hillman, soul

...is primarily an imagining activity most natively and paradigmatically presented by the dream. For it is the dream that the dreamer himself performs as one image among others and where it can legitimately be shown that the dreamer is in the image rather than the image in the dreamer. (*AP*, p.6)

Jung noted the priority in analytic practice of, "Stick to the image." (*CW 16*, §320) This has become an essential aspect of archetypal psychology's methodology. The image is the primary psychological data of archetypal psychology. Often, the metaphor of the craftsman is used to refer to the work with images—how well does the craftsman stick to the images? Psychic reality is our experience of our own unconscious, especially images. Fantasy images are the most basic level of reality. These images are the primary activity of consciousness and are the only reality we get directly.

Psychology as the Art of Soul

In introducing his anthology of Hillman's writings, Thomas Moore described James Hillman as "an artist of psychology." (*ABF*, p. 1) He noted that Hillman's writings are a challenge "to rethink, to re-vision, and to reimagine:"

... Hillman demands nothing short of a new way of thinking. He takes psychoanalysis out of the context of medicine and health, not only in the obvious ways, rejecting the medical model, but in subtle ways: asking us to give up fantasies of cure, repair, growth, self-improvement, understanding, and well-being as primary motives for psychological work. He is more a painter than a physician, more a musician than a social scientist, and more an alchemist than a traditional philosopher. (*ABF*, p. 1)

Moore noted a Mercurial element to Hillman's psychological theory and that Mercury was the god who dynamically moved back and forth between the realm of the divine and that of humans. Mercury is the god of communication and revelation mediating insight and meaning as something is looked at, reflected up, held and turned, and examined from various angles. Hillman's writing is mercurial in that:

... Hillman takes philosophy into his hands and speaks elegantly about it, but his words do not sound like philosophy. He speaks of religion in ways that worry theologians and devotees and yet give religious language new life. He takes up ancient mythology and alchemy and turns them so that they speak to the most recent concerns. Above all, he re-

visions psychology, taking it back from those who use it as a science of behavior, to treat it as an art of the soul. (*ABF*, p. 2)

Hillman's allusion to Husserlian phenomenology was noted above regarding his book, *Emotion*. Hillman had looked at his concern from many angles so that the phenomenon might reveal itself:

> ... He does the same with suicide, masturbation, depression, paranoia, betrayal, heart disorders, feeling, death, failure, growth, and love—all standard themes of psychology's discourse. Like an artist painting a still life, he allows phenomena to show themselves for our contemplation. When he thus presents something typically judged as evil or unhealthy, such as suicide fantasies, or paranoia, it is revealed more fully. We come to know ourselves, not through dissection and abstraction, but through this particular revelation of the psyche's nature. Again, Hillman's style may change according to the subject under consideration. Each phenomenon, each god, has his own rhetorical style and emotional tone. The subject has a say in the way it is written about. (*ABF*, p.4)

A Definition of Soul

As a phenomenologist, Hillman continued to address the notion and phenomenology of soul. Hillman's book, *Suicide and the Soul* (1964) is the first modern book on psychology to take up the notion and phenomenon of soul. Hillman mentioned that Jung's refusal to classify various sufferings of people as behavioral acts or medical / psychiatric diseases really had the virtue of recognizing the gross inadequacy of only outside descriptions. The patient really wants the analyst to discern and value experience and suffering from the inside. Such experience and suffering have always been associated with the phenomenon of soul which is not a scientistic term.

Science does not give a definition of soul. Rather, its meaning is given by its context which is its inside and is experienced and suffered. This must be understood through sympathy, empathy, and insight: "The root metaphor of the analyst's point of view is that human behavior is understandable because it has an inside meaning." (p. 44) The main concern of an analyst is to remember the interior meanings which are suffered and experienced. "Soul" can be amplified by other terms in everyday life which have long been associated with soul:

...mind, spirit, heart, life, warmth, humanness, personality, individuality, intentionality, essence, innermost, purpose, emotion, quality, virtue, morality, sin, wisdom, death, God. A soul is said to be 'troubled,' 'old,' 'disembodied,' 'immortal,' 'lost,' 'innocent,' 'inspired.' Eyes are said to be 'soulful,' for the eyes are 'the mirror of the soul'; ... The soul has been imaged as the inner man, and as the inner sister or spouse, the place or voice of God within, as a cosmic force in which all human, even all things living, participate, as having been given by God and thus divine, as conscience, as a multiplicity and as a unity in diversity, as a harmony, as a fluid, as fire, as dynamic energy, and so on. One can "search one's soul" and one's soul can be 'on trial'. There are parables describing possession of the soul by and sale of the soul to the Devil, of temptations of the soul, of the damnation and redemption of the soul, of development of the soul through spiritual disciplines, of journeys of the soul. Attempts have been made to localize the soul in specific body organs and regions, to trace its origin to sperm or egg, to divide it into animal, vegetable, and mineral components, while the search for soul leads always into the 'depths'. (*SS*, pp. 44-45)

Hillman is articulating something that cannot be defined empirically, "The soul is a deliberately ambiguous concept resisting all definition in the same manner as do all ultimate symbols which provide the root metaphors for the systems of human thought." (p. 46) His phenomenological work as a Jungian analyst can be glimpsed as he noted:

What a person brings to the analytical hour are the sufferings of the soul; while the leanings discovered, the experiences shared, and the intentionality of the therapeutic process are all expressions of a living reality which cannot be better apprehended than by the root metaphor of psychology, psyche or soul. (*SS*, p. 47)

Hillman noted that the terms *psyche* and soul can be used interchangeably. Actually, the term soul tends to keep an ambiguity which the more biological connotations of *psyche* miss. Soul also has more metaphysical connections sharing frontiers with religion.

Hillman's initial attempts to describe the phenomena of soul are refined in a later work, *Insearch: Psychology and Religion* (1967). He suggested that we only come to the phenomena of soul through a journey into the perils of depth, the lower positions of the dark, the down, and the deep. This way of descent means an encounter with much that has been repressed or denied in Western culture: "matter, physis, the female, evil, sin, the lower body, passion." (pp. 49-50) This is what psychoanalysis has called "the return of

the repressed." Hillman indirectly alluded to Paul Tillich's existential theology noting, "The way of descent may yield an encounter with the 'ground of being.'" (p. 50) We encounter the soul and its experience of God "via the unconscious, the shadows in counseling" (p. 50),

> The unconscious then is the door through which we pass to find the soul. Through it, ordinary events suddenly become experiences thereby taking on soul; through it, meaning becomes vivid again as emotions are stirred. And it is through the unconscious that many people have found a way into love and a way into religion and have gained some small sense of soul. This is confirmed again and again in analytic practice. Yet to look for the soul in the unconscious requires that we first find the unconscious. And since finding means recognizing, we are obliged to go over the simple empirical ground, the very basics of how we recognize that there is "such a thing" as an unconscious. We shall not establish its existence, nor the existence of soul either, by argument, by reading, or by any direct proof. We stumble upon it; we stumble upon our own unconscious psyches. (*IS*, p. 50)

These stumblings yield an experiential proof of the unconscious in our living experiences of forgetting and remembering, our habits, our physical stumblings, slips of the tongue, and the psychopathologies of our everyday lives. We see this as the constellation of personal complexes which affect our attention, behavior, and perceptions. We see this in our dissociations following trauma as well as in classic cases of multiple personality. You can say that soul is disguised or inherent in our experiences of unconsciousness.

When events happen to us which are beyond our conscious intentions and control, we stumble into soul. Our moods and emotional complexities, our ups and our downs, our affective experiences, all potentially lead us downward into the depths of ourselves and our ground of being. We need our symptoms so we can be led or lured toward depth and soul. Suffering takes us toward aspects of psyche which need to be befriended. In our nighttime dreams, we are living in a deeper existential reality.

Hillman's attempt at articulating the nature of soul was extended in his Terry Lectures at Yale University, which were then published as his groundbreaking work, *Re-Visioning Psychology*. He writes:

By *soul* I mean, first of all, a perspective rather than a substance, a viewpoint toward things rather than a thing itself. This perspective is reflective; it mediates events and makes differences between ourselves and everything that happens. Between us and events, between the doer and the deed, there is a reflective moment—and soul-making means differentiating this middle ground.

It is as if consciousness rests upon a self-sustaining and imagining substrate—an inner place or deeper person or ongoing presence—that is simply there even when all our subjectivity, ego, and consciousness go into eclipse. Soul appears as a factor independent of the events in which we are immersed. Though I cannot identify soul with anything else, I also can never grasp it by itself apart from other things, perhaps because it is like a reflection in a flowing mirror, or like the moon which mediates only borrowed light. But just this peculiar and paradoxical intervening variable gives one the sense of having or being a soul. However intangible and indefinable it is, soul carries highest importance in hierarchies of human values, frequently being identified with the principle of life and even of divinity. (*RVP*, p. x)

Hillman added several new articulations to this characterization of the phenomenon of soul:

In another attempt upon the idea of soul I suggested that the word refers to that unknown component which makes meaning possible, turns events into experiences, is communicated in love, and has a religious concern. These four qualifications I had already put forth some years ago; I had begun to use the term freely, usually interchangeably with psyche (from Greek) and anima (from Latin). Now I am adding three necessary modifications. First, "soul" refers to the *deepening* of events into experiences; second, the significance soul makes possible, whether in love or in religious concern, derives from its special *relation with death*. And third, by "soul" I mean the imaginative possibility in our natures, the experiencing through reflective speculation, dream, image, and *fantasy*—that mode which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or metaphorical. (*RVP*, p. x)

The Mytho-Poetic Basis of Mind

Hillman's archetypal psychology presupposes what he calls "a poetic basis of mind." This means that everything can be taken as poetry, as *poesis* (the Greek word for poetry). Hence all aspects of life and of dreams can be valued as poetry and as myth. This imaginative move frees consciousness from the confinements of literalism as the depths

are experienced. "Archetypal" characterizes this psychology as poetry. Images are sought out in events so that depth, meaningfulness, and sharper textures are noticed. The ancient Greek *archai* were the basic elements from which experience is constituted. So, archetypal comes to mean "imagined fundamentally." Soul is best served by an aesthetic approach. As soul manifests itself, it also desires to be reflected upon and has a desire to understand itself. It seeks its own logos or study. Psychology becomes the story of soul. Thomas Moore has noted:

> Metapsychology, or theory, for Hillman is not a quest for meaning beyond the soul's own imagery; rather, it is one of the ways of imagination proper to psychology. It, too, is poetry. Psychoanalytic concepts and ideas have to be heard as expressions of imagination and read as metaphors. And this approach performs a therapy on psychology itself, reminding psychology that it is not a science or a moral philosophy or a spiritual discipline. It is an imaginative activity of soul. (*ABF*, p.16)

Soul-Making

Since "image is psyche," soul-making is the ongoing fantasy activity of soul, an imagining, a crafting of images. This can take place as artistic creation but also as any activity imagined from the perspective of soul. A *psycho-poesis* happens when imagination engages the boundaries of the human and works with mythic dominants through the articulation of images. The intent of soul-making is the realization of images, "the individuation of imaginal reality." Soul-making sees and hears by seeing the image in the event:

> Imagining means releasing events from their literal understanding into a mythical appreciation. Soul-making ... is equated with de-literalizing—that psychological attitude which suspiciously disallows the naive and given level of events in order to search out their shadowy, metaphorical significance for soul.... So the question of soul-making is "what does this event, this thing, this moment move in my soul? What does it mean to my death?" The question of death enters because it is in regard to death that the perspective of soul is distinguished most starkly from the perspective of natural life. (*ABF*, p. 27)

Psyche's Inherent Multiplicity

Hillman's anthropology is not dissimilar to Jung's empirical understanding of the psyche. Hillman emphasizes the soul's inherent multiplicity: there is innate diversity in

human existence between people and within the psyche itself. Psyche's inherent multiplicity seeks a vision of the sacred which resonates with its own experience of itself:

> ... By starting and staying with the soul's native polycentricity, the multiple archetypal powers, psychology must always keep in mind the governance of the Gods. By keeping our focus upon soul-making, we cannot help but recognize that the Gods in the soul require religion in psychology. But the religion that psychology requires must reflect the state of soul as it is, actual psychic reality. This means polytheism. For the soul's inherent multiplicity demands a theological fantasy of equal differentiation. (*RVP*, p. 167)

The Gods are discovered as we recognize the stance of our perspectives and our sensitivities to those configurations which dominate our lives, thoughts, and behavior:

> ... Gods are imagined as the formal intelligibility of the phenomenal world, allowing each thing to be discerned for its inherent intelligibility and for its specific place of belonging to this or that *kosmos* (ordered pattern or arrangement). The Gods are *places....* By offering shelter and altar, the Gods can order and make intelligible the entire phenomenological world of nature and human consciousness. All phenomena are 'saved' by the act of placing them which at once gives them value. We discover what belongs where by means of likeness, the analogy of events with mythical configurations. (*AP*, pp. 36-37)

This placing means asking, "What belongs where, to which mythical pattern?" Each God has his or her own logos, logic, and necessity. There is an imaginal background to our vision of the divine. Gods are imagined through a specific archetype, such as the main image of God in our culture being imagined through the *senex* archetype, or the emphasis on home and family values being imagined through the Hera archetype.

In *Re-Visioning Psychology*, Hillman noted that his understanding is close to that of Jung's in considering the fantasy images in daydreams, nocturnal dreams, and unconsciously in our consciousness to be "the primary data of the psyche." (p. xi) Psychic images stand behind all of our experiences of feeling and knowing. These are the givens of psychological experience. These fantasy images allow access to our knowledge of soul. Fantasy-images are behind our psychic experiences and events. This is a psychology based upon a psychology of archetypal fantasies and images. This is Hillman's poetic basis of mind which informs an imaginal psychology which does not

start in the study of the brain, nor the biochemical processes, nor analysis of the structure of language, nor in other scientific or positivistic approaches to personality and behavior.

This chapter has noted that Hillman identified with a phenomenological method and how his interest in the phenomena of soul quickened. It has summarized Hillman's attempt to chararacterize and portray the phenomena of soul even as he noted the indefinable nature of soul. This chapter had begun to make the case that Hillman as phenomenologist of soul began articulations which have import for our human understanding of religious experience and the gods of myth personifying archetypal or transpersonal mythic backdrops for the polycentric nature of the human soul.

CHAPTER 4

MAJOR SOURCES OF ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOLOGY

The previous chapters have noted that Hillman's interest in the phenomena of soul began in his training and practice as a Jungian analyst. The intent of this chapter is to identify the significant cultural sources and influences from which Hillman's unfolding "archetypal psychology" emerged. The analytical psychology of C. G. Jung was central to Hillman's thought and practice, however, his theory and practice evolved from interactions with other cultural figures and fields. This chapter examines the question of what are the major sources of archetypal psychology?

James Hillman named "archetypal psychology" as such in 1970. He wrote an Editorial Postscript in *Spring 1970* (pp. 212-19) in which he introduced the term "archetypal" by contrasting it with previous terms used to characterize the psychology published in *Spring*—Jungian, analytical, and complex. The word Jungian meant many things to many people; it was derived from C. G. Jung's family name, but it acted like a symbol providing an emotional atmosphere around a professional, somewhat kinship community. "Complex psychology" was Jung's theory of the psyche based upon his Word Association Test, whereas "analytical psychology" was related more to the practice of psychological analysis. Hillman concluded that the earlier terms were somewhat "superseded by the concept of the archetype" as Jung developed his theory:

> ... The archetype is the most ontologically fundamental of all Jung's psychological concepts, with the advantage of precision and yet by definition partly indefinable and open. Psychic life rests upon these organs; ... and they are the operative agents in Jung's idea of therapy. This designation reflects the deepened theory of Jung's later work which attempts to solve psychological problems at a step beyond scientific models and therapy in the usual sense because the soul's problems are no longer problems in the usual sense. Instead, one looks for the archetypal fantasies within the 'models', the 'objectivity' and the 'problems'. Already in 1912 Jung placed analysis within an archetypal frame, thereby freeing the archetypal from confinement to the analytical. (*Spring 1970*, p. 216)

Hillman emphasized that, as with Jung, the archetypes are represented most adequately by myth. The mythical and the archetypal transcended the psyche, were not totally located in the psyche, but related to a realm beyond the human. Hillman concluded, "A true depth psychology is obliged by the nature of the psyche to go below or beyond the psyche." (*Spring 1970*, p. 216) Hillman's emphasis upon the adjective "archetypal" was his attempt to get out of so much "psychologizing"—the placing of too much responsibility upon the individual psyche. The archetypes are psychic structures in that the individual psyche is one place in which they manifest. However, the archetypes also manifest in history, myth, the psychoid realm, even the instinctual. The archetypal is not just to be recognized in personal biography and individual cases. The archetypal must be recognized in the realm of culture such as the arts and as well as in ideas. The difficulties of culture need to be addressed "...through the archetypal elucidation of its problems." (p. 217)

C. G. Jung as the First Immediate Father of Archetypal Psychology

Hillman acknowledged C. G. Jung as "the first immediate father of archetypal psychology." The following pages summarize places of agreement with Jung rather than Hillman's re-visioning of Jung's thought, which will follow in a subsequent chapter of this work.

Hillman has had a complicated relationship with Jung. In many ways, Hillman still is a Jungian. He was the Director of Studies at the Jung Institute in Zürich for twenty-five years. He uses Jungian terminology in his work. He has admitted wanting to value the empirical psychology of Jung without its Kantian metatheory. Hillman elaborates on Jung's central idea of the objective psyche—the collective unconscious.

On the other hand, Hillman is somewhat heretical in traditional Jungian circles. Thomas Moore noted:

> ... Many Jungian psychologists call Hillman a renegade, heretic, or not a Jungian at all. A clue to this apparent puzzle is the fact that he relates to tradition, including Jung, more with passionate engagement than with filial devotion.... By turning to Jung with precision and a comprehensive knowledge of Jung's extensive and intricate writings, Hillman engages Jung in a genuine creative dialogue. (*ABF*, p. 5)

Hillman has appropriated Jung's understanding that the psyche is multiplistic in nature rather than a unitary phenomenon. Jung's theory of complexes was an important contribution to any understanding of the unconscious since the feeling-toned complexes are the structural elements of the personal unconscious, which are related to the particularity of personal experience. Jung believed the complexes acted as "sub-psyches" or "splinter psyches" as they are characterized by spontaneity and a relative autonomy, almost acting as separate personalities. Jung understood them to be feeling-toned as they mediate much affect which colors a person's experience, perceptions, and understandings. At the heart of these complexes was an archetypal core. It may be said that "many persons" occupy the psyche, that there is a populated interior to the psyche. These complexes are representationally presented in the images of nocturnal dreams. Hillman agreed with Jung that there is no single personality but many personalities operative in the psyche. They are not the literal multiples associated with the Dissociative Identity Disorder of the *DSMIV*. This is not what Hillman would be condoning. Rather, he argued that there is no one partial personality such as the ego characterizing the whole psyche. Many autonomous personalities constitute the psyche. Multiplicity is the natural condition of the psyche.[1] This understanding of the multiplistic nature of psyche is important as it leads toward a polytheistic psychology which would offer various mythic backdrops and motifs to the complexities of the psyche.

Hillman appropriated a great deal from Jung's work. As a source of archetypal psychology, Hillman noted:

> ... From Jung comes the idea that the basic and universal structures of the psyche, the formal patterns of its relational modes, are archetypal patterns. These are like psychic organs, congenitally given with the psyche itself (yet not necessarily genetically inherited), even if somewhat modified by historical and geographical factors. These patterns or *archai* appear in the arts, religions, dreams, and social customs of all peoples, and they manifest spontaneously in mental disorders. (*AP*, p. 2)

Jung considered the archetypes *per se* not to be of the empirical world. Archetypes are not phenomena in time and space. They are more spiritual or of the *noumenal* world. They are never known or understood. However, for Hillman, the archetypal is always

considered to be phenomenal in nature. This departure from Jung sidesteps the Kantian idealism of Jung.

Jung reconnected psychology to myth. Hillman agreed with Jung that the language of the archetypal structures and patterns of the psyche are the metaphorical discourse, language, or stories of myth. It is in myth that we can recognize and study the universal, basic, formal patterns of existence. To know human nature one must study culture where mythic portrayals are manifested in religion, literature, art, drama, ritual, style, etc. Hillman described this move as "the poetic basis of mind." This is a move "... away from biological, socio-historical, and personal-behavioristic bases for human nature and toward the imagination." (*AP*, p. 3)

Jung made a radical distinction between the archetype *per se*, which was *noumenal* and not of the phenomenal world, and the archetypal image, which was a phenomenon existing under the conditions of human existence—time and space. Archetypes were *a priori*, inherent, and universal. Jung wrote, "Every psychic process is an image and an 'imagining,' otherwise no consciousness could exist...." (*CW 11*, §889) Archetypal images become the basics of fantasy. It is through archetypal images that we imagine the world and by which experience becomes understood. They become a means of seeing. They become governing fantasies by which consciousness is possible. This allowed Hillman not to be caught in scientistic and personalistic understandings or styles. It also allowed him to undermine the axiomatic assumptions in the field of psychology.

Jung valued the phenomena of images. He took the phenomena of images in dreams as being exactly what they appeared to be rather than searching for some hidden meaning to manifest dreams. Jung did not look for a latent dream. Jung noted, "To understand the dream's meaning I must stick as close as possible to the dream images." (*CW 16*, §320). This was also emphasized in archetypal psychology. Raphael Lopez-Pedraza echoed Jung's emphasis in his often repeated injunction to, "Stick to the image." This emphasis characterizes archetypal psychology's approach to analysis. In his essay, "The Archetypal School," Michael Vannoy Adams summarizes:

> ... In imaginal psychology, the technique of analysis entails the proliferation of images, strict adherence to these phenomena, and the specification of descriptive qualities and implicit metaphors. The method evokes more and more images and encourages the

individual to stick attentively to these phenomena as they emerge, in order to provide qualitative descriptions of them and then elaborate the metaphorical implications in them. As an analyst, an imaginal psychologist must be an imagist, a phenomenologist, and a metaphorician. (*CCJ*, p. 105)

Jung alluded to the archetypes of *senex* (Latin for the old man) and *puer* (Latin for the young man) but it became a central paradigm for Hillman. Hillman understood this archetypal tandem to be operating in contemporary thought. The *senex* characterizes a style of thought and of life related to history, tradition, order, the abstract, and depression. The *puer* characterizes thought and life colored by the present, adventure, futurity, the transcendence of the old and tradition. The *senex* might be identified with the actual and the *puer* with the possible or potential. Hillman suggested this archetypal tandem find reconciliation so that one does not dominate the other. This style can be seen in Hillman's writings about the phenomena of soul: he wrote with a love of tradition and footnotes, but his turns of imagination brought newness, animation, and resonance. Some writers have concluded that this archetypal tandem influenced Hillman's relationship with Jung as well as Hillman's ongoing revisioning of Jung. Moore noted the passionate engagement of Hillman and that Hillman was not an uncritical devotee of Jung's:

> ... Through his close, original reworking of Jung's thought, he stands nearer to Jung and more faithful to his spirit than do many of Jung's devotional followers. Hillman has made moves in each of Jung's major areas, from typology to alchemy and theology. He has also elaborated many of Jung's seed ideas for contemporary civic life and opened sources in the history of ideas, in the manner of Jung, that feed Jungian thought with new material. By turning to Jung with precision and a comprehensive knowledge of Jung's extensive and intricate writings, Hillman engages Jung in a genuine creative dialogue. (*ABF*, p. 5)

Corbin's Theory of a Creative Imagination of the Heart

Hillman's archetypal psychology is also known as "imaginal psychology." Hillman derived the adjective "imaginal" from the great scholar of Islamic mysticism, Henry Corbin (1903–1978). Hillman referrs to Corbin in *Archetypal Psychology* as "the second immediate father of archetypal psychology." (*AP*, p. 3) Corbin was a French scholar, philosopher, mystic, and author who interpreted Islamic thought, particularly Islamic mysticism via the Shi'ia branch of Islam. The so-called immediate fathers of

archetypal psychology, Jung and Corbin, were both participants and perrenial speakers at the Eranos Conferences in Ascona, Switzerland:

> ... The Platonist inspiration at Eranos, its concern for spirit in a time of crisis and decay, the mutuality of engagement that transcends academic specialization, and the educative effect of eros on soul were together formative in the directions that archetypal psychology was to subsequently take. (*AP*, p. 54)

Corbin appropriated a great deal of Jung's understanding, integrating many concepts from analytical psychology:

> ... Corbin extensively employed the technical vocabulary of Jung's Analytical Psychology, including such terms as individuation, archetype, mandala, quaternity, shadow, active imagination, Self, synchronicity, coincidentia oppositorum, and animus/anima. In a rather pure form, at least in the 1950s, he folded Shi'ism into the Jung cult, proclaiming in Jungian idioms that "to know one's self, one's soul, one's anima, and therewith all the universe of the soul, is to know one's Imam." His world of visionary forms was a veritable *Mundus archetypus*. (*AP*, p. 186)

Corbin articulated an Islamic understanding of imaginal phenomena. He wrote about the traditional cosmology of Islamic theosophers and mystics. He especially interpreted Persian visionary tales of spiritual initiation and practice by Islamic authors such as Sohrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi. Hillman adopts the term "imaginal" from Corbin's understanding. Hillman also concluded that the imaginal was just as real or more immediately real than any external reality. The images which emerged from the unconscious have an ontological status, a self-generative nature.

Tom Cheetham's recently published work (2003), *The World Turned Inside Out: Henry Corbin and Islamic Mysticism*, attempts to open up the rich scholarship of Corbin. Cheetham also reminds his reader that Corbin was more than a scholar: "He was an exponent of a kind of mystical theology that has seen its fortunes eclipsed by the rise of materialism and rationalism...." Cheetham notes two aspects of Corbin's work which are important for archetypal psychology: "...the rediscovery of the reality of the *mundus imaginalis* and the effort to loosen the grip of dogmatic monotheism on Western consciousness by disclosing the polytheistic faces of Divinity." (p. vi)

Corbin identified three worlds which have their own organs of perception—the senses, imagination, and the intellect, which correspond to the body, soul, and mind. There is a way between the Western dilemma of the empirical world and the world of abstract intellect. This middle realm is ontologically real, as much as our senses and our intellects. This is the world of the image. The imaginal world has a reality and order all of its own. This is an intermediate world constituted of images, which for Corbin is intermediate to the world of bodily sensations and the world of intellectual abstractions. This imaginal world of *mundus imaginalis* gives an ontological foundation for work with images. Imagination is freed from the matter / spirit dualism. This intermediary reality is known through the imagination. Reality is not liberalized as physical and intellectual phenomena. Imagination is a mediating place requiring its own styles and methods, which are not those characterized by intellectual or bodily sensation. Corbin understood that both the sensate and intellectual worlds had underlying imaginal foundations. Imagination is the main capacity and activity of the imaginal world. Here Corbin intuited a direct connection between the realm of the archetypes (*mundus archetypalis*) and the world of the image (*mundus imaginalis*).

As Corbin worked with Arabic and Persian texts and theosophies, he needed a term other than "imaginary." The imaginal is not the imaginary. He examined the narratives, visionary tales, and stories of "spiritual initiation." These were tales about the Gnostic experience, for instance the story of the Stranger or Captive aspiring to return home. This Captive in one story leaves the world of sensate experience. Topographies are explored in a visionary state, in "the country of the hidden Iman," or in the Spiritual City, which is not an imaginary city. It is a particular reality "Beyond Mount Qaf." Where it literally is becomes meaningless in that it has no sense in terms of sensate experience. This is not literal movement from one location to another. This is akin to leaving the natural world which hides a spiritual world of hidden and inner realities. This is a striving in a direction toward returning home. This internalization moves you out of external reality. Spiritual reality is found in the where, the where of all things, not in sensible space but in the topography of visionary experiences. The imaginal world is not restricted to the empirical world and the world of abstract intellect. The adjective "imaginal" points

to realities which are important for a recovery of soul as well as for a vibrant, imaginal spirituality.

Corbin knew that all too often we commonly make distinctions between the real and the imaginary as something unreal. We think that imaginary means the unreal, that which does not have being, that which does not really exist. Imaginary was too equated with the unreal, with something outside the framework of being and existing. In French, "imaginary" also connoted the utopian. The imaginal world has its own order of reality which makes a presentation. Corbin's conception of the imaginal is at the heart of his argument for the ontological reality of imaginal objects such as those of religious and visionary experiences associated with the religious experience and spirituality. This is an intermediary world of images with their own reality. They exist between the abstract intellect and bodily sensation. The organ which perceives its imaginative consciousness is the cognitive imagination. The imagination for Corbin is actually the knowing or the cognitive function of this intermediary world.

The idea of the *mundus imaginalis* was an idea which pointed to a field of imaginal realities. This field required methods and faculties of perception which are distinct from any spiritual world beyond the *mundus imaginalis* or from the ordinary empirical world of usual sense perception. This notion provided an ontology in which the archetypes of psychic experience could be located. The archetypes are the fundamental structures of the imagination. Imaginative phenomena go beyond the empirical senses in both appearance and value. They have a theophanic nature. They have a potentiality which is more than finite actuality. They appear in the imagination or to the imagination. Hillman emphasized: "... The *mundus imaginalis* provides for archetypes a valuative and cosmic grounding, when this is needed, different from such bases as: biological instinct, eternal forms, numbers, linguistic and social transmission, biochemical reactions, genetic coding, etc." (*AP*, p. 4) What is the organ by means of which the penetration of the *mundus imaginalis* is accomplished? How do we produce a movement from the outside to the inside? It is not by the senses nor by the intellect:

...it is the intermediary power which has a mediating role par excellence, i.e., active imagination. What is involved is the organ that makes possible a transmutation of inner

spiritual states into outer states, into vision-events symbolizing with these inner states. (*WWI*, p. 82)

.   ...spiritual imagination is indeed a cognitive power, an organ of true knowledge. Imaginative perception and imaginative consciousness have their function and their noetic (cognitive) value within their own world, which is...the *mundus imaginalis*. (*WWI*, 84)

Corbin argued that archetypal reality is accessible to imagination through its presentation as an image. The image is an archetypal presentation which is perfectly real. "This world requires its own faculty of perception, namely, imaginative power, a faculty with a cognitive function, a noetic value which is as real as that of sense perception or intellectual intuition." (*WWI*, p. 79) The method and procedure which emerges in archetypal psychology is imaginative. Its articulation is rhetorical and poetic. Hillman noted the implications of such a method for therapy:

...its therapeutic aim (is) neither social adaptation nor personalistic individualizing but rather a work in service of restoration of the patient to imaginal realities. The aim of therapy (q.v.) is the development of a sense of soul, the middle ground of psychic realities, and the method of therapy is the cultivation of imagination. (*AP*, p. 4)

The appearance of an image can be understood as a symbolic imaging a primordial phenomenon. This appearance or presentation is irreducible and unconditional and cannot manifest in any other way in our world.

Steven M. Wasserstrom's[2] recent work, *Religion After Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Corbin at Eranos* notes that: "Corbin, it should be added, also lived long enough to see a school of post-Jungian psychology, James Hillman's 'Archetypal Psychology,' substantially and explicitly be influenced by his thought." (p. 8) Wasserstrom describes Corbin as "a favorite theorist of poetics for decades" (p. 148) due to Corbin's argument for the ontological reality of the objects of visionary experience. He refers to the influence of three historians of religion—Eliade, Scholem, and Corbin. All three placed a primary emphasis on the symbolic imagination. Focussing on Corbin, he concludes that: "...his influence on post-Jungian psychological thought, through the agency of James Hillman, is without question the most pronounced such influence of the three." (p. 187) Wasserstrom's acknowledgment of Hillman's archetypal psychology attests to the argument of this work that archetypal psychology has

contributions to make in terms of a psychological understanding of religious experience and spirituality. But this recognition by Wasserstrom does in no way endorse or approve of Hillman, Corbin, or archetypal psychology.

Adolf Portmann, a Third Father

In the recently revised and republished version of *Archetypal Psychology* (this was originally an early article written for an Italian encyclopedia and then was expanded and made into a small book and published by his press, Spring Publications in 1987), now called *JH:Uniform Edition 1* (2004), Hillman noted a third father to be honored, Adolph Portmann (1897–1982):

> ...the eminent Swiss zoologist whose originality, judgment and inspiration led the Eranos conferences from the early 1960's until his death in the late 70's. Portmann's approach to biology opened the way to an aesthetic reading of life's phenomena. Form, color, pattern, movement, inter-relatedness reveal the self-display of animals as living images (Bleakley 2000; Hillman and McLean 1997). (*JHUE1*, p.71)

Portmann became the President of the Eranos Foundation in Ascona, Switzerland after the death of its Dutch founder, Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn, on Easter 1962. In 1964, Hillman became one of two silent financial backers of the Foundation (along with its Director Rudolph Ritsema, who, along with Eranos' founder, was also from the Netherlands). Later in 1967, the time of a lawsuit against Hillman in Zürich,[1] he left the Jung Institute in Zürich as its Director of Studies. However, he was welcomed at Eranos as a lecturer even after he was found culpable in the court case (Hillman first lectured at Eranos in 1966 and continued as a regular speaker until he withdrew his money from the Foundation in 1987). Over the subsequent years, Hillman's friendship with Portmann deepened through their Eranos relationship. The opportunity for Hillman at Eranos left the door open for him to continue a career in Europe and to be part of the Eranos *Tagungs* and the even more select group of Eranos advisors, informally known as the Eranos Round Table. Eranos gave him a distinguished forum and a continued influence in the world of Jungian psychology and ideas.

Portmann was born in Basel. He studied zoology at the university there. He later worked in Geneva, Munich, Paris, and Berlin. His focus was in marine biology, and he

headed a distinguished laboratory at the University of Basel. There he became a professor of zoology. His primary research focus covered marine biology and comparative morphology of vertebrates. Portmann took an interdisciplinary approach as he attempted to understand sociological and philosophical aspects of the lives of humans and animals. Portmann identified differences between animals and humans highlighting that humans are formed in a major way by speech. People can learn to be cruel to each other by being told what to believe and how to act. For instance they can burn churches or persecute others. Humans are products of speech. Portmann described animal passion, such as in intercourse, and contrasted this with our human needs for love, compassion, sacrifice, and the cultivation of noble feelings. For Portmann these were all interconnected. One act of animal passion could not be looked at without injecting these other human elements of our experience that are creations of speech.

Hillman was influenced by Portmann's empiricism in regard to images from the natural world as well as from the phenomena of dreams. Hillman noted that Portmann's "biology of living forms" contributed to archetypal psychology the understanding of "perceived presence as available inwardness." (*JHUE1*, p. 71) We need "an animal eye" and "animal body" to aesthetically perceive and then to aesthetically respond. There is a self-display of the "animal's inwardness." Archetypal psychology has relied on Portmann, as well as others, for understanding perceived presence as an available inwardness. This builds on the neo-Platonic notion of an inherent intelligibility of all things, which can be understood as a participatory awareness rather than as a detached consciousness often associated with the goals of psychotherapy.

The main characteristic of consciousness then becomes an awareness which participates aesthetically, and then the kind of consciousness identified with Jung's analytical psychology becomes secondary to this more immediate participation with imaginal presence and presences. For Hillman, in contrast to Jung, "Unconsciousness, rather than defined as unreflected, means isolate, anesthetized, unresponsive to affording images." (*JHUE1*, p. 71) The animal eye and the animal body make the world more immediate:

> The immediacy of the world afforded by the image to the animal eye and animal body
> bears upon other ideas important to archetypal psychology, e.g., Vico's *certum*,

Santayana's "animal faith," Grinnell's (1970) "psychological faith," and Hillman's ... "mythical certitude."

There is also a resemblance here with Levinas's (1969) immediacy of the face that evokes a compelling ethical response. Archetypal psychology embeds human existence within an animalized, animated world, not because the human has fallen into it owing to sin or is evolving out of it toward a higher condition, but because the psyche, as Aristotle said, is the forming idea of a living body. (*JHUE1*, p. 72)

Hillman was in a study group of colleagues for some years examining animal images in dreams. His essay "Going Bugs" was an echo of this earlier work on animal imagery. Hillman and his third wife, the artist Margot McLean, collaborated on a recent work, *Dreams Animals* (1997), with Hillman's commentary and McLean's paintings. This work portrays the presence of animals in our waking lives as well as our dreams and fantasies. The dedication of this book includes Adolf Portmann. Hillman notes how animals and their living images seem to wake up the imagination. Hillman seems to hint that we get more animal-like as we get into imagining

... You know, people come to therapy really for blessing. Not so much to fix what's broken as to get what's broken blessed. In many cultures animals do the blessing since they are the divinities. That's why parts of animals are used in medicines and healing rites. Blessing by the animal still goes on in our civilized lives, too. Let's say you have a quick and clever side to your personality. You sometimes lie, you tend to shoplift, fires excite you, your're hard to track and hard to trap; you have such a sharp nose that people are shy of doing business with you for fear of being outfoxed. Then you dream of a fox! Now that fox isn't merely an image of your "shadow problem," your propensity to stealth. That fox also gives an archetypal backing to your behavior traits, placing them more deeply in the nature of things. The fox comes into your dream as a kind of teacher, a doctor animal, who knows lots more than you do about those traits of yours. And that's a blessing. Instead of a symptom or a character disorder, you now have a fox to live with, and you need to keep an eye on each other. (*Dream Animals*, pp. 2, 5)

Hillman refered to Portmann in his Eranos lecture, "On Paranoia,"[3] as he discussed the necessity of a "de-literalizing therapy" of the word "revelation." He made the point that instead of revelation, there would be little movements from concealment

toward disclosure, within presentations, suggestive hints, in encounters which would allow partial absence or hiddenness:

> Revelatory visions and voices and truths, synchronistic moments too, then are recognized to be no more fundamental, no more superordinate – regardless that they come with a rush of splendor – than the immediate presence of aesthetic display. By this I refer to Adolf Portmann's *Selbstdarstellung* as revelation, here on earth everyday, the radiant shining in each thing as a *phainoumenon*, the affordance given by each event. Each event intelligible by its own affordance of intelligibility, the world as inherently intelligible in its aesthetic presentation, requiring no revelation for its divinity, no *sousterrain* or hiddenness for its meaning, no *Schlüsselerlebnis*, ("this intelligible event which makes all other events intelligible," Niebuhr, *The Meaning of Revelation*, 1941/1960, p.69). Exegesis then becomes, not a disclosing of hidden meaning, but rather a *poiesis*, a poetic working of the given in the enjoyment of ongoing imagining. (*OP*, pp. 44-45)

Hillman was elaborating on Portmann's understanding of self-preservation and J. J. Gibson's notion of "affordance" which is a theory of direct perception by living organisms of what is given in the displays of their environments.

Hillman made this elaboration in two Eranos lectures: "The Thought of the Heart" (*Eranos 48-1979*) and "The Animal Kingdom in the Human Dream" (*Eranos 51-1982*). Hillman was encouraging a "careful noticing of an awakened aisthesis," which is nothing other than "paranoid hypervigilance" which has "returned to sanity." This sensitivity would see the extraordinary otherness of the usual world. This has implications for a psychological understanding of religious experiences, perhaps a more super / natural understanding of the experience of religious revelation:

> Revelation, then, is always going on in display. It requires no literal witness, no special prophetic gift, only exegetical intelligence, that ability to read display, to sense beauty. No testimony, only a careful noticing, a considerate appreciation of "eachness" (Wm. James), each thing in its image, each word in its echo. To say it again: hiddenness is not an absence that becomes presence through revelation, the unintelligible made now intelligible, the invisible now visible. Rather, let us say, hiddenness is a category of existence, hiddenness affords depth, secrecy, inwardness, pregnancy, chambering, resonance, potential and death in any phenomenon, promoting attention to it, a studious

care, a rewarding watchfulness and an evaluation of any phenomenon as never what it seems plainly and sheerly to be. (*OP*, p. 45)

Hillman would like psychology to train its senses toward acquiring an aesthetic perception so that there is less separation from our world, our existence, and the mysteries of their presentations to our animal eyes so that our animal bodies can make a more aesthetic response.

Earlier Predecessors Influencing Hillman's Thought

Hillman extended the thought of his so-called three immediate fathers, Jung, Corbin, and Portmann. This placed his work on a basis which extends backward in time to thinkers and a tradition which have valued the notion of soul as a first principle:

> In extending the tradition of Jung and Corbin forward, archetypal psychology has had to go back to their predecessors, particularly the Neoplatonic tradition via Vico and the Renaissance (Ficino), through Proclus and Plotinus, to Plato (*Phaedo, Phaedrus, Meno, Symposium, Timaeus*), and most anciently to Heraclitus. (Corbin's works on Avicenna, Ibn'Arabi, and Sohrawardi belong also in this tradition...) (*AP*, p. 4)

This neo-Platonic tradition has been elaborated upon by Hillman and other archetypalists. There is a long history in the West of valuing a soul-centered life. The Renaissance tended to turn to mythology to gain understanding and insight. The philosophies of thinkers and healers such as Marsilio Ficino and Paracelsus inform Hillman's work. Their philosophies are imagistic and do not separate psychology from religion. Ficino, in the Florentine fifteenth century, understood soul to be in the middle realm between spirit in the upper realm and nature in the lower realm. In this neo-Platonic tradition, psyche was "the middle realm" of image and imagination between the realms of spirit / thought and nature / instinct / the material world.

Hillman's essay, "Plotinus, Ficino, and Vico as Precursors of Archetypal Psychology" (1973) began with C. G. Jung's 1909 dream where he descended to the ground floor of a house and found a mixture of Renaissance and medieval furnishings, and then a Roman cellar even deeper. Shortly after this dream, Jung read books on excavation and myths. He discovered the work of Friedrich Creuzer who had studied with Schiller. Creuzer had edited neo-Platonic texts. Creuzer arrived at a symbolic approach to

studies of religion and to mythology. Hillman concluded that Creuzer was a neo-Platonist as he valued "the ability to imagine mythologically, an art similar to that of the poet." (1973, p. 148) Neo-Platonists attempted to "show the symbolic spirit at work in natural events." Hillman noted that when Jung separated from Freud, this liberation from "personalistic and literalistic interpretation" was the equivalent of "seeing through the illusions of literal and personal reality in terms of archetypal verities." (1973, p. 148-9) In neo-Platonism, it was physicalistic and literalistic hermeneutics which created a blind eye. Hillman concluded that Jung shared an archetypal attitude with Creuzer, an attitude which Western tradition calls "neo-Platonist."

Hillman noted that Plotinus was "the greatest of the neo-Platonists," teaching in Rome from 244 to 270 C.E. Plotinus was not a direct source for Jung. Jung's medical empiricism may have been the reason as Plotinus was into spiritual, metaphysical, and theological philosophies. But Hillman suggested that Jung and Plotinus were both curious about the nature of psychic reality or the nature of soul. The *Enneads* of Plotinus were concerned about emotional phenomena. Hillman saw a parallel in Plotinus' understanding which paralleled the understandings of archetypal psychology. Hillman has noted that Plotinus also knew that "Man can act unconsciously" and that "Consciousness is mobile and multiple." (p. 150)

Imagination is necessary for consciousness and is central to soul. There are many aspects of our psyches which are unknown; and there is a multiplicity of consciousness such as Jung's dissociative theory of personality of the feeling-toned complexes. Years after this essay, Hillman used the terms "conscious" and "unconscious" in a different way than Jung. He eventually understood the conscious as "what we are aware of" and that the unconscious "is what we are not aware of." Hillman affirmed:

> Plotinus' psychology of consciousness is thus a true *psychology*, and not a disguised physiology in which consciousness derives from brain processes. This approach is characteristic also of Jung. Jung never stresses the separability of psyche from physiology, but he certainly never emphasizes the connection, attempting always to keep psychology from organological models. At the base of consciousness there are psychic (archetypal or primordial) fantasy-images. (1973, pp. 151-2)

It was Jung's belief in the independent power of the imagination which eventually drove his separation from the psychologies of both Freud and Adler. Jung wrote that, "Every psychic process is an image and an 'imagining,' otherwise no consciousness could exist...." (*CW 11*, §889) Jung defined "image" (*CW 6*, §743) in a manner which emphasized that it is independent from our perceptions of external objects. He suggested that these images or "fantasy-images" arise spontaneously from the inner aspects of imagination in a way which portrays the psyche as a whole.

Plotinus also spoke of the psyche as *anima mundi*, the collective *psyche* which was a part of the individual person. Both Plotinus and Jung shared this Platonic bias in which psyche can also be understood as independent of particular persons in particular bodies (the Aristotelian bias). Myths display both the psychologies of the soul of the world as well as the individual soul. Jung and Plotinus shared an understanding of soul as the primary metaphor.

Ficino, in this neo-Platonic heritage, called the ongoing work of soul a "perpetual ratiocination." He noted that soul is "ever-writing on itself," that psychologizing is "a perpetual operation." (p. 153) The activity of soul never comes to an end as long as the psyche exists. The implications of this are:

> Psychology itself then can come to no ultimate conclusion, no system, nor can it even make any statement that is for sure. Each dream interpretation, each psychological law, each insight is both an answer and a new question. And, all subjective psychologizing reflects the archetypal processes of the *mundus imaginalis*, so that the more imaginative – in actual images – is this psychologizing, the more basic it is and the more it truly reflects the psyche. (1973, p. 154)

So Jung referred to his theorizing as "mythologizings" which had an "as if" or fantasy quality to them. Jung took this neo-Platonic approach of symbolic perception as he linked "Gods" with diseases (*CW 13*, §54). This provided an archetypal mode for therapy with psychological suffering.

Hillman continued is this essay to identify the Mediterranean influences on archetypal psychology. Marsilio Ficino, who lived and practiced in Florence, was also a psychological author, "a kind of depth psychologist." (*LE*, p. 154) Ficino had translated

Plato and Plotinus and is part of the neo-Platonic tradition which places soul at the center of existence. Hillman alluded to this passage from Ficino's writings:

This (the soul) is the greatest of all miracles in nature. All other things beneath God are always one single being, but the soul is all things together...Therefore it may be rightly called the center of nature, the middle term of all things, the series of the world, the face of all, the bond and juncture of the universe. (*LE*, p. 155)

Ficino's psychological philosophy was based on "the introspection of interior experiences," which lead to the recognition of psyche's existence apart from the body. The mind is homed in the soul, which Hillman understood to be like Jung's *esse in anima*. (*CW* 6, §66, 77) This meant "being in soul." All that we know we know through soul as it is conveyed through the presentation of psychic images. Soul is everywhere, the always present faculty. It is inherent in both theology and the natural sciences, not limited to one academic department such as psychology. In his neo-Platonic understanding, Ficino saw personality as having three aspects. The rational mind was one. The realm of imagination and fantasy, which were linked to fate, was a second, and, the body, which links to nature, was a third. Hillman saw a parallel to Jung's understanding of the archetypal aspects of image and instinct. Fate can be effected by psychic images through which we find our myth.

Giambattista Vico, an eighteenth century Neapolitan philosopher, also stood in this neo-Platonic tradition. He had read Ficino's translations of Greek texts into Latin. Hillman believes that all three of these thinkers were psychological and that it was through Jung that we can recognize them as psychologists. Vico was valued as an "originator of humanistic method," which was both anti-positivism and anti-Cartesianism in nature. Vico used words like "*anima/us*." He understood the independent genesis of myth. Hillman values Vico as a precursor of archetypal psychology because of his elaboration of metaphorical thinking. As with Jung, this kind of thinking for Hillman is primary. Vico personified concepts as did Jung. He appreciated the universal images represented in mythology. He reached back to "the polytheistic imagination to be found in the neo-Platonic approach to the psyche.... These mythical persons are the archetypes, the meaphysical realities...." (*LE*, p. 159) Vico saw "poetical characters," which are like

the archetypes in Jung's recognition. Events could be redeemed by a recognition for what they essentially are by "reverting" them to the mythic causes, ideas, and patterns:

> The method called return or reversion (*epistrophé*) in Neoplatonism compares with what Vico called *"ricorsi"*. *Ricorsi* is not only the idea that history recurs and recapitulates itself in cycles. Psychologically, *ricorsi* is a *method* for understanding present events in terms of their poetical characters, their archetypal background. *Ricorsi* is a perspective, like Neoplatonic reversion, for seeing present historical events in terms of myths and myths in present historical events. (*LE*, p. 159)

The method of reversion was alluded to in the later work of Hillman, extended with the influence of Corbin, and discussed also in *The Dream and the Underworld*. Hillman noted these implications for archetypal psychology:

> The rectification and reversion process of archetypal therapy means approximating one's personal behavior and fantasy to an archetypal figure and process, to a myth in Vico's language, and to recognize all behavior and fantasy as metaphorical expression. It is one's understanding that is thus rectified by the image against which the behavior and fantasy is placed. The poetical characters provide the means for understanding the very widest range of human behavior, of human fantasy and human psychopathology. In the mirror of these images we recognize ourselves. (*LE*, pp. 159-60)

Hillman ended this essay by pointing to Jung's "Italian complex," his *lacuna* about Italy evidenced in dreams, behavior, and omissions. This research into "south of the Alps" may be necessary for broadening the field of Jungian psychology. There was a psychic complexity in regard to Italy which Hillman attempted to explore. Hillman noted the contrast of this "soul of the Alps" tradition with the more German background which influenced Jung such as Schopenhauer, Carus, von Hartmann, Kant, etc.:

> The downward direction may also be envisioned as Southward. Unlike the main psychologies of the twentieth century which have drawn their sources from Northern Europe – the German language and the Protestant-Jewish monotheistic Weltanschauung – archetypal psychology starts in the South. ...archetypal psychology situates its work in a pre-psychological geography, where the culture of imagination and the modes of living carried what had to be formulated in the North as "psychology." "Psychology" is a necessity of a post-reformational culture that has been deprived of its poetic base.

