Transcript of Proceedings, Case Number A1506891 Heard by Trial Judge, the Honorable Patrick T. Dinkelacker. Transcript Prepared for Appeal number C-16-762. This Lawsuit was filed Preventing the Sale of Historic District Property

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Cincinnati Enquirer Letter to the Editor

October 19, 2016

It is imperative, that comments expressed by Madeira Mayor, Melisa Adrien, in the October 15, 2016 Enquirer, news story, titled, "Lawsuit against Madeira dismissed", be addressed. Mayor Adrien would have you believe that one resident, unelected, and holding no appointed position, has the power to expend Madeira Tax Payer dollars. Not so, and in fact Mayor Adrien, and six council members always determine, how tax dollars will be spent and for what purpose, (mostly behind closed doors). Recently, a local Businessman, James Tepe, has publicly leveled allegations of "Collusion and Political Favors", regarding six years of dealings with local land, and restaurant developer, Mr. Thomas Powers. Those allegations have merit, and the attempt to sell off a portion of the Madeira Historic District, reeked with the stench of "collusion and Political Favors".

My Lawsuit was filed when Adrien, and six council members passed Resolution number 15-30, a resolution that can only be construed as an attempt at destroying the Madeira Historic District, while enriching Developer Powers, at the expense of Madeira Taxpayers. The Lawsuit could have been dismissed, shortly after April 25th of this year, the day that Adrien repealed Resolution 15-30, but Adrien's attorneys, took no action, asking for a dismissal. Maybe that's because Adrien and her city attorneys had "orchestrated a shell game".

Here is how the scheme developed. Mayor Adrien presented, at the April 25th City Council meeting, ordinance number 16-03, repealing resolution 15-30, that included a contract with Powers, to "buy and sell", involving the vacant B&B Mower property, and the sale of Historic District property, (the cause for my Lawsuit). Immediately, at the same April 25th council meeting, Adrien brought forth a new resolution, number 17-16, identical to 15-30, except for one important section in the "new" contract, section E. Section E stated that if my

Lawsuit were to be dismissed, or if the city wins the suit, the city would than revert back to the contract associated with resolution 15-30, thus "the shell game" created by our Mayor. The game was created to fool the court, and the residents of Madeira. My Lawsuit was justified, just as the appeal is justified. This is all about political power, favors, and six years of collusion, and irresponsible decisions, made by Mayor Adrien, former Mayors, City Lawyers, City Manager Moeller, various City Council members, and Planning Commission members. This is all about, misappropriating and spending more than \$700,000.00 of Madeira tax payer dollars. This kind of political behavior should never be tolerated, and intimidation coming from Mayor Adrien will not be tolerated.

Douglas Oppenheimer

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Madeira Ohio 45243

Please be advised that Attorney Curt Hartman was appointed as a Hamilton County Trial Judge and Attorney Brian C. Shrive of The Finney Law Firm Continued Legal representation of Douglas Oppenheimer, Shrive's name should be substituted in place of Curt Hartman.

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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS						
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO						
CITY OF MADEIRA, ex rel.						
OPPENHEIMER,						
Plaintiff, Appeal No. C1600762						
vs. Case No. A1506891						
CITY OF MADEIRA, et al.,						
Defendant.						
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS						
APPEARANCES:						
CURT HARTMAN, ESQ.,						
On behalf of the Plaintiff.						
KEVIN MCDONOUGH, ESQ., On behalf of the Defendant.						
BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the						
motions hearing in this cause, heard on						
Tuesday, February 23, 2016, before the						
Honorable Patrick T. Dinkelacker, a said Judge						
of the Court of Common Pleas, the following						
proceedings were had, to wit:						

MORNING SESSION - Tuesday, February 23, 2016 1 2 MR. MCDONOUGH: Kevin McDonough, City of Madeira. One of the motions set 3 today for hearing is a motion to dismiss 4 5 Mr. Powers. We called his office and they can't seem to locate him, and we 6 7 were wondering if, for some reason, he 8 doesn't have it on his calendar. notice the listing only lists me and Mr. 9 10 Hartman on this case, for some reason. 11 Has anyone heard from Mr. Goodin on 12 this case? 13 THE COURT: He is real good about 14 showing up. 15 MR. MCDONOUGH: Yes, he is. I have a feeling that for some reason maybe he 16 17 thought March 8 -- if you want to set this over for another date. 18 19 MR. HARTMAN: I am fine submitting 20 on the paper. I can check with Mr. 21 Goodin and see if he is fine. Not a 22 complex issue. 23 THE COURT: Do you want to argue 24 the other motion, then? 25 MR. HARTMAN: I am fine with it on


paper. We both kind of agreed there is no case law out there indicating --MR. MCDONOUGH: There is nothing directly on point regarding, under a taxpayer action like this, whether the Respondent can actually counterclaim against, technically. Basically, we will submit. THE COURT: Let me talk to you in chambers for a second. (Discussion was held off the record in chambers.) (End of proceedings.)

