

TSSE's danger disclosures to me - RE: hold on new CT machines procurement

MacLean, Robert

Fri 2/1/2019 3:33 PM

To: Pecoske, David <David.Pecoske@tsa.dhs.gov>; Cogswell, Patricia <Patricia.Cogswell@tsa.dhs.gov>; McNeill, Ha <Ha.McNeill@tsa.dhs.gov>; Byrne, Eileen <Eileen.Byrne@tsa.dhs.gov>; Maxwell, Kathryn <Kathryn.Maxwell@tsa.dhs.gov>; Powers, Krista <Krista.Powers@tsa.dhs.gov>; Connolly, Liam <Liam.Connolly@tsa.dhs.gov>; Gorham, Ashley L <Ashley.Gorham@tsa.dhs.gov>; Christy, Amy <Amy.Christy@tsa.dhs.gov>; Propis, Ryan <Ryan.Propis@tsa.dhs.gov>;

Cc: Miller, John <john.s.miller@tsa.dhs.gov>;

Bcc: [Redacted]

Importance: High

Happy Friday TSA Senior Leadership Team!

I hope that you're staying warm and safe on those icy roads! We're grateful that I chose to exhaust my earned leave today in order to feel better and avoid my usual purposeless 50-mile drive in an agency vehicle.

I have the duty to make the following disturbing disclosures to you as soon as possible:

I recently was contacted by an agency *Transportation Security Specialist for Explosives* (TSSE). He is aware of my proposal to you to place an **indefinite hold** on the procurement of new computed tomography (CT) machines until after all commercial aircraft have Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSB) emplaced.

The TSSE responded with information regarding a substantial danger to public safety and security. He has decades of high-level military and civilian law enforcement Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) experience. He has been with the agency for over a decade.

The TSSE's most disturbing disclosure to me: If TSA senior managers were to allow him to build the **least detectable as possible** improvised explosives devices (IED)—with either faux or actual explosive material—that detection machines and/or their Transportation Security Officers (TSO) screening machine-operators would fail to detect his device-creations “100%” of the time. He stated that TSA senior managers direct TSSEs to embed **unnecessary metallic material** inside faux IEDs so that TSOs can more easily find them. The goal of the needless metallic material directive is in order to build TSO's confidence, and also to avoid them going to Congress about the inevitable failure to detect common to well made IEDs.

With regards to my assertion that the TSO computed tomography (CT) machine operators will almost always fail to detect terrorist organizations' average to best IEDs, the TSSE told me that was "very true" given the inherent monotony of the TSO-operator's job and the creativity of terrorist organizations' IED-makers.

The TSSE constantly asserted to me that he has absolutely **no confidence** in his senior managers and would only trust officials who I recommend he make the aforementioned disclosures to. He stated that there is no accountability for retaliation and senior managers do not care about improving IED-detection—only useless screening statistics and passenger wait-times. He often cited that the agency's IED-detection program is mostly "security theater".

Again, I'm bringing this most serious matter directly to you given the public safety and security implications and my senior managers' practice of withholding vital information from you. Case in point: their withholding— from former TSA Administrator/Admiral Peter Neffenger—of Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge Jeffrey Buzzi's May 26, 2016 complaint about the flagrant retaliation against me.

Respectfully submitted,

[Robert MacLean](#)

Federal Air Marshal

Cell: 949-344-5222

From: MacLean, Robert

Sent: Wednesday, January 9, 2019 12:36 PM

To: Pekoske, David; Cogswell, Patricia; McNeill, Ha; Byrne, Eileen (Eileen.Byrne@tsa.dhs.gov); Maxwell, Kathryn; Powers, Krista; Connolly, Liam; Ashley L Gorham (Ashley.Gorham@tsa.dhs.gov); Christy, Amy; Propis, Ryan

Cc: Miller, John

Subject: Right now buying CT machines would be gross wrongdoing

Good afternoon TSA Senior Leadership Team,

We respectfully request that you please hold all procurement of computed tomography (CT) machines until most—if not all—commercial passenger aircraft ("aircraft") have had Installed Physical Secondary Barrier (IPSB) systems emplaced. Purchasing CT machines now would be gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.

Last week, the very popular CBS network television series "SEAL Team" —in its second season—exposed this imminent danger to aircraft:

<https://youtu.be/keKf2un03wI>

IPSBs are **100% effective** against this weaponless low-tech/lone-wolf threat that can be easily carried out by one suicidal passenger. The Trump administration's national security priority is exactly the same: to install a **physical barrier** on the U.S./Mexico border—expensive technologies are secondary.

