

Curriculum Vitæ – GIULIO TRIGILIA

PERSONAL DATA

LAST UPDATE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2017

CITIZENSHIP Italian
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EMPLOYMENT & AFFILIATIONS

2016 – ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF FINANCE, **Simon School, University of Rochester**
2017 – MEMBER, **Finance Theory Group (FTG)**
2017 – MEMBER, **European Finance Association (EFA)**

EDUCATION

2016 PhD in ECONOMICS, **University of Warwick** (Coventry)
Thesis: “Essays in Financial Economics”
2010 Master in ECONOMICS, **Collegio Carlo Alberto** (Turin)
2009 Master in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, **University of Bologna** (Bologna)
2006 Bachelor in POLITICAL SCIENCE, **University of Bologna** (Bologna)
2003 Maturità, **Liceo Classico Michelangiolo** (Firenze)

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Primary Financial and Information Economics, Contract theory, Game theory
Secondary History of Finance, Education (Applied Microeconomics)

WORKING PAPERS

- 2017 | Optimal Leverage and Strategic Disclosure
I consider a costly-state-verification model where investors also observe the realized return with some probability. I interpret a higher probability that the investors are informed as capturing either the transparency of a firm’s business, or the informational efficiency of the market it operates in. The model covers all degrees of informational asymmetries between two extremes: full opacity (Gale and Hellwig (1985)) and perfect information (Modigliani and Miller (1958)). For all intermediate degrees of asymmetric information, I find that the optimal capital structure can be implemented by a simple mixture of debt and equity and, consistently with the evidence, leverage should be negatively correlated with transparency. Among the extensions, I consider the role played by limited commitment and disclosure.
- 2017 | Optimal Security Design under Asymmetric Information and Profit Manipulation (joint with K. Koufopoulos and R. Kozhan) – submitted
We consider a model of external financing in which entrepreneurs are privately informed about the quality of their projects and seek funds from competitive financiers. The literature restricts attention to monotonic or manipulation-proof securities and finds that straight debt is the uniquely optimal contract. We characterize the optimal contract when entrepreneurs can misreport their earnings. (cont’d) We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for straight debt to be suboptimal, and we show that it is never uniquely optimal. Generically, the optimal contract is non-monotonic and involves profit manipulation in equilibrium. It can be implemented as debt with a strictly positive performance-based bonus. Importantly, our results suggest that ex ante asymmetric information does not suffice to theoretically justify the optimality of straight debt.
- 2017 | Credit Failures (joint with H. Polemarchakis and L. Zavalloni)
When financial markets are subject to adverse selection, competitive equilibria exist but are constrained suboptimal: Pareto improving government intervention (i) balance the budget and (ii) do not require information finer than the information available to market participants. With multiple commodities, the constrained optimality of competitive allocations obtained in recent literature for analogous situations fails. Successful interventions require savings taxes and investment subsidies.
- 2017 | Estimating Value-Added Models for Doctoral Teaching Assistants: Evidence from a Random Assignment Procedure (joint with R. d’Este and G. Gaete-Romeo)

Doctoral students employed as teaching assistants are a widely-employed and important resource in the post-secondary education sector. Yet, very little is known about their impact on students' academic success. This paper provides first 'value-added' estimates for doctoral teaching assistants (DTAs). We focus on a UK university, where the match between students and DTAs is random. A one standard deviation change in DTAs quality increases students' test scores by around 0.09 of a standard deviation. The analysis reveals larger "value-added" estimates for assessments taken during the course. Estimates significantly drop for end-of-term tests, and are not different from zero for final exams. The analysis suggests that two mechanisms might partly explain the decay in the estimates: the timing of the evaluation, and its importance in determining students' academic outcome. Considerations related to the measurement of teachers' quality via the 'value-added' approach are finally discussed.