CERTIFICATE

I, Ann Marie Stowers, RPR, the undersigned, an Official Court Reporter for the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, do hereby certify that at the same time and place stated herein, I recorded in stenotype and thereafter transcribed the within 3 pages, and that the foregoing Transcript of Proceedings is a true, complete, and accurate transcript of my said stenotype notes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 11th day of October, 2016

Ann Marie Stowers, RPR Official Court Reporter Court of Common Pleas Hamilton County, Ohio



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                    COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
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     OPPENHEIMER,
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                  Plaintiff,
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                                  Appeal No. C1600762
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On behalf of the Plaintiff.
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     KEVIN MCDONOUGH, ESQ., STEVEN GOODIN, ESQ., On behalf of the Defendant.
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                BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the
    motions hearing in this cause, heard on
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    Thursday, March 10, 2016, before the Honorable
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    Patrick T. Dinkelacker, a said Judge of the
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    Court of Common Pleas, the following
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    proceedings were had, to wit:
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1 MORNING SESSION - Thursday, March 10, 2016 2 THE COURT: For the record, City of 3 Madeira, ex rel Douglas Oppenheimer 4 versus City of Madeira, Case Number 5 A1506891. 6 Mr. Goodin, you showed up today. 7 MR. GOODIN: Thank you, Judge. apologize for the last time. I don't 8 9 know how we messed that up. We are 10 honored to be here. 11 THE COURT: I do apologize for the 12 delay. We are here today in response to 13 the motion filed on behalf of Mr. Powers; 14 is that correct? 15 MR. GOODIN: Yes, Judge. 16 THE COURT: Okay. I have read that 17 and you have responded to the Memorandum 18 in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. 19 Is there anything you want to say in 20 regards to it? 21 MR. GOODIN: Judge, 30 seconds. I 22 think from our standpoint, this was a 23 taxpayer lawsuit basically filed between 24 Mr. Oppenheimer and the City of Madeira. 25 My client, at one point, had a

contract to buy the property that was in question. That contract is dead. The option has expired. Our view is, we are not in this anymore, basically. There is really no relief that can be sought for my client. He is the only guy here that lost money. He lost \$10,000 and different options he put on the property that are now gone.

His concern, just being very frank, was facing an attorney fee award at the end of this if Mr. Hartman's client were to be successful. I know Mr. Hartman doesn't intend to seek fees against him but that's his primary concern.

We feel this is really a matter between Mr. Oppenheimer and the City of Madeira. My client supports the City of Madeira's position, but we don't see a road for us going forward.

MR. HARTMAN: And as I indicated in our response, I think Mr. Powers is included because of that interest in that existing contract. I would indicate to Mr. Goodin right off the bat that if we

were successful, the attorney fees under the fee shifting statute would be against the City, not against his client.

In terms of the existence or non-existence of a contract, I kind of just came up here actually in the hallway earlier here so that may have put a wrinkle into it. Our concern was, I didn't want to be told Mr. Powers was a necessary party that should have been in, and without him, the Court could not issue --

THE COURT: You complied with the service aspect?

MR. HARTMAN: Exactly. Yes.
Whether or not he gets out, I suggested
to Mr. Goodin, just have him default. We
won't take a default judgment. He just
lives with the final judgment of the
Court was another option. His presence
is not significant. Again, whether or
not it is still necessary, I am not sure.

MR. GOODIN: A potential way out might be for the Court to hold the claim in abeyance in regards to Mr. Powers. He

doesn't want to be in a default situation, but he doesn't want to pay me to come here in a matter, so that's where we are.

THE COURT: There is a lawsuit hanging over his head. He is not on that contract anymore. He has no legal connection right now other than maybe he lives in Madeira but within the City of Madeira.

I would be inclined to sign an entry granting the Motion to Dismiss. If you want to come up with some alternate, that's fine. But I think he deserves to be out. You have done your job. I think it is time for Mr. Powers to move on.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ GOODIN: We will figure something out.

THE COURT: A week from today?

MR. GOODIN: That's perfect.

MR. MCDONOUGH: I don't need to say much. On behalf of the City of Madeira, Kevin McDonough. We certainly don't oppose the motion to dismiss Mr. Powers out, number one.

Number two, there certainly is an issue regarding whether this entire case is moot at this point because Mr. Powers' contract is gone with the prospective sellers. It is my understanding the contract, there is no reason for him to enter into a contract with Madeira any longer for the sale of that small portion of the piece of property that's located in the historic district.

As we discussed when we were last here and Mr. Hartman stated that I was seeking an advisory opinion of the Court and my counterclaim has been dismissed by the Court. This case may be moot. We need to look into that.

MR. HARTMAN: I think we just need a little bit more evidence just in terms of what the current status is, what future plans are. It may become a moot issue. Of course, there are always the exceptions in terms of great general public interest. That is an exception and may be applicable here. We can visit that down the road; not today.

1 THE COURT: I want to keep it moving, obviously. If we set it out for 2 30 days for something/CMC because if you 3 4 don't work it out, so to speak, then we 5 need to pick dates to keep this thing 6 moving. 7 MR. HARTMAN: I would argue even in 8 the next 30 days, try to work out what 9 the factual record is. If we have to do counter-motions in the meantime, nothing 10 11 prevents us from filing those motions 12 before the 30 days. THE COURT: That's an arbitrary 30 13 days, but that's just my way of keeping 14 15 it moving. 16 MR. GOODIN: Judge, in fairness, I 17 think the contract ran since we were last 18 here. 19 MR. MCDONOUGH: It has expired. 20 MR. GOODIN: But I don't think that 21 was known to anyone when I was last here. 22 MR. MCDONOUGH: It wasn't. 23 THE COURT: I appreciate that. 24 Okay. Talk with Emily. Thanks for your 25 patience.

