

MANUSCRIPT OVERVIEW

CLIENTS AND CONSTITUENTS:
POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS IN PATRONAGE DEMOCRACIES

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I. OVERVIEW

This book provides a theoretical and empirical examination of *constituency service* in developing countries. The predominant view of distributive politics in “patronage democracies” emphasizes the partisan targeting of pork and clientelism. In contrast, I demonstrate that high-level legislators in India and other contexts often provide direct, non-partisan assistance to individual constituents. Under what conditions do they provide constituency service, rather than engage in partisan bias? I show that the uneven character of access to services at the local level—often due to biased allocation on the part of local intermediaries—generates demand for help from higher-level officials, and also creates incentives for those politicians to bypass intermediaries by providing direct assistance. The book’s findings highlight the potential for an underappreciated form of democratic accountability, one that is however rooted in the character of patronage-based politics.

The contributions of the book are conceptual, theoretical, empirical, and normative. First, I provide a new conceptualization of resource distribution that incorporates the manner by which politicians offer non-contingent assistance—constituency service—to voters. This framework makes a case for integrating what had effectively been a “residual” category of politician behavior in studies of distributive politics and instead highlights its role as a central element of allocation. In doing so, this conceptualization also broadens our understanding of the strategies available to politicians to influence the delivery of benefits to citizens.

Second, I offer a new theory of distributive politics that explains the ways in which different strategies of allocation—non-contingent assistance, contingent clientelism, and contingent pork barreling—interact to produce specific distributive outcomes. I consider the limitations of contingent allocation strategies for targeting specific types of voters, and highlight the ways in which constituency service offers an important strategic alternative for cultivating supporters otherwise left out of distributive processes. In the case of clientelism, I underscore the ways in which biased local-level intermediation can generate demands and opportunities for mediation at other levels of government, specifically for those individuals who are denied access to important state resources locally. Higher-level politicians, in turn, are attractive targets of appeals because they are less likely to make their assistance contingent on partisan behavior: they have little capacity to monitor individual voters in their constituencies. Moreover, they often have significant influence over the distribution of state resources and, in many contexts, have electoral incentives to provide assistance. In contrast with geographically targeted distribution of benefits to groups or areas in a district, constituency service also allows politicians to serve those individuals who do, or feasibly might, support them, but who do not live in areas that would otherwise receive pork. Thus, politicians employ constituency service, often as a tool to develop reputations as responsive representatives, but their incentives to do so are strongly shaped by the dynamics of partisan bias in a democratic setting.

Third, I test the empirical implications of my argument using a range of methodological techniques, primarily in the Indian context. This includes collection of a novel data set containing unprecedented parallel information on politicians, bureaucrats and citizens in three Indian states as well as a second survey of high-level politicians across India; a large-scale field experiment that includes nearly all of India’s state and national legislators and with which I test hypotheses about the incentives of politicians to provide non-contingent assistance; survey experiments to evaluate variations in the demands for assistance and the degree to which

contingencies exist in provision of assistance; geo-located analyses of spending by legislators of constituency development funds; interviews with politicians and bureaucrats; and evidence from in-depth qualitative shadowing of politicians in their constituencies to document the character of politician-citizen interactions. This multi-method approach and the diversity of data sources offers a comprehensive view of politicians' behavior and a unique opportunity to examine in detail the strategies politicians use to respond to voter appeals and to affect resource distribution. I also use unique constituency and politician-level data that I collected on state assembly members across India to assess descriptive hypotheses about who responds to citizens' petitions.

Finally, I describe the normative implications of my argument and findings for perspectives on political accountability and responsiveness. I suggest that politicians in patronage democracies offer representation in the form of "constrained accountability." These actors are substantially more accountable to their constituents than has previously been acknowledged in the literature on distributive and electoral politics. At the same time, the character of contingent local politics shapes this accountability, by generating the demand for higher-level assistance and by shaping politicians' assumptions about the partisan inclinations of their petitioners. The nature of constituency service in a context of highly inefficient service delivery also implies that elected officials may have incentives to maintain poor quality access to services, so as to retain their perceived relevance in the eyes of citizens. In these ways, constituency service offers a normatively better outcome for citizens than we might otherwise expect in patronage democracies, but one that still falls short of full democratic accountability on multiple dimensions.

