

Some Remarks on the Depoliticising Relationship between Ethics and Science in Contemporary Radical and Post- Marxist Thought

Paul Reynolds

Abstract

In this chapter I want to reflect on the role of scientific and ethical discourses in radical political philosophy and theory after the 'cultural turn'.¹ Part of the post-structuralist critique of modern theory and science is focused on a shift in understandings of from aspirations to inform, understand and discover to creating orthodoxy, delimiting creativity and disciplining difference. Hence radical theories such as Marxism that underpinned its theoretical claims through a 'science of society' were claimed to be oppressive, exclusive and methodologically narrow. The space that science left was first denied as a sphere of engagement, but swiftly became filled by ethical discourse, as post-modern influenced radicals claimed to dislocate ethics from science and presented ethics as a last and legitimate grand narrative. We could draw from past radicalism the spirit and normative values of revolutionary change but not its analytical power. In reviewing this change, I want to make three sets of observations. First, I think this misconceives the relationship between science and ethics in a way that presents ethical thinking as constituted of affective and subjectively based normative judgements. This overlooks the necessity of reason in claims for ethical thinking that arrives at prescriptive judgements. Secondly, it misconceives what constitutes scientific thinking and conflates the conservative structures so persuasively critiqued by post-structuralist thinkers with critical thinking that constitutes ethics and science in a dialectical relationship. Third, it misconceives ethics as an inquiry into normative thinking that is disciplined by deliberative judgement. Ethics is not simply the adoption of norms, values and prescriptions for what is 'good' or 'better'. It is the relationship between a mode of inquiry (ethical thinking) and its substantive prescriptions, and one cannot be contingently constituted by the other. These criticisms are hardly novel (and will be criticised as overly classical in its analysis), but this ground clearing exercise does raise the issue of what is remembered and forgotten in ethical and theoretical thinking within radical theory.

Key Words: Ethics, science, discourse, power, Marxism, theory, politics

1. Introduction

The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point is to *change* it. (Marx, Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach)

A critical feature of modern and contemporary radical theories has been their representation as and relationship with discourses of science and ethics.² Radical theorists have sought, at different junctures and in different contexts, to represent themselves as both right in ethical standards - 'right and wrong' - and right in scientific standards - 'true and false.' The radical goals of social and economic transformation for the purposes of equality, rights, and justice have been underpinned by scientific and ethical refutations of pathology, prejudice, exploitation and oppression, and articulations of more just, equitable, enabling and emancipating forms of social and economic organisation. In asserting either moral or methodical claims as a basis for radical critique, theorists have composed the two discourses in a relationship that is alternately conflicting, contradictory, congruent and complementary depending upon the particular intellectual and historical conjuncture in which they are articulated. What they share is that they have been avenues of truth-telling and for speaking truth to power, in elucidating social transformation, change and critique of existing social constructs.

The relationship between discourses of science and ethics in radical theory is complex, context-sensitive and inherently political. To say a particular theoretical position has a scientific or ethical quality ascribes a persuasive power and status. It is this entering into the discursive world of deployment, engagement, conflict and hegemony that moves discussion away from particular theories and philosophical constructions of science and ethics and toward their cultural and political articulation. Here, it is not the explanatory power, logical coherence, comprehensiveness of explanation or critical power of a theory of science and/or ethics that is of primary regard. It is the hegemonic occupation of public discourse by particular powerful articulations that found themselves in and claim their explanatory power from scientific or ethical claims. Often, such articulations seem most congruent with, or are a product of, the intellectual work of powerful interests within the particular social context. These articulations can be enduring, establishing a historical continuity of orthodoxy, or can change and amend in successive conjunctures. What is common to these variable articulations is their power is in speaking truth insofar as they make definite claims and argue from foundational assumptions that are elucidated, where the persuasiveness of a theory is regarded as related to the explanatory power of their telling to truth.

In emergent capitalist modernity, science was the dominant discursive foundation of radical theories because science claimed definite knowledge and underpinned powerful arguments for change. In late,

diversified modernity, science became increasingly regarded as open to question, its status of speaking to truth refuted.³ In contemporary radical theory, claims of ethical power, and the reification of ethics as a last universal discourse for contested ideas, are the basis of speaking to truth, and the core of powerful and persuasive argument.⁴

This shift from science to ethics as a dominant discourse within radical critique had a significant impact on the nature and form of radical politics. Marxism as a universalised critique of capitalism has been besieged by post-Marxist positions and alternate radicalisms that seek to avoid overarching causal determinations and emphasise contingency and agency in the development of radical responses to contemporary ills.⁵ Different forms of post-Marxism, 'anti-politics' and ethically centred radicalism has limited the role of politics as a form of coherent theorising for change, rather reconfiguring it as an expression of antagonisms and form of protest at particular issue-based points of conflict.⁶

In this discussion, I want to make some observations about the relationship between science and ethics in radical theory. Whilst often they are set against each other as opposites and/or separate in their concerns, methods and deployment within different theories, the juxtaposition of ethics and science in radical discourse is necessarily more complex, nuanced and critical in the articulation of a feasible and sustainable radical politics. After a brief excursus of the nature of concepts of ethics and science, the first section of the chapter reviews the different paradigmatic claims for scientific and ethical discourse in different historical conjunctures in the development of capitalist modernity. I then concentrate on three observations arising from that outline.

First, I query the way in which paradigmatic cultural and political representations attribute particular and fixed meanings to the concepts of science and ethics, and particularly fixed meanings, which are used to enhance or diminish science or ethics as constitutive discourse. Second, I question the division of science and ethics as discourses constituted in and constitutive of radical theory, where that difference sets them against each other as opposites rather than in a more complex relationship. Finally, I suggest that rethinking how we see science and ethics within contemporary radical theory strengthens the way in which they can be deployed to constitute a viable and sustained politics.

What brings all three sets of observations together is not simply a sense of clarifying or ground clearing for what basis radical theory is built upon, though that in itself is important. It is the impact of the way in which discourses of science and ethics are deployed on what is constituted in the political. Both science and ethics have been used as to depoliticise radical critique- to cut off claims to truth and explanation from a political context and shift focus away from the idea of praxeological political action and

towards more contemplative and passive relationships - but lively and generative of discourse - with social and economic phenomena and change. A cornerstone of radical politics is its capacity to engage in thinking as constitutive of and constituted in action. The entreaty of Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, and the notion that radicalism is emancipating to its subject as well as strategic in its goals, requires that radicalism politicise. In this sense, the deployment of science and ethics in radical theory often represents the possibility of a politicising moment, its precise form depending on the character of the constitutive process under which politics emerge and the constitutive forces in that conjuncture.

Whilst the politicising possibility is evident, it is equally possible that discourses of science and ethics can be deployed to depoliticise or rendered depoliticised, in the interests of those who wish to curtail or draw limits to political discourse. Whilst this is inherently a political act in itself, depoliticisation suppresses or renders absent the political from discourse.⁷ What separates politicised discourse from depoliticising discourse is not the heat of debate, discussion, advocacy and movement action; it is the relationship of all of this to a notion of truth, rigor in argument for truth and a sense of engagement beyond terms of theoretical orthodoxy and fashion.

