

Rwanda Case Study
Part I: Context of the Territory and Conflict

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A. **Description of the Territory**

Rwanda, formally known as the République rwandaise, is a relatively small country of 26,338 sq km (10,169 sq m) close to the size of the state of Maryland in eastern sub-Saharan Africa, bordering the eastern side of Lake Kivu; the western and northwestern border is shared entirely with The Democratic Republic of the Congo, going through Lake Kivu, most of the northern border is shared with Uganda, the entire eastern border and southeastern border is shared with Tanzania, while most of the southern border is shared with Burundi (EIU 2010, 2, 4-5; WB 2010a par. 1; State BAA 2010, par. 1).

As of 2005, just under 20% of Rwanda's land area is forested, nearly ½ of the country's land area is considered arable, and it is one of the most mountainous countries in the world (IFAD 2009, par 6; FAO 2007, par 1). Though landlocked, Rwanda has several large lakes, including Lake Kivu which is shares with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as Lake Muhazi, Lake Ihema, Lake Bulera, Lake Ruhondo, and Lake Mugesera (FAO 2010a, par. 1). There are volcanoes in the northwestern part of the country, and the landscape is characterized by grasslands and "small farms extending over rolling hills," "rugged mountains," and valleys (State BAA 2010, par 5). Even though Rwanda is very close to the Equator, its "high elevation makes the climate temperate;" it has two rainy seasons which grace the land with 80 cm (31in.) of average annual rainfall (State BAA 2010, par. 6). "Subsistence farming dominates Rwanda's economy, employing 90% of people and providing around 40% of GDP," notes The Economist Intelligence Unit (2008, 3), while "[t]ea and coffee are the main cash crops and usually generate over 80% of export earnings." Yet an emerging and quickly-growing services sector, centered on "telecommunication," now accounts for over 40% of Rwanda's GDP. As the State Department (2010) notes, Rwanda has "few natural resources to exploit and a small, uncompetitive industrial sector," and its numbers corroborate with those of the EIU (2010, par. 4, 26). Both the State Department and The World Bank (2010) estimate the 2009 GDP at \$5.1 billion USD (State BAA 2010, par. 4; WB 2010a, par. 1).

Rwanda's approximately 10 million people are composed of problematically defined Hutu and Tutsi with an extremely small Twa (pygmy) population; "ethnic monitoring is illegal," but those self-identifying as Hutu outnumber Tutsi 4:1 and, according to estimates from earlier this decade, over 93% of the country is estimated to be Christian, with over ½ the population estimated as Roman Catholic, over ¼ Protestant, just over 11% Adventist, and a Muslim minority of under 5% (WB 2010a, par. 1; State BAA 2010, par. 2, 7; EIU 2010, 4; EIU 2008, 12). The nation has the highest population density in Africa and yet is extremely rural-based (EIU 2008, 12; State BAA 2010, par. 7). About 90% of Rwandans are subsistence farmers, life expectancy is around 50, and about 70% of the population is literate, while Kinyarwanda, English, and French are the languages spoken by Rwandans and used by the government (EIU 2008, 2-3; State BAA 2010, par. 2; WB 2010a, par. 1).

As for the government, the EIU (2008) categorizes it as "authoritarian," while Freedom House (2010) gave it a low score and categorized it as "not free;" each rating was the lowest category possible (EIU 2008, 8; FH 2010, par. 1). Formally, the government is a republic with separate executive, (a bi-cameral) legislative, and judicial branches, administratively organized into the capital city (Kigali) and four provinces with geographic names, subdivided into thirty districts (State 2010, par. 3; GR 2010, par. 2). The EIU (2010) notes there are just three "genuine" opposition parties, none of which were allowed to seriously challenge the regime of President Paul Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), who was recently reelected to a second seven-year term with 93% of the vote in a highly-criticized election (EIU 2010, 3; Reuters 2010). Freedom House expects Kagame's RPF-based regime to increase its "tight control over civic and political life, particularly limiting press freedom" (FH 2010, par. 1).

B. **Description of the Conflict**

The following is a summary of the views of, mainly, multiple scholars, NGOs/IOs, and some journalists regarding on the sources of the violent conflicts in recent Rwandan history. They are by no means representative in any statistical sense of their fields and/or professions.