This project was the subject of a book workshop held at the University of California, Berkeley in November 2016 and attended by Steven Wilkinson, Kanchan Chandra, Daniel Posner, Justin Grimmer, and Anirudh Krishna, in addition to multiple faculty from the Political Science Department at the University of California, Berkeley. The project has also garnered wide and diverse attention through talks I have given on the subject at Brown University, the University of California, Berkeley; the University of California, San Diego; Claremont McKenna College; the University of Pennsylvania (Center for the Advanced Study of India), and several disciplinary conferences, including the American Political Science Association, the Asian Studies Association, and the Annual Conference on South Asia.

2. CHAPTER SYNOPSES

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Chapter Descriptions

PART I – Introduction, Argument, and Approach

Chapter 1 – Introduction: Representation, Distribution, and Constituency Service

The book begins with an empirical puzzle: in India, we observe politicians at high levels of government spending significant time intermediating with the bureaucracy on behalf of individual citizens. Moreover, this form of assistance is a major form of resource distribution, accounting as I show for a significant proportion of the benefits received by citizens. From the perspective of comparative politics, this is unexpected, as senior officials are thought to delegate intermediation to local actors who can allocate resources to individual voters in electorally beneficial ways. For their part, high-level politicians should focus primarily on the partisan distribution of club goods. Instead, I suggest that such politicians engage with individual citizens in this manner because they have an electoral incentive to build a positive reputation for responsiveness. By providing assistance to individual constituents in a non-partisan way, they can foster a personal vote, while also pursuing other, more well-documented forms of partisan distribution. Constituency service also allows politicians to bypass partisan local brokers with whom they may not be aligned, and reach responsive voters directly. I preview my argument for the conditions under which politicians will offer this “constituency service” or will instead pursue pork-barrel or clientelist allocation. I then offer a conceptual framework for incorporating constituency service into our understanding of distributive politics. I conclude the chapter with an outline for the book.

Chapter 2 – Clients or Constituents? A Theory of Assistance in Patronage Democracies

In this chapter, I discuss in greater detail my argument for why constituency service constitutes a key element of distributive politics, alongside forms of locally brokered clientelism and contingent allocation of group-oriented goods. I elaborate the primary characteristics of patronage democracies that may affect the relevant incentives of both individual citizens and high-level politicians and, thus, the conditions under which my argument should hold. I then consider the limitations of more widely-studied forms of distributive politics and outline the ways in which constituency service offers a compelling alternative to politicians for pursuing their desired electoral ends.

This discussion suggests a number of empirical implications, which guide the analyses in subsequent chapters. First, high-level politicians should receive substantial requests for assistance from individual citizens. As I show, the volume of such direct requests greatly outstrips anything anticipated by existing scholarship on patronage democracies—necessitating explanation of this important empirical phenomenon. In addition, these requests should often be for the same kinds of particularistic benefits that make up the core of allocation by local-level, often clientelistic, intermediaries.

Second, the nature of requests to high-level politicians should be tied to the character of local distributive dynamics. Those individuals who are most likely to be blocked from assistance by local intermediaries should make more appeals to alternative actors, in general, and be more likely to make appeals to high-level politicians, in particular. Where partisanship is strong at the local level, this implies that non-copartisans of local actors will be the most likely to make appeals to alternative, high-level intermediaries.

Third, politicians' responses to requests for assistance with individual access to state entitlements should be largely non-partisan in character. While there may be a small benefit that accrues to co-partisans in terms of receipt of assistance, in line with work on constituency service in developed countries, this effect should be small relative to the baseline rate of assistance offered to all individuals. The bulk of response should, instead, reflect a general willingness to provide assistance to all petitioners.

Finally, however, variation in the nature of politician responses should reflect differences in the availability of partisan information and the character of benefits being requested. Non-contingent assistance should be likely for individual entitlements, even where partisanship can be identified. In these cases, the benefits of providing assistance often outweigh any potential upsides of targeting resources. Where the allocation of goods is costly and, crucially, more feasibly targeted to groups of individuals with known partisan leanings and aggregate patterns of electoral support, however, we should be more likely to observe partisan allocations on the part of politicians. Again, the extent of constituency service is thus variable, and it depends *inter alia* on the nature of the good being allocated: the same politicians who engage in constituency service in some contexts engage in partisan bias in others.