Politics itself is essentially contested as a concept, and to make a judgement as to what politicises and depoliticises involves working with a paradigmatic appreciation of the political.⁸ Radical politics has identified its politics with three characteristics: resistance to oppressive, exploitative and alienating power and interests; a sense of politics as strategic struggle rather than the mechanisms and minute of government; a praxeological conjoining of theory and practice in politics. All of these questions are grounded in foundations that are regarded as truths and drive forward radical ideas and their (strategic) call to action. Different radicalisms might differ on who the oppressors or exploiters are, how far a general societal or specific issue based approach will achieve change and how far different activities are political or not, but they share those broad common characteristics. What is at stake for radical politics is the answer to one question: how far the discursive deployments of science and ethics are empowering to this form of politics? These remarks are prompted by particular concern for their deployment in contemporary post-Marxist and radical politics, where the call to politics seems dislocated from a coherent and effective theoretically informed political strategising, on the basis of a particular depoliticising configuration of science and ethics.

It is worth saying something about the approach of this chapter, and particularly the broad level of distinctions that are asserted in this chapter. Clearly, where discussion makes broad distinctions about discursive change and development it is open to question, and the chapter itself argues in some of its discussion that there is a peculiar violence to the 'ordering' and

‘smoothing’ of complex and untidy, uneven and contradictory historical processes, developments and ruptures. The intention is not to argue a specific determinant argument but to make some remarks at a general level that seem at least to touch on broad critical understandings of the way radical thinking has developed and its problems. Whilst this is a modest intention, the act of making broad distinctions is inevitably provocative. In that respect, the chapter is not expected to please the historian, philosopher, social theorist and sociologist, and perhaps a significant proportion of radical thinkers. What it seeks to achieve is to open up questioning and thinking about the nature of changing intellectual and political deployments and articulations of ethics and science and the particularity of representational politics in driving the rewriting of the past in theory and history. It is not, then, principally about the discourses of science and ethics in themselves, but their cultural and political articulations and the depoliticising nature of contemporary representations and articulations

2. The Complex Lives of Concepts - An Excursus on Science and Ethics

At a level of theoretical abstraction, concepts have a life of their own. The concepts of science and ethics both represent discursive imaginaries that take in a range of constituents that give a sense of meaning, understanding and perception in their use. When something is regarded as scientific and/or ethical, it draws upon a historical reservoir of discursive articulations that are subject to specific power/knowledge conflicts and disagreements. Whilst the life of a concept appears ‘smooth’ - coherent, meaningful, internally consistent in its constituents - to those who take it ‘off the rack’ to deploy in their presentation of argument, underneath there is a history of competing, conflicting and contradictory uses, yielding different dominant articulations and reconstitutions within different cultural representations, theoretical schema and hegemonic strategies in different conjunctures.⁹ The apparent stability of a concept in its meaning and import is conditional and limited - to express arguments a concept is necessarily deployed without continual caveats and qualifiers, but the ruptures, dissonances and contestedness of concepts often recedes as the narrative subsumes it into a particular discourse.¹⁰

This is particularly evident when the concepts are themselves critical to the power of that discourse. Claims of scientific and/or ethical quality or status are powerful signifiers in theories that claim to have explanatory power, offer programmes for change and ‘speak to truth’. The representational politics of deploying science or ethics in discourse is therefore significant. Whilst there is a necessity to the ‘violence’ - as Derrida might have phrased it - of the way concepts and their discursive use in narrative impose a particular *logos* in the construction of meaningful

presentations and representations if anything is to be claimed or said, its contingency and conditional status should be retained in thinking through a particular question or problem. In talking about the politicising or depoliticising character of the use of discourses of ethics and science, the construction of discourse itself is part of the phenomena. This construction is partly intentional political strategy, as political factions seek to use discourse to represent themselves and engage in interpellation and mobilisation. At the same time, concepts themselves become agents in carrying pregnant meanings into discourse in a way that can limit those engaged in inquiry and politics. Hence there is a need for conjunctural and contextual sensitivity. Nevertheless, conjunctural and contextual sensitivity are not an apologia for not speaking to truth as it is envisaged, they are part of the discipline by which this truth is sought, found and evaluated.

3. The Hegemonies of Science and Ethics

Those engaged in radical social theory and political economy of the 19th Century stressed the scientific nature of their endeavour. The context within which they developed their thinking demanded it. Scientific discourse had underpinned the industrial revolution and the early stages of the development of capitalist industrial modernity. It was implicit in a reading of the enlightenment that tied the age of reason and the trajectory of progress in the hands of human endeavour, focused on uncovering the 'laws' of the physical world and harnessing science and technology to effect social change.¹¹ Science and technological development were put to the service of, and themselves were catalysed by, emergent capitalist industrial nation-states. They became a feature by which capitalist nation-states fulfilled their ideological promise of progress for all, in a politically limited way since technological innovation and scientific endeavour, not social and political struggle, were conceived as the engines of change. The revolutionary transformations that science and technology offered, principally through industrialisation, whilst less pronounced than the political struggles of the French and American revolutions, were nevertheless significant to the exhaustion of '*ancien regimes*'.¹² It is hardly surprising then that radicals sought to incorporate science into their discourse when it was so centrally associated with progress, development and modernisation.

From the late 1760's until the 1860's, there was an uncomfortable, juxtaposition of ruling aristocratic and finance/merchant interests with those of the emergent bourgeoisie, and the upheavals and revolutions that periodically punctuated this period significantly changed the distribution of power in states undergoing modernising and industrialising processes in economy and society in Europe.¹³ Part of the armoury of the bourgeoisie was precisely the promise of scientific and technological change superseding the economic power of merchants, financiers and aristocratic *rentiers*. The

struggles within different fractions of capital that characterised these revolutions were often less prominent than the struggles arising from the development of the industrial working class and the condensation of both labour and workers' struggles that capitalism created in industrial conurbations. Yet these fractional struggles were as important in shaping the trajectory of social change. To a lesser or greater extent, those class formations who grasped the discursive power of science and technology were significant in realigning power, creating wealth and expanding production, writing a progressive narrative for social change that privileged the value of science and the social determinations of technological change.

Part of this fractional struggle was precisely aimed at containing mass dissent. The power of the masses, demonstrated bloodily and briefly in France after 1789 through to the revolutionary ruptures that swept across Europe in 1848, gave a new imperative to progress, which was to engage political and social reform so as to alleviate the worst excesses of inequality and poverty. This included combating emerging working class consciousness that could not be easily beaten down or incorporated without cost to existing class and elite hierarchies. Here, discourses of science and technology represented an apolitical momentum forward that ruptured traditional and agricultural social orders and put the workers' protests on the wrong side of progress. Equally, their deployment in transforming social relations through the development of industrial conurbations and condensing worker populations created the term of a politics of dissent. Thus scientific discourse became the basis not only for hegemonic capitalist development and for radical critiques, but specifically it became a battleground for those who sought to see reform as either change for or containment of mass working class politics.

