Predicting moral decision-making with dark personalities and moral values

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ABSTRACT

We examined (N = 355; 250 women) how the Dark Tetrad traits (i.e., psychopathy, narcissism, Machiavellianism, and sadism) are associated with moral dilemmas and Moral Foundations. The Dark Triad traits were associated with utilitarian decision-making on moral dilemmas. Sadism did not provide incremental variance above the Dark Triad traits in accounting for responses to moral dilemmas. Compromised morality explained higher dilemma scores, beyond the Dark Tetrads traits. Therefore, we suggest that compromised moral values within dark personalities result in higher utilitarian decision-making. Men had darker personalities and were more utilitarian than women were, while women were more moral than men. Subsequently, men made more utilitarian decisions as compared to women, which may be a result of their darker personalities and lower concerns for moral values. Collectively, our results add to the discussion about the need to expand the Dark Triad to include sadism and the role of personality in understanding individual differences, morality, and moral decision-making.

1. Introduction

In the past decade, the study of dark personality traits has become important to researchers, psychologists, and philosophers. Of these traits, the Dark Triad of subclinical psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and subclinical narcissism (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) has garnered much attention. These distinct but overlapping traits are characterized by emotional instability (Arvan, 2013) and lower concerns for morality (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014; Jonason, Stroesser, Kroll, Duineveld, & Baruffi, 2015). Individually, psychopathy is characterized by callousness, impulsivity, and low empathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Machiavellianism entails manipulative tendencies and deceptive proclivities (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014). Narcissism relates to high self-enhancement and grandiosity (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006). The Dark Triad traits typically have been associated with overall diminished concerns for morality (i.e., psychopathy), flexible moral beliefs (i.e., Machiavellianism), and a superficial and socially desirable system of morality (i.e., narcissism; Jonason et al., 2015). Therefore, they have implications in decision-making involving moral repercussions.

While the Dark Triad traits have been studied considerably in recent times, sadism is another dark trait, which research has advocated for inclusion in the cluster, thereby expanding it to a tetrad (Furnham, Richards, & Paulhus, 2013; Reidy, Zeichner, & Selbert, 2011). Sadism shares overlapping characteristics with the Dark Triad traits (Chabrol, van Leeuwen, Rodgers, & Séjourné, 2009), and sadists enjoy opportunities to be cruel and brutal, and are likely to hurt innocents (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999). Some studies, however, have issued caution against expanding the cluster to a tetrad (Bertl, Pietschnig, Tran, Stieger, & Voracek, 2017; Jonason, Zeigler-Hill, & Okan, 2017). In this study, we examine the interplay of dark personality and morality in predicting moral decision-making and test for the utility of including sadism in addition to the Dark Triad traits.

2. The current study

Diminished moral concerns of individuals high on the Dark Triad traits are often manifested in utilitarian decision-making on moral dilemmas (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014), such as the Trolley and the Footbridge dilemmas. Moral dilemmas typically entail two scenarios, in which some form of harm is going to occur, and the individual facing this dilemma has the choice to either let it happen or choose another option which is also harmful but results in overall greater good. The
dilemmas are segregated into personal and impersonal (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) in which the latter have lower emotional valence, and individuals are more likely to agree to undertaking the task in impersonal dilemmas but not in personal ones. However, individuals high on dark traits may make utilitarian choices on both types of dilemmas because they are emotionally callous in nature (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011) and have less concern for safety (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014) even when they can distinguish between right and wrong (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010).

Moral judgements can be understood in the context of the five basic moral foundations (Gra|ham et al., 2011, 2013; Graham & Haidt, 2011). Harm/care refers to the extent to which individuals exhibit care towards another. Fairness/reciprocity pertains virtues such as justice. Ingroup/loyalty is related to cooperating with the ingroup. Authority/respect is associated with valuing obedience, deference, and/or respect towards authority figures. Purity/sanctity refers to the feelings of disgust towards impure activities, people, or objects. Harm and Fairness are “individualizing” foundations, as they are associated with the protection of an individual’s rights (Graham, Haidt, & Novek, 2009; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). The remaining are “binding” foundations associated with group-binding values, rather than individual ones (Graham et al., 2009). In this study, we focus only on the higher-order moral foundations for reportorial economy and because we do not have cause to make distinct predictions for each of the five moral foundations.