Sources of the Conflict

Socio-Political-Economic Structure: Pre-Colonial-Era Influence

Tradition says that (Ba)Tutsi cattle herders came to the area of Rwanda in the 15th century and began to dominate and rule over the local (Ba)Hutu; the reality was a bit more complicated, as in some areas Hutus retained a degree of independence or co-ruled with local Tutsi, some even throughout the colonial period (State BAA 2010, par 8; Mamdani 2001,41, 68-69; Scherrer 2002, 19). Tutsi commentators/supporters tend to argue that there is only a socio-economic class, and no racial or ethnic, difference, Hutu commentators/ supporters that there is a racial/ethnic difference (Mamdani 2001,41). Even though those who would be later termed Tutsi were generally animal-herders who migrated more recently into lands already inhabited by the people who would later be called Hutu, at the same time these new Tutsi rulers came to practice the local Hutu culture to form a new society inclusive of both (Scherrer 2002, 17; Mamdani 2001, 42). The history and definition of the terms Hutu and Tutsi have been (and are still) fluid themselves; as Jan Vansina (2004, 134-139, 191-194) explains, “Tutsi” was originally a term that a “*fraction*” of some pastoralists used to identify themselves, and later was applied to the “political elite” within that group. “Hutu” was originally a derogatory term that those who called themselves Tutsi used to describe behavior resembling that of low, backwards country-folk, and these elites expanded the term to refer to their servants, even if they were part of the ethnic Tutsi, then expanded to a class or people who performed menial tasks for the ruling elites, then to the inhabitants of a specific area, to refer to foreigners. A century or so before the arrival of Europeans in the interior of Africa, Tutsi came refer to combatants, as the finest troops and leaders were drawn from the Tutsi elite, Hutu to noncombatants in the army, in keeping with their servant role, most of whom were of rural farming stock.* Vansina points out that this is the era when the terms became oppositional: Tutsi referring to all herders, generally the elite, and Hutu referring to all farmers, generally the masses, spreading from the area around the government to the whole region; this was reinforced by institutionalized social changes in the mid-to-late 19th century further burdening farmers and exempting herders, generating resentment from those now conceiving themselves Hutu oppressed by Tutsi even to the point that servants of ethnic Tutsi origin and lower-class herders began to see themselves as raised over “Hutu” farmers and identified with Tutsi more absolutely, culminating in several “Hutu” conflicts with increasingly oppressive “Tutsi” overlords after 1885 in the closing years of the 19th century. Thus, “two hierarchized social categories” resulted, but it would be the Europeans, starting with the Germans, that would elevate this distinction to that of being a racial or ethnic one.

Multiple scholars echo the view that Hutu and Tutsi identities fluidly evolved over time, that the distinctions, antagonisms, and conflict between self-identified Tutsi and those they labeled Hutu were increasing and emerging as the Europeans arrived, with Mamdani stating that they should be viewed as “political identities” and in general concurring with Vansina, whom he cites; for him, “[to] be a Tutsi was thus to be in power, near power, or simply to be identified with power—just as to be Hutu was more and more to be a subject” (Mamdani 2001, 59-64, 69-71, 73-75; Scherrer 2002, 18; Prunier 1997, 5-9, 11-12, 21-22; Hintjens 1999, 249-250). Desperate for liberation, many of the oppressed Hutu farmers saw the first agents of Imperial Germany as awaited saviors (Vansina 2004, 136).

* Prunier (1997), conversely, makes the case that the army was one of the institutions that contributed to social cohesion and that Hutu fought more regularly than some claim; Mamdani argues that, though, like Prunier, the Hutu fought more often than some claim, the reforms that enabled this “debased the social position” of non-military Hutu and contributed to overall Hutu/Tutsi friction (Prunier 1997, 14-15; Mamdani 2001, 69).

Socio-Political-Economic-Religious Structure: Colonial-Era Influence

Among the sources consulted, there seems to be no doubt that European colonialism was a major contributor to the divisions which exploded into war and genocide in the 1990s. Gérard Prunier (2009) notes this “could never have occurred without the manic cultural reengineering of the Belgian colonial authorities,” that “Europeans rationalized African cultures to death. And it is that contrived rationality that they bequeathed to Africa when they walked away from the continent in the 1960s” leaving Africa in “very dangerous moment” (2009, xxxix-xxx). Helen Hintjens (1999) states that “colonial rule is part of any adequate explanation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,” and that “[t]he idea of a hierarchy of races had far more devastating implications in Rwanda and Burundi than could ever have been imagined by the early European explorers and ethnographers who first propounded such theories” (1999, 251, 255). Though Central African pre-colonial Kingdoms developed a unique sense of the “nonexistence” of mixed identities before shortly before the Europeans arrived, this idea “was transformed and reinforced in its severity by the policy of segregation pursued by the colonial powers,” where “this abstract and arbitrary ‘ethnic’ classification [pushed by European conquerors] often determined whether a person lived or died,” up to and through the period of the 1994 genocide as “[r]acial and colonial ethnology indeed had devastating effects that continue to be felt today” (Scherrer 2002, 18, 21).