The battle cry of '*Sapere Aude*' applied to both those who pressed forward the development of modern capitalism and those who began to theorise its reform or radical restructuring. Auguste Comte's positivist 'social physics' and Henri Saint Simon's French socialism both built upon a systemic critique of the industrial system where rights, equality and justice were underpinned by scientific knowledge and its application in reshaping social and economic relations.¹⁴ The dominant developments in sociological inquiry, from Durkheim to Weber, were grounded in scientific insight arising from sociological method and the translation of natural science insights and methods into the social sphere.¹⁵

Karl Marx's oft-quoted fusion of German philosophy, French politics and English economics was underpinned by a notion of science that arose from a materialist ontology, a dialectical method but also crucially the claims for a scientific approach to analysing cause and effect in both the vagaries of capitalism and the possibilities of socialism. His dedication of *Capital Volume 1* to Darwin was indicative of the importance he attached to

‘scientific’ work, and the status of Marxism as a scientific method underpinned its revolutionary potential.

In Marxism, science manifests itself in three senses - the use of empirical evidence, the dialectical method and the materialist ontology.¹⁶ Marx’s extensive marshalling of empirical work allowed him to claim his refutation of the claims of bourgeois ideology were grounded in ‘facts’. This is not to claim an empiricist position per se, but to evoke the spirit of science in the use of data to build an evidenced case, in contrast to the aspiration and philosophically based claims of liberals as to the working of the market and its cumulative benefit in enabling the ‘wealth of nations.’¹⁷ This should not be underestimated. Marx won over the Communist League in the winter of 1847 with an early version of his distinctive theoretical critique (and was then invited to write the Communist Manifesto), but it was the weapons he crafted in amassing and analysing data (as in *Capital*) that gave Marxism a ‘feel’ of being scientific and a persuasive basis for revolutionary agitation

The centrality of Marx’s claims to science lay in a materialist ontology, where recognition of the speculative character and irrefutability of metaphysical claims led to an ontology that insisted that the material conditions of life shaped and determined social structure, human agency and metaphysical claims and ideologies. Materialism establishes a non-mechanical view of the world that is nevertheless open to measurement and analytical and evaluative strategies. The dialectic is re-envisioned from Hegel, the scientific method by which this ontology could be read precisely because the dialectic corresponds to the form and dynamic nature of that ontology. Having recognised the dialectical nature of human development, the dialectic becomes the basis of both charting historical motion and elucidating its dynamics, causalities and changes.

This is a simplified expression of the basis of Marx’s science, and there is much more of a nuanced nature to say about Marx’s science and dialectics, but for the purposes of this discussion, Marx’s science comes from both philosophical insight and ‘working the evidence’ in a way that conjoins the ontological, methodological and the social science of analysing the world, and is essentially praxeological. Marx’s science is based upon the congruency and conjoining of these different levels of reflection and analysis, and an ontology that permits insight on the way the world works through analysis that is dialectical in its conjoining, requiring constant engagement by Marxists in analysing different societies at different times with their distinct structures and processes of development, using conceptual tools and scientific method that itself is subject to critical reflection, amendment and development as it is used. Marx’s science does have foundations, in class, in capitalism, in dialectics, in materialist ontology, but its application is fundamentally conjunctural and none of these foundations are immune to their own ‘laws’, which recognise the historical and material basis of change

in human societies has an impact on how Marxist 'science' is conducted, how it is understood as 'science' and how it is remade in continual engagement with a changing world.

Two considerations are crucial to this understanding. First, the science of Marxism is necessarily congruent with its ontology. If Marxists recognise the nature of a materialist and historical ontology of change, they also recognise that whilst their philosophical categories and dialectical method give Marxism its power in analysis, Marxism is subject to those same ontological and methodological rules as it uses to understand the world.

Second, for Marxism, the claim of using 'science' is important in the particular conjuncture of the middle of the 19th century in building an international working class movement against a backdrop of the failure of revolutionary movements. *The Communist Manifesto* of 1848 provides a polemical and determinant picture of the scientific truth of Marxist analyses of the contradictions of capitalism and the coming of socialism because it is a political necessity.¹⁸ There is a strategic as well as a philosophical basis for the advocacy of scientific method, with scientific method providing the 'certainty' to which workers can rally and mobilise. Marx's *Capital* engages in a scientific analysis that is oppositional to, yet retain the same sense of reifying scientific discourse as, bourgeois representations of capitalist modernity. Science is the battleground to speaking truth and to privileging the power of a particular analysis. In the middle of the 19th Century, speaking to truth is speaking through scientific discourse.¹⁹

This is not to claim a self-consciousness of the strategic use of a claim for science. It is rather to recognise that at the time, in the context of historical developments in economy, society and intellectual critique, scientific discourse is the space within which both bourgeois and radical critiques are present. Marx, as with other thinkers of the time, shows no reflective self-consciousness about his science, indeed it is the power of his 'science' as well as his political commitment that frames the style of much of his writing, arguing combatively against other theorists claiming a similar form of insight that for Marx is not sufficiently scientific.

If science was the dominant theoretical discourse in analysing social change and the character of social life in the 19th century, its' practitioners did so by seeking to eclipse a form of thinking associated with ethics. Social science and radical theory both developed from a position that dominant philosophical discourse often made three errors in analysing social life. First, philosophical discourse abstracted from the reality of social conditions, so that the freedom and liberty that was developed within enlightenment philosophy bore little resemblance to the lived experience of much of the population. Second, philosophers concentrated more on the principled discourse of what ought to be rather than the material conditions people lived in - the 'is' of social experience. Finally, philosophical discourse often failed

to go beyond an individualistic frame that implied that decisions, judgements and evaluations should be made in the context of individuals rather than collective groupings, and in a social context which juxtaposed the abstracted individual with their necessary status as communal and social animals.

This rejection of ethical discourse within radical thought was reinforced by three particular motivations. One, reflected in Marx's *German Ideology* was a rejection of German Idealism as a dominant ethico-political discourse, and as a paradigmatic philosophical discourse representative of philosophy's lack of praxeology.²⁰ The philosophy of Kant and Hegel spoke to an ethical notion of politics in the service of reason and good within enlightenment values and in a context of an emergent capitalist and modern society. Whilst it is clear that this representation of Kant and Hegel is somewhat limited in philosophical nuance, since both extensively grounded their ethics within their 'science', it had considerably more power as a political position.

Second, ethics was by its discursive construction elided with morals. By focusing on questions of morality, ethics seemed limited to the reproduction of political orthodoxies and dominant representations of the political good. Ethics was morals, and morality was the dominant discourse by which class society posed its questions, often in an abstracted and individualised context and against extant moral discourse - particularly different forms of Christian discourse - that elided with conservative values. As such, morals devalued ethics as critical discourse.