Unfortunately, we spend a lopsided amount of resources on treating all passengers as suicidal threats while we make little effort to focus on airport workers who have the advantage of being homicidal threats and can destroy aircraft with almost impunity:

<https://www.govexec.com/management/2019/01/tsa-whistleblower-disclosures-prompt-two-aviation-security-probes/153881/>

CT machines can detect firearms with ease—as they are heavy metal objects—CT machines **and their operators** finding a hidden IED inside carry-on or check baggage is akin to trying to find a needle in a haystack. IEDs come

in all shapes or sizes and may be not be metallic

For 16 years, we've known that it's now next to impossible to hijack or destroy aircraft with firearms due to the fact all pilots are aware of 9/11 (i.e., duress of deadly hijack) and all flight deck ("cockpit") doors ("door") have been high velocity fragment and galley cart impact proof since April 4, 2003

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bulletproof-cockpit-doors-a-reality/>

Federal Air Marshal (FAM) instructors further proved the doors are impenetrable during the December 14, 2014 Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland study.

Terrorist organizations know that it is much more feasible to smuggle an improvised explosive device (IED) with the assistance of an airport worker—who can escape the country before anyone misses him; or fool an airport worker into unwittingly planting an IED:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/undercover-sting-snags-would-be-airline-drug-smugglers-at-dallas-fort-worth/2015/07/15/4d016a0e-2b04-11e5-bd33-395c05608059_story.html

The purchase of CT machines reminds us of this prior purchase:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/31/AR2009123102821.html>

Those CT machines funds would be better used for—

- 1) Pre-Check expansion,
- 2) biometric identifications systems expansion,
- 3) Redirecting agency law enforcement Criminal Investigators and FAMs to routinely conduct 2015 Dallas Fort Worth International Airport-type “undercover stings”.

As the Radio Technical Commission on Aeronautics RTCA DO-329 study proved: It's unreasonable to expect FAMs to safely fire at and stop a suicidal passenger already inside a cockpit that was unlocked so that a pilot could **routinely** switch the flight attendant, sleep, eat, or use the lavatory—the primary Aviation & Transportation Security Act mission of a FAM.

The 9/11 Commission Report provides substantial evidence that the 9/11 hijackers simply waited for the pilots to routinely unlock the cockpit within 30 minutes after takeoff and “jammed” their way in. This is shown on pages 5, 158, 236, 245, and 275.

From page 158:

“While in Karachi [Pakistan], [9/11 principal architect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM)] also discussed how to case flights in Southeast Asia. KSM told them to watch the [cockpit] doors at takeoff and landing, to observe whether the captain went to the lavatory during the flight, and to note whether the flight attendants brought food into the cockpit.”

Again the same plot four months after the U.S. Department of Transportation publicly announced on April 4, 2003 [<https://cbsn.ws/2x23icG>] that all cockpits were now galley cart and bullet resistant—wait for doors to routinely unlock and open:

“[suicidal hijackers] would attempt to seize control of a commercial aircraft either shortly after takeoff or shortly before landing”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/07/30/memo-warns-of-new-plots-to-hijack-jets/ab4a69d8-3d55-490f-ba48-16e084574b1e/?utm_term=.5712be23e51e

- 4) and redirecting a significant amount of non-law enforcement agency employees to be liaisons with the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in order to stop threats before they become airborne:

“On December 5, 1972, [retired four-star Air Force General] Transportation Assistant Secretary Benjamin Davis announced a change in emphasis for the [pre-9/11 Federal Air Marshal Service] program. According to Davis, ‘. . . the best place to prevent a hijacking is on the ground before the plane goes into the air.’”

<https://www.cbp.gov/about/history/history-leads-to-the-present/remembering-two-911s>

After issuance of the 9/11 Commission Report, the ODNI was solely established in order to stop another 9/11.

I speak on behalf of numerous dedicated and brave agency workers who are concerned about retaliation for reporting wrongdoing.

Again, I’m contacting you directly given the fact that the Washington Field Office senior leadership fails to provide you with evidence of employee retaliation. Specifically, it withheld former TSA Administrator/Admiral Peter Neffenger Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge Jeffrey Buzzi’s May 26, 2016 complaint about the flagrant retaliation against me.

Not on our watch.

