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**THE 2022 NATO MADRID SUMMIT
BACKGROUND, KEY DECISIONS, AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS**

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Introduction

NATO's 2022 Summit was probably one of the most anticipated events in the Alliance's history, due to the historic decisions that had to be made such as the new NATO Strategic Concept, applications of Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance among other major security issues. The Summit was held on June 29th - 30th, 2022 in Madrid, where member states' leaders discussed the Alliance's security issues *"to make sure that NATO continues to fulfil its key purpose and greatest responsibility: ensuring collective defense for its member countries and keeping its one billion people safe."* Participation of no member states in the Summit made it more interesting and challenging; especially the countries that attended a NATO Summit for first time like Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.

The Political Background Behind the Scenes...

On June 27th, 2022 NATO's Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg highlighted during a press conference, that the Summit would be a transformative one emphasizing the fundamental shift in the Alliance's deterrence and defense policy. He also pointed out that China would be addressed for the first time. Stoltenberg also said that NATO was going to strengthen its forward defense and boost its ability to reinforce during crisis and conflicts. It is important to note that the day before the opening of the Summit Turkey, Finland and Sweden signed a memorandum opening the Alliance's door to the Scandinavian countries.

At this point it should be stressed that Finland's and Sweden's NATO membership was one of the major concerns for the Alliance since Turkey had opposed their accession claiming that both countries are *"home"* to many terrorist organizations. The trilateral memorandum signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three countries in June 28th, 2022 stated among others that Finland and Sweden will not provide support to YPG/PYD and Gulen's movement known as FETO; in addition they would confirm that the PKK is a proscribed terrorist organization, and that there are no national arms embargoes in place between them and Turkey. Lastly, they would commit to the implementation of seven concrete steps through the establishment of a Permanent Joint Mechanism., Turkey in return agreed to support Finland's and Sweden's NATO membership.

Another significant NATO security issue that was believed to be addressed at the Summit by Turkey was its demand for the demilitarization of most of the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean Sea. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlut Cavusoglu warned that if Athens did not change course, Ankara would question the sovereignty of the islands, an action that prompted Greece's to swiftly react releasing 16 maps that demonstrated Turkey's illegal unilateral actions and claims. Nevertheless, Turkey decided to not make good on the threat avoiding, to further escalate the tension after its opposition to Finland's and Sweden's accession. The Turkish President denied meeting the Greek Prime Minister stating that *"It is impossible for me to meet with Mr. Mitsotakis. We have closed the door on that."*

Participants and the Agenda

The agenda of this year's Summit was mainly based on the 2030 agenda that was endorsed during the 2021 NATO Summit held in Brussels on June 14th. The agenda was the result of a process that involved consultation with Allies along with input from security experts, member state top officials and civil society, aiming at the strengthening of the Alliance's members - both militarily and politically - in order to adapt to the rapidly changing security environment. The 2030 agenda comprised of the following 9 proposals:

- ✓ Deepening the political consultation and coordination,
- ✓ Strengthening Deterrence and Defense,
- ✓ Improving Resilience,
- ✓ Preserving NATO's technological edge,
- ✓ Upholding the rules-based international order,
- ✓ Boosting training and capacity building,
- ✓ Combating and adapting to Climate Change,
- ✓ Endorsing the next Strategic Concept, and
- ✓ Investing in NATO.

The 2022 NATO Summit brought together the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance's 30 members along with their counterparts from Australia, Finland, Georgia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, Ukraine. The Summit was also attended by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, Jordan's and Mauritania's Foreign Ministers, as well as the Minister of

Defense of Bosnia & Herzegovina. According to NATO's official website, the security issues that were to be discussed included:

- ✓ Strengthening NATO's long-term Deterrence and Defense,
- ✓ Sustaining support for Ukraine,
- ✓ Launching NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept,
- ✓ Reinforcing partnerships and maintaining an Open Door,
- ✓ Adapting to threats and challenges from any direction, and
- ✓ Transatlantic unity and Alliance solidarity.