Individuals high on dark traits typically exhibit lower concerns for individualizing foundations and some binding foundations (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014; Jonason et al., 2015). Therefore, utilitarian decision-making of dark personalities on moral dilemmas may be a result of their lower concern for moral values, as the content of these dilemmas encompasses the welfare of others or active or passive harm to others (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). Therefore, we suggest that lower concerns for individualizing and binding foundations would mediate the relationship between the dark traits, and personal and impersonal moral dilemmas (H1a). Furthermore, subclinical sadism has been linked with defective moral functioning (Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2015). Sadists were willing to work towards hurting an innocent person, as opposed to individuals high on Dark Triad traits, who exhibited unprovoked aggression only when it was easy (Buckels, Jones, & Paulhus, 2013). Thus, individuals with higher sadistic propensities may choose to actively hurt individuals in moral dilemmas, thereby exhibiting a utilitarian-natured response. Therefore, we suggest that the addition of sadism to the Dark Triad cluster would predict utilitarian decision-making beyond the Dark Triad (H1b).

While utilitarian decision-making may be a result of interplay between dark traits and moral values, it may be influenced by sex differences as well. Men score higher on dark traits, whereas women score higher on the individualizing moral foundations (Jonason et al., 2015, Jonason, Zeigler-Hill et al., 2017). Because of their darker personalities, some men may make more utilitarian decisions. Consequently, we expect to replicate sex differences in the dark traits, morality, and moral decision-making (H2a) and expect that dark traits will mediate the relationship between sex and moral dilemmas (H2b).

The Dark Triad traits have previously been studied with moral foundations (e.g., Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014; Jonason et al., 2015), but less research has examined the importance of including sadism and the relationships that dark traits and moral foundations have on moral decision-making jointly. Assessing actual decisions as opposed to self-reported morality may be important because individuals may act contrary to the foundations they endorse (Suhler & Churchland, 2011). Moral decision-making has sweeping implications for individuals and societies (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011) and, thus, accounting for variance in the decisions people make warrants serious investigation. In this study, we attempt to understand the role of personality and moral values in understanding moral-decision making in men and women.

3. Method

3.1. Participants

Three hundred and fifty-five participants (250 women, $M_{age} = 24.94$ years, $SD = 10.23$, range: 18–84) were recruited through online multiple-site entry, to provide generalizable findings (Reips, 2002). Data was collected through portals like Social Psychology Magazine, Webexperiment, and on social media groups. The sample included 32% Indian, 40% American, and 28% respondents of 34 other nationalities. Tick-box informed consent was obtained from the participants before participation in the study. All participants were asked to rate their English fluency on a scale of 1–5, and only the responses of those who rated themselves 4 or 5 were included. All participants were entered into a prize draw for an Amazon voucher worth USD 11.50.

3.2. Measures

3.2.1. Moral dilemmas

A subset of personal and impersonal moral dilemmas from Greene et al.’s (2001) study was chosen based on the mean emotional rating of each scenario as given by two raters ($1 = extremely unpleasant; 5 = extremely pleasant$; $M_{Personal Moral} = 1.50, SD_{Personal Moral} = 0$; $M_{Impersonal Moral} = 2.25, SD_{Impersonal Moral} = 0$). The inter-rater correlation for emotional valence of personal and impersonal dilemmas was 0.79. Four personal moral dilemmas (i.e., Vaccine Test, Footbridge, Crying Baby, and Lifeboat; $M = 1.60, SD = 1.13$), four impersonal moral dilemmas (i.e., Stock Tip, Standard Trolley, Resume, and Lost Wallet; $M = 1.33, SD = 0.81$), and two non-moral dilemmas (i.e., Scenic Route and Jogging; $M = 1.24, SD = 0.52$) were used (Koenigs et al., 2007). Participants indicated (yes/no) whether they would engage in the behaviour at the end of every dilemma. The scenarios were culturally neutral. Although each dilemma called for a dichotomous response, we summed them to conduct parametric tests that were insensitive to differences in dilemmas (Range = 0–4).

3.2.2. Moral foundations questionnaire

This was used in its 32-item format (Graham et al., 2011). First, participants assessed the relevance of the moral foundations for reportorial economy and because we do not have cause to make distinct predictions for each of the five moral foundations. Therefore, subclinical sadism has been linked with defective moral functioning (Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2015). Sadists were willing to work towards hurting an innocent person, as opposed to individuals high on Dark Triad traits, who exhibited unprovoked aggression only when it was easy (Buckels, Jones, & Paulhus, 2013). Thus, individuals with higher sadistic propensities may choose to actively hurt individuals in moral dilemmas, thereby exhibiting a utilitarian-natured response. Therefore, we suggest that the addition of sadism to the Dark Triad cluster would predict utilitarian decision-making beyond the Dark Triad (H1b).