Prunier (1997, 5-8 and quoting Ministère des Colonies 1925) notes that “[g]iven an almost obsessive preoccupation with ‘race’ in late nineteenth-century anthropological thinking, [the clear physical differences between Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa]...soon led to much theorising, romanticising and at times plain fantasising” by Europeans. One account from the colonial era, contrasted with other contemporary accounts denigrating both the Hutu and Twa, read as follows: “[g]ifted with a vivacious intelligence, the Tutsi displays a refinement of feelings with is rare among primitive people. He is a natural-born leader, capable of extreme self-control and of calculated goodwill.” Prunier follows this quotation with his own prose, noting that “[t]he Europeans were quite smitten with the Tutsi, whom they saw as definitely too fine to be ‘negroes’.” It was common for respected scientists, social-scientists, explorers and missionaries to come up with fantastic ideas, often published in book form, of the origin of Tutsi being semitic or from ancient Egypt, or Tibet, among other theories. Seeing them as more racially similar to white people than other Africans and having some Caucasian features, the Tutsi were described as a “conquering superior race”, carrier of a “superior civilisation” at a time when Europeans saw themselves in Africa in much the same light. The Tutsi were a clearly from a different stock than the “negro” race, which was clearly an “inferior” people. Prunier attaches “the utmost importance” to such ideas and writings for three reasons:

First, it conditioned deeply and durably the views and attitudes of the Europeans regarding the Rwandese social groups they were dealing with. Secondly, it became a kind of unquestioned ‘scientific canon’ which actually governed the decisions made by the German and even more so later by the Belgian colonial authorities. Thirdly, it had a massive impact on the natives themselves. The result of this heavy bombardment with highly values-laden stereotypes for some sixty years ended by inflating the Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and crushing Hutu feelings until they coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex. If we combine these subjective feelings with the objective political and administrative decisions of the colonial authorities favoring one group over the other, we can begin to see how a very dangerous social bomb was almost absent-mindedly manufactured throughout the peaceful years of *abazungu* [European] domination. (Prunier 1997, 9)

The Rwandan state at that time, in the eyes of the Europeans, had a more complex political system than “totally savage negroes” were capable of forming, so they concluded that, of course, the racially

superior Tutsi had brought this complex political system with them and imposed it upon the “inferior” and “negro” Hutu (Ibid., 10-11). One of Belgium’s key administrators of the 1920s wrote:

The Batutsi were meant to reign. Their fine presence is in itself enough to give them a great prestige *vis-à-vis* the inferior races which surround ... It is not surprising that those good Bahutu, less intelligent, more simple, more spontaneous, more trusting, have let themselves be enslaved without ever daring to revolt. (Prunier 1997, 11 quoting Ryckmans 1931)

This description of the view of the first Europeans in Rwanda is also backed up by Mamdani (2001, 75, 78-87). He notes that instead of the simpler “subject-power” divide of pre-colonial times, the act of colonial authorities “racializing Hutu and Tutsi as identities...signified the distinction as one between indigenous and alien...making...[the] Tutsi and Hutu identities evocative of colonial power and colonial subjugation...[making these identities] more volatile than ever in history.” He poses the idea, building upon Hannah Arendt, that the “nurturing ground of scientific racism” which enabled the Holocaust was European imperialism/colonialism in “continental Africa.” The preconceived notion was that Africa outside of the Mediterranean was “The Dark Continent,” that is must be primitive and savage; when Europeans discovered complex political institutions and societies, such as the Rwandan monarchy, and this did not fit with their preconceived ideas, the reaction was to take “[e]very sign of ‘progress’ on the Dark Continent...as evidence of a civilizing influence of an outsider race. The race of civilizers, it was said, were Caucasians who were black in color without being Negroid in race.” It was in this way that the Europeans conceived the Tutsi and separated them from “so-called real Africans.” The Tutsi themselves never attached a “politically significant” meaning to their movement into Hutu lands, so “[the idea that the Tutsi were superior because they came from elsewhere, and that the difference between them and the local population was a *racial* difference, was an idea of colonial origin.” Serious thought went into rationalizing that either black Africans were the cursed descendents of Caanaan, son of Ham, son of Noah of the Judeo-Christian myth in Genesis and other Judeo-Christian myths, or people like the Tutsi were their descendents and had subjugated the inferior Negroid race and civilized Africa, then became corrupted by Negroids in the process; thus one went from ancient biblical myth to modern, 20th century “scientific” theories accepted as gospel by many until only a few decades ago. Rwanda became completely unique in European dominated Africa in that the ideologies here discussed inspired an actual colonial “set of institutions that reproduced the Tutsi as a *racialized* minority,” and the ideology that produced these institutions was “in turn reproduced” again and further by these institutions in a mutually reinforcing cycle. For Mamdani, this “racialization...was not simply an intellectual construct, one which later and more enlightened generations of intellectuals could deconstruct and discard at will.” Because of the racialized institutions, a full “political-social movement” would be needed to overthrow the racialization of Hutu and Tutsi.