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I, Ann Marie Stowers, RPR, the undersigned, an Official Court Reporter for the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, do hereby certify that at the same time and place stated herein, I recorded in stenotype and thereafter transcribed the within 9 pages, and that the foregoing Transcript of Proceedings is a true, complete, and accurate transcript of my said stenotype notes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 11th day of October, 2016

Ann Marie Stowers, RPR
Official Court Reporter
Court of Common Pleas
Hamilton County, Ohio

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               On behalf of the Plaintiff.
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    STEVEN GOODIN, ESQ.,
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    BRIAN FOX, ESQ.,
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               On behalf of the Defendant.
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               BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the
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    motions hearing in this cause, heard on
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    Tuesday, September 6, 2016, before the
    Honorable Patrick T. Dinkelacker, a said Judge
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    of the Court of Common Pleas, the following
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    proceedings were had, to wit:
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1 AFTERNOON SESSION - Tuesday, September 6, 2016 2 THE COURT: For the record, City of 3 Madeira, ex rel Oppenheimer versus City 4 of Madeira, Case Number A1506891. 5 Mr. Fox, Mr. Goodin, you represent 6 the City of Madeira as well as Tom 7 Moeller; is that correct? 8 MR. FOX: We do, Your Honor. 9 MR. GOODIN: Yes, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. 11 And, Mr. Hartman, you represent 12 Mr. Oppenheimer; is that correct? 13 MR. OPPENHEIMER: That's correct. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 Matter is on the docket today 16 regarding Respondent's Motion For 17 Judgment on the Pleadings. I have read 18 that motion as well as Relator's 19 Memorandum In Opposition to Motion for 20 Judgment on the Pleadings, as well as Respondent's Reply to Relator's 21 22 Memorandum In Opposition to Motion For 23 Judgment on the Pleadings, as well as the other things that I needed to read. So I 24 25 am ready to proceed.

Mr. Fox, Mr. Goodin, is there anything you wanted to say in regards to your motion?

MR. GOODIN: Your Honor, if I might address the Court for a few moments.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. GOODIN: Judge, we appreciate the Court's time in hearing us on these motions. I know the Court's time is limited. I know you get these motions all the time. This case is a big deal to the City of Madeira and we appreciate you letting us be heard on this. Judge, we will cut right to the point.

We are not trying to be cute by filing this motion or waste anyone's time. We believe this matter is ripe for decision now without any additional discovery. We feel the rule in Ohio in these kinds of cases is very simple.

Basically, it is this. A piece of legislation, a law, charter amendment, anything that has been adopted by a municipality, if that language is not ambiguous, the Court must give it its

plain meaning.

Judge, in this case, the charter amendment which Mr. Oppenheimer apparently drafted, it doesn't even mention public ownership or any kind of prohibition of transfer of the property or against selling any portion of any of the parcels involved.

It clearly only applies to the structures of the building, ask that they be deemed historic and the buildings themselves be allowed to stand. And that's something Madeira simply does not argue or contradict.

Judge, we would argue that even if somehow the language were contradictory or ambiguous, it would still have to be construed against Mr. Oppenheimer as the drafter.

Now, what we think the Court is faced with and what Madeira is faced with here is this. Mr. Oppenheimer apparently wants to depose current former City Council members kind of in hopes that they will give some sort of contrary

interpretation and I don't believe that's going to be the case but we think that is the concern here. We believe that decision, how this works, under Ohio law, he is stuck with the words that he drafted and put before the voters and that the voters approved and those words, Judge, they are in the materials. It is short and sweet. City of Madeira "was deeded and assumed ownership of Hosbrook House located at 7014 Miami Avenue and Muchmore House located at 7010 Miami Avenue.

In addition to these two
properties, the City also has ownership
of historic Railroad Depot located at
7701 Railroad Avenue. These three
important historic properties are to be
preserved, protected and left standing on
the same ground these structures were
built on. These three historic
structures would be included in the,
quote, unquote, historic district.

That's it. This isn't a typical historic preservation code with pages of

detailed regulations. It is one paragraph. That's what Mr. Oppenheimer's group put out, approved by the voters and that's what we stand by.

Factually, Judge, how we got here,

I believe this is in the pleadings, we
are not speaking outside the pleadings,
is that we got an individual who came
forward and wanted to buy a parcel, a
small parcel that was adjacent to or part
of one of these pieces of land, did not
want to buy the structure, take away from
the structure. This lawsuit was filed.

That deal has since fallen apart, as the Court knows, but we would still argue there is controversy here because this is something that is capable of repetition. We have the feeling we will be back in court, even if the City were to try to sell these.

Again, we are not trying to argue that the properties aren't historic or that the properties can be torn down or anything of the sort. But like most historic properties, they can be

transferred to public hands with certain restrictions that are required by the charter.

So, in terms of relief, Judge, we do believe we are here properly. We don't believe further discovery is necessary. We believe the language is clear. If these folks, voters had intended to prescribe or cut off or prohibit any kind of public ownership, and we put the plain language in here, we believe it did not, so we maintain declaratory judgment can be rendered now as a matter of law for the City of Madeira.

THE COURT: This contract, Article 16, was voted on and in ordinance 15-30, they are meant to counteract each other, whatever, in a way. 15-30 is really no longer applicable because at least as far as this lawsuit is concerned, Mr. Powers, that contract which was attached to that ordinance is done, gone, over; is that correct?

MR. GOODIN: That is correct, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: And in the Complaint, the Complaint is asking, in part, under the first cause of action, the declaratory judgment aspect that, in part, preclude the City of Madeira from proceeding forward with the contract authorized by Ordinance Number 15-30. That contract is gone.

Is there any basis for declaratory judgment in regards to that?

MR. GOODIN: In regards to that specific contract, no, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

As far as the second cause of action, which is the injunction against Madeira and Thomas Moeller as the manager, in part, and I quote from part of it, "This is to order the City of Madeira as far as an injunction from executing or performing any other acts whatsoever in furtherance of any contract or prospective contract authorized by ordinance number 15-30."

MR. GOODIN: In regards strictly to

that ordinance, Your Honor, no. That ordinance is dead. You are absolutely correct.

THE COURT: So what is, in your opinion, if you would help me with that, the justiciable with why is this lawsuit still here, then? I understand that you want me to move on and make it a further order regarding future thing. I am just talking about this lawsuit, the language of this lawsuit, what's before the Court?

MR. GOODIN: That is the key question. I will tell you what our position on that is, very straightforward. The Court is correct, the contract that brought this issue to a head is dead. It is not happening. It has been withdrawn. Ordinance was never enacted. It was never acted upon, I should say.