Key Decisions

The decisions made by the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance's members were published in the *Madrid Summit Declaration* that was issued on June 29th. The first part of the Declaration - acting as an introduction - describes the security challenges faced by the Alliance stating that "*NATO is a defensive Alliance and poses no threat to any country*". It also stressed NATO's commitment to uphold the rules - based international order, condemned Russia's actions against Ukraine describing them as "*a blatant violation of international law,*" reiterated the Alliance's unwavering support to Ukraine, characterized Russia as "*the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area,*" and finally addressed several asymmetric threats faced by NATO along with systemic competition mainly from the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The first key decision mentioned in the Madrid Summit Declaration is the endorsement of the new *Strategic Concept*. NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept maintains the 2010 Strategic Concept's core tasks - deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security - emphasizing in deterrence and defense. In fact, the description of NATO's strategic environment begins with the phrase "*the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace,*" to continue by stating later that Russia is trying to "*establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation.*" As far as China is concerned, the new Concept underlines that PRC's policies challenge NATO's interests, security and values, while its strategic partnership with Russia poses a threat to the Alliance. It also stresses the need for strengthening dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, an action that will


directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.




Picture 1 (Photo Source: www.nato.int)

The second decision mentioned in the Declaration is the Alliance’s enhanced political and practical “*support to Ukraine,*” through the delivery of non-lethal defense equipment, the improvement of Ukrainian cyber defenses and resilience, and the modernization of its defense sector. Another decision that was made was the strengthening of the Alliance’s “*Deterrence and Defense posture,*” through a new 360-degree approach, the deployment of additional combat-ready forces on NATO’s eastern flank reaching to Brigade-size units (Pictures 1, 2), the creation of credible rapidly available reinforcements by increasing the number of NATO’s high readiness forces to well over 300,000 (Picture 3), the preposition of equipment, the enhancement of Command & Control (C2), the establishment of division-level structures of C2 and the enhancement of the Alliance’s collective defense exercises.

The fourth key decision mentioned is the enhancement of NATO’s “*Resilience,*” a capacity characterized both as a national responsibility and a collective commitment, through the strengthening of the Alliance’s “*energy security and interoperability,*” the endorsement of a new “*Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Policy,*” the enhancement of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), the expansion of NATO’s partnership with industry and the establishment of a virtual rapid response cyber capability.




Picture 2 (Photo Source: www.nato.int)



Picture 3 (Photo Source: www.nato.int)

The Allies also decided to invest more in Defense by launching a multinational “*Innovation Fund*,” which will complement the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), to endorse a strategy concerning the delivery of the next

generation Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS), and to integrate *Climate Change* (Picture 4) and *Human Security* considerations across all of NATO's core tasks.



Picture 4 (Photo Source: www.nato.int)

Other key decisions included the incorporation of “*Gender Perspectives*” across the Alliance, the enhancement of cooperation with current and new NATO’s “*partner states*” beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, the strengthening of the Alliance’s strategic partnership with the European Union, the adoption of new political and practical measures to support Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and partners from the South. The last two decisions mentioned in the Madrid Summit Declaration were the signing of the Accession Protocols with Finland and Sweden - an action that reaffirmed the member’s commitment to NATO’s Open Door Policy - and the Alliance’s commitment to the 2014 “*Defense Investment Pledge*” which is going to be extended beyond 2024, ensuring that NATO’s political decisions are adequately resourced.

Future Considerations

Russia’s invasion to Ukraine has definitely changed the security landscape not only in Europe but also in both transatlantic and international relations, reminding everyone that

conventional warfare and large-scale military operations are not to be overlooked or underestimated. In addition to that, it resulted in an ongoing energy crisis which - along with climate change issues - affects military operations as well as everyday life. This situation led NATO to review several of its policies, strengthening its defense posture, enhancing its cooperation between member states and reaching out to new partners, in an attempt to counter Russia's aggression and China's effort to increase its influence. As a conclusion, some of the future considerations we need to keep in mind after the completion of the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid are the following:

a. **Open Door Policy:** Finland's and Sweden's signing of the Accession Protocols granting them the state of the official invitees reaffirmed NATO's Open Door Policy, showing the way to Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine. This means that whenever one of these countries has fulfilled the prerequisites for its accession to NATO, the accession process will be initiated. This will most probably trigger Russia's reaction, especially regarding Ukraine and Georgia, as Russia considers NATO's enlargement as a major threat to its interests, especially when it comes to states that belonged to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