Christian Scherrer (2002) confirms this account of the development of European racial “scientific theory,” noting that

classical European philosophy of the nineteenth century, and especially the colonial science of ethnology,...armed with the dreadful ‘theory of races’, became an instrument for segregation, ethnicization and racialization, and was soon exerting a decisive influence on the activities of European powers in the colonies.

Racially based ideologies shaped the thinking of the European colonizers about the peoples they subjugated. For the terrible backlash of such ideologies caused by decades of their application on the colonial subjects, before and after decolonization, and the horrendously destructive impact on the thinking of the colonized people, produced countless tragedies in the former colonies until present day: one of the last but most cruel examples being Rwanda 1994...The Hutu majority inevitably felt insulted; the Hutu were

seen as “inferior” race by the colonizers, and discriminated against. The Tutsi, meanwhile, “had a good time” and were seen as half –Europeans...; until the 1950s they could consider themselves the born rulers. (2002, 21).

For him, too, there was a large gap between European theories and reality (Ibid., 22). Citing some of the previously-discussed authors and others, Hintjens provides a description of “fantastical theories” that defined especially the colonial administrative structures of Belgium, which “created a monolithic division between Hutu and Tutsi identities, and started to dissolve the ideological glue of Rwandan monarchical society” (Hintjens 2002, 252-254). Vansina also corroborates what the other authors articulated (Vansina 2004, 138). Even a book published by Oxford University Press in 1963, written by a Yale academic still radiates the racial stereotypes and prejudices of the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa crafted in the early colonial era (Louis 1963, 107-113). Timothy Longman (2010) confirms this too (2010, 42-43, 60-61).

Though having claimed the area of Rwanda for Germany at the infamous Berlin Africa Conference of 1884-1885, the Germans did not make it to the area of Rwanda until the late 1890s, shortly after the death a long-reigning king who left a dynastic struggle upon his death and a realm in political turmoil; especially “after a [German] demonstration of firepower,” the insecure Rwandese king eagerly accepted protectorate status as part of German East Africa in exchange for support (Scherrer 2002, 20; Prunier 1997, 23-25; Chrétien 2003, 218-219, 247-248; Longman 2010, 38). This period of German rule over Rwanda was of a very “indirect nature,” with a very light German presence; policy was to aid the king in expanding his power and jurisdiction, or “subcontract” other Tutsi chiefs to bring about control where the king’s forces or control were too weak; overall, the Germans after further strengthened and accelerated the already present trends that were empowering Tutsi and disempowering Hutu even before European arrival, even as the Germans recognized Tutsi “despotic oppression” (Punier 1997, 25; Chrétien 2003, 248; Scherrer 2002, 21-22 and quoting von Götzen 1895).

Prunier (1997, 26-30, 35) notes that the Belgians would continue these trends when they seized Rwanda from the Germans during WWI (officially sanctioned by the League of Nations in 1919), and it would not put their own stamp on colonial policy until the mid-1920s. At this point, rather than leave the existing balance, which was overwhelmingly Tutsi, they even began replacing what few Hutu chiefs/leaders were left with Tutsi, so much so that by the end of the Belgian era in 1959, “forty-three chiefs out of forty-five were Tutsi as well as 549 sub-chiefs out of 559;” a triad of chiefs traditionally oversaw the land, with one that oversaw farming, generally a Hutu, generally reporting to a Tutsi chief, but the Belgians merged all three into a single Tutsi position. Some of the more oppressive reforms that were expanding when the Germans arrived now became universal, and taxation, which before was generally tied to family or community units, now became a more oppressive form for individuals instead. Lands traditionally held by family and village groups communally were declared “vacant” by Belgian legislation. An emerging capitalist culture, too, favored those already with power: i.e., the Tutsi. Tutsi realized everything was going in their favor, and used the Belgian system to press their advantage even further without formal direction from the royal court or the Belgians, too. This new, centralized form of feudalism ended up forcing most Hutu men into forced slave-like labor, working on projects for the Belgians or on crops they wanted to export for money; it took up at least half of their time, and anyone who refused was beaten or worse; eventually, many fled Belgian Rwanda into the British colonies.

Other authors confirm that the Belgians continued the German system, then made it more oppressive for Tutsi in many of the ways Prunier mentions (Scherrer 2002, 21, 26-28; Chrétien 2003, 270-272, 278, 281-287; Hintjens 2002, 253-254; Mamdani 2001, 88, 90-98; Longman 2010, 64-65). Scherrer also notes the introduction of identity cards identifying most as Hutu or Tutsi) He also notes the massive transfer of hundreds of thousands of both Hutu and Tutsi into the Belgian Congo; the Belgians needed more labor for that large, resource-rich colony because Leopold II’s policies decimated the population; because of these actions, the Rwandans and Burundians moved there by the Belgians consist

of one of the largest ethnic groups in today's DRC (Scherrer 2002, 27-28). Hinjens and Longman confirm the importance of the issuing of identity cards for Rwandese society: identities were now fixed (1999, 253; Longman 2010; 65).