Discussions of morality were primarily predicated on conservative arguments for individuated market driven changes combined with conserving social and political values, which did not disturb, though sometimes resisted the teleological notion that progress - science and technologically driven - would bring about social change and a greater sense of well-being for all. Indeed, whilst liberals did not require state-based measures of social equality to balance market inequalities until into the 20th century, the argument that had always underpinned the support of capitalism had been the premise at the centre of Smith, that functioning markets contributed to the wealth of all. Intrinsically, morality was an implicit feature of progress.²¹ This notion of progress and change was profoundly depoliticising. There was little room for politics except as an incremental systemic tendency or an idealisation of nation, class and race, particularly for a politics of mass struggle, emancipation and reorganisation. Hence, whilst science was a battleground that radicals stepped into, ethics was regarded the preserve of the conservative. There was no political capital in extensive moral claims when science seemed more persuasive. There were exceptions. French radicalism struggled to remodel ethics outside of a philosophical discourse and into a social context, notably in the work of Durkheim, often regarded as a conservative oriented functionalist but radical in his commitment to

transform moral theory.²² Nevertheless, ethics as principally conflated with German Idealism and understood as the foil of radicalisms in the 19th Century, from Marx to Nietzsche.

Yet as the 19th century gave way to the 20th Century, and industrial development gave way to economic instability and crisis and political order dissolved into war, the status of science changed. It became increasingly associated with efficiency and technological development that was troublingly amoral, such as Taylorism in the workplace, bureaucracy in the political process and the development of military technologies. The growing sense of the disasters as well as benefits that political direction of technology produced both highlighted an apolitical representation of 'science' and a renewed desire to harness scientific development to human prerogatives, which diluted the political character of scientific claims.

The hegemonies of science and ethics reversed sharply after the Second World War, partly through emergent philosophical discourses within radical thinking and critical of modern and enlightenment thinking, and partly through the disillusionment with science that both the War and the Holocaust brought about.²³ The Holocaust punctuated the conceit of the progressive discourse of modernity and demonstrated science could be under the service of barbarism.²⁴ Science was no longer easily associated with aspirations to inform, understand and discover, driven by a fundamental respect for knowledge and truth. Studies of the scientific paradigm identified its inherent political and social dynamics.²⁵ Lyotard headed a post-structuralist critique of science that identified science with disciplining, controlling and constraining human freedom.²⁶ The 'grand narratives' or *logos* imposed upon understandings of social change and development were refuted as determinist, essentialist, functionalist and reductionist.²⁷ Marxism and much of modernist radical theory was characterised as constituting orthodoxy, disciplining difference and reducing and determining complex social, cultural, economic and political struggles and dynamics to foundational 'scientific' claims. The apotheosis of this appeared to be Althusserian Marxism, where the science of Marxism appeared to lock class agency and praxeology into an anti-humanist 'iron cage' of structural determinants. As science had enabled radicalism in the 19th Century, so the Holocaust, communist ideological science and militarism disabled it. Science as a claim for truth was seen as bankrupt and wanting without ethical thinking.

In this context, Marxism became reconceived as a conservative, oppressive and exhausted 'grand narrative'. Its associations with 'actually existing communist societies', the sharp dichotomising between communist politics and Marxist intellectual criticality, the emergence of identity focused radicalisms that put gender, ethnicity, disability and sexuality at the centre of radical politics and the apparent exhaustion of socialist and radical politics against a Conservative resurgence in the 1980's all contributed to its

representation. In this context, the Marxist claim to be a 'science of society' directly contributed to its rejection by philosophers influenced by post-structuralism and social scientists influenced by the 'cultural turn'. Whilst there was a renewed interest in critical theory and Marxist humanism, what was regarded as orthodox Marxism was consigned to history.

At the same time, the post-structuralist critique of foundationalism also challenged radical theories based on identity, most prominently with post-feminist challenges to feminism.²⁸

The 'exhaustion' of Marxism was celebrated by Laclau and Mouffe and their post-Marxist theorising of radical democracy as being constituted in the 'spirit' of Marxism without the constraints of the science of Marxism.²⁹ Here, categories of class and capital that have been formulated in a scientific model where their essential characteristics register constraints upon agency are reconfigured to emphasise agency, in doing so diluting their explanatory and causal power. The politics of subordination and antagonism superseded class struggle and radicalism transformed from an ontologically materialist prefigured struggle for emancipation to a more open-ended plural contestation and its effective regulation towards emancipation. As class (or gender or ethnicity or disability or sexuality in identity theories) had been the central concept occupying the explanatory articulations of emancipation, so democracy took its place. Regardless of the problem of an ontological category such as class being replaced by a procedural concept such as democracy, what democratic theory allowed was an open-ended, plural and fluid model of social relations and political antagonisms.

The intellectual lineages of post-Marxist thought feed into a number of dissembling projects, including prominently: post-modern politics and poetics (Lyotard, Baudrillard); post-structuralist critique (Foucault, Derrida); the cultural turn and cultural theory (Bourdieu, Bennett); queer anti-foundationalism and performativity (Butler, Sedgwick); post-colonial and post-imperial thought (Spivak, Hardt and Negri) and post-Marxist materialism and ontology (Macherey, Badiou). What each of these share is a sense of the opening of contingency, a critique of foundationalism and modernist theorising and a fascination with complexity and the 'other,' whether the affective, the deconstructive or the plural and diverse.³⁰

Such contemporary thinking has produced political discourse that loosely follows three paths: a retrenched Marxist theory and politics (flourishing after the financial crash of 2009); a more 'cosmopolitan democratic' politics typified by social movements, issue based campaigns, identity politics and theories of deliberative and direct democracy; and forms of gradualist politics and reformist politics that seek to extend the democratic and pluralist space within liberal democracies.³¹ The latter two constitute the major forms of left political discourse since the 1980's, with Marxism only

recently resurgent with the financial crisis of 2009, and popularised in the renewed interest in communism in the work of Žižek and Badiou.

Yet the prevailing political appeals of much of this politics are founded in ethical discourse. It is normative values and standards that become the terrain of struggle. Normativity and the struggle with subjectivity and the affective in a potentially estranged and 'othered' world becomes the centre for 'politics'. It is moral judgement and action that concerns much of the choices that are signposted, providing the impetus to think and act that was driven in modernity by dialectics of agency and structure. Post-Marxist politics is constituted by disjuncture, dissonance, rupture and contingency, articulated through subjectivities and the affective, through ethical discourse. This in itself is not problematic, except that there is an absence of constraint, conjuncture, confluence and closure in opposition to these possibilities.

Such qualities in a theoretical exposition come from the discipline of seeking to speak to a truth - however conditional and contingent - in such a way as to enter into discourse that is critical of that truth, and engages in critique against a *schema* whereby truth is rigorously challenged by method. Science and ethics provide the theoretical schema and that rigor of method. The disillusionment with science elided with a loss of faith in the task of speaking to truth, or the possibility to establishing even conditional truth, and the resurgence of ethics replicated its earlier problems of abstraction, individuation and the reduction of ethics to respect for normative positions.

Again, a distinction should be drawn between ethical thinking, which may well offer theoretical models that articulate particular means of judgement and particular constraints to action, and their cultural articulation in contemporary theory and politics. Ethics is in essence a deliberative subject where approaches such as deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics - the use the classical theories - provide the means of thinking through complex problems and situations.³² There is a discipline to this thinking that clarifies the contingencies of and constraints to a situation for the agent, whilst leaving a sense of moral responsibility in the agent's deliberation and action. However, in contemporary politics, that has allowed for arguments that diversity, plurality and complexity have constrained definite truths as an outcome of theory, and replaced the desire to theorise the nature of a problem and possible actions to resolve or alleviate it. It becomes an ethical condition not only to consider normative values as a means of incorporating diversity and pluralism, but as a means of thinking about the possibilities of social and cultural transformation.