Respectfully submitted,

[Robert MacLean](#)

Federal Air Marshal
Washington Field Office
Cell: 949-344-5222

From: MacLean, Robert

Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2018 1:41 PM

To: Pekoske, David; Cogswell, Patricia; McNeill, Ha; Maxwell, Kathryn; Powers, Krista; Connolly, Liam; Christy, Amy; Ashley L Gorham (Ashley.Gorham@tsa.dhs.gov); Bond, Robert; Robert Vogt (Robert.Vogt@tsa.dhs.gov); Ambrose, Edward; Ronan, Edward

Cc: Sarandrea, Eric; Norman Robinson (Norman.Robinson@tsa.dhs.gov); McShaffrey, Richard; Dwain Troutt (Dwain.G.Troutt@tsa.dhs.gov); Clyde Porter (Clyde.Porter@tsa.dhs.gov); Lowell Dimoff (Lowell.Dimoff@tsa.dhs.gov); Edward Bradford (Edward.Bradford2@tsa.dhs.gov); Krystal Brown (Krystal.Brown@tsa.dhs.gov); Jimenez, Jose; John Muth (john.muth@tsa.dhs.gov); Miller, John; Schumacher, Todd; Lopez, Jeramey; Perez, Joseph; Larbi, Nouri; Bill.Petrak@faa.gov; 7-AEA-RIC-FSDO@faa.gov; Seth.Kaufman@oig.dot.gov; Scott, Edward; RussellW@gao.gov; Duffy, William; Snow, Daniel; Stone, Charles; Darci Bobo (Darci.Bobo@tsa.dhs.gov); Mulligan, Scott; John Busch (john.busch@tsa.dhs.gov); Piekarsky, Kellie; Yeager, Robert

Subject: Documents request for 1/18/2018 5 USC § 1213 order - RE: Danger to flight deck and pilots

Good afternoon to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Senior Leadership Team,

This request for documents is being addressed directly to you given the fact that this practice routinely violates Section 104 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001—

https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/aviation_and_transportation_security_act_atlsa_public_law_107_1771.pdf

—and **endangers** commercial passenger aircraft (“aircraft”) hundreds of thousands of times a day.

Below is the January 7, 2016 to March 2, 2016 correspondence that led to the pending 5 U.S.C. § 1213-order that the agency shall issue a report of investigation no later than September 17, 2018. Since the 5 U.S.C. § 1213 order was issued on January 18, 2018, the agency requested three 60-day extensions—the third being the final **due this coming Monday**.

I intend to invoke the privilege under 5 USC § 1213(e)(1) to submit my reply-comments to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (Special Counsel), which in turn the Special Counsel will submit to Congress and the White House:

“Any report required under subsection (c) or paragraph (5) of this subsection shall be submitted to the Special Counsel, and the Special Counsel shall transmit a copy to the complainant, except as provided under subsection (f) of this section. The complainant may submit comments to the Special Counsel on the agency report within 15 days of having received a copy of the report.”

[. . .]

The Special Counsel shall transmit any report submitted to the Special Counsel by the head of an agency under subsection (c) or paragraph (5) of this subsection, any comments provided by the complainant pursuant to subsection (e)(1), and any appropriate comments or recommendations by the Special Counsel to the President and the congressional committees with jurisdiction over the agency which the disclosure involves.”

Would you please consider providing me the following documents in order that the most factual reply gets submitted?

1. **All unredacted documents with regards to the U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground flight deck door study conducted on or about December 14, 2014**

All study reports, memorandums, emails, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “Skype® for Business” messages, and DHS cellular phone text message with regards to the aircraft flight deck door (“door”) testing study at the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland on or about December 14, 2014 (“2014 Aberdeen study”).

A list of all DHS employees who participated in the 2014 Aberdeen study. A list was provided of the DHS employees involved in the September 28, 2011 Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics study titled, *“Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures”* (RTCA DO-329).

The door or doors tested, were the typed reinforced prior to the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) / Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) deadline of April 9, 2004—three months and 17 days prior to the issuance of the July 26, 2003 *DHS “Advisory Title: Potential Al-Qaeda Hijacking Plot in the U.S. and Abroad”* (2003 DHS Advisory). For six years, the 2003 DHS Advisory was fully redacted in responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.

On January 15, 2002, the FAA publicly announced [<https://go.usa.gov/xPrmb>] its mandate that all doors be retrofitted and reinforced by April 9, 2003 in order—

“to resist intrusion by a person who attempts to enter using physical force [and] to minimize penetration of shrapnel from small arms fire or a fragmentation device”

On April 4, 2004, the FAA also publicly announced [<https://cbsn.ws/2x23icG>] that all doors had been retrofitted and reinforced—three months and 22 days prior to the issuance of the 2003 DHS Advisory. A noteworthy excerpt from the 2003 DHS Advisory states that suicidal terrorists intended to breach the flight decks—

“either shortly after takeoff or shortly before landing[.]”