Christianity, especially the Catholic Church, was to play a major role in advancing many of these trends. Longman (2010, 39-43) notes that the early Catholic missionaries focused on converting the elite leadership, hoping a situation would develop like that of Imperial Rome under the Emperor Constantine I. This quickly evolved into a policy of siding with the leadership in any dispute; thus, they became facilitators of the centralization that worked against the interests of Hutus; the Rwandan king even allowed the missionaries to establish themselves in areas of weak control in order that they help him establish control and dissuade rebellion. Part of the strategy of converting elites involved creating schools to offer the younger cohorts of the elite a western-style education. By WWI the schools were starting to attract students in significant numbers.

The early Catholic missionaries were a major force, if not the major force, in perpetuating the racial ideology about the foreign origins and innate superiority of the Tutsi among Rwandans, and as they were the elite rulers, it was converting the Tutsi that concerned the missionaries the most, yet ironically, it was the weak Hutus who saw in the missionaries a chance at salvation and aid against their Hutu oppressors and who were almost all of the early converts; the missionary hierarchy, though, had a clear position in favor of the Tutsi, telling their subordinates, over some robust objections (the more robust the more likely they would be sent back to Europe), that though the new Hutu converts would often appeal to the missionaries for protection from and help with Tutsi oppression, they should always side with the Tutsi because this was the strategy which would win the most converts (Ibid., 43-48, 60-61). They would work even more closely with the Belgian colonial regime, being of the same faith, when the Belgians took over from the Germans, and in December of 1917 the missionaries achieved the first conversions of elite Tutsi; once they had enough of these, the policy went from supporting the ruling Tutsi against the concerns of Hutus to supporting the positions and advancement of those Tutsi who were now Christians over other Tutsi who "viewed as the enemies of the Church" (Ibid., 48-50). When Belgians considered giving some power to Hutu leaders later in the 1920s, it was a missionary who convinced them to go with newly converted, missionary-educated Tutsi instead; the schools they had built earlier were now serving as a sort of academy for a new governing elite that would be promoted by the missionaries, ones with strong ties to western education and Catholicism, and this in turn created a situation where now the Tutsi royal court was appealing to missionaries for help and regularly sending their sons to the missionary schools (Ibid., 50-53). By 1931, the Church was powerful enough to help engineer the removal from power of the Rwandan king (after he began seeking support from Protestant missionaries) in favor of his son, who was a catechumen; from 1929-1930, the Catholics had about 5,000 baptisms occur, but from 1931-1932 this number was over 16,500, including many Tutsi, and from 1930-1940 Church membership rose from under 100,000 to 300,000 (Ibid., 53-56). The Church even developed different curricula for Hutu and Tutsi,* both of which taught the racial ideology as historical fact; Tutsi began to embrace and believe this ideology, and a new Tutsi group of elite intellectuals would perpetuate these ideas as "the fiction of ethnicity had, in a practical sense, become a reality, a political and social fact of primary importance" (Ibid., 64-66). Longman's description and/or emphasis on the role of Catholic missionary power and influence is corroborated by various other authors (Scherrer 2002, 27; Mamdani 2001, 88-93; Chrétien 2003, 272-275; Prunier 1997, 30-34; Hintjens 253). Prunier (1997) sums much of their opinions up succinctly when he writes that Christianity "did not transcend social fractures, it reproduced them in many different dimensions and (albeit unwittingly) exaggerated their effects," and "through the actions, both intellectual and material, of white foreigners, myths had been synthesized into a new reality (1997, 34, 39).

* Hutu and Tutsi were sent to separate schools, even given different types of meals: milk and meat for Tutsi, "maize porridge and beans" for Hutu (Scherrer 2002, 27).

The Tutsi, Belgian authorities, and the Church worked together in a mutually beneficial relationship, where the fictional past concocted by the Europeans' "scientific" theories gave way to a present "truth," and a cadre of native Rwandan Tutsi intellectuals would back these concepts up with a "beautiful story," one of the most prominent of whom was Alexis Kagame (1912-1981), a native Rwandan Catholic priest; a consequence of the development of this culture was that Hutus "began to hate all Tutsi" (Ibid., 36-39). For Prunier (1997, 39-40), a "time-bomb had been set and it was now only a question of when it would go off;" he notes "there is no trace in...[Rwanda's] precolonial history of systematic violence between Tutsi and Hutu." Though "[m]aterial interests can always be negotiated, ideas cannot and they often tend to be pursued to their logical conclusions, however terrible," and the ideas imprinted by Europeans into Rwandese society were "strong, well-implanted, and widely believed" so much so that they would form the base of future ideas in Rwanda society for decades to come.

