May 16 Q&A - Follow-up Q&A between BPC and Interested Parties - 6/12/2019 Additional Answers

Interested Party	BPC Question:	Response: As part of PMSA Rebuttal Submission on 6/12/2019
PMSA	Is it correct that PMSA's request for a decrease in the number of pilots is primarily driven by financial considerations?	No, we fully support the entirety of the Pilotage Act.
PMSA	Has the PMSA recommended an increase in the number of pilots to the BPC in the last 10 years?	All PMSA submissions to the BPC are public records. Our positions are clearly set forth in each of them.
PMSA	Does PMSA agree that avoiding delays for vessels awaiting an available pilot is an appropriate goal for the BPC?	Yes along with statutory mandates to optimize pilot service including but not limited to optimized watchstanding, dispatch, vacation and comp day policies, meeting categorization and policies, ordering rules, minimization of travel and repos, maximization of multiple harbor shift days in compliance with rest rules, leveraging opportunities like cruise ship round trips and so on. Matching a rested available pilot to arriving and departing vessels without delays is achievable by many different approaches.
PMSA	What is your understanding of "board-on-arrival" service as that term is used by PSP?	This is not a RCW, WAC or BPC term. It is a PSP term and it is not an accurate description of the current requirement to place orders well ahead of time per PSP policy.
PMSA	When you describe the current ordering system for pilots as already being an appointment system, were you suggesting the current system permits pilots to control vessel arrival and departure times?	We did not describe it as an appointment system but instead responded to PSP constantly referring to the BC appointment system. As for onlering- BC pilots are a service provider and asked to meet the ship when it chooses to arrive - not the other way around. The BC system requires ordering lead times (like in Puget Sound): 12 hour lead time North coast. IO hour lead time South coast and while these are the minimum ordering times, many agents order a pilot much further in advance. For example, as of June 5" there were 159 orders out to June 13th. In BC there are terminal "berthing windows" and vessels might decide to head south first if they're too late for their "berth window".
PMSA	With respect to pilot scheduling, does the PMSA and its members prefer a system that allows the vessel to select its departure or arrival time? Alternatively, would PMSA prefer a system by which pilots pre-determine arrival and departure time slots, leaving vessels to select the next available time?	PMSA and its members prefer that a compulsory pilotage ground provide competent, rested pilots to all arriving and departing vessels without delays.
PMSA	Would PMSA prefer an appointment system that maximizes pilot efficiency by requiring each vessel that misses its scheduled time to re-order a pilot or otherwise move to the end of the queue?	PMSA and its members prefer that a compulsory pilotage ground provide competent, rested pilots to all arriving and departing vessels without delays.
PMSA	Rather than licensing additional pilots, would PMSA prefer that pilots delay vessels when there is no on-duty rested pilot?	PMSA and its members prefer that a compulsory pilotage ground provide competent, rested pilots to all arriving and departing vessels without delays.
PMSA	What safety factors did the PMSA address in its suggestion that the number of pilot licenses should be reduced?	PMSA didn't recommend a reduction in the number of pilot licenses.
PMSA	What does PMSA consider a "bona fide emergency" as that term is used in PMSA's submission?	That should be defined by BPC. An example would be the BPC Chair open letter to industry in July 2018 describing a temporary emergency that was based on an unprecedented shortage of pilots due to pilot retirements, medical issues, and trainees not ready to be licensed from the pilot training program.
PMSA	Would having insufficient pilots to provide service without delays constitute an emergency?	Again the BPC is the entity to define a pilotage emergency. A logical first question would be to define insufficient pilots - does that include when the on duty available number of pilots is reduced to 13 on a particular day as highlighted in the PSP submission? The logical next question would be to identify and assess the policies and conditions that created such a condition.
PMSA	If there is always a delay between raising the number of licenses and the time it takes to license a pilot (14-18 months), is there any set of circumstances that constitutes a true emergency?	Again BPC has to make that determination and the BPC must manage the training and licensing pace the best they can to have trainees ready to license wizen there are openings. There is a communication from the previous BPC Chair describing that is acceptable to temporarily exceed the number of pilots authorized when a candidate is ready for licensing and there are pending retirements on the horizon; PSP objected stating: "Licensing trainees wizen they complete training- even if they are not needed- will largely destroy this efficiency and deny the board and industry the economies made available by the board's reduction of the number of pilots to 54."