Given the FAA’s 2003 and 2004 public announcements, the 2003 DHS Advisory warned that hijackers were simply going to wait for the pilots to unlock doors to use the lavatory (“door-transition”) after the aircraft was stabilized in autopilot mode.

In our April 17, 2018 meeting, DHS/TSA Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (TSA-FAMS) Headquarters (HQ) Regional Director One Dwain Troutt told me and Program Assistant William Duffy (Cc:ed) that he was a *subject matter expert* on the attacks of September 11, 2001. Regional Director Troutt stated to Program Assistant Duffy and me that at least one or more of hijackers breached the flight deck after an unbeknownst pilot unlocked and opened a door in order to use the lavatory shortly after takeoff.

One goal of the study was to determine what amount of physical force—from individuals and/or a standard galley cart—could defeat a locked post-April 4, 2003 reinforced door. A flight deck is also known as a “cockpit.”

10 months after the 2003 DHS Advisory, an application for a flight deck steel 12-cable “Secondary Barrier” Patent Application (No. 10/849333) was filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on May 18, 2004 [<https://go.usa.gov/xUAaf>] “12-cable-IPSB”. 12-cable-IPSBs were deployed on aircraft soon after the 2003 DHS Advisory.

There should be little to no doubt that 12-cable-IPSBs were deployed as a result of the 2003 DHS Advisory:

As a result of the Sensitive Security Information-marked 2003 DHS Advisory’s disclosure, there was significant media, and public commentary and inquiry by members of Congress. Even a question was posed to President George W. Bush during a July 30, 2003 White House Rose Garden press conference prompting the President to provide a very long and concerning response [<https://go.usa.gov/xPrwn>].

All FAMs had to drive over to their field offices for then-unprecedented emergency briefings and training as a result of the 2003 DHS Advisory.

The 12-cable-IPSBs have mostly been removed and not replaced with another other type of IPSB due them being cost-ineffective and dangerous.

Cost-ineffective—

due to them being damaged from passengers and their roller-bags as the 12-cable-IPSBs need to be installed at the most-travelled choke-point of the aircraft. In order to repair the 12-cable-IPSBs, one or more maintenance teams need to repair or replace the 12-cable-IPSB and the portions of the cabin where it anchors to. This problem causes the aircraft to be out of service for a considerable amount of time if no other maintenance issues exist.

Dangerous—

given the fact that a broken 12-cable-IPSBs can block the exit for emergency egress. Worst of all, the exposure of 12-cable-IPSBs to the main cabin exposes it to sabotage from a carry-on items such as with scissors [<https://go.usa.gov/xPryd>] or with a non-flammable/non-toxic adhesive [<https://www.jbweld.com/products/j-b-extremeheat>].

Another determination-goal of the 2014 Aberdeen study may have involved the penetration of firearm ammunition or a fragmentation device—i.e., improvised explosive device—discharged into the door. Such actions could allow a breach of the flight deck before a Federal Air Marshal (FAM) team, crew members, or passenger could intervene and stop attackers from destroying the aircraft.

2. **An unredacted copy of the RTCA DO-329 listing a FAM and several TSA-FAMS supervisors and managers on the RTCA DO-329's Special Committee 221 (No. SC-221)**



Door-transitions occur when pilots need to use the lavatory, obtain sustenance, or sleep.

3. **An unredacted copy of the USDOT Office of Inspector General (USDOT/OIG Audit Report (No. AV2017063) titled, “FAA Has Taken Steps to Identify Flight Deck Vulnerabilities but Needs to Enhance Its Mitigation Efforts”**

The 2017 USDOT/OIG Audit Report—

“concluded that some improvised secondary barriers, such as a flight attendant with a galley cart, were ineffective ‘as tested [by the RTCA DO-329’s SC-221],’ and additional enhancements were required to raise the effectiveness of certain barrier methods to an acceptable level.” (*emphasis added*)

It’s noteworthy that the RTCA DO-329’s air crew and TSA-FAMS role-players were specifically tasked and prepared for simulated rush-attacks during door-transitions. In an actual attack, such preparedness is not optimum due to factors such as a FAM team distracted during a “Quiet Skies’ — Special Mission Coverage” (Quiet Skies) flight.

Also notable is the fact that RTCA DO-329’s attacking role-players were going at a reduced speed and strength to avoid serious injury to themselves or others. In contrast, suicidal terrorists would attack at full speed and strength with potentially the aid of an easily available narcotic such as Phencyclidine.