The City's concern is this, is that the issue underlying it, though, is one that is capable of repetition. It is kind of an exception to the mootness doctrine via the standard of the Ohio and

Federal law that if you have a situation, that appellate review, court review is capable of repetition, this is a classic case.

Our understanding, Judge, is if they ever tried to sell one of these pieces of land again, we will be right back in front of this Court or another court on the exact same issue, which is, does Article 16 prohibit public ownership.

So we are, essentially, Judge, trying to call the question. We believe that we found this exception to the mootness doctrine that allows us to do that.

Our view was that, later it was moved for declaratory judgment so, therefore, declaratory judgment could be appropriate either way under the Ohio law, so that's what we are trying to do here, Judge.

So in terms of, the Court is absolutely correct, the contract really at issue is gone. We believe there is a

broader issue as to whether another contract could be entered into. And that's what we are asking the Court, in its discretion, to take up.

THE COURT: If, in fact, I was to rule that because there is no basis for this Court to enter any type of declaratory judgment, there is no basis for this Court in this particular lawsuit as it is right now to issue any injunctive order, I issue that order, I believe you can help me with it. Let's do it this way. Do I have jurisdiction to do anything further in regard to this case?

MR. GOODIN: In regards to, if you deny the declaratory judgment as written and don't take up the other issue --

THE COURT: Right. What you are asking me to do in addition to what's before me. If I say, you know what, your motion is correct. I am granting the motion on the pleadings, there is nothing for me to decide, it is over, what jurisdiction do I have then to extend any

other type of ruling? I am done.

MR. GOODIN: You do not. Judge, it would effectively end the case. It would be tantamount to a 12(b)(6) dismissal of pleadings or dismissal as a matter of law. So, it would have the effect of ending the case. We would leave with an entry stating the Court's interpretation of the ordinance or the charter as written.

The way we see it, Judge, under Ohio law, the Court has two choices, or three choices. One would be to rule for the relator and issue declaratory judgment saying that there is some sort of public ownership, people are required to comply here, which we strongly disagree with.

Secondarily, the Court could find the matter to be moot because the contract is dead and simply dismiss the case.

Or, third, we could issue a declaratory judgment in Madeira's favor saying that there is no public ownership

1 requirement and dismiss the case that 2 So we think there are really three way. 3 paths under Ohio law the Court could go 4 down. 5 THE COURT: Thank you very much, 6 Mr. Goodin. I appreciate your responses. 7 MR. GOODIN: We would like to 8 reserve a couple moments for Mr. Fox to 9 reply. 10 THE COURT: It is your motion. Ι 11 always give the movant another chance. 12 Mr. Hartman, I know I have read 13 everything you have brought before me and 14 you always do a good job of laying out 15 what you want the Court to read. I guess I am back to the, you know, what is still 16 17 here? 18 MR. HARTMAN: I think there is 19 still a live controversy actually with 20 respect to Ordinance 15-30. 21 With all due respect, Mr. Goodin's 22 representation that that is over, dead 23 and done with, I don't believe that's 24 accurate. 25 THE COURT: Tell me why.

1 MR. HARTMAN: May I approach? 2 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 3 MR. HARTMAN: This, Your Honor, is 4 a copy of a resolution from the Madeira 5 City Council. It is 17 there -- 16, that 6 was passed this year. This was actually 7 to approve a contract related to the 8 development that's at issue in 15-30 9 ordinance. 10 In light of this lawsuit, they look 11 to do some other things not involving 12 these historic properties. 13 THE COURT: Before you go on, am I 14 allowed to consider this in regards to a 15 12(c)? 16 MR. HARTMAN: I believe you are for 17 two reasons. One, questioning mootness. 18 Mootness actually becomes an evidentiary. 19 Mr. Goodin simply getting up here and 20 saying, it is over and done with is not 21 sufficient evidence to find a case moot. 22 THE COURT: I am not considering it 23 I am considering moot, if I grant 24 their motion and the case is over, then I 25 certainly consider their request for me

to make a further ruling moot.

Go ahead with your argument.

MR. HARTMAN: First issue, the Court has to say is the case moot. If it doesn't, it lacks any case or controversy by which to make any further ruling or decision.

And so like I said, with mootness, the party claiming mootness, which is usually the defendant, has to come in and establish factually that the case is moot, that there is no likelihood that the ordinance will be adopted, et cetera. So Mr. Goodin coming in here and simply saying it is over and done with, the deal has fallen apart, is not evidence, is not sufficient to make it moot.

Before you, Your Honor, is

Resolution 17-16, which isn't public

record of the City of Madeira. I believe

it is available on their website. So,

therefore, the Court can take judicial

notice of it both in terms of the 12(c)

motion or otherwise.

And if you look at this contract,

City Council of the City of Madeira authorized on the recital page of this contract they approved, paragraph E talks about this lawsuit and the contract at issue in 15-30.

It says, "A lawsuit has been filed that refences this lawsuit" and then it goes on "which attempts to prevent the seller hereunder and the purchaser hereunder to enter into another contract captioned the first contract for sale.

That is the contract at issue in 15-30.

It then goes on, "This recital states that the parties hereto intended to enter into the first contract, but based upon the filing of the lawsuit" -- this lawsuit -- "the parties were temporarily prevented from doing so pursuant to the agreed preliminary injunction."

This is the key phrase in this recital.

"If a lawsuit is dismissed or decided in favor of the purchaser, the parties intend to enter into the first

1 contract."

The parties, the City of Madeira has declared by this contract their intentions to proceed forward with the contract authorized by 15-30. The case is not moot. They have not totally disavowed any interest to pursue that contract. They have actually declared the opposite. So I believe that clearly establishes and repudiates any claim that the case is moot. So, therefore, there is a live justiciable controversy.