...archetypal psychology requires an imaginal location. Freud's 'Vienna' and Jung's 'Zurich,' or the 'California Schools' are fantasy locations, not merely sociological and historical contexts. They place the ideas in a geographic image. Such is "south" in the imagination of archetypal psychology. (*AP*, p. 30)

There was a different understanding of the unconscious in the "South" which Hillman noted as a specific geography related to space, culture, ethnicity, and symbolism. In identifying this cultural locus of the area, Hillman continued:

... It is both the Mediterranean culture, its images and textual sources, its sensual and concrete humanity, its Gods and Goddesses and their myths, its tragic and picaresque genres (rather than the epic heroism of the North); and it is a symbolic stance "below the border" which does not view that region of the soul only from a northern moralistic perspective. The unconscious thus becomes radically re-visioned and may as well be located "up north" (as Aryan, apollonic, Germanic, positivistic, voluntaristic, rationalistic, Cartesian, protestant, scientistic, personalistic, monotheistic, etc.). Even the family, rather than a source of 'northern' neurosis, can be revalued as the ground of ancestral and societal binding. (*AP*, p. 31)

Gaston Bachelard and the Natural Archetypology of the Imaginal

Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) was acknowledged by Hillman to be "...another major source of the archetypal tradition." (*AP*, p. 40) He certainly was a phenomenologist of the imagination. Bachelard was another influence upon Hillman's thought who gave images their ontological value. Bachelard exposed the conceptualization or intellectualization of image and metaphor, preferring instead to phenomenologically observe the activities which are characteristic of the imagination itself. Hillman similarly came to emphasize that the image has priority over concepts.

Bachelard is a well-known French scientist, psychologist, and literary critic. His influence has been wide, informing disciplines such as art, literature, language, poetics, philosophy, and psychoanalysis. He was the Chairman of Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the Sorbonne from 1940 to 1962. He was a French thinker who moved from the philosophy of science to a poetic analysis of the imagination of matter. His publications on the imagination of matter and the four elements included: *The Psychoanalysis of Fire, Air and Dreams, The Poetics of Space, Water and Dreams*. Other

works include: *The Poetics of Reverie: Childhood, Language, and the Cosmos* (1960/69), *The Right To Dream* (1970/1983), *On Poetic Imagination and Reverie* (1987) (a selection of writings published by Spring Publications), and *Fragments of a Poetics of Fire* (1988/1990).

Hillman was introduced to the work of Bachelard as he came to the Dallas Institute by Robert J. Sardello and Robert Romanyshyn. Sardello and Romanyshyn had been part of the Duquesne University community and were familiar with the phenomenological thought of Europe. Both were familiar with the phenomenological bent of Heidegger and Husserl. Hillman was familiar with French culture and speaks good French, so this was a natural kinship. Bachelard was a phenomenologist who had not been associated with the Nazi element in Germany, as had Heidegger. Hillman's presence in Dallas intersected with Gail Thomas and Joanne H. Stroud, both of whom were Founding Fellows of The Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture and financial backers of the translations and publications of Bachelard's works through the Dallas Institute.

Bachelard explored the experience of reverie which is not the same as nocturnal dreaming. Reverie is inseparable from one's personal past of memories and images and fantasies. It is also inseparable from one's language. Bachelard used a phenomenological method to explore the poetic imagination involved with reverie as well as literature. He paid particular attention to the poetic images imagined from a poetic perspective. His phenomenological requirement was described as:

> ...it returns to putting the accent on their (the poetic images) original quality, grasping the very essence of their originality and thus taking advantage of the remarkable psychic productivity of the imagination.

> ... Phenomenology, at least, is set up to consider the poetic image in its own being, distinct and independent from any antecedent being, as a positive conquest of the word. (*The Poetics of Reverie*, p. 3)

Bachelard studied poetic reverie. Poetry puts this on the right track because reverie as such seeks to become written. In reverie, images are created. Whereas psychology works between the contrasts of clear thought and nocturnal dream, Bachelard was looking at poetic reverie as a natural, spiritual phenomena which had a constructive

character as consciousness was somewhat solitary, relaxed, abandoned, in such a reverie. Reverie gives birth to the phenomenon of soul, and the consequential poetic image witnesses to soul discovering the world. Bachelard has incorporated some of Jung's psychology, especially the notions of *anima* and *animus*. He related these notions to the masculine and feminine nature of words.

Bachelard was impatient with any reduction of images into other realities such as the physical or conceptualizing psychology. He was critical of realistic or intellectualistic explanations. Images could never be fully encompassed or explained by psychology. Images required an ontology. There were metaphysical aspects to the poetic endeavors of human existence. Bachelard placed imagination on a transcendental dimension, to *a priori* conditions of human experience, in contrast to transcendent. Bachelard's study of the phenomena of imagination was summarized as, *"Imagination is a tree."* (*TR*, p. 300) Although material elements do not determine the tree, they are never separated from human imagination, dream, and poetic reverie and expression. The image can integrate the sky, the earth, reality, the ideal. Bachelard understood that there was a relationship between archetypes and actual experiences of life and the human imagining of experience.

Archetypal psychology also considers particular events to be imagistic. Since they are imagistic, they are ensouled, they have soul. Imagination is also understood as "...primordially patterned into typical themes, motifs, regions, genres, syndromes." (*AP*, p. 12) Psychic life is informed by such imaginal patternings. A French cultural analyst and Eranos lecturer, Gilbert Durand, deepened the thought of Gaston Bachelard. He and others have been examining "...the inherent organization of the imaginary as the basis of cultural anthropology and sociology, even as the basis of psychological meaning in all consciousness." (*AP*, p. 12) Durand published an article in *Spring 1971* on "Exploration of the Imaginal." He wrote, "The basic disease from which our culture may be dying is man's minimization of images and myths, as well as his faith in a positivist, rationalist, aseptized civilization." Too often, the modern mind has assaulted the image by reducing imagination to concept or the psyche to an epiphenomenon of perception, rationality, or reasoning. This is a devaluation of soul. Durand affirmed the counter-vailing movements

to this trend: Novelis, Coleridge, Bachelard, and Jung. Referring to the work of Corbin, Durand noted an intermediary world as the locus of image and dream:

> Beyond the transcendental self, beyond the self fragmented by existence, beyond the world of phenomena, another modality is revealed: the modality of the *mundus imaginalis*, that gigantic net, woven by the dreams and the desires of the species, in which the little realities of everyday life are caught despite themselves. (*WWI*, p. 60)

Durand concluded that the soul's integrity be valued. This is best done by allowing the images their own place and their own manner of existence. The images come complete and can initiate relationships far better than concepts. They display their own logic and imagining powers by revealing themselves as we explore the imaginal.

Bachelard's study of Isidore Ducasse, known by the literary name Lautréamont, and its publication, included an essay by James Hillman entitled, "Bachelard's Lautréamont Or, Psychoanalysis without a Patient." Hillman noted:

> Bachelard's approach implies a radical theory of psychoanalysis: that we can enter into the depths, the motives, the passions of a written soul without personal contact with a him or a her, that we can perhaps better know this person without knowing him or her personally, that there can be, in short, a psychoanalysis without a patient. (p. 103)

Hillman saw that Bachelard's analyses of the patient observed that imagination was present in the many complexes and in the images of poetic reverie. Complexes could be appreciated as indicators of how one embraces the world. Psychoanalysis must stay with the uniqueness of the image-complex and not violate the originality of the poetic image. Bachelard did a psychoanalysis of reveries and images. He did not psychoanalyze the imagination in a personalistic reduction. Hillman quoted Bachelard's conclusion to *The Psychoanalysis of Fire*:

> Imagination escapes the determination of psychology—including psychoanalysis—and constitutes a realm that is authochthonous, autogenic. We subscribe to this view: more than the will, more than the élan vital, the Imagination is the very force of psychic production. Psychically, we are created by our reveries. Created and limited by our reverie, for it is reveries that design the final confines of our spirit. (p. 108)

Another way of saying this is that you should not violate the originality of the poetic image by translating it into already known themes, motifs, or conceptual understandings. Our uniqueness is found in our complexes.

In the new "Postscript" to *James Hillman Uniform Edition 1* (2004), Hillman alludes to Bachelard:

> Finally, a psychoanalysis of the phenomenal world is based less on phenomenal method or on systems theory of interdependence than on the poetics of Gaston Bachelard. There is an elemental reverie, a mythical imagining going on in the world's stuff much as the soul of the human is always dreaming its myth along. Things transcend themselves in their affordances (Gibson), in their imaginings which poets from Wordsworth and Coleridge through Borges, Williams, Barthes, Ponge, Oliver, Blakeslee, and Bly (in his own work and his translations) make very clear. Things offer themselves as animals do to one another in their display. Substances themselves project upon each other according to the alchemical definition of projection. Not the human subject, but the images invent the ideas we "have." (p. 82)

The Jung Institute of Zürich

After marrying and living in Sweden for some months (he met his wealthy, Swedish first wife in a Paris cafe), Hillman is said to have gotten bored "staring at fish in fish tanks." He and his new wife then spent time traveling up the Nile to the Sudan, and then living in the Himalayan mountains in Kashmir, studying with the obligatory guru. He and his wife next went to Zürich as they had become aware of Jung and believed there was something in Zürich to do if not to learn. Jung was still alive and analytical psychology had not yet split into different camps. The Jung Institute was well-respected as a new institution in Switzerland.

Some of the first generations of "Jungians" were still present and conducting seminars and publishing: Marie-Louise von Franz was giving lectures on "The Problem of the Puer Aeternus," "Alchemy: An Introduction into the Symbolism and the Psychology," "The Feminine in Fairy Tales," all of which eventually were published. C. A. Meier was the Institute President. The students who came to study in Zürich had the sense that "they were witnessing the birth of something new and special." (Kirsch, p. 19)

Creative people were attracted to Zürich to be immersed in analytical psychology. Kirsch in his book, *The Jungians*, notes of Hillman's generation:

> ... The American students matriculated at the Institute, such as James Hillman, Marvin Spiegelman, and Robert Stein, complainingly and teasingly declared themselves "puers," which was evidence of immaturity, of not having grown up. It was a paradoxical situation, because on the one hand, living in Zurich was "provisional" and therefore *puer*, but on the other it was leading to meaningful work as an analyst. (Kirsch, p. 19)

Many of these students went on to publish and become prominent analytical psychologists as they emerged from Zürich as "the center of gravity in the Jungian world." Hillman became a leader in the field of Jungian training:

> In 1959 James Hillman, a young, brilliant, American student, who had received his Ph.D. at the University of Zurich and graduated from the Jung Institute, became the new Director of Studies. His doctoral thesis *Emotion: A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and Their Meanings for Therapy* was highly regarded and was immediately published, which happened rarely in the publishing world of those days. Hillman's wide-ranging intellect brought new ideas and lecturers from different fields to the Institute. (Kirsch, p. 20)

During this period of time at the Zürich Institute, Jung's influence lingered. There was a great deal of interest in archetypal symbolism. The mythological amplification and interpretation of dreams colored clinical training. As an early Director of Studies at the Institute, Hillman had a significant influence upon a new generation of students. Hillman's interests helped connect the Jungians with *Daseinanalyse* (the existential analysts). Some existential analysts began to invest in a Jungian analysis.

In 1967, Hillman was at the center of controversy where questions of boundary issues and violations were raised.[4] Hillman eventually resigned as Director of Studies at the Jung Institute. He stayed on in Zürich, continued his private practice, and began Spring Publications using the *Spring Journal* from New York as its base. "In 1970 the Analytical Psychology Club sold its rights to the journal and transferred them to James Hillman who, at that time, was living in Switzerland." (Kirsch, p. 65) In Zürich, from where he began to publish, Hillman used the press as a forum for his ideas. A number of future publishers in the field of Jungian psychology began their publishing careers as

editors working for Hillman at Spring Publications in Zürich—Daryl Sharp of Inner City Books, Murray Stein of Chiron Press, and Robert Hinshaw of Daimon Verlag.

Hillman brought the *Spring* journal to Dallas when he returned to the United States in 1978. He was its editor and publisher from 1970 to 1997 (although he had essentially turned it over to Charles Boer in 1988). *Spring* began to reflect the thoughts and concerns of Hillman's archetypal psychology rather than the previously classic Jungian essays and articles. Jay Livernois became the Managing Editor of the journal in 1991, eventually buying it from Hillman in 1997. Livernois has since transferred the *Spring Journal* and its book publishing to Nancy Cater of New Orleans, a Ph.D. graduate of the Pacifica Graduate Institute, where the focus continues to be on archetypal psychology publishing such writers in the field as David L. Miller, Ed Casey, Greg Mogenson, Wolfgang Giegerich, Lyn Cowan, Ben Sells, Ginette Paris, and Paul Kugler, along with an occassional article by James Hillman.

Karl Kerényi and the Study of Myth as the Center of Humanism

As Hillman landed in Zürich, he invested in private lessons on mythology with Karl Kerényi who was considered "the twentieth-century's genius mythographer." These lessons were an influence on Hillman's ideas. Kerényi was a Hungarian professor of philology and mythology who had been a refugee in Ascona during WWII. Jung and Kerényi had collaborated in elaborating on Greek myths, and Jung had Kerényi invited as a regular Eranos lecturer. Jung gained insights into the phenomenon of the transference by working with Kerényi. Jung and Kerényi seem to have had a high regard for each other.

Kerényi is considered one of the founders of modern studies in Greek mythology. He had studied classical philology completing a doctorate on Plato and Longinus as well as aesthetic theory in antiquity. He eventually became a professor of classical philology. He explored sites in Greece and around Ascona. He met W. F. Otto in 1929 and was encouraged to join studies of comparative religion and social history. His friendship with Jung brought to him an understanding of modern analytical psychology. He lived in Switzerland after 1943 and eventually became a Swiss citizen. He became a co-founder of the C. G. Jung Institute in Zürich.

Kerényi collaborated with Jung to make connections between Greek mythology and analytical understandings. They published *Essays on the Science of Mythology: The Myths of the Divine Child and the Divine Maiden* in 1949. They both wrote commentaries to Paul Radin's work, *The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology*. Kerényi wrote a series of book length essays on the archetypes in Greek mythology. The Bollingen Foundation published three of these: *Dionysus: Archetypal Image of Indestructible Life* (1976), *Eleusis: Archetypal Image of Mother and Daughter* (1960), and *Prometheus: An Archetypal Image of Human Existence*. Kerényi wrote other significant works on Hermes, Apollo, Athene, Asklepios, as well as other gods, goddesses, and heroes of the Greeks (the first three translated and published by Hillman and Spring Publications).

Hillman had quickly moved away from biochemical, social and historical, personal and behavioral understandings of human nature. He concluded that to study human nature, one needed to turn to the metaphorical discourse of myths. Myths were the irreducible language of archetypal patterns. He noted, "Support for the archetypal and psychological significance of myth, besides the work of Jung, comes from Ernest Cassirer, Karl Kerényi, Erich Neumann, Heinrich Zimmer, Gilbert Durant, Joseph Campbell, and David Miller," (*AP*, p. 3) and all except Cassirer were Eranos lecturers

In a 1998 book, *The Soul's Logical Life*, Wolfgang Giegerich (another lecturer from the Eranos Conferences who was encouraged and supported by Hillman in his writing and thinking starting in the late 70s to today) cites Kerényi as he asks, "Why Jung?" This question is articulated as Jung becomes Giegerich's starting point in arguing for a more rigorous notion of psychology. He refers to a posthumously published manuscript about "Contacts with C. G. Jung." Kerényi wrote the following in 1961, the year Jung died:

> If I now, looking back upon the phenomenon C. G. Jung, put into words what was most characteristic about him, also on the basis of personal contacts during the last twenty years, then it is taking the soul for real. For no psychologist of our time, has the psyche possessed such a concreteness and importance as for him. (*The Soul's Logical Life*, p. 39)

Giegerich remarks that Kerényi had written a quotation from Jung's *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* on the margin of his manuscript, "It was then that I dedicated myself

to service of the psyche. I loved it and hated it, but it was my greatest wealth." (*The Soul's Logical Life*, p. 39) Giegerich concluded, Kerényi valued that, for Jung, "the soul was a concrete and living reality.... Jung *for that very reason* stands out among all his contemporary colleagues. He and his sense of he reality of the psyche are singular." (*The Soul's Logical Life*, p. 40) Kerényi witnessed, in his own words, that Jung was the only one who "firmly believed in the existence of the soul." Kerényi would not have meant this in terms of a religious belief such as a creed or system, nothing to do with the problem of God's existence and nature. Jung had been gripped by both the experience of and the notion of soul.

Åke Hultkrantz's Study of Indian Soul-Beliefs

An early influence on Hillman was a dissertation by the Swedish ethnologist, Åke Hultkrantz. Entitled *Conceptions of the Soul among North American Indians: A Study in Religious Ethnology* (republished by Spring Publications as *Soul and Native Americans*), this 545 page tome was used at the Jung Institute in Zürich around 1961 as the subject of an analytical practicum while Hillman was Director of Studies. Hultkrantz had spent seven years in America examining Native American ideas about soul. Published in Stockholm in 1953 this became an important work for Hillman. It investigated understandings of the phenomenon of soul in Native American beliefs, and Hultkrantz managed to set aside the predominant Christian belief in a single soul as well as cultural value judgments as he summarized diverse and varied Indian beliefs about the phenomena of soul.

In his Introduction, Hultkrantz admitted the difficulty in defining just what is meant by soul, especially in light of separate traditions which were unable or unwilling to codify particular notions about the phenomenon. Indian cultures and legends attested to a "soul pluralism" which at times did come together in uniform doctrines. Hultkrantz noted, "Psychological soul pluralism also causes confusion between early concepts of soul." (p. 2) Dreams were often seen as adventures of the soul.

There was much evidence of soul dualism, especially between life-soul and free-soul. The soul seemed connected to bodily life having the nature of breath and associations with the heart. The soul was the body's psychic correlate. In some instances,

Christian influences were responsible for the development of a unitary concept of soul. Hultkrantz concluded, "In the end only careful examination of the patterns of Indian conceptions of the soul can help define the nature of the soul-belief in question. (p. 7) Soul-beliefs were aspects of questions such as, "What happens when a person dies?", "Are there post-mortal forms of existence?", and "How does spirit relate to soul elements?" Soul dualism constituted a psychological phenomenon which was universal with "a directness and an inner self-evidence." (p. 47)

Soul-beliefs included variations such as the free-soul, the shadow soul, the body soul, the life soul, the breath soul, and the ego soul. There were associations with the heart, brain and mind, and breath, "the mysterious force of human structure," "your body molded as a living man," "human heat." There were many instances of "the loss of soul." And soul was connected to the individual personality, additionally soul was often assumed to leave the body during dreams and then to experience the events of the dream. At death, soul departed and did not return.

Hillman was stunned by the different conceptions and variations of soul which Hultkrantz found among Native Americans. This was an early experience of thinking in terms of multiplicities. This influence can be seen throughout Hillman's thought which honors multiplicities. From this appreciation, Hillman eventually challenged the late Jung's understanding of the Self and his unitary interest in mandalas. Such understandings break down from the multiplistic perspective and understanding.

Spring Publications published Hultkrantz's work in 1997. Jay Livernois, managing editor of Spring at the time and general editor of the Spring edition, recently mentioned that Åke Hultkrantz is still alive. Livernois has also emphasized in personal correspondence that according to talks with Hillman, "He (Hillman) got the idea for a greater emphasis on the polymorphous nature of soul from Hultkrantz's dissertation." This emphasis on "the polymorphous nature of soul" suggests implications for religious studies, theology, and the psychological understanding of religious experience. Livernois remarked that, "Hillman has written on the ability of Christ to assume many different faces of God. This new gender / gay / homerotic / queer theology and various other images of God would just be a matter of course for Hillman who has noted the many takes on Jesus and the different roles he assumes through history."

Evangelos Christou and the Living Soul as Psychology's Focus

The early work of Evangelos Christou had an impact on Hillman. Christou was also a candidate at the Jung Institute of Zürich. Hillman and Christou became friends. Christou had studied with the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in Cambridge University. Christou attempted to think through a unique logic for psychotherapy which was separate from that of the natural sciences and from philosophy. Psychotherapy needed a logic suited to its own concern—the living psyche. He was attempting to articulate a meta-psychology emerging from the phenomena of psyche, finding first principles from the problems of soul. Psychotherapy should be the beginning point for psychology, and the logos of the soul should be observed and articulated from the phenomenology of soul itself.

In the early 1960s Hillman formed Dunquin Press. This was named for a peninsula in Ireland where Hillman vacationed: "A peninsula pointing across the Atlantic toward America, Dunquin lies at the farthest fringe of European civilization." When Hillman purchased and became the publisher of Spring Publications, the "rare monographs and translations, symbolism, and depth psychology" of Dunquin Press became the Dunquin Series. This included *The Logos of the Soul* by Evangelos Christou. Hillman introduced the monograph noting that:

> … It attempts to think through a fundamental logic for psychotherapy and to separate this logic from that of the natural sciences and from that of philosophy. Psychotherapy has its own legitimate area of activity and its rights are based on the soul which, like the realms of matter and mind, requires a logic of procedure, a book of words. The failure of psychotherapy to make clear its legitimacy has resulted in psychologies which are bastard sciences and degenerate philosophies. Psychotherapy has attempted to support its pedigree by appropriating logics unsuited for investigating its area. As these borrowed methods fail one by one, psychotherapy seems more and more dubious — neither good physics, good philosophy, nor good religion. Psychotherapists suffer from not being able to communicate about their area of reality in a scientific manner. (Christou, p. i)

This work took up first principles in a meta-psychology as Christou followed in Jung's attempt to take "psychotherapy as the starting point for psychology, and by developing his logos of the soul from the phenomenology of the soul itself … the psyche

is the first reality." (p. ii) Christou, as a practicing psychoanalyst, stayed with the problems of the living soul to discuss psychological reality, meaning, experience, verification. This posthumous publication was the only work by Christou who understood that psychology is the science of the lived soul. Christou's promising life and work were tragically cut short due to an auto accident in the Western Desert outside of Alexandria, Egypt. Hillman noted as the final sentence of his "Editor's Introduction" that within this work, "We are confronted with a *document humain* attesting to the mystery of the soul." (Christou, p. iv)

Christou's work and influence upon Hillman may have helped him to have found a way out of the problem Jung encountered, that of being torn between the religious / metaphysical on the one hand and the empirical / scientific / medical on the other. Hillman found a way out of that dilemma by seeing that psychology can indeed find its first principles within the phenomenon of soul itself, without having to turn to either philosophy or science for its staring points from which to understand or treat the difficulties of soul.

The concern which Christou articulated and struggled with, then picked up by Hillman, continues to be a contemporary concern. An editorial on the *New York Times* op-ed page which appeared recently (February 26, 2006) is entitled, "A Mind Is a Terrible Thing to Measure." It was written by Adam Phillips, a psychoanalyst and author of a recent book, *Going Sane: Maps of Happiness*. This article noted that recent trends in psychotherapy suggest it is a field under pressure to "...make therapy into more of a 'hard science' by putting a new emphasis on measurable factors." (p. 13) He noted:

> Given the prestige and trust the modern world gives to scientific standards, psychotherapists, who always have to measure themselves against the medical profession, are going to want to demonstrate that they, too, can provide evidence for the value of what they do.... Since at least the middle of the 19th century, Western societies have been divided between religious truth and scientific truth, but none of the new psychotherapies are trying to prove they are genuine religions. Nor is there much talk, outside of university literature departments, of psychotherapy trying to inhabit the middle ground of arts, in which truth and usefulness have traditionally been allowed a certain latitude.... (Phillips, p. 13)

Phillips noted that one of the good things psychotherapy can do is remind men and women of the limits of what science can do with their well-being, that the scientific method will never be sufficiently adequate for helping people work out their lives, character, and destiny. Much of human life is not predictable—love, sexuality, the gods and goddesses, loss and mourning, inspiration, suffering, creativity. The current attempt to make psychotherapy look like a hard science is a sign of "a misguided wish to make psychotherapy both respectable and servile to the very consumerism it is supposed to help people deal with." Phillips concluded:

Religion has historically been the language for people to talk about the things that mattered most to them, aided and abetted by the arts. Science has become the language that has helped people to know what they wanted to know, and get what they wanted to get. Psychotherapy has to occupy the difficult middle ground between them, but without taking sides. Since it is narrow-mindedness that we most often suffer from, we need our therapists to resist the allure of the fashionable certainties. (Phillips, p. 13)

These contemporary concerns echo the attempt made by Christou for psychology or psychotherapy to find its own first principles without appropriating from either philosophy / religion on the one hand and science/medicine on the other. Hillman's early book, *Suicide and the Soul*, made an attempt to find the root metaphor for psychoanalysis without appropriating other metaphors, methods, or first principles in fields such as law, medicine, religion, and social work.

Influences from the Eranos Conferences

The Eranos Conferences were created in 1930 by Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn at her estate, Casa Gabriella, on the shores of Lago Maggiore in Ascona, Switzerland. Frau Fröbe had been interested in the occult and religions, both Eastern and Western, spirituality, mythology, philosophy, and psychology. Starting in 1933, Jung was the dominating presence among the many presentors at Eranos. Mostly these were well known scholars such as Heinrich Zimmer, Louis Massignon, Martin Buber, Joseph Campell, Gershom Scholem, Paul Tillich, Henry Corbin, and Mircea Eliade. Frau Fröbe invented the legend that her idea for Eranos supposedly came after she "paid a call on the eminent scholar of religion Rudolph Otto." Otto never attended Eranos but this founding

fable of Eranos was told and retold especially after 1950 to gain distance away from Eranos' occult roots:

> ...he named it Eranos, stressing that it should always be a gathering place for psychologists, physicians, mythologists, theologians, and scientists to exchange ideas about their relative disciplines. This never really happened, for after Jung attended the first one, all other conferences, no matter what their ostensible theme, became a forum for analytical psychology, with him as its focal point. (Bair, p. 413)

However, in spite of this fiction, Eranos continued to be suffused with a distinct occcult sensibility besides its overt focus on religion, psychology, and culture. Participants came with interests in yoga, alchemy, astrology, Islamic and Jewish mysticism, the *I Ching* and Chinese philosophy (with its seven notions of the soul), Native American culture, etc. In addition Jung encourged Frau Fröbe to begin an archive of archetypal images which became the basis for what is now called the Archive for Research in Archetypal Symbolism (ARAS), in part paid for by Frau Fröbe's own money, then the Bollingen Foundation, and then a number of other institutes, including the Jung Institute of Chicago (through Fowler McCormick's patronage). These pictures and commentaries on archetypal images are now available on-line for analysts, academicians, and researchers in the fields of psychology, myth, and religious studies.

Hillman first lectured at Eranos in 1966 and throughout the 70s and 80s until 1987. In his Eranos lecture, "On Paranoia" (1986), Hillman noted that a critical motif in the Eranos community was the recognition that the interests of psychology and theology are inseparable. He noted:

> It becomes clearer now that we have had to enter theology in order to pursue our topic to its psychological roots – as did Freud..., as did Jung in his theological writings and his controversies with theologians. Psychology and theology need their inherent link, else theology loses soul and psychology forgets the Gods. This interpretation *is* the Eranos tradition since its inception with C.G. Jung and Rudolf Otto, continued by Gershom Scholem, Henry Corbin and Ernst Benz, and now by Ulrich Mann, David L. Miller and Wolfgang Giegerich. We may not divide psychology from theology any more than we may divide soul from spirit. (*OP*, p. 39)

Hillman pointed to the mysterious depth in the presentation of all phenomena, to what I prefer to call the super/natural aspects of life, which an aesthetic eye and heart may behold. It will be noted below that a primary recognition at the Eranos round table was the awareness that psychology and religion cannot really be separated from each other if in fact the common locus and concern is for a living psyche, the phenomena of soul.

Gershom Scholem and the Interest in the Esoteric

Gershom Scholem was another frequent lecturer at the Eranos Conferences. Scholem is responsible for the creation of the modern study of Jewish mysticism. He was a professor of Jewish mysticism at Hebrew University in Jerusalem until his death in 1982. He created the field of Kabbalah studies as a scholarly discipline and authored books which clarified the Messianic concept and analyzed its transformation in the Kabbalah (see *The Messianic Idea in Judaism*, *On the Mystical Shape of the Godhead*, *On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism*, and *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*).

Scholem did not have such an affinity to depth psychology as did Corbin. He did not use the terminology of psychoanalysis believing this would not be helpful. However, he did use the diad of conscious and unconscious, and he used the term archetype. He did believe there was an Hasidic predecessor to the concept of the unconscious, even as Jung had concluded that the unconscious was first identified by the ancient gnostics. There were rational and irrational trends in Jewish history. Scholem did not reduce the psychology of religious experience to psychological terms as that would be psychologism. The religious study of religion was more paramount to him than the psychological study of religion. Scholem acknowledged there was a realm of religious reality or experience in individual psychology accessible through psyche's depths, but this was not totally identified with the psyche.

Hillman referred to Scholem as a source in *Kinds of Power*. Thomas Cheetham cited this reference in his book, *Green Man, Earth Angel* (2005) as he discussed the experience of the world. According to Cheetham, our knowledge and our education can get in the way of our experience of the world. Education is training or technique, not really "an initiation into mystery." Cheetham noted, "James Hillman draws our attention

to an idea from Jewish mysticism: *tsim tsum*, Retreat, Withdrawal." (p. 10) Then he quotes Hillman:

> ... Since God is everywhere, the existence of the universe is made possible by a process of shrinking in God...God crowds out all other kinds of experience. He must pull back for the Creation to come into being. Only by withdrawal does God allow the world. (*Kinds of Power*, pp. 210-11)

Hillman's suggestion was that we let the world expand and not constrict our experience of the world with our rational and realistic understanding. The world can only shine forth as human control is withdrawn. It is in the mythic experience that our imagination can reveal the depth and mystery of existence. It is in imagination that the human meets the trans-human or trans-personal, those powers and spaces beyond our will.

Perhaps the following quotation from Scholem's work, *On The Possibility of Jewish Mysticism in Our Time* (where he discusses Mystical Psychology), might suggest possible influences on Hillman's thought:

> Suitable to its understanding of man is Kabbalah's mystical psychology. The various levels of the soul likewise emanate from a supernal source in the *sefirot* world. One should in particular note the *Zohar's* doctrine of the existence of an intuitive psychological power within man (the *nishmata kaddisha* or "holy soul," in the language of the *Zohar*), which is not part of the psycho-physical organism, but develops within man insofar as he is steadfast in acquiring and actualizing religious apprehensions and values. This holy soul contains the deepest religious consciousness. In this highest secret level of the soul, into which there shine the supernal *sefirot*, man connects with God via the *kavvanah* (intention) that penetrates to the depths of the Godhead and opens the sources of supernal plentitude which shine upon man, particularly during the time of worship. (Incidentally, this doctrine involves a substitution for and mystical reinterpretation of the medieval Aristotelian doctrine of cognition concerning the acquired intellect in man and its connection to the divine active intellect.) (p. 146)

An article in the *New Yorker*, "The Heretic: The Mythic Passions of Gershom Scholem" (September 2, 2002, pp. 143-48), noted Scholem's respect for the "transcendent nature of language" and his "leaping with scholarly ferocity into the hitherto untouchable cauldron of Jewish mysticism."

It was untouchable because it was far out of the mainstream of Judaism, excluded by rabbinic consensus. Normative Judaism saw itself as given over to moral rationalism: to codes of ethics, including the primacy of charity, and a coherent set of personal and social practices; to the illuminations of midrash, the charms of ethical lore—but mythologies and esoteric mysteries were cast out. The Zohar, a mystical treatise, was grudgingly admitted for study, but only in maturity, lest it dazzle the student into irrationality. ... Unlike Freud, who dismissed religion as illusion, Scholem more ambitiously believed it to be as crucial for the structure of the human mind as language itself.

... Scholem was divulging a tradition hidden underneath, and parallel to, normative Jewish expression. Below the ocean of interpretive commentary lay another ocean also of interpretive commentary, but in imagistic and esoteric guise. ... The position of classical Judaism was that the essence of God is unknowable: "Thou canst not see My Face." The Kabbalists sought not only to define and characterize the Godhead—through a kind of spiritualized cosmogonic physics—but to experience it. (pp. 144-45)

Scholem articulated Kabbalah as myth, apparently influencing Harold Bloom, Jacques Derrida, and others. When classical Judaism challenged Kabbalah as heresy, Scholem replied:

From the start this resurgence of mythical conceptions in the thinking of the Jewish mystics provided a bond with certain impulses in the popular faith, fundamental impulses spring from the simple man's fear of life and death, to which Jewish philosophy had no satisfactory response. Jewish philosophy paid a heavy price for its disdain of the primitive levels of human life. It ignored the terrors of which myths are made.... Nothing so sharply distinguishes philosophers and Kabbalists as their attitude toward the problem of evil and the demonic. (p. 148)

The mystical imagination had created a cosmology from its many experiences of terror. Things were not in their place. God too was in exile, but there was hope for redemption. Apparently, Scholem aligned this hope with Zionism, which he felt passionate about and supported while living in Israel.

Although it is difficult to identify any citations of Scholem's work or thought in Hillman's writings, it was through this encounter that Hillman got to know the Jewish sage character, his concept of God among Jewish theologies, and saw how this breaks down the constructions of divinity. Seemingly, Hillman was uncomfortable with

Scholem's more overt and enthusiastic Zionism, and not being a Zionist, may not have wanted to be associated with it too closely (It should be noted again that Hillman comes from a Jewish background, his maternal grandfather was a famous rabbi and one of founders of Reformed Judaism in America). Perhaps a clearer understanding of Gershom Scholem's influence upon Hillman's evolving thought could be obtained by a critical reading of Scholem's presentations at Eranos conferences at which Hillman may have been present.

The Dallas Institute and Phenomenological Interests

Hillman moved to the United States in 1978 and bought a house in the city of Dallas, Texas. He initially returned to become the Graduate Dean of Students at the University of Dallas in Irving, Texas. It was in Dallas that Robert Sardello introduced Hillman to a deeper understanding of the phenomenological work and approach of Gaston Bachelard.

The following paragraph described something of these years of Hillman's work and influence:

> Over time Hillman moved away from individual analysis and became more focused on broader disorders of the collective. He has since called this a "therapy of ideas" rather than of persons and has named it "archetypal psychology." Although "archetypal psychology" is considered by many to be a separate strand within analytical psychology, the fact that it is seen as a "disorder of the collective" has prevented it from developing an institutional base like the other trainings in analytical psychology. (Kirsch, p. 22)

Hillman understood that a metaphorical perspective could reanimate soul, even revitalizing aspects of life previously understood as not having soul. This included the bodily world, aspects of medicine, ecology and the world about us, architecture, food, etc. Referring to the work at the Dallas Institute, Hillman noted:

> ... These have all been examined as metaphorical images and have become subject to intense psychological revision by Sardello and his students first at the University of Dallas and subsequently at The Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture. The metaphorical perspective which revisions worldly phenomena as images can find "sense and passion" where the Cartesian mind sees the mere extension of de-souled objects. In this way, the poetic basis of mind takes psychology out of the confines of laboratory and consulting

room, and even beyond the personal subjectivity of the human person, into a psychology of things as objectifications of images with interiority, things as the display of fantasy. (*AP*, p. 23)

In "An Inquiry into Image" (*Spring 1977*), Hillman made an allusion to an influence from the Dallas community upon on his understanding:

... As Robert Romanyshyn has said, phenomenology and archetypal psychology need each other. Phenomenology needs the sense of mythic structures in the background and their deep values; archetypal *psychology* needs the de-literalizing, sometimes humorous, sense of metaphor in the foreground. So, too, the two senses of archetypal, descriptive and operational, need each other. Both occur together in images from which both derive in the first place. (p. 85)

Postmodern Conversations and Poetics

Hillman moved to Thompson, Connecticut in 1983. At the International Congress of the Association for Analytical Psychology in 1989, Hillman announced that he would no longer practice as an analyst but would deepen his career writing and lecturing. Although he continued to be an eminent figure in the Jungian world, his writings have become more popular to a wider readership around the world.

Hillman facilitated a Pre-Symposium Workshop at the August, 2000 International Symposium of Archetypal Psychology hosted by Pacifica Graduate Institute at the University of California at Santa Barbara on the overall theme of "Psychology at the Threshold." The title of Hillman's workshop was, "Archetypal Psychology: Retrospective and Recent Acquisitions." The description read, "A return to sources and an engagement with current extensions and criticisms." Hillman highlighted that his creativity had always benefited from collaborating with other men and women. He reviewed much of the retrospective sources summarized above as well as some of which follow. There were many conversations and seminal influences which Hillman was gratefully acknowledging. The following paragraphs note some of these influences.

A longtime collaborator of Hillman's was Charles Boer, a mythologist, poet, and Professor of English at the University of Connecticut. Boer is the author of several books of poetry, criticism, a translator of *The Homeric Hymns*, Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, and Marsilio Ficino's *Book of Life*. Boer has contributed to *Spring Journal* and was an editor

for it from 1988 to 2001. It has been partially through this friendship and collaboration that Hillman has come to meet contemporary poets and literary figures, deepening his American sensibilities. Boer helped Hillman broaden his understanding that focussing attention on the image can relate to contemporary poetry, with its wealth of imagery, to archetypal psychology. Hillman came to enjoy contact and conversations with a number of poets from Robert Creeley to Robert Duncan to Gary Snyder to Robert Bly and now his third wife's close friend, Mermer Blakeslee.

It was through Boer's influence (and Paul Kugler's, a former English major of Boer's at the University of Connecticut) which made Hillman aware of the work of the American poet Charles Olson. Charles Olson (1910-1970) is said to have actually coined the term "postmodern." Hillman never met Olson, but Hillman engaged with Olson's work in the 1970s when he moved back to the United States through his friendship with Paul Kugler and Boer who was close to Olson and became co-executor (along with George Butterick) of Olson's estate on his death. Olson in the 1950s was already talking about a "poetry of soul" while Hillman was immersed in the English Romantics or moderns like T. S. Eliot. Olson reached beyond the humanistic perspective toward the inhuman realm of the gods especially through his use of history and mythology in his poetry. Olson also had a notion called "objectivism" through which the objective world outside is also imagined and ensouled. The poetic image is not merely a subjective expression of the ego but rather it should be the basis for our human acts of knowing.

Olson had taken over the direction of Black Mountain College in North Carolina, and in so doing, influenced a generation of writers and artists. Robert Creeley (1926-2005) and Robert Duncan (1919-1988) were part of the group known as "the Black Mountain Poets" with whom Hillman came in contact through Boer and Kugler. The modern poet, William Carlos Williams (1883-1963), had influenced this group as he wanted to see poetry as "explorations" rather "than finished literary masterpieces." (*Spring 59*, "Preface")

The contributions of these American poets helped Hillman's move away from his eurocentric sensibilities and go more deeply into the American scene. Several conferences occurred in the Buffalo, New York area (1978 & 1981) organized by Paul Kugler, a Jungian analyst who practices in Buffalo. In 1983 Robert Duncan challenged

his audience with a piece entitled, "Opening the Dreamway," which intended to open up some dreamings in Jungian psychology following his reading of Hillman's *Re-Visioning Psychology* and *The Dream and the Underworld.* Duncan had heard Hillman lecture at the C. G. Jung Institute of San Francisco in 1979 on the latter work and in Buffalo in the fall of 1981 at the "Anima, Animal, and Animation Conference." In his essay Duncan addressed Hillman's desire to create a "poetic psychology."

Hillman collaborated with the poet, Robert Bly, and the storyteller and writer on myths and rituals, Michael Meade, in scores of lectures and conferences as well as the joint editorship of the poetic anthology, *The Rag and Bone Shop of the Heart: Poems for Men* (1992). Bly has authored, edited, and translated many works and collections of poetry. His book, *Iron John: A Book About Men,* was a significant influence on the contemporary culture via the short-lived phenomena of the mens' movement.

In the late 90s, Hillman walked the battlefields of the Civil War with his friend and long-time collaborator, A. K. "Kenny" O Donoghue. They have been filmed discussing "the blood in the land."

CHAPTER 5

HILLMAN'S RE-VISIONING OF JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY

The argument of this work is that James Hillman as a phenomenologist of soul has articulated a depth psychology which can contribute to contemporary understandings of religious experience. Few texts exploring a psychological understanding of religious experience fail to have a chapter on Jung and the significance of his analytical psychology for the psychology of religion. The argument can be made that Hillman, who has been characterized as Jung's "revisionist successor," deserves a significant chapter in such texts, not just for his revisioning of Jungian theory and practice but for unique contributions to the psychological understanding of religious experience.

Psychologists of religion have attempted to examine and understand religion in its breadth, diversity, and depth by using the perspectives of various psychologies. Psychoanalytic theories have postulated underlying psychological structures, processes, and complexes about basic human needs. Psychoanalysis has contributed a range of materials which lay at the interface or intersection between psychology and religion. Such writings by depth psychologists such as James, Freud, Jung, Erikson, and Allport, are an important part of the dialogue between psychology and religion as they join the interdisciplinary literature of philosophers, theologians, phenomenologists, and anthropologists of religion in the comparison of the varieties of religious experience. However, these points of views were articulated in particular historic contexts. Such psychologies of religion can become fixated or self-contained, closed chapters in texts. Once stated, they can become dogmatic assumptions which are literalized without subsequent research and revisioning. The field of psychology of religion suggests there must be multiple accounts for religious behaviors, that theoretical understandings may be partially correct, yet no understanding has total knowledge all on its own. We understand religious experience best by looking at it from different perspectives. There should be a toleration in the psychology of religion for subsequent amplifications and revisions of theoretical perspectives. New perspectives can stimulate and reanimate our thinking about religious experience. In a pluralistic, postmodern world, new understandings and

perspectives should be brought into discussion, deliberation, and debate. There especially needs to be nondogmatic psychological understandings which are nonsectarian; Hilllman's archetypal psychology is a fine example.

David M. Wulff's textbook, *Psychology of Religion: Classical and Contemporary* (1997) is a model of such tolerance for its deepening of older conceptions by new, diverse, and pluralistic expressions from contemporary psychological perspectives. For example, following his chapter on "Freud's Psychology of Religion" and his evaluation of it, he goes on in a subsequent chapter to discuss "The Object-Relations Perspective." An implication of this dissertation's argument is that authors in the field of psychology of religion, such as Wulff, should follow their chapters on the "Jungian and the Analytical Tradition" by a subsequent chapter on "Hillman and the Archetypal Approach" with its revisioning of Jungian thought and its own perspective on religious experience and spirituality.

Hillman's "Re-visions" of and Divergences from Jung's Analytical Psychology

Jung's psychology of religion continues to have an impact upon the field of the psychology of religion. However, there have been deviations from Jung's understanding of religious experience. Jung wrote his theories in the context of his day and age. There was a particular history of ideas from which Jung's ideas emerged. Jung conceptualized in a quasi scientific style following the Cartesian tradition of Western thought; Jung was in debt to Kant for his meta-psychological understandings. Yet, conceptual understandings change and evolve. New ideas may broaden, deepen, validate, or invalidate older understandings. All ideas should be understood as somewhat provisional in nature, that they can be subject to periodic re-readings, reinterpretations, and revisions. Hillman's work has been such an endeavor.

In introducing Hillman's work in, *Jung, Freud, and Hillman: Three Depth Psychologies in Context*, Robert H. Davis characterized Hillman's attempts to replace academic approaches to psychology with his archetypal psychology. He noted the different influences on Hillman than the ones on Jung, and the different context from which archetypal psychology arose:

... James Hillman is the only one (depth psychologist) who has largely escaped the criticisms leveled at contemporary scientists by postmodernists, probably because he never claimed to be a scientist. That refreshing fact alone would justify his inclusion in a book about depth psychology. Although he is a great admirer of Jung and of Freud and follows in their traditions, Hillman is the product of a different set of circumstances and intellectual influences. His writings reflect his poetic gifts and his affinity with Renaissance philosophers and the arts.

... Hillman extends Jung's ideas into new and largely uncharted waters. I say uncharted because I see Hillman as a truly postmodern Jungian analyst...and also because his basic premises leave him even more exposed to charges of polytheism and heretical tendencies than his predecessor was. Hillman is unique in the struggle to understand and adapt to the dilemmas posed by modernity. After deconstructing much of existing psychological theory, he constructs something entirely new and different, which paradoxically is also very old. He looks beyond and through the more established religions with which we are most familiar today, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, to ancient Greece, invoking polytheism with a refreshing in-your-face challenge to both monotheism and scientific materialism. At the beginning of a new millennium, he seriously advocates a return to the gods, goddesses, and myths of other places and times as a way to improve our understanding of the complexity of the human psyche. (Davis, p. 5)

It was not just Jung's analytical psychology which Hillman re-visioned; Hillman was interested in re-visioning psychology. Hillman's radical reappraisal of psychology means giving primacy to the ancient idea of soul as well as its phenomena. Hillman probably meant depth psychology by the generic name psychology. He was not interested in the other focuses in the wider field of psychology such as behavioristic psychology, developmental psychology, industrial psychology, experiential psychology, etc. His desire was to create a poetic psychology whose understanding of psyche as a mythopoetic phenomenon.

Hillman's revisionist project suggested dissatisfaction with psychologies without soul. What were these basic dissatisfactions? Hillman's early work boldly rejected the medical science / psychiatric / clinical models. He demarcated the root metaphors which inform approaches to such concerns as suicide, understanding of pathologies, and treatment modalities. Hillman understood psychopathologies to be natural psychological

phenomena so there was less pressure to cure disease. Hillman questioned both Jung's and Freud's aspirations and pressures to use the empirical method to make pretenses that psychology was a human science. Hillman came to use an imaginal approach through his understanding of psyche as a mythopoetic phenomenon. If psyche is image, as Jung concluded, then psychology needed a methodology which treated the imagination. Also, both Freud and Jung had structural understandings of the psyche characterized by centralized or integrative inner authorities such as the ego and the Self. Hillman's portrayal of psyche did not privilege such structures. Conceptualized structures became more relative as psyche was understood to be multiplistic, decentralized, and differentiated in its complexities. Hillman articulated what has been called a post-structural approach to the psyche.

Lastly, Hillman had no patience with orthodoxies whether they be in the fields of religion or psychology. His re-visioning was not an attempt to establish a new school of psychoanalytic thought. In his book, *Inter Views* (1983), Hillman articulated a desire to avoid another orthodoxy, "To set up a school creates immediately a new orthodoxy. We certainly don't need more orthodoxies." (p. 33)

Hillman became a revisionist of the Jungian tradition of analytic and depth psychology as he made deviations from Jung's understandings. What are the similarities and differences between Jung's thought and Hillman's revisions? The following pages summarize the critical diversions from and "revisions" of Jung made by Hillman.

A New Direction: A Poetic Psychology Rather than an Analytic Psychology

Hillman described his psychology as "archetypal" rather than "analytical." He demarcated depth psychology in terms other then the religious / metaphysical or the medical scientific / psychiatric. The work of Evangelos Christou argued for depth psychology and psychotherapy to find its own fundamental logic apart from philosophy and the sciences. Depth psychology needed to support its unique field of theory and practice by not appropriating first principles from philosophy, religion, science, physics, biology, etc. Jung had suggested that psychotherapy was the starting point for depth psychology, that the logos of the soul would be found within the phenomenology of the

soul itself. Christou searched for the logos of the soul, concluding it should be found within the problems of the living soul.

Hillman affirmed Jung's understanding that "image is psyche," and Hillman concluded, therefore, that psyche is a mytho-poetic phenomenon. Soul is constituted of images which come to have an ontological primacy in Hillman's psychology. Images are understood to have an autochthonous quality, independent of the subjective imagination which perceives them. Images are independent of ego subjectivity, coming and going, presenting and fading at their own will and spontaneity. Images become the fundamentals of psyche, therefore, of psychology itself. Images claim a *sui generis* authority and autonomy. So, the noetic and the imaginal are not contrary to each. Images and the heart are interdependent.

A Reinterpretation of the Archetype

Jung made a distinction between the nature of the archetype and the intrapsychic archetypal image. Jung believed that the archetype was ultimately unknowable, but a person could experience the image, result, or affect of the archetype. The image is the experiential expression of that which cannot be known and is a phenomenon of that which is inexpressible.

Hillman did not emphasize that distinction. Rather, he dismissed this arguing instead by saying that if the archetype is an unknowable, then what can we really say about it? We are better off focussing on the archetypal image itself. Hillman reinterpreted Jung's understanding of the archetype. Jung understood the archetype to be an objective, inherited pattern. This may not be known in itself and is contrasted with the archetype or archetypal image. Hillman used the term archetypal more in the sense of a depth response and appreciation of any image. Hillman's phenomenological viewpoint attributed the descriptive adjectives of Jung's archetypes—spontaneity, relative autonomy, and presentation—to the phenomena of images.

Archetypal psychology does not use the noun "archetype." It uses "archetypal" as an adjective. Here Hillman clearly departed from Jung's understanding. Jung believed that his distinction between the archetype and the archetypal image was parallel or comparable to the Kantian distinction between noumena and phenomena. This did not

work for Hillman since he was a phenomenologist of soul: he argued that all a human individual can ever encounter are images. In discussing opposites and "theoretical fascination with structure", Hillman reminded us of this phenomenological approach in saying,

> I'm simply following the imagistic, the phenomenological way: take a thing for what it is and let it talk. And if we're talking about depression, let the depression show all the images of depression, whether its saturnine depression or at the bottom of the sea with Dionysus or like Theseus sitting on a stone forever, heroic paralysis—so much to do, he can't move. Mars too has terrible depression: bitter, lonely frustration, like rust; or Hera, "the left one" as she was called—forsaken, all alone, who cares? So many styles of depression. (*IV*, p. 14)

The archetype as such does not exist for archetypal psychology. There is no *noumena*, no neo-Kantian categories or structures. Rather, the word "archetypal" is used to describe an operation, a perspective, and approach to the phenomena of the image so any image may be considered archetypal. You give value to the image in your move with the image. You give the image a certain typicality, value, or depth in your move with it. Capitalizing a word can connote such a valuation. The noticing of concrete, precise, specific, and descriptive qualities of an image can render it archetypal. No numinous, metaphysical structures are posited in this approach to the image. There are no archetypes *per se* standing behind and informing the phenomenon of the image.

An "Imaginal Cure" or a "Talking Cure"?

Psychoanalysis has been called "the talking cure." With a bit of wit, Michael Vannoy Adams has suggested that archetypal psychology emphasizes a "seeing cure." (*CCJ*, p. 104), that the visual is highlighted as much as the verbal. For Hillman and the archetypal psychologists, it was the eye of the imagination to see through the literal to the metaphoric or imaginal. In making this phenomenological move, there is also the opportunity to intuit or sense the mysterious which may be evoked in this imaginal method. The real is rendered imaginal, and the literal is poeticized or made metaphoric or mythic. This is a different approach than Freud or Jung where the id is made into ego, or the unconscious is made conscious. There are always metaphorical possibilities in that

which seems most literally real. This is true in both academic/scientific/medical understandings as well as in religious, theological, philosophical, or metaphysical notions.