The 2017 USDOT/OIG Audit Report cited that the—

“FAA has not effectively communicated the guidance to air carriers and inspectors. Despite the important recommendations from the RTCA report, only 5 of 63 air carrier representatives and none of the 34 FAA inspectors we interviewed were aware of either the RTCA study or FAA’s guidance. According to FAA, this is because none of the airlines we interviewed had requested new blocking procedures, and inspectors were under the impression the guidance only applied to new procedures. As a result, critical information contained in the study was ineffectively communicated to the field to address safety risks as called for in FAA’s Safety Management System.” (*emphasis added*)

The USDOT/OIG’s sensitive treatment of its 2017 Audit Report is irrefragable evidence of how dangerous door-transitions are without IPSBs:

The 2017 USDOT/OIG Audit Report is unpublished and a heavily-redacted version is only available upon FOIA requests. Only redacted FOIA response copies of the 2017 USDOT/OIG Audit Report are provided to **FAMs who hold active non-interim Top Secret security clearances**.

One of the TSA-FAMS members on the RTCA DO-329’s SC-221, is Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge (SAC) Rose Tancredi. SAC Tancredi and Deputy Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge (DSAC) Donald Anderson recently traveled to several TSA-FAMS field offices to brief FAMs about Quiet Skies. Numerous current and former TSA-FAMS employees have informed me that SAC Tancredi, DSAC Anderson, and other TSA-FAMS senior leaders are to the effect inferring to numerous FAMs—that if they do not collectively make Quiet Skies successful, the TSA-FAMS agency may suffer a budget reduction and FAMs could be relocated as a result of *Involuntary Redirected Assignments* or be subjected to a *Reduction in Force*.

*****END OF DOCUMENTS REQUEST FOR 5 U.S.C. § 1213 ORDER REPLY*****

Given the fact that I am a FAM, the 5 U.S.C. § 1213-order’s complainant, and hold an active non-interim Top Secret security clearance—I have a “need to know” basis to view these documents for my reply-comments to be submitted to Congress and the White House.

I appreciate your time, effort, and consideration of this exceptionally substantial and specific danger to public health and safety.

Respectfully requested,

[Robert MacLean](#)

Federal Air Marshal
Washington Field Office
Field Office Focus Group Representative
949-344-5222

From: MacLean, Robert

Sent: Monday, April 30, 2018 12:45 PM

To: Perez, Joseph <Joseph.Perez1@tsa.dhs.gov>

Cc: Miller, John <john.s.miller@tsa.dhs.gov>; Sarandrea, Eric <Eric.Sarandrea@tsa.dhs.gov>;
McShaffrey, Richard <Scott.McShaffrey@tsa.dhs.gov>

Subject: Study reports—relative to tactics—not disseminated to FAMs

PDF ATTACHED

SFAM Perez,

Recently during training, a current and a former trainer each made an assertion that conflicted with each others'.

When asked what the agency's position is on what flying FAMs' "primary tactical focus expectation" should be with regards to a suicidal attacker's "end-game" in a non-hidden-IED scenario, this is what the two responses were:

It was unanimous that if such elaborate cockpit-breach plans have been years in the planning, a lone-wolf attacker would simply wait for the pilots to notify the flight attendants that they're about to unlock the cockpit—then rush in after. The 2011 Radio Technical Commission on Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-329 study—with the participation of numerous FAMs—not only proved that the *flight attendants/galley-cart* and the *flight attendants/no galley-cart* methods "were ineffective." The RTCA also concluded that the prepared FAM DO-329 test-team was unable to stop a rush-attack on the cockpit, even when the attacker began to sprint dozens of feet from the cockpit—the exact distance was designated as SSI.

Last year, the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General (DOT-OIG) confirmed the DO-329's 2011 findings in its unpublished Audit Report (No. AV2017063), that was so sensitive, that it will not allow FAMs with Top Secret clearances to view its UN-redacted SSI version.

Attached is the heavily redacted version that DOT-OIG was willing to provide me in a FOIA request that I got back in a record amount of time.

Here are two citations from the 2017 DOT-OIG Audit Report:

“the [RTCA] report concluded that some improvised secondary barriers, such as a flight attendant with a galley cart, were ineffective ‘as tested,’ and additional enhancements were required to raise the effectiveness of certain barrier methods to an acceptable level.

[. . .]

“FAA has not effectively communicated the guidance to air carriers and inspectors. Despite the important recommendations from the RTCA report, only 5 of 63 air carrier representatives and none of the 34 FAA inspectors we interviewed were aware of either the RTCA study or FAA’s guidance”

FAMs are concerned that such critical information—relative to FAMs' primary tactics—is also being withheld from them.