Chapter 3 – Research Methods and Data Sources

The third chapter provides an overview of the empirical approach I take to testing these implications. I consider the feasibility of evaluating politician and citizen behavior in practice and discuss in some detail each of the research methods used to accomplish this goal. I also detail each of the data sources used in the empirical analyses and provide a summary of these sources as a reference for the discussion in subsequent chapters.

PART II - The Demand for Constituency Service

With this theoretical and empirical framework in mind, Chapter Four begins the second part of the book, which concentrates on the demand for constituency service. This Part II focuses substantially on the non-programmatic aspects of democracy in India and, especially, on how demands for assistance from high-level politicians originate partly from the dynamics of local distribution. Thus, though this book contributes most centrally to understanding direct assistance by high-level politicians, it necessarily expends substantial attention to local politics, using original qualitative and quantitative data to illustrate the nature of local targeting and how this shapes demands for assistance. This account is critical for the book's argument, because as previously discussed, it is at least in part the multi-level nature of politics and distribution that can generate both a demand for and the supply of constituency service. This initial focus on local distribution also allows for a more holistic depiction of the nature of political responsiveness in India.

Chapter 4 – Access to Services in Patronage Democracies: the Indian Case

In Chapter Four, I present a discussion of service provision in India to set the context for an analysis of distributive politics and, in particular, constituency service, in a patronage democracy. I lay out the features of India's political economy that lead us to describe it as a patronage democracy. I then outline the characteristics of India's primary political, bureaucratic, and social institutions and actors, considering the formal roles and responsibilities of key actors at all levels of government with regard to distributive politics as well as their informal powers over distribution, so as to provide a comprehensive overview of the Indian political system at the national, state, and local levels. I show that, while local political actors often have substantial power over allocation of benefits from important development programs, high-level officials also have the capacity to influence the distribution of both these and other resources from the state. Thus, these senior officials can feasibly shape access to benefits and services in quite important ways for individual citizens. I draw on these accounts in later chapters, so as to showcase the ways in which the dynamics I describe and document provide key insights into the overall nature of distributive politics in India and, I argue, other patronage democracies. I conclude with a discussion of the potential for constituency service in India from the perspective of prevailing theories, considering in particular the character of political institutions, the nature of electoral and party politics, and the dynamics that may—or may not—encourage politicians to build personal reputations for responsiveness

Chapter 5 – Local Politics, Distribution, and Partisan Blocking

In Chapter Five, I present the first set of empirical analyses, focused on the dynamics of politics at the local level. Drawing on close-range “shadowing” of local council presidents and surveys of both presidents and citizens, I document the intimate relationships that these elected officials have with their constituents. This analysis suggests considerable responsiveness of local politicians to citizens, often highlighting a form of local constituency service that has not been sufficiently described in many prior accounts. However, I also highlight the partisan nature of local politics, and the way that partisanship is emphasized especially by those presidents who share the party of the more senior state legislator in their area. I then document the implications of this partisanship for contingent distribution, showing that individuals who do not share the partisanship of their local president are less likely to receive benefits from the local council.

Chapter 6 – Denials of Demand and Appeals for Mediation From “Above”

The analysis of local politics continues in Chapter Six, where I examine the implications of this dynamic of local blocking for the character of citizen strategies to access state services. I show that non-copartisans of local officials, who are more likely to be denied services locally, are also expected to make appeals to a large number of potential intermediaries when attempting to access benefits and services from the state. Using detailed survey data from three Indian states—which complements India-wide analysis elsewhere in the book—I show that these findings are particularly strong in Uttar Pradesh, where a long history of village council elections has enabled political parties to become more entrenched in local elections than in the neighboring states of Bihar and Jharkhand. I then establish that high-level politicians are important alternative sources of assistance, particularly when individuals have difficulty accessing public benefits from their local elected official. Importantly, I use survey data from Karnataka to show that those individuals who appeal to high-level officials for assistance are, on average, more successful in acquiring their desired service than those who appeal to local politicians. Thus, local blocking leads to an increased demand for assistance from high-level politicians.