Mr. Goodin talks about this case as capable of repetition yet in danger of review. That concept requires fact-specific issues. Simply saying the issue of the charter may come up again is not enough to be, if the case is moot, to be capable of repetition yet in danger of review. It has to be the same or similar factual scenario that has to arise.

And this factual scenario, and the issue really becomes, what is the scope of the authority of the City of Madeira to do with these historic properties, the

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properties designated by address, i.e., by parcel, and declaration in the City charter, not only that the three historic properties are to be preserved, protected and left standing on the same ground and that the historic structures will be included in this historic district.

Simply trying to give a broad declaration as to what that means is not the proper role of the Court. The Court must make that ruling based on specific facts, specific instances before it. We brought that to this Court in the context of Resolution 15-30 where the City of Madeira sought to sell, to transfer free and clear a portion of those historic properties without any restrictions whatsoever.

As we indicate in our reply, it is not a question of who owns the property.

It is a question of what is done and must be done in order to allow for those properties to be preserved, protected and left standing on the same ground.

We believe the case is ripe and

should adjudicated. It is ripe for adjudication. The question becomes, it is not ripe for motion -- judgment on the pleadings with the declaratory judgment of some declaratory judgment that I don't know what they want.

All this Court can declare, based upon the facts in the case presented, is whether the proposed contract under Resolution 15-30 violates or does not violate that charter provision.

That's all the Court can do. It can only make the ruling and declaratory judgment based on the facts and the issues presented by those facts.

So, at this stage, I don't believe the Respondents are entitled to their judgment on the pleadings. I think we need to develop, really, the scope and the intent of that thing. It is interesting and it is not in the record, but we have come across the legal opinion from the Madeira City Hall director where he opined that the parties -- he says, there is no prohibition against selling

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the property but it should be noted that any party acquiring the property would be subject to the restriction that the properties be preserved, protected and left standing.

Our whole issue has been that Resolution 15-30 provided no such requirement upon the purchaser.

The charter provision is not going to be in the chain of title. Whether or not they do it by restrictive covenant or whatnot, that's what we need at any sale, at any deed transferring any portion of those properties. The properties themselves have to be preserved, protected and left standing on the same ground. How they do that, that's discretionary to the City. But to simply give a fee simple removal or dividing of the property in fee simple with no restrictions whatsoever, that's the 15-30 had no such restrictions, issue. no such limitations upon the purchaser. That's the issue. It is a live issue. And the Court can rule on that live

issue.

I indicated the City charter is akin to a constitution. Courts, in adjudicating constitutional questions rule on the issues that are presented to them and from that, people can start learning and garnering what the constitution means, doesn't mean.

Courts don't open up the door or broadly say, here is what the constitution means, theoretically. Here are the facts. Here is the ruling. And over time, the people learn what the First Amendment means, the 14th and in this case, it will over time based on the specific facts. I believe we need to present the case to the Court probably by cross-motions for summary judgment as to what the scope is and the permissibility or not of the contract authorized by 15-30.

If the Court has any further questions on that, on the mootness question, et cetera --

THE COURT: I go through these

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March 24th, the Court put on an cases. entry granting Defendant Thomas Powers' Motion to Dismiss. He is out. So it is not a question of fact where that stands and not just because Mr. Goodin or somebody stood up and said, Judge, it is over and done with. He is out of this lawsuit. If he is out of the lawsuit and the two causes of actions that you filed on behalf of your client, there is nothing I can do about them, I am back to, why does this lawsuit need to continue at all? He is out. That's not a fact issue anymore. There are no facts to be determined, developed, in regards to that. He is out. That's what the cause of action was brought to this Court on, injunctive declaratory relief. went through it again last night. Why am I doing this?

MR. HARTMAN: Because the question is really, this comes up as a taxpayer in an action challenging an abuse of corporate power. Mr. Powers is in only because he may or have claimed interest

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in that contract. Mr. Goodin came in representing Mr. Powers at the time saying, he doesn't need to be in there, so whether or not Mr. Powers is or is not in this lawsuit is irrelevant because the impression is it is an abuse of corporate power. Has the City or is the City exceeding or threating to exceed its corporate powers by entering into the contract authorized by 15-30. And that the Court can say, City, you cannot do that.

whether or not Mr. Powers is in the case doesn't matter. We believe 15-30 is still reliable based upon the recitals in the most recent contract and, therefore, the Court can declare whether or not the contract proposed by 15-30 does or does not preserve, protect and leave standing on the same ground the property at issue.

THE COURT: I appreciate the argument.

Mr. Fox.

MR. FOX: Thank you, Your Honor.
You were correct in identifying for

purposes of this motion today the Court is really constrained to the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Rule 12(c) motions are to be treated just like a Rule 12(b)(6) would, so the Court is really constrained to what was actually pled here. If you look at what's actually pled here, this case is really relatively simple.

If you look at the Complaint,
paragraphs 8, 15, 16, there is the
request by the relator that the Court
prevent the City from transferring this
property because there was some sort of,
I would argue, erroneous belief the local
governments, municipalities under home
rule are not allowed to transfer property
where there is a charter amendment
stating that certain properties are to be
preserved and protected.

Nowhere in the pleadings, either in the Complaint, either in the motion for preliminary injunction is there any sort of connection between the argument that the diminution in value is actually violative of the charter amendment. The

charter amendment is not a work of art.

The City didn't write it. Counsel didn't cause it to be written. The charter amendment is not a work of art. But it is unambiguous inasmuch as it does nothing to constrain or prevent the City from disposing of this property whether it be a sliver or whether it be the whole property, the whole address.

what is of paramount importance with the charter amendment is that so long as these properties exist, they are to be preserved and protected.

Mr. Powers was dismissed out, so the new resolution that we just saw has no bearing or effect on this Court. It is the City's argument that there are really only two options in this case.