Hillman understands imagination as reality. This is why archetypal psychology can also be called "imaginal psychology." Hillman appropriated his understanding from Corbin that the imaginal has its own ontology, that it is just as real as any aspect of external reality. The phenomena of images are given an ontological status just as is external reality. There is a *sui generis* autonomy, spontaneity, and presentation in all images. Jung had noted in *CW 16* that a person should "stick to the images." Raphael Lopez-Pedraza reemphasized this in the archetypal community to the point where it has become an adage of the imaginal or phenomenological approach to dreams. This emphasis on adhering to and sticking with the phenomena of images is a different emphasis than Freud's free association or Jung's technique of amplification. The imaginal method of archetypal psychology tends to evoke more specifics, particularities, metaphorical possibilities, and even more imagery as the analyst or practitioner keep their eyes of imagination on the specific descriptions, qualities, and metaphors in the phenomena of images and dreams. In archetypal psychology, the images are not understood as internalizations of external, object relations. The images cannot be reduced to aspects of outer reality. The imagination is understood to be primary, not secondary. There is no pressure to find external referents for images.

The "Imaginalized Ego" or the "Relativized Ego"?

The intent in a Jungian analysis is to enable the ego, the center of the conscious personality to individuate in relation to the emerging self (the ego as it is changed by relating to previously unconscious contents) or the archetypal Self (thus the capital s). Jung understood the psyche to be a self-regulating entity. There is a balancing of the one-sided or neurotic ego. At the heart of this self-regulatory process is what Jung called "compensation"—the tendency to counterbalance the lack of balance or one-sidedness between the conscious ego personality and the unconscious. Dreams are understood to have a compensatory nature and service for the individuation process. In analysis, the psyche has an opportunity to become more integrated, whole, or unitary. One

consequence in this compensatory process is what Jung called "the relativized ego." By making a place for other aspects of the psyche which have a relative autonomy and spontaneity, the ego's control over the psyche is relativized.

Hillman appeared to agree somewhat with Jung in terms of the imagination "relativizing" the ego in the analytic process (or out of the analytic process for that matter). The ego is loosened up, decentered, relativized by imaginal work. But, Hillman wrote of this, not so much in terms of compensation with its fantasy of opposites, but in terms of the ego being saturated in imagination. It is the imagination which imaginalizes the ego. You see this in dreams where the dreamer appears phenomenologically as an image in the dream. Then, the ego-image is part of a community, family, or group of images. All images are relative! The ego is one image among a number of images. The ego is not the only, nor central, nor controlling image, thus it is relativized by the imagination. The goal in the practice of archetypal psychology is not to strengthen the ego. The imaginalized ego sheds empirical illusions about its hegemony, domination, or centrality.

An Interpretive or Imaginal Hermeneutics?

Hermeneutics is the art of working with symbolic and imaginal material, usually understood as the art of interpretation. How do we sit with or understand or work with products of the human mind or of the psyche as a whole? Paul Ricoeur wrote a chapter in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences* entitled, "The Question of Proof in Freud's Psychoanalytic Writings." (1981/5) Ricoeur suggested that psychoanalysis has never quite succeeded in illustrating how its claims are justified, which then makes it hard for psychoanalysis to call itself a science. So, he asked, "What are the facts in psychoanalysis?" "What are the observables?" He proposed four criteria. The facts are psychological phenomena which are capable of being said. They are sayable in the analytic situation to another person. They are psychic realities, productions which fall between the imaginary and the real. They are capable of entering into a story or narrative, remembered adequately to be conveyed in a story. Ricoeur summarized, "the very specificity of the psychoanalytic 'fact', with its fourfold nature of being, able to be said, to be addressed to another person, to be fantasied, figured, or symbolized, and to be

recounted in the story of a life." (p. 259) It is the hermeneutical endeavor which then must respond to the psychic representations in regard to explanation and understanding.

Jung's intellectual and experiential aspects affected his analytical hermeneutics. His intellectual inclinations understood the observables in typifications, structures, or concepts which were too abstract, too general, too notional. On the other hand, his experiential bias led him to personify images and notions with concrete, specific, particularities. His interpretive methods were characterized by these inclinations. Jung's casual-reductive interpretation contrasted with his synthetic/constructive interpretation which cautioned against the reduction of images to the personalistic or individualistic past.

In contrast, Hillman's archetypal psychology was influenced by Bachelard's warning always to give priority to the image over the concept. Hillman's phenomenological method was not considered an interpretive or hermeneutic methodology (Adams, 1997, p. 108). Hillman understood hermeneutics to be too potentially reductionistic or of running the risk of conceptualizing the imagination. Images lose their particularities when interpreted in terms of abstract concepts and general structures of the psyche. Clinical hermeneutics tend to lose the particular and specificity, therefore the intelligibility of the image. Experience is too intellectualized. Hillman remained a phenomenologist who wanted to stick to the phenomena of the image or dream. His imaginal psychology sought to see and value the image's particularities, to avoid conceptual generalizing, even through the use of Jungian notions of ego, persona, shadow, *anima/us*, and Self. Michael Vannoy Adams noted this contrast by reference to Jung who said, "Water is the commonest symbol for the unconscious." (*CW 9i*, §40)

> ... Hillman (1975/1979) cautions against the interpretation of "bodies of water in a dreams" ... that is, to the specificity of concrete images. A hermeneutic psychology reduces plural waters, different concrete images (bathtubs, swimming pools, oceans), to a singular "water" and then to an abstract concept, the "unconscious." Imaginal psychology values the particularity of all images over the generality of any concept.... Waters in dreams or in active imagination may be as different as rivers are from puddles. These waters may be deep or shallow; they may be transparent or opaque; they may be clean or dirty; they may flow or stagnate; they may evaporate, condense, precipitate; they may be

liquid, solid, or gaseous. The descriptive qualities that they exhibit are so incredibly diverse as to be potentially infinite—as are the metaphorical implications. (*CCJ*, p. 108-09)

No Centralized Structure of the Psyche Is Privileged

Freud and Jung developed psychologies which hypothesized central authorities as structures of the psyche—primarily the ego and the Self. Many theories of personality emphasize a powerful, centralized ego as agent, decision-maker, aegis and locus of authority. Freud believed a strong ego was necessary to contain or control the id and all the irrational and unconscious forces in the personality. Jung agreed that the ego is at the center of the psyche yet it can be relativized in relation to the archetypal Self. Jung preferred that the center of consciousness move from the ego toward the Self as the more encompassing central agency of psyche. Jung privileged the relativized ego over a non-individuating ego; but he seemed to privilege the archetypal Self as the totality of ego and the unconscious psyche. The archetypal Self seemed more privileged that the personal ego. The ego still must play the role by knowing the Self via the ego-Self axis or dialogue. It is the ego which uses language, verbalizes whereas unconscious material is fantasy and what Jung called fantasy-images. In Jung's understanding, with all of its implications for a psychological understanding of religion, there is a big difference between the ego and the Self as Jung's Self is characterized by traits usually attributed to God or in Rudolph Otto's language, the Holy—transcendence, numinousity, ineffability, and those Kantian "things as such," beyond the phenomenal world dimensions. Jung's understanding of the Self was also associated with a God-image in the psyche. At best, the Self seems to lure or guide the process of individuation within a setting of the ego making choices.

In a typically postmodern challenge, Hillman prefered a less powerful and centralized ego, rather an ego saturated by imagination, or the relativized ego as image itself. Jung's understanding was too governing, controlling, or perhaps Christianized for Hillman, perhaps due to his Jewish background and understanding. Hillman marginalized both Jung's ego and Self for a psychology centered on the primacy of soul, a psyche which is multiplistic by nature. Robert H. Davis summarized (2003):

... The metaphor of Rome controlling the provinces in this chapter's epigraph is drawn from Hillman's *Re-visioning Psychology*. The image of ego as Rome characterizes

and dramatizes Freud's description of the role of ego as it seeks to control all of the actors and domains within the psyche. But the ego can lose control, and the psyche can fall to the invaders just as Rome did. The ego weakens, and the psyche goes to pieces. Controls break down, and when that happens we need to do more than strengthen the ego; we need another model entirely. Hillman calls for a return to Greece with its polytheistic approach. There is a need for new and different myths and images that recognize the diversity of personality, its multiple moods and emotions, its many faces, splits, and inconsistencies. Looking for and discovering the gods within the fragmented psyches of modern humans is the new task of depth psychology, according to Hillman. (Davis, pp. 166-67)

For Hillman, the ego was something to be "seen into" or seen around. Too powerful an ego gets in the way of the imagination's presentations, or you might say, as Adams does, the fantasy principle.

A Dismissal of Jung's Notion of the Archetypal Self

Hillman rarely alluded to the Self which was a central concept in Jung's thought. Jung spoke of the Self as the totality of the psyche, as an archetypal core of the ego, and as the archetypal images of an ordered wholeness of the psyche. Jung identified images of the Self, such as the mandala or sacred circle imagery in Eastern religions. Jung wrote:

> ... As an empirical concept, the self designates the whole range of psychic phenomena in man. It expresses the unity of the personality as a whole. (*CW 6*, §789)

> ... I have defined the self as the totality of the conscious and unconscious psyche, and the ego as the central reference-point of consciousness. It is an essential part of the self, and can be used *pars pro toto* when the significance of consciousness is borne in mind. But when we want to lay emphasis on the psychic totality it is better to use the term "self." There is no question of a contradictory definition, but merely of a difference of standpoint. (*CW 14*, §133)

> ... The ego is the only content of the self that we do know. The individuated ego senses itself as the object of an unknown and supraordinate subject. (*CW 7*, §405)

In Jung's understanding, the individuating ego sensed that it was a part of a larger entity of subjectivity: it was subordinate to a deeper or greater aspect of psyche which is characterized by a kind of transcendence. Jung preferred an understanding of the Self, which was based upon a single center. This can be seen as a monotheistic approach or

bias to the Self. Jung understood that statements about the transcendent reality are anthropomorphisms, that the image or idea of God are distinct from that inexpressible and unfathomable reality *per se*. Jung identified many God-images which led him to make mythological statements, but none of them was totally expressive of the immeasurable otherness of transcendent reality. Jung's psychology postulated a transcendent essence lying behind an image of the divine. That unknowable would be hinted at in the God-image.

Hillman appeared to be relativizing both Jung's notion of ego and of Self. It was not the same as Jung's relativization of the ego in the service of the Self or the totality of the psyche. Hillman relativized the ego to any number of archetypal forms or powers. Hillman argued for an approach which saw an essentially polytheistic, multiplistic, or multifocal nature to Self. Each fragment of the Self must be honored. In contrast to Jung, the ego was imaginalized against a polytheistic backdrop of many archetypal forms and patterns.

Pathologizing Is a Natural Function of the Psyche

In Jung's analytical psychology, an important psychological task was the confrontation with the shadow. The shadow was a complex which included all that a person did not wish to be. The shadow was what we refused to admit about ourselves. It had an archetypal core as did all complexes. This denied aspect of psyche could be characterized as either negative or positive, depending upon the ego's self-evaluation of itself or its own one-sidedness. For Jung, the shadow played an important role in the creative process, one of destruction and reconstruction, of sacrifice and reward, of death and of renewal.

Jung recognized the shadow elements of the psyche. However, as a psychiatrist there was always the curative intent. The shadow aspects of individual or collective lives were not necessarily Jung's starting points. Hillman, in contrast, always looks at the shadow dimension of anything, personally or collectively. Hillman had not been bound by a scientistic nor psychiatric approach to curing not having a medical or clinical background. If Jung was caught in a curative fantasy, Hillman was identified more with an embracing or befriending of our pathologies.

Hillman has attempted to mythologize our psychopathologies, in other words, to find a mythological backdrop to our individual sufferings or pathos. This was evident in the work he edited entitled, *Facing the Gods* (1980). Hillman's chapter, "On the Necessity of Abnormal Psychology," in its second paragraph began:

> Fundamental to depth psychology and to the soul is hurt, affiliation, disorder, peculiarity—"abnormal psychology." Depth psychology was called into existence as a treatment for abnormal psychology. Depth psychology was, and remains a *logos* for the *pathos* of the *psyche*. ... I would like to extend our concept of psychopathology by introducing the term *pathologizing* by which I mean: the psyche's autonomous ability to create illness, morbidity, disorder, abnormality, and suffering in any aspect of its behavior, and to experience and imagine life through this deformed and afflicted perspective. (*FG*, p. 1)

Many aspects of our culture deny the reality, existence, and necessity of abnormality or pathology. The religious community as well as the medical community characterize pathology as either sick or sinful, "wrong." Hillman argued that there is a necessity to pathologizing in the psyche. Pathologizing needed to be grounded within the archetypal. Hillman again in *Facing the Gods* (1980) alluded to Jung:

> Here we take our cue from Jung's: "The Gods have become diseases." Jung is indicating that the formal cause of our complaints and abnormalities are mythical persons; our psychic illnesses are not *imaginary*, but *imaginal* (Corbin). They are indeed fantasy illnesses, the suffering of fantasies, of mythical realities, the incarnation of archetypal events. (*FG*, p. 2)

Psyche produces pathologies. This is a natural phenomena, a normal aspect of the *psyche*. The medical model, which Hillman consistently rejects, suggests the pathologies be treated and cured. Hillman is not identified with this curative fantasy. If pathologizing is psyche's way of creating illness and abnormality, do we really want to relieve individuals of their symptoms? It is often through symptoms, such as difficulties in the realm of either work / vocation or love / *eros* / relationship which motivate men and women into some encounter with their own psyches. Again, Hillman's style was the mythopoetic approach rather than the clinical mandate or medical model of curing an individual of symptoms.

For Hillman, pathologizing was a way of soul-making. Everyone falls apart at some time or other. If we try to maintain a non-pathological persona, it fails eventually. It would be a work of fiction. *Psyche* has the capacity to spontaneously initiate illness, suffering, morbidity, abnormality, and symptoms. Professional agendas at aiming to relieve symptoms and to cure suffering are missing the mark. Hillman was aware of the "therapeutic fallacy" of a professional naming an illness or pathological syndrome, then taking credit for coming up with the treatment protocol or curative endeavor to relieve the symptoms. Hillman is aware that our pathologies open up awareness to the ultimate reality of death as well as depth.

A New Cultural Interest in the South and the Renaissance

Hillman's archetypal psychology has a "downward direction" which was envisioned by Hillman as "Southward." For the most part, psychology had found its precursors and appropriations in the "North:"

> ... Neither Greek nor Renaissance civilization developed "psychologies" as such. The word "psychology" and most modern psychological terms (Hillman, 1972c) do not appear in an active sense until the nineteenth century. In recognition of these historical facts, archetypal psychology situates its work in a pre-psychological geography, where the culture of imagination and the modes of living carried what had to be formulated in the North as "psychology." "Psychology" is a necessity of a post-reformationalist culture that had been deprived of its poetic base. (*AP*, p. 30)

So, the south, i.e., Mediterranean lands, became the imaginal location for Hillman's archetypal psychology.

The phenomena of soul are not merely envisioned from "the northern moralistic perspective." The implication of this preference was:

> ... Having re-oriented consciousness toward non-ego factors—the multiple personifications of the soul, the elaboration of the imaginal ground of myths, the direct immediacy of sense experience coupled with the ambiguity of its interpretation, and the radically relative phenomenology of the "ego" itself as but one fantasy of the psyche— archetypal psychology makes superfluous the move toward oriental disciplines which have had to be found in the East when psychology is identified with the perspectives of northern psychic geography. (*AP*, p. 31)

This understanding is important for a psychological understanding of religion and is a controversial deviation from Jung's psychology of religion. Hillman's version can be seen as a "phenomenological neo-Platonism." What is apparent in experience is real and existent. Knowledge of soul comes primarily through our experiences of the world and our imagining activity.

The *Anima Mundi* and a Depth Psychology of Extraversion

The archetypal psychology of James Hillman is not an ego psychology but rather a depth psychology and an imaginal psychology of soul. In Hillman's understanding of soul, it is an ambiguous term which defies any dictionary definition. In Neo-Platonic philosophy, soul was not just the intra-psychic province of an individual psyche. There was also a "world soul" called *anima mundi*. Hillman read this as "soul-in-the-world." *Anima* essentially means "soul." In archetypal psychology, there was the desire that an individual's ego or awareness descend into the unconscious depths (what is not known) in order to become animated and ascend to the world again with a deepening of both experience and an imaginal and aesthetic respond to the world with its soul. The purpose of analysis or therapy, or just working on yourself and the world, was a reanimation in contrast to Jung's goal of individuation.

Thomas Moore, a philosopher and friend of Hillman's from his Dallas days, popularized this aim of archetypal psychology in his best-selling works, *Care of the Soul* (1992) and *Soul Mates* (1994). There also is soul in the world. This is a different understanding from the philosophy of Descartes. His was a subject/object dualism whereby only humans have souls and non-human objects do not have souls. Hillman's archetypal psychology understood that all aspects of existence have soul, that they present an image. Our environmental world is not dead matter. Cartesian philosophy had led us to believe that the world is not ensouled nor animated. Archetypal psychology would analyze the world as much as individual psyches. Our world also needs archetypal therapy. This understanding can be seen in works by archetypal psychologists such as Robert Sardello in his book, *Facing the World with Soul* (1992).

In the last decade or so, Hillman has been articulating a depth psychology of extraversion. Archetypal psychology has encouraged a more active citizenry to assume

political responsibility. There are several areas where Hillman's thought has been embodied in the concrete understandings and actions of other archetypalists. One area has been that of race. Hillman has wondered why racism continues to exist. He wrote an essay, "Notes on White Supremacy: Essaying an Archetypal Account of Historical Events" (1986). There is an archetypal preference for white over black. So, you end up with "the fantasy of white supremacy." The challenge is to modify the racist imagination. Hillman noted that ideas of supremacy are "archetypally inherent in whiteness itself." (p. 29) He concluded that white racists are literalists who irrationally project some archetypal element in a literalistic manner for prejudicial purposes. Their white supremacist and literalistic projections must be challenged and re-visioned. It was a failure of the imagination which led to racism. This was a toxic and lethal aspect of our social lives which results from the fallacy of literalism.

Michael Vannoy Adams, who understands Hillman quite well, has also taken on this concern about racism. His book, *The Multicultural Imagination: "Race," Color, and the Unconscious* (1996) examined how the unconscious responds to the categories of color, looking at how the unconscious contributes to this dilemma in the soul of the world. Racism is an unconscious projection. Adams looked at the "raciality of the unconscious" and argued that psychoanalysts and psychotherapists in the present and the future must learn to be effective multiculturalists. Robert Bosnak is an archetypal analyst who has also been politically active. He has tried to understand a dream journal of an AIDS patient in *Dreaming with an Aids Patient* (1989). He has organized international conferences around themes of xenophobia, nuclear war, apocalypse, environmental crisis, jihad, and the millennium.

Hillman's understanding of the *anima* became more global than Jung's understanding. Hillman's emphasis upon *anima mundi* was not such a narrow reading as is Jung's. However, this awareness of the *anima mundi* and Hillman's depth psychology of extraversion led to the critique by some that archetypal psychology has displaced the traditional Jungian emphasis upon introversion in the individuation process.

Hillman's Divergences Have Implication for a Psychological Study of Religion

James Hall, a Jungian analyst, presented an essay at the 1979-81 annual meetings of the American Academy of Religion for a "Consultation on Jungian Psychology and the Study of Religion." Hall's paper was entitled, "Differences Between Jung and Hillman: Implications for a Psychology of Religion." Hillman was leery of too much concreteness in the ego, as did Jung. Hillman associated this with the ego-senex identification. In an essay critical of Hillman, Hall concluded that Hillman's difficulty with Jung's understanding of the ego was that Hillman read the phenomenon of the ego only as "a heroic ego."

Hall understood Hillman as trying to "see through" some of Jung's basic assumptions, that he was "trying to rescue Jung from the 'Jungians.'" However, Hillman may have been mistakenly "reifying" the ego, the collective unconscious, and the Self, then deliteralizing these notions:

> Hillman's massive detour is not necessary, for Jung himself offers a more subtle analysis of the problem. Jung sees *all* the world as primordially *unus mundus*, for which synchronicity is both personal and scientific evidence. Jung affirms that the world *is* and that one *is* connected to the image of God, through whatever convolutions of the psyche that connexion may be seen. The Christian world for Jung is anything but a sterile "monotheistic" tyranny; it is a still-unfolding archetypal movement, disclosing as-yet-not-anticipated mysteries. (Hall, p.159)

Hall worried that Hillman was not really rescuing Jung. Rather Hillman was confining and restricting Jung through too narrow a reading of Jung's psychology of religion. Hall offered up this summary regarding the differences between Jung and Hillman, which have significance for psychology of religion:

> Jungian psychology has become increasing important in conceptualizing a psychology of religion that appreciates the unconscious depths of the human personality. Because many persons approach Jung's thought through the writings of Hillman's "archetypal psychology," it is important to note significantly different emphases in Jung and Hillman. Although based on Jungian thought, Hillman's "archetypal psychology" stresses the phenomenological form of Jung's writings at the expense of Jung's lifelong concern to speak scientifically while remaining true to his clinical insights about the individual psyche. Jung showed great respect for the ego, for a personal standpoint in relation to the unconscious, while "archetypal psychology" places little stress on ego-psychology or the

related clinical concerns of healing. The Jungian concept of the Self, the central archetype of order, is the least empirical of Jung's structural terms but the one most related to religious experience. While largely ignoring the Self, "archetypal psychology" stresses a multiplicity of god-images presented as personified archetypes without the co-ordinating center of the Self.

Analytical psychology (Jung's own term) offers a wider field for understanding psychology of religion than does the constricted form of Jung's thought that Hillman has presented as "archetypal psychology." A clear understanding of Jung is essential to bring his thought to bear upon current questions of natural theology.... (Hall, pp. 159-60)

Overall, Hillman had moved many of Jung's ideas in a new direction. This yielded an archetypal psychology which is not religion, not philosophy and metaphysics, not a medical science or empirical psychology, but rather a philosophical aesthetics or poetic psychology. Hillman had moved Jung's ideas away from science and empiricism into the neo-Platonic tradition from which he psychologized myth and mythologizes psychology.

CHAPTER 6

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS

The argument of this work is that the archetypal psychology of James Hillman has made and continues to make significant contributions to both a psychology and a theology of depth. This chapter illustrates that it is the shared concern for the phenomena of soul where the interests of both psychology and religion intersect in their attempts at understanding, meaning, and appreciation of how deep mysteries of value, purpose, suffering, beauty, faith and love touch the uniqueness of psyche, whether encountered in the consulting room of an analyst or the office of a pastoral counselor. The word therapy has a lot of medical associations and connotations. It also has many religious overtones.

Early in his career as an analyst, Hillman tried to take back the mantle of healing, the care of soul, from both the medical profession and the church. He took that new path by affirming the reality of the middle realm of psyche as the realm of image and imagination in between the worlds of spirit (perhaps Church) and nature (perhaps not just body but also medicine). That intent is clear in *Suicide and the Soul* as Hillman looked for the root metaphor in depth psychology and the treatment of psychoanalysis. The analyst must stay connected to the reality of inner meanings associated with soul. The root metaphor informing analysis is to sit with the soul in the act known as "care of the soul:"

> The Greek word *therapeia* refers also to care. The root is *dher*, which means carry, support, hold, and is related to *dharma*, the Sanskrit meaning 'habit' and 'custom' as 'carrier'. The therapist is one who carries and takes care as does a servant (Greek = *theraps, therapon*). He is also one to lean upon, hold on to, and be supported by, because *dher* is also at the root of *thronos* = throne, seat, chair. Here we strike an etymological root of the analytical relationship. The chair of the therapist is indeed a mighty throne constellating dependency and numinous projections. But the analysand also has his chair, and the analyst is both servant and supporter of the analysand. Both are emotionally involved and the dependence is mutual. However, this dependence is not personal, upon each other. Rather it is a dependence upon the objective psyche which both serve together in the therapeutic process. By carrying, by paying careful attention to and devotedly caring

for the psyche, the analyst translates into life the meaning of the word 'psychotherapy'. The psychotherapist is literally the *attendant of the soul.* (*SS*, pp. 115-16)

Hillman addressed "The Practice of Therapy" in *Archetypal Psychology: A Brief Account.* He noted that archetypal psychology valued "the ritual procedures of classical analysis" even though these characteristics are not rigid—regular meetings, individual patients, face-to-face, at the therapist's locus, and for a fee. He defined classical analysis in *Loose Ends* as:

> ... a course of treatment in an atmosphere of sympathy and confidence of one person by another person for a fee, which treatment may be conceived as educative in various senses or therapeutic in various senses and which proceeds principally through the joint interpretative exploration of habitual behavior and of classes of mental events that have been traditionally called fantasies, feelings, memories, dreams and ideas, and where the exploration follows a coherent set of methods, concepts and beliefs stemming mainly from Freud and from Jung, where focus is preferably upon the unanticipated and affectively charged, and whose goal is the improvement (subjectively and/or objectively determined) of the analysand and the termination of the treatment. (*LE*, p. 101-02)

One underlying assumption in this practice was Jung's understanding of the psyche as inherently purposeful: all psychic events whatsoever have *telos.* Archetypal psychology did not literalize this meaningful intent apart from the images in which such *telos* manifests itself:

> ... Thus archetypal psychology refrains from stating goals for therapy (individuation or wholeness) and for its phenomena such as symptoms and dreams (compensations, warnings, prophetic indications). Purpose remains a *perspective* toward events in Jung's original description of the prospective versus the reductive view. Positive formulations of the telos of analysis lead only into teleology and dogmas of goals. Archetypal psychology fosters the sense of purpose as therapeutic in itself because it enhances the patient's interest in psychic phenomena, including the most objectionable symptoms, as intentional. (*AP*, p. 43)

An archetypally informed psychotherapy understands therapy itself to be the enactment of a fantasy. It tries to examine this fantasy, reminding itself of its own foundational notions.

Hillman published an article entitled, "The Fiction of Case History: A Round" in the book *Religion as Story* (1975). He suggested that psychoanalysis is a work first of all with imaginative "tellings," which should be interpreted as an activity in the realm of *poesis*. There was a persuasive power as imagination is made into words. Hillman wanted to examine the rhetoric and literariness of what was said. He wanted to understand the effects of speech on soul. Case histories are an aspect of psychology which could be understood as assuming the poetic basis of mind. Hillman alluded to some of Freud's literary devices. He suggested that Freud had one plot, the Oedipus myth. Freud and Jung turned to myth as plots are myths. Myths, though, are "the tale of the interaction of humans and the divine" (*RS*, p. 132):

> ... Once Freud and Jung took the step into understanding human nature in terms of myth, they moved from human nature to the nature of religious powers. The poetic basis of mind must be taken in the classical sense of *poesis*, as a *mimesis*, a making in the shapes of the Gods, and a making of our lives mimetic to them. The selective logic that operates in the plots of our lives is the logic of the mythos, mythology. (*RS*, p. 132)

Hillman went on to assert that case histories are fictions rather than literal accounts. They are invented accounts. They are fictions—mental constructs, fantasies by means of which we fashion or "fiction" (*figere*) a life or a person into a case history. So case histories have various styles, a variety of genres:

> ... And therapy may be most helpful when a person is able to place his life within this variety, like the polytheistic pantheon, without having to choose one against the others. For even while one part of me knows the soul goes to death in tragedy, another is living a picaresque fantasy, and a third engaged in the heroic comedy of improvement. (*RS*, p. 141)

Various archetypal powers can be at work in understanding cases and in formulating case studies. Saturn, Hermes, Dionysus could all inform narrative and plot:

> The idea that there is a God in our tellings and that this God shapes the words into the very syntax of a genre is not new in literary studies even if it might come as a shock to my colleagues who believe they are really only writing clinical accounts of facts. (*RS*, p. 145)

Rhetoric has a persuasive quality to it. Particular archetypes found in particular myths can affect our practices and our case histories. We can find these Gods in psychology by looking closely at the genres in case writing.

Hillman then went on to emphasize soul history rather than case history. A case history may be a biography of events. However, a soul history spontaneously invents fictions as it imagines and plays rather than reporting. The soul history seems to point beyond itself. A soul history is about inner experiences which are not made of literal truths. The outer events of a case history become inner experiences as they go through a psychological process whereby soul works on them in various ways—love, ritual, dialectic, mania, anxieties, creativity, fantasies. To become inner is to be opened up, opening something to insight:

> Hidden in this fantasy is a tenet of my faith: soul slows the parade of history; digestion tames appetite; experience coagulates events. I believe that had we more experiencing there would be need for fewer events and the quick passage of time would find a stop. And then I believe that what we do not digest is laid out somewhere else, into others, the political world, the dreams, the body's symptoms, becoming literal and outer (and called historical) because it is too hard for us, too opaque, to break open and insight. (*RS*, p. 150)

Soul has a deep-seated need for storytelling or for soul-making through the rhetorical "tellings," which go on in both analysand and analyst. This is psyche's need for *poesis*, for the making of stories. Soul-making is at the heart of psychotherapy. This yields a psychological faith in the intelligences in the genesis of dreams, fantasies, and images. A goal of therapy is an imaginal love:

> The work of soul-making is concerned essentially with the evocation of psychological faith, the faith arising from the psyche which shows as faith in the reality of the soul. Since psyche is primarily image and image always psyche, this faith manifests itself in the belief in images: it is "idolatrous," heretical to the imageless monotheisms of metaphysics and theology. Psychological faith begins in the *love of images*, and it flows mainly through the shapes of persons in reveries, fantasies, reflections, and imaginations. Their increasing vivification gives one an increasing conviction of having, and then of being, an interior reality of deep significance transcending one's personal life. (*RVP*, p. 50)

Hillman worked for years as an analyst but had an emotional and physical reaction to it. He admitted to a sense of inauthenticity to the work, and his world as a analyst broke down. However, he slowly found a new model:

> ... It was the coming together of, well, of my biography.... I imagined myself working in my room, like having a sculpture studio, and anybody who wanted to work with me in the studio could come and make iron sculptures with me. Fine, I'll show you how I do it, let's do it together, let's work on this; welding iron. It wasn't any longer "I'm curing your psyche," "I'm your analyst," or even "I interpret or counsel" or anything to do with therapy. Therapy was contained now in another fantasy outside of therapy, let's call it the "art fantasy," so that therapy was no longer literal. We're two people working together on psychic material, and that material is not our feelings, our transference, back and forth, because to identify psychic material with subjective feelings, no matter how intense, is just bad art. And bad therapy, too. I was beginning to see. In other words, I was finding a way of doing therapy with an artist's fantasy which didn't literalize either art or therapy—or the patient—and which allowed in even more feelings because they weren't so sticky, so overvalued. (*IV*, pp. 108-09)

Hillman's artistic and creative temperament quickened in midlife and asserted itself in his own work as a therapist and analyst. He seemed to integrate his literary inclinations with his love of psychoanalysis and therapy.

Befriending the Dream

The practice of archetypal psychotherapy encourages us to stick with the dream as an imaginal phenomena so that it moves the dreamer into new places as well as into depth. The important endeavor is to "befriend the dream" as you might get to know another human beings in his or her autonomy, spontaneity, and specific and particular presentation. This often means a cautiousness about interpretation, the translation of the dream into structural and conceptual understandings, and the avoidance of using the dream for practical applications for the conscious, daytime situation.

The phenomena of dreams are characterized by imaginal spontaneity, autonomy, presentation, and uniqueness. There are many possibilities in the interpretation or work with dreams. Each person or therapist sitting with a particular dream comes with unique presuppositions, assumptions, biases, and viewpoints about understanding a dream. To

practice a psychotherapy informed by Hillman's thought is to practice an art different from any psychotherapy which has a salvationistic coloring. The practice of analysis is not ego-strengthening nor moralizing. It is to practice image metaphorizing. It is to stick with concrete images and to be cautious about interpretation colored by abstract or structural concepts.

Michael Vannoy Adams recognized Hillman's ability to identify where we are unconscious, where our conscious personalities and egos are lax. The ego is where we experience "I-ness," and it imagines it knows when it does not know. However, the ego is also an image, an ego-image. This is who I imagine myself to be, but this fantasy of who I am is also the product of imagination, of a fiction, whether it be individual or collective:

> ... As Hillman redefines psychotherapy, it is not the translation of fantasy into reality but the translation of reality into fantasy. That is, by this definition, psychotherapy is a demonstration that what the ego takes – or mistakes – for reality is always already a fantasy, a rhetorical device, a poetic conceit, a metaphor. A "Hillmanian" psychotherapy is based not on any putative reality principle but on what I call the *fantasy principle*. (*FP*, p. 173)

The appreciation, use of the image, and the approach to the image, and the working with the image are at the heart of the practice of archetypal psychology whether in Jungian analysis, analytical psychotherapy, pastoral counseling, art therapy, literary work, and other pursuits outside of the clinical situation. In his early work, Hillman noted that the usual Jungian approach to the dream was well expressed with a term borrowed from existential analysis, "to befriend the dream:"

> ... To participate in it, to enter into its imagery and mood, to want to know more about it, to understand, play with, live with, carry, and become familiar with—as one would do with a friend. As I grow familiar with my dreams I grow familiar with my inner world. Who lives in me? What inscapes are mine? What is recurrent and therefore what keeps coming back to reside in me? These are the animals and people, places and concerns, that want me to pay attention to them, to become friendly and familiar with them. They want to be known as a friend would. They want to be cared for and cared about. This familiarity after some time produces in one a sense of at-homeness and at-oneness with an inner family which is nothing else than kinship and community with oneself, a deep level of what can also be called "the blood soul." In other words, the inner connection to the

unconscious again leads to a sense of soul, an experience of an inner life, a place where meanings home. (*IS*, pp. 57-58)

This is a phenomenological or aesthetic approach to the dream, and it is noninterpretive. There is an attempt to listen to the dream, to adhere closely with the specific images, to explicate the dream's specifics and particularities. The feeling tone of the dream is noticed.

Archetypal psychology understands that the dream is not literally mine. The dreamer's ego must be imaginalized, see that even the ego itself becomes an image in the dream. It is important for the ego not to stay locked in rigid ego attitudes such as literalism, naturalism, personalism, moralism. The waking ego needs to begin imagining in the likeness of the dream's own imaginal textures, moods, motifs, particularities, scenes and setting. Working with dreams analytically may well mean discernment and discrimination of both affect and intentions, but such work should attempt to stick with the imagery and the many meanings inherent in the images of the dream. There is an intelligence within the dream as a phenomenon, in its own individuality.

Hillman was dubious about "the hermetic task" being too much for the analyst. In other words, the burden of interpretation of dreams may actually get in the way of an archetypal therapy. Rather than emphasizing the talking to the patient, the analyst might well talk more to the images which are real. It is the mutual task in therapy to let the images have life by letting them speak. The figures in our dreams are real. The images have many of the characteristics which Jung attributes to the archetype *per se—* spontaneity, autonomy, and they make a presentation. The psyche is not unconscious but rather analyst and dreamer may not be aware. Consciousness floats back and forth in the analytic vessel. Consciousness may actually be in the image:

For instance, a black snake comes in a dream, a great big black snake, and you can spend a whole hour with this black snake talking about the devouring mother, talking about the anxiety, talking about repressed sexuality, talking about the natural mind, all those interpretive moves that people make, and what is left, what is vitally important, is what that snake is doing, this crawling huge black snake that's walking into your life...and the moment you've defined the snake, interpreted it, you've lost the snake, you've stopped it, and then the person leaves the hour with a concept about my repressed sexuality or my cold

black passions or my mother or whatever it is, and you've lost the snake. The tasks of analysis is to keep the snake there, the black snake, and there are various ways for keeping the black snake...see, the black snake's no longer necessary the moment it's been interpreted, and you don't need your dreams any more because they've been interpreted.

But I think you need them all the time, you need that very image you had during the night. ...because that image keeps you in an imaginative possibility... (*IV*, pp. 53-54)

Hillman asserted once again that the image has "...an inherent structure of consciousness that wants something from you ... calls you to it." The image is more inclusive than a conceptual understanding.[1]

Hillman made it clear that a dream does not have just one literal meaning. Rather, dreams are polysemous—they have many seeds of meaning. The dream is inexhaustible in terms of its potential meanings even though its presentation is filled with particularities, its own individuality. Hillman did not understand the dream in the usual Jungian move of compensation for the one-sidedness of the ego via the self-regulating psyche. Rather, Hillman placed the dream into connection with Hades, an Underworld mythic backdrop. There are hidden intelligences in the unfathomable depths of one's being. The work with dreams is to get to these hidden intelligences, that place of inner harmonies from which the dream finds its genesis. Hillman said that in experiencing this imaginal depth, we feel a love of the images:

Yet if we think back on any dream that has been important to us, as time passes and the more we reflect on it, the more we discover in it, and the more varied the directions that lead out of it. Whatever certainty it once might have given, shifts in complexities beyond clear formulations each time the dream is studied anew. The depth of even the simplest image is truly fathomless. This unending, embracing depth is one way that dreams show their love. (*DU*, p. 200)

Depth Through Archetypal Remembrance: Reversion and the Return of Phenomena to Their Imaginal Backgrounds

In working with dreams (or perhaps as dreams work upon us), a sense of depth can be accessed through an archetypal remembrance which has been called "reversion"— a returning of phenomena such as the images in dreams to their imaginal backgrounds or mythic backdrops. Hillman has described this move also as *epistrophé* Reversion or

epistrophé is a returning or a recalling of phenomena toward their imaginal background or depth. This is a valuing of imaginal phenomena, such as dreams and their images, in terms of their likenesses or resemblances. The principle of reversion is derived from the work of Henry Corbin. Hillman credited Corbin for the unique method of *epistrophé* known in Islam as *ta'will*. As noted above, Corbin was a fellow presenter and friend of Hillman at the Eranos gatherings. Corbin had also hosted Hillman's family in Tehran before the fall of the Shah of Iran. Corbin had worked with the method of *ta'wil*, trying to explain it and illustrate it in his works. *Ta'wil* meant, "to lead something back to its origin and principle, to its archetype." In *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi'*, Corbin wrote (as quoted by Hillman in his essay "Pothos"):

> In *ta' wil* one must carry sensible forms back to imaginative forms and then rise to still higher meanings; to proceed in the opposite direction (to carry imaginative forms back to the sensible forms in which they originate) is to destroy the virtualities of the imagination. (*ABF*, p. 59)

Hillman articulated this brief definition of reversion:

> Reversion through likeness, *resemblance*, is primary principle for the archetypal approach to all psychic events. Reversion is a bridge too, a method which connects an event to its image, a psychic process to its myth, a suffering of the soul to the imaginal mystery expressed therein. *Epistrophé*, or the return through likeness, offers to psychological understanding a main avenue for recovering order from the confusion of psychic phenomenon, other than Freud's idea of development and Jung's of opposites. Besides, this method has two distinct advantages. First, it makes us look again at the phenomenon: what is actually dreamed, actually stated, actually experienced, for only by scrutinizing the event at hand can we attempt to find which of many archetypal constellations it might resemble. "Which of many" is the second advantage: a single explanatory principle, regardless how profound and differentiated its formulation, such as Jung's Self and its opposites or Freud's development of the libido, does not offer the psyche's native variety a diversity of resemblances. Epistrophe implies return to multiple possibilities, correspondences with images that can not be encompassed within any systematic account. (*DU*, p. 4)

Epistrophé can be understood as imaginal memory, a kind which reflects our experience with many I's, complexities, and voices. There are many positions or

perspectives to live or speak from—the abandoned child, the warrior, the good parent, the wild woman, the energizing *puer*, the powerful *senex*. Various mythic perspectives give voice to emotional complexities which were earlier unexplained, or un-befriended emotions. We live in archetypal experience. Myth awakens us to the multiplicities inherent in our being. There is archetypal memory which lies deeper or behind our experience and our knowing. The gods and goddesses are valued as effective and affective presences within us, between us, and within our experiential world. Our archetypal memory is something like a deeper gravity which may offer some inner integration for our subjectivity with its complexities and unfathomable mysteries.

The method of reversion turns the dream back to myths beyond the dream or psyche's manifestations in external or social experiences. Mythic knowledge offers a vision which can restore dreams to a universal, profound "metapsychology of myth." Hillman has noted that all psychoanalytic approaches—Freudian, Jungian, post-Jungian archetypal psychology, use this method. Freud and Jung acknowledged this. But, they did not leave myth as myth even with Jung's personification of archetypes. They were not free of psychological conceptualizing. Myths were translated in superordinate principles or concepts. Dreams and images became examples of such principles. Dreams witnessed to this metapsychology. Hillman concluded that their *epistrophé* reverted to myths imagined positively—systematic, objectively established, and literally believed as true. Hillman emphasized that myth does not ground, it should open up. Myth helps us stay in the perspective of depth, of imaginal depth, with nothing more reliable under our feet than this depth itself. Image is psyche. It can only revert to its own imagining.

How do we keep the dream working in the soul itself? This is the big question of practice. Do we explain what a dream means? Do we treat its images as universal symbols? Do we encourage personal associations or articulate amplifications which dissociate the dreamer from the dream? Do we interpret it positivistically or personalistically as omens for the conscious daylight hours?

Myth helps us honor the fathomless depth of a particular image. Dreams show their love through this unending, fathomless depth. We want to encourage more inquiry, hard imaginal work, intuiting more possibilities and depth. Dreaming is the psyche doing its own soul-work. Mythological knowledge helps us interpret our own dreams as well as

those of our analysands. Aristotle was to have said, "The most skillful interpreter of dream is he who has the facility of observing resemblances." When we ask the question, "What does the dream or its images resemble?", a familiarity with myth can be helpful in seeing correspondences.

The method of reversion informed by mythological literacy (Michael Vannoy Adam's term) is helpful for our work of "seeing through", of "de-literalizing." Many issues in working with dreams (such as whether an image is to be understood via an objective nor subjective interpretation) cannot be understood or be resolved by one-sided interpretations, or by personalistic reductions into "me," or even by archetypal reversion or *epistrophe* to spirits without loosing the in-between world of soul. Reversion is a method which enables our work with dreams to move deeper than the literal, into the imaginal or metaphoric, toward the deeper mysteries from which symbols and images are generated. We learn to read dreams less in the service of life and more in the service of psyche with its underworld depth or dimension within each complex, in its depth where it touches the mystery of death, where it is truly found. Mythic knowledge helps us protect the depths from which dreams arise, the hidden invisibilities that govern our lives.

Aesthetics as "The Royal Road"
—Hillman's Imaginal Method and the "Image Essays"

At the heart of archetypal practice and work with dreams and images is an imaginal method. If psyche is image, then sitting with or attending to the psyche or soul involves an imaginal, poetic, aesthetic, or phenomenological approach to the observables of the psyche. Hillman liked the word soul since it slips away from reductionist definitions, goals, and intentions. It keeps the mystery alive, thus keeping archetypal psychology, in the tradition of depth psychology's references to and respect for depth and mystery. The imaginal approach understands that there is an imaginal world (*a la* Corbin) whose integrity and self-generativity should be respected. There is a hesitancy to translate image and dream into concepts, ideations, humanistic and therapeutic intentions. Heroic attempts at interpretation wound the imagination. The soul has a kind of primacy rather than the ego-building associated with my therapeutic approaches.

The following is perhaps the most important experience in my analytical training at the C. G. Jung Institute of Chicago. My analyst at the time was teaching a course on Archetypal Psychology the evening following my analytic session. I had worked with two dreams, one perhaps with several male figures, one perhaps with feminine images. My analyst asked if I would mind his using my two dreams as grist for this course with my peers in training. I agreed in that he assured me of confidentiality regarding the dreamer, and I agreed, because I trusted my fellow candidates in our peer learning community.

In class the images of my dreams were noted on a blackboard. My colleagues began to approach the dreams with their interpretive lenses. The candidate who had been reading Kohut saw a grandiose child. The colleague who had been reading Jung saw an *anima* figure. As my fellow students made their moves upon my dreams, I had an autonomous bodily reaction. I could barely breathe. My heartbeat slowed. Something inside me was reacting to what felt like a violation, a rape of the dream and its images. I had made sense of this exercise consciously. It was an unconscious element generating my reaction. Eventually, the analyst instructor begin to look at the images phenomenologically, without turning the images into ideas, concepts, or preconceived images of pathology. I relaxed. I could breath again. Color returned to my face. I concluded that the images (thus, *psyche*) felt seen, valued, befriended, and respected.

In the late 1970s, Hillman wrote three essays: "An Inquiry into Image," *Spring 1977*; "Further Notes on Images," *Spring 1978*; and "Image-Sense," *Spring 1979*. I have named these the "Image Essays" as they have important implications for the practice of imaginal psychology. In these Hillman noted the distinction between symbol and image, that images are particularized by a specific context, mood, and scene. (*Spring 1977*, p. 62) Hillman used the following dream to illustrate some of the points he was trying to make:

In some kind of cave, a dark cavern. The whole place slopes backwards and downwards from where I'm standing. There was a big dead white swan with arrows sticking out of its breast at all angles. I think there were five of them. I felt I could not breathe in there and turned desperately around toward daylight—brilliant—hurrying out without looking back.

But in my hurry I seem to lose control of my leg, the right one, I guess at the knee, and my leg wobbled in all directions as I hurried. (*Spring 1977*, p. 63)

There are a number of symbols in the dream—swan, cave, arrows, etc. This is symbolism which can be looked up in dictionaries of symbols. Something significant or unknown is bundled into the symbolic image. But symbols bend toward a kind of universality, toward universal human experiences. This tendency can be reinforced using the Jungian method of amplification. When actually, the symbol only appears in an image whose particularity and peculiar nature is distanced from. Amplification has some advantages such a locating an image within a symbolic or cultural tradition or motif, freeing a dream from narrow and personal understandings, and opening up to the wider imagination. But, a symbol can only appear in an image, so an imagistic approach keeps focussing on the specific context, mood, and scene.

Imaginal methods can point at the specificities in the phenomena of the images. You try and stick to the actual phenomena, pointing at the image in its presentational specificity, its precisely qualifying context. You get back to the unknown by sticking to it in the image:

... There is nowhere else to go. Only it can tell us about itself. So we set aside our collective consciousness that knows what dreams are, what dreams do, what they mean. The practice with dreams as images suspends our theory which relies on a symbolic approach. We do not want to prejudice the phenomenal experience of their unknownness and our unconsciousness by knowing in advance that they are messages, dramas, compensations, prospective indications, transcendent functions. We want to go at the image without the defense of symbols. (*Spring 1977*, p. 68)

One finds precision in this imaginal approach by staying with the actual, concrete, specific qualities of the images. All the images adhere, are co-relative, co-temporaneous. There are internal relationships between the images. (I always think of a Chagall painting with many images having spontaneity, hanging in the air, all over the canvass at once, no logical nor ego story line, just church steeples floating, copulating couples floating, cows with legs to the side, all the images there at one instant before one's eyes.) Hillman noted his departure from Jung regarding the archetype *per se*:

Jung says archetypes *per se* are unknowable, irrepresentable, unspeakable. Let's take this not as a metaphysical statement, but as an operational statement. Let's work with it, seeing how the irrepresentable-unspeakable works in images. (*Spring 1977*, p. 70)

So the archetypal is now adjective rather than noun. There is one event, an archetypal image. The focus remains on the image. The mood and the scene of a dream and its images can be read and re-read, heard and re-heart. This is what Patricia Berry calls "restatement." This gives more opportunity for connections to surface and patterns to unearth. Archetypal has to do with a making rather than a function of being. Meaning emerges from the image portrayed in all its specificity.

In this approach, many of the usual moves are not made—amplification, valuing one part, reading images symbolically, not using developmental models, adding or subtracting affect, using a narrative, not identifying an antagonist, not moralizing, not sexualizing, not pathologizing, not personalizing the figures, not correcting the dream, not mythologizing by assigning the image to an archetypal locus or God. Nevertheless, this chanting or weaving with the images lures out the implications of the dream. Some interpretations do emerge into awareness indirectly. There are multiple implications to images which emerge in playing with the dream-work, often by using analogies, likenesses, noticing similarities and resemblances as well as mythic elements:

This subliminal richness is another way of speaking of its invisible depth, like Pluto is another way of speaking about Hades. Our exercise with the image gave us a new appreciation of the unfathomable nature of any image, even the meanest, once it dies to its everyday simple appearance. It becomes bottomlessly more layered, complicatedly more textured. And as we do our image-making, even further implications appear, more suppositions and analogies dawn on us. An image is like an inexhaustible source of insights. Mythologically, we are now talking about Hades who in the Neoplatonic Renaissance was the God of the greatest depth, mystery, and insight. (*Spring 1977*, p. 80)

There are hidden harmonies within those unfathomable depths of the images. One cannot get to the soul of the images without acquiring some love for the images.

Hillman wrote that by archetypal psychology, he meant a psychology of value. Psychology can become archetypal if it can resonate with the unfathomable, the multiple, the generative, and the necessary which are honored in this imaginal or

phenomenological approach. Psychology then becomes an "ongoing operation with the soul's images." This is not a descriptive psychology of the archetypes. It is an inquiry into the images.

In "Further Notes on Images," Hillman alluded to the work of Patricia Berry (Hillman's second wife) who published an essay, "An Approach to the Dream" (Berry, 1982, pp. 53ff; *WWI*, pp. 90ff), in which she discussed the radical relativism of interpretation. Berry presented the following dream by a woman:

> I was lying on a bed in a room, alone apparently, but with the feeling of turmoil around me.
> A middle-aged woman enters and hands me a key. Later, a man enters, helps me out of bed
> and leads me upstairs to an unknown room. (*Spring 1978*, p. 153)

Berry looked at seven interpretations of this dream from various theoretical or interpretive understandings. The seven different interpretations illustrated how even a simple dream has polysemous (many-meanings) possibilities. It becomes important to approach the dream without suppositions and preconceived notions about the dreamer's problems, desires for resolution, or interpretations coming out of theoretical biases. A singleness of meaning should be avoided since such literalizing stops the analogizing process from which the images's multiple meanings can unfold. Many possibilities of meaning can emerge as the analogizing process goes on longer and deeply.