What arises from this is a depoliticising moment where politics becomes an 'absent presence' - it is manifest in social movements, cosmopolitanism and democratic thinking, and in the endless and open nature of political discourse. It is however at the same time not anchored in a referent outside normative articulations and claims - indeed it rejects such

referents. Science intrinsically supports a hierarchy of claims to truth, and ethical thinking can sustain distinctions between good and poor arguments to truth. However, in contemporary radicalism, science is illegitimate and ethics permissive - neither are intended as being the means by which politics is conditioned to a truth. Truth lies not in the means of understanding and articulating, but in the positionality of the subject and their affective experience - the moment that consumes attention rather than the moment that has the potential for the next moment and its becoming.

4. **Ethics, Science, Politics and Enlightenment**

This sketch of the historical relation of concepts of science and ethics in radical thinking is necessarily general in its juxtapositions, and there are examples of where critical thinkers have sought to make more nuanced and complex understandings of science and ethics in modern and late modern times.³³

The representation of the relationship between ethics and science, where one supersedes the other at different historical conjunctures, nevertheless provides a useful historical mapping of change and ruptures in the underpinnings of left politics, and for an account of different relationships between left theory and truth. This mapping, however, neglects or underplays the congruencies between ethics and science and their relationship to politics. It does this because the way in which this broad discursive movement is mapped does not refer to philosophical distinctions, congruencies or juxtapositions, but cultural and political ones. It is possible to find different relationships, some with oppositional notions of science and ethics and some with congruent notions. The philosophical relationship between science and ethics is complex yet congruent as much as contradictory. What emphasises division and disagreement is the way in which these philosophical arguments are articulated in modern industrial societies. It is precisely their representation that gives the appearance of separation. This representation is not fundamentally - or in much of the discourse, at all - about drawing philosophical distinctions about what constitutes an approach to social understandings based on science or ethics. It is about culturally constructed articulations driven by the distinct yet inextricably related impulses to explain social development and lay claim to the most authoritative explanation - to speak to truth.

The juxtaposition of science and ethics is therefore a sociological and cultural enterprise and not a philosophical one, although that does not mean that the philosophical discourse juxtaposing ethics and science is not context-sensitive or sensitive to the genre it develops within. The broad history I have remarked upon, with the emergence of strong scientific discourse eclipsing ethical discourse in early capitalist modernity and becoming resurgent again after the Second World War is not about the

development and discursive power of particular philosophical arguments; it is about the deployment of these discourses in the political and cultural terrain.

The root of this problem, and the reason for an extensive historical discussion, is the earliest reading of enlightenment discourse through the lens of the emergence of capitalist modernity. The archetypal image of the enlightenment is that of a rational and scientifically driven revolution, unevenly and with different trajectories moving over Europe as capitalist modernity and industrialisation began to develop. Yet this ignores the historical identification of the enlightenment as a far more complex, cultural and political process, in which the characterisation most deployed in more contemporary readings 'smooths out' substantial differences and distinctions. The most important difference obscured in this representation is its subjugation of the rich plurality of the enlightenment, and particularly the romantic enlightenment, typified in the poetry of Wordsworth, Keats and Coleridge, which represented a different form of looking beyond religious representations and dogma and rethinking the human subject in their context.³⁴ Beran provides a cogent mapping of this enlightenment thinking through critical traditions to French post-structuralism and the emergence of the affective against the rational moment.³⁵ The division of rational and romantic or affective creates a division in exploring the human condition, with science and rationality pre-eminent with the growth of a scientifically and technologically innovative modernity, and the affective becoming more important as disillusionment set in with what progress modernity promised, and the fruits of rationality and science were questioned. This necessarily encourages a sense of re-engagement with the sensory and affective - with the world of identity, psyche and difference, as people look from how they can connect the world around them to what type of world comes from what type of selfhood.

This is, of course, a very broad-brush representation of a far more complex and multi-faceted and conflicting process of challenges to modern orthodoxy. It does not imply that the affective is conjoined with the ethical in the way that science and the rational have been conjoined in modern discourse. What it does claim is that disenchantment leads back from a rationalist discourse in both affective and ethical agendas and that what they share is a sense of being able to expand and occupy the hegemonic space vacated or lost by science and rationality in the way the world is presented, particularly in left thinking. Capitalism, and capitalist, industrial, patriarchal, racist, imperialist, heterosexist, able bodied modernity remain the critical object for left thinking, but their approach to it is not to rejuvenate its science but to reject on ethical grounds and on grounds of modernisms dehumanising character. Whether these two approaches are conjoined, juxtaposed or simply have an observed congruency is a matter contingent to the particular theorist. Nevertheless, what remains *representationally* is a

dichotomised model where science is contrary to ethics, normative thinking is contrary to analytical thinking, rationality is contrary to emotions. Whilst in individual studies, the rational basis of ethics or the synthetic distinction of analytic and normative in ethical thinking might be teased and developed with nuance, the representations of these intellectual dichotomies drive intellectual and political positions that emphasise opposition. Inglehart's post-materialism, ecological perspectives and the single issue/rainbow coalition politics of social movement theories all speak to a disenchantment to the rational *logos*, with science, industry and scientific critiques of social change, and a call to re-evaluating normative choices, ethical norms and positions and affective and phenomenological approaches to understand the self in late modern societies.³⁶

One approach to underlining this discursive representation of science and ethics within changing contexts of intellectual enquiry and politics is that of 'paradigm'. It is not simply an ideological exercise, but more a thinking and writing within 'genre' and within 'school' or 'perspective', and how that feeds into political debate. What emerges from the paradigmatic development of particular deployments of understandings may well then inform ideological debate, but it provides a form of rupturing and normalising of orthodoxy that is more subtle in its construction than the mobilisation of world-view and interpellation that is characteristic of ideological politics (though the distinction may be fine).

This discussion provides a basis for understanding discourses of science and ethics as being articulated in the political milieu in a way that provides a fixed sense of their meaning and a definite sense of their import and importance, whereas closer inspection sees science and ethics as constitutive discourse that have more complex and conjoined trajectories. Lest this seem little more than a complex way of arguing that the post-structuralist critiques of modern discourse is persuasive, it should be added that recognition of the 'solid state' of deployments of science and ethics under modernity are qualified by this sort of account of the relationship between concept and its deployment within contexts, conjunctures and narratives that present its genealogy in discourse.