One is to dismiss this case for mootness.

The other option is that the Court would grant our motion for judgment on the pleadings and construe this charter amendment such that it acknowledges that the City does have the power to dispose

of this property, that the City does have the power and that there is nothing contained in that charter amendment that would prevent or limit the City's ability to dispose of the property.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Fox.

I have read everything I am supposed to read. I thought about this. Interesting arguments from both sides. I appreciate that. It is a 12(c) motion. The standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civil Rule 12(c) is similar to a standard for evaluating Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

under Civil Rule 12(c) dismissal is appropriate where the Court, number one, construes the material allegations in the Complaint with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party as true and finds beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle him to relief. I cite as authority, State ex rel Midwest Pride,

on the questions of law. It may be granted only when no issues of material fact exist and the movement is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Respondent is asking for three things in the motion.

IV, Inc. versus Pontious, 75 Ohio St. 3d

case. Civil Rule 12(c) motion presents

It is a 1996 Ohio Supreme Court

Number one, their motion be granted in its entirety. That relator's Complaint be dismissed on the merits and the prejudice and that a ruling for future possible lawsuits coming from Article 16 do not prohibit the City from selling any property in its possession.

I have already done a little bit of the complaint situation. Declaratory judgment, from the outset, this lawsuit was brought to preclude the City of Madeira from proceeding forward with the contract authorized by 15-30. That is a contract which is attached as part of the pleadings with regards to Mr. Powers.

According to Mr. Powers being dismissed

from this lawsuit on March 24th, that is no longer pending before the Court.

The second cause of action was the injunction against Madeira and Thomas Moeller, in part, from executing or performing any other acts in furtherance of any contract or prospective contract authorized by Ordinance Number 15-30.

Again, 15-30 is not something that is pending before the Court. There is no contract pending. There is no deed transfer pending. There is nothing with Mr. Powers. He is out of this case pursuant to the filings in this case. So the Court has trouble with finding what justiciable issue is pending at this point. I think I know which way I have to go on that.

As far as the Respondent's further motion asking the Court for the issuance of a declaratory judgment because, in part, and I am quoting, in part, which is the property in question is in limbo. I understand that.

Drawing a part from my days in the

court of Appeals, there is no pending issue before this Court. There is no agreed party left. If I, in fact, grant the motion, there may be a grievance in the future, and it certainly looks like it is heading that way, but I don't believe the Court is empowered with the authority or the jurisdiction maybe even to decide the case at this point.

What I have before me, I am

persuaded that the motion -- Respondent's

Motion to Dismiss is appropriate. I will

grant that motion. Relator's Complaint

is dismissed on the merits and with

prejudice at this point.

I find the other request because there is no justiciable issue before the Court, the Court is not in the business of and should not be in the business of making preemptive anticipatory ruling so I am not going to rule on that.

The case is dismissed. Cost to plaintiff. I would ask for an entry within two weeks.

Anything further for the record at

1 this point, Mr. Fox, Mr. Goodin? 2 Nothing, Your Honor. MR. FOX: 3 MR. GOODIN: No, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Hartman. 5 MR. HARTMAN: If I can seek 6 clarification on your ruling. I was a 7 little lost. You indicate the Motion to 8 Dismiss is granted on the merits and as 9 otherwise stated. I am a little bit lost. If the case is moot --10 11 THE COURT: You are absolutely 12 right. It is dismissed, but I am not 13 ruling on the merits. The merits could 14 be construed to be some type of factual 15 situation. There are not facts I am 16 ruling on because the party that's 17 subject -- that's a good point. If you 18 are providing the Court with an entry, I 19 asked both counsel to provide it to me, 20 but if you are providing it to me, please 21 do not put in there on the merits because 22 I think Mr. Hartman is absolutely 23 correct, it is not on the merits. 24 MR. FOX: Dismissed with prejudice? 25 MR. HARTMAN: You are saying 15-30

is no longer applicable. There is no longer controversy. It is not a disposition on the merits, not with prejudice because if the issue rearises again, with prejudice would be on the merits. There is a res judicata effect. If they reenact the ordinance --

THE COURT: I have to admit, I did not recently look up what prejudice means. I apologize to everybody.

Perhaps the Court should know that. I do not. I do not want to grant this on the merits. I actually took that language, which I wrote out, from your suggested entry.

It will be dismissed. I am dismissing the case based upon the granting of the motion. There is nothing there for me to do. It is over. Help me with the prejudice.

MR. FOX: We will work it out. It was before the Court on motion for judgment on the pleadings so as a matter of clarity, you are granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to

points one and two of our attached order, but not to three?

THE COURT: That's correct. I am not ruling on three. You are just asking the motion be granted, which I am doing, and second, the case is dismissed because there is nothing left.

MR. FOX: That's what we are asking for.

THE COURT: The prejudice, you want to take the prejudice out? I don't have a problem. I did not do my homework but I appreciate him bringing that up.

MR. FOX: I think the concern he has with respect to some sort of collateral effect or res judicata effect I think is not something to be concerned about but I will check. We will work on it together.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. If it needs to come back, come on back and I can do my homework. I have done it before. Off the top of my head, I didn't think to do my research on that. Good point.

MR. FOX: Hopefully, we will work it out and won't need to approach the Court. THE COURT: Two weeks? Put the appropriate language on there. If you need to do what you got to do, just let me know. I appreciate the professionalism, the way it was presented. We will see what happens. Thank you very much. (Proceedings concluded.)