A move toward aesthetics notes the beauty within the specifics of the dream. A move called reversibility of the image can occur, picking up on a quality such as blue and placing it with another image, such as an arrow. Grammar can be reversed. An imagistic view of words can free them from restraining daytime or logical reasoning. The dream is not to be understood as concepts:

> I am doing away, not with personifying, but with the literal notion of these persons as
> agents in the psyche: complexes, Gods, archetypes—and other figures of speech and
> imaginative perspectives that are taken literally because they are presented as nouns. ...

> You know, we empty out each dream and the miracle of its presentation when we
> refer a dream outside itself. Analytical interpretations of dreams into empirical life—our
> past history, present problems, or future prospects—arise from treating the dream-words as
> concepts which signify something not in the dream. ... Just the fact that the dream-swan
> must be referred to some sort of swan somewhere kills the bird as an image.

Images don't stand for anything. They gain their sense from where, when, and which way they stand. (*Spring 1978*, pp. 171-72)

Other moves can be made. One is "eternalizing" by taking the word "when" and saying "whenever" thus increasing the volume, value, intensity of the image. Another move is that of "contrasting," which helps open up or sharpen the preciseness of an image. One image can be held up to contrast with another. Singularizing is when the word "only" is added such as, "Only when you open the door." Sometimes just sitting with the dream, keeping its images around, like a bottle of wine on the table, allows images to present more fully, or rather allows something in the dreamer to open up to possibilities.

In "Image Sense" (*Spring 1979*), Hillman suggested that images are perceived by an animal sense at some instinctual level and that they in some way have animal body. In responding to a "Protester," Hillman responded:

... What holds that conjunction of concrete sensation, psychic image, and spiritual meaning is *aisthesis*, which denotes originally both breathing in (smelling) and perceiving. I am saying that when we walk through the world aesthetically, then we experience images like breath through the nostrils, a reflex consciousness on which life depends. Instead of the search for meanings, the perceptive sensitive response which transforms events into images. This *via aesthetica* would be what is meant by "living psychologically": the undersense returned from symbolism and from paranoic meanings to the significance of the senses. A significant life does not have to find 'meaning' because significance is given directly with reality; all things as images make sense. (*Spring 1979*, pp. 142-43)

For Hillman, the mind was primarily aesthetic. He suggested a "close noticing" as living psychologically. This is the old meaning of *psyche* as a breath-soul:

Does this not rekindle your animal faith in the image? To our animal faith, the image is simply there, living, moving like the airs we breathe, whether we believe in it or not, whether it numinously nods or not, whether we understand it or not. Release from *pistis*—'I don't believe in these things; fantasies only; I make them up myself.' Release from symbolic hermeneutics—'I must find out what the image means; interpretation, understanding.' Instead, aesthetics; and rather like the "mythical realism" of Boer and Kugler (*Spring 1977*). It seems aesthetics is the *via regia*, if we would restore our life in

images and work out the appropriate method for the poetic basis of mind, mind based in fantasy images. (*Spring 1979*, p. 143)

Imaginal Practice with Dreams

The practice I wish to focus upon is that of working with the phenomena of dreams, whether in therapeutic work or in attempting to befriend one's own dreams. It has always been a treat to read of cases illustrating the influence on a colleague's practice by having Hillman's work as an influence. I particularly have enjoyed reading Michael Vannoy Adams' clinical illustrations. In his work, *The Fantasy Principle*, there is a chapter entitled, "Compensation in the Service of Individuation." Adams had been invited to contribute to a publication examing what Paul Ricoeur called a "conflict of interpretations" or this may have been a "consensus of interpretations." Various analysts from different theoretical points of view were asked to interpret a dream series of a patient whom the participants had never met nor treated. Adams worked with the dreams from an imaginal and phenomenological approach which illustrated an attempt to "stick to the image" or closely adhere to the images with a "nothing less assumption," in other words, the images were not something else then their specific presentation. Adams' response to three dreams is a wonderful witness to the imaginal method of sticking with the images even while noting resemblances, specificities, and particularities in the dream series. He engaged the images with an aesthetic eye and avoided the pitfall of conceptualizing away from the dreams and their imagery.

The following is a dream presented in a classroom situation. The dreamer is a friend who graciously granted permission to share his dream in an educational context. At the time of the dream, this intelligent and creative young man was an upper classman in college, traveling through India with a girlfriend, anticipating graduation following his senior year. The Dream:

I am a Yugoslavian nobleman or prince in the eighth century. My father has just been killed, and I am seeking revenge against the king who had this done. I am conscious of being a magnificent swordsman—in fact, the best in the land. However, the man defending the king is fighting with a special sword called "The Sword of God." I am frustrated and incredulous; I cannot defeat this man. He seems much more powerful than me. My sword feels so heavy in my arms. He pierces me once. I manage to continue fighting for a few

more moments but can feel the life force leaving my body. He strikes me again, and I die. I am given to understand that the sword still survives in a sealed cave in Yugoslavia, and that I can call on its power, which is morally neutral, by saying special words which will be known to me when the time is right. I will only be able to use the sword's power once—afterwards it will be gone. I must use the power in reference to my relationship with my father—to try to resolve all conflict, at least on my side.

How might an archetypal psychologist approach this dream in a phenomenological way? Theoretical presuppostions would be set aside or bracketed so that the phenomena of the dream could be closely adhered to. Freudian reductions to the personal dynamics of aggression and ambivalence between personal father and son would not be literally seized upon. Jungian tendencies to amplify into universal symbolism and archetypes such as father and son, King and Prince, *senex* and *puer*, sword, cave, death and rebirth would be set aside to focus upon the phenomena of the dream and its particular imagery as well as its specific context, mood, and scene. The dream images would not be mistaken for universal symbols. An attempt would be made to not conceptualize the particular images. The images would not be amplified in any distancing from the concreteness of the imagery. The dream would not be locked into presuppositions and assumptions about pathology, childhood development, family systems, the Oedipal complex, etc. Although likenesses and resemblances might be identified, there were be a sticking with the images. The following questions might come to mind. How does the dream or its images present themselves with specificity? How do we "sense" the images in their particular presentations? How do we aesthetically approach the dream by adhering to the images? Is there a spiritual or religious meaning in our *aisthesis*, in our aesthetic method of befriending the dream?

As I approach this dream, I note that the first sentence of the dream text begins to describe the scene in particular and precise settings of place and time—Yugoslavia in the eighth century. I have fantasies of the Balkans, mountains, conflicts between various tribes and principalities, tensions between upper classes and serfs and peasants, the Christianized and un-Christianized. This is almost a fairy-tale land, somewhere between ancient history and on the border of mystery. Early in the dream, there is an identification with royal blood: the dream ego's attitude is identified with a particular position, of

nobility or royalty. Perhaps in this case, the dream also is indeed a royal road to the unconscious. However, the father, who is perhaps a king if his son is a prince, has been killed. The old refrain, "The King must die," is evoked. Has the spirit of the father died in this dreamer? How might that have occurred?

The son in this dream is seeking vengence against another man who is indeed a King. He wants to wield his own princely sword to vengefully thrust out against some swordsman defending a kingly murderer. The mood of the dream is of vengence and combat, a conflict of two men. I remember the Old Testament caution, "Vengeance is mine says the Lord." This son is an accomplished swordsman, "the best in the land." However, a man defending the King who killed the dreamer's father wields a special weapon, "the Sword of God." Is this Sword of God something like the celtic Excaliber? Is this an image of a religious defence? The dream ego *imago* is frustrated and finds it hard to believe when he cannot defeat the man with "the Sword of God." Talented though he may be, he is up against a power or presence much stronger than himself and his princely sword. This male defender of the king is more powerful than the son who seeks revenge for his father's death. There is an affective heaviness which the dreamer feels. The "Sword of God" pierces his body only once but that lets the life force leave his body. It is as if his blood is spilled. The king's defender strikes again, and then the young man who seeks to avenge his father's death dies himself. Is this something like Kierkegaard's recognition that, "Man's extremity becomes God's opportunity"? or Jung's understanding that an experience of the Self is a defeat for the ego?

The drama shifts. This ego figure's death is not an end. There seems to be a revelation, a disclosure, a hopeful, promising, or anticipatory opportunity ahead. There is a new understanding that the Sword of God endures, is sealed away in a cave in Yugoslavia. Mythically, caves are where the human and divine meet. From caves for the dead, resurrections emerge. Caves are something like wombs from which new energies and lives unearth. This Sword of God has been sheathed in this cave, protectively, in a kind of incubation. But, the dream ego figure can access this Sword of God's special power that is morally neutral with special words which he will know at the right time. The dreamer will only be able to use this power from the Sword of God once, then it will vanish. Does this image resemble the fable of King Arthur who finds a miraculous way to

free Excaliber from the stone in which it was stuck? What kind of masculine initiation might this dream be evoking? Is the sword an intrument of separation? The words in *Matthew* are paraphrased in my mind, "I do not come to bring peace but rather a sword, to separate a man from his father and a woman from her mother, for you shall find your enemies under your own family roof." In its end, the dream appears to evoke a new attitude on the part of the dream ego figure as he senses an imperative to try to resolve conflicts with his personal father.

A traditional Freudian would probably pick up on unresolved Oedipal dynamics and conflicts in the dreamer's psychology with the tendency to reduce the dream to its apparently unresolved Oedipal conflicts between the dreamer as son of the personal father. Is there an unconscious desire of the son to slay the father? The sword could be interpreted as a symbolic representation of the phallus. Is the son's as big or as adequate as the older man's? Modern Freudians would focus on the aggression and anger, whether Oediapal or pre-Oedipal. An object relations oriented therapist would understand all of the dream's images as internalizations of relationships in the outer world which would include the family of origin.

A customary Jungian approach to the dream is to garner up the personal associations of the dreamer, keeping an eye to how the dream may have a compensatory intent toward the one-sided consciousness of the dreamer's conscious personality. The dreamer shared some of his personal associations. His father was an aggressive, successful, professional man. There was a counter-dependent dynamic with his father who had little empathy for his son's eccentric nature, vocational aspirations, and recreational and artistic pursuits. His mother was apparently depressed, unemployeed, financially dependent upon the father, and unable to mediate the father/son conflicts. Most of his personal associations to the dream were in terms of his hurt and anger around the non-supportive father. The father tried to confront him with the realities of life. The son would hold out for what he thought was an innovative piece of recreational equipment to sell as an entrepreneur. At the time he shared this dream in class, he had returned to live with his family while launching his own business venture, which, eight years after this dream, had not yielded financial empowerment to the dreamer so that he continued to live in the family home. He seemed to recognize, "It is hard for the spirit of

the father to come alive in me." Jung noted in his essay, "On the Phenomena of the Spirit Archetype" that it is the spirit of the father which throws open the door to the future. This dreamer was indeed having difficulty separating his life from his family's.

A Jungian approach to the dream also would begin with personal association, always with an eye toward the compensatory intent or lure of the dream. How might the dream be luring the dreamer beyond a one-sided, conscious attitude? A Jungian might look for the essence of the images' meanings even while tring to stick to the specific particularities of the dream. A Jungian might interpret the dream and its imagery through the universality of its symbolism—prince, king, sword, cave. Certain archetypal or typical essences are implied by the images. A Jungian might ask how this dream serves the individuation process of the dreamer, or what is prospective intent or lure of the dream?

As a "modified archetypalist," I value multiple perspectives on the meanings inherent in such dream images. I find that Hillman's aesthetic approach is a corrective reminder to value the primacy of the dream images. One needs to continually return to the dream in its own presentation and qualifying context. One can pursue various lines of analogy, likeness, resemblance, motifs, but one must read and re-read and bring re-statement to work with dreams. Hillman has referred to Rafael Lopez-Pedraza's admonition of "sticking to the image." He refers to this approach to the dream as employing a phenomenological or imaginal method. This approach emphasizes the phenomena of the dream images. This phenomenological techique attempts to notice, sit with, adhere to, and respect the specific integrity of the concrete and particular dream images.

The purpose of the case material above certainly illustrates some of my own work with dreams in the practice of analysis and pastoral psychotherapy. However, the primary intent of its inclusion is to high-light approaches to the dream via an imaginal approach. Hopefully the motifs in archetypal psychology have been represented. For me these are: the primacy of the image, the polysemous nature of psychic material, a non-reductionist approach foregoing facile catergories and concretized jargon, and use of the images in a meditative and reflective mode.

CHAPTER 7

THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS OF
ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF RELIGION

Hillman's re-visioning of Jung's analytical psychology should be noted in works and texts which summarize the implications of Jung's psychology for understanding religious experience. However, this thesis also argues that James Hillman has already made significant contributions to the psychological understanding of religion which deserve acknowledgment. Hillman's unique contributions should be a significant chapter in psychology of religion texts rather than merely as footnotes to chapters on Jung.

What are the implications of Hillman's archetypal psychology for the psychology of religion, religious studies, and theology? People have begun to identify potential contributions which need to be brought into the conversations with the psychology of religion, religious studies, and theology. David Wulff's book, *Psychology of Religion: Classic and Contemporary*, was perhaps the first psychology of religion text to acknowledge the work of James Hillman. Wulff highlighted several contributions to this field made by Hillman. Wulff noted two particular contributions of archetypal psychology: 1) the questioning of Jung's emphasis on the unity of personality and the individuation process, and 2) the critique of any psychology without depth.

I will begin to highlight the contributions of James Hillman's archetypal psychology to psychological understandings of religious experience by starting with these notations by Wulff whose text is comprehensive and contemporary. The references noted in Wulff's bibliography suggested that his primary reading on archetypal psychology was Hillman's *Re-Visioning Psychology*. However, this is a limited reading of Hillman and archetypal psychology. Wulff's references to Hillman are an important anticipation of understanding the contributions of archetypal psychology in the field of religion and theology, still Wulff does not elaborate with satisfactory depth and discernment such contributions. Yet, this project will identify the key contributions of Hillman for theology and religious studies, first by quoting Wulff's recognitions, then by noting the key contributions of archetypal psychology.

Questioning the Unity and Wholeness of the Personality

Wulff noted that Jung shared the same assumption which other humanistic psychologists have had in their psychological understandings of human personality. This was the assumption that there is a natural tendency toward wholeness and unification:

> ... Yet according to James Hillman (1975), formerly Director of Studies at the C. G. Jung Institute in Zurich and now a proponent of a radical archetypal psychology that deviates in significant ways from analytical psychology, Jung has erroneously literalized the individuation process. By affirming "the comforting teleological fallacy," he has substituted a monotheistic theology for a true archetypal psychology. (Wulff, pp. 468-69)

This citation refered to Hillman's section on psychologizing psychology in *Re-Visioning Psychology*. Hillman had said that any psychology which gets "caught in its tools, its psychological methods and insights" can use such literalisms in such a way that psyche is no longer served, nor is soul-making. An "activity" of therapeutic psychology may be more adequate than a "discipline." Literalism was self-defeating since "then the particularity, multiplicity, and spontaneity of the soul's reflections become codified." (*RVP*, p. 145) The structures or systems such as in Jung's psychology and Freud's were teleological systems which needed to be seen through to their root metaphors. Such psychodynamic processes could be reimagined as mythical tales rather than literal processes.

Hillman specifically examined existential psychology and Jungian psychology. The structures of existential psychology were concepts and not really persons nor images. Such an approach became a metaphysical activity rather than a psychological activity. They did not value the amplification of image through myth, fairy tales, religion and art as did the Jungians. However, Jungian therapy was conceived in a developmental manner and process, as the individuation process. Hillman believed the Jungians literalized this process. This was an archetypal fantasy, however. This was one "explanatory fantasy of soul," whether in an individuation or developmental model. Hillman suggested, "...forgoing the comfortable teleological fallacy which holds that we are carried by an overall process on a rocky road onward to the Great End Station." (*RVP*, p. 14) Hillman was arguing that individuation is a perspective, not the one goal of psyche's process.

Elsewhere, Hillman alluded to this kind of understanding being informed through a monotheistic bias in our culture

Wulff recognized Hillman's re-visioning of this central notion in Jung's analytical psychology of religion:

> ... From Hillman's perspective, individuation is only one archetypal fantasy among many, corresponding to just one of the possible perspectives that lie deep within our nature. This process can be taken into account, he says, without elevating it to the fundamental law of the psyche. In his own "revisioning" of psychology, Hillman undertakes to free the individual soul from all partial identifications, especially with the ego and the life in which it is centered, and to engage in "soul-making" through a noninterpretive understanding of the imaginal process. Because the soul expresses itself in images of Gods, Hillman says, a genuine depth psychology must be religious and theistic—even polytheistic given the soul's "native polycentricity" (*RVP*, p. 167)—though not, of course, in any literal sense. (Wulff, p. 469)

Wulff noted that this "recasting of Jungian psychology" has influenced Thomas Moore's writings, "James Hillman: Psychology with Soul" (*Religious Studies Review*, 6, 278-285) and *Care of the Soul: A Guide for Cultivating Depth and Sacredness in Everyday Life* (1992).

Acknowledging the Limits of Psychologies without Depth

Hillman critiqued any psychology which lacked depth or literalized its own assumptions and structures of understanding. Wulff pointed out that Hillman "...for one, finds humanistic psychology disturbingly one-sided and superficial. He faults it for its innocently simplistic and romantic notion of growth and its neglect of human limitation, irrationality, and pathology." (p. 630) Wulff cited Hillman's suggestion that humanistic psychology was "naive if not delusional." Hillman had asked,

> ... For where is sin, and where are viciousness, failure, and the crippling vicissitudes that fate brings through pathologizing?
>
> ... By insisting on the brighter side of human nature, where even death becomes "sweet," humanistic psychology is shadowless, a psychology without depths,... (*RVP*, p. 65)

It was Hillman's valuing of psychopathology which enabled him to see into any transcendental denials of pathologies. This characterized humanistic psychology even though this approach had opposed other psychological approaches which had somewhat dehumanized the individual:

> ... In attempting to restore his dignity to man, this psychology idealizes him, sweeping his pathologies under the carpet. By brushing aside or keeping them out of its sight, this kind of humanism promotes an ennobled one-sidedness, a sentimentalism which William James would have recognized as tender-mindedness.

> It shows immediately in the words favored by contemporary psychological humanism. Unlike the terms of professional psychopathology, these resonate with a positive glow: health, hope, courage, love, maturity, warmth, wholeness; it speaks of the upward-growing forces of human nature which appear in tenderness and openness and sharing and which yield creativity, joy, meaningful relationships, play, and peaks. (*RVP*, pp. 64-65)

Humanistic psychology is a somewhat naive view of the *psyche* because, "Where is sin, and where are viciousness, failure, and the crippling vicissitudes that fate brings through pathologizing?" (*RVP*, p. 65)

Hillman's work was an ongoing critique of how many psychologies are soulless. They have appropriated the first principles of other disciplines—medicine, bioenergetics, biochemistry, psychiatry, new age notions, and Christianized therapeutic strategies. Hillman was impatient with psychological literalisms and positivisms, all which displaced the phenomena of soul in its uniqueness, specificity, and particularities.

Rehabilitation of the Use of the Word "Soul" in Psychology

In 1950, Erich Fromm, one of the world's best-known psychoanalysts, wrote a book entitled, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*. He noted how there was little concern with the soul, with the exception that priests and ministers appeared to the only professionals who seemed concerned with the soul, "the only spokesmen for the ideals of love, truth, and justice." He particularly noted the failure of nerve in the field of psychology:

> ... Academic psychology, trying to imitate the natural sciences and laboratory methods of weighing and counting, dealt with everything except the soul. It tried to understand those aspects of man which can be examined in the laboratory and claimed that conscience, value judgments, the knowledge of good and evil are metaphysical concepts,

outside the problems of psychology; it was more often concerned with insignificant problems which fitted an alleged scientific method than with devising new methods to study the significant problems of man. Psychology thus became a science lacking its main subject matter, the soul; it was concerned with mechanisms, reaction, formations, instincts, but not with the most specifically human phenomena: love, reason, conscience, values. Because the word *soul* has associations which include these higher human powers I use it here...rather than the words "psyche" or "mind." (Fromm, p. 6)

In *Suicide and the Soul* (1965), Hillman pointed out "psychology's science-complex" (p. 42ff). The scientific approach to behavior, including the phenomena of suicide, was to look at it from the outside. This view was usually "typical." Even death was seen as typical when observed from the outside. It always appeared to be the same. Suicide got defined as self-destruction. Then where did the individual soul or inside experience of death get valued? Then what happened to the tragic dimension of life? The more scientific the approach, the more behavior was locked into being looked at or observed from the outside. Typical classifications became a trap. Words such as "self-destruction," "termination," got detached from the emotions inherent in experience and behavior. Acts were not understood as unique, with inside meanings and emotional valuations.

The central issues in the practice of psychology were conceptualized from the outside perspective associated with scientific objectivity—"delinquency, alcoholism, psychopathy, aging, homosexuality." Even the term neurosis became an outside term which masked uniqueness, individual differences. However, the practice of the analyst was informed by a root metaphor which required maintaining a connection with the inside: "His calling is to the soul of individuals..." He maintained connection to the unique intentions of particular individuals. The analyst inevitably was drawn into an awareness of suffering and into the inner world of the patient—aspects of personality associated with the soul. Here, Hillman noted that references to soul had fallen into disrepute in the field of psychology:

... 'Soul', however, is not a scientific term, and it appears very rarely in psychology today, and then usually with inverted commas as if to keep it from infecting its scientifically sterile surround. 'Soul' cannot be accurately defined, nor is it respectable in

scientific discussions as scientific discussion is now understood. There are many words of this sort which carry meaning, yet which find no place in today's science. It does not mean that the references of these words are not real because scientific method leaves them out. Nor does it mean that scientific method fails because it omits these words which lack operational definition. All methods have their limits; we need but keep clear what belongs where. (*SS*, p. 44)

Hillman's consequential work over the decades has been an attempt to re-vision psychology so that imagination is seen as the primary activity of the psyche. The words "psychology" and "psychological" increasingly have referred to the phenomena of soul without apology. Psychology now is not necessarily seen as merely a science of behavior, observed externally. As this project's argument affirms, one of Hillman's primary contributions to both a psychology and theology of depth has been the restoring of interest and validity to the phenomena of soul.

A Distinction Between Soul and Spirit

Hillman was a phenomenologist or psychologist of soul even though he never characterized himself as such. His interest in phenomenology came in the 1970s and lasted into the early 1980s through the influence of the Duquesne psychologists Robert Sardello and Robert Romanyshyn. They worked together in Dallas, beginning with the first Archetypal Psychology Conference at the University of Dallas in 1976, and as colleagues at the University of Dallas until Hillman and Sardello's firing by the University in the spring of 1980. However, by 1983, Hillman was no longer interested in anything which might be associated with Heideggger. He became more taken by poetics due to his interest in Bachelard, and the influence of Charles Boer, Paul Kugler (and Kugler's friend Jack Clark), and Robert Bly. He also became more interested in writing and publishing poetry himself on the side, which he did in Andre Codrescu's poetry magazine, *The Exquisite Corpse*.

In contrast to Hillman's interest in the phenomena of soul, his understandings appeared at times to be critical of spirituality. A key contribution to the psychology of religious experience and theology is Hillman's distinction between spirit and soul, words which are often used by many people in a synonymous manner. A significant contribution to the psychology of religion was Hillman's clarification that spirit (*pneuma*)

and soul (*psyche*) denote and signify different realities of experience. In the neo-Platonic traditions, there were three realms of experience within human nature. The upper realm was that of Spirit (mentation, intellect), The lower realm was that of Nature (body, instinct, sexuality). The middle realm was that of Psyche (image, imagination). The middle realm was actually that of soul, traditionally seen as existing between Spirit and Nature. This tripartite anthropology of Spirit—Soul—Nature had been inherited in the modern world as a more simplified dualism of body and spirit with the middle realm forgotten, left out, without a place. Spirit and body seemed to be the only options in this dualism. All too often soul was sublimated into spirit since both were understood as non-corporeal in nature. Hillman's work addressed this confusion and the neglect of the realm of imagination in our culture. Hillman alluded to Jung's notation that, "Every psychic process is an image and an imagining." Jung had understood the psyche/soul to be constituted of images. Hillman's followed this line of understanding.

A book entitled *Puer Papers* (1976) included Hillman's essay, "Peaks and Vales: The Soul / Spirit Distinction as Basis for the Differences Between Psychotherapy and Spiritual Discipline." Hillman began this piece alluding to two Councils of the Roman Christian Church in 381 and 325 C.E.:

> Because at the Council in Constantinople the soul lost its dominion. Our anthropology, our idea of human nature, devolved from a tripartite cosmos or spirit, soul, and body (matter), to a dualism of spirit (or mind) and body (or matter). And this because at that other Council, the one in Nicaea, images were deprived of their inherent authenticity. (*PP*, p. 54)

The third place, the "intermediate realm of psyche," or the "realm of images" or "the power of imagination" was still being sought as perhaps part of Jung's "modern man in search of a soul." This was the realm exiled by the religious, theological, and spiritual leaders back then:

> ...long before Descartes and the dichotomies attributed to him, long before the Enlightenment and modern positivism and scientism. These ancient historical events are responsible for the malnourished root of our Western psychological culture and of the culture of each of our souls. (*PP*, p. 54)

The fear of and anger at the phenomena of images was old. Jung's psychology was a return to images, to the soul's life of fantasy (which Jung saw associated with polytheism). Jung's return to images was an attempt to reverse the historical bias which reduced soul to the rational spirit:

> ... Jung's psychology is based on soul. It is a tripartite psychology. It is based neither on matter and the brain nor on the mind, intellect, spirit, mathematics, logic, metaphysics. He uses neither the methods of natural science and the psychology of perception nor the methods of methaphysical science and the logic of mentation. He says his base is in a third place between: *esse in anima*, "being in soul." And he found this position by turning directly to the images in his insane patients and in himself during his breakdown years. (*PP*, pp. 56-7)

As Hillman moved into a discussion of the difference between soul and spirit, he reminded the reader that we are always fantasizing, that root-metaphors and mythic perspectives are also at work in our understanding of soul and spirit, and how soul looks at spirit. The archetypal images at work are "the Peaks" associated with spirit and "the Vales" associated with soul. Soul is closer to the valleys of human experience, to the concrete world, to the relationships of life in the vale—to body, to family, to mortality, etc. Spirit seems to have a desire to transcend the valley and its limitations in its search for peak experiences of cosmic realities, idealistic aspirations, universal truths, immortality, the lofty realm of the mountain tops. Spirit is often characterized as above the human depths, masculine, abstracting. This contrasts with soul that values the depths, the mess of life, the ambiguities of love, the lowly realities and limitations of shadow, infirmity, pathology, and mortality.

Hillman affirmed that spirit's transcendent desire can bring passion and conviction to experience. However, he cautioned against a spirituality split off from the down-to-earth experiences of soul. Spirituality without soul can lead to the destructive possibilities inherent in literalisms and spiritual fanaticisms. Hillman himself tended to stay close to the soulful concerns inherent in shadow aspects of life. He has written about betrayal, panic, masturbation, gossip, schism, etc. Thomas Moore raised an ironic question about Hillman's priority of soul in contrast to spirit:

It could be objected that on his own ground Hillman is rather spiritual himself. His extensive theories form a metapsychology, a philosophy of soul. He loves to challenge philosophy and religion. He seems to avoid soulful elements in his writing. You find few case histories, little autobiography, rare anecdotes. However, the spirit is grounded in other ways. Hillman takes history as myth; he usually gives the autobiography and geography of an idea and, most telling of all, he treats his own work as fiction, as a mythology of soul made of fragments from history, religion, philosophy, and literature. As a scholar he is a *bricoleur*, a handyman, an artist, as has been said of the psyche. (*ABF*, p. 113)

Hillman was not arguing for dismissing spirit in some move into soul. Spirit should nurture soul and not get in the way of soul and imagination informing spiritual truth, dogma, or understandings.

Hillman's distinguishing of soul from spirit should become more familiar to the psychologists of religion as well as theologians. Discussions and understandings of spirit and spirituality should not become threats to the depths, images, and fantasies of soul. Nor should repect for the phenomena of soul dilute the concerns of spirit and of spiritual practice.

A Polyvalent Psychology and Psyche's Multiplicity

Jung's analytical psychology has been understood as a "dissociative theory of personality." Jung's theory of complexes understood the feeling-toned nature of complexes to be sub-psyches or splinter psyches which were characterized by spontaneity and relative autonomy—they acted like personified aspects of the psyche's interior. As personified, complexes were like the actors inhabiting the psyche. Complexes were foreign to consciousness, but were accessible to both consciousness and unconsciousness. Complexes were demonstrated empirically in Jung's Word Association Experiment. However, they could also be identified in the imagery of dreams. Jung's structural psychology personified some of these inner personified elements of the interior: the Shadow, the *anima*, the *animus*, the Self.

Complexes were the structures of the personal unconscious, shaped by particular life experiences such as this particular mother, this particular father, etc. However, Jung understood complexes to have an archetypal core at the heart of each complex which had to do with the potentialities of the archetypal or collective unconscious—those

potentialities which are common to all human beings and attested to in comparative religion, mythology, and fairy tales. These archetypal or mythic cores have to do with the Great Mother, the Patriarch, etc. Jung's essay on "The Role of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual" illustrated how the fantastic power rendered onto the personal father may have its origins in the myths of Jehovah, Zeus, Thor, etc. The subjective depths and fantasies of imagination affected the perceptions of the child so parents looked like giants and giantesses.

Psyche is inherently multiple in that there are essential and deep-seated divisions within the psyche. There is an intrinsic diversity when we look at the psychic facts or observables of the psyche—its memories, fantasies, dreams, and other material. The unconscious expresses or demonstrates an inner multiplicity. Hillman believed that all the contents of the unconscious should be respected without the exclusion of some contents over others. Some contents should not be repressed, judged, nor demonized. This challenges the one-sided tendencies of the ego or conscious personality. The ego's task is not to integrate all of these diverse elements and complexities into some ego syntonic unity in a kind of new PC of psychological correctness, but rather the ego's task is to differentiate these multiple images, personifications, or sub-consciousnesses.

Hillman (1983) avoided the use of the Jungian notion of the Self or the archetypal Self. He believed this term became something like a God-term which kept Jungians in a paternalistic/monotheistic bind. He saw this notion dominating both Christianity as well as depth psychology itself. Hillman did not want to make singleness of soul a unitary norm.[1]

Hillman quoted Jung to illustrate the connection between the complexes or the "splinter psyches" of psyche's multiplicity and the gods and goddesses of the Greek pantheon:

If tendencies towards dissociation were not inherent in the human psyche, fragmentary psychic systems would never have been split off; in other words, neither spirits nor gods would have ever come into existence. That is also the reason why our time has become so utterly godless and profane: we lack all knowledge of the unconscious psyche and pursue the cult of consciousness to the exclusion of all else. Our true religion is

a monotheism of consciousness, a possession by it, coupled with a fanatical denial of the existence of fragmentary autonomous systems. (*CW 13*, §51)

This anthropology of a polyvalent psyche led Hillman to appropriate a notion from mythology and religion—polytheism—to point to the mythic or archetypal fantasies which lie behind complexes. To appreciate the divisions and multiplicities of soul, a mythic backdrop could provide a more adequate metaphoric field for placing, imagining, and befriending soul in its polyvalent multiplicities.

A Polytheistic Psychology

Psychology had demonstrated the innate diversity among men and women but also within the individual, the polycentric psyche which Jung understood. What were the fundamental structures or values to account for this diversity? Freud and Jung had models which took account of the polyvalency of the personality. Hillman attempted to rediscover the perspectives of polytheism which he understood to be far-reaching in cultural implications. He noted that Thomas Moore suggested that this perspective would be natural for an *anima* based psychology, that it could reanimate the study of religion and religious studies. David Miller was speaking and writing from a christology which demonstrated "the relevance of the polytheistic perspective for even a religion whose dogma historically derives from an anti-polytheistic position." (*AP*, p. 32) Hillman has suggested that, "the soul's inherent muliplicity demands a theological fantasy of equal differentiation." (*RVP*, p. 167) It was the Greek, Renaissance, and Romantic traditions of thought which had polyvalent or polytheistic attitudes, metaphors, mythic fields from which to appreciate the diversity of perspectives in human nature.

Archetypal psychology became concerned with the dominance of the monotheistic hero myth dominating ego-psychology, Western religion, and even secular humanism. The West seemed caught in "the single-centered, self-identified notion of subjective consciousness...." (*AP*, p. 33) This myth was responsible for the repression of psychological diversity, which then was called psychopathology. More perspectives were needed for the experience of individuality, in vision, style, values, etc. Pluralism and multiplicity were not enough:

... Psychology needs to specify and differentiate each event, which it can do against the variegated background of archetypal configurations, or what polytheism called Gods, in order to make multiplicity both authentic and precise. Thus the question it asks of an event is not *why* or *how*, but rather *what* specifically is being presented and ultimately *who*, which divine figure, is speaking in this style of consciousness, this form of presentation. Hence, a polytheistic psychology is necessary for the authorization of "a pluralistic universe" (William James 1909), for consistencies within it, and for precision of its differentiation. (*AP*, p. 34)

In his essay, "Psychology: Monotheistic or Polytheistic" (*Spring 1971*) Hillman stated that there was an inherent polytheism to the nature of the unconscious. The psyche was polytheistic, polycentric, multiplistic in nature. There were many archetypes, many psychic centers, and any may dominate or color consciousness at a particular moment. However, it should be noted that Hillman's understanding of a polytheistic psyche was not the same thing as a fragmented psyche, which is often associated in our times with a fragmenting culture.

As Hillman searched for a psychology which would give value and place to psyche's native multiplicity, he arrived at a polytheistic psychology where there is not the demand to integrate this multifaceted psychology into a unitary and whole self. This approach avoided the inevitable emotional fragmentation or disintegration which results when a heroic ego is under pressure to value integration and unity. Hillman wrote, "Polytheistic psychology refers to the inherent dissociability of the psyche and the location of consciousness in multiple figures and centers." (*RVP*, p. 26)

In introducing a chapter in the anthology of Hillman's writings, *A Blue Fire*, Thomas Moore affirmed that this polytheistic psychology understood multiplicity to mean that psyche has many directions of meaning and value, and that is has nothing to do with psychotic dissociation or moral relativity:

The psyche is not only multiple, it is a communion of many persons, each with specific needs, fears, longings, styles, and language. The many persons echo the many gods who define the worlds that underlie what appears to be a unified human being. The persons of dream represent the many personalities who have a role in the psyche's everyday dramas. A polytheistic psychology looks carefully at the relations between dream figures,

giving them a hearing, allowing each his due, even those dream persons the ego finds objectionable and threatening.

The images of polytheistic mythology are themselves therapeutic because they give place to the soul's variety and conflict. We can imagine tensions when we have an orientation in the first place that acknowledges many different directions in the psyche. A bias toward monotheism shudders to find many tendencies in tension and aims toward a unified resolution. A polytheistic position holds tension so that all parties concerned find a way to coexist. (*ABF*, p. 37)

Monotheism was woven into the fabric of our culture. It was a prevalent attitude. Hillman saw that the monotheistic bias was privileged in such a way that in our more secular society it acted as a kind of covert ideology rather than as an overt theology. It got woven into the psychological assumptions. If has affected the field of depth psychology and psychoanalysis. In "Monotheism or Polytheism?", Hillman asked, "Which fantasy governs our view of soul-making and the process of individuation—the many or the one?" He responded,

The very sound of the question shows already to what extent we are ruled by a bias toward the one. Unity, integration, and individuation seem an advance over multiplicity and diversity. As the self seems a further integration than anima/animus, so seems monotheism superior to polytheism. (*The New Polytheism*, p. 110)

Hillman alluded to the Jungian anthropology of a polyvalent or polycentric description of the objective psyche. Jung had used the metaphor of the *lumen natura* to illustrate the multiplicities of consciousness in the psyche, which were like the luminous nature of fish eyes:

... A polytheistic psychology corresponds with this description and provides its imagistic formulation in the major traditional language of our civilization, i.e. classical mythology. By providing a divine background of personages and powers for each complex, polytheistic psychology would find place for each spark. It would aim less at gathering them into a unity and more at integrating each fragment according to its own principle, giving each God its due over that portion of consciousness, that symptom, complex, fantasy, which calls for an archetypal background. It would accept the multiplicity of voices, the Babel of the anima and animus, without insisting upon unifying them into one figure, and accept too the dissolution process into diversity as equal in value to the

coagulation process into unity. The pagan Gods and Goddesses would be restored to their psychological domain. (*The New Polytheism*, p. 114)

Whereas Jung would see the Self as being beyond the phenomena of the image, archetypal psychology asked, which specific archetypes or which specific gods and goddesses manifest in images in our dreams and fantasies?

Michael Vannoy Adams argued for an inclusive psychoanalysis that does not approach images and psychic contents with stipulations about contents in advance of approaching the material. He concluded:

The ultimate reason why a polytheistic psychology is preferable to a monotheistic psychology is that it is less likely to countenance an ego that regards the images (the "gods" and "goddesses" from the unconscious as evil, offensive, or blasphemous and that then summarily excludes them from consideration. I would say that from the perspective of the ego, the unconscious is intrinsically "blasphemous," because the images that emerge from it continually address the pieties of the ego with irreverence. To these images from the unconscious, the attitudes of the ego are "unbelievable." The ego is a "true believer" with "holier-than-thou" attitudes toward the unconscious, and that is why the profane is the indispensable shadow of the sacred and why blasphemy is a necessary compensation for the holy. (*FP*, p. 224)

The Restoration of Soul to the World—*Anima Mundi*

Jung discussed the soul of the world as the *anima mundi*, the light of nature as having a multiplicity of partial consciousness, of the lumen naturae, similar to many stars or sparks in the world. Soul was not just of a personal nature but was a transpersonal phenomenon. Jung discussed this in terms of the objective psyche or the collective unconscious. There was soul in the world as well as the soul of the world.

The notion of the *anima mundi* became a large part of Hillman's depth psychology. Soul should not be reduced to just personal subjectivity and personalism. Hillman emphasized the notion of the *anima mundi* or world soul of the neo-Platonists, "...psychology is to hear the psyche speaking through all things of the world, thereby recovering the world as a place of soul." Imagining is the essential activity of the *anima mundi*. It is always happening. Analytical psychology understands that the individual

psyche lives into a larger realm which is also ensouled: that the world and our culture also have soul.

Hillman believed soul should not just be seen as psychic reality based on a system of private experiencing subject and dead public objects. He referred to the world soul of Platonism, to the world ensouled as appreciated by the neo-Platonic tradition, such as in the Florence of Marsilio Ficino:

> ...let us image the *anima mundi* as that particular soul-spark, that seminal image, which offers itself through each thing in its visible form. Then *anima mundi* indicates the animated possibilities presented by each event as it is, its sensuous presentation as a face bespeaking its interior image—in short, its availability to imagination, its presence as a *psychic* reality. Not only animals and plants ensouled as in the Romantic vision, but soul is given with each thing, God-given things of nature and man-made things of the street. (*TH*, p. 101)

The world and nature are alive, they make a display, they self-present in images and specifics such as color and texture. They ask for our attention. What has often been understood by psychology as projection is really the world's and the culture's animation: psychic realities appear in images. The *anima mundi* animates these images. The world and culture have their own lives: soul is not imprisoned in the interiority of ego and subjectivity. Depth psychology must regain a respect for the *anima mundi* rather than responding through the limitations of subjectivistic interpretations:

> ... To interpret the world's things as if they were our dreams deprives the world of its dream, its complaint. Although this move may have been a step toward recognizing the interiority of things, it finally fails because of the identification of interiority with only human subjective experience. (*TH*, p. 106)

Hillman's approach to *anima mundi* was an aesthetic approach which looked at various presentations of soul-in-the-world. Hillman did soul-making with the soul-in-the-world by deepening his experience in the world. In *Inter Views*, he had a chapter entitled "Across the River and Into the Street." When asked the question, "What is repressed today? Where is it today?, Hillman responded:

> It is hiding out there in public; disguised, like the devil always is, dressed in plain clothes, in the street. In Freud's time we felt oppressed in family, in sexual situations, in

our crazy hysterical conversion symptoms, and where we felt oppressed, there was the repressed. Where do we feel that thick kind of repression today? In institutions—hospitals, universities, businesses; in public buildings, in filling out forms, in traffic.... (*IV*, p. 125)

Everything in nature or cultural are imaginal. Hillman wrote articles using his attentive noticing, his attention to the specific and aesthetic qualities of things to comment on the city, places for meeting, architecture, ceilings, education, work, money, style, transportation, sex, war, terrorism, 9/.11. A recent DVD, "Surfing LA" has Hillman cruising the streets of an urban society with Michael Ventura, an LA film critic, novelist, and essayist, and John Densmore, a former drummer with the Doors, and author of *Riders on the Storm* (1991), a book about his life with the Doors. This film tests Hillman's comment that, "conversation is consciousness" with its spontaneous responses, wit, insights, and moments of boring silence.

Archetypal Fantasies and Root Metaphors Inform Belief Systems

Hillman's archetypal psychology recognized that there are images, fantasies, and root metaphors which inform all understandings, including religious and theological understandings. Hillman held that in all of our reflections and understandings, one can never be purely phenomenal or truly objective. A person, or we might say a thinker such as a philosopher or theologian or scientist, is never beyond the subjectivism which is inherent in the soul's basic fantasy structures. There is no way to be totally objective:

> If imagining is the native activity of the *anima mundi*, then fantasy is always going on and is not subject to a phenomenological *epoché* (Husserl: setting aside or bracketing out in order to move directly to the event itself). Moreover, if fantasy is always going on, then *epoche* is itself a fantasy: of isolating, of objectification, and of a consciousness that can be truly addressed by phenomena as they are. (*AP*, p. 24)

Perhaps this is what Jung was pointing to when he spoke of "the personal equation" or "personal factor" in that there is no Archimedan point from which to observe, that psyche is always involved in our observations, our theorizing and speculations, and our fields of understanding, including theology, religious studies, and the psychology of religion.

Fantasy structures affect our understandings and theoretical stances. Objectivity can only be approximated. The best approximation is when subjectivity itself is examined:

> ... examining its own perspective for the archetypal subjects (q.v. personifying) who are at this moment governing our way of being in the world among phenomena. Psychology as an objective science is forever impossible once one has recognized that objectivity is itself a poetic genre.... (*AP*, p. 24)

This genre understands the world as without interiority and animation; it does not acknowledge that fantasy is inevitable in our observations, discernments, and understandings. The admission of this imagining activity is difficult in particular fields and points of view, often those related to the phenomenon of spirit:

> One position is particularly obdurate in yielding to the fantasy that fantasy is always going on, and that is the stance of spirit. It appears as scientific objectivity, as metaphysics, and as theology. And where archetypal psychology has attacked these approaches, it is part of a wider strategy to distinguish the method and rhetoric of soul from those of spirit, so that soul is not forced to forfeit its style to fulfill the obligations required by a spiritual perspective, whether philosophical, scientific, or religious. For psychology to be possible at all it must keep the distinction between soul and spirit (Hillman, 1976; 1975a, pp. 67-70; 1977a).

Hillman was emphasizing a mythical and imaginal way of understanding the world, culture, and thought. This imaginal perspective tended to have a priority over other perspectives. Jung understood that the archetypes were at the bottom of our understanding and conceptualizing. Jung's epistemology understood that we know through our experience of psychic images. Jung recognized that all aspects of reality are involved in psychic imagery, fantasy, metaphor, and myth. Hillman extended this understanding to an archetypal *epistemé*, an archetypal theory of knowing. He explained this in *Re-Visioning Psychology*:

> ... Rather our aim is to remember that all knowledge can be psychologized. And that by being psychologized, it also becomes a means of psychological reflection. Therefore all teaching is relevant to the soul as long as its literalism is psychologized. Every statement in

every branch of learning in every university department is a statement made by the psyche through men and women and is a psychological statement. (*RVP*, pp. 132-133)

This method of knowing means that concepts and systems of understanding have informing metaphors. This involves a deliteralizing of ideas that are taken literally by "seeing into" or "seeing through" to the informing archetypal fantasies and metaphors. Archetypal psychology's work is to identify and explicate the archetypal dimension and perspective in all experiences. This is the work of psychologizing: "Through psychologizing I change the idea of any literal action at all—political, scientific, personal—into a metaphorical enactment." (*RVP*, p. 127) This epistemology is based on the primacy of myth. The literal is seen into and through toward metaphor. Truths are turned toward *poesis*:

> ... All consciousness depends upon fantasy images. All we know about the world, about the mind, the body, about anything whatsoever, *including the spirit* and the nature of the divine, comes through images and is organized by fantasies into one pattern or another.
> ... Because these patterns are archetypal, we are always in one or another archetypal configuration, one or another fantasy, including the fantasy of soul and the fantasy of of spirit. (*PP*, p. 57)

Hillman appeared to be placing some ultimacy to the psychic or phenomenal images. Everything appeared to be reducible to these images which, in Hillman's understanding, were just what they appeared to be, irreducible to other categories:

> ... To hold that "we are not real" means that the reality of persons and every act of consciousness is a reflection of a fantasy-image: for these are the only actual existents that are not reducible to something other than their imagery; only they are as they literally appear; only fantasies are utterly, incontrovertible real. (*RVP*, p. 209)

However, Hillman made some qualification to psychologizing. He, like Jung, did not want his approach to be dismissed as a psychological reductionism or psychologism. There may be a legitimate role for particular, literal understandings or logics:

> We should hasten to qualify that psychologizing does not mean *only* psychologizing, or that statements may not have content, merit, and import in the area of their literal expression. Philosophical and scientific assertions are, of course, not only psychological

statements. To reduce such assertions wholly to psychology commits the psychologistic fallacy, or "psychologism." This point is important. (*RVP*, p. 133)

Hillman understood the perspective of depth psychology to have a primacy in relationship to other cultural undertakings since it was already present as other fields and disciplines invented methods to conceptualize their endeavors, whether in the arts, sciences, philosophy, theology, or the trades:

> ... In fact, the categories of logic and number, of science and theology, could themselves be reduced (i.e., led back) to more basic metaphors of myth. No concepts, no matter how general and abstract, could embrace the range of these archetypal metaphors. (*MA*, p. 179)

> ... Our premises present a world that escapes both the demands for logic for definition and the demands of empirical science for demonstration. Fictions take their place in the realm traditionally reserved for the soul, between the world of spirit (metaphysics and intellect) and the world of nature (science and sense perception). They furnish psychology with its own psychic premises, not borrowed from metaphysics and the sciences, which offer a mode of seeing through metaphysics and the sciences. (*RVP*, p. 152)

No realm of life can stand outside of image, myth, and fantasy. There is a kind of ultimacy which Hillman valued in *psyche* as first priority. Archetypal psychology came to understand that there is an imaginal or fictional nature to other axioms, laws, and hypotheses.

The Imagination's Challenge to Literalism

The literal is often the first, surface, or denotative meaning. It is the primary meaning of a word or text. To literalize is to understand in terms of the primary or surface meaning. Literalism is the adherence to the explicit or denotive meaning of a given text, doctrine, perspective, theory, image. In archetypal psychology, literalism has to do with location. An image, dream, or perspective is locked into one literal or surface meaning.

Hillman had spoken about soul-making involving a movement from literal meanings toward imaginal/metaphor meanings so that the deeper mystery can be intuited or sensed. Soul can never be identified with only one of its many locations. Hillman challenged some common literalisms. Many people took the sense of in-ness literally.

They locked this into the concrete location of inside me, a literal inwardness or subjectivity. We do not literally put soul inside psyche or body or mind. Actually, we exist in all of soul since soul enters everything human. It is not confined to the human. There is an imaginal psychic quality to all events:

> ...the moment we realize body also as a subtle body—a fantasy system of complexes, symptoms, tastes, influences and relations, zones of delight, pathologized images, trapped insights—then body and soul lose their borders, neither more literal or metaphorical than the other. Remember: the enemy is the literal, and the literal is not the concrete flesh but negligence of the vision that concrete flesh is a magnificent citadel of metaphors.
>
> Putting soul inside man also neglects that man, too, is a personified literalism—no more an actual real container than soul. (*RVP*, p. 174)

Another literalism was the belief in the clinical field that emotions merely belong to human nature, that men and women are literally responsible for these gifts which have their own spontaneity, autonomy, and presentation, like the divine influxes of William Blake. Is it only my I-ness which intends such experiences? Perhaps they are really organized or initiated by mythical images, imaginal realms.

> If human nature is a composite of multiple psychic persons who reflect the persons in myths, then the experiencer is also in a myth. He or she is not one but many, a flux of vicissitudes. A fixed recording center in their midst is the archetypal illusion of self-identity. This illusion results from experiences which at the first, prepsychologized level always appear literal, to be literally just what they are. The literalization of experience results in literalizing the experiencer. But if experiences can be seen through archetypal fantasies, then the subject of them has no more fixed identity than they. (*RVP*, pp. 177-78)

This discussion about literalizing actually has implications for the field of ethics and morality since the imagination is often negated or dismissed in such discussions. Hillman wrote that he was trying to:

> ...de-moralize the psyche from the moralistic fantasy which reads psychic events in terms of good and bad, right and wrong. This requires the fiction of a fixed subject, the Chooser, or a choosing subject, the Fixer, who can repair, amend, atone. The moralistic fallacy is central to the myth of man in the middle, humanism's psychology of a self-

identified ego, the Hero whose decisive sword divides in two so that he may choose between good and evil. (*RVP*, p. 178)

Just how much freedom does an individual have to choose from? The fantasy of the heroic ego with such freedom to choose also literalizes:

> ...we entertain the extreme view that the notion of human being as centered in the moral person of free will is also a mythical fantasy, an archetypal perspective given by a single Hero or a single God; our freedom to choose, our moral center and decisiveness, our free will—all is the code of a transpersonal dominant. Moral codes, including those which attempt the simplification of universality (the Judaic, the Christian, the Kantian, or the Delphic), are the literalization of an archetypal position. (*RVP*, p. 178)

This moralistic fallacy is evident in psychology and its moralistic overtones of how basic human nature really is in such a manner that what does not fit that definition becomes psychopathy, deviant, or evil. However, emotions can also be understood as "divine influxes" whose effects may vary in terms of moral intent:

> ... (Morals) are effects of Gods who structure our consciousness according to definite principles. There is a morality of Hermes where cheating belongs, of Ares where raging destruction belongs, of Dionysus where victimization belongs. The necessity that rules the Gods give a necessity to each of their imaginal positions and prevents any single one from overstepping the limits presented by the images themselves. The principles of one mythical perspective do not go beyond the myth itself and are not general rules for all conduct. (*RVP*, pp. 178-79)

Archetypal psychology attempts to move off the questions of good and evil. It attempts to look at moralities archetypally. Morality has an imaginal dimension to it in that imaginal powers can make moral claims upon us. It is important to recover the psychic images underlying morality:

> ... These images remind us that we are not alone, choosing and deciding, but that in our choices and decisions we are always reflecting mythic stances. To follow a morality literally is the fallacy that forgets morality's imaginal background; it is even an immoral or impious stance, for it forgets the God in the morality. ... Images are to be left free of judgments, good or bad, positive or negative. (*RVP*, p. 179)

A Necessary Critique of Christianism

Hillman was an imaginal psychologist who has devoted much effort at freeing psychological experience with its mythical basis from the Christian overlay with its interpretation of the myths. Freud concluded that religion was an illusion. Jung tried to deepen Christianity downward through the recognition of shadow and the collective unconscious. Hillman has tried to "bypass the Christian view by stepping behind it to the Greeks, to polytheism." (1983, p. 75) In his volume, *Inter Views*, Hillman characterized his critique of Christianity as "A Running Engagement." He admitted:

> ... I see my work as a long-running engagement with Christianity, a continuing skirmish with the accepted modes of Western thought and therefore with Christian thought, a running engagement all the way through, whether it's in suicide or emotion or Pan and Dionysus or whether it's in the attempt to revalue what was called in alchemy "the primary material" or individual syndromes that have been judged and condemned. It's to save the phenomenon from that organization of the mind which makes our culture sick: belief, unity, truth, identity, integration—all those highly valued words which have a monotheistic psychology behind them. (*IV*, p. 78)

Hillman did not want to see the Christian structures collapse. He was into the "freeing the mythical basis of the psyche from the Christian interpretation of myths."