5. Science and Ethics as Metaphor, Method and Relationship to Truth

The second remark I want to offer dwells more specifically on how science is read, and more specifically, the way in which science is culturally articulated, even amongst those familiar with the scope and limitations of scientific discourse. After Kuhn (1996), and notwithstanding the critical terms of debate in Lakatos and Musgrave (1970), it is necessary to re-evaluate how science is deployed as a concept.³⁷ With early left thinking in the 19th century, science is seen as a means of uncovering truth. This does not

necessarily mean that this truth is seen as immutable, decipherable or indeed singular, but it does mean that science establishes frameworks of facts, laws and understandings that have a definite relationship to truth. The validity of this science was essential for radical theory, and particularly Marxism, to provide an effective foil to modernity and its promise of progress. This is represented to an absurd degree in Soviet science such as Lysenkoism, where ideology determined science and its truth.³⁸ The decline of science as a critical discourse and the dislocation between science as method and science as truth, where the former advocates rigorous, critical and transparent methods and the latter speaks to the extent to which any methods can bear insights, gives a more nuanced understanding of science. It gives rise to the notion that cultural articulations of science are best understood as metaphor, where it is the power of the discourse, rather than the method or truth it represents, that is critical. It is the power of scientific truth that requires political strands of Marxism to develop a dialectical method that purports towards the inevitably of socialism through dialectical change and class agency, informed by it in the political writings of Marx and Lenin. In a contemporary age of scepticism, such thinking is less persuasive. Yet equally, it is possible to read in Marx and subsequent thinkers a notion of science that arises from a materialist ontology that is not closed and determinant, and allows for agency as well as social determinations. Here, science becomes a metaphor for the quality of analysis, so the empirical, methodological and theoretical rigor of studies of capitalist crisis or development, of class formations and class politics mediated through cultural, moral and social lenses, become the means by which science is understood. This, in essence, is the attraction behind critical realism for Marxists, where critical realism provides a more sophisticated and complex, open ended ontological framework for critical analysis, allowing the debates between Marxists and critical realists to weigh relative agencies and determinations within specific analyses.³⁹

Scientific thinking, then, develops its explanatory power from its method and rigor, not from the inherent qualities of that which it explores - nature, society, the body, the self. A conservative teleological and technological reading of science becomes metaphoric when, at a high level, researchers become aware of just how conditional their truths are. The cultural import of discourses of science obscure this conditional relationship to truth. This crude notion of science as truth seeking and truth defining is mapped onto scientific theories of society, such as Marxism, and the consequence is precisely that they seem to claim too much. Likewise, except when conjoined with belief, as in Christian ethics, ethics is seen as normative, contributing to debates on values but without a sense of producing teleological truth.

This sort of articulation of cultural constructs of science and ethics as irretrievably wed to certainty (fact or belief) or just 'better opinion' effectively obscures the possibility of seeing science and ethics not as different discourses afflicted with the same false beliefs about truth, but as being in a dialectical relationship. Rigorous method and foundational ontological judgements about the world are tested against ethical critique that is itself subject to scientific rigor in the quality of its logical argument and suppositions - in the case of Marxist theory against the discipline of a materialist ontology.

One final short remark I want to offer is to clarify that not only science is misconceived. Ethics as an inquiry into normative thinking is disciplined by the logic of its deliberative judgement and the presuppositions upon which it sets out its argument. Ethics is not simply the adoption of norms, values and prescriptions for what is 'good' or 'better'. It is the relationship between a mode of inquiry (ethical thinking) and its substantive prescriptions, and one cannot be contingently constituted by the other. These criticisms are hardly novel but this ground clearing exercise does raise the issue of what is remembered and forgotten in ethical and theoretical thinking within radical theory.

6. Ethics, Science, Politics and Enlightenment

If we contrast the acknowledged progenitor of enlightenment thinking - Immanuel Kant - and the much acknowledged most influential philosopher of the day - Alain Badiou - one similarity is striking. Both engage in the use of what they would characterise a scientific method - through reason or mathematics as method - yet both claim to say much about the ethical subject, ethics in society and ethical claims to truth. Both would find a dichotomising of science and ethics absurd - perhaps because both would agree that whatever intellectual work is done in uncovering society, it is precisely grounded in ontological question from which science and ethics both issue. That science usurped ethics as the dominant underpinning to political discourse with the development of industrial modernity, and then ethics usurped politics in the contemporary age of disillusionment would be met by a certain sense of stoicism. These would be questions of politics, and the political framing of knowledge - deeply context sensitive but limited in leading deep enquiry or in developing a cogent sense of the malaise of society and its possible corrections or ameliorations.

Nevertheless contemporary radical theory in the service of diversity, pluralism, cosmopolitanism and inclusion, may well have negotiated its way into a conceptual cul-de-sac, generating much heat but no light. For, commendable as this anti-foundational and dynamic approach to politics and to understanding and informing social change and development may be, its development sits upon a paradox. Science has moved to being detached from

a politics of truth and instead is curiously dislocated in pushing technological change outside politics or invariably politicised to the point where the 'science' is subordinate to political opinion and rhetoric. Both essentially depoliticise scientific discourse, both obscuring the very real politics that technological and scientific change constitute, and rendering science dissonant from the methods by which truth is sought.

Likewise, ethics as discourse has become the means by which the formal inclusion, participation and 'voicing' and 'hearing' of difference, diversity and plurality may be negotiated, but without a sense that there is a standard of method by which arguments can be equivalently assessed in relation to truth telling. Ethics becomes both part of the coda by which all are safeguarded in their participation, yet impotent in moving beyond these formal questions to substantive issues - what it is we seek to do and say in the name of truth and emancipation. Ethics is depoliticised, becoming little more than normative debate, the product of which, regardless of merit, is a goal in itself.

Rancière is instructive in this regard.⁴⁰ Depoliticisation takes place when politics relinquishes a sense of trying to have a relationship with truth and a debate between competing visions through rigorous argument, and settles instead for becoming endless debate, a cacophony of exchanges of position, vision and decision that continue their conditions of being and presume their presence has a meaningful impact on social life. This is what might be regarded as an 'absent presence', where politics becomes spectacle and where those means by which politics is re-engaged with truth, meaning and commitment - principally through science and ethics - are subjugated and suppressed. The deployment of these concepts and their relationship is in a depoliticised space.

Another way of thinking about this is to return to the critiques of the exhaustion of Marxism - particularly Barrett in her critical engagement with the changing politics of truth from Marx to Foucault, and take a lead from the response of Gregor McLennan.⁴¹ Faced with the critical rejection of the 'sins' of modern theory - reductionism, functionalism, essentialism and universalism - McLennan embraces them. For McLennan, the assertion of determinations, reducibility, function and essence is exactly what the radical theorist of society should be doing in constructing a politics of truth, even if this truth, dialectically, is conjunctural, momentary and unstable. It is the commitment to truth - where truth is conditional - that is the core of the praxeological commitment to act informed by theory and theorise understanding the imperative to act. It is ethics and science as discourse that demand that arguments are made and then critically engaged - but only when they are politicised, and their import to representations of truth taken seriously. They lose their value when they are depoliticised and become part

of the ‘play’ of representations that focus on the representation or articulation of a position rather than its truth-telling.

Notes

¹ This chapter was first given at the first global inter-disciplinary conference of Culture, Politics and Ethics in Salzburg, Austria in March 2009, organised by Inter-disciplinary.net. My thanks to the conference group who attended and commented on the paper and especially to John McSweeney for his remarkable tolerance and patience in waiting for this chapter to gestate. It is very much a sketch and ‘thinking publically’ as opposed to anything polished and positioned - hopefully that will come later.