PART III - The Supply of Constituency Service

Having considered the characteristics of distributive politics at the local level, Part Three of the book evaluates the supply of responsiveness from higher-level politicians.

Chapter 7 – High-Level Politicians and the Provision of Assistance

In Chapter Seven, I draw on accounts from surveys and shadowing of politicians to characterize the nature of politicians’ engagement with citizens, highlighting the importance politicians place on making time for citizen interactions and responding to citizen requests—to the extent that those politicians spend, on average, a quarter of their time interacting with individual citizens. Importantly, the primary focus of these contacts is requests for assistance with the same types of goods and services that are typically also requested of local village presidents, providing additional evidence that demands may at least partially originate from individuals’ failure to acquire these benefits at the local level.

Chapter 8 – When is Responsiveness Constituency Service?

While the analyses to this point suggest that high-level politicians spend significant time assisting individual voters, they cannot yet show whether and when this assistance is non-partisan and non-contingent in nature. In Chapter Eight, I draw on a field experimental audit of politicians with a near census of Indian state and national legislators, as well as additional survey experiments, to show that, on the whole, politicians do not take indicators of partisanship into account when responding to individual-level requests. Specifically, the field experiment shows that for India’s high-level politicians, information on electoral preferences does not affect the willingness of representatives to respond to an individual’s request for assistance. In addition, indications of shared ethnicity, e.g. caste, which may be closely tied to political preferences, do not result in preferential treatment. A further analysis finds that, in contrast with an emphasis on partisanship, there is some suggestion that indicators of a personal vote—that the petitioner has voted for the politician in the past—have a small effect the quality of a politician’s response, if not the baseline rate at which they respond. Overall, these findings offer strong evidence that the

aid politicians offer to individuals requiring assistance navigating the state is often non-contingent in nature, taking the form of constituency service.

Chapter 9 - Which Politicians Respond, and to Whom?

I expand on this analysis of responsiveness in Chapter Nine, where I explore additional variation in the characteristics of politicians' responsiveness. First, I investigate the degree to which responsiveness reflects state- and individual-level characteristics that may be associated with incentives to cultivate a personal vote. These analyses highlight, in particular, that—consistent with the theoretical discussion in Chapter Two—electoral politics play a key role in affecting the degree to which politicians attempt to build their personal vote via provision of assistance to individual constituents.

In this ninth chapter, I also investigate the degree to which information on local blocking affects politicians' willingness to respond. I show that, in general, politicians are slightly less willing to respond when an individual indicates that they have attempted to acquire assistance at the local level and have failed to do so. However, this occurs only when politicians are not given additional electoral information about partisanship or patterns of past support; given the plausibly predominant presence of co-partisans among local officials in many legislators' constituencies, legislators may reasonably infer that the petitioner is a less persuadable voter in this context. Moreover, this finding is driven by the behavior of politicians in those states where there is a long history of local council elections and, thus, political parties have had the opportunity to become entrenched locally. In these states, when information on past local appeals is combined with information that the petitioner shares the politician's electoral preferences, the negative effect of information on local denial of service disappears. This implies that politicians in those states with strong local party penetration interpret information about a failure to receive assistance locally as an indicator of local partisan blocking and, combined with information on electoral history, an indication that it is their co-partisan who requires assistance. Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine therefore collectively establish the prevalence of constituency service and also explore the conditions under which it does and does not occur.

Chapter 10 - When is Responsiveness Partisan Bias?

A major challenge for the study of constituency service, however, and an important contribution of this book, is to situate it in relation to better studied forms of representation or distribution—such as partisan bias. The theoretical discussion in Chapter Two anticipates that contingent allocation should be more likely where the cost of allocation is high and it is relatively easy to determine the electoral preferences of likely beneficiaries. Thus, the same politicians may engage in both constituency service and partisan bias, depending on the nature of the benefit. In Chapter Ten, I evaluate the conditions under which politicians will allocate benefits in a contingent, versus non-contingent nature, using evidence from politician surveys, experimentally induced variation in the type of good for which citizens request assistance in my audit study, and data on development spending by politicians.

