Shadows of Syntax: Notes, Typos, and Errata (Last Updated: November 2020)

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This document will be updated whenever new issues come to light.

Shadows of Syntax

- Page xiv: typo — "had became".

- Page 34: typo — "that it is itself".

- Page 42: There is one point in this discussion where the wording might be misleading in seeming to identify composite and singular dispositions. The intended sense was instead identifying a single composite disposition *plurally* with many singular dispositions.

- Page 47: "instead" is a bit awkward here, toward the top.

- Section 2.IX: Here I suggest that acceptance/rejection and inference need to be interdefined, but that neither of these notions require inference-rule-following. This is a claim about these notions, *as such*. Obviously, my inferentialist view entails that having beliefs with certain content, such as logical beliefs, requires following certain inference rules. Some of the complexities about this are discuss in section 4.VII. There is a sense in which a global inferentialist metasemantics would require inference-rule-following in order to

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have any propositional attitudes, but (a) in the book I consciously avoid assuming global inferentialism and (b) this requirement is arguably different than the one I am denying here. Sorting all of this out requires a full metasemantic theory for the whole of language. Work for the future.

- Page 55: typo — "philosophical motivation for view".

- Page 57: "unnatural" would probably be better than "unwieldy" here.

- Page 64: The case where c occurs in R is that of being "directly" for an expression.

- Page 66: In the first "meaning-constituting" the dash is unneeded. Likewise in "narrow-holism" in the next paragraph (and the reverse for the following, "narrow holist (and non-holist) inferentialists").

- Page 81: Footnote 51 shouldn't be read as ruling out the relevance of more complex, model-theoretic arguments to this issue.

- Page 96: typo — "the the canonical opponent".

- Page 110: typo — should be "propositionalist" instead of "propositional" in footnote 28,

- Page 115: It would have been worth citing Davidson's discussion in "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" to bolster my point here.

- Page 136: At the bottom, the bit about instances of schematic rules not "explicitly" containing the expression means only that the schematic form of the rule doesn't contain it.

- Page 143: typo — "as similar story".

- Page 144: typo — "said principle", should be "principles".

- Page 153: typo — "modus ponens in valid".

- Page 163: typo — "Boghossian call this".

- Page 173: typo — "attributing the idea of Casimir Lewy".

- Page 184: typo — "more in more detail".

- Section 7.IV: This section is crucial in answering the motley of vague objections people continue to raise to conventionalism even after abandoning the pointed arguments discussed in the first three sections of chapter 7. For the most part, these objections are confused in a way this section tries to explain. In particular, much confusion is generated by different senses of both "convention" and "true by". Let me illustrate the first point with chess, which we are *all* conventionalists about. Is it "conventional" that you can't mate a lone king with a knight and a king? Yes, in the sense that our chess conventions constitute a practice in which that cannot be done. No, in that this is a fact *about* the conventionally constituted game of chess, and is not itself something we merely stipulated directly. Obviously there are objective facts about conventionally determined practices. The same holds for our conventionally determined linguistic practices. Somewhat related confusions bedevil worries about logic being "true by" convention. Instances of the law of non-contradiction are conventional, not because they are are derivable from our conventions, explicitly stated, but because they are derivable from nothing, *using* our conventions. Of course, these and other related points are stressed throughout the book, but I wanted to point those troubled by related worries to this section, in particular.

- Page 210: Footnote 3 uses "X" instead of "F", without comment.

- Page 213: typo — "say that language is", missing "a".

- Page 214: typo — "need go meta".

- Pages 216-217: These principles too are *explanatory*.

- Page 229: "quantifier deflationists" in footnote 54, should be "metadeflationists".

- Page 230: typo — "predicate-expressions", should be "predicate-like expressions".

- Page 231: typo — "does he" should be "he does" in footnote 61.

- Page 245: typo — "of the a".

- Page 262: typo — "impact" should be "impacts" in footnote 40.

- Page 264: typo — missing ":" in the lead-in to the Tarski quote.

- Page 268: Omega inconsistent theories aren't automatically inconsistent with their uniform reflection principles, as my comment here seems to suggest. They are inconsistent with uniform reflection plus true theory of Π_2-sentences in the language of arithmetic. See the notes to "Infinite Reasoning", in my paper notes and errata.

- Page 273: I think "set-models" and "class model results" should probably be "set models and "class-model results".

- Section 11.II: The parenthetical at the start of this section is just for focus.

- Page 293: typo — "it likely that".

- Page 302: typo — "some intuitively some".

- Page 316: Footnote 37 is quite compressed. Originally there was a complete section responding to Hauser and Woodin, but it was a late cut.

- Page 372: The publication dates for Tennant's *Anti-Realism in Logic* and *The Taming of the True* should be 1987 and 1997, respectively. Also, in the listing for the former there is a typo — "Tennnant".

- My apologies to readers for these. As I hinted at in the preface, the typesetting of this book was quite vexed for several reasons. Any errors that slipped through are entirely my fault. I hope I get a chance to correct these in a paperback edition.