

Andrew Robinson

The great high-energy write-off



Deeper and down
The tunnel excavated in Texas for the Superconducting Super Collider remains empty.

Tunnel Visions: the Rise and Fall of the Superconducting Super Collider

Michael Riordan,
Lillian Hoddeson and
Adrienne W Kolb
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480pp

The US Congress wrote off \$2bn and 10 000 person-years of effort in 1993 when it cancelled the giant, high-energy particle accelerator project known as the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC), approved in 1987. The repercussions of this decision have been severe and long-lasting. Five years later, when I interviewed one of the abandoned project's keenest advocates, particle physicist and Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg, he was still mourning its loss. "In a way, the vote that cancelled it was democracy in action," Weinberg told me. "The public has always been interested in things that are directly important to them – medical cures, national defence – and they have a certain general interest in cosmology. Our big failure was that we did not succeed in making the public feel excited about learning the laws of nature." This was true despite Weinberg's own general-interest book, *Dreams of a Final Theory*, which was conceived as an inspiring argument for the SSC and published in 1992. "They felt excited about putting a man on the Moon," he reflected ruefully.

But it was not only the public and its political representatives in Washington DC who failed to support the completion of the SSC. Many US physicists, too, had reservations about the importance of its scientific agenda, its military-industrial organization and, especially, its enormous and ever-growing price tag. The last of these had the inevitable knock-on effect of reducing the funding for other fields of science. In 1989 Weinberg's fellow physics Nobel laureate, Philip W Anderson, testified against the SSC before a Senate committee as follows: "Scientists like myself in the fields of condensed-matter physics...are caught between the Scylla of the glamorous big-science projects like the SSC, the genome and the Space Station, and the Charybdis of programmed research with 'deliverables' aimed at some misunderstood view of 'competitiveness' or at some unrealistically short-term goal." This emboldened other condensed-matter physicists, including two Nobel laureates (Nicolaas Bloembergen and J Robert Schrieffer), to speak out against the SSC. Indeed, in 1990 feelings were running so

high that condensed-matter physicists threatened, as a community, to leave the American Physical Society because of its unequivocal support for the project.

The Anderson quote comes from the brilliantly titled *Tunnel Visions*, an anatomy of the SSC's failure that its authors describe as "three decades in the making". Michael Riordan, Lillian Hoddeson and Adrienne Kolb are experienced US historians of science; the latter two recently collaborated on a history of Fermilab, the flagship US particle-physics laboratory (see August 2009 p36). Their book is based partly on oral interviews with more than 100 participants in the SSC project, including politicians, political advisers, physicists and science journalists (but not including former presidents George H W Bush and Bill Clinton, or, surprisingly, Anderson). Other facts are drawn from published statements dating from the 1970s to the present, or from the many archives of unpublished evidence. It is not the first history of the SSC, but it is likely to be the last word on the subject. Although too lengthy and detailed for a general reader, and sometimes needlessly repetitious, *Tunnel Visions* will unquestionably be vital reading for anyone interested in the complications of funding "big science", especially projects requiring international contributions.

The authors identify five chief factors directly responsible for the SSC's cancellation, if we leave aside the project's underlying failure to inspire the public. The first was beyond the control of the SSC's supporters. After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the incoming Clinton administration shifted the government's decades-long support for physics (and its possible military spin-offs) towards other kinds of science, such as genetics and climate science. The second factor was the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, which approved the SSC as an essentially national project, unlike its lower-energy European equivalent at CERN. This, combined with the subsequent failure of the first Bush administration to attract a substantial contribution to the project from any foreign government

(despite Bush's public commitment to do so and his wooing of the Japanese) meant that few non-Americans had much invested in its completion. The third factor was the choice of an unprepared site in Texas, far from any centres of high-energy physics, rather than a site in Illinois, where the project could have benefited from Fermilab's long experience. The fourth was the poor management of the construction phase, in which there was no single project manager. Instead, a dysfunctional clash between academic physicists inexperienced in project management and engineers habituated to a military-industrial ethos produced chaos on site.