I show that—while less frequent than particularistic requests—citizens do ask politicians for group-based goods, and these are largely the same types of goods that state legislators allocate using their Constituency Development Funds (CDFs). By mapping the locations of CDF projects and matching these to the locations of polling stations, I then show that citizens living in areas that offered strong support to a politician in the last election are much more likely to receive spending from that politician's CDF.

Drawing on data from my experimental audit, which includes the set of politicians from Karnataka for whom I have CDF spending data, I then compare the behavior of politicians spending their CDF funds with responses to the experimental audit of responsiveness. This comparison shows that, while electoral characteristics do predict behavior with regard to partisan targeting, they offer much less explanatory value for understanding patterns of constituency service. Thus, the same factors cannot explain both partisan bias and constituency service and the same individuals who engage in non-contingent assistance to individuals seeking entitlements may also target group-based benefits in a largely partisan manner.

Part IV – The Significance of Constituency Service

Chapter 11 - Constituency Service in Comparative Perspective

To what extent should we expect to observe similar dynamics of distributive politics in other patronage democracies? I suggest that there are substantial reasons why high-level politicians in countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America may also be likely to engage in individual-level distribution with an eye toward building a personal vote, rather than support for their party. I consider a set of institutional conditions that should affect the likelihood of elected officials offering constituency service. I then offer preliminary evidence in the form of case studies and cross-national survey data to highlight where these dynamics may well be at play.

Chapter 12 - Constrained Accountability in Patronage Democracies

In the Conclusion to the book, I discuss in greater detail the implications of my analyses on constituency service for understanding the “repertoires of distribution” used by politicians in patronage democracies. I then consider the normative implications of my findings to our understanding of democratic practice in patronage democracies. I suggest that the form of representation present in these contexts is characterized by “constrained accountability.” High-level politicians in patronage democracies are, I argue, substantially more accountable to their individual constituents than we have been led to believe by the existing literature. However, the nature of this accountability remains, in multiple ways, limited. Citizens are hindered in their ability to access high-level politicians, relative to local intermediaries. Politicians’ logic for offering constituency service is influenced by its relationship to the nature of local, contingent distributive politics. And, finally, the long-term responsiveness of politicians to the inefficiencies in public service delivery brought to their attention by citizens’ requests is hampered by their short-term electoral incentive to remain relevant intermediaries for their constituents. Constituency service, then, is an important conduit for achieving democratic responsiveness in contexts otherwise characterized by discretionary targeting and perverse accountability, but it is a particular form of representation that is still shaped and constricted by the environment from which it emerges.

In providing this form of limited accountability, constituency service also serves to support the functioning of democracy in patronage contexts. While the targeted nature of clientelist and partisan distribution excludes a large portion of voters from the significant resources of the state in patronage democracies, constituency service offers those same voters a potential resource for accessing the state. High-level politicians, who play important roles in partisan distribution, also provide direct assistance to their constituents in a non-partisan manner. This responsiveness makes available the resources of the state to a much wider swath of voters and, in doing so, contributes to the functioning, and persistence, of patronage democracy.

3. READERSHIP

The aim of the book is to provide a clear, coherent, and original account of distributive politics, emphasizing the important role for high-level politicians in offering constituency service to individual citizens. The manuscript is designed for the field of political science, but will find an audience in public policy, economics, sociology, development studies, and South Asian studies as well. It will be of interest to professors and graduate students of political science and public policy, as well as a wider readership of undergraduates, policy professionals, and journalists. The manuscript includes easily interpretable figures and tables, with minimal technical details. The main target readership will be in the United States, Europe, and India, but the general themes and methodological approach should raise interest in the broader international market.

Clients and Constituents will be of interest to a number of different organized sections of the American Political Science Association including Comparative Politics; Comparative Politics of Developing Countries, Political Economy; Public Policy; Experimental Methods; and Qualitative and Multi-method Research.