PMSA	PMSA states in its submission that "PSP report[s] that pilots take two weeks of vacation each year mostly on duty days meaning duty says stood would be 168 and not 182." What/who is the source of that statement what precisely was said by that source?	The source is PSP data and PSP and NASA descriptions and simple math. PSP states 178 days of duty plus 3 in the summer for a total of 181 so using that number it would be 181 minus 14 days of vacation during duty days equaling 167. Pilots all claim a full 24 hours of duty on transition Tuesdays thereby creating a double counting situation that apparently is used to validate vacation policies. The actual dispatch records of o.ffgoing and oncoming pilots reveals that each section does not stand a full day of dispatch ready duty on transition Tuesdays. A number of pilots in each section could completely take transition Tuesday days off and shift that duty day to another day but instead all pilots count it as a duty day knowing only some of them will move ships and then they all still take 14 duty days off.
PMSA	You state that 2018 was an anomalous year and argue it should not have been used in NASA's analysis. What was anomalous about 2018 and how in your opinion would that impact NASA's linear regression analysis?	See the numerous examples in our rebuttal which highlights statements from PSP and BPC Chair describing the "unprecedented" condition and the "lowest number of pilots available for duty in recent memory".
PSP	When a dispatcher is preparing to call in a pilot on respite, is there a system in place for who they call first and it what order after that?	Yes, the dispatchers create lists of pilots not in rotation (the "call list") and have information regarding the pilots' rest based on the pilot's last assignment. Once it is determined there is a need for a callback (this often occurs 24 hours in advance when the anticipated number and timing of orders exceeds the expected rested on-duty pilots) the dispatcher first emails all pilots to notify them of the coming need and then starts calling pilots to find out who will and will not be available. The dispatcher then calls the pilots on the list sequentially until a pilot is reached who is available to accept the callback. Both pilots who accept or refuse callbacks are moved to the bottom of the list (maintaining the order of rotation). The dispatcher then continues down the same list to find a pilot for the next necessary callback. If a pilot is not license-qualified to accept an assignment, that pilot remains at the top of the list until offered a callback for which the pilot is qualified.
PSP	How can there be 15,000 change orders compared to 7,325 assignments in 2018?	The magnitude of order time changes is the result of unpredictability in vessel arrival and departure times that causes shipping agents to make frequen changes to the order time.
		As requested at the BPC meeting in May, more precise information regarding the number of order time changes has been obtained from PSP's dispatch system, the Coe System. This information will be submitted on June 12.
PSP	How can there be 15,000 change orders compared to 7,325 assignments in 2018?	The magnitude of order time changes is the result of unpredictability in vessel arrival and departure times that causes shipping agents to make f changes to the order time. As requested at the BPC meeting in May, more precise information regarding the number of order time changes has been obtained from PSP's d

17 PSP	Page 5) Though a very important point, it's deemphasized in a parenthetical "no rest rule violations were identified in a review of data for 2018 and 2019". Please explain then the graph on p34 of the NASA report that shows approximately 200 instances of $<=8$ hrs rest which would have been noncompliant starting in 2018 and the additional approximately 640 instances of 8 to 10 hrs rest which would have been noncompliant in 2019. Are these possibly all harbor shifts?	PSP agrees it is an important point that there were no identified rest rule violations in 2018 and 2019 as it shows the Pilots' dedication to safety rule compliance. PSP is committed to complying with rest rules and works with its dispatchers to proactively avoid situations where pilots might not obtain rest in adherence with the rules. The circumstances identified on page 34 of the NASA report, in which pilots had less than 8 hours of rest prior to an assignment, are understood to include situations where a pilot performed a repo followed by a rest period followed by an assignment. The same was true in circumstances were a pilot performed an assignment followed by a repo. Other circumstances include multiple harbor shifts.
		It is also important to note that prior to October 2018, when the Board of Pilotage Commissioners ("BPC") adopted its 10-hour rest policy, to which the pilots have vigorously adhered, the BPC rest rule, WAC 363-116-081, required seven hours of rest after an assignment of seven hours. PSP policies have been more stringent and require greater rest and define "assignment time" more broadly than does the BPC. However, NASA's rest period analysis defined assignment differently than either PSP or the BPC. Page 4 of the NASA report includes the definition applied by NASA: "a duty period including vessel movements, repositions, upgrades, meetings and training." Thus, NASA identified circumstances when BPC rules and PSP policies may allow for insufficient rest when considering hest practices for fatiaue management.