Hillman continued in this chapter:

> ... What made our modern consciousness Christian happened mainly because, as the Christian theologians said, their method of interpretation took each thought "A prisoner for Christ," that is, gave every myth, every fantasy, every image a Christian meaning. So, the big job is to free the psychological material from those Christian meanings. One way to do this might be to show that these images can carry meanings outside of the Christian approach, outside of the dogma that already says what they mean. I tried to do this in the image of the pathologized Christ-suffering can mean other things beside resurrection.... Suffering has other models, too, like deepening in the sense of Saturn, like dissolving and letting go in the sense of Dionysos, like raging and fighting back; it can make for prophesy; it can make for love; or the kinds of suffering we see in the women in Greek drama. We need many models, besides the Christian one, to locate our psychological experiences. (*IV*, p. 76)

For Hillman, "the return to Greece" basically meant re-visiting classical mythology without the Christian interpretive overlays. This running engagement with Christianity

pointed out that the mythical stories and structures and personages should not be imagined merely through the lens of Christianity. They can be appreciated in a different manner when freed from being prisoners of the Christian point of view.

This engagement was not a dispute in terms of theological argumentation. That was not the kind of engagement Hillman was into:

> ... The (Christian) viewpoint makes the Underworld into Hell and Pan into the devil, Hecate into a witch, and the *diamones*, or protective personifications that guided even Socrates, into demons. I'm not in a position to deal with Christianity head on in a theological manner, that is, to examine Christianity, to examine Church history, the doctrines, and so forth and so on. I don't know enough theology. All I can do is see the effects of bits of it here and there and to look at all these doctrines, all these ideas, these extraordinary fantasies as acts of imagination, as psychological events. That's what Jung did, except that he was still trying to "save Christianity" as heretics are really. He was still a Christian. I don't have that apologetic burden. (*IV*, pp. 76-77)

Hillman alluded to his friend, David L. Miller, who has used a cultural analysis to show that Christianity has many forgotten meanings. Christian writings were originally in Greek and the pagan myths can be seen through these writings. There is a forgotten pagan and polytheistic background to Christianity. Even though this opens another way out of literal Christian overlays, Hillman concluded that Miller's approach was still theology or apologetics, "still committed to saving Christianity":

> ...I want something more psychological. I am more worried about the actual shadow of Christianity working in our mind-sets, in our repressions, right in the middle of psychology itself. The Christian heritage is constantly at work, like a vaccine, like a toxin, invisibly inside our feelings and reactions and ideas, preventing us from seeing ourselves and our world. A self-deception. Look, why was it necessary for Jung—or Nietzsche or Kierkegaard—to spend a whole life working over Christianity or for Freud to invent whole new myths like the primal horde and that roly-poly polymorphous child of sexuality and the three Invisible Persons of the psyche: Ego, Id, Superego? They were trying to find ways out of the Christian overlay. (*IV*, pp. 77-78)

All myths create a kind of blindness to those who are caught in the myth. Hillman was attempting to address that unconsciousness through which Western thought has

become Christian thought. This "organization of the mind" not only makes individual sick, but also the culture: "...belief, unity, truth, identity, integration—all these highly valued words which have a monotheistic psychology behind them." (*IV*, p. 78) Is the person the only carrier of soul? As Hillman discussed the personifying which is part of thinking about human experience, he was critical of Christian understandings noting:

> This view confines the idea of subjectivity to human persons. Only they are permitted to be subjects, to be agents and doers, to have consciousness and soul. The Christian idea of person as the true focus of the divine and the only carrier of soul is basic to this world view. The Christian concentrated focus upon actual living persons has also come to mean that the psyche is too narrowly identified with the ego personality. Also basic to this modern view of persons is the psychology of Descartes; it imagines a universe divided into living subjects and dead objects. There is no space for anything intermediate, ambiguous, and metaphorical. (*RVP*, p. 1)

Other entities which present themselves to us must be understood as imaginary persons. Hillman admitted his equating Christianism with moralistic fundamentalism. He understood that fundamentalism was in service to the myth of the hero:

> ... It gives you fundamental principles—words, truths, directions. It builds a strong ego. It is American psychology. No Hermes, no Dionysus, no Aphrodite in it at all. Utterly monotheistic because there is only one meaning, one reading of the text—like, for instance, the one meaning of Christ's suffering. Another one of these monotheistic disasters of psychology is the unity fantasy. ...the basic idea is the one and only Catholic Church, the one true religion, the historical cosmic Christ, the one and only Son of God, therefore anything that doesn't fit within that unity is split, or schizoid, a hysterical complex or autonomous or whatever else, and you have lost the fact that you are a bundle of many levels, people, noises, impulses, trends, personalities, possibilities and no two days are the same and no two voices are the same and one is a loose structure of many beings—Jung called them complexes. (*IV*, pp. 81-82)

The myth of unity forces a Western ego which has to be a unifier and runs the risk of what the Greeks acknowledged as *hubris*. In traditional Jungian understanding, this ego gets relativized by the archetypal Self as the inner God-image which some would compare with "Christ in their lives." Jung may have acquired this notion of the archetypal

Self from his study of Eastern religions or European mystics or ancient alchemy. But what matters, Hillman stated:

> ...is that it has become amalgamated with Christianity and monotheistic unity because we are in a Christian culture. So when Jungians use the term "self" they can't help but be in the old monotheistic senex structure of unity and centering. The self idea doesn't get us out of the trap, it closes back into it. It's a hopeless circle of hoping to get out of the ego and into the self, via what the Jungians call "the ego-self axis." But what is that axis? ... I spent my time examining the *anima mundi*, which is not an axis but a pleroma, a great fullness of psychic realities...full of the unexpected.... In which the ego and the self are heroes or archons or fictions or complexes, with their different styles of rhetoric, persuasion. Unfortunately, Jungian psychology has got itself caught by its rhetoric. It really believes in these "things," these hypostases, ego and self, which are abstract concepts to begin with and not images and figures, so they are talking *theology* and not psychology. (*IV*, p. 83)

Hillman was not necessarily against either Christianity or the Self. He was attempting to raise consciousness about the mythical fictions woven into belief systems which, if unrecognized, get presented as literalized meanings or as empirical facts. This missed the unconscious which was inherently unknown and unexpected:

> ...psychic reality is unexpected, inventive, unforeseen—just like our dreams—and that the meaning is given by the self idea is no longer unexpected. People already know what to expect from the self: it's already conceptualized. ...fourfold mandalas, synchronicities, transpersonal experiences. (*IV*, p. 85)

Hillman was aware that both religious notions and psychological ideas can be used defensively. Conventionalities can blind us to the very phenomena of psychic and mythic realities.

Hillman also challenged the Christian notion of evil. There was no Devil nor evil in the Greek world. There were other things—ignorance, ugliness, destructiveness. Each god had a mode or style of destructiveness; each could destroy and liberate. This ambiguity was co-present. But in Christian thought, a denial of this ambiguity created a splitting whereby the dark side of the deity is projected in a defense mechanism onto the enemy—pagans, Jews, Moslems, etc.[2] The Greeks saw that things were more mixed up, complex, that phenomena was not all good nor all evil.

Another critique of Christianity which Hillman made is that it biases spirit over soul. Christian thinking has been an expression of spirit rather than of body:

> ...it even opposes the spirit to the soul; therefore in the New Testament we have very little about dreams, we have very little about soul phenomena, and a great deal about spirit phenomena: speaking in tongues, conversions, missions, healing, miracles, preaching. ... A psychology that starts out from Christianity becomes spiritualized, a spirit psychology, a spiritual theology. Soul enters only via symptoms, via outcast phenomena like the imagination of artists or alchemy or "primitives," or of course, disguised as psychopathology. That's what Jung meant when he said the Gods have become diseases: the only way back for them in a Christian world is via the outcast. (*IV*, p. 88)

Psychological life needs to be understood mythically rather than theologically. This involves some problems with believing. The statement, "I believe," becomes a subjectivism which can deny the imagination.

Hillman wrote that he was trying to get at an "animal faith," a faith in the world whereby the heart has a sensing, "of a blood-soul, like an *anima*, or of imagining." In Christianism, the heart had become "the place of personal confession and self-examination and conscience ... subjectivism." Often, Christian beliefs appeared to cut us off from this animality, this animism, which is what Jung called *esse in anima*, a living in the world with soul and sensing soul-in-the-world:

> ... Christianity works very hard at saving the soul, but this seems impossible if it leaves out the animal soul. This extraordinary religion, the religion that we are all in no matter how hard we try to deny it or escape it, has lost its animals. So it is always fulfilling its image of a God without genitals, without animals, no matter how much it tries to save the soul. Christianity wouldn't have to moralize about the soul so much and worry about evil so much, about belief so much, if it didn't have something in its basic archetypal fantasy, inherently in the religion itself, that is destructive to the soul. And that is why psychoanalysis is engaged with Christianity. It has to be. Psychoanalysis has to be worried about, superstitious about, the shadow of Christianity and its effect on the soul. Psychology's job is always with the shadow—"the horror, the horror"—and Christianity says the soul is saved or will be saved by belief in the Christian fantasy, but the horror, the horror may lie in that very fantasy itself. (*IV*, pp. 91-92)

Incorporating Jewish Elements into Psychology

Can archetypal psychology itself be placed in a religious tradition? James Hillman was Jewish. His maternal grandfather was a rabbi instrumental in founding the Reformed Jewish movement in American. Hillman addressed the question of placing archetypal psychology in a religious tradition in his essay, "How Jewish Is Archetypal Psychology?" (*Spring 53*, 1992). He noted that archetypal psychology has been placed in various traditions. David Miller has seen a Protestant coloring with its attacks on conventional idolatries and deconstructive method. Its notion of soul and roots in neo-Platonism and Marsilio Ficino could give it a Roman Catholic hue. Others see it as having a pre-Christian or pagan concern. Hillman noted, however, that "The Jewish component has been forgotten—or repressed." (p. 122)

Hillman described archetypal psychology as a "pre-Christian endeavor ... neither Protestant nor Catholic. Hardly Christian at all, but Pagan." (p. 122) He alluded to the question of a Jewish psychology which had been around since Freud, and admitted he is nervous about identifying archetypal psychology as Jewish for fear of "...opening the door wide to suppressed demons I can't even imagine." (p. 122) But what characteristics fuel the question?

> Not in theology or ritual, in textual reverence or law is archetypal psychology Jewish; rather it is Jewish in its current incursions into the collective culture of therapy, a culture which is *horribile dictu* and *kholile*, still devoutly unconsciously Christian. By unconsciously Christian I mean a culture unconscious of its Christianism. I mean that the most resistant unconsciousness is not so much primitive wildness or inert sloth as it is the Christian inheritance that informs every feeling, every thought that comes to mind. Christianism is endemic to the culture, inescapable. Contemporary therapy partakes of this unconsciousness in its worship of the inner child, its self-righteousness, and its sentimentalism about victimization and empowerment (see Nietzsche). What in Christian tradition is being washed in the blood of the innocent white lamb appears in the culture as salvation through denial—a denial that therapy is powerless to pierce since it worships at the same altar. Hence my "Running Engagement with Christianity" in both *Inter Views* and *The Dream and the Underworld*. I have been trying for years to distance an archetypal psychology from the Christianism of therapy. (*Spring 53*, pp. 122-23)

Hillman continued to show how archetypal psychology did what anti-Semitic legends have said about Jews for centuries. Archetypal psychology's Jewishness did create a tension with the collective culture Hillman was characterizing as Christianism. The killing of the savior may be seen in archetypal psychology's deconstruction of notions such as salvation, redemption, and perfection as it has "de-throned the Jungian identification of Self with Christ." Like the accusations of Jews, archetypal psychology has been impossible in its "stubborn refusal" to budge from "stick to the image" and "all is fantasy." It will not convert to "psychological literalisms" such as, "the end goal of soul-making as wisdom, integration, and conjunction of opposites." The belief in images appears idolatrous. Archetypal psychology wanders in a Diaspora, never quite settling down with theologians, philosophers, psychiatrist and clinical psychologists, even wandering into dialogues with poets, ecologists, city planners, movie makers, etc. Archetypal psychology poisons the wells by dropping "drops of doubt into collective comfort" which offend Christian literalisms. Archetypal psychology kills "the child" metaphorically as its tries to see into the literalistic understanding of "the inner child," "the victimized child," etc. There is a "worldliness" to archetypal psychology as it dirties idealisms with the reminder of inevitable and necessary pathologizing, grounding soul in the pathologized psyche. In its vision, even the gods and goddesses are pathologized with their particular forms of destructiveness, so it "…conforms to both a Greek feeling and to the Hebrews' experience of Jahweh's arbitrary destructive wrath." Christianism preaches that "souls have got to get saved" due to its idea of evil:

> But if there is no evil per se, then what's there to be saved from, to recover from? The world? In Jewish eyes, the world and the flesh are not devilish. In fact worldliness is where the divine exists—see Spinoza's *Ethics*, Maimonides's *Guide*, the founding inspiration in Zionism's "homeland," and again see Levinas's ontological priority of ethics. So the saving grace for the Jews, like the recent task of archetypal psychology, is working on the world, in the world, for the world, as the path of soul-making. This path deviates from the high road of therapy which, sad to say, may often be a secular disguise for Christian recovery from worldliness, sin and evil. Before there was therapy, even before Christianism, there was being around on the planet, living in the world and informing it with soul and the soul with the world, an archetypal teaching which was, maybe, the old job of the Rebbe. (*Spring 53*, pp. 129-30)

In the chapter, "A Running Engagement with Christianity" in *Inter Views*, Hillman noted, "The Greeks didn't have a word 'religion.' Christianity just didn't know what to do with its Greek inheritance—so they baptized it 'pagan.' It means 'rocky hill': I'm pagan; Man of the Hill!" (p. 80)

However, Hillman is actually Jewish. Laura Pozzo then asked Hillman about the Jewish approach to history. Hillman replied:

Freud made a Jewish move with his case history: he deliteralized it. The Jewish approach to the *story* and the variations on the story. History is a series of images, tales, geographies, figures, lessons. It's not so much fact. Psychologically, it's the story of Christ, not the historical Christ—the redeemer is in the imagination, in the imaginal, always about to appear, but never phenomenal. In fact, you could say the redeemer is the imagination itself. Like Blake said, "Jesus the Imagination," but then he was a Kabbalist. As far as I know, is it a Jewish mode to prove the historical Abraham, the historical Noah, the historical David? It's certainly a Christian mode to dig up evidence for the historical Christ. Some of the very finest, most subtle minds—Renan, Schweitzer—have been engaged in this ridiculous business of proving or disproving their religion with historical "facts." I don't think the Jewish mode thinks in terms of scientific evidence to show the uniqueness of its faith.

But the story isn't literalized into a credo, a dogma that must be believed.

It has to be retold, that's the whole business of the Midrash, it has to be retold and it has to be twisted—like what we said about Bach, that he left no form as he found it, he had to make his own twist to the form that he got—to my mind that's Jewish thinking. (*IV*, p. 80)

The further discernment of the reintroduction of Jewish thought and ideas into either a psychology or theology by discussions with archetypal psychology points to an area for more research which is beyond the argument here and extent of this project.

CHAPTER 8

CRITIQUES OF HILLMAN AND ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOLOGY

Hillman and his archetypal psychology have been a revisionistic attempt in the field of Jungian psychology. The underlying and basic assumptions which underlie Hillman's theories and writings have been difficult for many colleagues and readers to understand. There have also been a number of critical and contrasting assessments of Hillman's depth psychology from both within the ranks of the Jungian community as well as the wider field of psychoanalysis and as well as the professional fields which interact with it. This project has already addressed a few of the questions raised about Hillman's archetypal psychology. Is archetypal psychology really a depth psychology or is it more of a literary enterprise? Is Hillman really still a Jungian given his departure from Jung in his definition of the archetype? Does Hillman no longer believe in the archetypal Self? Is Hillman creating a psychology of soul as one-sided as a psychology of ego?

Archetypal Psychology or Imaginal Psychology?

One of the first and rather reactionary assessments of Hillman's archetypal psychology is by V. Walter Odajnyk, a Jungian analyst who wrote an article for *Quadrant*, "The Psychologist as Artist: The Imaginal World of James Hillman." (1984) In it he tried to grasp the basics of Hillman's theory. Odajnyk noted Hillman's "impressive body of work" over a couple of decades as well as the broadening which the focus on soul brings to psychology. His perspective on Hillman was, "Simply put, Hillman's nature has imposed on him the task of joining his literary impulses with his love of psychology." (p. 42) However, Odajnyk wondered if Hillman's defining of the unconscious as imagination and "Hillman's urge to subsume psychology under the arts" does not suggest that he should call his body of work "imaginal psychology" or "phenomenological psychology" rather than archetypal psychology which connoted Jung's understanding of the archetype (something Hillman does not conform to). Odajnyk questioned if Hillman's focus on the soul as the main source of psychic life was

not as potentially one-sided as ego-psychology: "...where before the ego tried to dominate the psyche, now all psychic life is to be subsumed by the needs of the soul. Instead of ego-psychology, we have soul-psychology." (p. 43)

Odajnyk had difficulty understanding the underlying assumptions of Hillman's work since he had no biographical information on Hillman and that "no one has yet undertaken a critical appraisal of this *oeuvre*, which would certainly be a book-length enterprise." (pp. 42-43) He summarized the intent of Hillman's writings as:

> ... The unconscious defined as imagination; the emphasis on images and soul; the preoccupation with Greek and Roman mythology; the insistence on treating the dream only in its own terms; the tendency to dismiss everyday reality in his therapeutic work; the defense of the *puer*; the positive acceptance of pathology; the constant play on words; the attempt to be original, indeed, revolutionary; and the conscious effort to develop his own school of psychology—what was it all about? (Odajnyk, pp. 39-40)

Odajnyk criticized Hillman on his lack of an explanatory biography or psychobiography. "I gather he is a personally reticent or shy man." He was just critical of Hillman in this area rather than respecting Hillman's psychological reasons for not putting the ego, biography, and personalism on center stage (an official biography is now in the works). Hillman deliberately moved away from an overemphasis upon the subjectivism, personalism, and literalism of biographies. Odajnyk wanted to pin this aversion on the psychology of the *puer* which he felt Hillman was identified with, "the attempt to escape one's given reality." Odajnyk revealed his own biases in his desire to know more about Hillman's parents, childhood, teenage years. He wrote, "These biographical facts might have been helpful in understanding his often angry anti-authority and anti-conventional feelings and behavior." (p. 41)

My understanding of Odajnyk's turning to biography is that he really does not understand Hillman's resistance to being ego-rhetorical and that his focus on this question of biography suggests his own inculcation and biases as an analyst with an eye to personal development, history, the person behind the ideas. Thomas Moore's "Prologue" to *A Blue Fire* may speak to Obajnyk's concern about a lack of biographical confession or admission on Hillman's part:

... For Hillman, style and imagination *are* method. If the theory holds that imagination is the primary activity of the psyche, then Hillman's own psychological writing will above all reflect imagination. If one wants to learn something about archetypal psychology, it would be helpful to notice not only *what* Hillman says, but also *how* he explores an idea and expresses it.

One aspect of style that strikes some readers is Hillman's way of depersonalizing and deliteralizing himself as author. A third-person sense seems always to qualify his first-person statements. Except for some brief passages in *Inter Views*, one rarely comes across biographical details. When he does write in the first person, he is almost always engaged in a passionate debate about ideas. In effect, Hillman fictionalizes himself in his writing, adding one more metaphoric stone to his building of the imaginal. (*ABF*, pp. 2-3)

Odajnyk raised other critical questions about Hillman's psychology. These concerns were articulated around the following: Hillman's defense of the psychology of the *puer*, his attempt to establish a school of thought, his departure from Jung in his understanding of the archetype and a consequential displacement of such forces onto the phenomena of images, his going from one extreme to an other in the valuation of multiplicity over unity. Odajnyk appeared to have a rather narrow definition regarding the psychology of the *puer*—the attempt to escape one's given reality, identification with eternal youth, etc. Hillman acknowledged living in the mythical structure of the *puer*, the young man, however, this archetypal place brought potentials, adventures, newness, experience in the here and now, which can paradoxically balance the abstract, regulated, depressive mood, and love of tradition associated with the *senex*. Hillman's tendency is to be mostly senexy in his writings, so the *puer* coloring added a liveliness to his thought. Hillman has worked to bring about a reconciliation in the paradoxical tandem of the old and the new. His archetypal psychology brought fresh perspectives to old notions; his sense of authority as a *senex* has fathered a field, so to speak, but he retains a *puer* wit.

A new school of thought had indeed emerged from Hillman's ideas. Odajnyk quoted Hillman, "Archetypal psychology can be seen as a cultural movement part of whose task is the re-visioning of psychology, psychopathology, and psychotherapy in terms of the Western cultural imagination." (*AP*, p. 2) Odajnyk was critical of what he felt was Hillman's attempt to portray archetypal psychology as a "broadly-based intellectual movement." Ironically, since Odajnyk's 1984 assessment, the field of

archetypal psychology has grown and influenced many aspects of culture, but not through a literalized building of an institute (except for the organic, independent growth of the Pacifica Graduate Institute) or community of institutes.

Odajnyk's primary concern, and it is a common critique of Hillman's thought, was his departure from a traditional Jungian understanding of the archetype:

> The most fundamental issue that needs to be addressed is Hillman's departure from Jung in the definition of *archetype*. "...unlike Jung, who radically distinguishes between noumenal archetype *per se* and phenomenal archetypal image, archetypal psychology rigorously refuses even to speculate about a non-presented archetype per se. Its concern is with the phenomenon: the archetypal image." This leads to the next step: "...any image can be considered archetypal." (Odajnyk, p. 43)

Since "archetypal psychology" suggested it was based on the Jungian understanding of archetypes, why not use the adjective imaginal or phenomenological instead? Plus Hillman knew of Jung's understanding of the archetypes becoming indirectly visible and knowable by the *psyche* through images, why the resistance to Jung's understanding?

Odajnyk found Hillman's view of religion to be disconcerting as well as his refusal to speculate about any non-presentational archetype. Hillman had concluded, "The Gods are taken essentially, as foundations, so that psychology points beyond soul and can never be merely agnostic." (*AP*, p. 34) For Hillman, the Gods were to be "...respected as powers and persons and creators of value." (*AP*, p. 34) They were imagined as "the formal intelligibility of the phenomenal world." To Odajnyk, this understanding of these forces which "...order and make intelligible the entire phenomenal world of nature and human consciousness, ..." (*AP*, p. 36) but are not images nor conceptual constructs, sounded much like Jung's understanding of archetypes. Had Hillman really gotten beyond the Kantian dualism he wanted to avoid? And, had Hillman really avoided a monotheistic way of thinking by placing soul at the center of existence? Had Hillman ignored the fact that the *psyche* favored unity over multiplicity with the emergence of monotheism paralleling an inner development whereby the ego emerged as the unifying force?

For all the questions and concerns raised by Odajnyk, he did affirm the importance of Hillman's work as a valuable contribution and counterpoint to our common cultural assumptions and understandings:

> ...(Hillman) deliberately wants to get away from the Northern European Protestant-Jewish *Weltanschauung*, with its Germanic, positivistic, rationalistic, monotheistic mental constructs, and pick up the Mediterranean culture—Greek, Renaissance, Romantic—with its affirmation of soul, sensuousness, passion, humanism and polytheism. Again, this is the artist's journey. Italy! It's this move, as well as his emphasis on soul as opposed to ego, image as opposed to concept, empathy as opposed to understanding, art for art's sake, i.e., sticking to the image as opposed to the utilitarian approach to dreams and the psyche, that makes Hillman's perspective a valuable counterpoint to the Northern European way of seeing and doing things. The same is true of his "polytheism:" the stress on pluralism, multiplicity, relativism; letting every complex, every image have its say and not placing them in an hierarchical order. (Odajnyk, p. 44)

Is Archetypal Psychology Incompatible with a Scientific Worldview?

Walter A. Shelburne was a Professor of Philosophy who wrote a book entitled, *Mythos and Logos in the Thought of Carl Jung* (1988). In this work, he argued that Jung's idea of the collective unconscious would be reconciled with a scientific point of view. He noted that whereas Jung tried to ground his archetypal theory in a scientific attitude, James Hillman had taken up the cause of mythos and tried to understand all of experience by its terms, including science but also theology. Hillman saw mythos actually underlying logos: all thought, including science, informed by fantasy, root metaphors, mythic images. Shelburne concluded that Hillman's alternative understanding of archetypes was incompatible with the scientific attitude:

> ...the radical nature of Hillman's metapsychological views necessitates a detailed rebuttal. For to accept Hillman's ideas on the relationship between science and archetypes would mean that Jung's whole project of a reconciliation of a theory embracing archetypal phenomena with the scientific worldview is fundamentally mistaken. Thus, there are real incompatibilities between Hillman's and Jung's views of archetypes and these incompatibilities need to be addressed before the idea of a rapprochement of an archetypal theory with science can be accepted as a meaningful and viable enterprise. (Shelburne, p. 83)

Shelburne claimed that Hillman emphasized mythos to the denigration of logos. Even psychology got deliteralized by Hillman. Was everything reducible to a fantasy? Was there metaphor in every statement or thought?

In his critique of Hillman's view, Shelburne asked if, from Hillman's point of view, science was merely another fantasy of the soul for "...the essence of science is the eventual accountability of these models to literal truth conditions determined by experimental outcomes." (Shelburne, p. 89) He questioned whether *mythos* was accountable to *logos* when Hillman's imaginal approach to the dream was not translated or interpreted in light of daytime realities:

> ...(Hillman) wants us to focus on the images and disregard any thought about what the images might mean in respect to translating their significance for events in the everyday world. But this simply will not do because the mythos is itself meaningless unless it does relate at least indirectly to the logos perspective of things. Dreams are meaningless unless they have at least some indirect relation to our waking, nondream world. Metaphors, likewise, are meaningless without an implicit relation to the literal world. For we evaluate the mythos not entirely in terms of itself, but also in terms of how it helps us to appreciate and understand the logos. We judge metaphors, then, on how well they serve to illuminate the nonmetaphorical. (Shelburne, p. 89)

It would appear that the question Shelburne was raising has something to do with the accountability of the mythic to the logical, the *mythos* to the *logos*. Shelburne doubted if Hillman could be consistent in his assertion that archetypal psychology was not concerned with truth while still arguing for the primacy of soul in psychology. *Logos* cannot be disregarded in the attempt to deliteralize everything. The metaphorical should not be understood as the literal and fantasy as the concrete reality.

Shelburne pointed out that Hillman's move away from *logos* toward *mythos* had forced Hillman to admit that his psychology fell to some degree within the realm of religion as Hillman understood archetypes as Gods which addressed us. Shelburne noted the following statements by Hillman in *Re-Visioning Psychology*:

> By setting up a universe which tends to hold everything we do, see, and say in the sway of its cosmos, an archetype is best comparable with a God. (p. xiii)

Archetypes are psychic structures, but not only this, for they are also Gods who cannot be encompassed by anyone's individual soul. (p. 134)

A re-vision of psychology means recognizing that psychology does not take place without religion, because there is always a God in what we are doing. (p. 228)

Here we are opening into "the religion of psychology" by suggesting that psychology is a variety of religious experience. (p. 227)

Hillman actually did not take these "Gods" literally since that was the fantasy of theology rather than of archetypal psychology. But did the capital "G" suggest a slipping back into *logos*? Hillman was pointing to something real but not literally real.

Shelburne also thought that Hillman's argument was weakened "...by its ideological character that has a ready-made answer to any criticism." (Shelburne, p. 90) since all points of view could be psychologized or seen through. Other points of view could be rendered as manifestations of another fantasy. If Hillman's epistemology was more primordial or primary than nonpsychological understandings, could his archetypal psychology be validly criticized from other perspectives? Perhaps Hillman's ideas were similar to faith or belief if they were not subject to rational critiques of other points of view. Shelburne pointed out the need of archetypal psychology to address those who were critical of it if it ever wished a broader acceptance.

Shelburne concluded:

Thus, although aspects of Hillman's perspective on the archetypal theory may have something of value to offer as an alternative model in terms of which to understand archetypes, Hillman fundamentally fails to demonstrate that his overall outlook on the mythos and logos is superior to Jung's original position, and that Jung's attempt to achieve a reconciliation with science is misconceived. Because of the inconsistencies and undesirable consequences attendant upon Hillman's view, it cannot be accepted as an adequate alternative theory of archetypes. (Shelburne, p. 91)

In What Way Are the Gods Real?

There was an animated conversation between James Hillman and Wolfgang Giegerich for a number of years. Giegerich is a German Jungian analyst and Hegelian. After his university studies in literature in Germany and the United States (he was also an assistant professor at Rutgers), he trained in analytical psychology in Stuttgart. He has an

analytical practice and is a training analyst near Munich. It is important to note that Giegerich's constructive thought is Hegelian, thus the allusions to "negation," "sublated," "dialectic," "logical life." Giegerich's essay, "Killings: Psychology's Platonism and the Missing Link to Reality" (*Spring 54*, 1993), provoked a response by Hillman, "Once More Into the Fray" (*Spring 56*, 1994).

Hillman began his response addressing Giegerich as "my admired colleague and well-loved friend." Giegerich's essay was presented at the 1992 Festival of Archetypal Psychology at Notre Dame University and was apparently taken from his study, *Killings—Violence from the Soul: An Essay on the Origin and History of Consciousness*. Archetypal psychology, he noted, was a psychology "with Gods." But was this talk of Gods "merely a kind of glamorizing jargon, fundamentally removed from that reality that once was referred to by the word 'Gods'?" Can you really behold such Gods in our modern world? The question led into the motif of sacrificing bulls to Zeus. Is there much to Zeus if there were not sacrifices? Afterall, sacrifice was an old religious rite. Giegerich discussed the hunt as ritual. The shock of the kill shocked the soul itself. What was told in myth, however, was at one time an actual event in a concrete life of a man or woman:

> ... Meaning here is primarily within, and as the event, it is not a conscious *feeling experience* of meaning, nor yet a positivized meaning as intellectual content. There is no Marxist superstructure here, no platonistic realm of ideas. The imaginal, the psychological, which later articulates itself at first in the form of Gods and spirits and then as images and ideas and still later as concepts, *is* only *as* the negated, killed merely-biological life. (*Spring 54*, p. 11).

From this understanding, Giegerich stated that the soul does not belong to ontic categories but rather the soul is logical life. As logical life, soul was self-generating. Soul had "edified itself by means of innumerable incisive acts" such as through killing eventually recognizing itself as the light and as consciousness:

> ... Each killing blow imprinted the specific archetypal image in the soul afresh. The archetypes are here not simply *a priori*. There is not an inexhaustible store of archetypal images given with the world. Man has to contribute to their generation: by *sacrum facere* (making sacred, sacrificing). Just as for the Pueblo Indians, as we hear from Jung, the sun does not travel merely by nature across the sky, it needs continual help from humans,

through ritual. The blow and the blood are "facts" in a literal sense, results of the soul's own *making*, and left with their shocking effect an indelible impression in the soul, one that bestowed on the divine an unquestionable reality. Millenia after the abolition of bloody sacrifices, the shock that had made the soul shake, deepened and renewed in thousands of sacrifices, still has an echo, which today we call an archetypal or numinous experience. (*Spring 54*, p. 13)

Giegerich concluded that the Gods did not have reality through such sacrifices and rituals in our contemporary experience. They were more abstract and subjective. Gods were not "existing entities" but rather the "results of the soul's acting." The Platonistic fallacy was the reduction of soul-making to a passive reception of vision and imagination rather than an active making of sacrificial act and gesture. Archetypes and images, in imagistic psychology, similar to Platonic forms, are too removed from historical actions and from the logical but real action of the soul. The Gods got defined as symbols or metaphors:

... Even Hillman, who after all introduced the term soul-making and the idea of pathologizing as soul-making, in the early days of archetypal psychology thought that the statements in myth about killings or dismemberment "have a meaning, not on the positivistic level of historical fact, but on the imaginal level. They are symbolic expressions. (*Spring 54*, pp. 15-16)

Giegerich questioned whether the approach of archetypal psychology could really connect modern men and women to reality with its *aisthesis*, with imagination and intuition, with an imaginal or aesthetic approach.

Hillman's response noted that Giegerich "maybe the most important Jungian thought going on right now—maybe the only Jungian consistent thought at all." Hillman affirmed that Giegerich's "analysis of the plight of the soul of psychology" and his other work have "kept a vision of ruthless truth alive..." But, Hillman identified fallacies in Giegerich's paper. There was a fallacy of historical models. "Must Gods in the present be observed by mimesis of the past...?" (*Spring 56*, p. 3) This was defining a God as historical fallacy but which slipped into a theological fallacy of defining God. Zeus may remain Zeus even without the concrete bull and sacrifice. The Gods asked not to be forgotten, so they may well be remembered "as psychological facts." Killing, spear, ax, sacrifice can be understood in an "as if" or metaphorical manner. Another fallacy was the

ontological fallacy through which something is declared as real. (p. 6) The metaphorical actualities should not be rendered as "irrealities." They did have ontological status. Hillman did not allude to Corbin's thought here. But, the imaginal world in archetypal psychology could be understood to be just as real as any reality. There are many types of reals—imagination, ideals, principles, etc.:

> None of these is necessarily prior and thereby *more real* than any other. To claim that any one of them is prior, more basic, more necessary or more inclusive is to privilege one real over another and therewith reveal your position in the philosophical spectrum, which God you are serving. Besides, the real you elect at first says which fantasy of reality your soul inhabits—and which one it has most trouble seeing through as a fantasy, because it believes this elected fantasy is *really real*. (*Spring 56*, p.7)

Hillman admitted to following Jung's psychic ontology: "The psyche creates reality every day. The only expression I can use for this activity is fantasy." (*CW 6*, §78) To ask for harder facts was what Whitehead might call an example of the fallacy of "misplaced concretism."

> My point here is that the experience of death does not require the ritual sacrifice of actual animals because the imagination, the metaphor, the abstraction, of this act is no less an actual fact—unless we attribute primary ontological status to actual knives and blood. He does. I don't. (*Spring 56*, p. 8)

Another fallacy was what Hillman called "the fallacy of Lutheran concretism," raising the question, "What happens to the wine and bread during Mass? In what way was the God present—concretely or symbolically, physically or psychologically in sense or in mind?" How do we keep "the sensuous feeling of psychological acts even as we symbolize? Hillman concluded that we need not depend on literal enactments. Hillman also thought Giegerich confused soul with ego when he wrote, "(Gods) are results of the soul's acting...." Reality was made by fantasy. The imaginal needed to be understood as real as the logical. "The very modes which Giegerich finds flaky and thin—the senses, aisthesis, imagination, intuition, vision, metaphor—are the modes by which the Gods present themselves." (*Spring 56*, p. 14)

Hillman noted that neither he nor Giegerich meant that Gods were either made by us or are just projections. Each thinker acknowledged the Gods required something "from

the soul for their continued reality." Hillman said they did not want to be forgotten. Archetypal psychology worked at their remembrance:

> ... (The Gods) offer a land of magical realism to give home to this hemisphere's transcendent longings, at the same time allowing us to escape from the concretism of America's fundamentally earthbound religiosity. The imagination they enrichen confirms that this world—contra Giegerich's desire for a "human world"—despite all its human horrors is nonetheless a constant miracle of delusional grandeur. They give us vision. Vision makes the world real; aisthesis makes it bearable; rhetoric makes it speakable; poiesis, illusional; and rhapsody, illogical. Not Hegel; Whitman. The Gods are our prosperity. (*Spring 56*, p. 18)

Giegerich had challenged Hillman about the dangers inherent in humanizing mythology as well as making the argument that the soul's life should at bottom be a logical life. If psychology wanted to be a discipline of thought proper it must overcome the illusion that its subject matter was what is going on inside people. Conventional Jungianism appeared to him to be a regression behind Jung's notions and archetypal psychology was an advance. However, it was in need of a radical criticism in regard to its imaginal base. Giegerich's critique was that archetypal psychology would have to go beyond the imaginal. (p. 11) Psychology must try to comprehend our reality in conceptual terms, to develop a truly psychological mode of conceptual, abstract thought. Today's soul needed more abstract thinking.

Most recently, Giegerich has published *The Soul's Logical Life*. He appreciated Jung's genuine notion of soul which was intuitive and not conceptually worked out in a consistent manner. Jungians minimized this heritage when turning psychology into either a common, pop psychology or reducing it to an endeavor characterized as scientific and clinical. Giegerich took the Hegelian move of "sublating" and suggested psychology was a sublated science and medicine. He gave Hillman credit for bringing the phenomena of soul back to the field of psychology. However, "...a critical analysis shows that a psychology based on the imagination cannot truly overcome the positivistic, personalistic prejudice that it set out to overcome...."

Thomas Moore is an author who has publicized Hillman's ideas to the public, primarily through his best-selling book, *Care of the Soul*. Giegerich criticized Moore's

interpretation in Moore's essay, "Artemis and the Puer" in *Puer Papers*, (pp. 169-204). Giegerich's concern was that the mythical image of Actaion was "*...de facto* reduced to mere duplication of the psychology and pathology familiar in modern empirical people, whereas it was actually supposed to provide the archetypal background that could illumine them." (p. 165) What was the relationship between archetypal images and our psychological afflictions? Giegerich articulated many questions which continue to be discussed in conversations regarding Hillman's archetypal psychology. What was the relationship between classical mythology and modern psychological realities as understood by imaginal psychology? Did imaginal psychology humanize mythology rather than de-humanize psychology? Was this a hermeneutical effort to make sense of suffering in a new perspective? Or was this saying there are ontological or immediate connections between our complexes and myths?

The polytheistic stance seemed to suggest that the ancient Gods were still alive and inherent in the present. Did we have to de-literalize in order to access the imaginal? Was the mythological mode of being-in-the-world denied to those who live in the modern period following the Enlightenment? Was there a different logic to our world than that of the classical world in which the Gods and mythical heroes were alive and filled the world? Could imaginal psychology really supply this logic to the our postmodern world? Or was imaginal psychology merely making the case for an aesthetic appreciation of ancient mythic images? Perhaps the Greek Gods which archetypal psychology alluded to were the result of higher learning which meant they were "formal abstractions" rather than resulting form authentic religious or mythological experiences. These concerns continue to be a challenging but a collegial dialogue exists between Giegerich and Hillman.

Is Archetypal Psychology Really "the New Age Version of Jungian Theory?

A less philosophical, collegial, and rigorous critique of Hillman and archetypal psychology was made by David Tacey in a book entitled, *Jung and the New Age* (2001). Tacey was not a Jungian analyst. He was an academician, an Associate Professor at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Autralia. He articulated a theoretical and philosophical account of New Age thinking and was critical of New Age culture's understanding of

Jung as a mystic. In addressing this misappropriation of Jung, Tacey explored New Age consciousness and the emergence of spirituality in contrast to formal religion. Although his previous writings appeared to favor Hillman's thought and archetypal psychology, even claiming to having done analytic work with Hillman, his critique of Hillman in this book had an emotional aura of antagonism and critical negativity. His critique seemingly demonstrates, perhaps, a kind of emotional disappointment in Hillman's thought, especially in Hillman's more recent publications.

Tacey seems to have felt that archetypal psychology was "...the New Age version of Jungian theory, ..." And, he was suspicious of New Agers who might give up on life to follow "the downhill course of ecstasy into the ocean." (p. 64) A genuine encounter with the sacred, by which he appeared to mean an encounter with God, would draw the person back into life. Tacey understood the theology of incarnation to lead toward a metapsychology of the ego. The ego should be respected as it is an archetype. Hillman and his archetypal psychology did not do this:

> The theology of incarnation leads in turn to a metapsychology of the human ego, insofar as the ego carries the incarnation forward and is the locus of suffering in the human person. The human ego is not just a useless appendage, but is a divinely sanctioned entity. The human element is made in the image of the divine, to perform the work of the divine. ... For Jung, the ego is a prefiguration of the archetype of the Self; it is our partial, human, incomplete experience of that greater Self which will always remain elusive and beyond our full realisation. The ego must not be dissolved, despite the exhortations of James Hillman and his archetypal psychology, because the ego is itself an archetype and needs to be respected as such. It is therefore ironic that 'archetypal' psychology displays such a systematic vendetta against the ego, a recognition that allows us to conjecture that 'archetypal psychology' is in fact the New Age version of Jungian theory, or the Jungian school that most nearly approximates to the oceanic, anti-incarnational philosophy of New Age experience. There are real philosophical and cosmological differences between a psychology of life integration and a cult of the unconscious. (*Jung and the New Age*, p. 64)

From this critique, Tacey moved into a discussion of wholeness as both a new psychological as well as spiritual ideal. He felt the New Age had a cosmology whose spiritual practices such as meditation attempted to break down the barriers of the rational intellect to return to the world and the experience of a primal unity or wholeness, the one

true reality. Tacey was critical when Jung was appropriated to this quest for the "unitary reality of the uni-verse." But Tacey concluded that the New Age missed Jung's dynamic condition (by which I hope he means Jung's complexes and complexities) of wholeness.

Hillman's self-identification with the *puer aeternus* was another locus for Tacey's critique. He wrote that as he read von Franz, the *puer* often wore "...heavy gowns and hooded capes." (This sounds like a compensation, making a place for the senex which Hillman suggested was the real backdrop of the *puer*, not the tandem of the mother/son but the tandem of the young man/old man, potentiality / actuality.) Tacey pulled out the authority one-upmanship of an eminent Jungian analyst in von Franz, an analyst whom Hillman was respectful of although they had collegial disagreements. Tacey writes:

> ... Marie-Louise von Franz wrote...that the puer was not yet 'born' into the world, and he clung to secret spaces as to the bosom of the world mother. James Hillman (1973) later denounced von Franz's reading of the *puer*, claiming that the *puer* had nothing to do with the mother, and attacking von Franz for imposing the mother complex onto this mythic figure. In her correspondence with me in 1978, von Franz, in turn, denounced Hillman, declaring that he was denying certain facts about the *puer aeternus* because he had a personal identification with the archetype. Von Franz assured me that Jung would not have followed Hillman's position, since for Jung 'the *puer aeternus* only lives on and through the Mother.' (1912/52: 258) I sided with von Franz in this dispute, and recognised that the *puer* was indeed a son of the mother, and that his mysticism was a secret attempt to return to her. (*Jung and the New Age*, pp. 92-93)

Tacey suggests that

> ... The messy psychological and emotional problems of individual experience are gloriously transcended by our identification with spiritual or cosmic patterns. ... In this way, 'archetypal' psychology can become a defence against development (in the sense of individuation), and 'myth' becomes a way of avoiding contact with what is really going on in the psyche. (*Jung and the New Age*, p. 102)

He was also concerned about the New Age's popularization of Jungian thought, as well as spiritual insights of Buddhism, Yoga, Jewish mysticism, Sufism, etc. These, he concluded, were seductive, flawed, vulgarizations:

... But the list of writers indulging in escapist or unreal representation of Jungian psychology is considerably large, and growing all the time now that writers have glimpsed the market potential of Jungian thinking.

... But in this category I would place the works of such writers a Robert Bly, Robert Johnson, Robert Moore, Douglas Gillette, Clarissa Pinkola Estes, Guy Corneau, Carol Pearson, Jean Shinoda Bolen, Caroline Casey, and the later writings of James Hillman, among others.... When I am critical of these writers, it is sometimes said that I am envious of their success. This excuse can be used as a way of avoiding criticism, and the intellectual debate can be shut down by resorting to reductions of this kind.

Some of these New Age Jungian writers ... have not had any formal education in Jungian thought, and are basing their writings on a minute theoretical foundation. But others, like Robert Moore, Hillman, Estes, Corneau, Bolen and others are trained, professional Jungians. The recipe for fame and publicity is simple: if a writer can offer a program whereby people transcend their normal limitations by ascending to spiritual heights, success is guaranteed. The New Age literature drops the idea into people's heads that they are actually Gods, or that they can command the Gods to work on their behalf, or that they can perform heroic or God-like tasks. Just by reading the latest book, the humble reader can be marvelously transformed into a man who bends iron with his bare hands, or a gifted knight who discovers the grail or draws the sword from the stone. Any ordinary neurotic can suddenly transform into Hermes or Zeus, or a broken life can miraculously arise from its depression as Innana, Ishtar or Persephone. (*Jung and the New Age*, pp. 108-09)

I am well acquainted with the writings and personally some of the authors of whom this diatribe attacks. I know much of their vigorous and thorough educational, clinical, professional, and publishing accomplishments. I would conclude that all their work is in that spirit which Hillman reminds us, "Know Thyself and Honor the Gods." Hillman's understanding is that the Gods merely want to be remembered. Tacey, whether out of envy or not, is projecting a fantasy which concretizes and generalizes both these authors and their readers. I doubt if these writers and their audiences are as prone to such literalizations and inflation as Tacey fears.

At best, Tacey is concerned about Jung having been too optimistic about the archetypal Self and that this optimism has contaminated all of the other archetypes. He

does not want to see "an unrealistic capitulation" to archetypal powers. He does not want to see either individuality lost nor ethical responsibility abdicated. Again, his critique;

> ... It is a loss of the individual and unique character in favour of the comfort and support of archetypes, Walter Mitty-like, and in a systematic recapitulation of James Thurber, we lose our individual smallness and acquire the greatness of the King, Warrior, Magician, Lover and so on. But these archetypal personae are masks which hide or disguise our individuality. They do not represent opportunities for individuation in Jung's understanding of the term. (*Jung and the New Age*, pp. 111-12)

As a Jungian analyst, an ordained minister, educator, and pastoral psychotherapist, I do not see individuals, whether men or women, becoming as inflated as Tacey says. An awareness of a multiplicity of archetypal motifs, patternings, and images may actually enrich the vocabulary and consciousness of individuals so that they are not unconsciously identified with the Gods or the archetypes.[1] There is a danger in the binary opposition of archetype and human woven into Tacey's critical response which a postmodern analysis would attempt to deconstruct probably leaving a residue of narcissism.

The practice of archetypal psychology itself tends to open up a person to particularity and uniqueness, image by image, dream by dream, affect by affect, in a deepening way, which often yields recognition of the suffering, depression, terror, responsibility, struggle, strife which are aspects of what Jung called "individuation" and have much to do with what Hillman calls "pathologizing." When Jung was asked, what is the Self as an archetype and how is it different from individuation? He replied,

> ...the archetype is the general idea, and the self the particular thing in the Here and Now.
>
> ... It is an omnipresent eternal figure which one encounters everywhere, while the self is not to be encountered everywhere. The self is, by definition, the most indivdual thing, the essence of individuality. It is *the* uniqueness.
>
> ... You cannot even encounter it in anybody else, only in yourself. The self is the immediate awareness of your uniqueness, and it is a uniqueness which is in a way most personal, most intimate. It is *your* uniqueness. (Jung's *Zarathustra Lectures*, p. 151).

Tacey noted that Hillman was the first major Jungian thinker to cast doubt on the heroic ego and paradigm which was colored by masculine overtones in Jung's theory of

consciousness. He admitted this critique had to occur. He quoted Hillman's essay "On Psychological Femininity:"

> ... We are cured when we are no longer only masculine in psyche, no matter whether we are male or female in biology. Analysis cannot constellate this cure until it, too, is no longer masculine in psychology. *The end of analysis coincides with the acceptance of femininity.* (*MA*, p. 292):

Tacey understood Hillman as one who argued for the sensitive "New Age Guy." Hillman was relying on the anti-heroic fashions of late modernity to make his case. Tacey appeared to want a strong heroic ego "...to protect consciousness against the crushing forces of the unconscious." Hillman was too close to "...the matrix and the mother..." so it was difficult for the ego to "...ward off her evil influence." (p. 114) Tacey wanted nothing to do with this anti-heroic psychology. He felt Hillman needed more masculine strength, the ego needed to fight the dragon, not marry it—"Hillman's life and work reveals the dangers of an incomplete understanding of Jung. It is as if Hillman reads Jung with one eye open, and another eye shut." (p. 116) Again, the critique is a diatribe filled with inaccurate and outdated clichés about the Men's Movement:

> The men who join Hillman and Bly's North American mythopoetic men's movement imagine that 'being a hero' means banging drums, howling at the moon, complaining about their mothers, or denouncing radical feminists. But Jung imagined a far more subtle method for becoming a hero: the art or discipline of resisting one's own infantile desires to crawl back into the belly of the mother, or the unconscious. The hero is the one who resists the seductive attractions of the unconscious, and who, even while journeying in the psyche, understands his debt to consciousness and society. Like Odysseus, he dialogues with seduction but does not surrender to it. (*Jung and the New Age*, p. 116)

Hillman has made the point in any number of presentations that all theoretical understandings must maintain an element of self-reflective doubt, that there is inevitable shadow or not-knowing even in our most brilliant attempts at articulate and comprehensive understandings. It is in acknowledgment of this psychological recognition that this chapter has summarized critiques of Hillman's archetypal psychology.