The 1950s would see a significant shift Rwanda; Longman (2010, 66-69) notes that besides the wave of anti-colonialism and democratic ideology that swept the world after WWII, the Church was beginning to shift towards favoring the Hutu. There more native priests than white one in Rwanda by 1951, most of them Tutsi, and they wanted to challenge the white elite, eager for independence while they were still in control, lest the Hutu end up rising in stature before a transfer of power. Even as they challenged the whites clergy, this white clergy was less conservative and elitist than the priests that half century earlier, coming from more working-class backgrounds. They were naturally more inclined to be sympathetic, then, to the Hutu. Amid rising discontent, the Catholic Church in Rwanda began offering more opportunities for Hutus in education and in the Church, and helped create a new Hutu elite; this was mirrored by similar impulses on the part of Belgian colonial administrators, to create representative council and to dismantle some of the more oppressive feudalistic systems that had been intensified by the Europeans, but these attempts served to raise Hutu expectations more than they delivered any amount of social justice; in some cases, they had the opposite effect of the one intended. Mamdani notes many of the same trends, including the counter-productivity of the reforms of the civilian Belgian colonial authorities (2001, 109-116). Hintjens, Prunier (1997), Scherrer, and Chrétien note some of the same trends (Hintjens 1999, 254; Prunier 1997, 42-46; Scherrer 2002, 28; Chrétien 2003, 287, 300-303). The Church magazine *Kinyamateka* became the country's most popular publication under one of the new Hutu elites, Grégoire Kayibanda; confident with the new backing of the Church, Hutus began to assert themselves, publish treatise, organize, and form groups, even political parties, aimed at advocating and advancing the cause of Hutu, the most prominent of which was Kayibanda's Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM), founded in 1957; Tutsi elites responded by digging in, with the royal court even banning fraternization between Hutu and Tutsi, and with visits from the UN decolonization missions occurring on this time, both sides knew independence would be coming sooner and later and were preparing (Prunier 1997, 44-47; Chrétien 2003, 303; Longman 70-71; Mamdani 2001, 118).

When the Tutsi king died in July of 1959 under "mysterious circumstance," tensions increased further, and the Tutsi responded by creating their own party, the Union National Rwandaise (UNAR), a month later; Kayibanda, a few months later, changed the name of his MSM to Parti du Mouvement pour l'Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU); that November, an incident led to two weeks of violence between Hutu and Tutsi, leading thousands of Tutsi to flee, and Belgian paratroops from the Congo had to restore order (Longman 2010, 72-73; Mamdani 2001, 120-124; Scherrer 2002; 28-29). Of the numerous chiefs and sub-chiefs who had been killed, arrested, or fled during the violence, the Belgians replaced every one with a Hutu, and national local elections, marred by violence and the flight of many thousands of Tutsi, were held in June and July of 1960, whereby PARMEHUTU dominated the election (70.4 % of the vote) and UNAR had a dismal showing (1.7 %); January of 1961 saw the monarchy abolished and Kayibanda made Prime Minister with Belgian support, and legislative elections were held late in the year with another landslide victory for PARMETU, and though violence between Hutu and Tutsi continued, Rwanda

achieved independence from Belgium on July 1st, 1962 (Longman 2010, 73; Mamdani 2001, 123-124; Scherrer 2002, 28-29; Prunier 1997, 49-54).

Socio-Political-Economic-Religious Structure: Postcolonial-Era Influence

As the new Hutu order established itself as the rulers of Rwanda, conflict with Tutsi was a feature of its inception: some Tutsi refugees/exiles supported the new system; 50,000 refugees in Burundi used a sympathetic regime there to use Burundi as a base to militarily attack the new regime; the Tutsi forces in the Congo, which was in the midst of its own civil war, were “militarily eliminated” by the Congo’s soon-to-be-dictator General Mobutu after allying with the wrong faction; the refugees in Tanzania came under strict control but ended faring relatively well; and those in Uganda were also under tight state control; those Tutsi conducting the attacks were denounced as *inyenzi*: cockroaches, and from 1962-1963 these attacks invited brutal retaliation and repression against Rwandan Tutsi, killing likely many thousands and resulting in the execution of all Tutsi political leaders who had tried to be part of the government (Prunier 1997, 55-57; Mamdani, 129-131; Scherrer 2002, 29). He made it clear that should the Tutsi retake Kigali, he would end them as “a race” (Chrétien 2003, 306; Scherrer 2002, 29). With Tutsi in power in Burundi and Hutu in Rwanda, hostility between the two nations and crossborder attacks were not uncommon (Scherrer 2002, 30, 37). As the regime settled in, it became a Hutu version the authoritarian Tutsi order under the Belgians; Kayibanda personally appointed all officials down to a “very low level,” replicating the former Tutsi monarchical establishment; when the Tutsi minority in power in Burundi massacred many Hutu in 1972-1973, he responded by inaugurating a period of even higher Tutsi repression, resulting in more Tutsi fleeing the country (Prunier 1997, 57-61). This action was typical of the postcolonial era, as “[e]very time a Hutu regime encountered a problem, the Tutsi in the country were a priori considered suspect” (Chrétien 2003, 305). “Racial” tensions were not defined as between the “native” Hutu and “alien/foreign” Tutsi, a legacy of the European colonial ideas (Mamdani 2001, 134-135;). This move actually exacerbated tensions within the Hutu elite, and the army commander, Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana in a coup in July of 1973, a move that was popular with both Hutu and Tutsi, since he was a Hutu but said he would protect the Tutsi (Prunier 1997, 61; Scherrer 2002, 38; Chrétien 2003, 307; Mamdani, 138, 142).