In closing, if the 2011 RTCA, the 2014 Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and the 2017 DOT-OIG study reports—ALL never disseminated to the vast majority of training and rank-and-file FAMs—are accurate and factual, this significantly impacts what our primary tactical focus should be. Compounding the concern is the new SMC CONOPS plan that draws attention away from the cockpit and redirects our resources to one person who does not warrant being on the “No Fly List.” Such a change is substantive given the fact that aircraft size, routes, and locations have always been our strategic priorities per law, specifically 49 U.S.C. § 449179b):

“[Deploying FAMs on] nonstop, long distance flights, such as those targeted on September 11, 2001, should be a priority”

Several field offices had to be closed due to the agency deeming the threat to their flight routes and locations had been reduced.

I look forward to learning more during my next training classes.

Respectfully,

[Robert MacLean](#)
Federal Air Marshal
Washington Field Office
Cell: 949-344-5222

Cc:
Acting FAMS Director Eric Sarandrea
Assistant FAMS Director for Field Operations, Scott McShaffrey
SFAM John Miller (first-line)

Subject: RTCA report on secondary barriers
MacLean, Robert
Sent: Thursday, January 07, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Schumacher, Todd E.

Dear Supervisory Federal Air Marshal Schumacher,

I respectfully request you please provide me with an UNREDACTED copy of the September 28, 2011 Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA DO-329) "Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures" report?

I have been informed copies containing Sensitive Security Information results can be provided by the Federal Aviation Administration's Flight Standards Office (AFS-007).

The report has results of flight deck attack simulations while a pilot opens the flight deck door during inflight lavatory usage or crew changes.

The RTCA "Special Committee 221" for this report had officials from our Agency who may also be able to provide me with an unredacted report:

- Edward Bradford
- Krystal Brown
- Rose Tancredi
- Lowell Dimoff (Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge, TSA Training Center, Atlantic City, New Jersey)
- Jose Jimenez (Washington Field Office)

I have a need to know as flying Federal Air Marshal (FAM), as a FAM Team Leader on a January 10, 2015 flight mission to the Arabian Peninsula, and any other upcoming missions as a FAM Team Leader.

I greatly appreciate all of your time and effort.

Respectfully submitted,
Robert MacLean

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Robert MacLean
Federal Air Marshal
Staff No. 438
Transportation Security Administration
Washington Field Office
Personal cell/text: 949-344-5222
Government cell/text: 210-840-6001
Robert.J.MacLean@ole.tsa.dhs.gov

RE: Request for SSI-marked 9/28/2011 RTCA DO-329 report: "Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures"

Nouri.Larbi@faa.gov

Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 2016 7:30 AM

To: MacLean, Robert

Cc: Schumacher, Todd E.; Troutt, Dwain G.; McCann, Dan

Good morning Mr. MacLean,

I was out of the office since Friday and I was not able to reply sooner. I understand your regional office will be

Addressing your request. Again, I am sorry for not replying sooner.

Thank you

Nouri Larbi

Senior Liaison
Department of Homeland Security
TSA Office of Security Policy & Industry Engagement
202-351-9480/202-360-8861 (Mobile)
571-227-5492/202-267-4084 (Office)
Nouri.Larbi@tsa.dhs.gov
Nouri.Larbi@faa.gov

From: Robert.J.MacLean@ole.tsa.dhs.gov [<mailto:Robert.J.MacLean@ole.tsa.dhs.gov>]
Sent: Friday, February 12, 2016 7:21 AM
To: Nouri.Larbi@tsa.dhs.gov
Cc: Todd.E.Schumacher@ole.tsa.dhs.gov; Petrak, Bill (FAA)
Subject: Request for SSI-marked 9/28/2011 RTCA DO-329 report: "Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures"
Importance: High
Dear Mr. Larbi,

I was originally given the email address Nouri.Larbi@faa.gov to contact you, but I found this @tsa.dhs.gov account also.

I have a "need to know" as an active duty Federal Air Marshal who flies and/or supervises mission flights as a Team Leader to have a copy of the UNREDACTED Sensitive Security Information (SSI) designated September 28, 2011 Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA DO-329) "Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures" report.

Appendix B; B-2 of this report specifically states:

"FAA Flight Standard Division, AFS-007, will manage the SSI document. AFS-007 and TSA will determine if the requestor has met the need to know standards for SSI information related to the SC-221 Committee's work." (emphasis added)
Per Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations § 1520.15 (b), SSI is exempt from Freedom of Information Act requests:

"SSI disclosed by TSA or the Coast Guard.