PART II

THE IMPACT OF ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOLOGY

Part of the thesis of this dissertation is that the archetypal psychology of James Hillman has contributions to make in regard to our postmodern world. There is a deconstructive aspect in postmodernism. Archetypal psychology has become a broad based, pluralistic movement in various aspects of culture. There are many "archetypalists," as clinicians doing therapy and analysis, as professors in many fields, as lecturers and authors addressing postmodern concerns. James Hillman has been the main figure and primary theoretician of this movement.The following chapters support the argument of this dissertation that Hillman's archetypal psychology has already made an impact upon contemporary discussion and emerging understandings in the contexts or fields of postmodern thought, psychoanalysis, theology, spirituality, and religious studies.

CHAPTER 9

FURTHER POSTMODERN CONVERSATIONS

The following pages identify and summarize a few of the postmodern conversations Hillman or other archetypalists have had or which have occurred indirectly through the influence of Hillman's thought: conversations about the unconscious in a postmodern psychology, the possibility of a creative interchange with the field of process theology, and the feminist appreciation of Hillman's revisioning of Jung's thought.

The Unconscious in a Postmodern Psychology?

Archetypal psychology has not merely been characterized as a "post-Jungian" school of psychoanalytic thought and understanding. It has also been characterized as a "post-structuralist, post-modernist" school of thought (*CCJ*, p. 115). As such, comparisons have been made to other postmodern figures and schools of thought. Michael Vannoy Adams, a Jungian analyst, archetypal psychologist, and author, has noted that archetypal psychology has:

... important affinities with both the semiotic psychology of Jacques Lacan and the deconstructive philosophy of Jacques Derrida. Both Hillman and Lacan abhor ego psychology, and they both radically decenter the ego. The "imaginary" of Lacan is similar (although by no means identical) to the "imaginal" of Hillman. Paul Kugler (1982, 1987) asserts that Lacan's "imaginary" is also similar to Jung's "*imago.*" Adams (1985/1992a) contends that what Hillman means by "re-visioning" is comparable to what Derrida means by "deconstructing." Both Hillman and Derrida criticize the metaphysical logic that opposes image (or signifier) to concept (signified) and that privileges the latter over the former. (*CCJ*, "The Archetypal School," p. 115)

Adams alluded to another of his essays, "Deconstructive Philosophy and Imaginal Psychology: Comparative Perspectives on Jacques Derrida and James Hillman (*JLC*, pp. 231ff). Adams was a professor of literature so he was aware of Derrida whose writings have contributed to contemporary literary criticism. Adams noted that the deconstructive philosophy of Derrida had been a reaction to the "oppositional logic of structuralism." Levi-Strauss had emphasized that the mind understood phenomena through oppositional categories. The structuralist tended to be a formalist, studying texts or myths in terms of this oppositional logic. Derrida's deconstructive approach scrutinized the metaphysical and value assumptions which tended to judge or categorize phenomena. There was a subverting the logic of oppositions which privileged one phenomenon over another. There was a reversal of categories that was necessary. Oppositional logic had tended to privilege "the spoken over the written, the serious over the frivolous, the factual over the fictional, the literal over the figural, the prosaic over the poetic, the referential over the reflexive, the masculine over the feminine..." (*JLC*, pp. 235-36) Derrida particularly deconstructed the opposition which privileged the concept over the image. Derrida was suspicious of interpretation and preferred a dissemination which did not foreclose in an ultimate sense. There was no signified which transcended a text or series of signifiers, nothing which totalized what the text meant.

After summarizing similar moves in archetypal psychology, Adams concluded with the following articulations:

Derrida and Hillman would reverse the logic of oppositions and the order of priorities that have privileged the signified over the signifier, the concept over the image. They

would substitute dissemination or phenomenology for hermeneutics. This is not to say that there are no differences between Derrida and Hillman. But the differences are perhaps more semantic than theoretical or practical. For example, Derrida rejects the term "polysemy," while Hillman retains it. Hillman privileges the image over the concept because it implies multiple—or, he says, polysemous—imaginative possibilities. If, as he seems to do, Hillman means a regressively infinite, logically determinate (in the strict sense of indeterminacy rather than merely what Freud meant by "overdetermination") number of such possibilities, then this difference between Derrida and Hillman is more apparent than real. Deconstructive philosophy and imaginal psychology are not reducible, the one to the other. But what Hillman would do for psychology is remarkably similar to (if not quite the same as) what Derrida would do for philosophy. What Derrida would deconstruct, Hillman would revision, imaginally. (*JLC*, p. 248)

How Do We Understand the Unconscious in a Postmodern Depth Psychology?

Hillman was a participant in a major international conference sponsored by Hofstra University and the C. G. Jung Foundation of New York which was held in 1986. The conference was on "C. G. Jung and the Humanities" and the products and conversations of this gathering were published as *C. G. Jung and the Humanities: Towards a Hermeneutics of Culture* (1990). Hillman was a participant in a Creativity Symposium with Robert Bly, Joseph Campell, and Lucio Pozzi, who had spoken on "Creative Shadows." Hillman was also part of a Symposium on "Post-Jungian Contributions" with Edward Casey, Paul Kugler, David Miller, Andrew Samuels, Carol Schreier-Rupprecht, and Beverley Zabriskie. Kugler had been in many conversations with James Hillman over the years.

Essential to any depth psychology is its understanding of the "unconscious." But what is meant by this term? Is it a disturbance of consciousness? What is it below the threshold of consciousness? Does it have a biological or transcendent nature and aim? Paul Kugler, a Jungian analyst, former student and friend of James Hillman, and author of *The Alchemy of Discourse: An Archetypal Approach to Language*, addressed these questions in his essay, "The Unconscious in a Postmodern Depth Psychology?" (*JH*, pp. 307-18) He reminded the reader that it was hard to define something which is "the not known." To arrive at any understanding, "…content must first be psychically represented to consciousness as a word, an image, an emotion, or inscribed in the flesh as a

psychosomatic symptom." (*JH*, p. 307) So depth psychology understands such re/presentations as the texts of psychological life. Such texts can be understood as "other". But who is the author and who is the intended reader of such texts? Kugler turned to literary theory to look at the questions posed for depth psychology by postmodern theory.

A modern understanding was that the true meaning could be found in the author's intent. In modern depth psychology, there was a parallel understanding that the analyst as an objective observer could interpret dreams as texts through a knowledge of the patient's psychodynamics, history, etc. This was like a Freudian approach. The true meanings of a dream or dream series could be identified. However, in more recent literary criticism, imagery was emphasized, literary products could be understood on many levels as the autonomy of the text was focussed upon. Kugler noted this was more like Jung's emphasis on "…the autonomy of the psyche, the focus on the emerging image patterns, the move to the deeper collective themes, the discovery of paradox and reconciliation, and the belief in the ultimate unity and coherence of the psyche." (*JH*, p. 309)

However, the move into a postmodern understanding led to questioning the autonomy of a text. Over the decades, there was a move toward the recognition of language, its basic units defined through internal differences. There was a movement through Saussure, Levi-Strauss, and Lacan. Levi-Strauss's structural model was similar to Jung's understanding of the archetypes in the search for psychic structures which were unconscious. Lacan understood the development of the personality by way of "…a matrix of culturally determined 'symbols' (signifiers) making up our textual environment." (*JH*, p. 311) There was a search for similar structural processes through this lineage of thought. The French post-structuralist, Jacques Derrida, articulated a deconstructive method, a new way of interpretation that:

> …has seriously called into question our Western metaphysical tendency to ground the act of interpretation in "absolutes" such as Truth, Reality, Self, Center, Origin, and even Author. Our Western style of thought has been committed to a belief in some "ultimate" presence, truth, or reality with a fixed, unimpeachable meaning. This fixed meaning acts as the unquestionable "ground" from which to interpret or explain all the other elements in our systems of thought.

The tendency to ground the act of interpretation in a transcendental signified is characteristic not only of Western metaphysics but of depth psychology as well. Psychoanalysis has traditionally grounded clinical diagnosis and therapeutic understanding on just such absolutes. To understand a symptom, we look to one of those ultimates to give authority to our diagnosis or interpretation. We look for the "origin" of the symptom, or we attempt to discover what "really" happened in the patient's "history," or we view the symptom from the point of view of the "self" and its an innate tendency to "center" or bring "unity" to the personality. For these "absolutes" to perform their interpretative function, they must themselves transcend the very clinical phenomenon they seek to explain. (*JH*, p. 313)

Kugler suggested this transcendence happened when the meanings of the phenomena in clinical practice are interpreted as either causally (the past) created or teleologically purposive (the future). The clinical phenomena, such as dreams, are interpreted through absolutes preexistent in the psyche (*a priori*) or the result of experience (a posteriori). This located clinical material in the past. But such posited absolutes can be located in the future moving toward such "…ultimates as the self, archetypes, wholeness, unity, spirit, soul, death, and so forth." (*JH*, p. 313) Such absolutes became first principles.

The postmodern critique in Western epistemology suggested that all conscious knowledge and theories of understanding become "ambiguous and indeterminate" as they work through figurative structures. The text was understood as "irreducibly plural, oscillating between literal and figural significance that can never be fixed to a single center, essence, or meaning." (*JH*, p. 315):

… Contrary to the structuralist's desire to construct an objective, interpretative science, the postmodern theorist makes no such effort to create a terminology transparent to its truths. For we have come to realize that language of any sort—be it literary, philosophy, clinical, or scientific—does not allow for a transparent view to the so-called empirical world. Our theories of interpretation have no location outside language, neither objective nor empirical, and can never be a ground but only a mediation.

… The modernist-structuralist idea of a detached observer is being replaced by the idea of an intersubjectivity in which the images in the text interfuse with and alter the lens of the viewer reading the text. We not only read texts, but we read the world through texts. And it is precisely this realization that has undermined our epistemological confidence in

the authority of our transcendental signifiers. The more we attempt to account linguistically for the authority of these ultimates, the more the absoluteness in our god terms begins to deliteralize, dissolve, and disappear. (*JH*, pp. 315-16)

The postmodern movement led us to question the absolutes which have been grounds for clinical authority. Those absolutes are not seen as eternal, *a priori* archetypal structures, "...but are rather *temporal and linguistic by-products* resulting from a representational theory of language." (*JH*, p. 316) In a postmodern understanding, these transcendental concepts, notions, and terms were understood to have an imaginal or fictive nature but rather the metaphorical status of language. They cannot be literally literal. This does not have to lead to extreme relativism or to nihilism, Kugler concluded:

> ... It leads, instead, to a psychological realism based upon the awareness that all systems of clinical interpretation gain their authority through a grounding in a transcendental "ultimate." But this "ultimate" is no longer so absolute, so ultimate, so psychologically inflated through an unconscious identification with the *deus absconditas*. In therapeutic analysis we still must, on one level, *believe in* our god term and use it *as if* it were the ultimate explanatory principle. But on a deeper level, we also know that it is not. And it is precisely this deeper level of awareness that prevents our psychological ideologies from becoming secular religions and differentiates professional debates from religious idolatry. For the ultimate ground of depth psychology is not a known god term but the ultimately unknowable, the unconscious itself. And this *is* the "absolute" ground that gives authority to all schools of depth psychology. (*JH*, p. 316)

Hillman's influence can be heard in Kugler's understanding even though Kugler does not cite Hillman. Archetypal psychology addresses concerns which Kugler raised in the reflections summarized above. Hillman's phenomenological emphasis upon the primacy of the image was a kind of god term, at least that was where Hillman placed the self-generative activity characterized by spontaneity, autonomy, and presentation. These are qualities which Jung used to describe the archetype. Hillman avoided the unquestionable absolutes and transcendental ultimates in his imaginative approach.

Archetypal psychology can be understood as a postmodern depth psychology, appropriate to the challenge of postmodern understandings, especially if the discourse of analysis or language of the clinical situation is understood to be that of images. The work

of Hillman can be understood as a postmodern semiotics of image. Kugler's challenge that the ultimate ground of any depth psychology is not a known god term but the ultimately unknowable, the unconscious itself and is addressed by archetypal psychology's non-interpretive approach to image and dream. These questions and concerns continue as there is an ongoing discussion between archetypal psychology and postmodern understandings.

Archetypal Psychology and Process Theology as Postmodern Movements

A conference was held in 1983 at the Claremont Graduate University so that two postmodern movements might explore their complementarities—archetypal psychology and process theology. David Ray Griffin, Professor of Philosophy of Religion at the School of Theology at Claremont and Director of the Center for Process Studies, edited, prefaced, and introduced the papers from this conference in the book, *Archetypal Process: Self and Divine in Whitehead, Jung, and Hillman.* (1989) Griffin stated that the intent of this gathering:

> These two movements share many ideas and fundamental aims. In particular, they both want to return soul and divinity to the world. ... Is it possible for them to join forces against the soul-denying and divinity-excluding materialisms and positivisms that they both oppose? Can archetypalists derive cosmological depth, breadth, and support from process theology? Can process theologians acquire a developed, empirically based psychology and a richer, more evocative rhetoric of soul and divinity from archetypalists? More modestly: can people rooted in one of these two movements genuinely converse with those from the other? Or are the differences in fundamental intention and approach between the *philosophical* and *psychologizing* modes of thought so profound as to make genuine dialogue, let alone conspiracy, impossible? (*Archetypal Process*, p. vii)

One participant noted that it was as if two communities came together which spoke two different languages. However, Griffin's Preface and Introduction were articulate and the separate papers presented were quite good. Griffin's appreciation was expressed for James Hillman, "...whose generous, undogmatic, and witty spirit (perhaps I should say soul) set the tone for a conference in which genuine conversation, the growth of mutual understanding and appreciation, and even movement of thought occurred."

Griffin's thesis was that archetypal psychology and process theology were both postmodern movements which could be seen as complementary. Griffin noted that both archetypal psychology and process theology were postmodern movements in that they rejected key understandings of the modern world view—the mechanistic doctrine of nature, sensate empiricism, and the denial of any divine presence, especially any *present divine influence*, in the world. He noted that Whitehead and Jung were postmodern in rejecting these tenets as well but both did not return to a premodern approach. They were committed to rational empiricism. Both made psyche or soul central with one speaking of psychic energy or libido and the other speaking of creativity. Both understood perception to be more than merely sensate. A finalism or teleology was evident in both—Jung's aim of individuation and realizing the Self, and Whitehead's subjective aim and the lure of the divine subjective aim. The salvific aim or endeavor for each was the continual interplay of conscious and unconscious dimensions in human experience. There were differences, however. Whitehead was philosophical; Jung wanted an empirical approach without the metaphysics. Jung had a debt to Kant; Whitehead tried to return to pre-Kantian philosophy with some corrections. Jung's was an empirical psychology, although informed by Kantian metaphysics; Whitehead's was a philosophical psychology whose thought was based upon the primacy of human experience but Whitehead did not do the empirical observation and work.

Griffin understood that whatever Jung meant by God was not the traditionally one-sided good God. Process theology also had rejected traditional theism. The view of process theology denied the traditional doctrine of divine omnipotence. Griffin questioned the Jungian tendency to give divine sanction to all archetypes. Jung came to an understanding of a divine unconsciousness which he related to the human search for meaning. Jung explained evil in terms of the divine as an omnipotent but unconscious force in which the opposites were combined. Griffin questioned Jung's idea of the divine in its providing a divine sanction to everything understood as an archetype. This problem arose from Jung's equating the collective unconscious as the ontological place from which archetypes arose with God. Were all experiences of numinosity archetypal? Did all archetypes partake of God? If so, good and evil would be on the same plane, with profound implications ontologically, psychologically, and theologically. This would also

prevent our understanding of archetypes as being socially constructed, which had implications for social justice concerns. Jung's archetypal theory could be used as a quasi-religious or scientific justification for the status quo in any society. Griffin also believed Jung's belief in God was as an "all-powerful, as determining all things." This association of God with total power was rejected by process theology.

Griffin noted distinct emphases in Hillman's archetypal psychology from Jung's analytical psychology which would affect any dialogue with process theology. He noted Hillman's desire "...to annul (Jung's) metaphysics so as not to lose his psychology." (*Archetypal Process*, p. 215) These changes were less problematic for process theology than "Jung's metaphysical theology."

Hillman did not equate the archetypal image of the Self with the God archetype, or a one, all powerful God. Hillman favored a polytheistic psychology "...in which all the archetypes are treated with parity." So, messages from the unconscious are not treated as revelations arising from the one divine reality. This revisioning of Jung toward a more pluralistic approach took away "...the theological obsession with evil." Griffin must have read much of Hillman's writings since he noted in words similar to Hillman that "...evil is an acute problem for theodicy only within a framework of a monotheistic context that is virtually monistic." (p. 64)

Griffin then summarized a major revision Hillman made in regard to Jung's analytical psychology. This revision was at the heart of many critiques of Hillman's archetypal psychology, both in the world of Jungians as well as outside that world. However, Griffin as a process theologian was affirming these particular moves which Hillman had made:

> ...Hillman rejects the idea of a *unus mundus*, at least the idea of a noumenal world in which all times and places are one, which lies behind the notion of synchronicity (*Spring 1971*, 193). In Hillman's approach, finally, there is no Kantian, noumenal archetype-in-itself behind the archetypal image (*AP*, 3, 13). This deletion removes the basis for thinking of archetypes as eternal, unchanging patterns that are divinely sanctioned by the creator of the world. The way is thereby opened for thinking of them as historically and socially conditioned—even if Hillman himself does not do so, but instead thinks of them phenomenally, aesthetically, and valuationally, generally ignoring the question of origin. (*Archetypal Process*, p. 64)

These revisions of Hillman removed some of the difficulties process theology had with Jung's "metaphysical theology." However the foreshadowing postmodern aspects of Jung's thought which were valued by process theology also have been kept by Hillman:

> ...the freedom or spontaneity of the psyche, along with its purposiveness and power; the importance of depth; the emotional nature of ideas and images; and a nondualistic view in which soul is attributed to all things, not just humans. (*Archetypal Process*, p. 64)

However, Griffin wondered if this could enable his vision whereby "...archetypalists would provide the empirical psychology, while process thinkers would provide the cosmology, theology, and metaphysics." (pp. 64-65)

Griffin believed Hillman's distinction between soul and spirit was behind Hillman's "rejecting metaphysics, cosmology, and theology altogether." Soul lived in fantasies and images but not in literal beliefs. Spirit was concerned "...with literal truth about objectivity, and, accordingly, develops science, cosmology, metaphysics, theology, and ethics." (*AP*, p. 25) This reinforced the contrast between psychology and philosophical theology. Archetypal psychology tried to deliteralize all objective statements about the world, about just about everything. Hillman's was a preference of soul in contrast to spirit. Were Hillman's discussions about soul merely metaphorical or were there ontological dimensions?

There was also the matter of Hillman's polytheistic psychology. This might appear to be a difficulty in a creative interchange between archetypal psychology and process theology:

> ... Process theology with its pan-en-theism is monotheistic, affirming (in a quite literal sense) a cosmic soul of the universe, in which we live, move, and have our being. Hillman's call to give equal weight to all archetypal configurations, which he sometimes calls "Gods," means rejecting the Hebrew-Christian monotheism of Western culture in favor of a return to Greek polytheism. (*Archetypal Process*, p. 66)

Griffin concluded that this was not so problematic, that there could be a reconciliation of polytheism and monotheism, that Hillman foresaw this concern in his Postscript to his piece, "Psychology: Monotheistic or Polytheistic": "The task of psychology...is not the reconciliation of monotheism and polytheism. Whether the many are each aspects of the one...is discussion for theology, not psychology." (*Spring 1971*, p. 205) In other

writings, Hillman had continued to point out the difference between polytheism as psychology and polytheism as a religion. Hillman had reminded readers that the Gods were not to be taken literally and that polytheistic psychology did not suggest a theological polytheism. In Hillman's pluralism there was a multiplicity of powers which were recognized coequally, somewhat democratically. Griffin reminded that Hillman's difficulty with monotheism was really a reaction to monism—the understanding that only one being had any power. Hillman was accurate that such an understanding contradicted the polyvalent nature of both psyche and the world.

The monotheism of process theology was not monism but rather a "nonmonistic monotheism. Griffin articulated this by citing Whitehead's work, *Process and Reality*:

> The monotheism of process theology, however, is quite different. God is not, and could not be, the only being with power. The metaphysical ultimate is not God, but creativity, which is necessarily instantiated in a multiplicity of beings besides God, and this means that power is necessarily dispersed throughout the universe. Still more pluralism is entailed by the idea that the eternal objects, which are the eternal forms or possibilities, are not created by God but are required by God as much as they require God (*PR*, p. 257). God, creativity, and the eternal objects, furthermore, require that there be creatures (*PR*, p. 225). All the metaphysical principles, finally, are equi-primordial with these other realities, and are therefore not matters of divine volition. This monotheism is not monism. (*Process and Reality*, p. 67)

Process theology's ontological pluralism affirmed pluralism in all aspects of human existence: "There is not One Right Way for all human beings." (p. 68)

Hillman was also uncomfortable with the eschatology colored by monotheistic (or rather monistic) thinking. He disagreed with "...the comforting teleological fallacy which holds that we are carried by an overall process on a rocky road onward to the Great End Station" (*RVP*, p. 147). Griffin noted that Whitehead affirmed teleological processes as potentialities emerged into actualities: "Although Whitehead's statement of the ultimate principle of existence begins 'the many become one,' it concludes with 'and are increased by one.'" However, this creative unfolding or emergence of novelty never literally came to an end. "Plurality is permanent," Griffin emphasized.

Hillman's distinction of soul and spirit can be related to his allusion to the archetype of "syzygy," which combined both soul and spirit in a dynamic interrelatedness. Griffin reminded that Hillman was trying to maintain autonomy for psychology and its primary metaphor and focus upon soul and the self-generativity of images. It is this priority which colored Hillman's critical comments in regard to science and metaphysics. Most philosophic or metaphysical systems had been hard on the phenomena of soul. The nature of modern science had made Hillman's critique easy. This would not have been the case if a postmodern science had been articulated which would have attributed interiority to all aspects of existence.

Griffin concluded this brief summary noting that in light of the Kantian idealism which Hillman rejected in Jung's understanding, "Hillman needs a replacement for Jung's philosophical theology." Process theology may have something to offer archetypal psychology through an ongoing discussion.

Hillman in the Context of Feminist Thought

In Jung's understanding, all the archetypes emerged from the collective unconscious understood as the divine origin of things. This conflicted with the feminist understanding that some archetypes were socially constructed and the result of historic processes. Demaris S. Wehr's essay, "Religious and Social Dimensions of Jung's Concept of the Archetype: A Feminist Perspective," in the book, *Feminist Archetypal Theory: Interdisciplinary Re-visions of Jungian Thought* (1985) was particularly concerned about "Jung's and the Jungians' explanations of archetypes of the feminine and of the *anima*...descriptively, and also prescriptively, limiting images of women in a patriarchal society." (pp. 23-45) Were the Jungian archetypes divinely revealed in some unchangeable and prescriptive sense rather than socially constructed, in our case within a patriarchal culture? Jung may have intended to affirm archetypes of the feminine as well. But, instead it appeared that there was an ontological status given to all archetypes: "Jungian theory can function as quasi-religious or scientific legitimation of the status quo in society, reinforcing social roles, constricting growth, and limiting options for women." (*Feminist Archetypal Theory*, p. 23) Eventually, Wehr published *Jung and Feminism: Liberating Archetypes* (1987) in which she argued for the liberation of the archetypes

from "their static and eternal associations" and any idea that they were "divinely ordained" or that the notion and reality of archetypes stood "on sacred ground." She noted the "decidedly religious" language used when Jung spoke of the Self:

> I have called this centre the *self*. Intellectually the self is no more than a psychological concept, a construct the serves to express an unknowable essence which we cannot grasp as such, since by definition it transcends our powers of comprehension. It might equally well be called "the God within us." The beginnings of our whole psychic life seem to be inextricably rooted in this point, and all our highest and ultimate purposes seem to be striving towards it. This paradox is unavoidable, as always, when we try to define something that lies beyond the bourn of our understanding. (*CW* 7, §399)

Wehr was critical of Jung's assumption of a natural balance, opposition, compensation which were governing paradigms in Jung's analytical psychology. She worried that Jung's psychology would lend "archetypal legitimation to an unequal social situation between the sexes." The imprint of patriarchy colored many of Jung's and Jungians' notions which were subtly reinforcing a monotheism justifying the patriarchy. She alluded to Hillman's recognition of this bias in Jung's psychology:

> Jung distinguishes the ego from the self, revealing, again, the self's religious nature, and, as James Hillman points out, Jung's ultimately monotheistic stance. Going beyond the necessarily limited perspective of the ego is reminiscent of the goal of both Eastern and Western religions: (*Jung and Feminism*, pp. 68-69)

Wehr concluded that androcentrism and misogyny affected Jung's understanding of the feminine, the *anima*, and women. She saw that his cultural and gender bias did not allow him to adequately define women and the feminine adequately:

> ... Women readers and analysands need to recognize and challenge these elements of Jung's psychology or it will remain a seductive trap, luring them with compelling images of the "feminine," and thereby contributing to our lack of awareness of the internalized oppression that can be fostered by use of his categories. Interestingly, among Jungian analysts, it is a man who has most clearly challenged Jung's androcentrism at the level of theory. I refer to James Hillman, who in his most recent work, *Anima*, forthrightly recognizes the limits of Jung's position. ...Hillman has gone the furthest toward systematically revising Jung's categories. (*Jung and Feminism*, pp. 99-100)

Wehr made one other reference to Hillman in a footnote backing up her assertion that individuation consisted in getting to know the multiple personalities or the "little ones:"

> James Hillman, who coined the term the "little people" and suggested "befriending" them, believes that polytheistic elements are present in Jung's view of the psyche, although it is Hillman himself who draws them out explicitly. Hillman bemoans the monotheistic emphasis that the centrality of the self represents. (*Jung and Feminism*, n. 10, p. 136)

Catherine Keller's book, *From a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism and Self* (1986/1988), was another attempt to look at an old world view of a separatist Self in patriarchal acculturation in contrast to a more connective, feminist Self. Keller, a theologian, was actually a doctoral student in Claremont who had suggested ideas for the conference around "Archetypal Process."

Keller looked at the motif of "...the monster"— "...sirens, sea serpents, and sphinxes, dragons, dwarves and giants, harpies and horrors of every imaginable combination." She alluded to James Hillman as she reflected on "Medusa's punishing deformity...an inflicted monstrosity, a deformation." She was thinking about this affliction as she wrote, "If as James Hillman says, 'myth lives vividly in our symptoms, ... we owe our symptoms an immense debt.'" (p. 51) She believed this was a suggestion worth consideration—to whom did the symptom and thus the debt belong? She related the mythic symptom to the psychology of the hero. And, she alluded to the Jungian analyst Erich Neumann in regard to the archetype of the Great Mother in her concern about feminine monstrosity and monster slaying. She posited that the cultural hero produced this symptom of deformity. The heroic ego opposes not just the symptom of the mother / monster, but any symptom at all:

> ... At least this is the claim of James Hillman, whose "archetypal psychology" (as distinguished from "analytic") remains remarkably free of Jungian dogmatism. "For our concern is with the symptom, that thing so foreign to the ego, that thing which ends the rule of the hero—who, as Emerson said, is he who is immovably centered." "Immovably centered," we might add, because reflected in the image of an impassionable transcendence—which Perseus in relation to his father, Zeus, only begins to incarnate. Hillman himself systematically links the heroic mythology—even in its polytheistic

setting—with "monotheistic psychology," which not only the Judeo-Christian traditions but also Campbell's monomyth exemplify. That which fixates on its own oneness, its immutable center, cannot tolerate the plurality of images within itself. As they try to bear their messages, the heroic ego cannot look, cannot hear. So they become (or already were?) his symptoms, pressed down into the unconscious, which Hillman prefers to name the Underworld. As the hero is servered from the realm of dreams, of death, of the hosts he cannot control, he will not tolerate the underworld messengers, the Medusas, and works all the more violently to repress them. Though part of "his" personality, the "symptom" will not bow to his task. (*Broken Web*, pp. 65-66)

Keller noted that Hillman was not caught in the heroic model of the emergence of consciousness, whether in individual persons or culturally. And Hillman was not caught in preferring a single image. Plus Hillman saw that the Western heroic form of ego consciousness is actually the enemy of soul-making. Events were deepened into experiences due to soul's relation with death:

...the heroic ego's aversion to the underworld, indeed to all depth, is inseparably linked to his monster-killing compulsions. Our guess that the swashbuckling male hero inspires by his power drive the entire subjectivity of the One against the Many, of the self-identical, other-opposing dualist, receives notable support from Hillman's "psychologizing." "For what sort of mind working with what sort of issue is the ideology of oppositionalism so useful?" he asks (in the context of his later critique of the Jungian dogma of opposites). ... We may infer that the heroic neurosis of patriarchal culture, hacking away at its own symptomatic monstrosities, is self-divided precisely in its immovable egocentricity—always two in its oneness, and so not surprisingly self-reflected. (*Broken Web*, p. 66)

Keller believed this critique was appropriate for both Freudian and Jungian thought. She concluded her discussion of Hillman and archetypal psychology on a positive note:

While Hillman is perhaps no feminist, he early advocates anima as culture's lost soul, not as mere complement to masculinity. In a way that prefigures *Revisioning Psychology*, his critique of the heroic consciousness, Hillman's essay "On Psychological Femininity" in *The Myth of Analysis* richly documents the history of biological, medical and psychological woman hating. The book concludes: "It is so difficult to imagine, to conceive, to experience consciousness apart from its old identifications, its structural bedrock of

misogyny, that we can hardly even intuit what this bisexual God might hold in store for the regeneration of psychic life." Whether or not we would now be intuiting a "bisexual God" (whom he himself does not long pursue), Hillman's work helps expose this misogynist bedrock underlying the basic Western sense of self-consciousness. (*Broken Web*, pp. 66-67)

Hillman probably was alluding to the god Dionysos when he was intuiting a "bisexual God." Hillman had written an essay on, "Dionysos in Jung's Writing" (*FG*, 1980, pp. 151ff). He noted:

> ... Some years ago, I suggested with some detail that analytic consciousness has been governed by an archetypal structure that favors the masculine over the feminine, the principles of light, order and distance over emotional involvement, or what has, in short, been called the Apollonic over the Dionysian. ... I put the case that the fields of psychiatry and mythology—by using each other's arguments—have been for the most part in collusion against the Dionysian, resulting in repression, and thus a distortion, of all Dionysian phenomena so that they have come to be regarded as inferior, hysterical, effeminate, unbridled and dangerous. I suggested a rectification of our appreciation of this archetypal structure, and also a means to move toward this rectification. For, after all, Dionysos was the Lord of Souls (as Rohde called him), so that psychotherapy can hardly afford to labor under misleading notions of him. (*FG*, p. 151)

Dionysos was associated with the phenomena of androgyny, being masculine but also being very related to the women, even an aspect in the Eleusian mysteries which were about feminine initiation. Dionysos was also related to the phenomena of dismemberment:

> ... If, however, dismemberment is ruled by the archetypal dominant of Dionysos, then the process, while beheading or dissolving the central control of the old king, may be at the same time activating the pneuma that is distributed throughout the materializations of our complexes. (*FG*, p. 160)

Naomi Goldenberg's feminist critique of Jung's theory focussed on the Jungian notions which tended to perpetuate patriarchal hierarchies—*anima/us*, *eros/logos*. Goldenberg cautioned about women defining women's experiences in these notions of absolute, unchanging, archetypal patterns since that understanding can limit experiences.

Focussing on the Great Mother can distort or limit genuinely lived experience. The problem of archetypes left women with three options: accept such patriarchal definitions, search for female archetypes, or redefine the terms. Goldenberg encouraged women to "...equate image with archetype..." thus loosening up the implied hierarchies. Goldenberg, in *Changing of the Gods: Feminism and the End of Traditional Religions* (1979), wondered about the new gods of the New Age:

> When we study the religious thought of those who have already outgrown the father-god – the witches, the radical feminists, the modern psychologists – we see a direction inward. All of these people tend to place their gods within themselves, to focus on spiritual processes whose values they experience internally. Judging from these harbingers of our new religious culture, the psycho-religious age will be a mystical one. It seems highly likely that the West is on the brink of developing a new mysticism – post-Christian, post-Judaic. It will most probably be a type of mysticism which emphasizes the *continual observation of psychic imagery. (Changing of the Gods,* p. 120)

Goldenberg then wrote about "the watcher" deep within. She referred to James Hillman as a kind of watcher:

> Cultivation of a presence like the watcher certainly seems to be what is happening in the psychological theories of James Hillman, one of the most interesting psycho-religious thinkers writing today. Hillman is the founder of "archetypal psychology" – a post-Jungian analytic theory of crucial importance in this new age. He puts psychology and religion in the same territory, refusing, as he says, to define these fields "against each other so that they may more easily become each other."
>
> Hillman's thought is stunning in its originality and yet, as he says, curiously "old-fashioned." He returns to the original meaning of psychology as the "logos of the soul" – as the study and enrichment of that ancient *religious* entity known as the *soul*. Hillman's concept of the soul is very similar to Lessing's concept of the watcher. Just as Lessing has introduced mysticism into her novels through the watcher, Hillman has introduced mysticism into his psychology through the soul. (*Changing of the Gods,* p. 121)

Goldenberg recognized that Hillman shared with Keats a salvific aim in the development of soul, that mode of perceiving "...which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or metaphorical." There was a conviction which came through

cultivating soul, of having a deep sense of interior reality. She suggested that archetypal psychologists should hold this soul-making as respectfully as any religious sect:

> Faith in soul, Hillman says, comes to us through the awareness of images, images which move "through the shapes of persons in reveries, fantasies, reflections, and imaginations." He especially values the thoughts and fears that drag us down and terrify us. In archetypal psychology, it is the dark gods that move us most. Other psychologies whitewash these forces by reducing them to labels like *repressed anger* or by dulling their sting with drugs. The archetypalists, however, value depression very highly. They feel that it is our fears of death, illness and aging which move much of our lives. They despise modern psychology for trivializing Hades and his retinue. (*Changing of the Gods*, pp. 122-23)

Goldenberg noted that archetypal psychologists made reference to the gods and goddesses of ancient Greece, images of behavior patterns which were still alive today. The polytheistic backdrop addressed the multiplicities of human experience. This was a way of exploring the psychological perspectives and relationships personified in specific imagery. She agreed with Hillman's close look at the imaginal process and alluded to her essay, "Archetypal Theory After Jung:"

> ... He (Hillman) shares my feeling that archetypes create problems for Jungian theory. His latest work acknowledges that archetypes do not have to be specific symbols. Hillman suggests that we use the adjective "archetypal" instead of the noun "archetype" to refer to those psychic images which are particularly important. The adjective archetypal would be a word for the process of valuing an image, dream or fantasy. Any image that moves us deeply and spurs us to reflection can thus be an archetypal image. We do not need Jungian dictionaries or esoteric encyclopedias of ancient myth to tell us what *the* archetypes are. This philosophical move of changing archetype to archetypal is a landmark in Jungian theory. It begins to rise above the petty reification-deification of Jungian terms and leads us to see the actual psychological processes and viewpoints to which the terms refer. In fact, many Jungian nouns, such as *unconscious, ego, anima* and *animus*, need to be seen through in a similar fashion. (*Changing of the Gods*, pp. 123-24)

Goldenberg affirmed the advances archetypal psychology made in psychology and religion by this getting free of old, concrete, Jungian jargon. However, she felt its use of terms like "literal" and "imaginal" had the potential to be constraining as well. It was

alright to use these terms to keep imaginal process alive. The problem was when "literal" was used to refer to the material world or actions within that world, and when "imaginal" was used to refer to a non-material world, inaction, or contemplation. This bordered on a dualism which Hillman would be uncomfortable with—that of spirit and matter. Archetypal psychology could easily become "...a hollow game of intellectualizing, removed from significant dealings with human life." (p. 125) She noted that depth psychology should be rooted in the emotional experiences of real people:

> ... Archetypal psychology must stop its misguided attempt to deliteralize everything. ...I think it equally necessary that we understand that metaphors are also flesh, that they are continuous with our bodily selves.

> *...our spiritual depth and progress in the years ahead depend on our ability to see the tangible aspects of imaginal things.*

> The intimate tie between image and life is something which feminist theorists can teach psychologists of religion.

> The new mysticism of the West will largely be defined by women and men who will have an increasing awareness of their own physical presence within the philosophies they create. These women and men will not want to deny the value of their literal, bodily selves. Their theories will affirm materiality and will acknowledge that images are flesh as well. It is difficult to say more about the mysticism we will know in the new age of new gods. Only one thing seems certain – it will be a mysticism with guts! (*Changing of the Gods*, pp. 125-27)

Goldenberg wrote this critique almost thirty years ago. Hillman's move toward a depth psychology of extraversion, his awareness of the *anima mundi*, and his own aesthetic approach over recent decades appears to have moved towards that tie between image and life. Goldenberg's feminist concern can be addressed from the vantage point of Hillman's writing in recent decades.

There has been both affirmation for Jung in the feminist movement, but there has also been a critical rethinking of his understanding of the feminine and its role. Karen Elias-Button (*JLC*, pp. 355ff) is a feminist who is knowledgeable about women's poetry. She has discussed a number of issues which are related to Jungian literary criticism. She alluded to Goldenberg's work which was just cited above. Her article on "Journey into an

Archetype: The Dark Mother in Contemporary Women's Poetry" and discussion around it raised some issues in Jungian literary theory. Did Jung's description of the *anima* or in the somewhat Jungian literature about the Great Mother archetype accurately portray the role of the feminine? These descriptions often conveyed a condescension which feminists have obvious difficulty with.

A fundamental question became, "What is the status of any archetype, essentialist and unchanging or to some degree existential and imaginal?" (p. 355) If the answer was the latter response, as Hillman and the archetypal psychologists argued, then the poetry of contemporary women becomes a valid source for archetypal images of the goddess, just as important as the ancient mythologies of Greece. Contemporary poetry by women can serve as "a metaphorical model toward a definition of the feminine in women's own terms." Elias-Button built on this kind of thinking to discover contemporary images in poems using the works of Anne Sexton, Sylvia Plath, May Sarton, and Adrienne Rich. The Dark Mother could be understood differently so that poet and readers may begin to consciously value new definitions and viewpoints of the feminine today.

This attempt to understand Jung's theory of interpretation and its practice in a more imaginal approach, going beyond the usual structural and reductivist allegorical rewriting of literary texts was not just a concern in feminist thought. It was a shared and conscious project by a number of authors and commentators in the field of Jungian literary criticism.

This chapter on conversations between archetypal psychology and elements in our postmodern society supports the argument of this project that Hillman and his depth psychology have made significant inroads into contemporary culture, both in the world of psychology as well as the world of theology. The following chapters extend support for the argument regarding Hillman's influence and the continued impact of archetypal psychology by focusing on continuing conversations regarding psychoanalytic theory, spirituality, and a theology of depth.

CHAPTER 10

INFLUENCES UPON PSYCHOANALYTIC THOUGHT

The great founders of depth psychology, Freud and Jung, explored the close connection between religion and the nature of psychic reality. Freud concluded that religion was an illusion. Jung valued the the psychological reality of religious experience, that experience of a dynamic agency which was transpersonal, independent of personal subjectivity. Jung valued religious experience as a purposeful experience of a dimension more powerful than oneself. However, there appear to be two ontological understandings at work in Jung's thought—a somewhat empirical scientific view involving the psychic systems of oppositions and of logocentrism yielding abstract conceptualizations which tended to be taken literally, and an understanding of psyche grounded in the phenomena of imagination which he called *esse in anima* and which is a more poetic realm—"a middle ground encompassing both subject and object, which declares the reality of fantasy, metaphor, and imagination." (Schenk, p. 35) This work has summarized how Hillman has reacted to Jung's conceptual assertions when his concepts have been taken literally and how Hillman has emphasized the mytho-poetic nature of psyche. Hillman has attempted to see into Jung's work from his more phenomenological perspective.

This chapter summarizes the work of authors in the field of psychoanalysis, particularly Jungian and post-Jungian authors, who consider the phenomena of soul to be the central paradigm or metaphor in psychology. The intent of these brief introductions is to illustrate directions in which archtypal psychology is being integrated into psychoanalytic thought. The work of Michael Vannoy Adams as a Jungian analyst has built on Hillman's thought with an emphasis upon post-structural understandings. The work of Greg Mogenson has explored the concept of soul in analytical culture. The faculty of the Pacifica Graduate Institute and their publications have appropriated Hillman's archetypal psychology to address soul in the world.

Archetypal psychology has not just included the ideas of James Hillman: the theory and practice of imaginal psychology has been carried on in a broadly based cultural movement. Hillman was a firm believer that creativity is not something occuring

in isolation but depended upon community and collaboration. Although Hillman has been the most articulate and personified face of this movement, others have written and sold their works quite solidly.

Analysts as well as other cultural thinkers are hard to classify. No one fits into a neat category. The attempt below is an effort to identify and demarcate where Hillman's archetypal psychology continues to wend its way forward into cultural conversations. The authors I briefly summarize may not call themselves "archetypal psychologists"; however, they have each been associated with Hillman's thought. They often cite or allude to Hillman. The work of each has implications for the fields of psychology of religion and theology.

Michael Vannoy Adams and a Post-Structural Psychology

Michael Vannoy Adams has been a Senior Lecturer in Psychoanalytic Studies at the New School for Social Research in New York City. He is a Jungian analyst in private practice and a member of the Jungian Psychoanalytic Association of New York. He is on the faculty of the Object Relations Institute for Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis and is an Honorary Research Fellow of the Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies at the University of Kent. He is the author of *The Multicultural Imagination: "Race," Color, and the Unconscious* (1996), *The Mythological Unconscious* (2001), and *The Fantasy Principle: Psychoanalysis of the Imagination* (2004). His chapter on "The Archetypal School" in *The Cambridge Companion* (1997) is a concise summary of Hillman's archetypal psychology.

Adams has been aware of the issue of diversity which appeared to him "to epitomize the contemporary, collective identity crisis.... Integration respects the differences among the parts, within the whole." (1996, pp. 6-7) There is a pluralism of the psyche, a pluralism of psychoanalysis, cultural pluralism and ethnic pluralism. "Race" and "racial" pluralism take attention away from "the diversity of diversity, the multiplicity of cultures." An analysis of the unconscious sources of racism is needed which understands racism as a mental illness which needs to be psychoanalyzed. Racism is a symptom of the failure of imagination. Adams looked at how our unconscious responds to "racial" categories. He argues for a non-defensive ego and self-image which

are receptive to other-images as a way to foster pluralism and authentic multicultural differences.

Adams wrote about psycho-mythology in *The Mythological Unconscious*. He referred to Hillman noting that there should be, not just one and only one myth, but many myths to inform therapeutic acts of interpretation:

> Hillman argues that if psychoanalysis were to employ other myths in addition to the Oedipus myth, many myths with many different motifs—for example, Eros and Psyche ("love"), Zeus and Hera ("generativity and marriage"), Icarus and Daedalus ("flying and crafting"), Ares ("combat, anger, and destruction"), Pygmalion ("mimesis where art becomes life through desire"), Hermes, Aphrodite, Persephone, or Dionysus—then the methods of analysis would be very different and much truer to the diversity of human experience. (1997a: pp. 112-13)

Adams also believes in a re-visioned psychoanalytic theory and practice which can "comprehensively address the multiplicity of archetypal images that exist in and emerge from what I call the mythological unconscious." (1997a, p. 8) Hillman frequently is cited in this book about the use of mythological knowledge informing therapeutic practice. For the reader wanting to observe the practice of archetypal psychology, this is an important work around dreams, archetypal imagery and method, within the practice of a Jungian analysis. Adams cites Hillman that myths should not be used in utilitarian *applications* to solve personal problems:

> Despite their graphic description of action and detail, myths resist being interpreted into practical life. They are not allegories of applied psychology, solutions to personal problems. This is the old moralistic fallacy about them, now become the therapeutic fallacy, telling us which step to take and what to do next, where the hero went wrong and had to pay the consequences, as if this practical guidance were what is meant by "living one's myth." … (*RVP*, p. 158)

Adams agrees that myths are not programs but rather perspectives. Adams suggests, however, that myths have value for practical life. They do not tell us what to do. Rather, they offer us "practical precedent" (p. 33). Myths are different from Gods: they neither dispose nor impose. They propose possible or probable solutions to practical problems to internal or psychic realities and not external realities.

In contrast to Freud's reality principle, Adams values the fantasy principle which he finds central to Jung's thought. Jung alluded to William James' non-directed thinking which for Jung became "fantasy thinking" as "image crowds upon image." (*CW 18*, §19). Jung admitted, "I really prefer the term 'imagination' to 'fantasy,' because there is a difference between the two which the old doctors had in mind when they said that 'opus nostrum,' our work, ought to be done 'per veram imaginationem et non phantastica....'" (*CW 18*, §396). Imagination has to do with the work of evoking inner images. Adams refers to the Hillman tradition of Jungian psychology:

> ... What is distinctive about Jungian psychology, especially in the Hillmanian rendition of it, is that it is an imaginal psychology. Jungian psychology is as much a psychology of the imagination as it is a psychology of the unconscious. Hillman even says: "I tend to use 'imagination' instead of that word 'unconscious'...not that there isn't unconsciousness in us all the time. (*FP*, p. 7)

In *The Fantasy Principle* Adams appreciates a Jungian approach to dreams: explication, amplification, and active imagination. He says,

> All three of these techniques, I would emphasize, are dependent on *the fantasy principle: the conviction that fantasy is logically prior to reality, that the psyche, or the imagination, constructs reality, and that the image says what it means and means what it says.* (*FP*, p. 16)

Adams uses the term imaginal since the phenomena of dreamwork and analysis are images. He understands Jungian psychology to be a phenomenological psychology so he prefers to say "imaginal psychology." As Jungians "stick to the image," they are using a phenomenological and imaginal method. Adams considers Hillman's work to be especially valuable in this regard.

Adams' chapter on "Compensation in the Service of Individual" has two dreams from an anonymous dreamer. He works with these dreams through an imaginal or phenomenological approach. To read this chapter is to observe how an analyst can indeed practice archetypal psychology, even without a patient. He teases out possible meanings to the dreams in a method of returning to the image as a kind of circling of the image, a circumambulation, as Jung called it. This method also prevents free associations or amplifications to dissociate from the phenomena of the dream itself.

Adams' chapter, "Jungian Post-Structural Theory: Structures versus Constructs, Concepts versus Images," discusses the structural theory in contemporary object relations psychology and Jungian psychology. There are theoretical differences. Theorists such as Fairbairn understood multiple structures or personifications as an internalization of objects from external reality whereas Jung was an archetypal psychologist seeing such structures or personifications as already internal to the psyche and *a priori*. However, Adams argues that constructs are concepts:

> *...concepts tend to obliterate the distinctive qualities of the specific images that manifest in the psyche of a particular patient—and it is precisely those distinctive qualities (the nuances of specific images) that are the only basis for any interpretation or experience that purports to be accurate.* In short, concepts (or "structures") are abstract, whereas images (or "personifications") are concrete. (*FP*, p. 49)

As concepts, the Jungian notions of ego, persona, shadow, *anima* or *animus*, and Self are abstract generalizations. It is better to say ego-image, *anima*-image, etc. As empirical images, these are concrete particularizations. This emphasizes that "*...the psyche never manifests except as images* " (*FP*, p. 50):

> Because concepts are simple and images complex, James Hillman says, the substitution of a concept for an image is psychologically reductive. "Then complexities becomes simple," he says, "the rich becomes poorer." (This is what I mean when I say that the image is *content-rich in information*, while the concept is *content-poor in information*.) Conceptualization of the imagination is a typification. "We begin," Hillman says, "to regard things typically: in types, then stereo-types." By means of concepts, we type-cast images. "Only the image," Hillman says, "can free us from type-casting, since each image has its particular peculiarity" – or distinctive quality. He then discusses the danger of concepts (or "ideas"). "When we neglect the image for the idea, then archetypal psychology can become a stereotypical psychology," Hillman says. "Then the precise detail of an image, just as it is, is replaced by a general idea of it." (This substitution is, of course, what I call an *abstract generalization....* (*FP*, p. 51)

Adams suggests that a post-structural Jungian theory would be a post-conceptual theory. He reminds that Hillman is not tossing out conceptual language. Adams wonders if relying less on typical Jungian structural conceptualizing and language and relying

more upon the imaginal language which psyche prefers might not be a better approach. He makes a distinction between a conceptual essentialism and an imaginal essentialism. The latter would result in an immediate agreement as to what meanings an image might have with its already definite presentation and contents. Conceptual essentialism is when concrete images are turned toward concepts which are abstract such as "the unconscious." How can one really define phenomenon such as "time," "life," "the unconscious"?

Adams' chapter in *The Fantasy Principle*, "The importance of being blasphemous: Profanation versus resacralization," refers to a cultural phenomenon which is related to the contemporary experience of the sacred and to the desire to return to religion via a resacralization of life and even secular culture. He understands "…the profane as the indispensable shadow of the sacred and blasphemy as a necessary compensation for the holy (and, at worst, for the religiouslity of a holier-that-thou attitude on the part of true believers." (*FP*, p. 206) Blasphemy is "…an act that is offensive to the religious sensibilities of believers." He considers all religions to be manifestations of the mythological unconscious. He quotes Jung as saying, "All talk of God is mythology. (*Letters*, 1951-61) Adams admits, "Religions are simply mythologies that adherents 'believe in.' What I believe in is what James Hillman believes: 'Psychology can do very well without the category of belief. (1981a, p. 129, "Monotheistic or Polytheistic")."

Adams alludes to Jung's claim that he was merely a psychologist and could make no metaphysical assertion about the existence of God. He could only attest to the phenomena of "God-images" and "God-concepts." Even if all cultures have such images and concepts, that does not prove the existence of God. From an empirical point of view, God could mean any number of entities—Yahweh, Allah, Zeus, Thor, etc. God-images are relative. God-images derive from what Adams calls, the "cultural unconscious." Summarizing Jung's understanding, he notes:

> … The God-concept is the *archetype* of God. The archetype of God is strictly psychic reality, not a metaphysical reality. In contrast to theology, psychology is an empirical science, and, as such, it is incompetent to answer any metaphysical questions about the existence of God. …such questions are simply beyond the proper purview of the discipline.