18 PSP	Page 7) Are the 161 cancelled movements in 2018 included in the 7324 assignments for the year?	Yes, all of the cancelled movements were included in assignments for the year in the analysis on page 7 of PSP's submission. As noted during the meeting on May 16, 2019, the cancellations included in the assignment number are not cancellations for which advance notice was given. These represent situations in which a pilot was assigned to the vessel, taking the pilot out of rotation and using pilot resources. Each of these cancellations required pilots to perform work in anticipation of an assignment, which includes preparation and frequently includes travel.
19 PSP	Page 9) 2 Efficiency, port competitiveness and reducing delays) iii Illustrations of delay causation) Watch* = Pilots schedule to be on-watch, including pilots on major medical Does that also include the President?	l understand your question to ask whether the number of pilots stated to be standing watch in the examples of delays include the President of PSP. Although the President only takes assignments on a sporadic basis due to his high workload, he is included in a watch group of five pilots. In this case, the President's watch group was on-duty on July 20, but on respite during the July 7, August 6 and August 24 examples.
20 PSP	There were 21 or 22 pilots scheduled to be on-watch, including pilots on major medical, in the four examples of days with a delay or delays. I understand this should be 5 of the 11 groups on watch. With 51 pilots and 11 groups, an average group size is 4.6. Indeed, we are told each group is 4 to 5 pilots. 5x4.6 = 23.2. But why then mostly only 21? Are groups arranged together such that you could get 4 of 5 groups only have 4, not 5 pilots? Are there groups with less than 4 pilots?	In 2018, there were 11 watch groups that typically consisted of five groups of five pilots each, four groups of four pilots, and one group of three pilots (to which a fourth pilot is now being added). Those numbers within each watch group fluctuated at times briefly due to retirements and the licensing of new pilots. The watch calendar, included on page 19 of PSP's submission, reflects that there are 11 different combinations of watch groups that work together. Because of those different combinations, the total number of on-duty pilots varied between 21 and 23 pilots in 2018. This explanation obviously raises the question of why PSP does not split all pilots into two equal groups. If there were only two watch groups of one-half the total pilots in each group, the individual pilots would work and spend time with only one half of the pilots in PSP. Instead, PSP found that using 11 watch groups varies the individual pilots on watch, which exposes limited level pilots to a greater number of experienced pilots. This promotes safety and offers educational opportunities through job-related discussions at the pilot station. Additionally, although PSP could also reorganize the pilots in each watch group in a way that would provide greater consistency in the number on-duty pilots, and allo goals of: (1) maximizing the number of pilots taking assignments. PSP's actual practice considers the President and pilots may of pilot license levels during each duty period. PSP believes that by taking those factors into account it achieves greater consistency across duty periods in the number of on-duty pilots taking assignments.
1 1 7 3 7	Examples 1 and 2 show that more than 1 assignment can be done per day by a single pilot. On July 7, ten (10) Call back jobs were done by 8 pilots. On July 20, elevent (11) call back jobs were done by 6 pilots. Presumably, that's 5 pilots who did 2 jobs and 1 pilot who did 1. This ties to the estimate of duty day utilization rate. Page 12) i. Duty day utilization rate An assignment ≠ repo ≠ meeting ≠ training ≠ 1 day ????	While the question being asked is not entirely clear, we will assume this question is intended to raise the question of why in PSP's pilot utilization analysis are assignments, repos, meetings and trainings are treated as one "day." The answer is that any metric that focuses solely on assignments and does not consider all of the work activities performed by pilots is neither valid in assessing pilot work nor safe from a fatigue management perspective. The latter point is probably the most important here, and the reason these work activities can be fairly treated similarly in looking at pilot workloads. Addressing your fist point, it is correct that pilots can, in theory, perform more than one assignment in a single day. In the case of the callback jobs discussed in the question, each repo is considered one callback job, and a subsequent vessel assignment is considered a separate callback job1, and pilots are sometimes able to perform a repo and an assignment in a single day. Additionally, pilots can perform multiple harbor shifts in a single day, which is why in the referenced discussion on page 12 of PSP's submission, pilots working multiple harbor shifts in a single day, which is why in the referenced discussion on page 12 of PSP's submission, pilots working multiple harbor shifts mere credited with only one assignment each. The total assignments relied upon in the calculation was thus 6,808 rather than 7,324. Another situation in which pilots work more than one assignment in a single day exists when a pilot works two overnight assignments in a row. In that circumstance, two assignments are spread over three calendar days, with two taking some part of a single day. This variable schedule, discussed on page 26 of NASA's Puget Sound Pilot Fatigue Study Report, Exhibit 1, is part of nearly every calendar day, making it difficult to quantify what should constitute a single work day. For purposes of pilot utilization, one day can be considered the work that can safely be performed between two rest periods regardle

			Dr. Czeisler recommended that the BPC limit work episodes to 12 consecutive hours during the daytime, and 8 consecutive hours if more than one of the work hours occurs between 24:00 and 06:00.2 Dr. Czeisler also recommended that no pilot begin a pilotage assignment if the expected time of completion, including return travel, would cause the pilot's work episode to exceed the maximum allowed work duration. Although these recommendations have not been fully adopted by the BPC, they support that repos, meetings and training be considered in evaluating when rest is required.	