4. BRIEF AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Jennifer Bussell is an Assistant Professor in the Travers Department of Political Science and the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. She has previously taught at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin, and in the Department of Political Science at Yale University. Her research focuses on political representation, the political economy of development, informal institutions and policy-making, and Indian politics. Her first book, *Corruption and Reform in India: Public Services in the Digital Age*, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2012. Her work has also been published or is forthcoming in multiple academic journals, including *Comparative Political Studies*, *Governance*, *International Studies Quarterly*, and *Studies in Comparative International Development*.

She holds Doctoral and Masters degrees in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley and a Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology from the University of Chicago. She teaches courses on Political Representation and Distributive Politics, Policy-Making in Developing Countries, Indian Politics, the Political Economy of Natural Disasters, and Qualitative and Mixed-Method Research.

5. REVIEW OF THE MARKET

The dynamics of distributive politics are a key focus of Political Science. A wealth of literature considers the ways in which politicians make use of their power over state resources to build and retain their electoral base. In most cases, this work focuses on the distribution of benefits to individual citizens via local intermediaries or the allocation of pork barrel type projects and targeted club goods by higher-level officials. My analysis builds on this tradition by highlighting a key blind spot in current work: the potential importance of non-partisan assistance for building a personal vote in patronage democracies.

Two recent books that consider the dynamics of distributive politics deserve particular attention for the insights they offer into the incentives of politicians and the ways in which allocation can occur across diverse contexts.

- i. Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

This important account of clientelist politics places its focus on a key, but previously understudied, actor in distribution: the local broker. The authors highlight the logic of delegation to local actors, alongside the mixed incentives that such intermediaries hold in distributing benefits and building a base of support. Drawing on data from multiple parts of the world, they show that local access to state benefits is often contingent on support for a broker's preferred political party. I expand on this work, highlighting the lack of attention to those individuals who are not aligned with the local broker—what options do these citizens have to access state benefits? My theoretical account uses the logic of brokers as a starting point and then considers the implications of these dynamics in generating demand for assistance from other actors within the state.

- ii. Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven Wilkinson, Eds., 2007. *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt and Wilkinson's edited volume offers significant insights into the character of patronage politics across a range of country contexts. Drawing on research from as far afield as Mexico, Japan, and India, the contributing authors highlight diverse ways in which citizens are linked to politicians and the implications of these linkages for both access to resources and the character of electoral politics. The theoretical perspective I offer in this book builds on these accounts, but focuses on the choices politicians make about different strategies of linking to voters. Rather than emphasizing a particular kind of linkage, I consider the factors influencing politicians' choices across linkage strategies, and the implications of these choices for representation and distribution.

Scholarly analyses of India offer important foundational insights for examining the particular character of distributive politics in this context.

- iii. Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

This study's main contribution is to address the factors influencing the performance of ethnic parties, particularly in India. A key element of the argument rests on a conceptualization of India as a patronage democracy in which "the state monopolizes access to jobs and services, *and* in which elected officials have discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state" (6). The ability of politicians to distribute state resources on an individualized basis is important for Chandra's claims about elite and voter behavior. She highlights the access politicians have to licit or illicit resources matters for campaign strategies

and voter expectations. In this book, I expand on Chandra's line of reasoning to show how these relationships and resources can be used by high-level politicians both to target benefits to co-partisans and also to offer constituency service to the broader community.

- iv. Kruks-Wisner, Gabrielle. Forthcoming. *Active Citizenship: Claim-making and the Pursuit of Social Welfare in Rural India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

A forthcoming book by Kruks-Wisner highlights the important role of the Indian state in providing benefits to citizens and the difficulties faced by individuals in accessing these benefits. Kruks-Wisner's focus is on citizens: what are the strategies that individuals use to navigate the state, and how do these strategies differ across individuals? These are important questions, because they place the emphasis on citizens themselves, and their ability to make choices about the most probable strategies for accessing their desired benefits. She offers a unique account of these dynamics, drawing on detailed fieldwork and large citizen surveys to uncover the multiple pathways citizens follow in their efforts to make claims on the state. I draw on Kruks-Wisner's findings about the range of actors to whom individuals will direct claims and highlight the particular importance of high-level politicians as a target of these requests.

6. SCHEDULE

A preliminary complete manuscript was prepared for a book conference in November, 2016. A complete, revised manuscript will be completed by October, 2017.

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