HONORS AND AWARDS

- 2014 RES JUNIOR FELLOWSHIP, Royal Economic Society
- 2010 DEPARTMENTAL SCHOLARSHIP & TUITION WAIVER, University of Warwick (3 years)
- 2009 SCHOLARSHIP & TUITION WAIVER, Collegio Carlo Alberto
- 2006 PRESTITO AD HONOREM, University of Bologna and Unicredit Bank (3 years)

WORK IN PROGRESS

- 2017 | Sharing hidden losses (joint with N. Koreli)
- 2017 | Dynamic contracting with evidence (joint with S. Fu)
- 2017 | Share issuance, prices and information in Victorian Britain (joint with P. Wang)
- 2017 | Strategic transparency (joint with D. Orlov)
- 2017 | Endogenous Leverage Cycles

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Years	Subject	Avg. valuation
2016 – ...	Instructor: Investments (Undegraduate)	3.5/5
2011 – 2016	TA: Advanced Microeconomic Analysis (M.Res)	4.7/5
2013 – 2016	TA: Philosophy and Economics (Bachelor, 3d year)	4.4/5
2013 – 2016	TA: Economic Analysis: Micro (Msc)	4.2/5
2013 – 2014	TA: The Industrial Economy: Strategy (Bachelor, 2d year)	4.3/5
2010 – 2013	TA: Microeconomic Analysis (Bachelor, 1st year)	4.6/5

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

- 2017 | Leicester Business School (scheduled, November 30), Warwick Econ (scheduled, November 29), Oxford Nuffield College (scheduled, November 28), Cambridge – CERF (scheduled, September 15-17), Mannheim – EFA, LSE – FTG summer conference, Pompeu Fabra – 25th Finance Forum, Roma III – Colloquia in games and contracts under asymmetric information
- 2016 | Minnesota Carlson, Rochester Simon, Bologna Econ, Tilburg Finance, IESE Barcelona, Sussex Econ, Bath Econ, Bank of England – Stress Testing Strategy, Bank of England – Policy, Strategy and Implementation, European Central Bank – DG Research
- 2015 | Warwick – META, Oxford – IFABS, Warwick – Macro Summer Workshop
- 2014 | Warsaw – Hurwicz Memorial Workshop, Imperial College Business School, Surrey – FEBS, Warwick – Economics PhD Conference
- 2013 | Warwick Econ, Warwick Business School

REFEREE

JOURNAL OF BANKING AND FINANCE, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

OP-EDS: VOXEU.ORG; LAVOCE.INFO; SOLE24ORE

24.06.2016	Default Sovrani, chi Rischia di Più con Brexit?, with P. Manasse (in Italian)
19.03.2013	Professor Monti and the Bubble, with P. Manasse and L. Zavalloni
23.11.2011	Italy’s humpy shaped swap curve and Berlusconi timebomb politics, with P. Manasse
21.11.2011	Welcome to Eurotaly, with P. Manasse
19.07.2011	Little time for Italy, with P. Manasse
06.07.2011	The fear of contagion in Europe, with P. Manasse
26.11.2010	Will the Irish crisis spread to Italy?, with P. Manasse
27.09.2010	The financial costs of political instability: estimates from Italy, with P. Manasse
05.04.2010	Alla ricerca della credibilità perduta (in Italian)

OTHER PUBLICATIONS – NOT PEER-REVIEWED

2017 | [Brexit ed il rischio di default sovrano](#), with P. Manasse, Osservatorio Monetario 3/2016, Capitolo 5 (in Italian)

LANGUAGES

ENGLISH (Fluent), ITALIAN (Mothertongue), FRENCH (Basic)

OLDER RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Years	Employer	Objective
2013 – 2016	Prof. Ilan Kremer	Reviewing papers in economic theory and finance
2014 – 2016	CRETA (Warwick)	Managing webpage and organising weekly seminars
2013 – 2014	Dr. Mirko Draca	Micro data management and cleaning
2012 – 2013	Prof. Sascha O. Becker, Prof. Gregory Crawford	Data collection and developing web crawlers
2009 – 2010	Dr. Theodoros Diasakos	Proofreading a GE asset pricing model

REFERENCES

Prof. Ilan Kremer
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Prof. Motty Perry
University of Warwick
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Prof. Herakles Polemarchakis
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Prof. Dan Bernhardt
University of Illinois
danber@illinois.edu