Habyarimana’s regime was at first characterized by relative tolerance, if still institutional discrimination, concerning Tutsi, with the unwritten rule that Tutsi could not participate in politics but in return could expect to be “generally left in peace” in full effect;* for the whole country, he instituted a one-party system, outlawing all but his Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) and focused on development, staying true to his party’s name (Prunier 1997, 74-77; Mamdani 2001, 144-149). The Tutsi went from being an alien “race” to an alien-origin “ethnicity” that was still the subject of official, institutional discrimination (Mamdani 2001, 138). The Church in this era went from, in colonial times, an institution that “admired the Tutsi and helped them rule,” to one that “now admired the Hutu and helped them rule;” one party rule, social order, productivity, and economic development with the aid of international institutions and foreign aid workers characterized the beginning of the regime (Prunier 1997, 77-83). Longman, too, notes the general cooperation with the regime for much of this period (Longman 2010, 95).

It was the collapses in world coffee and tin prices of the 1986 that caused the regime problems by devastating the economy and the main sources of government revenue, since coffee exports and tin exports were such large parts of Rwanda’s economy, as “one can say that the political stability of the

* Mamdani disputes Prunier’s claim that Tutsi were not allowed to participate politically, arguing that, under the one-party system, this was fine since everyone did as Rwandans, though they were still excluded from “meaningful participation in power;” civic participation was fine, too, and the regime was less “ideological” (Mamdani 2001, 138-143).

regime followed almost exactly the curve of those prices,” leading into a breakdown of the cohesion between the various Hutu regional groups that had dominated MRND; 1989 saw the budget cut 40%, mostly for social services, and a rise in general repression (Prunier 1997, 84-89; Hintjens 1999, 242).

In panic-mode, Habyarimana took France’s President Mitterand (in a general campaign of promoting democracy by tying democratic development to economic aid) suggestion to move to a multi-party system, announcing this intention in August of 1990; but within a few months Tutsi exiles had begun the Rwandan civil war, invading their old country from Uganda; the whole region would be convulsed in conflict that, as of the writing of this paper, still rages on (Prunier 1997, 89-90, 93).

Population Growth

As mentioned earlier, Rwanda has the highest population density in Africa. Even when the colonialists first arrived, the population density was noted as being very high (Louis 1963, 108-109; Chrétien 2003, 220-223). Jared Diamond (2005) devotes an entire chapter in his *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* to Rwanda, and cites population density as a major cause of the Rwandan genocide, noting that many of the victims were landowners and some of the perpetrators specifically cited overcrowding, and it resulting extreme scarcity of resources, as one of the justifications for their genocide, drawing from Prunier (1997) among others. (Diamond 2005, 311-328; Prunier 1997, 4). Hintjens raises this issue a potential cause as well (1999, 234).

C. Parties to the Conflict

Hutu

As mentioned, President Habyarimana’s MRND was the ruling party in Rwanda at the time of the opening of hostilities (it would become the MRND(D) as he would add *et la Démocratie* to the party’s title in July 1991; his, and its, power base lied in north of Rwanda (Prunier 1997,126; Mamdani 2001, 151). The President was attempting to engage in democratic reform in the hopes of economic aid, as mentioned, but Rwanda was invaded by exiled Tutsi in October of 1990, and the ensuing civil war would be the focus of his administration, which became more extreme during the war (going from pledging Hutu-Tutsi healing to Hutu Power), until he his plane was shot down in early April 1994 (Mamdani 2001, 185; Prunier 1997, 213-229; Scherrer 2002, 93-95). The genocide against the Tutsi ensued, (Scherrer 2002, 104-129; Prunier 229-280). After the genocidal killing stopped, a few months later the Tutsi forces ejected the Hutu regime, and millions of Hutus fled, mainly into Zaire, where they settled (Prunier 2009, 291-299). In the sixteen years since, they have been involved in a series of devastating wars, and according to a recent UN report, the Tutsi regime that came to power in Rwanda may have committed counter-genocide in Zaire/DRC against these Hutu; the survivors of that Hutu regime and militias driven out after the genocide have been plaguing the people of eastern DRC (Gettleman and Kron 2010). They want to retake the Rwanda from the Kagame’s Hutu-repressive regime and resettle in Rwanda.