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The Dark Triad traits have previously been studied with moral foundations (e.g., Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014; Jonason et al., 2015), but less research has examined the importance of including sadism and the relationships that dark traits and moral foundations have on moral decision-making jointly. Assessing actual decisions as opposed to self-reported morality may be important because individuals may act contrary to the foundations they endorse (Suhler & Churchland, 2011). Moral decision-making has sweeping implications for individuals and societies (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011) and, thus, accounting for variance in the decisions people make warrants serious investigation. In this study, we attempt to understand the role of personality and moral values in understanding moral-decision making in men and women.

3.2.3. Levenson self-report psychopathy scale

Psychopathy was measured using this scale in its 26-item, 4-point Likert scale format (1 = disagree strongly; 4 = agree strongly; Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995). Items contained statements such as “I am often bored” and were cumulatively scored ($\alpha = 0.87$; Range = 29–91).

$^3$ Results for the lower-order factors are available upon request.
3.2.4. Machiavellianism-IV

Machiavellianism was assessed using this 20-item scale in its 5-point Likert scale format (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree; Christie & Geis, 1970). Items comprised statements such as “It is wise to flatter important people” and were cumulatively scored (α = 0.76; Range = 34–87).

3.2.5. Narcissistic personality inventory

This 16-item scale was used to measure narcissism in its forced-choice format (Ames et al., 2006). Each item comprised one narcissistic and one non-narcissistic choice; e.g., “I really like to be the center of attention” versus “It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention”, and a cumulative final score was obtained (α = 0.72; Range = 0–13).

3.2.6. Comprehensive assessment of sadistic tendencies

This measure was used in its 18-item, 5-point Likert scale format (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree; Buckels & Paulhus, 2013). The scale comprised items such as “I enjoy tormenting people”, which were cumulatively scored (α = 0.79; Range = 18–82).

4. Results

Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for Dark Tetrads traits, dilemmas, moral foundations, and sex differences. Men scored higher than women on all dark traits and personal moral and impersonal moral dilemmas, and lower on individualizing moral foundations. Sex differences did not vary across cultures for Indian, American, and other nationalities for the dark traits (Fs = 0.09 to 0.19, ps = 0.83 to 0.91), moral foundations (Fs = 0.06 to 1.62, ps = 0.20 to 0.92), and dilemmas (Fs = 0.08 to 0.49, ps = 0.61 to 0.92). Such results conform to H2a but show a sampling robustness to the sex difference that is noteworthy.

Both types of dilemmas had positive associations with all dark personality traits; further, the dark traits were more strongly associated with impersonal dilemmas than personal dilemmas (see Table 2). Steiger’s z scores indicated that the dark traits associated differently with personal and impersonal dilemmas (mean z = 1.82, p = 0.03). However, this relationship was largely driven by Machiavellianism (z = 2.75, p = 0.003), as the average score of the other three traits were non-significant (mean z = 1.51, p = 0.07). Impersonal dilemmas were negatively associated with individualizing and binding foundations, while personal dilemmas were negatively associated with only individualizing foundations. Non-moral dilemmas did not correlate with the dark traits as they had no emotional valence. All dark traits were negatively associated with individualizing moral foundations, while only Machiavellianism correlated negatively with the binding foundations.

Mediation models (Figs. 1 and 2) undertaken using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS indicated that all dark traits positively predicted personal and impersonal dilemmas (Bs = 0.02 to 0.06, SEs = 0.003 to 0.02, ts = 1.51 to 7.03, ps < 0.05; c’ paths). Moreover, individualizing moral foundations operated as the proximal factors through which individuals high on dark traits made decisions on personal moral dilemmas (H1a; c’ paths). This was further evidenced by significant a and b paths (ps < 0.05) when individualizing foundations were the mediators (Figs. 1 and 2). Individually, all dark traits were negatively associated with the individualizing foundations, and these foundations negatively predicted scores on personal moral dilemmas. However, only Machiavellianism shared a negative relationship with binding foundations (B = −0.42, SE = 0.09, t = −4.39, p < 0.001; c’ path), while binding foundations negatively predicted impersonal dilemmas except when Machiavellianism was a predictor (Bs = −0.007 to −0.005, SEs = 0.003, ts = −2.62 to −1.90, ps < 0.07; b paths). All mediations were partial, with the exception of a full mediation of moral foundations between narcissism and personal dilemmas.