² I would argue for this for radical theories across Marxism, feminism, anti-racism, sexuality and disability theories, though I will use Marxism principally here

³ See, for example, S Aronowitz, *Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society*, University of Minnesota Press, Duluth, 1988; M Foucault, *The Order of Things*, Routledge, London, 2001; JF Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, G Bennington & B Massumi (trans), Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984.

⁴ For two attempts to assert ethics as both post-modern and yet beyond contingent see E Laclau and C Mouffe, *Hegemony and Social Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, Verso, London, 1985; JF Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, University of Minnesota Press, Duluth, 1989.

⁵ For an overview of these see S Sim (ed), *Post-Marxism: A Reader*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1998; idem, *Post-Marxism: An Intellectual History*, Routledge, London, 2000; P Goldstein, *Post-Marxist Theory: An Introduction*, SUNY, New York, 2000.

⁶ Indicatively, S Hall and M Jacques (eds) *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990's*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1989; G Mulgan (ed) *Life After Politics: New Thinking for the 21st Century*, Fontana, London, 1997; D. Trend (ed), *Radical Democracy: Identity, Citizenship and the State* Routledge, London, 1996; S Wilks (ed), *Talking About Tomorrow: A New Radical Politics*, Pluto, London, 1993.

⁷ The best outline of this process is J Rancière, *On The Shores of Politics*, Verso, London, 1995.

⁸ Essential contestedness is best explained by WB Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 56, 1956, pp.167-198.

⁹ To understand this process, see M Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Routledge, London, 2002.

¹⁰ For the best discussion of these reading and writing ruptures, see J Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997; idem, *Writing and Difference*, Routledge, London, 2003.

¹¹ For extensive discussion of the nature of the enlightenment, see J Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; idem, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity and the Emancipation of Man 1670-1752*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006; R Porter, *Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2000. For a taste of the relevant theoretical strands of the enlightenment, see I Kramnick (ed), *The Enlightenment Reader*, Harmondsworth, Penguin 1995; N Geras and R Wokler (eds), *The Enlightenment and Modernity*, MacMillan, London, 2000.

¹² Indicatively, E Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848*, new ed, Abacus, London, 1988; idem, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, new ed, Abacus, London, 1989; idem, *Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day*, 2nd rev. ed, Harmondsworth, Penguin; 1999; D Ogg, *Europe of the Ancien Regime*, Fontana, London, 1965; and W Doyle, *The Ancien Regime*, 2nd rev. ed, Palgrave Macmillan; London, 2001.

¹³ For left accounts, see K Marx, *The Revolutions of 1848*, D Fernbach (ed), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973; E Kamenka and FR Smith (eds), *Intellectuals and Revolution: Socialism and the Experience of 1848*, Edward Arnold, London, 1979.

¹⁴ A Comte, *Introduction to Positive Philosophy*, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1988; CH Saint-Simon, *Selected Writings on Science, Industry and Social Organisation*, Croon Helm, London, 1975.

¹⁵ E Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Free Press, New York, 1938; M Weber, *Economy and Society*, new ed, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992.

¹⁶ For a general background - traditional and critical - of the science of Marxism and Marxism as science see M Cornforth, *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, Dialectical Materialism, Vol. 1, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1952; S Avineri (ed), *Varieties of Marxism*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977; P Blackledge and G Kirkpatrick, *Historical Materialism and Social Evolution*, Palgrave, London, 2002.

¹⁷ A Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, abridged ed, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1993.

¹⁸ K Marx and F Engels, *The Communist Manifesto: Complete with Seven Rarely Published Prefaces*, Filiquarian Publishing, New York, 2005.

¹⁹ K Marx, *Capital: Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1, Harmondsworth, Penguin Classics, 2004; idem, *Capital: Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 2,

Harmondsworth, Penguin Classics, 2006; idem, *Capital: Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 3, Harmondsworth, Penguin Classics, 2006.

²⁰ K Marx and F Engels, *The German Ideology*, Prometheus Books, New York, 1998.

²¹ Smith, op. cit.

²² Durkheim, op. cit.

²³ This is best addressed within the Marxist canon in M Horkheimer and T Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2002, and for an alternate view, see L Kolakowski, *Modernity on Endless Trial*, University of Chicago Press, London, 1990; idem, *Metaphysical Horror*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2001. For a comprehensive theoretical survey see S Crook, *Modernist Radicalism and Its Aftermath: Foundationalism and Anti-Foundationalism in Radical Social Theory*, Routledge, London, 1991.

²⁴ See Z Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991.

²⁵ See TS Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd rev. ed, Chicago University Press, London, 1996; I Lakatos and A Musgrove, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965*, vol. 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970.

²⁶ JF Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, G Bennington and B Massumi (trans), Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984.

²⁷ This is typified by M Barrett, *The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, and effectively refuted by McLellan, 'Post-Marxism and the 'Four Sins' of Modernist Theorizing', *New Left Review*, vol., 213, 1996, pp. 53-74.

²⁸ Representatively, see V Coppock, D Hayden and I Richter, *The Illusions of Post-Feminism: New Women Old Myths*, Taylor and Francis, London, 1995; E Hackett and S Haslianger, *Theorising Feminisms: A Reader*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

²⁹ E Laclau, and C Mouffe, *Hegemony and Social Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, Verso, London, 1985.

³⁰ For the best current survey of this post-Marxist tendency see P Goldstein, *Post-Marxist Theory: An Introduction*, SUNY, New York, 2000. The absence of a wider and more critical engagement in the literature is surprising.

³¹ Selectively, on democracy, see D Held, *Models of Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987; P Hirst, *Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994. On social movements, see T Mertes (ed), *A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Possible?*, Verso, London, 2004; S Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social*

Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. On cosmopolitanism KA Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*, Harmondsworth, Penguin 2007; D Archibugi, D Held, and M Kohler (eds), *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998; D Archibugi (ed), *Debating Cosmopolitics*, Verso, London, 2003; G Brock and H Brighouse (eds), *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005; S Vertovic and R Cohen (eds), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. On pretenses of radical reform, see A Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Polity: Cambridge, 1995; A Giddens (ed), *The Progressive Manifesto: New Ideas For the Centre Left*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003.

³² For an outline of classical ethical thinking, see T Beauchamp, *Philosophical Ethics*, 2nd ed, McGraw Hill, London, 1991.

³³ Two examples are M Peters, M Olssen, and C Lankshear (eds), *Futures of Critical Theory*, Rowman and Littlefield, London, 2003; and A Callinicos, *The Resources of Critique*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006.

³⁴ See D Wu (ed), *Romanticism: An Anthology*, 2nd ed, Blackwell, Oxford, 1998, and N Kompridis (ed), *Philosophical Romanticism*, Routledge, London, 2006.

³⁵ D Beran, *Early British Romanticism, the Frankfurt School and French Post-Structuralism: In the Wake of Failed Revolution*, Peter Lang, New York, 2001.

³⁶ R Inglehart, 'The Silent Revolution in Post-Industrial Societies', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 65, 1971, pp. 991-1017.

³⁷ TS Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd rev ed, Chicago University Press, London, 1996; I Lakatos, and A Musgrove, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965*, vol. 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970.