(a) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this section, and notwithstanding the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a), and other laws, records containing SSI are not available for public inspection or copying, nor does TSA or the Coast Guard release such records to persons without a need to know." (emphasis added)

<http://1.usa.gov/1LbpcsB>

In conclusion, your office shall provide me an SSI version of this report through secured means. I would like to respectfully request an SSI version of this report. If your regional office does not have access to one, please direct me to the office that can. According to the

report, that would be the Flight Standards Office (AFS-007).

I have Cc'ed my direct supervisor, Supervisory Federal Air Marshal Todd Schumacher. I appreciate all of your valuable time, effort, and patience with me.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert MacLean

Cc:

Bill Petrak, FAA

Todd Schumacher, TSA Supervisory Federal Air Marshal

--

Robert MacLean

Federal Air Marshal

Staff No. 438

Transportation Security Administration

Washington Field Office

Personal cell/text: 949-344-5222

Government cell/text: 210-840-6001

Robert.J.MacLean@ole.tsa.dhs.gov

From: Bill.Petrak@faa.gov [Bill.Petrak@faa.gov]

Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 2016 2:36 PM

To: MacLean, Robert

Subject: FW: SSI-marked 9/28/2011 RTCA DO-329 report: "Aircraft Secondary Barriers and RE: Request for SSI-marked 9/28/2011 RTCA DO-329 report: ...

<https://mail.ole.tsa.dhs.gov/owa/DanaInfo=mail.ole.tsa.dhs.gov...>

2 of 6 4/3/16, 5:10 PM

Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures"

Hello Mr. MacLean,

I work in the FAA Headquarters in AFS-1000. We are the keepers of the SSI for DO 329. I received your request from one of our field offices requesting the SSI from DO 329. One of my primary functions in the office is to be the liaison between the Flight Standards organization and the TSA.

My

counterpart in TSA is Mr. Nouri Larbi. He is the TSA's liaison to the FAA and has an office in our agency. To help ensure efficiency and proper procedures, he filters information and requests from the

TSA to the FAA. Please route your request for this SSI through him so we can properly process your

request. He can be reached at Nouri.Larbi@faa.gov

Bill Petrak

Aviation Safety Inspector

Federal Aviation Administration

Aviation Special Activities and Security Division, AFS-1000

800 Independence Ave, SW

Washington, D.C., 20591

(202) 267-9531

-----Original Message-----

From: 7-AEA-RIC-FSDO (FAA)
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2016 12:33 PM
To: MacLean, Robert
Subject: RE: SSI-marked 9/28/2011 RTCA DO-329 report: "Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures"

Mr. MacLean,

Thank you for the clarification regarding the FOIA not providing an un-redacted version of the document you seek. I have found out that AFS-007 is no longer office to assist in making the determination as stated below. The FAA's Flight Standard Service now has AFS-1000, Aviation Special Activities and Security. I have forwarded your request to those folks and they will handle it in accordance with proper protocol.

Regards,

Jeff Slaughter
Manager
Richmond Flight Standards District Office (EA-21)
804-222-7494 tel
804-222-4843 fax

-----Original Message-----

From: MacLean, Robert [<mailto:Robert.J.Maclean@ole.tsa.dhs.gov>]
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2016 11:20 AM
To: 7-AEA-RIC-FSDO (FAA)
Cc: Schumacher, Todd E.
Subject: SSI-marked 9/28/2011 RTCA DO-329 report: "Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures"
Importance: High

Dear Mr. Slaughter,

I appreciate your instructions, but with all due respect, I already have a copy of the Sensitive Security Information-(SSI)-redacted September 28, 2011 Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA DO-329) "Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures" report. Appendix B; B-2 of this report specifically states:

"FAA Flight Standard Division, AFS-007, will manage the SSI document. AFS-007 and TSA will determine if the requestor has met the need to know standards for SSI information related to the SC-221 Committee's work." (*emphasis added*)

Per Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations § 1520.15 (b), SSI is exempt from Freedom of Information Act requests:

"SSI disclosed by TSA or the Coast Guard.

(a)In general. Except as otherwise provided in this section, and notwithstanding the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a), and other laws, records containing SSI are not available for public inspection or copying, nor does TSA or the Coast Guard release such records to persons without a need to know." (emphasis added) <http://1.usa.gov/1LbpcsB>
I have a "need to know" as an active duty Federal Air Marshal who flies and/or supervises mission flights as a Team Leader.