Tutsi

The Tutsi fled Rwanda by the hundreds of thousands in the early years of Rwanda’s independence, and in subsequent waves; especially in Tutsi-led Burundi and Tutsi-friendly Uganda, the refugees used bases from these countries to strike at the new Tutsi regime (Prunier 1997, 61-74). Paul Kagame was a refugee who grew up in Uganda, but ended up serving, along with many other Tutsi, in a Ugandan rebel army that seized power in 1986; he would eventually rise to power as a major player in Tutsi cabinet and became President in 2000, and was reelected I a disputed election this year (Prunier 1997, 90-91). In return for his service and that of other Tutsi, Uganda supported him and the newly named Rwandan Patriotic Front organization; form Uganda, it inaugurated an invasion of Rwanda, which

culminated in the Hutu genocide against Tutsi and subsequent seizure of power in Rwanda of Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front; but issues with the Hutus who fled into Zaire/DRC helped spark what would become known as Africa's World War, pulling in a host of nations into conflict in the DRC, with Rwanda's armies and the Hutu militias from the genocide still fighting each other, playing a driving role in the two Congo wars, and possibly involving a counter-genocide (Prunier 2009, 346-358). They are trying to destroy the Hutu militants who escaped into the DRC, and Kagame is trying to modernize Rwanda, though he is becoming increasingly repressive (EIU 2010; Scherrer 2002, 259-262). Tutsi militias also operate as arms of the DRC's army, fighting Hutu militias after being reintegrated by

Uganda

Uganda aided the Tutsi since so many of them helped put the current regime take power, and was an ally of Rwanda's during its interventions in the DRC (Scherrer 2002, 38-40, 256-257).

Burundi

As discussed earlier, ethnic tension in Burundi between Hutu and Tutsi often involved or triggered reactions from Rwanda (Scherrer 2002, 37-59, 219-243).

Zaire/DRC

Mobutu's Zaire intervened with France in the Rwandan civil war to assist the Habyarimana regime; Rwanda, in return, helped to engineer a coup against Mobutu which resulted in "Africa's world war;" though it has fought Rwanda and Tutsi militias in the past, at this point, DRC's priority is restoring its sovereignty in the east and defeating the Hutu militias still there (Gettleman and Kron 2010; Prunier 1997, 101).

France

France was a strong supporter of the Habyarimana regime, even fighting on its behalf and arming it; France has extensive relationships in Africa stemming from its colonial period, as well as major business interests (Prunier 1997, 100-113).

D. Milestones of the Conflict

Rwandan Civil War

As noted earlier, the Rwandan Civil War began early in October 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), detaching itself from Uganda's National Resistance Army, invaded Rwanda from Uganda; after initial progress, this was beaten back with international aid, but the Tutsi reorganized and began a guerilla conflict, and would launch other invasions, but the fighting dragged on as peace talks at Arusha went on for many months, and even though a deal (over 100 pages in length) was reached, RPF launched another invasion in response to Hutu massacres of Tutsi in February of 1993, but the French assisted when they were closing on Kigali and tense "peace" ensued (Scherrer 2002, 87-99).

Genocide

In April of 1994, the situation grossly deteriorated after the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents' plane was shot down, and the genocide began, killing as many as 1,000,000 Rwandese, mostly Tutsi; the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) fails to stop the killing, and Opération

Turquoise failed to establish a safe zone, though motivated RPF was able to eject the Hutu regime, and this launched a massive flow of millions of Hutu refugees, including the perpetrators of the genocide, as participation was widespread (Prunier 1997, 192-212, 237-299; Scherrer 2002, 101-129).

Post-Genocide: Congo to Present

Rather than peace, the RPF's victory ushered in mass reprisal killings; the refugee crisis near Lake Kivu was massive, and the Hutu militias there militarized some of the camps and used it to launch attacks and cause instability; eventually, in 1996, Rwanda intervened in Zaire, which started a chain of events that led to Mobutu's downfall; by 1998, a second war began in the Congo, drawing numerous countries in what has been called "Africa's World War;" millions have died as a result of the fighting, and the Hutu-Tutsi conflict is still going on in the eastern DRC; 20,000 MONUC troops over the last decade have not been enough to stop the fighting; as mentioned, Rwanda's Tutsi government has recently been accused of committing genocide against the Hutu in Rwanda and the DRC (Prunier 2009, 7-72).

No resolution to the conflict is within the grasp of the near future.

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