b. **The future of (war in) Ukraine:** NATO's continuing political and practical support to Ukraine through the delivery of non-lethal defense equipment, the improvement of its cyber defenses and resilience, and the modernizing of its defense sector will play a significant role to the outcome of the ongoing military operations and consequently to Ukraine's sovereignty and national independence. As long as NATO supports Ukraine, its resilience will grow, preventing Russia from achieving its national objectives. Otherwise, Russia's aggressiveness might not be contained in Ukraine but spread in other states too, transforming the European security landscape from a peaceful environment to a war zone.

c. **Russia's reaction:** One of the major future concerns - closely related to the previous one - is Russia's reaction to the provisions of NATO's new Strategic Concept. The Alliance's new enhanced defensive posture on its Eastern Flank – part of which is the borderline with Russia – will definitely be seen as a threat by Russia. Another factor that is usually overlooked is that Russia will also react to both the improvement of Ukraine's cyber defenses and the establishment of NATO's virtual rapid response cyber capability since, according to NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence "*Russia*

perceives the information space in very geopolitical terms, with their domestic information space representing a continuation of territorial state borders, which they view as constantly being violated by foreign intrusions.”

d. **China’s reaction:** Another major future concern is the way China is going to react not only to the provisions of NATO’s new Strategic Concept - which despite the Alliance’s will for constructive cooperation also states that PRC actions target Allies and harm Alliance security – but also to NATO’s attempt to strengthen cooperation with new partners in the Indo-Pacific region, China’s backyard. As far as Korea, Japan and Australia – whose leaders participated the Summit for the first time – are concerned we need to stress the fact that although PRC’s actions are based on the concept of “*Peaceful Development*,”¹ an official foreign policy that emphasizes in China’s soft power, in its 2019 White Paper PRC states that Korea is undermining the regional strategic balance, Japan is becoming more outward-looking in its military endeavors and Australia is seeking a bigger role in security affairs in the Asia - Pacific region.

e. **Climate Change and Energy Security:** As far as Climate Change is concerned, NATO has set an extremely ambitious objective aiming to “*become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security*,” cutting greenhouse gas emissions by nearly 50 % during a relatively short timeframe, reaching zero emissions by 2050. In order to be able to achieve such a goal, the Alliance must gradually take a 360-degree turn towards renewable energy sources, converting not only its weapon systems but also all of its means so that they can operate with a different power supply and perhaps readjust the Alliance’s supply chain, keeping in mind energy security issues such as availability and reliability of the sources, affordability of prices and sustainability of cost.

f. **Defense industry and member’s expenditures:** According to the Secretary General’s statements during the pre-Summit press conference, only 9 NATO members reach or exceed the Alliance’s target of spending at least 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while 19 members have clear plans to reach it by 2024. This statement, in addition to the ongoing situation in Ukraine, the changes that need to be done from NATO members in order to achieve the Climate Change goals mentioned above, and the establishment of the Alliance’s new Innovation Fund, leads us to the conclusion that there is going to be a

significant increase in the amount of Defense spendings, a factor that will mainly benefit the Alliance's members that have developed a competitive defense industry sector.

g. **NATO & EU:** Last but not least, as far as the relations between NATO and the European Union (EU) are concerned, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept states that the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO which plays a complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing role in supporting international peace and security. It also states that the Alliance will reinforce its coordination and cooperation with the EU in several key areas and that the European Defense capacity must be further developed. This objective has already been endorsed by the EU in March 21st, 2022 by launching its Strategic Compass, an ambitious plan of action aiming at the establishment of a 5,000 troops Rapid Deployable Capacity (EU RDC), the deployment of 200 fully equipped Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP) mission experts within 30 days, the conduction of regular live exercises on land and at sea, the enhancement of military mobility and the reinforcement of the EU's civilian and military CSDP missions and operations (Picture 5).



Picture 5 (Photo Source: www.eas.europa.eu)

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