CERTIFICATE I, Ann Marie Stowers, RPR, the undersigned, an Official Court Reporter for the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, do hereby certify that at the same time and place stated herein, I recorded in stenotype and thereafter transcribed the within 34 pages, and that the foregoing Transcript of Proceedings is a true, complete, and accurate transcript of my said stenotype notes. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 11th day of October, 2016 Ann Marie Stowers, RPR Official Court Reporter Court of Common Pleas Hamilton County, Ohio

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1	COURT OF COMMON PLEAS				
2	HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO				
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4	CITY OF MADEIRA, ex rel.				
5	OPPENHEIMER,				
6	Plaintiff, Appeal No. C1600762				
7	vs. Case No. A1506891				
8	CITY OF MADEIRA, et al.,				
9	Defendant.				
10					
11					
12	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS				
13					
14	APPEARANCES:				
15	CURT HARTMAN, ESQ., On behalf of the Plaintiff.				
16	STEVEN GOODIN, ESQ.,				
17	BRIAN FOX, ESQ.,				
18	On behalf of the Defendant.				
19					
20	BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the				
21	motions hearing in this cause, heard on				
22	Tuesday, September 20, 2016, before the				
23	Honorable Patrick T. Dinkelacker, a said Judge				
24	of the Court of Common Pleas, the following				
25	proceedings were had, to wit:				

1		EXHIBIT INDEX				
2	СО	URT'S		REG	CEIVE	
3	1	Entry Dismissing Action Without Prejudice	Page	13,	Line	14
4		without Prejudice				
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1 MORNING SESSION - Tuesday, September 20, 2016 2 THE COURT: Anybody here on 3 Oppenheimer versus City of Madeira? 4 Come up, gentlemen. We may have a little 5 problem here. It is on the docket for 6 hearing. But in checking my notes, the 7 docket, I am not sure what it is here 8 for. 9 MR. GOODIN: We had a hearing and 10 you asked us to kind of figure out the 11 entry how this case has gone. 12 We took the prejudice out. What we 13 did, we have dueling entries, I guess, 14 unfortunately. 15 Basically, what we understood Your 16 Honor to say was, we had three prongs. 17 Our motion is granted, case dismissed and 18 then a third thing about declaratory 19 judgment. We took three out and then we 20 went to the second prong, said prejudice, 21 and we took that out, which is what we 22 thought the Court wanted. 23 THE COURT: That's what I said.

MR. GOODIN: So that's what we proffered.

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Mr. Hartman has a different take.

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MR. HARTMAN: Gets into the, on the merits, not on the merits, et cetera, because is there going to be res judicata effect to this entry.

The entry that the Respondents tendered indicate firstly, the motion for the judgment on the pleadings is granted, but then the Complaint is dismissed, which is legally incompatible. You can't dismiss a Complaint and then grant a judgment. You either grant a judgment, which is an adjudication on the merits or you dismiss the case.

And under Rule 41(b)(3), and I have got a copy of the rules for the Court on that, Rule 41(b)(3) says that dismissal under division B of this rule, which doesn't apply, and any dismissal not provided for in this rule except as provided below, which isn't applicable, operates as an adjudication upon the merits unless the Court, in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies.

Therefore, I think that it is

1 critical that the entry indicate that it 2 is without prejudice. I have a few cases 3 I pulled that I can show the Court. 4 THE COURT: You are okay with their 5 entry if I put without prejudice on it? 6 MR. HARTMAN: No, I don't think --7 I don't think, in essence, legally what 8 the Court did do, it did not grant their 9 motion for judgment on the pleadings. 10 you granted their motion for judgment on 11 the pleadings, you are entering judgment 12 in their favor. 13 THE COURT: I thought that's what I 14 did. 15 MR. HARTMAN: But I think 16 substantively -- because if you grant 17 judgment on the pleadings, you can't 18 dismiss the Complaint. 19 THE COURT: But I thought granting 20 the motion for judgment on the pleadings 21 in their favor, then the Complaint needs 22 to be dismissed. 23 MR. HARTMAN: What you really did 24 substantively is you accepted their 25 arguments, which is the entry I tendered

which basically says that having considered the briefing oral arguments, Court finds that in light of the City having proceeded in a manner no longer involving the sale of the real estate as authorized by the Ordinance 15-30, there is no longer a live case or controversy. There is no longer a justiciable issue. It is no longer, in essence, a ripe case anymore. You accepted their arguments in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. I just don't want a judgment entered that becomes an adjudicatory thing. Otherwise, I have to take it up on appeal. Without prejudice, it is not even an appealable order.

MR. GOODIN: Judge, if I could address this. Another option that we offered which seems to me the simplest way out of it, if you were inclined to go down this path, we have tendered an order that just says, the case is hereby dismissed, period. No prejudice either way. Nothing about a judgment. Nothing about anything, which struck us as the

1 easiest way out of this thing. If they try to move this property, there will be 2 3 a refiling. 4 MR. HARTMAN: You will argue res 5 judicata. You look at Court of Appeals 6 decisions. There are cases where the 7 Court of Appeals bemoan that trial courts 8 did not say whether or not the dismissal 9 was with or without prejudice and then the Courts of Appeals are going through 10 11 machinations trying to figure out was it 12 with or without prejudice. We know 13 that's a potential issue. 14 THE COURT: I thought if you did 15 not put with prejudice, the law presumes 16 that it was done without prejudice. 17 MR. GOODIN: That was my 18 understanding. 19 MR. HARTMAN: If I may refer you to 20 Rule 41(b)(3). 21 I have a copy for the Court. 22 THE COURT: 41(b)(3). 23 MR. HARTMAN: When the party 24 voluntarily dismisses its Complaint, that 25 it is without prejudice, Rule 41(A)(1).

That's where the default is without prejudice.

I have a case, Deutsche Bank

National Trust versus Eddington, 2014

Ohio 1769 from the Fourth District,

paragraph 11.

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"It is generally true that under Rule 41(b)(3) when a trial court dismisses a complaint, but the entry is silent about whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, the dismissal is with prejudice. The presumption that when a dismissal is without prejudice is only under 41(A) when a plaintiff files a notice of dismissal voluntarily.