In conclusion, your office shall provide me an SSI version of this report through secured means. I would like to respectfully request an SSI version of this report. If your regional office does not have access to one, please direct me to the office that can. According to the report, that would be the Flight Standards Office (AFS-007).

I have Cc'ed my direct supervisor, Supervisory Federal Air Marshal Todd Schumacher.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert MacLean

--

Robert MacLean
Federal Air Marshal
Staff No. 438
Transportation Security Administration
Washington Field Office
Personal cell/text: 949-344-5222
Government cell/text: 210-840-6001
Robert.J.MacLean@ole.tsa.dhs.gov

From: 7-AEA-RIC-FSDO@faa.gov [7-AEA-RIC-FSDO@faa.gov]

Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 2016 2:40 PM

To: MacLean, Robert

Subject: RE: Message from www.faa.gov: Richmond FSDO Information

Mr. MacLean,

Please use the website link below to request the documents you seek. These would be items that may

be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

<https://www.faa.gov/foia/>

Thank you,

Jeff Slaughter

Manager

Richmond Flight Standards District Office

804-222-7494

-----Original Message-----

From: Robert.J.Maclean@ole.tsa.dhs.gov [<mailto:Robert.J.Maclean@ole.tsa.dhs.gov>]

Sent: Tuesday, February 02, 2016 8:03 PM

To: 7-AEA-RIC-FSDO (FAA)

Subject: Message from www.faa.gov: Richmond FSDO Information

This email was sent through the Federal Aviation Administration's public website. You have been contacted via an email link on the following page: http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/field_offices/fsdo/ric/contact/

Message:

To whom it may concern:

I respectfully request you please provide me with an UNREDACTED copy of the September 28, 2011

Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA DO-329) "Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures" report?

I have been informed copies containing Sensitive Security Information results can be provided by the Federal Aviation Administration's Flight Standards Office (AFS-007).

The report has results of flight deck attack simulations while a pilot opens the flight deck door during inflight lavatory usage or crew changes.

The RTCA "Special Committee 221" for this report had officials from my Agency.

I have a need to know as flying Federal Air Marshal (FAM), as a FAM Team Leader on a January 10, 2015 flight mission to the Arabian Peninsula, and any other upcoming missions as a FAM Team Leader.

I greatly appreciate all of your time and effort.

Respectfully submitted,
Robert J. MacLean
Federal Air Marshal
Staff No. 438
Transportation Security Administration
Washington Field Office
Personal cell/text: 949-344-5222
Government cell/text: 210-840-6001
Robert.J.MacLean@ole.tsa.dhs.gov

RE: Request for SSI-marked 9/28/2011 RTCA DO-329 report: ...
<https://mail.ole.tsa.dhs.gov/owa/DanaInfo=mail.ole.tsa.dhs.gov...>

6 of 6 4/3/16, 5:10 PM

FAM Reference Material Regarding Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures

Schumacher, Todd E.

Sent: Wednesday, March 02, 2016 11:47 AM

To: 18Squad11

The WFO has a copy of the DO 329 report "Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures" and the SSI information that was redacted from the original document. These documents are available in the office in hard copy only. They cannot be sent electronically and cannot be reproduced or taken out of the office. Please see me at your convenience to review the documents.

The FAA has also covered the report with an advisory circular http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-110.pdf (see attachment AC_120-110).

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,
Todd

Todd Schumacher
571-216-5264
Todd.Schumacher@dhs.gov

2/1/2019

Read: TSSE's danger disclosures to me - RE: hold on new C... - MacLean, Robert

Read: TSSE's danger disclosures to me - RE: hold on new CT machines procurement

Byrne, Eileen

Fri 2/1/2019 3:36 PM

To: MacLean, Robert <Robert.Maclean@tsa.dhs.gov>;

Importance: High

Your message

To: Byrne, Eileen

Subject: TSSE's danger disclosures to me - RE: hold on new CT machines procurement

Sent: Friday, February 1, 2019 3:33:18 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)

was read on Friday, February 1, 2019 3:36:14 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

Read: TSSE's danger disclosures to me - RE: hold on new CT machines procurement

Miller, John

Fri 2/1/2019 4:06 PM

To: MacLean, Robert <Robert.Maclean@tsa.dhs.gov>;

Importance: High

Your message

To: Miller, John

Subject: TSSE's danger disclosures to me - RE: hold on new CT machines procurement

Sent: Friday, February 1, 2019 3:33:18 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)

was read on Friday, February 1, 2019 4:06:14 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).