³⁸ Indicatively, see L Graham, *Science, Philosophy, and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1987.

³⁹ See A Brown, S Fleetwood and JM Roberts (eds), *Critical Realism and Marxism*, Routledge, London, 2002.

⁴⁰ J Rancière, *On The Shores of Politics*, Verso, London, 1995.

⁴¹ M Barrett, *The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992; G McLennan, 'Post-Marxism and the 'Four Sins' of Modernist Theorizing'. *New Left Review*, vol. 213, 1996, pp. 53-74.

Bibliography

Appiah, K.A., *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2007.

Archibugi, D., D. Held and M. Kohler (eds), *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998.

Archibugi, D., (ed), *Debating Cosmopolitics*, Verso, London, 2003.

Aronowitz, S., *Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society*. University of Minnesota Press, Duluth, 1988.

Avineri, S., (ed), *Varieties of Marxism*. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977.

Barrett, M., *The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.

Bauman, Z., *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991.

Beauchamp, T., *Philosophical Ethics*, 2nd ed. McGraw Hill, London, 1991.

Beran, D., *Early British Romanticism, the Frankfurt School and French Post-Structuralism: In the Wake of Failed Revolution*. Peter Lang, New York, 2001.

Blackledge, P., and G. Kirkpatrick, *Historical Materialism and Social Evolution*. Palgrave, London, 2002.

Brock, G., and H. Brighouse, (eds), *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

Brown, A., S. Fleetwood, and J.M. Roberts (eds.), *Critical Realism and Marxism*. Routledge, London, 2002.

Callinicos, A., *The Resources of Critique*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006.

Comte. A., *Introduction to Positive Philosophy*. Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1988.

-
- Coppock, V., D. Hayden and I. Richter, *The Illusions of Post-Feminism: New Women Old Myths*. Taylor and Francis, London, 1995.
- Cornforth, M., *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, Dialectical Materialism, vol. 1. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1952.
- Crook, S., *Modernist Radicalism and Its Aftermath: Foundationalism and Anti-Foundationalism in Radical Social Theory*. Routledge, London, 1991.
- Derrida, J., *Of Grammatology*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997.
- _____. *Writing and Difference*. Routledge, London, 2003.
- Doyle, W., *The Ancien Regime*, 2nd rev. ed. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2001.
- Durkheim, E., *The Rules of Sociological Method*. Free Press, New York, 1938.
- Foucault, M., *The Order of Things*. Routledge, London, 2001.
- _____. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Routledge, London, 2002
- Gallie, W.B., 'Essentially Contested Concepts'. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 56, 1956, pp.167-198.
- Geras, N., and R. Wokler (eds), *The Enlightenment and Modernity*. MacMillan, London, 2000.
- Giddens, A., *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995.
- Giddens, A., (ed), *The Progressive Manifesto: New Ideas For the Centre Left*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003.
- Goldstein, P., *Post-Marxist Theory: An Introduction*. SUNY, New York, 2000.
- Graham, L., *Science, Philosophy, and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1987.

Hackett, E. and S. Haslianger, *Theorising Feminisms: A Reader*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Hall, S., and M. Jacques (eds), *New Times: The Changing face of Politics in the 1990's*. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1989.

Held, D., *Models of Democracy*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987.

Hirst, P., *Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994.

Hobsbawm, E., *The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848*, new ed. Abacus, London, 1988.

_____. *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, new ed, Abacus, London, 1989.

_____. *Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day*, 2nd rev. ed. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1999.

Horkheimer, M. and T. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.

Inglehart, R., 'The Silent Revolution in Post-Industrial Societies'. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 65, 1971, pp. 991-1017.

Israel, J., *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.

_____. *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity and the Emancipation of Man 1670-1752*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Kamenka, E., and F.R., Smith (eds), *Intellectuals and Revolution: Socialism and the Experience of 1848*. Edward Arnold, London, 1979.

Kramnick, I., (ed), *The Enlightenment Reader*. Harmondsworth, Penguin 1995.

Kolakowski, L., *Modernity on Endless Trial*, University of Chicago Press, London, 1990.

_____. *Metaphysical Horror*. Harmondsworth, Penguin 2001.

-
- Kompridis, N., (ed), *Philosophical Romanticism*. Routledge, London, 2006.
- Kuhn, T.S., *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd rev ed. Chicago University Press, London, 1996.
- Laclau, E., and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Social Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. Verso, London, 1985.
- Lakatos, I., and A. Musgrave, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965*, vol. 4. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970.
- Lyotard, J.F., *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, G. Bennington and B. Massumi (trans). Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984.
- _____. *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*. University of Minnesota Press, Duluth, 1989.
- Marx, K., *The Revolutions of 1848*, D. Fernbach (ed). Harmondsworth, Penguin 1973
- _____. *Capital: Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1. Harmondsworth, Penguin Classics, 2004.
- _____. *Capital: Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 2. Harmondsworth, Penguin Classics, 2006.
- _____. *Capital: Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 3. Harmondsworth, Penguin Classics, 2006.
- Marx, K and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*. Prometheus Books, New York, 1998.
- _____. *The Communist Manifesto: Complete with Seven Rarely Published Prefaces*. Filiquarian Publishing, New York, 2005.
- McLennan, G., 'Post-Marxism and the 'Four Sins' of Modernist Theorizing'. *New Left Review*, vol. 213, 1996, pp. 53-74.
- Mertes, T., (ed), *A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Possible?* Verso, London, 2004.

Mulgan, G., (ed), *Life After Politics: New Thinking for the 21st Century*. Fontana, London, 1997.

Ogg, D., *Europe of the Ancien Regime*. Fontana, London, 1965.

Peters, M., M. Olssen, and C. Lankshear (eds), *Futures of Critical Theory*. Rowman and Littlefield, London, 2003.

Porter, R., *Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World*. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2000.

Rancière, J., *On The Shores of Politics*, Verso, London, 1995.

Saint-Simon, C.H., *Selected Writings on Science, Industry and Social Organisation*. Croon Helm, London, 1975.

Sim, S., (ed), *Post-Marxism: A Reader*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1998.

Sim, S., *Post-Marxism: An Intellectual History*. Routledge, London, 2000.

Smith, A., *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, abridged ed. Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1993.

Tarrow, S., *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.

Trend, D., (ed), *Radical Democracy: Identity, Citizenship and the State*. Routledge, London, 1996.

Vertovic, S. and R. Cohen, (eds), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002.

Weber, M., *Economy and Society*, new ed. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992.

Wilks, S., (ed), *Talking About Tomorrow: A New Radical Politics*. Pluto, London, 1993.

Wu, D., (ed), *Romanticism: An Anthology*, 2nd ed. Blackwell, Oxford, 1998.

Paul Reynolds is Reader in Sociology and Social Philosophy at Edge Hill University. He is Centre Director of CREED, the Centre for research Ethics and Ethical Deliberation, and Chair of the University Ethics Committee. He holds positions on a number of editorial boards, including *Historical Materialism: Research in critical Marxist Theory*, and the *International Journal of Graduate Education*. He is also 'Transformations' Hub Leader with *Inter-disciplinary.net*. Overseeing global networks in the study of ethics, sexuality and intellectuals.