Finally, and probably most fatally, there was the escalating cost. The finished project was projected to cost \$4.4bn in 1987, but by 1993 the revised estimate was running at over \$10bn and heading, some feared, for \$15bn – all this at a time of government cutbacks in science funding. Because of its cost, the authors report, “the SSC had crossed an invisible line beyond which outsourcing its management contract was politically impossible”. Its con-

Why did the Large Hadron Collider at CERN succeed, where the SSC failed?

struction had become “more like building an aircraft carrier than a high-energy physics laboratory”.

Why did the later Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN succeed, where the SSC failed? Parts of *Tunnel Visions*, especially its epilogue (“The Higgs boson discovery”), address this important question in considerable and revealing detail. In the first place, the management of CERN was not subjected to direct political interference by the European Union or national governments. Second, the LHC benefited from the contributions of more than 20 nations

worldwide. Third, it was built in the same tunnel as the previous Large Electron–Positron Collider, so lessons could be learnt from the latter's construction and operation. Fourth, it was project-managed from 1993 until its completion in 2008 by a single physicist, Lyn Evans (the son of a Welsh coal miner), who was assisted by the burgeoning World Wide Web platform invented at CERN. Finally, although the LHC certainly suffered from cost overruns – and eventually cost more than \$10bn – its physicists and engineers enjoyed the strong support of CERN's management.

As *Tunnel Visions* is driven to conclude: “pure-science projects at the multibillion-dollar scale should henceforth be attempted only as international enterprises involving interested nations from the outset as essentially equal partners” – as with the LHC. “Nations that attempt to go it alone on such immense projects are probably doomed to failure like the Superconducting Super Collider.”

Andrew Robinson is the author of *The Story of Measurement and Einstein: a Hundred Years of Relativity* (2015 Princeton University Press)

ADVENT RESEARCH MATERIALS

Periodic Table of the Elements

Standard Catalogue Items

Element Name, Symbol, Atomic weight, Density, M.p./B.pt.(°C), Melting point (Solids & Liquids), Boiling point (Gases)