Hierarchical regressions with the Dark Triad in Step 1 and sadism in Step 2 indicated that the linear combination of the Dark Triad traits predicted higher scores on personal moral (R2 = 0.05, F(3, 351) = 6.49, p < 0.001) and impersonal moral dilemmas (R2 = 0.02, F(3, 351) = 2.76, p = 0.04). The Tetrads as a whole predicted utilitarian decision-making on personal (R2 = 0.05, F(4, 350) = 4.89, p = 0.001) as well as impersonal moral dilemmas (R2 = 0.03, F(4, 350) = 2.39, p = 0.05). However, sadism did not predict utilitarian decision-making on either personal (B = 0.003, p = 0.73) or impersonal dilemmas (B = −0.01, p = 0.26), beyond the Triad. Therefore, contrary to H2b, the addition of sadism to the Dark Triad model did not account for more variance in moral decision-making.

Further, we assessed whether the Dark Triad traits mediated the relationship between sex (males = 1, females = 2) and moral decisions (H2b). Males scored higher than females on the dark traits (Bs = −9.80 to −0.93, SEs = 0.35 to 1.27, ts = 1.84 to 3.23, ps < 0.05). The b paths from the mediators to dilemmas revealed positive relationships of psychopathy (B = 0.01, SE = 0.005, t = 1.84, p = 0.06) and Machiavellianism (B = 0.02, SE = 0.005, t = 3.23, p = 0.002) with impersonal moral dilemmas. Further, males were more likely to make utilitarian decisions on personal (B = −0.40, SE = 0.14, t = −2.91, p = 0.004), but not on impersonal dilemmas (B = −0.09, SE = 0.09, t = −0.93, p = 0.36, ns). The presence of tetrads partially mediated the relationship between personal dilemmas (B = −0.54, SE = 0.13, t = −4.19, p < 0.001), and fully mediated the effect of sex on impersonal dilemmas (B = −0.29, SE = 0.09, t = −3.05, p = 0.003). There was a full mediating effect of the dark traits between sex and impersonal moral dilemmas, and a partial mediating effect of these traits between sex and personal moral dilemmas.

5. Discussion

The malevolent and callous tendencies of the Dark Triad traits have long been associated with compromised moral values (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014; Jonason et al., 2015) which results in utilitarian decision-making on moral dilemmas. We examined the additional contribution of moral values and sadism in predicting utilitarian decisions on both types of moral dilemmas among dark personalities. And, we replicated work on sex differences in moral values and dark traits (Jonason et al., 2015; Jonason, Zeigler-Hill et al., 2017), suggesting that sex differences in moral decision-making may be mediated by (a function of) dark personality traits.

In line with previous research, dark traits were negatively

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Descriptive statistics and sex differences.</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Cohen’s d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal moral dilemmas</td>
<td>1.60 (1.13)</td>
<td>1.98 (1.21)</td>
<td>1.44 (1.06)</td>
<td>4.19** 0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impersonal moral dilemmas</td>
<td>1.33 (0.81)</td>
<td>1.53 (0.94)</td>
<td>1.25 (0.74)</td>
<td>3.05* 0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychopathy</td>
<td>52.58 (10.72)</td>
<td>55.78 (11.61)</td>
<td>51.23 (10.05)</td>
<td>3.72** 0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>56.92 (8.75)</td>
<td>59.09 (8.73)</td>
<td>56.01 (8.63)</td>
<td>3.05* 0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>4.32 (3.04)</td>
<td>4.97 (3.23)</td>
<td>4.04 (2.91)</td>
<td>2.65** 0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadism</td>
<td>35.19 (11.79)</td>
<td>42.10 (12.80)</td>
<td>32.30 (10.04)</td>
<td>7.71*** 0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualizing foundations</td>
<td>42.89 (8.51)</td>
<td>40.28 (9.58)</td>
<td>43.98 (7.79)</td>
<td>−3.81** −0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binding foundations</td>
<td>48.86 (16.11)</td>
<td>47.85 (16.26)</td>
<td>49.28 (16.06)</td>
<td>−0.77 −0.09</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note. d is Cohen’s d for effect size.

** p < 0.01.

*** p < 0.001.
associated with individualizing moral foundations (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014; Reidy et al., 2011) and positively with both types of moral dilemmas (Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009; Jonason et al., 2015; Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2015). The relationships of psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and sadism were stronger with impersonal than with personal moral dilemmas, which further justified distinguishing between these two types of dilemmas. Particularly, these differences were driven by Machiavellianism, which could be attributed to the general moral flexibility of these individuals (Jonason et al., 2015). No difference in relationships with both dilemmas for narcissists may indicate that they undertake a similar thought process while approaching both types of dilemmas.

Overall, utilitarian decision-making of individuals high on dark traits on personal moral dilemmas (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014) was driven by individualizing foundations. As the personal dilemmas entailed causing harm to other persons, it was inferred that individual’s responses were associated with their lower concerns for harm and fairness. Subclinical psychopaths exhibit lower concern for

Table 2
Associations of dark personality traits with moral dilemmas and values.