My concern is without the entry, the argument for dismissal is with prejudice because the entry doesn't indicate such under (b)(3).

THE COURT: All I know is my attempt was to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings, which I believe then results in the Complaint being dismissed and I am not dismissing it on the merits or with prejudice per

1 the entry.

That's what I meant to do. That's what I am telling the Court of Appeals, which will take a look at this and that's fine. That is what I am saying to the Court of Appeals. That was my intention. And I think the entry that you have reflects that. Is that correct?

MR. GOODIN: Judge, we didn't say prejudice either way. We are not trying to be funny or pull any trick here. We originally had in there with prejudice so we took that out, and I thought what the Court, I think, thought which that means it is a junk ball, effectively, if it is refiled.

MR. HARTMAN: And if we agree on that conclusion, why not state it?

MR. GOODYEAR: Well, candidly, we also don't want to get beat up with this back and forth. Judge, this may seem like kind of a silly case, but over in Madeira, it is a big deal. Sometimes it has that --

THE COURT: Taking a lot of my

time.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ GOODIN: I do apologize for that.

Judge, all I can say is, we proffered an order that we thought was to the "T" what you asked for. We can have it reviewed.

MR. FOX: It was consistent, when I confirmed at the hearing, you are granting one, two, but not three? Yeah. So that's what we did. We included within the order that language.

MR. HARTMAN: Part of the problem,
I think, is what City of Madeira is being
told because the City manager reports to
City Council that Judge Dinkelacker
granted our Motion for Summary Judgment.
This is in court, in the case involving
the City's legal ability to sell a
portion of the property within the
historic district. They are viewing it
as a win.

MR. GOODIN: There was never summary judgment. I don't know where he got that.

1 THE COURT: I don't care what the 2 guy says. 3 MR. HARTMAN: We agree that it is 4 not an adjudication on the merits, that 5 there is no res judicata effect. Why not 6 have language? We are all on the same 7 page there. That's what I understand the 8 Court's rule is. 9 THE COURT: I am going to go with 10 this. What would you want me to pencil 11 in here to make it part of this hearing? 12 MR. HARTMAN: I think the 13 clarification, basically, that this entry 14 does not constitute an adjudication on 15 the merits and is, therefore, without 16 prejudice. If I get that entry, I have 17 to appeal it to preserve my rights. 18 Otherwise, res judicata. 19 THE COURT: I learned as a trial 20 judge, appeal what you want. 21 MR. HARTMAN: I am trying to 22 promote judicial economy, though. We all 23 agree it is not on the merits. 24 THE COURT: Doesn't mean they are 25 right. It just means they got the last

1 I know all about the Court of say. 2 Appeals. 3 MR. HARTMAN: But we all agree it is not on the merits and without 4 5 prejudicial effect. Why not put it in 6 the entry? That's what I want. We all 7 agree on it. 8 MR. FOX: We don't all agree. 9 MR. HARTMAN: You do think there is 10 prejudicial effect. See, that's my 11 problem. 12 MR. GOODIN: Judge, we submit it to 13 the Court. 14 MR. HARTMAN: If I can tender mine 15 as an alternative. 16 THE COURT: I will tell you what. 17 Mark it as -- we will make it a part of 18 the record. 19 I am not going to second-quess 20 myself. I understand you are doing your 21 job as an attorney. Good for you. You always do. This is what I said. And, 22 23 you know what, maybe for clarification, 24 you have a Fourth District case there. I 25 didn't hear our First District. I would

religiously follow what the First 1 2 District did. 3 MR. HARTMAN: I got that entry last 4 evening so I didn't have much time. 5 THE COURT: No problem. 6 I signed the order that was 7 proffered by the defendants. I do want 8 to make part of the record, Ann Marie, 9 Mr. Hartman's Entry Dismissing Action 10 Without Prejudice, so if this goes to the 11 Court of Appeals, they have a chance to look at that and see what they have to 12 13 say. 14 (Court's Exhibit 1 was marked and 15 received into evidence.) 16 MR. HARTMAN: That raises then a second issue of a stay pending appeal. 17 18 We did have the agreed injunction in 19 place during the course of this case with 20 the Court entering the entry disposing of 21 the case that would vacate that 22 injunction. I will be asking then for that stay or similar injunction pending 23 24 appeal. 25 That goes to the Court MR. GOODIN:

1 of Appeals? 2 MR. HARTMAN: Goes to trial court 3 first. 4 MR. GOODIN: I am unaware of any --5 MR. HARTMAN: Not to belabor this case any further for you. 6 7 THE COURT: I try to get it right. 8 Once I dismiss the case, especially when 9 and if you file your Notice of Appeal, I 10 have lost all jurisdiction to do 11 anything. 12 MR. HARTMAN: Except for a stay 13 pending appeal. 14 MR. GOODIN: I think that's right. 15 He can file a stay before the appeal goes 16 on. Then he has to renew it up there. 17 MR. HARTMAN: If you deny it, then 18 I go to the Court of Appeals. 19 MR. FOX: We will most certainly 20 object to any preliminary injunction on the merits based on the arguments that we 21 22 set forth in our motion. 23 MR. HARTMAN: I want to give you a 24 heads up. I will file that motion, then. 25 I have to file the Notice of Appeal first

CERTIFICATE

I, Ann Marie Stowers, RPR, the undersigned, an Official Court Reporter for the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, do hereby certify that at the same time and place stated herein, I recorded in stenotype and thereafter transcribed the within 16 pages, and that the foregoing Transcript of Proceedings is a true, complete, and accurate transcript of my said stenotype notes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 12th day of October, 2016

> Ann Marie Stowers, RPR Official Court Reporter Court of Common Pleas Hamilton County, Ohio

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