			Additionally, each repo, meeting and training is a work event of sufficient duration that rest is likely required both before and after before the pilot should be considered rested for an assignment.	
			For example, outbound repos to the pilot station, including time to prepare and reach the ferry, take approximately six hours. Because pilots at the pilot station are not given time to prepare, repos to Seattle take less time: between three and three and a half hour. In 2018, the average repo time was four hours and 36 minutes. If each repo was immediately followed by an assignment, pilots could regularly exceed the maximum work hours recommended by Dr. Czeisler and thus each repo should be considered a work shift or "day" when assessing pilot workload.	
			Meetings, which are vital to the continued operation of PSP, are actually more time consuming than repos. Although the point raised in Question 7, below, is stated to be supposition, meetings actually take far more than ¼ day, on average. Excluding out-of-town meetings requiring an overnight stay (which are significantly longer), there were 462 meetings in 2018. The average meeting time, including return travel, was 6.3 hours, while the median meeting duration was 6.4 hours. This excludes the time required to travel to each meeting, which has not been historically recorded. Thus, the total time worked by pilots attending meetings likely exceeds 7 hours each. Consequently, each fairly constitutes a day of work within the pilot utilization analysis.	
			Most training sessions for pilots constitute a full work day and frequently require out-of-town travel during which the pilot is unavailable to take assignments. Thus, they too should constitute a work shift or "day."	
			In this context, there are few times a pilot should work an assignment and then attend a meeting or training without an additional rest period, or vice versa, because each meeting and trainings are time consuming and require additional travel both before. Because best safety practices thus reduce the number of these work episodes that can be combined into one 12 or 8 hour period, each can and should be fairly treated as a "day."	
22		NASA p30 "average 9.4 hrs per work period" from call time (Start) to check-in time (end). Add 10 hours to rest, and then can round up to a day per assignment. Fine. But, do we have data to account for repositions, meetings, and trainings as also each a day?	Yes, as discussed in response to Question 5, PSP has data to account for repos, meetings and trainings, and believes each should be fairly treated as a day for purposes of this analysis.	
23		the utilization rate is 89%. Supposition Given the approximation that an assignment equates a day, the TAL of 145 means a utilization	From a fatigue management perspective, all time that a person spends awake contributes to fatigue through homeostatic sleep pressure, including time spent piloting on board vessels, travel time, repo time, meeting time and training time.4 This phenomenon may be observed throughout the fatigue experts' recommendations. Dr. Czeisler recommended that for purposes of determining maximum work periods, "[e]ach work episode should, by definition, begin from the time that a pilot is ordered by and assigned to a vessel and will include preparation time, transit time to and from the vessel, time between pilotage assignments and any other compensated work performed by the pilot, whether or not it is related to pilotage, until such time as a mandatory rest break is begun."5 He further recommended that the period between work shifts (i.e., the rest period) should exclude transportation to/from a vessel and administrative pilotage work.6 Extrapolating from his opinions, all time spent awake and working must be considered in determining when rest should be required. Dr. Flynn-Evans has made similar statements, supporting that all time awake is important in assessing	
		Question how should travel time, repo time, meeting time, and training time each be counted – in recognition of different levels of effort/ attention/ fatigue inducement (did I just make up that term?)	fatigue.	
			As addressed in response to question 5, above, the questioner was correct to be uncertain about the time required to perform repos, meetings and repos. Due to both the travel and actual time involved, and relevant rest requirements, each should be considered to be far more closely related to being a "day" for purposes of pilot utilization. As a result, the actual pilot utilization rate has been far above the TAL when considering all necessary work a pilot performs.	