<table>
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<th>1</th>
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<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Impersonal dilemmas</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>2. Personal dilemmas</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
<td>0.60***</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Psychopathy</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Machiavellianism</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.65***</td>
<td>0.45***</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Narcissism</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sadism</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Individualizing foundations</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Binding foundations</td>
<td>–0.13</td>
<td>–0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>–0.23***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
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*p < 0.05.

***p < 0.001.

Fig. 1. Moral foundations mediating the relationship between psychopathy and personal moral dilemmas and Machiavellianism and personal dilemmas. *p < 0.05,

**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Fig. 2. Moral foundations mediating the relationship between narcissism and personal moral dilemmas and sadism and personal dilemmas. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
individualizing foundations, and are emotionally callousness (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011), resulting in utilitarian decisions on personal dilemmas. Machiavellian individuals may prefer utilitarian options in personal dilemmas, because of their emotional detachment (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). Such detachment may stem from externally-oriented thinking (Jonason & Krause, 2013), leading them to be indifferent to actively causing harm to other individuals. Last, narcissists’ utilitarian decision-making may be associated with their ambivalent preferences for such responses (Djeriouit & Trémolière, 2014) and their tendency to act in socially desirable ways (Raskin & Terry, 1988), thereby responding in a way they think other individuals would. Except for Machiavellianism, none of the dark traits predicted binding foundations. This may possibly be due to their tendency of long-term thinking (Jones & Paulhus, 2010), where they may see benefits of infringing upon these moral values. Furthermore, binding foundations played a limited role in explaining utilitarian decisions and were marginally associated with only impersonal moral dilemmas. Findings suggested that variance in dark traits was primarily associated with choices on impersonal dilemmas, whereas choices on personal dilemmas were mediated by individualizing foundations. As the general nature of moral dilemmas used in this study was associated with individualizing foundations, binding foundations were secondary to explaining utilitarian decision-making.

Furthermore, the addition of sadism did not predict moral dilemmas beyond the Dark Triad. However, the Dark Tetrad predicted utilitarian decision-making on both personal and impersonal dilemmas, indicating that utilitarian decision-making is associated with overlapping characteristics shared by the four traits. Thus, such decision-making on personal and impersonal dilemmas is not aggravated by characteristics of aggression associated with sadism, but rather, driven by the lower moral concerns, and to some extent by callousness, a trait common to the tetrad (Trémolière & Djeriouit, 2015).

As expected, men scored higher than women did on dark traits (Chabrol et al., 2009; Jonason, Zeigler-Hill et al., 2017), while women scored higher on individualizing moral foundations (Jonason et al., 2015). Men scored higher on personal and impersonal moral dilemmas, which contradicted Bartels and Pizarro’s (2011) finding that there were no sex differences in utilitarian responses. We found that utilitarian decisions on personal dilemmas were driven by lower concerns for individualizing foundations, while those on impersonal decisions seemed to be driven by the dark traits. Both factors explain why men made more utilitarian decisions. This finding may be important in understanding the behavioural tendencies preceding higher rates of heinous crimes and sexual exploitation tendencies (Jonason, Girgis, & Milne-Home, 2017) among men as compared to women.

5.1. Limitations and conclusions

This study had several strengths. For instance, the inclusion of the parent-measures of the Dark Triad traits sidesteps problems associated with shorter measures; the examination of moral decision-making and moral values provided a broader picture of the interplay of personality, values, and moral behaviour than previously undertaken; and the inclusion of a somewhat heterogeneous sample in terms of ethnicity suggests a universality to the results presented here. Despite that, the present study is characterized by several limitations. For instance, only eight dilemmas were used, which may not be enough to comprehensively examine moral decision-making. Future research could use more diverse dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007; Trémolière & Djeriouit, 2015) to observe consistency in moral judgements and thereby generalize current findings. Similarly, because the dilemmas were associated with individualizing foundations, the relationship between binding foundations and moral decision-making can be explored by constructing dilemmas that tap into binding foundations. Last, the current study could be replicated by having individuals perform real-life tasks, which require moral decision-making at an intuitive level.

In conclusion, we have extended prior work in the field by providing evidence for direct associations between dark personality traits and moral decisions, and negative ones between moral foundations and moral decisions. Lower concerns for individualizing moral values explained the utilitarian decision-making of individuals high on the Dark Tetrad cluster. The use of moral dilemmas with moral foundations, the addition of sadism to the Dark Triad, and differential results for impersonal moral and personal moral dilemmas enabled a comprehensive assessment of dark personality traits and morality.

References