Religion is about belief; science is about knowledge. In short, as a psychologist, Jung was an agnostic. (*FP*, p. 207)

Adams admits to being a polytheist in the psychological sense which Hillman uses, that he is a pluralist believing in many "gods," lower-cases "to indicate that they are not literal, metaphysical entitites, but metaphorical, psychic factors, what Jung calls archetypes of the unconscious":

Monotheism is a variety of monism. William James says that the distinction between pluralism and monism is "the most pregnant of all the dilemmas of philosophy." James asks: "Does reality exist distributively? or collectively?—in the shape of *eaches, everys, anys, eithers*? or only in the shape of an *all* or *whole*?" (*Radical Empiricism*, p. 258) He says that "the attribute 'one' seems for many persons to confer a value, an ineffable illustriousness and dignity upon the world, with which the conception of it as an irreducible 'many' is believed to clash (p. 267). Jung says that monism "proceeds from the desire to set up one function or the other as the supreme psychological principle. According to Jung, "This psychological monism, or rather monotheism, has the advantage of simplicity but the defect of one-sidedness." It entails, he notes, "exclusion of the diversity and rich reality of life and the world." (*CW 7*, §482) (*FP*, pp. 217-18)

Adams prefers the many-sidedness of polytheism to the one-sidedness of monotheism due to the intrinsic and rich diversity of the unconscious. *Psyche* is not monistic but has multiple consciousnesses. Lopez-Pedraza has noted that "the many contains the unity of the one without losing the possibilities of the many." (*Spring 1971*, p. 214) In other words, unity exists as a possiblity of the many. The oneness of the each of the many images which constitute psyche is emphasized. That the unconscious manifests in a multiplicity of images is the conclusion of an anlyst working with patients. So, the Jungian notion of the "Self" is not really needed. It is a superfluous abstraction which does not need to be privileged. Adams takes exception to the "conflation of the psychological and the metaphysical in Ann Belford Ulanov's comment that the conversation is "between ego, Self, and that which the Self knows about, God" ("Jung and Prayer," J. Rice-Menuhin, ed., p. 92). Adams concludes that this understanding goes way beyond the limitations of what psychoanalysis can know. Both Adams and Hillman

prefer Jung's understanding of individuation as a differentiation rather than as an integration:

> ... The purpose of psychoanalysis ... is not an integration of these images *with* the ego but a differentiation of them *by* the ego and thus an increase in consciousness. Psychoanalytically, the decisive issues is *which specific "gods" or "goddesses"* (archetypes) manifest as images in the dreams, fantasies, and other material of *particular patients*—and for *what distinctive (even idiosyncratic purposes)*. (*FP*, pp. 220-21)

One image or archetypal fantasy should not be privileged over another in dogmatic presuppositions that would exclude or preclude other perspectives. An inclusive psychoanalysis would give value to all the contents of the unconscious. Again, Adams alludes to Hillman's critique of monotheistic coloring to our culture and its effects upon clincial understandings:

> According to Hillman, monotheism is pervasively implicit in Western culture. Because, however, Western culture now espouses secularism, this monotheism is not so much an overt theology as a covert ideology. Thus Hillman says that in Western culture monotheism "no longer appears with"—for example—"the devount and fanatic visibility of Islam." Rather, it manifests in "hundreds" of psychological assumptions "about how things are and how they should be." (*FP*, p. 221)

There is something blasphemous about the nature of the unconscious, not unlike that of the analyst and patient, with one playing Devil's advocate, stating different or varying perspectives and opinions in compensatory intents and moves.[1] The unconscious presents various alternative images, perspectives, positions, affects which have been "ignored, neglected, repressed, dissociated, or otherwise excluded from serious consideration by the ego:

> ... What the unconscious advocates are alternative perspectives that compensate the partial, prejudicial, or defective attitudes of the ego. To the ego, the advocacy of these alternative perspectives from the unconscious seems "devilish"—or, I would say, blasphemous. That is why the ego tends to be defensive rather than receptive to them.

> I personally prefer the notion that the unconscious is analogous to a devil's advocate rather than to God (or God "via the devil"), because the devil's advocate analogy seems to me more accurately to approximate the actual function of the unconscious. All three of

these analogies, however, are monotheistic: either the unconscious is a God that functions alone, a God that functions through the devil, or an advocate that functions for the devil. In a sense, of course, the very notion of "the" unconscious is monotheistic. In contrast, I would say that, from a polytheistic perspective, what psychoanalysts call "the" unconscious, as if unconsciousness were unitary, is a misnomer for all of the *multiple consciousnesses ("gods" and "goddesses," or psychic factors) of which the ego is unconscious and that confront the ego and challenge it to become more conscious.* (*FP*, p. 224)

The polytheistic approach will value the particularities of the *psyche* in terms of contrast and differences much as a wide diversity of gods and goddesses who personify unique and distinct qualities, patternings, stories, energies, intentions which cannot simply be reduced to categories of good and evil, right or wrong, sacred or profane.

The ultimate reason why a polytheistic psychology is preferrable to a montheistic psychology is that it is less likely to countenance an ego that regards the images (the "gods" and "goddesses") from the unconscious as evil, offensive, or blasphemous and that then summarily excludes them from consideration. I would say that from the perspective of the ego, the unconscious is intrinsically "blasphemous," because the images that emerge from it continually address the pieties of the ego with irreverence. To these images from the unconscious, the attitudes of the ego are "unbelievable." The ego is a "true believer" with "holier-than-thou" attitudes toward the unconscious, and that is why the profane is the indispensable shadow of the sacred and why blasphemy is a necessary compensation for the holy. (*FP*, p. 224)

Greg Mogenson and the Concept of Soul in Analytical Culture

Like Adams, Greg Mogenson is broadly acquainted with the field of psychoanalytic theory and practice as well as being Jungian trained. Each is respectful of the pluralism in the field of psychoanalysis yet each attempts to articulate what is unique in the practice of Jungian analysis. Each has moved into ongoing dialogues with Hillman. Greg Mogenson is a graduate of the Inter-Regional Society of Jungian Analysts and is in private practice in London, Ontario. He is the author of many articles in analytical psychology. His books include *Greeting the Angels: An Imaginal View of the Mourning Process* (1992), *God Is a Trauma: Vicarious Religion and Soul-Making* (1989), and *The Dove in the Consulting Room: Hysteria and the Anima in Bollas and Jung* (2003).

Mogenson wants to focus on "...the *religious dimension* of the *psychology* of those overwelming events we describe as traumatic." (*God Is a Trauma*, p. 1) His focus is on the psyche and all his references to God refer to the *imago dei*, the God-image, or the God-complex, not to God in an ontological sense. He notes:

... My aim is not to reduce theology's God to a secularized category of psychopathology but, rather, to raise the secularized term "trauma" to the immensity of the religious categories which, in the form of images, are among its guiding fictions.

Whether a divine being really exists or not, the psychological fact remains that we tend to experience traumatic events *as if* they were in some sense divine. Just as God has been described as transcendent and unknowable, a trauma is an event which transcends our capacity to experience it. Compared to the finite nature of the traumatized soul, the traumatic event seems infinite, all-powerful, and wholly other....

Human affliction has always been a problem for theology. Indeed, the question "How do we reconcile suffering and pain with a loving God?" has proven to be among the richest questions sustaining theological reflection. ...

... For the theologian the premier psychological question—"What does the soul want?"—takes a backseat to the premier theological question "What does God demand?" (*God Is a Trauma*, pp. 1-2)

Mogenson wants to put psychological reflection over the controlling metaphors of theology which too often literalize in terms of the God-givens of goodness or of affliction, evil, and pain. However, he also wants to look at the impact upon the psyche of monotheistic theology's no-name God. This God is both unknowable and unimaginable. In trauma, we stand as well before an event for which metaphors fail. How does our soul-making make "...*the traumatic contingencies of our incarnational life into soul?*" (*God Is a Trauma*, p. 7) Mogenson identifies a difficulty—

...*any metaphor which offers itself as the ultimate metaphor is no metaphor at all.* The soul's mediating function, knocked around by events it cannot relativize into images, is completely knocked out when "saved" by the metaphor that ends all metaphors: Christ as vicarious atonement." (*God Is a Trauma*, p. 10)

In order for psychological writing to stay psychological, it must eschew the monolithic tendencies of the positivistic spirit of scientism and theology. Psychological life, like a dream series or a conversation that meanders amongst the soul's complexes, is

radically discontinuous—even with itself. One theory can never encompass the soul's bounty. Soul-making is an endless process, and the events that we make into soul one day may have to be re-made the next. ... Indeed, were we to become monolithic, were we to stop the soul's ongoing imagining activity with a final truth, we would simply be replacing the traumatic content with an equally unabsorbable didactic content. In the name of soul-making, we would then actually be contributing to vicarious religion. We would be writing doctrinal theology. Events would not be turned into experiences which lend the soul substance while at the same time allowing it to imagine on. They would be turned into dogmas, fixed meanings and psychoanalytic cult reactions. (*God Is a Trauma*, p. 13)

Mogenson suggests the relief comes with "...increased ambivalence, complexity...and the courage to criticize one's own convictions." The soul heals by "differentiating problems." This is not the way of simple understandings, truths. It is the way of ongoing imagination.

Mogenson uses the metaphor of "the dove in the consulting room" to explore the spiritual dimension of psychoanalysis, its theories and practices. He asserts that

...*hysteria is the anima, or Madonna even, of the therapeutic psychology that come to prominence during the last century of the Christian aeon.* Our touchstone in this effort will be Christopher Bollas's year 2000 book, *Hysteria*, which we shall attempt to read through Jungian and post-Jungian glasses. (*Dove*, p. 4)

At the heart of Mogenson's analysis is an understanding of Jung's psychology of religion—that psyche is not just a personal affair, that it has a beyond-the-personal or transpersonal dimension, the figures of which can present as autonomous images which deny our rationalistic and causal understandings. The hidden and unconscious ground underlying everyone's life reveals itself in ways which cannot be reduced to the personalistic. Our pious and religious ancestors in their religious ontologies called this "the out-pouring of the Holy Spirit" or by other names. Now, "...the contemporary analyst and analysand, living within psychology's parenthetical 'ontology' and speaking in its God-terms, call the 'autonomous,' and therefore 'numinous,' 'reality of the psyche.'" (*Dove*, p. 10)

Mogenson asks,

... But what about God in the sense of traditional belief? God in the sense of a wholly other, absolutely transcendent deity? Is depth psychology, as the theologian Martin Buber worried, an eclipse of God?

Like it or not, our age is a psychological one, and under these conditions God can only be known immanently, as an image, emotion, or idea in the soul. Heir to the religion which preceded it, psychology itself has the character of a theophany. While such an assertion will, no doubt, arouse the resistances of those who can construe it only as a confinement of God within human limits – so small is their notion of psychology – it may be understood as a deepening extension of God along the axis of human experience. (*Dove*, p. 11)

Mogenson does a kind of Jungian analysis of Bollas' work on hysteria, which is thorough and articulate on a phenomena from which psychoanalysis began and which continues to elicit ongoing discussions. Mogenson particularly lands on the Christian account of Christ's birth, which Bollas rather reductively limited to father, mother, and child. Using Jungian psychology and post-Jungian understandings (largely those of archetypal psychology), Mogenson respects the mythic and imaginal backdrop of this story without the personalistic understandings coloring Bollas' reading.

Hysteria is an elusive phenomena which plays a role in the field of psychoanalytic culture. This is related to the spiritual aspects of the unconscious in psychoanalysis—i.e., "the dove in the consulting room." Mogenson affirms the religious dimension of the *psyche* although this "...should not lead us to conclude that the spirit's dove is exclusive to the consulting rooms of Jungian analysts—or even that it is necessarily to be found there at all."

Analytical Psychology and the Pacifica Graduate Institute

Archetypal psychology is evident at Pacifica Graduate Institute in Santa Barbara, California where some of Hillman's papers are stored for a fee, and where he continues to teach and lecture at various times throughout the year. Many of the Pacifica faculty teach archetypal psychology in the spirit of Hillman's ideas. Their publication, *Depth Psychology: Meditations in the Field* (2000) offers a sampling of how the influence of Hillman's archetypal psychology continues to address concerns of soul, both individually and in the world. This volume was published to honor Hillman's respect for the many

diverse expressions of the *psyche* presented in papers during the Second Festival of Archetypal Psychology in Santa Barbara in 2000.

In this volume[2] from the Festival, Hillman has an essay, "Look Out: Three Occasions of Public Excitement." It begins with a reminder about one of the intentions of archetypal psychology:

> ... We are trying to turn psychology inside out. We are looking for the inside outside. This move attempts to deliteralize the idea of psychology as an examination of human subjective processes inside our minds, our feelings, our behaviors, our relationships because this idea of psychology leaves the world out there abandoned, deserted, only sociology, economics and science, quite disemboweled of soul. (p. 161)

CHAPTER 11

HILLMAN'S INFLUENCE ON CONTEMPORARY SPIRITUALITY

Hillman has been a significant influence upon contemporary spirituality. This chapter makes the point that the influence of his work can be found in the writings of two important authors whose central understandings have been influenced by archetypal psychology. The first is Thomas Moore, the best-selling author of *The Care of the Soul*. The second is Daniel Noel, a college professor whose work, *The Soul of Shamanism*, has presented a shamanic spirituality which contrasts with the phenomena of the neo-shamanisms of popular culture.

Thomas Moore and the Restoration of Soul in Therapy and Spirituality

Thomas Moore is a friend and associate of Hillman's. He was a Fellow of the Dallas Institute. Before this Moore was a monk in a Catholic religious order for twelve years. He has degrees in theology, philosophy, and musicology. He taught religious studies and philosophy for years at several institutions. After leaving academia in the 80s, he has had a practice of psychotherapy in which he used archetypal psychology.

Moore's book, *The Planets Within: Marsilio Ficino's Astrological Psychology* (1982), illustrated the relevance of Renaissance psychology to modern culture. In Moore's "Introduction: The Recovery of Soul," he stated:

> Besides our own imaginations freely playing (seriously nonetheless) with Ficino's imagery, we fortunately have guides: C. G. Jung and James Hillman. These specialists in matters psychological and symbolic will not be claimed as authorities so much as exemplars. Their writings show us how to dive deep into images without strangling them, without giving them a Midas touch transforming them into our favorite golden theories.
>
> ... But as I read Jung carefully and more extensively, I discovered in him a true concern for the integrity of images. ... One of Jung's greatest contributions to art, and to religion in particular, is to demonstrate that images of tradition need not remain as lifeless, opaque hunks of matter. With imagination we can vivify them, rendering them more transparent by comparing them and restating them in the metaphors congenial to our modern perspective.

If in Jung there is the suggestion that psychology has to do with more than the personal life, that it is more than the ordinary person usually imagines it to be, then in Hillman's work this suggestion is repeated, amplified, and underscored. Hillman lays stress on soul and wants to bring psyche back into psychology. He has gone his own way, yet, like Jung, Hillman directs our attention to depth. For Hillman, an image is bottomless, and the way to let its significance seep into our skin is to dive into it. Hillman also accents the pathological currents in psychological experience, veering away from normative ideals too tight, too optimistic, too one-sided as reflections of the way psychological life proceeds. He also opts for a polytheistic rather than a monotheistic view of the world. There are many legitimate perspectives on experience, he suggests, and a single one becomes dominant only to the detriment of the psyche.

Hillman's concern for soul and his polytheistic position place him shoulder to shoulder with Ficino. (*The Planets Within*, pp. 23-24)

Moore's book, *Ritual of the Imagination* (1983), was a reminder that it is within ritual experience that personal myths are lived, engaging in "necessary rites of soul." Ritual is also a dynamic in psychotherapy. These were lectures given to the Dallas Institute. The release of his book, *Care of the Soul* (1992), was a sensation and was on the bestseller list for a long time. It took many of the values of archetypal psychology to a wider audience as Moore's ability to write well took complicated notions and related them to down-to-earth realities. An article in *The New York Times* by Emily Yoffe (April 23, 1995) entitled, "How the Soul Is Sold," had a lead stating, "James Hillman developed a psychoanalytic theory few could understand, until his protégé Thomas Moore translated it for the masses. A tale of two best sellers—and the man who did not write them." (p. 44) The second best-seller was Moore's *Soul Mates*. Yoffe noted Hillman as "Moore's inspiration, the well-spring of the younger man's ideas." Moore freely acknowledged his intellectual debt to Hillman. Yoffe says in the article:

... *Care of the Soul* can be seen in part as a gloss on Hillman's work, a clearer, more direct translation of Hillman's ideas. Call it Hillman Lite.

Hillman Heavy asks no less than to replace the governing beliefs of psychoanalysis. In Hillman's view psychology should be about depth, not growth. ... He has devoted decades to dethroning our culture's faith in the ego, to deflating our worship of heroic action and to deprecating our certainty in the concept of self. Hillman wants society to turn away from

its obsession with the unanchored altitudes of spirit, and come back down to earth, to the soul. He also asks us to reject the judgmental thinking of monotheism and return our psyches to the polytheism exemplified by ancient Greece. (Yoffe, p. 46)

Yoffe noted a difference in style between Moore and Hillman. Moore was a former seminarian and was now a therapist. He had "a gentle, reassuring manner of someone trained in gentleness and reassurance." Hillman "doesn't evoke, he provokes." Whereas Moore wrote in an accessible, friendly, somewhat meditative style, Hillman's writing challenged:

All the books provide intoxicating bursts of illumination, but they are also dense, allusive, complex. Hillman's writing style suggests that he will not be drawn into the delusion of the logically laid-out argument. "It requires a lot of culture," he says of his oeuvre. "It's work to read it." He offers almost no case histories, anecdotes or biography to help anchor the reader or show how to apply his ideas to one's own life. (Yoffe, pp. 46-47)

In a personal conversation with the Daniel Noel at the Second Festival on Archetypal Psychology in Santa Barbara in 2000, Noel noted this contrast of Moore and Hillman. "There is a big difference between reading or hearing Moore and Hillman. When you read or hear Moore, it is like you are receiving a reassuring, calming homily by a country priest. But when you hear or read Hillman, it is like being kicked in the ass by an angry Rabbi!"

Jay Livernois, the former managing editor of Spring Publications, has pointed out that while Moore maintains the bulk of Hillman's archetypal psychology, he has carefully edited out some of Hillman's critique of Christianism. This was said in reference to *A Blue Fire*, the anthology in which Moore has written concise and articulate introductions to chapters of selected writings of Hillman (mostly selected by Moore but with Hillman's input). However, Moore, perhaps because he is coming from a strong Roman Catholic experience, does not include the sharper elements of Hillman's critique of Christianism.

Moore has written a number of other well-received books: *Dark Eros: The Imagination of Sadism* 1990/92), *The Re-Enchantment of Everyday Life* (1996), *The Education of the Heart* (1996/7), *The Soul of Sex: Cultivating Life as an Act of Love* (1998, and *Original Self: Living with Paradox and Originality* (2000).

In *Original Self,* Moore referred to the influence of Hillman on him:

In my early thirties I discovered the writings of James Hillman. At that time his major books had yet to be published, and so I collected essays he was publishing in Europe. Soon we began a correspondence, and then we met and unexpectedly became neighbors. I spent several years reading and rereading his writings and those of his colleagues. They were forming something called "archetypal psychology," which turned out not to be a school or movement or system. Later, each of those originating and brilliant psychologists went their own way, fulfilling the core idea of archetypal psychology—to allow the soul to show itself so compellingly that a strong individual life emerges. Today archetypal psychology seems to be a thing of the past, a short-lived inspiration that appeared as a seed and quickly sank back into the earth. Because of this honest, organic quality, I trust it even more than when I was an active participant and it was flourishing.

One reason I appreciated archetypal psychology was the intense interest its creators showed toward the many ways human life takes shape. I learned from these thoughtful people to appreciate both oddity and real shadow in the showings of the soul. If a therapy client was acting in a bizarre fashion, we didn't indulge in any personal revulsion or take a high moral road or psychologically try to force the person to fit more neatly into polite society. Actively and open-mindedly we wondered what was going on. We asked the key archetypal question: What does the soul want? (*Original Self*, pp. 90-91)

Moore's characterization of archetypal psychology as "a short-lived inspiration" may be more properly understood as an allusion to his own involvement, especially in the Dallas years. In contrast to Moore's characterization, archetypal psychology appears to have taken root in many aspects of our culture, growing and bearing fruit, reaping harvests through new dialogues.

Moore has discussed the spiritual life in a recent book, *The Soul's Religion* (2002). Moore's writing has been articulate and comprehensible as he focussed on the art of finding the sacred in ordinary life, grasping the beauty or depth of everyday situations rather than in moralisms, piety, ideologies, and closed belief systems.

And Hillman seems to have been influenced by Moore's success leading him into a wider audience and readership. Hillman even appeared on "Oprah" as Moore had done earlier, which significantly contributed to Hillman's bestselling book success, *The Soul's Code*. Moore's writing style seems to have encouraged and enabled him to speak about the complexities and particularities of soul with a more eloquent yet ordinary language.

This approach can be observed in Hillman's recent publications besides *The Soul's Code*, which include *The Force of Character* and *A Terrible Love of War*.

Daniel Noel and an Imaginal Shamanism in the West

Daniel Noel taught for twenty-five years at Goddard College and later at Norwish University in Montpelier, Vermont. However, at the time of his recent death, he had become a core faculty member at Pacifica Graduate Institute. He published five books, one being *Paths to the Power of Myth*, and another was *The Soul of Shamanism: Western Fantasies, Imaginal Realities* in 1997. These works examined our Western fantasies and literary sources of the new shamanism. They are about "...shamanism as Western scholars, storytellers, and seekers have imagined it...." (p. 9) and also about reimagining shamanism into the future through a post-Jungian understanding. Noel articulated an authentic "Western shamanism of soulful spirituality, ..." (p. 11), which was indebted to the work of Hillman and archetypal psychology. He noted, "...the 'post-Jungian' work of James Hillman and colleagues with their 'imaginal psychology,' seems to me best equipped to *understand* the making of a modern Western 'shamanism.'" (*The Soul of Shamanism*, p. 21) He highlighted the centrality of imagination around his work within the *psyche* and the outer worlds of culture and nature.

Noel understood that the men and women interested in the new shamanisms were searching for a spiritual alternative to institutional religion. The sources informing the shamanisms (i.e. Mircea Eliade, Carlos Castaneda, and Michael Harner) actually were literary rather than literal. The fantasies of neo-shamanism did not emerge from actual experiences of indigenous shamans but were Western fantasies and fictions. Neo-shamanism was born of "fictive power." Their readings must be deliteralized to feel any power which might lead the way toward nonordinary, imaginal, or spiritual realities.

Noel cited Hillman who wrote that psychoanalysis "...has replaced the imaginal power of the psyche with the concept of the unconscious." Hillman had articulated a psychology which bridged from the "concept of the unconscious" to "the imaginal power of the psyche." (*The Soul of Shamanism*, p. 120)

This means the fictive power of the literary imagination that has secretly fostered neoshamanism is also the imaginal power of the psyche, the lost "soul" of the West and of

its modern seekers, to be rediscovered and recovered in acts and arts of shamanic imagining. By aestheticizing Jung, Hillman brings psychology into contact with the aesthetic core of neoshamanism, a movement prepared for by the novelistic imagining of a historian of religions and created by an anthropologist operating as a literary artist. (*The Soul of Shamanism*, p. 121)

Noel articulated a theory and practice of a shamanic spirituality using the key understandings of Hillman, namely: the primacy of the image over concept, the dimension of depth, the imaginal or non-interpretive approach to the dream, the belief in the imaginal and non-literal realm, active imagination and the fictions which heal, a valuing of suffering and pathology in the recovery of soul, and addressing the cultural loss of the *anima mundi* or the soul of the world. Noel concluded his work on shamanism by suggesting the need for an imaginal shamanism to reconnect our Western heritage which may lead to roots in "Old Europe" with its traditions of witchcraft and of Merlin.

In the late Daniel Noel's long associated with archetypal psychology, he recalled the many people adhering initially to the field of archetypal psychology:

First were the Jungians Patricia Berry and Rafael Lopez-Pedraza, who had helped Hillman to get things going in Zurich; then David Miller, a religious studies colleague of mine who re-visioned Christian theology in Hillman's direction; and Robert Sardello, a therapist associated with Hillman when he moved from Zurich to Dallas, and Mary Watkins, a developmental psychologist trained in both Jungian and phenomenological thought. Paul Kugler and Edward Casey lent philosophical depth to the Hillman circle, while art therapists Howard McConeghey and Shaun McNiff nurtured the crucial aesthetic interest Hillman had revealed for a psychology of soul. Supporters from abroad—Wolfgang Giegerich and Noel Cobb and Alan Blearkley from psychotherapy, Peter Bishop from cultural geography—came on board.

Others appeared, too: Ginette Paris, a communications scholar and "psychological feminist," Michael Perlman, re-visioning ideas about nuclear and ecological threats; Robert Bosnak, an unusually thoughtful therapist of dreams; Russell Lockhart, showing how an imaginal therapy would work; Michael Vannoy Adams, a postmodern literary critic; Charles Boer, an irreverent classics professor; and even a Chicago lawyer, Benjamin Sells. Many more writers appeared in *Spring*: less prolific contributors like me and Michael Whan, as well as prominent figures from the Jungian world who did not

identify so much as co-conspirators with Hillman. ... None of the (conferences, gatherings, "Festivals of Archetypal Psychology") would have made much of an impact on the larger public of readers and seeks, however, had it not been for one other name within the Hillman camp: Thomas Moore. (*The Soul of Shamanism*, pp. 126-27)

CHAPTER 12

THE INFLUENCE OF ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOLOGY
UPON DAVID L. MILLER'S "DEPTH THEOLOGY"

The argument of this dissertation is that Hillman's archetypal psychology had made and continues to make contributions to the study of religion as well as to the field of theology. Hillman's contributions to theology can be especially seen in the work of David L. Miller. Miller is a theologian and professor of religious studies who admits that archetypal psychology has contributed to his "depth theology," which is a poetic and imaginal theology. This chapter continues the argument that Hillman's depth psychology can alter theology just as the work of Freud and Jung affected the study of religion in previous decades.

Who Is David L. Miller and What Is His Work About?

David L. Miller is the Watson-Ledden Professor Emeritus of Religion at Syracuse University. He is a retired Core Faculty Member at the Pacifica Graduate Institute in Santa Barbara. For decades, Miller has been working and writing "at the intersections of religions and mythologies, literature and literary theory, and depth psychology and culture." Miller has published five books and over hundred articles and book chapters as well as numerous essays. Although Miller was not trained in Jungian analysis, Miller has been a lively participant in Jungian gatherings and in ongoing dialogue with archetypal psychologists. Miller has taught at the C. G. Jung Institute in Zürich. The Inter-Regional Society of Jungian Analysts conferred on him associate membership in 2002. Miller was made an honorary member of the International Association for Analytical Psychology at the International Congress of Jungian Analysts in 2004.

Miller's Move Toward a Theology of Depth:

Murray Stein, past President of the International Association for Analytical Psychology, asked Miller a question which led to Miller's recent article, "Holy and Not So Holy Ghosts: Psychopathogenic Shadows in Religious Images and Ideas." This article addressed Stein's question."How did Jung's psychology alter your way of doing

theology?" It is a succinct self-statement regarding Miller's understanding of his work toward a depth theology and well as the contributions of Hillman and archetypal psychology upon his work theological understanding of religion.

Miller had a growing recognition regarding a deeper, archetypal, theopoetic depth or mythic backdrop underlying Christian theology prior to his accquaintance with Hillman and archetypal psychology. This intuition began in the 1960s when he was a graduate student at Drew University. He related classical Greek religion to the theory of Aristophanes. He was aware of Werner Jaeger's works—*Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, Theology of Early Greek Thinkers*, and *Paideia*:

> ... Jaeger's thesis was...that Greek philosophy is ancient mythology abstracted, and renamed. What had been character (Gods and Goddesses) and plot (*mythos*) was translated by philosophical thinkers into idea and logic (*logos*). Behind the Presocratics, Plato and Aristotle lurk Homer and Hesiod....

> This was heady stuff for a young graduate student who had already learned from the writings of Adolf Harnack in seminary that Christian theology is formally constituted of Greek philosophical thought forms in which are situated Jewish apocalyptic and Jesus' life and teachings. I wondered whether the two—Harnack and Jaeger—could be joined. That is, if Christian theology is Greek philosophy, and Greek philosophy is Greek religion and mythology, I wondered if it could be plausibly shown that ultimately Christian theological ideas and images were sublated forms of Greek myths. Could it be that all the Gods and Goddesses are subliminally present in baptized canonical form in Christianity? Might Christian monotheism actually be polytheism *rediviivus*? Is it the case that behind one God there are many? I thought that this could be seen as a radical recontextualization of Christianity, against the then-current opinion that behind Christian theology is Jewish thinking. I determined to explore this possibility in what I intended to be a depth theology inspired by the archetypal psychology of C. G. Jung and James Hillman. (*TAJ*, p. 56)

Miller worked on the possibility of a depth theology from 1969 to 1988. He acknowledged that hints of this possibility were in the classical writings of Clement of Alexandria and Origen as well as in the more recent work of Irwin Goodenough, Richard Reitzenstein, Hugo Rahner. Americans were not familier with these ideas. Miller also wrote:

... What I thought I was doing was giving archetypal context, psychological and pagan mythological background, to Christian ideas and images. As a member of the Eranos circle during this period, I reported on my findings in nine lectures from 1975 until 1988 at Eranos. Many of the findings reported in those lectures, together with my own constructions, were recast in book form in *Christs: Meditations on Archetypal Images in Christian Theology*; *Three Faces of God: Traces of the Trinity in Literature and Life*; and *Hells and Holy Ghosts: A Theopoetics of Christian Belief.* The prolegomenon to the logic of the research program was announced in the earlier work *The New Polytheism: Rebirth of the Gods and Goddesses.* (*TAJ*, p. 56)

The Influence of Archetypal Psychology

Miller has said that much of his work on a depth theology was presented at Eranos from 1975 to 1988. Miller and Hillman had a friendship over those years as both were regular lecturers at the Eranos Conferences during that time. When Miller first went to Eranos, James Hillman was not only a speaker but had much to say about who else spoke due to his financial interest in Eranos and being part of an unofficial board with Portmann and Rudolf Ritsema (also including a fluctuating group of others which usually included Ritsema's wife, Catherine, and later, occasionally David Miller). Miller acknowledges the influence of archetypal psychology on his theology of depth: "James Hillman, to whom I was very much indebted in this work, heard all of this at Eranos over the years and he said nice things about it in 1983 in his book *Inter Views*." (*TAJ*, p. 56) But Hillman added a caveat concerning Miller's work although "...he said nice things about it." Hillman wrote:

> ... He (Miller) shows that Christianity is loaded with forgotten meanings. It's full of soul, he says. He shows the clown in Christ and the drunk in Christ and not only the hero myth. This opens a whole new way out—but, it's still theology, apologetics, still committed to saving Christianity, and I want something...more psychological. (*IV*, p. 77)

Miller responded by saying that it was not his intention to save Christianity, which will be whatever it might be and is already in our Western psychology whether an individual might be Christian or not:

> ... Theology is, I believe, for good or ill, depth psychology. This is what I was trying to expose. I was trying not to avoid, but to work with what might be called the

psychological *massa confusa* of Christian ideas that are in the Occidental cultural air. (*TAJ*, pp. 56-57)

Miller's work on theology was preceeded by an earlier book, *The New Polytheism: Rebirth of the Gods and Goddesses*. This small book contained a "Prefatory Letter" by Henry Corbin as well as Hillman's *Spring 1970* essay, "Psychology: Monotheistic or Polytheistic?" and was published by Hillman's press, Spring Publictions, in 1981.

Archetypal Themes and Shadows in Theological Understandings

It was assumed by many religious thinkers over the centuries that ancient Greek mythic themes had little to do with Christian theological understandings. Miller made a forcible argument that behind the dogmatic structures and theological categories with their monotheistic contents, there were mythic themes which were "polytheistic in form." The assumed Christian doctrines have masked archetypal perspectives. The shadows of the Greek gods and goddesses are found in the backdrop of Christian hermeneutics. Behind Christ lurked the mythic presence of Hermes or Odysseus. This cultural analysis was laid out in *The New Polytheism* and consequential books by Miller. Miller attempted to articulate insights so that Christian beliefs might maintain relevance in a "post-Christian world." The Greek mythic prototypes were found in Christian thought and analyzed in his essays such as "The Good Shepherd" and "The Intoxicated Teacher." Miller had been relating theological notions such as the Trinity to mythopoetic expressions both in ancient images and in modern literary and poetic expressions. He confessed that he had been trying:

...to demonstrate the importance and perduring power of Christian archetypal structures, apart from belief or unbelief: the lifelikeness of theology's forms of thought and feeling. Especially it was my intention to attempt to show the importance for Christian theology of the American secular study of religion,... (*Hells & Holy Ghosts*, p. 4)

Miller's 2004 book, *Hells & Holy Ghosts*, took a new set of beliefs around the motif of "the ghost," in contrast to his previous working with Christology and Trinitarianism. "The ghost" referred to divinity as Holy Ghost and the theme of life after death. Of this Miller wrote:

...the strategy is to locate the form of the Christian content in comparative mythological antecedents and in modern literary likenesses. The idea is to try to discover some of the functions of the *images* that have been promulgated by Christian *ideas*. (*Hells & Holy Ghosts*, p. 4)

Hillman's work was cited a number of times, especially a lecture Hillman delivered at the 1973 Eranos Conference about viewing death and the Underworld of ghosts from a depth psychology perspective:

... It is just this—a *perspective*—that psychology gives to a theology of ghosts and that ghosts give to a theological psychology.

What is this perspective? Hillman calls it imaginal, archetypal, a poetic basis of mind, just as Lacan has called it symbolic and linguistic. This poetic-linguistic perspective, according to these postmodern psychologists, provides a way properly to deal with the dead in the self, giving proper burial to the buried, a remembering which is not a further fixation of ego, not an idolatry of the dead. It would be difficult to know, without glancing at the endnote, whether Lacan or Hillman had written this line: "Human beings are defined by language, and letting your word determine your acts is one of the essential ways we have of recognizing our debt to the dead." (*Hells & Holy Ghosts*, p. 151)

Miller concluded that in the works of earlier theologians and historians, depth psychology and poetics were often lacking. His saw his work as a "cultural analysis" and a "therapy of ideas" as he looked for unconscious images within Christian ideas.

Probing the Depth and Shadows of Theology

Miller began to intuit that something else was going in the complexity of Christian ideas and theology following his own experience of Jungian analysis in 1975 and a subsequent Freudian analysis in 1984. It would appear that he acquired an eye for the shadow, not just the personal shadow but the shadow inherent in collective ideas and understandings. Jung's notion of the shadow, all that we consciously do not wish to be, was a deconstructive approach which had therapeutic import. The method in Miller's depth theology then attempted to:

...identify a problematic idea, to probe its depth so as to uncover its (or one of its) fundamental unconscious images, to press that image back into its narrative emplotting and ancient mythical underpinnings, and then to explore what that mythic image is now doing

poetically and metaphorically in the contemporary self and world. For example, deep within the idea of perfectionism, so well known in the complex of obsessive-compulsive disorder, I found historically the image of shepherding, grounded in Christianity's notion of the good shepherd commandment. I searched the background context of this imaginal notion, and I discovered Greek mythic images of monstrous and rapacious shepherds, e.g., Polyphemos. Following upon the death of the pastoral tradition in literature and art, which carried this image from Hellenistic times to the 16th and 17th centuries, I found in the modern poetry of, say, Robinson Jeffers, a critique of the image and its concomitant perfectionism. As this California poet put it..., the savior/shepherd complex is "the most insidious and seductive syndrome to attack people of good will." (*TAG*, p. 57)

Miller saw that shadow is inherent in all thoughts, ideologies, theologies, religions, and psychologies. Miller was aware that Christian theology and its ideas could make people sick, that "we suffer theologically", that there were problems in Christianity and shadows in theology which were toxic. Miller, in the tradition of Jung, understood that Western theism and theological ideas and images were responsible for a great deal of the psychopathology we observe today. In his essay, "'Attack Upon Christiandom!' The Anti-Christianism of Depth Psychology" (1986), Miller recognized:

...a religious viewpoint, logically necessitated by a monotheistic God who is *Summum Bonum*, is responsible for human feelings of shame, guilt, and anxiety, not to mention inferiority, worthlessness, and depression. At least in part, Jung's clients suffer from an unconscious Christian theology rather than from a conscious personality history. ("Attack," pp. 59-60)

In other words, people were suffering from an unconscious Christian theology far more than from their personal, subjective biographical histories. Miller's cultural analysis attempted to make these toxic shadows conscious, much as an analyst attempts to analyze the personal unconscious:

I discovered further shadows in other Christian images and ideas: the necessity of the third in love relationships; the notion that going down and in is hell and leads to depression, low self-esteem, and dependency; and so on. That is, I discovered that religion can make us sick, that religious images and ideas, in the cultural unconscious, are psychologically dangerous. (*TAG*, p. 57)

Miller had noted Hillman's caution that, "Psychology has to be worried about...the shadow of Christianity and its effect on the soul." (*IV*, p. 77) However, Miller did not agree with Hillman's interpretation of this depth theology being an attempt at apologetics. Miller emphasizes:

> ... As a theologian, I was simply attempting, not to save Christianity, but to put some historical and psychological flesh on such assertions by Jung and Hillman, not to mention similar ones by Freud and Lacan. On the one hand, I had not only been attempting to build an archetypal theopoiesis, but, on the other hand, I was also attempting to specify the psychopathogenetic nature of religion, and particularly Christianity. (*TAG*, p. 58)

Religion was "a ghost that haunts the self psychologically," whether a holy ghost or a not so holy ghost. Even if a religion or a theology or a god appears to die, there are after effects which haunt coming generations and centuries. Miller's depth theology, which was focussed on the shadow aspects of religion, emphasized the psychological shadows of religion and theology, in contrast to other critiques which were social or political in analysis. Miller remained aware of the complex of opposition inherent in an analysis of both the negative and positive aspects of theology and religion.

Archetypal Hermeneutics

Miller edited a collection of essays called *Jung and the Interpretation of the Bible* (1995). This volume's publicity noted that, "The Jungian vision, broadly conceived, has generally been recognized as the psychological school most congenial to Jewish-Christian principles and practice. But that vision has often been confined to such areas as the nature of religious experience, myth-making, personal religion growth, spirituality, and worship." The intent of this collection is to be an introduction to the uses of Jung in reading the Bible, which was to be an experiment in the exploration of biblical hermeneutics from a Jungian and archetypal point of view as articulated by biblical and theological scholars.

Miller was concerned about a "hermeneutic binarism" in the reading of the biblical text involving historiographical and theological emphases. This had affected the religious imagination:

As biblical scholarship has swung back and forth between these (largely unconscious) hermeneutic perspectives, the effect on the religious imagination has been to split dogma and piety, mind and heart, spirit and flesh, ideal and real, thought and feeling, infinite and finite, supernature and nature, transcendental and immanent. ... Psychologically put, they locate religion psychologically as a function of ego (ego's beliefs and doctrines and thoughts and ideas, or ego's experiences and history and behaviors). ... What is missed is the psychological possibility that there is an impact of biblical imagery in the here-and-now, a signifying that is different from without being opposed to historical or theological meanings, a textual intentionality and function that refers to a dimension of selfhood that is other than ego. (*Jung and the Interpretation of the Bible*, pp. 103-04)

Miller stated there is a third way. He alluded to Henry Corbin *mundus imaginalis* or "imaginal realm," that middle realm or between realm, inbetween the mind's intelligibles and experiential sensibilities. This third way was the realm of soul and imagination. Our ideas and our embodied experiences come together in the phenomenon of the image. Imagination holds together the epistemic aspects which otherwise tend to split off from each other. The Bible can be approached in this imaginal manner:

"The biblical text is a treasure-house of images that are contextualized in a variety of genres (myth, history, parable, poetry, letter, prophecy, and apocalypse). ... The biblical images are as-structures of the ideas (fantasies) and feelings of the psyche." (*Jung and the Interpretation of the Bible*, p. 105)

An archetypal approach to biblical texts would be this here-and-now approach through likeness and resemblance. One criticism of this approach was that the imagery had an archetypal psychological intentionality, which implied a world of essences and essential forms of meaning. The approach did not respect the otherness of the divine. Miller's understood this criticism coming from the notion of the archetype where too much emphasis was on Jung's universal and essentialist understanding and than upon Jung's depth psychological use:

Jung was firmly post-Kantian concerning essence and difference, even if his language side-slipped from time to time. He saw clearly that the so-called "self" is the object and the subject of psychological work and that all psychological knowledge was therefore hypothetical, having no claim to universal essentialist validity, and was thereby

confessional by nature. This implies that "archetype" is by no means a metaphysical postulate, but is heuristic in function. (*Jung and the Interpretation of the Bible*, p. 107)

Jung actually emphasized difference in his psychological interpretations, i.e., the broadening of consciousness through individuation and differentiation, a separation of the parts rather than an accomplishment of wholeness which Jung was suspicious of actually happening:

> ... Individuation is, he (Jung) said, a becoming of that which one is not, and it is accompanied by the feeling of being a stranger. So much is this the case that it has led James Hillman, a postmodern archetypalist after Jung, not to use the word "archetype" as a noun (as if it referred to some "things" or essences), but rather to use the word "archetypal," which Hillman says "is a move one makes rather than a thing that is. (*Jung and the Interpretation of the Bible*, p. 108)

It was this archetypal move which Miller encouraged, a "hermeneutic precisely de-essentializes the meaning of the text." Biblical images are "life-likenesses based on fundamental difference rather than sameness." This archetypal hermeneutics was not ahistorical. Miller quoted Jung's, "...without history there can be no psychology, and certainly no psychology of the unconscious." (1963, *MDR*, 205f)

Another criticism of archetypal hermeneutics was that of psychologism / reductionism, of humanizing what is divine in nature, of reduction to psychological understandings. Actually, Jung had worried about reductionism in Freud's methodology and tried to avoid reductionism through his own method of amplification, of seeking parallels in the archetypal realm of myth, fairy tales, religion, and the arts. Imagination met with imagination, saw the smaller in images of the larger. Miller noted that this is what Proclus called *epistrophé*, a "leading back" of human experiences to their deeper archetypal contexts:

> Rather than being a matter of psychologizing the Bible, it can be understood as the experience of "biblicizing" the psyche, of imagining human thoughts and feelings in terms of biblical images, divinizing the human rather than humanizing the divine. It is not that Jacob and his mother and father are in an oedipal complex, but rather that a given sense of the familial mess can be seen as a Jacob complex. (*Jung and the Interpretation of the Bible*, p. 112)

Deconstruction and the Learning of No/Thing

A recent publication, *Disturbances in the Field: Essays in Honor of David L. Miller* (2006), acknowledged Miller's work. This book is a collection of essays from colleagues, former students, and friends of Miller. Ernest Wallwork co-taught a course on Freud and Jung with Miller. He alludes to Miller quoting a Zen saying in Miller's 1986 article, "'Attack Upon Christendom!' The Anti-Christianism of Depth Psychology." The saying was, "Bean paste that smells like bean paste is not good bean paste." Miller's article had emphasized that the so-called "anti-Christianism" inherent in Freud, Lacan, Jung, Hillman, and others was not really a threat to religion, faith, or theology. It was "an iconoclastic critique" in the tradition of great religious leaders who opened up new opportunities for theology when the official and literal understandings had little animation. Miller was suggesting, "religion that smells like religion is not good religion." Miller's teaching colleague concluded:

> David finds in depth psychology a way of deconstructing the kind of totalistic thinking found in mainstream theology, ethics, piety and science, a thinking that is attributable to the monotheistic desire to "get it all together," to possess some definitive universal truth or truths. The totalistic thinking that pervades much modern theory in all fields of thought takes a single-minded, one-dimensional exclusionary, tyrannical single angle of vision on things. Writing and teaching against this legacy of monotheism, David has long sought to open the minds of his students, readers, and colleagues to the possibility of new ways of seeing that acknowledge "the multiple dimensions of everything," teaching us "a new tolerance—even more, an acceptance of the variousness of ourselves and others." Depth psychology, David writes, is one of these deconstructive openings that invites us to "listen closely...to the moods, emotions, unusual behaviors, dreams, and fantasies of ourselves and our societies" so that we may reach "an expanding consciousness, a new sensibility, a new polytheism...." (*DIF*, pp. 37-38)

It was noted above that "an eye for the shadow" is a deconstructive approach or methodology. Miller acquired an eye for the unseen negatives which were threatening to either personal or collective one-sided conciousness. Miller understood that if toxic theological understandings were not acknowledged they could have a pernicious impact upon men and women. In the Jungian tradition, Miller also understood that if shadow dimensions were acknowledged and grappled with, that which is "other" or "otherwise"

than consciousness, something therapeutic and creative might emerge. Hidden, or previously unconscious, meanings could be "worked through." Theology benefitted from self examination much as individuals benefitted from encounters with shadow aspects of personality.

In his deconstructive method, Miller attempted "to achieve the negative!" in exposing the inherent shadows of either good or bad in theological understanding. He admitted to being guided in his work both psychologically and theologically by Kafka's reminder, "What is laid upon us is to accomplish the negative; the positive is already given." (*TAG*, p. 59) Alluding to Hillman's misunderstanding that he was still trying to do apologetics to save Christianism, Miller noted:

> Over against the suggestion of James Hillman that my work's function may be too positive, some have complained that I have been too one-sidedly negative. Perhaps so. But I guess that I feel vocationally that theologians are, or might be, like plumbers. I don't want a master plumber to come into my house and tell me how wonderful my dishwasher is. I want her or him to find the leak in my toilet that will not get rid of the shit and find out why my Insinkerator will not dispose of the garbage. The theologian, I should have thought, is in the same business, plumbing the complex psychological depth of religion, exposing the shit and garbage. (*TAG*, p. 59)

Miller's has emphasized insights into "nothingness" in his teaching. The "negative approach," as some have characterized Miller's approach, sees into or through those constructions of the mind which can be de-literalized—Holy Ghost, God, Self, Race, Gender, the Unconscious. These are not concrete realities which can reinforce attitudes of domination. De-constructing these can loosen fixed meanings and positivisms. An archetypal and imaginal approach would search more deeply than literalized meanings to recognize the informing or root metaphor, fantasy, archetype or mythic backdrop. Imagination can yield new meanings for what appeared to be objective realities. Fresh interpretations can be recognized. Ginette Paris, a colleague of Miller's at Pacifica Graduate Institute, acquired a t-shirt for Miller's retirement party which read: "Hi! My name is Ginette. I am a David Miller fan. I have learned 'nothing' from him." (*DIF*, p. 54)

In an essay entitled, "Miller's Pentecost" in *Disturbances in the Field*, Greg Mogenson concludes that Miller has drawn on depth psychology to offer "...a compelling and therapeutic analysis of the defensive theologizing of the religion...that religion itself should be against." (p. 145) Mogenson suggests that Miller's therapy of ideas, his depth theology can bring about a movement from "theology's ego" toward "religion's soul"—this healing of ideas can occur like an annunciation. However, Mogenson articulates a challenge, not necessarily to Miller but regarding a similar enterprise upon depth psychology and its defensive use of certain notions and concepts:

> ...here is my question—can an approach to the study of religion that has fully integrated the insights of depth psychology bring its therapy of ideas to bear upon the interpretation of psychology? While depth psychology has certainly contributed much to religion in exposing "the religion of false piety, the religion used as human wish- or need-fulfillment, a crutch and opiate, the religion of spiritual pride..., must it not apply this same analysis to its own ideas if it is not to be guilty of calling the kettle black? Lacan said that if religion triumphs psychoanalysis is finished. But, by the same token, is not psychoanalysis finished if, like some freed Barabbas, it settles beneath the niveau that religion has long since reached?
>
> The Christian scriptures state that the Holy Ghost will not "leave (it)self without witness" (Acts 14:17) Miller's dialectical reading of depth psychology as postmodern theology allows us to reflect upon psychology in the light of this assurance. Deeply comprehended, and at its most soulful, psychology itself is the form that this witness has taken in our day, as Jung expressly indicates with his comparison of the analytic experience to the Annunciation and with his interpretation of his theologian's dream. (*DIF*, p. 145)

Hillman's Archetypal Psychology Can Alter One's Way of Doing Theology

To support the argument that archetypal psychology can affect the way a person does theology, this chapter has introduced Miller's "depth theology" as an illustration suggesting the various ways in which archetypal psychology can alter the way one might do theology. This would be a theology which would value the primary role of the imagination and the phenomena of images in matters of faith and theological understanding. This theological anthropology would value imagination as the distinguishing characteristic of the human person. The incarnation of the sacred might be found in the emerging novelty of new imaginings. This would be a mythologizing

theology respecting a multiplicity of god-images in which to place the complexities of the polycentric psyche into deeper meanings. The theological tasks of interpretation and reflection would notice the aesthetic and poetic particularities of faith expressions and would value the phenomena of the dream as a religious experience, perhaps with a revelatory intent.

Miller's approach suggests that any theology of depth would cultivate an eye for the shadow in the ideas, images, and narratives of religion and theology, noting the unconscious aspects of theological understandings. Such a depth theology would have a heretical coloring with its profound respect for image and myth in contrast to imageless monotheisms of philosophy, metaphysics, and theology. The transcendent would be seen as inherent in the love of imagination and of images.

CHAPTER 13

EMERGING DIRECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Archetypal psychology has made significant contributions to the study of religion as well as to a theology of depth, especially in restoring the phenomena of soul to their understandings and conversations. The following chapters identify emerging directions for futher rearch and discussion between depth psychology and the theological community.

The Interpretation of Religious Phenomena

Psychology of religion is a field which has a long tradition of attempting to psychologically understand experiences of doubt and conflict, suffering, conversion, mysticism, prayer, worship, abnormality, ecstasy and the nonratinal, commitment and alienation, habit and ritual, temptation and fantasy, sin and forgiveness, visions and revelations, and.dreams as religious experiences. The imaginal hermeneutic of archetypal psychology would attempt to deliteralize or "see into" the experiences which individuals might describe as "religious experiences."