24	PSP	Is it only ten hours after the check-in time, that a pilot can be called for either a repo or an assignment?	It is unclear from the question whether the questioning Commissioner is asking about best practices, BPC policy, or House Bill 1647, which adopted a ten hour rest period. House Bill 1647 is silent on this issue due to the lack of definition of "assignment." Because Dr. Czeisler recommended that mandatory rest periods be free from transportation and for the reasons discussed in response to Question 7,7 PSP currently applies the ten hour rest period to the time following check-in before either a repos or an assignment.	
25	PSP	When a pilot gets repo'd, does it basically equate to their call–in time for the next job?	We assume "call-in time" refers to the "call time," or the time at which a pilot is assigned to a vessel assignment or outbound repo. The short answer is no. The pilot is not assigned to a vessel movement until after the repo is completed, so the repo is not the "call-time" for a subsequent assignment. There is typically a multiple hour delay or rest period before the next assignment following a repositioning. For example, on page 33 of the Puget Sound Pilot Fatigue Study Report, NASA depicts in Figure 15 a round trip cruise operation. On Day 6 of the pilot's schedule, the pilot performed an outbound repo that was followed by a rest period, with the next assignment commencing hours later.	
26	PSP	Does repo-time not count at all currently towards "assignment time"?	No, under the current BPC rule, WAC 363-116-081, repo time has not been counted toward "assignment time." PSP recommends that the BPC consider what intervals should be included in assignment time in the rulemaking for which notice was issued June 3, 2019.	
27	PSP	Page 19) Watch systems	Thank you for pointing out the potentially confusing explanation of duty days in PSP's submission. Following 11 watch periods, each pilot will have	
		"After 10 cycles of this watch system, a pilot will have worked 150 days on-duty and 130 off-duty". Understood that it should instead read:	worked five on-duty periods, five off-duty periods, and one ETO period. The total of duty days during the five on-duty periods in that time is 75 days, with 65 days of respite. PSP does not distinguish between Earned Time Off and respite for purposes of callbacks. Each pilot has earned his or her time off duty, regardless of	
			name, and may choose whether or not to take callbacks during that period.	
28		Is a pilot on ETO available for a call-back? Can a pilot designate any ETO time or off-duty time as "vacation" (like listed in the activity report) such that	The use of the term "vacation" is a misnomer that resulted from the need for a short-hand way to describe the scheduled off-duty period that follows	
		they are not available for a call-back? And, if not designated as "vacation", is the pilot available to be called and asked to take an optional call-back?	the 5th on-duty period in the duty cycle differently from respite. Earned Time Off is a component of the day-for-day watch system that is treated no differently from respite. Because they are no different in treatment, it is the pilot's right to choose whether to refuse or accept callbacks during that time. Some pilots frequently work during ETO while others might accept fewer or no callbacks during that period. There is no official designation of "on vacation" within PSP's dispatch system.	
	REGARDING NASA REPORT			

	boxes on Th and S also be black boxes, like the one on W, indicating that these two vessel moves were actually	does not have unlimited resources to dedicate to this project and has been unable to commit time to answering the questions posed due to her busy
	call-backs??	schedule. She has confirmed she will be attending the BPC regular meeting on July 18, 2019 and will be available to answer Commissioner's questions
		about the Puget Sound Pilot Fatigue Study Report on that date.
30 PSP	P36) Earned Time Off and Compensation Time	Same as above
	Please explain why here a group is estimated at between 2 and 3 pilots, not 4 to 5, like it was by PSP p9	
31 PSP	Please explain the derivation of 0.055 as the multiplier needed to account for pilots on ETO. After doubling the	Same as above
	daily estimate, 1/11 (0.091) seems more like the right multiplier to account for an additional (an eleventh)	
	aroup?	EAR REGRESSION MODELS
32 PSP	Are these models (Tables 2, 5, 6, 7) based on the baseline data with ~47 active pilots? p38) "there were only the	
	equivalent of 47 pilots available for work throughout the year (i.e. 23.41 *2)." Where 23.41 is the total predicted	
	in Table 4, the baseline case 23.41 x 2 \approx 47.	
33 PSP	P37) If 4 additional pilots, then bank of net comp days would stabilize after about 2 years. Is that an	Same as above
	appropriate interpretation? Was 2 years determined as a goal period of time to substantially reduce the	
	bank of accrued days? If so – how? why? Why not 4, 6, or more years? Is the light gray line the scenario,	
	with 4 extra pilots, the one selected for the final Model (Tables 6 and 7)?	