1 Hydrogen 1 H 1.0079 0.090 252.87																	18 Helium 2 He 4.0026 0.177 256.93						
3 Lithium 3 Li 6.941 0.98 63.4	4 Beryllium 4 Be 9.0122 1.85 1287															13 Boron 5 B 10.811 2.46 2076	14 Carbon 6 C 12.011 2.27 3500	15 Nitrogen 7 N 14.007 1.251 -195.79	16 Oxygen 8 O 15.999 1.429 -182.95	17 Fluorine 9 F 18.998 1.696 -188.12	10 Neon 10 Ne 20.180 0.900 -246.08		
11 Sodium 11 Na 22.990 0.97 97.7	12 Magnesium 12 Mg 24.305 1.74 650															13 Aluminium 13 Al 26.982 2.70 660.3	14 Silicon 14 Si 28.086 2.33 1414	15 Phosphorus 15 P 30.974 1.82 44.2	16 Sulphur 16 S 32.065 1.96 115.2	17 Chlorine 17 Cl 35.453 3.214 -34.04	18 Argon 18 Ar 39.948 1.784 -185.85		
19 Potassium 19 K 39.098 0.86 63.4	20 Calcium 20 Ca 40.078 1.55 842															29 Copper 29 Cu 63.546 8.96 1083.6	30 Zinc 30 Zn 65.39 7.14 419.5	31 Gallium 31 Ga 69.723 5.90 29.8	32 Germanium 32 Ge 72.64 5.32 938.3	33 Arsenic 33 As 74.922 5.73 816.9	34 Selenium 34 Se 78.96 4.82 221	35 Bromine 35 Br 79.904 3.12 -7.3	36 Krypton 36 Kr 83.80 3.733 -153.22
37 Rubidium 37 Rb 85.468 1.53 39.2	38 Strontium 38 Sr 87.62 2.83 777															47 Silver 47 Ag 107.87 10.49 961.8	48 Cadmium 48 Cd 112.41 8.65 321.1	49 Indium 49 In 114.82 7.31 231.9	50 Tin 50 Sn 118.71 7.31 231.9	51 Antimony 51 Sb 121.76 6.70 630.6	52 Tellurium 52 Te 127.60 6.24 449.5	53 Iodine 53 I 126.90 4.94 113.7	54 Xenon 54 Xe 131.29 5.887 -108.05
55 Caesium 55 Cs 132.91 1.88 28.4	56 Barium 56 Ba 137.33 3.51 727	57-70 Lanthanoids	71 Lutetium 71 Lu 174.97 9.84 1652	72 Hafnium 72 Hf 178.49 13.31 2233	73 Tantalum 73 Ta 180.95 16.65 3017	74 Tungsten 74 W 183.84 19.25 3422	75 Rhenium 75 Re 186.21 21.02 3196	76 Osmium 76 Os 190.23 22.61 3033	77 Iridium 77 Ir 188.22 22.65 2466	78 Platinum 78 Pt 195.08 21.09 1768.3	79 Gold 79 Au 196.97 19.30 1063.2	80 Mercury 80 Hg 200.59 13.55 -38.83	81 Thallium 81 Tl 204.38 11.85 304	82 Lead 82 Pb 207.2 11.34 327.5	83 Bismuth 83 Bi 208.98 9.78 271.9	84 Polonium 84 Po [209]	85 Astatine 85 At [210]	86 Radon 86 Rn [222]					
87 Francium 87 Fr [223]	88 Radium 88 Ra [226]	89-102 Actinoids	103 Lawrencium 103 Lr [262]	104 Rutherfordium 104 Rf [265]	105 Dubnium 105 Db [268]	106 Seaborgium 106 Sg [271]	107 Bohrium 107 Bh [272]	108 Hassium 108 Hs [270]	109 Meitnerium 109 Mt [276]	110 Darmstadtium 110 Ds [281]	111 Roentgenium 111 Rg [284]	112 Copernicium 112 Cn [285]	113 Ununtrium 113 Uut [286]	114 Flerovium 114 Fl [289]	115 Ununpentium 115 Uup [288]	116 Livermorium 116 Lv [293]	117 Ununseptium 117 Uus [294]	118 Ununoctium 118 Uuo [294]					
57 Lanthanum 57 La 138.91 6.146 920	58 Cerium 58 Ce 140.12 6.689 935	59 Praseodymium 59 Pr 140.91 6.64 935	60 Neodymium 60 Nd 144.24 6.90 1024	61 Promethium 61 Pm [145]	62 Samarium 62 Sm 150.36 7.353 1072	63 Europium 63 Eu 151.96 5.244 826	64 Gadolinium 64 Gd 157.25 7.901 1312	65 Terbium 65 Tb 158.93 8.219 1366	66 Dysprosium 66 Dy 162.50 8.551 1407	67 Holmium 67 Ho 164.93 8.793 1461	68 Erbium 68 Er 167.26 9.066 1529	69 Thulium 69 Tm 168.93 9.321 1545	70 Ytterbium 70 Yb 173.04 6.57 824										
89 Actinium 89 Ac [227]	90 Thorium 90 Th 232.04 11.72 1750	91 Protactinium 91 Pa 231.04 15.37 1568	92 Uranium 92 U 238.03 19.05 1132	93 Neptunium 93 Np [237]	94 Plutonium 94 Pu [244]	95 Americium 95 Am [243]	96 Curium 96 Cm [247]	97 Berkelium 97 Bk [247]	98 Californium 98 Cf [251]	99 Einsteinium 99 Es [252]	100 Fermium 100 Fm [257]	101 Mendelevium 101 Md [258]	102 Nobelium 102 No [259]										

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