Hillman actually addressed the religious experience of revelation in his 1986 Eranos lecture, "On Paranoia". Hillman examined the religious experiences of three men who believed that they experienced religious revelations. One case study was Anton Boisen, a twentieth century Presbyterian minister and clinical pastoral educator who had written an account of his own paranoid experience.[1] John Perceval, an early nineteenth century Englishman, was the second case study. The last case Hillman discussed was Daniel Paul Schreber who also wrote an account of his mental illness. All three cases discussed the direct and immediate experience of God, their particular imaginal experiences of revelation. Hillman understood all three cases as demonstrations of "a noetic revelation lived literally" as each man tried to live with the hidden meanings revealed to himself. All three examples were classic cases of paranoia.

Hillman asked how we can distinguish religious revelation from pathological disorders? After not finding the answer to this question in the criteria of societal

acceptance, context, harmfulness, Hillman assumed that "all delusion is revelatory, all revelation, delusional," if in fact, deity was hidden, and the essence of religion was a relationship to what is hidden, then revelation was necessary to religion along with delusion. Hillman again alluded to the spirit of Eranos which recognized that psychology cannot be divided from theology. He cited Jacques Lacan's warning that:

> ...psychoanalysis is over and done with should religion triumph, I understand him to mean psychology is impossible wherever literal meanings triumph, wherever theologizing breaks its connecting thread with psychologizing. Yet, that menace is ever-present. As long as the culture requires revelation for its religion, there will be religious madness endemic in that culture; as long as revelation is necessary to the essence of religion, we must have dogmatic theology, and a Church, and a psychiatric establishment to guarantee the correctness of revelations, and we must expect as quite usual those contents we saw in our three cases, and which we see as well in our present-day apocalyptic crisis, our fundamentalist sectarianism, and our politically paranoid world. (*OP*, pp. 39-40)

The God in our culture's theology was an image of divinity characterized by literalism because he identified himself with his word, this God of scripture. His word was not understood poetically but with a noetic quality.

Jung associated the spirit Mercurius with water, the unconscious (*CW 13*, §371)—Hermes, the Messenger, a tricksterish element which lures out of single minded meanings toward multiple possibilities. The recognition of this element, of the unconscious, can save us from literalizations as it has no phenomenology as its own leading to verifiable statements; it is elusive:

> This pragmatic, functional sense of the unconscious serves as a prophylactic against anything and everything that might delusionally be assumed to reveal the hidden. As Jung observes, revelation cannot be distinguished from "an autonomous functioning of the unconscious." (*CW 11*, §237) The idea of the unconscious shadows the theology of revelation with the psychology of delusion, saving the soul from blinding certainty and theology, founded upon revelation, from its inherent insanity. *Deus absconditus* cannot become manifest apart from the images that present the manifestation. Revelation cannot be parted from imagination. Between the hidden and the perception of the hidden lies the third, the soul's imagining power, the bearer of the messages, *anima mercurialiis*. ...

Hermes the thief, tricky Mercurius, an impish prankster is the soul-guide to the hidden, saving us from literalism, and paranoia. (*OP*, p. 41)

This reminder has timely implications for the field of psychology in this post-9/11 world of deadly Islamic, Christian, and Jewish fundamentalisms.

Woven throughout this dissertation has been implications for the study of religion in fields such as depth psychology, theology, ethics, and the human sciences. Archetypal psychology understands soul as the primary metaphor of psychology. This implies that the phenomenon of imaginations is inherent in all human experiences. There is an imaginative possibility, or soul element, in all human experiences and understandings. Archetypal psychology has noted the literalizing, ontologizing, positivistic dangers in both psychological and cultural activities. It recognizes that there are fantasy elements informing enterprises such as psychoanalysis, theology, philosophy, and science. Archetypal psychology attempts to "see through" such understandings so that soul may be recovered from any literalisms, not so much to discredit these cultural undertakings, but to distinguish the methods and rhetoric of soul from those of spirit so that soul is not imprisoned and obliged to conform to the obligations required of in the perspectives of theology, philosophy, or science. Psychic events which soul is inherent in should not be conceptualized in spiritual terms attached to objectivity.

The Dream as Religious Experience

The phenomenon of the dream has been a place of discussion involving conversations between the fields of depth psychology and theology in attempts to understand religious experience. The dream has always been a fascinating phenomena evoking deep mystery and power. Dreams have often been connected to the divine or sacred. In ancient Babylonia, Egypt, and Greece, dreams were a mediating force between the human world and the divine realm. Archetypal psychology, as already noted, has implications for a phenomenological approach to the dream and its images. Archetypal psychology would agree with Jung's conclusion that dreams may not just be about religion but they can be understood as immediate religious experiences themselves. James Hillman has formulated the distinctive religious nature of dreams, especially in *The Dream and the Underworld.*

The dream, as understood by Jungians, is a locus for glimpsing processes that take place in the objective psyche. Dreams were also a place for the expression of or experience of transcendence. In 1937, Jung lectured at Yale University on "Psychology and Religion" noting that there is a religious instinct or impulse in the human psyche. The religious nature of the psyche was illustrated in a patient's dream series. The dreams were seen as "a statement of the patient's spiritual condition…(raising) the problem of his religious attitude." Pagan images were seen intuding into a solemn Catholic ritual. Jung understood the dreamer as desiring to flee from his anxieties and fears about any immediate religious experience.

In contrast to Freud who understood religion as an illusion or neurosis, Jung identified the immediate connection between psychic reality and religion, between the dream experience and the religious experience. In his Yale lectures, Jung argued for the psychological reality of religious experience. All experiences are psychological experiences. These experiences are empirical, one as valid as another. Religious experience is a "careful and scrupulous observation" of higher powers, the numinosum experienced as a dynamic agency, something more powerful then one's conscious self or ego.

Hillman understood the religious nature of dreams as experiences of soul, not just experiences of spirit. Soul is located in depths. The underworld was the mythical realm of depth, ruled by the god, Hades. This is a very different world from the waking or conscious life. Dreams become associated with the night world and the world of the dead. Alluding to Hillman's *The Dream and the Underworld*, Ronald Schenk, a late-comer to the Dallas circle, a Jungian analyst, and author, in a chapter entitled, "The Temple of Dionysos: Dreams as Religious Experience," notes:

> Whereas Freud talks about religion as a defense and Jung talks about religious creed as a defense from the "immediate religious experience," Hillman asserts that the rational view of dream (as disguises of unconscious thought—Freud; as compensation of unconscious attitude—Jung) is a defense against the immediate experience of the dream. The view of the dream from the perspective of the underworld, night world, and realm of the dead helps us develop a consciousness that allows for a more direct "animal perception" of the dream (Hillman, 1979a). If we are to know the dream as experience,

then we will need to "abandon all hope" (Dante's phrase upon entering the Inferno) for rational meaning, clarity, and certainy. (Schenk, pp. 53-54)

This Underworld was a place of depth in which one enters to learn something that cannot be learned in the day world of life and consciousness. Hillman argues that we must work meanings from the dream rather than work the dream with daytime meanings. This approach to the dream does not use the conceptual structures of the daytime world to approach the dream. The dream needs to be approached in an aesthetic and imaginal way, which honors the particular appearances and particularities of the dream. Schenk summarizes the work of Hillman and other archetypalists as the hermeneutics of working with dreams in an ongoing discussion:

> The dream comes to us on its own terms, psychic images, and for us to meet the dream, we have to consider it on aesthetic ground. Image is not only what is seen, but a way of seeing, a way of seeing that reflects an attitude of mind that honors something as more than itself. Images are religious in that we are seized by them and held by them. They are larger than us, a world of powers beyond that of the subjective will. No value judgments or moral lessons are implied from the dream. Nor is the dream to be seen as indicating a preferred way of being in the day world or giving advice for action to take in daily life. Rather, the dream image is to be seen as the presentation of a world in itself. Honoring the religious nature of the dream, then, is to see it through its own image. This would not be a passive undisciplined or ecstatic endeavor, but a contemplative process of entering into the dream image and deepening its experience. (Schenk, pp. 58-59)

This approach to the dream understands that the dream is not a fixed structure and that the unconscious is not making some moral comment about the dreamer. The experience of the dream is a liminal experience as subject and object are interrelated, as inner and outer distinctions are dissolved, as daytime certainties are loosened.

Schenk understands this as a Dionysian experience in which the conscious ego is relativized or as Hillman would say, is saturated with imagination. There are revealed presences in experiences of dreams which should be aesthetically approached rather than reduced to conceptual or structural understandings:

> In short, the dream seems to be a ritual in itself portraying the transformation of isolation and distance to relationship and involvement. From the standpoint of the dream,

there is nothing to indicate a problem, and such an interpretation would only indicate Jung's preconceptions regarding the form of the religious attitude. Likewise, the final dream can be seen not so much as a moralizing sermon that indicates what the dreamer must do in his life but a ritual, which in itself gathers (candles burning in four-pointed pattern, people collecting themselves) the different actions of the soul in flux reflected by the flame of the burning mountain. (Schenk, p. 62)

Discussions Regarding the Third Wave of Jungianism

Another ongoing discussion (which has been identified in the research of this work) involves a challenge put forth by Wolfgang Giegerich. Giegerich continues to ask if some of Hillman's followers in the field of archetypal psychology have taken his imaginal work and his non-literalization literally. In other words, have some Hillmanians worked images for ego's meanings and purposes? Have they literalized the referents of image work and archetypal image?

In *The Soul's Logical Life*, Giegerich expressed a concern regarding Hillman and his followers. (p. 111) He was trying to emphasize that "Psychological reality is a reality in its own right." (p. 109) He affirmed that archetypal psychology follows Jung as well as alchemy in its "seeing through" and de-literalizing hermeneutic by understanding imaginal and mythic motifs as metaphors and images. He was reacting to Thomas Moore's treatment of Actaion as an archetypal style in the chapter, "Artemis and the Puer" in *Puer Papers* which Hillman edited. Giegerich was arguing in his critique that "the actual nature of the soul's life is 'other than imaginal.'"

Imaginal psychology is inconsistent with its own central principle of deliteralizing when it comes to mythical figures like Actaion. Not that it would take Actaion literally as if he had been a historical or empirical personage, this is not my point. Of course it treats Actaion as an image or metaphor, such as an embodiment for a style of consciousness or for an archetypal perspective. What it does take literally and does not see through, however, is the literalness that is inherent in his ontological status as a real being (or entity) who has such and such traits, or as an "embodiment" who represents such and such archetypal perspectives. The *ontologizing* and *substantiating* that goes on in personifications is taken at face value. In other words, imaginal psychology does not see through the *substrate* character that inevitably comes with the images on account of the

imaginal mode. It is not enough to see through imaginal *contents* (be it "sexual" images or be it "puer consciousness"). The status of figures, the imaginal *form*, the very mode of "imagining things" and its inherent consequences, also has to be seen through and sublated. Imaginal psychology has to eat its own medicine. But if it did this, it would, of course, sublate itself and cease being imaginal psychology. It would realize that the actual nature of the soul's life is "other than imaginal." (pp. 110-11)

Giegerich wrote further that the alchemists described "the otherness of the reality they were talking about" through a *via negativa* such as saying, "not the ordinary gold...not the ordinary wine...not the ordinary stone...." He quoted Jung's reminder that we really cannot know what the unconscious is. Rather, the unconscious is an unknown through what is even more unknown. Since we feel that the unconscious is an empirical given in our practices, we make the error of using the term "the unconscious" as a known, positive reality, an empirical given, thus a positivistic term rather than one expressing a negation.

Archetypal psychology has tried to avoid this conventional way of referring to the unconscious. Following Corbin's lead, it replaced the term the unconscious with the imaginal. The imaginal should leave open what the referred to reality actually is. Miller has noted, "This is an important matter for those of lus who build theologically on Jim's psychology, i.e., that we don't utilize an imaginal or archetypal hermeneutic reading in order to authorize our (ego) beliefs and dogmas." (noted in a personal communication, 9/20/06) Miller concludes that Giegerich wrongly senses this matter for which he has placed fire upon Hillman and his followers.

How do we express an ultimate otherness. The language of alchemy was clear that the gold, the wine, the stone do not exist *per se*. Its language did not positivize nor ontologize the gold, the wine, or the stone.

How Literally Must We Take Hillman?

The argument of this work is that James Hillman as a phenomenologist of soul must be taken seriously as his archetypal psychology has become a significant depth psychology and cultural movement making contributions to both a psychology and a theology of depth. However, taking the work of this archetypal psychologist seriously need not mean taking his understandings literally. The question, "How literally must we take Hillman?" is certainly a question which will continue to be asked by those involved

in either a psychology or theology of depth which has been informed by Hillman's understaning.

Michael Vannoy Adams presented a paper in London in 1994 at a conference addressing Hillman and Ventura's controversial book, *We've Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy—and the World's Getting Worse*. Adams asked just how literal Hillman must be taken in that so many decades of therapy have made the world worse. Adams noted:

> ... It would be easy to take Hillman literally – and to mistake him. One of Hillman's favorite words is "deliteralizing." As Hillman defines it, it is to "see through" literal realities to metaphorical realities (1975: 136). It may be that we now need to deliteralize Hillman. If psychotherapy is not only a talking but also a listering cure, we need to "hear through" what he has said – or we need to "read through" what he has written – rather than take him at his apparent word, to the letter, imitate him, and repudiate psychotherapy. (*FP*, p. 169)

In Adams' reading of Hillman, he highlights several characteristics in Hillman's intent. Hillman argues for eccentricity in contrast to any normalizing, especially in the context of therapy.

Hillman attempted to see into Jung's work from a phenomenological point of view. Hillman recognized that there seemed to be two ontologies in the understanding and writings of Jung. This has created a number of confusions for those who characterize themselves as Jungians. Jung attempted to be empirical as he conceptualized a formal theory about psychic systems and structures regarding the self-regulating psyche, a compensatory understanding of dreams, a standing between the opposites, etc. In this approach, Jung conceptualized about ego, shadow, *anima/us*, and the Self. These notions appeared to have an ontological status, as being really real. To this day, many classical Jungians have understood these conceptualizations to be taken as literally. This Jungian use of conceptual logic and analysis finds meaning from the application of concepts. Analysis and analytical psychotherapy is all too often the application of Jung's concepts upon experiences which may be described as disembodied and separated from a world about them which is dead.

However, Jung emphasized another kind of ontology as an imaginal or poetic realm of experience which he described as *esse in anima*, a being in soul. Ronald Schenk, addressing postmodern reflections on depth psychology, describes this as "a middle ground encompassing both subject and object which declares the reality of fantasy, metaphor, and imagination." (Schenk, p. 35) He emphasizes that archetypal psychology has been a reaction to the literalization of Jung's conceptualizations:

> ... Archetypal psychology, founded with the work of James Hillman, emerged in
> reaction to this approach. By making ontological distinctions in Jung's work, Hillman has
> been able to demonstrate how Jung's grounding in imagination gives a psychological view
> of experience, while his leanings toward conceptualization tends, rather dangerously, to
> empower and enhance the observing ego in a nonpsychological way. (Schenk, p. 35)

Hillman revisions Jung's analytical psychology from a phenomenological point of view. So Jung's realm of imagination, *poesis*, and metaphor can be valued as the grist or essence of *psyche*. It has been claimed that by saving the phenomena of soul, Hillman has become "...a healer of Jung's thought." (Schenk, p. 36)

Archetypal Psychology and the Theological Task

As noted throughout this work, Hillman's archetypal psychology has implications not just for psychology, but also for a theology which attempts to be characterized as having depth. And theology is a search for a deep and wide worldview which tries to help believers or the community of faith to respond to both inner and outer worlds in such a way that their faith values are embodied in responses to personal and cultural experience. Miller and Hillman have turned to the Western classical mythology of Greece and Rome to identify mytho-poetic backdrops, transpersonal, and imaginal underpinnings for theological ideas, images, and narratives of faith. However, in a multi-cultural world with its variety of religious traditions, the mythic accounts and imagery of other cultures will be turned to and acknowledged.

Michael Vannoy Adams, in his book, *The Multicultural Imagination*, has emphasized that when analysts work with patients from other cultural and ethnic traditions, an analyst should learn something about the myths of those cultural backgrounds for a more adquate amplification of dreams. A similar suggestion has been

made by Lee H. Butler, Jr., a pastoral theologian, as he analyzes the interplay of identify formation in religious and spiritual identities and practices in his recent work, *Liberating Our Dignity, Saving Our Souls*, regarding African American identity, spirituality, and psychologies. In an essay, "Dreaming the Soul: African-American Skepticism Encounters the Human Genome Project," Butler alludes to dreaming as a "revelational process." (p. 141) Work with dreams of African Americans may benefit from the understanding and valuing the context of African and American sprituality.

Theology, Religion, and Archetypal Psychology

Hillman has noted that the field of religion and theology cannot be separated from depth psychology. The dialogue with depth psychology can keep theology observing the irrational facts of experiences, that "otherness" is continually making a presentation in our daily worlds and experiences, particularly in the phenomena of unconsciousness. Archetypal psychology particularly challenges theology to understand that its monotheistic fantasies can actually reinforce alienation from our natural world, not just creating unnecessary guilt, fear, and delusion and paranoia, but actually blinding men and women to the natural mysteries of human experience which could be disclosed with an awareness of the immediate presence of aesthetic display, whether in experiences such as dreams, the meeting of others, and in the soul-in-the world.

Philosophy, Ethical Discussion, and Archetypal Psychology

Depth psychology has challenged the academic certainties around ethics with its observation of the unconscious and the reminder that we must continually contend with deeper, unseen forces which can affect and determine out actions, choices, perceptions, decisions, and behaviors. Archetypal psychology's polytheistic understanding provides a mythical and multiplistic backdrop for differentiation and discussion of such forces without the monotheistic (and often patriarch) literalisms of right and wrong, good and bad. Its emphasis upon pathology and suffering point to values which are antithetical for the heroic, all-powerful ego psychology. Hillman has spoken about "the ethic of the image", its unique consciousness and its own intentionality. An ethical question might be, "In what image am I in when acting in this style?" There can be a polytheistic ethic to counterbalance the bias of the Judeo-Christian ethic or the patriarchal superego often

associated with it, or even a matriarchal superego with its notions of conscience and style of valuing inclusiveness. There are many points of view to understand people, events, values. Ethical thinking can most adequately stick to the actuality of experience through differentiation and the recognition of unfathomable depth is both personal and collective experience. Values may be better understood when relocated to their source in mythic patternings and fantasies, such as the terrible love of war placed within the myths of Mars and Venus, Ares, and Aphrodite, the marriage of a goddess of love and the god of war. Differentiation and placing can inform the work of ethical thinking. Archetypal psychology's emphasis upon polyvalences, multiplicities, pluralism argue for an ethics of diversity and inclusion as much as for differentiation and particularity, which can act for the withdrawal of projections through scapegoating. An archetypal ethics would try to see through the repressions of psychological diversity.

An ethics informed by archetypal psychology would not be characterized by fantasies of perfection nor even wholeness in the guises of truth, wisdom, goodness, etc. It would argue for differing values in all ethical deliberations, each style of consciousness having its own forms of unconsciousness, with a variety of mythic patternings. The awareness of the *anima mundi* would be an inspiration for many ethical and social justice involvement's regarding the natural world and its soul.

The Human Sciences and Archetypal Psychology

Hillman places depth psychology in its own realm, the living phenomena of soul, rather than in the scientific categories. The mind is understood to be a mythopoetical phenomena rather than the biological, biochemical, genetic, medical, social transmission, brain physiology, semantic structures, social organization, behavioral categories identified by either the natural or human sciences. Archetypal psychology understands that soul needs it own logos, that soul must be articulated in its own language and metaphors.

Many Images, Many Gods, and Some Levity

Hillman actually has a quick wit and a wonderful sense of human and ironic quickness. He has noted, "The literalizing and ontologizing dangers attendant upon the elevation of soul to first principle are met by a certain subversive tone in archetypal

psychology that speaks of soul events in imagistic, ironic, and even humorous ways." (*AP*, p. 17)

The following story reminds us that we live in an increasingly diverse multicultural world in which there are many God-images or fantasies about the sacred, the nature of the divine, and the nature of religious experience itself. There are many reasons to prefer a polytheistic psychology to a monotheistic psychology in this postmodern culture. Diversity actually necessitates a vision which can see, value, and respect particularities without reductions to good and evil, true or falsity. There are multiple consciousnesses, psychic factors, powers, gods or goddesses of which we all are too unconscious of but which challenge us to tolerate multiplistic understanding, to become more conscious and compassionate.

Michael Vannoy Adams, in his essay, "The Importance of Being Blasphemous," in *The Fantasy Principle*, alludes to an article in the humorous paper, *The Onion*. The headline was, "Judge Orders God To Break Up into Smaller Deities." Adams summarizes the article as,

> ... Under the headline were a cross, a crescent and star, and a star of David – images of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The article purported to be an account of an antitrust suit against God for anti-competitive practices. God, the judge said, had effectively perpetuated "an illegal monotheopology." Monotheism as monopoly! The judge had ruled that God was guilty of restraint of religious trade. God had purposely established "a marketplace hostile to rival deities." As a legal remedy, the judge had ordered God "to divide Himself into a pantheon of specialized gods, each representing a force of nature or a specific human custom, occupation, or state of mind." The article quoted a woman who had followed the case. "There will most likely be a sun god, a moon god, sea god, and rain god," she said. "Then there will be some second-tier deities, like a god of wine, a goddess of the harvest, and perhaps a few who symbolize human love and/or blacksmithing." The article also quoted a man who mentioned a number of advantages to the decision: "With polytheism, you pray to the deity specifically devoted to your concern. If you wish to have children, you pray to the fertility goddess. If you want to do well on an exam, you pray to the god of wisdom, and so on. This decentralization will result in more individualized service and swifter response times." (Anonymous, January 30-February 6, 2002: 1 and 6) (*FP*, p. 222)

Adams admits he sent this off to other Jungian analysts including Hillman whose letter included this question, "Is this *Onion* piece a joke, a scam, or is there such a judge?" Adams says yes, such a judge exists in the satirical imagination, and he notes that this "...article, momentarily induced even James Hillman, the archetypal deliteralizer, seriously to entertain the possibility that this was an accurate account of an actual court case against God!" (p. 222)

CONCLUSIONS
Bringing the Argument Home

This work is based on research into the phenomena of ideas in the work James Hillman collected and now known as archetypal psychology. It has summarized, sorted out, and stayed with the central understandings in Hillman's body of work and tried to illuminate areas not well understood in their genesis. It has argued that Hillman is indeed a modern phenomenologist of soul. As a "revisionist successor" to C. G. Jung, his new understandings can contribute to a deeper understanding of Jung's psychology of religion while also articulating new viewpoints for understanding the religious imagination. The evidence, data, critiques, and continuing influence of archetypal psychology indicate that Hillman has restored an awareness of and appreciation for the phenomena of soul in our postmodern world. His polytheistic psychology is an argument for greater diversity and inclusiveness in our psychological understandings of religions.

The word soul rarely appeared in psychology for decades. Modern understandings have felt uneasy with this term. However, James Hillman's archetypal psychology has restored and elaborated on an understanding of the phenomena of soul which is important for our knowledge of the religious experience and life. Archetypal psychology has much to contribute to the psychological studies of religion. It articulates a late modern if not a postmodern approach which can add to the methodological pluralism in the psychology of religion. Archetypal psychology reminds us that the blasphemous or heretical nature of the unconscious and its images will inevitably confront the one-sided pieties of both individuals and our collective consciousness.

Psychology of religion must take up the new articulations in philosophy and the humanities, including postmodern thought and its implications. The field has not yet arrived as a comprehensive, coherent, and systematic discipline. However, its history is that of a human science attempting to be pluralistic and inclusive of diverse methods for understanding the religious life and its experiences. The discipline of psychoanalysis has contributed to deeper understandings of religion as a psychological experience. Hillman's archetypal psychology has worthy contributions to continue making for this emerging

field. Our theories are like maps. You can have various maps of one domain which clarify various aspects of a topography—roads, sewage systems, communication networks, etc. The features which archetypal psychology highlight are the experience soul as an imaginative activity.

If a genuinely comprehensive psychology of religion from a depth psychology and psychoanalytic point of view is attempted, Hillman's thought as a phenomenologist of soul has already made important contributions. Psychologists of religion as well as scholars of religion may find new meanings to the care and understanding of soul, both within the individual psyche as well as soul in the world. A postmodern psychology of religion would appreciate the work of Hillman and the contributions of his archetypal psychology as an emerging movement which has re-visioned Jung's psychology of religion as well as making unique contributions of its own. Hillman's insights can speak to the contemporary debate on the nature of psychology of religion with his restoration of soul as an imaginal phenomenon. The most fitting tribute to both Hillman's archetypal psychology and Miller's depth theology would be to continue engaging with these ideas which have a therapeutic effect on personal and collective lives as they counter the psychopathological ideas and literalisms who are the theological legacy of Western theistic monotheisms.

NOTES

Preface

1.   Although I would not argue that Hillman's large body of writing is a systematic metapsychology, I would note that the reader of Hillman and of archetypal psychology can find many of the elements which would characterize major thinkers for comparison with each other. The following elements are often used for comparisons of philosophers, theologians, etc.—an anthropology or understanding of human nature, an epistemology regarding the act of knowing, a theology of fantasy of the divine or of the sacred, a notion about brokenness / healing / transformation, and an understanding of a salvific aim or task. With my interests, I would also add an understanding of the phenomena of dreams.

Hillman's anthropology is basically Jung's understanding of polyvalent *psyche*. His epistemology also leans on Jung's—it is through psychic images that we know. Hillman is not agnostic; he articulates a polytheistic psychology whereby many Gods become mythic or transpersonal backdrops for the complexities of the psyche and the world. The transformative task involves the movement from the literal toward the imaginal or metaphoric, to heal the imagination through an imaginalized ego. The salvific task has to do with the enterprise of soul-making, caring for the *anima mundi* or soul-in-the-world through an aesthetic response and an experience of imaginal love.

2.   The challenge of a polytheistic psychology has been received by David L. Miller at Syracuse University in the area of religious studies. There have been other academicians who have also addressed or been informed by archetypal psychology. However, Miller's *The New Polytheism*, as well as his other fine works, are examples of how archetypal psychology can inform religious studies.

Chapter 1

Who Is James Hillman?

1.   Patrick J. Mahaffey, "Religious Pluralism in the Service of the Psyche," *Depth Psychology: Meditations in the Field*, p. 88.

2.   I attended a biannual conference on "Postmodern Thought and Religion" at Villanova University a few years ago. During a coffee break, I had a lengthy conversation with Jacques Derrida, the founder of Deconstruction. I noted that some of the work and methodology of James Hillman was similar to some of his work. He did not know of Hillman but drew me out on Hillman's work and his latest publications. I noted that Hillman's last book was *The Force of Character*, an attempt to deconstruct literalized notions about aging. Derrida, an older man at the time, with a twinkle in his eyes, responded, "Now that is the work I need to read!"

3.   Since Hillman was in England at the time, the award was received on Hillman's behalf by the Managing Editor of Spring Publications, Jay Livernois. I was not surprised when Jay wittingly stated, "In light of James Hillman's contributions to the field of psychoanalysis, we should perhaps rename this award, *The Re-Vision Award!*"

4.   This introduction of James Hillman by Mikhail Gorbechev is quoted from *Pacifica in Depth* of the Pacifica Graduate Institute, Summer / Fall 2002, p. 5. Selections of Hillman's papers, which he rents to the Institute, are now a valuable resource for Pacifica's library. Hillman continues to lecture, teach, and conduct seminars on a regular basis at the Institute.

Chapter 2
Is Archetypal Psychology a Depth Psychology or Literary Method?

1.   A footnote in Ellenberger reads, "Eugene Bleuler is commonly credited with having coined the term *Tiefenpsychologie* (depth psychology), which was popular at the time when psychoanalysis was equated with the psychology of the unconscious."

Chapter 4
Major Sources of Archetypal Psychology

1.   I once did a source search of the *Collected Works* of Jung to see if he alluded to Unitarianism. The only reference was when Jung wrote something like the following: "The psyche is not a Unitarian phenomenon but rather a federation of multiple parties."

2.   Hillman recently conducted a seminar at the Pacifica Graduate Institute entitled, "Defending Jung." Hillman's knowledge of Jung, of Jung's work, and of the ongoing critiques of

Jung were evident as he addressed lingering attacks upon Jung's thought by such elements of our culture as right-wing, fundamentalist, and evangelical attacks found on the internet.

3.   Before the fall of the Shah of Iran, Corbin hosted Hillman and his family in Tehran.

4.   Steven M. Wasserstrom is an Associate Professor of Judaic Studies and the Humanities at Reed College in Portland, Oregon. Although his title, *Religion After Religion*, would suggest a postmodern theme, this is not really the case.This book examines the three great historians of religion—Scholem, Eliade, and Corbin—who all lectured at the Eranos circle in Ascone when Jung was a central participant. Each of these thinkers valued the symbolism of mystical experience as a central aspect of the monotheistic traditions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Wasserstrom is quite critical in this work of such trends, which he believes relativized or minimized religious rituals. Their approaches to religion, including the belief that the individual can access the sacred in immediate and personal experiences, de-emphasized the practices of law, ritual, and social history as they emphasized the modern trends of myth, mysticism, and esoteric or Gnostic approaches to religion.

Both David L. Miller and Jay Livernois, each with a knowledge of the Eranos community and tradition (Miller lectured there for almost fifteen years and Livernois was a former Direktor, lecturer, and publisher of the Eranos Yearbook), have reminded me that Wasserstrom's critique is nothing new, that it is quite predictable given his social location.

5.   Thomas B. Kirsch's book, *The Jungians: A Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Philadelphia: Routledge, 2000) summarizes this incident:

> Inappropriate professional and personal relationships were formed by some analysts with students and in 1967 Hillman was at the center of an allegation of sexual misconduct, and the case became public knowledge. Inside the Jungian community opinions wee heated and divided. However, the matter could not be confined to professional circles as the case was brought before the District Court of Zurich. This ensured that the matter was fully discussed by the Curatorium of the Institute, and also amongst the Patrons, who represented the international Jungian community. The Curatorium attempted to discuss the matter in ideological terms. Granted that Hillman had "sinned," wha ws the appropriate decision to take in the matter? Had this been the first time tha an event of this nature had occurred? Of course not! Jung himself had been involved with a patient, Toni Wolff, and this was a clearly known occupational hazard of any analytical work. Others had succumbed to the temptation, and Hillman was most certainly not alone or the first. One question was whether Hillman showed appropriate contrition or not. This led to bitter disputes within the Curatorium, with

Jolande Jacobi wanting Hillman out and others, like Riklin, wanting Hillman to stay on. The issue was not too dissimilar to what has happened recently with President Clinton in the United States. These moral questions continue to plague us, and they have no easy solutions. The deeper issues become quickly translated into practical decisions. With Hillman the decision became whether to get rid of him or let him stay as Director of Studies. Eventually, he resigned, but remained in Zurich as editor of Spring Publications.

This event was a harbinger of change in the Jungian world, as the question of boundary violations was at issue in many other Jungian training programs at this time. Clinical boundaries were to assume greataer importance in the future of all training programs, including Zurich. Perhaps change happened more slowly in Zurich, because the influence of Jung's own interest in archetypal symbolism and mythological amplifictions of dreams held sway longer over clinical traditions than in other training centers. It is not implied that an interest in clinical issues leads to a neglect of archetypal interpretations; clinical parameters have to be maintained while a deeper understanding of the unconscious is explored.

As I have understood it through private conversations, the concern around Hillman actually had to do with the ethical protection of knowledge disclosed by an analysand's spouse but not shared by Hillman with her husband's analyst, C. A. Meier, when requested by Meier, which was crucial for his analysis.

Chapter 6
Implications for the Practice of Analysis

1.   I am reminded of sharing one of my dreams with Hillman and my former wife at a cocktail party while attending a North American Congress of Jungian Analysts. I had had a dream in which James Hillman had presented the David figure a large, wooden salad bowl with crispy green lettuce and bright red tomatoes. Either that, or I was holding such a salad out for Hillman to notice. Whichever particularity, I went on to say that I had seen that the etiology of "lettuce" has some connection with "lactose." Like a good Jungian analyst, I have have done some research on this. Hillman just rolled his eyes. My wife, on the other hand, exclaimed, "Sometimes when I look at a salad like that and see its beauty, I just don't even want to eat it!" Hillman responded, "Now that is the response I like best!"

I trust this bit of disclosure at my own heroic, analytic ego's expense demonstrates the aesthetic or phenomenological approach rather than the interpretive or notional approach to the dream, a way of seeing with that animal eye or animal sense which keeps the imaginal phenomenon alive and, I would add, mysterious in its unfathomable depth.

Chapter 8

The Unique Contributions of Archetypal Psychology to
the Psychological Understanding of Religious Experience

1.   I believe that the use of this term appeals to many men and woman who basically are searching for more adequate images of God in either the modern or postmodern elements of our culture. I also believe that many advocates of Jungian psychology have their own unrecognized "religious complexes" arising from their conflict between what Jung called "a religious instinct" and the premodern, theism many experienced in childhood and young adulthood. They have not discovered authors such as Bishop John Shelby Spong who try to articulate a non-theistic Christianity. They have not found a modern or postmodern way to understanding religious experience.

2.   There are many painful examples of this kind of collective projection in the recent work by James Carroll, *Constantine's Sword: A History of the Church and the Jews*. Carroll notes that the Jews were "the original dissentors" or heretics in that they did not believe the literalized arrival of the Christian Messiah. His work begins with the Holocaust of the twentieth century and traces "the long arc of history" from the imaginal literature of the Gospels colored by hatred for the Jews, through many moments in church history when toxic ideas overwelmed healthier ideas and resulted in persecution of the Jews.

Chapter 9

Critiques of Hillman and Archetypal Psychology

1.   Jay Livernois was a participant in the Dallas community of archetypalists and a graduate student at the University of Dallas studying under Hillman in the spring semester of 1980. He left Dallas at the end of July that year to live in Florence, Italy. Tacey apparently studied briefly in Dallas after this and had some experience with the Men's Movement probably in the late 80s. In a personal correspondence dated March 8, 2003, Livernois responded to some of Tacey's critiques of this community of archetypalists: "Tacey is vulgarizing and misrepresenting what went on in Dallas. I was there as one of the graduate students. I never ever heard a student claim that he or she were a god or a goddess. But the students did learn about archetypes and how one could fall, metaphorically, under the influence of an archetype and not know it (called 'being unconscious').

When one could see the pattern of behavior and understand it, this was becoming more conscious. Never was there an identification with a god or goddess or archetype and especially not a hero. This was viewed as madness and stupidity. My sense of the archetypes is that they are patterns of behavior that can move through one like a virus or diarrhea. Tacey seems to be a conservative Jungian who doesn't get it. His moralizing, I suspect, is his disgust with Hillman's Jewishness and embrace of a polyvalent consciousness."

Chapter 10
Influences in the Field of Psychoanalytic Thought

1.   This is a similar to a point made by Dalrymple (1993) to the Department of Pastoral Studies at Loyala University and the C. G. Jung Institute of Chicago in a lecture entitled, "The Heretic as Religious Genius: A Psychoanalytic Understanding of Religious Dissent." The metaphor was used "the heretic" instead of "the devil's advocate." However, the intent of the alternative voice is similar.

When this lecture was presented to the C. G. Jung Centre of Milwaukee, one participant asked a question which I still ponder. He asked, "In a true democracy, or a truly democratic religious community or tradition, would the heretic be still be possible or even needed?" I suspect that democracy is always a work in progress, that both individual and collective consciousness will tend toward privileging a one-sideness or neurotic tendency, and alternative voices or perspectives or images will spontaneously constellate or manifest as corrective images hence the appearance of heretics or devil's advocates.

2.   Ginette Paris has an essay on, "Divinities of Marriage." Christine Downing writes on "The Body as Dwelling Place of Soul." Stephen Aizenstat, President of Pacifica, addresses the theme of "Dreams Are Alive." David L. Miller writes on "A Myth Is as Good as a Smile: The Mythology of a Consumerist Culture." Robert Romanyshyn has a piece on, "Yes, Indeed! Do Call the World the Vale of Soul Making: Reveries Toward an Archetypal Presence." Patrick J. Mahaffey, Editor of this collection, addresses the modern concern of the need for "Religious Pluralism in the Service of the Psyche."

Mary Watkins, who from early on has been so influential on archetypal psychology with her understanding of "waking dreams," authors an essay, "Seeding Liberation: A Dialogue Between Depth Psychology and Liberation Psychology." She points out that, "Liberation psychology, birthed from the inspiration of liberation theology, argues that psychology itself

requires liberation before it can be a clear force for liberation." (p. 206) She alludes to her reading of Paulo Freire, Gustavo Gutierrez, Ignacio Martin-Baro, and other teachers from the south.

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GLOSSARY

This glossary does not attempt to redefine what has already been articulated by Hillman and other archetypal psychologists and authors. For the most part, this Glossary tries to stick with Hillman's own phrasing. Quotations from Hillman's *Archetypal Psychology* (*AP*) and *Re-Visioning Psychology* (*RVP*) are noted. Other brief definitions are either quoted directly with authoritative sources noted, or they are paraphrased from standard definitions in the field in such volumes as Samuels' *A Critical Dictionary of Jungian Analysis* (*CDJA*), Sugg's *Jungian Literary Criticism* (*JLC*), or Stein's *Jung's Map of the Soul* (*JMS*)

Active Imagination. "The process of coming to know the image from the unconscious by re-imagining them through some other medium, such as painting, poetry, drama, sandplay, etc."(*JLC*, p. 421)

Allegorizing. Allegorizing is when we reduce an image to a concept. This is what occurs when we interpret what an image means and this misconstrues the purpose of analysis.

Amplification. "Elaboration and clarification of a dream-image by means of directed association and of parallels drawn from the human sciences (symbology, mythology, mysticism, folklore, history of religion, ethnology, etc." (*JLC*, p. 421)

Analogizing. Analogizing means "This is like that" rather than "this means that." Hillman asserts, "Analogies keep us in the functional operation of the image, in the patterns of similarities, without positing a common origin for these similarities." ("An Inquiry into Image," p. 86) Hillman uses an analogy to describe analogizing: Analogizing is like my fantasy of Zen, where the dream is the teacher. Each time you say what an image means you get your face slapped. The dream becomes a Koan when we approach it by means of analogy. If you... "interpret" a dream, you are off the track, lost your Koan. (For the dream is the thing, not what it means.) Then you must be slapped to bring you back to the image. A good dream analysis is one in which one gets more and more slaps, more and more analogies, the basic matters of your psychic life. ("An Inquiry into Image," p. 87)

Anima. "(Latin meaning soul). The unconscious, feminine side of a man's personality. She is personified in dreams by images of women ranging from prostitute and seductress to spiritual guide (Wisdom). A man's *anima* development is reflected in how he relates to women. Identification with the *anima* can appear as moodiness, effeminacy, and oversensitivity. Jung calls the *anima* "the archetype of life itself." (*JLC*, p. 422) Another definition is articulated by Stein. "The archetypal images of the eternal feminine in a man's unconscious that forms a link between ego-consciousness and the collective unconscious and potentially opens a way to the Self." (*JMS*, p. 233) Hillman uses *anima*, psyche, and soul interchangeably.

Archetype Irrepresentable in themselves, their effects appear in consciousness as the archetypal images and ideas. These are universal patterns or motifs that come from the collective unconscious and are the basic content of religions, mythologies,legends, and fairy tales. They emerge in individuals through dreams and visions." (*JLC*, p. 422) "By traditional definition, archetypes are the primary forms that govern thepsyche. But they cannot be contained only by the psyche, since they manifest as well in physical, social, linguistic, aesthetic, and spiritual modes." (*AP*, p. 1) "...unlike Jung, who radically distinguishes between noumenal archetype *per se* and phenomenal archetypal image, archetypal psychology refuses even to speculate about a non presented archetype *per se*. The word 'archetypal'... rather than point *at* something archetypal points *to* something, and this is *value* ... by archetypal psychology we mean a psychology of value." (*AP*, p. 13)

Archetypal Image "Archetypal psychology axiomatically assumes imagistic universals..., that is, mythical figures that provide the poetic characteristics of human thought, feeling, and action, as well as the physiognomic intelligibility of the qualitative worlds of natural phenomena. By means of the archetypal image, natural phenomena present faces that speak to the imagining soul rather than only conceal hidden laws and probabilities and manifest their objectification." (*AP*, p. 11)

Archetypal Psychology "Archetypal psychology, first named as such by Hillman, had from its beginning the intention of moving beyond clinical inquiry within the consulting room of psychotherapy by situating itself within the culture of Western imagination. It is a psychology deliberately affiliated with the arts, culture, and the history of ideas, arising as they do from the imagination. The term 'archetypal,' in contrast to 'analytical' which is the usual appellation for Jung's psychology, was preferred more importantly because 'archetypal' belongs to all culture, all forms of human activity, and not only to professional practitioners of modern therapeutics. ...thus, archetypal psychology's first links are with culture and imagination rather than with medical and empirical psychologies, which tend to confine psychology to the positivistic manifestations of the nineteenth-century condition of the soul.... Archetypal psychology can be seen as a cultural movement part of whose task is the re-visioning of psychology, psychopathology, and psychotherapy in terms of the Western cultural imagination." (*AP*, pp. 1-2)

Dehumanizing This is one of Hillman's tropes in his *Re-Visioning of Psychology*. "*Dehumanizing*...is understood as the release of the personal into deeper soul power, a transcendence of epic voluntarism of ego into the mythological many faceted nature of the archetypal self (not just Oedipus, but all the presiding metaphors of all the complexes). Since 'humanism's psychology is the myth of an without myths,' archetypal psychology means dehumanizing, archetypologizing, remythologizing, and theologizing."(Miller, 1975, pp. 586-87)

Depth "For archetypal psychology, the vertical direction refers to interiority as a capacity within all things. All things have an archetypal significance and are available to psychological penetration, and this interiority is manifested by the physiognomic character of things of the horizontal world. Depth is therefore not literally hidden, deep down, inside. Rather, the fantasy of depth encourages us to look at the world again, to read each event for 'something deeper,' to 'insearch' (Hillman), rather than to research, for yet further significance below what seems merely evident and natural. The downward turning fantasy is thus at the very basis of all psychoanalysis. The fantasy of hidden depths ensouls the world and fosters imagining ever deeper into things. Depth—rather than a literal or physical

location—is a primary metaphor necessary for psychological thinking (or 'psychologizing,' Hillman, *RVP*." (*AP*, pp. 29-30)

Depth Psychology Depth psychology is a psychology which "investigates in depth the individual soul for meaning.." Hillman notes, "Psychology means 'logos of psyche', the speech or telling of the soul. As such, psychology is necessarily depth psychology, since ... soul refers to the inner, the deep. And the logic of psychology is necessarily the method of understanding which tells of the soul and speaks to the soul in its own language. The deeper a psychology can go with its understanding, i.e., into universal inner meanings expressed by the archetypal speech of mythical 'tellings', the more scientifically accurate it is on the one hand and the more soul it has on the other." (1965, p. 51)

Fantasy Fantasy is seen as the archetypal activity of the soul. "For archetypal psychology, '*fantasy*' and 'reality' change places and values. First, they are no longer opposed. Second, fantasy is never merely mentally subjective but is always being enacted and embodied (*Pan and the Nightmare*, pp. xxxix-xl). Third, whatever is physically or literally 'real' is always also a fantasy image.... Jung stated the same idea (*CW 6*, §78): 'The psyche creates reality everyday. The only expression I can say for this activity is *fantasy*." (*AP*, p. 23)

Image The image is the datum which archetypal psychology begins. Jung identified image with psyche: "that the soul is primarily an imagining activity." This imagining activity is presented by the dream where even the dreamer becomes an image. Hillman notes: The source of image—dream-images, fantasy-images, poetic-images—is the self- generative activity of the soul itself. In archetypal psychology the word "image," therefore, does not refer to an after-image, the result of sensations and perceptions; nor does "image" mean a mental construct that represents in symbolic form certain ideas and feelings which it expresses. In fact, the image has no referent beyond itself, neither proprioceptive, external, nor semantic: "images don't stand for anything." (*DU*).

They are the psyche itself in its imaginative visibility; as primary datum, image is irreducible...Casey states that an image is not what one sees but the way in which

one sees. An image is given by the imagining perspective and can only be perceived by an act of imagining. (*AP*, pp. 6-7)

Literalism "By *literalism* I mean the 'natural and customary' meaning of something, just as it presents itself, without under sense or second level, as the dictionary says, 'without metaphor, exaggeration or inaccuracy,' or suggestion. Taking words in their primary sense. Primary, however, implies secondary, otherwise why use the term primary? Primary implies a plural possibility, another, further sense. 'Literal' mythically means without Hermes / Mercurius, without the Goddess Peitho who comes sometimes as Athene, sometimes as Aphrodite—the persuasive one. Literal means nothing tricky, nothing subtle, nothing charming." (from p. 4 of Hillman's essay "In")

Metaphor The soul has an imagistic style in its own speaking of itself. This is through metaphor: those figures of speech in which one term is transferred from the object it originally designates to an object it can indicate only by implicit comparison and analogy. This comes from a Greek word, metaphor a meaning transference. "The statement that 'the primary metaphor of psychology must be soul" attempts two things: (a) to state the soul's nature in its own language (metaphor) and (b) to recognize that all statements in psychology about soul are metaphors. In this way, soul-as-metaphor leads beyond the problem of 'how to define soul' and encourages an account of the soul toward imagining itself rather than defining itself. Here, metaphor serves a psychological function: it becomes an instrument of soul-making rather than a mere 'figure of speech,' because it transposes the soul's questioning about its nature to a mythopoesis of actual imagining..." (*AP*, pp. 20-21)

Myth "The primary rhetoric of archetypal psychology is *myth*.... This move toward mythical accounts as a psychological language locates psychology in the cultural imagination. Secondly, these myths are themselves metaphors ... so that by relying on myths as its primary rhetoric, archetypal psychology grounds itself in a fantasy that cannot be taken historically, physically, literally ... the myths themselves are understood as metaphors—never as transcendental metaphysics whose categories are divine figures. As Hillman (*DU*) says: 'Myths do not

ground, they open.' The role of myth in archetypal psychology is…to open the questions of life to transpersonal and culturally imaginative reflection … the study of mythology enables one to perceive and experience the life of the soul mythically." (*AP*, pp. 19-20)

Pathologizing This one of Hillman's tropes in *Re-Visioning Psychology*. "Pathologizing is discovering a mythology in symptoms, finding stories in hurts, transforming messes into variegated richness. This is perhaps most crucial of all the tropes, and it leads Hillman to say: 'By clinging faithfully to the pathological perspective which is the differential root of its discipline, distinguishing it from all others, depth psychology maintains its integrity, becoming neither humanistic education, spiritual guidance, social activity, nor secular religion.'" (Miller, 1975, p. 586)

Personifying This is one of Hillman's tropes in the revisioning of psychology. "Personifying is the re-peopling of the universe of meaning, seeing images in ideas, and bringing thought to life by seeing life in thought. 'Words are person,' Hillman notes with the poet, and he adds a psychologist's conclusion, 'Personifying is the soul's answer to egocentricity." (Miller, 1975, p. 586)

Poetic Basis of Mind Archetypal psychology "starts neither in the physiology of the brain, the structure of language, the organization of society, nor the analysis of behavior, but in processes of imagination." (*RVP*) The nature of the mind is it points to the necessary bond of psychology and the cultural imagination.

Poesis: *Poesis* means "the making of images in words." (*DU*, p. 124)

Psychologizing. This is another of Hillman's tropes. "*Psychologizing* (precisely the opposite of psychologism) is seeing through the literalism of every positivism, metamorphosizing through metaphor (performing one activity as if it were another) as peculiarly felicitous for 'soul-making' (his phrase for psychologizing. Hillman wants to 'join Owen Barfield and Norman Brown in a mafia of the metaphor to protect plain men from literalism.'—and from the egoism of one-dimensional self-understanding." (Miller, 1975, p. 586)

Psyche "An inclusive term covering the areas of consciousness, personal unconscious and collective unconscious. The collective unconscious is sometimes referred to as the objective psyche because it is not personal or individual." (*JMS*, p. 234)

Senex "(Latin meaning 'old man'). Associated with attitudes that come with advancing age. Negatively, this can mean cynicism, rigidity, and extreme conservatism; positive traits are responsibility, orderliness, and self-discipline. A well-balanced personality functions appropriately within the *puer-senex* polarity." (*JLC*, p. 424)

Soul "...the ideogram 'soul' tells us where and at what level we are operating. The usage of 'soul' has become somewhat controversial. for some it is a cliche, used simply to answer all problems. ...Hillman stated that when he used the word 'soul' he was referring to a perspective or viewpoint that is essentially reflective between us and events or deeds. Soul is not to be found in any one phenomenon in particular but also cannot be grasped in isolation from phenomena. Perhaps because of this paradox soul is often 'identified with the principle of life and even of divinity (Hillman, *RVP*, p. x). Hillman is also referring what it is that grants meaning, enables love, and motivates the religious instinct. In particular, he stresses the 'deepening of events into experiences' ('soul making') and the connection of soul to death. Finally, he envisions soul as subsuming 'the imaginative possibility in our natures, the experiencing through reflective speculation, dream image, and fantasy—that mode which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or metaphorical.'Soul is about depth, not the heights attainable by spirit. We may add that *depth* is surely both a condition and an *expression* of our phylogeny. This is an important point to bear in mind: imagery, even poetic imagery, is as old as man and not a product of the civilized or over-civilised version of *homosapiens*... To summarize: *soul* includes life, death, divinity, love, meaning, depth and intensity. But soul is, when all is said and done, as much a way of being and perceiving as it is a datum. In this sense, soul is a dependent on man for incarnation as man is on soul for depth. It follows that the business of analysis is not to cure the soul but rather to facilitate *soul-making* ... not to 'deal with' deep problems but rather to let the problems become deeper." (*CDJA*, pp. 244-45)

Soul-Making Hillman emphasizes, this is the "...deepening of events into experiences."

Unconscious "The portion of the psyche lying outside of conscious awareness. The contents of the unconscious are made up of repressed memories and material,

such as thoughts and images and emotions, that have never been conscious. The unconscious is divided into the **personal unconscious**, which contains the complexes, and the **collective unconscious**, which houses the archetypal images and instinct groups." (*JMS*, pp. 234-35)