		DELING REST RESTRICTIONS
34	Tables 4 – 7, above the Total, show three (3) rows understood to be reflective of rest restrictions:	Same as above
	 > 60 h work/week < 60 h rest 30 days 	
	• < 60 h rest 30 days • MHS > 13 h	
	In the two Final Models (Tables 6 and 7) these rows are zeroed out, presumably indicating no violations of the	
	rest rules. Is that correct? Was it the overall objective (or one of the objectives) of the modelling to find	
	the configuration of variables (call backs and comp days) that achieved these zeros? Is that how you	
PSP	knew you were done? Had reached a "final" model?	
35	Please define these rules. How is "work" defined"? How is "rest" defined? Please also give their current standing	Same as above
	as implemented by PSP? For instance, I understand MHS = multiple harbor shifts, and these work periods, as	
DCD	per the latest updated WAC, are not to exceed 13 hours in duration. This rule has already been implemented, as of October, 2018, correct?	
PSP 36 PSP	Why were these three (3) rules the ones predicted?	Same as above
37	Why was the minimum rest rule not modeled? Sorry – I didn't quite follow the explanation on the bottom of	Same as above
PSP	p41.	
38		Same as above
	On P5 of PSP report, it says "no rest rule violations were identified in a review of data for 2018 and 2019". On	
	p34 of the NASA report, in Figure 16 on Rest period duration, it looks like there are about ~200 instances of <=	
	8 and ~~640 instances of between 8 and <= 10 hours. On p41 of the NASA report, it says "There were 1386	
	instances where pilots received less than 10 hours off following an assignment (including back-to-back callback assignments)." Please explain how these numbers (no violations, ~200+640 ≈ 840, and 1386) all relate –	
PSP	as they sort of seem to describe the same value, but are all very different quantities.	
39	Are Table 6 and 7 not directly comparable to see the effect of the implementation of the rest rules in October	Same as above
	2018 (after the trailing 12 dataset ended and with three months (thru Dec) left to go on the CY dataset), bc the	
PSP	number of call backs set was also different, from 0.5 in Table 6 to 1.0 in Table 7?	
40	Intuitively, one might expect the number of predicted pilots to go UP (like by 2??) based on more restrictions	Same as above
	for rest. BUT, Table 7 predicts slightly less pilots (26.33 in Table 7 vs 26.67 in Table 6). Is this likely due the	
PSP	additional 0.5 callbacks allowed per day (from 0.5 to 1.0)?	
41	REGARI p40) In the caption for Table 6, these are referred to as "the expected per day values were set to reflect changes	ING FINAL MODEL
41	to pilot operations aimed at minimized fatigue". Are those changes just callbacks set to 0.5 and comp days	
DOF	set to 4.00?	
PSP		Same as above
42 42	p42) Besides for varying the number of callbacks and comp days, were there any other variables varied	
42 42	p42) besides for varying the number of calibacks and comp days, were there any other variables varied in the modeling? Asked another way - Besides for callbacks and comp days, were the other "adjustments made	
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42 PSP 43 PSP	 in the modeling? Asked another way - Besides for callbacks and comp days, were the other "adjustments made based on fatigue risk management recommendations" as in from the excerpt copied below. "The projected number of pilots needed to fulfill staffing requirements while also minimizing fatiguing work shifts is presented in Table 8. This projection includes the estimates from the linear regression model with adjustments made based on fatigue risk management recommendations. This model also includes the projected number of pilots needed to reduce the bank of compensation time accrued by the pilots and two pilots in rotation to cover future work hour restrictions that could not be modeled." "projected number of pilots needed to reduce the bank of compensation time accrued by the pilots" – was that 4? "This model also includes future work hour restrictions that could not be modeled." = 2 Sounds contradictory. Do you mean that "This model Table 8 includes" 	
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4	6		Table 8)	Same as above
			· Is the justification/reference for the 4 projected pilots for "compensation day coverage" the section back by	
			on 37? And/or twice the additional ~2 that were modeled in the Final Model? In which case, aren't the 4 pilots	
			for "compensation day coverage" already included in the Final Model? and then already included in the "Linear	
			regression estimate" of 53 (26.33 x 2 \approx 53)	
			What was "Additional work hour reduction coverage" that projected the 2 additional pilots? Where does this	
	PS	SP	come from?	