# Impact of Reconstruction Strategies on Basic Education Infrastructure in Post Boko Haram Insurgency in North East Nigeria

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**Abstract:** Basic education infrastructure was damaged during Boko Haram insurgency and reconstructing such infrastructure is essential to sustain recovery in North East Nigeria. The purpose of the study was to determine the impact of reconstruction strategies of poverty alleviation, effective governance, state reconstruction, conflict prevention and peace on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria. To achieve the purpose, five research questions and hypotheses guided the study. A descriptive survey design was adopted for the study. The population of the study comprises of four hundred (400) basic education sector players and actors from Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states was utilized for the study. Data was collected using researcher instrument tagged "Reconstruction Strategies on Basic Education Infrastructure Assessment Questionnaire" (RPBEIAQ). The instrument was validated, and reliability was determined using Cronbach Alpha. The data collected was analyzed using mean and standard deviation to answer the research questions and z-test was used to test the hypotheses at 0.05 level of significance. The findings show that poverty alleviation, effective governance, state reconstruction, conflict prevention, and peace strategies had a low impact on basic education infrastructure in North East, Nigeria. The study concluded that key players and actors like the federal ministry of education, state ministries of education, local government education authorities, NGOs, civil societies, donor and international aid agencies reconstruction strategies had a low impact on basic education infrastructure. The study also recommended among others that sound poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies should be implemented on basic education infrastructure in North East Nigeria.

**Keywords**: Boko Haram Crisis; Basic Education Infrastructure; Reconstruction Strategies; North East Nigeria.

## 1. Introduction:

The North East region of Nigeria comprising of Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, and the Taraba States have been ravaged by the Boko Haram Insurgency. Since 2009, statistical estimates of the negative impacts of the crisis include approximately 14.8 million people adversely affected, about 2.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) including over 177 thousand Nigerian Refugees in neighboring countries, over 20 thousand deaths and even more people severely injured or missing (Presidential Committee for North East Initiative (PCNI, 2016). Many of the regions residents stayed in IDP camps with host families away from their original homes and host communities. Many host communities were severely stressed, have to cater for the large influx of displaced people from places directly hit by Boko Haram insurgency.

The Boko Haram Crisis has also resulted in extensive damage to social infrastructure. Many primary and junior secondary schools works were destroyed or closed down.

Many communities were completely abandoned, especially in Borno and Yobe states. There was a limited number of teachers with 500 teachers killed and many fleeing the region. The economy of the region has virtually collapsed, with many parts of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa state having host keys basic education infrastructures like physical infrastructure, materials, and equipment. Basic education infrastructure was damaged during Boko Haram insurgency and reconstructing such infrastructure is essential to sustain recovery in North East Nigeria. The damaged basic education infrastructure was mainly buildings like classrooms and dormitories. Returning the region in terms of basic education infrastructure in primary and Junior secondary schools is one of the host priorities of federal, state and local governments through post-crisis reconstruction (Abdulrasheed, Onuselogu, & Obioma, 2015).

Post-crisis reconstruction is defined as a process of restoring the pre-conflict physical structure. However, it

deals with the structure and the broader need to rebuild the socio-economic structure and the institutional capacity in crisis-torn countries (Safe School Initiative, 2016). This include programs to rehabilitate basic education (Primary and Junior Secondary Schools) infrastructure. It involves the development of basic education system to bring the management of infrastructure and services to bring the accepted principles of co-existing amongst different communities and respect for cultural difference. Post-conflict reconstruction transitions of society from conflict peace by rebuilding its social, political and economic institutions.

The goals of post-conflict reconstruction are building acceptable, accountable and self-sustaining economic growth and create a civil society with free and independent media, civic organizations and a general climate in which people once again begin to trust each other and are reconciled with their troubled past and willing to live together peacefully (Coles, 2011). Basic education refers to primary 1-6 and JSS 1-3 levels of basic education system structure. Post-conflict reconstruction refers to its evaluation of the need for new primary and junior secondary schools, build and repair classrooms, hostels, workshops, laboratories during hall in schools, open primary, and junior secondary schools and maintaining and enlarging or restore primary and junior secondary schools (Abraham, 2003). Primary and junior secondary schools serving the poor, boarding facilities and centres for students are sometimes assisted on a case by basis require the reconstruction and repair of key basic education infrastructure which has been destroyed during the emergency (MacDonald, 2005).

Mashatt, Long&Crum (2008) share a common analytical framework for basic education infrastructure development based on the life-cycle analysis. The life cycle is the stages of a lifetime. A basic education infrastructure project cycle consists of designing, building, operating and maintaining a facility such as buildings, materials, and equipment. A conflict life cycle generally consists of stable peace, rising tensions, violent conflict, reconciliation and return to stable peace.

Post-conflict reconstruction in basic education infrastructure calls for a prioritized approach within a broad sector-wide framework. The focus on basic education infrastructure that is strongly reflected in this study and in literature is based on the recognition that primary and junior secondary education is the basis of the entire system and therefore warrant high priority. Without a systematic focus on basic education infrastructure, there is a danger that post-conflict reconstruction will introduce or exacerbate imbalance in the education system (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2005).

Buckland (2005) reported that basic education infrastructure should be prioritized within a system-wide approach, decentralize the system to encourage parental involvement in the provision of infrastructure in primary and junior secondary schools. Build the capacity of the central authorities to ensure an enabling environment for decentralization of basic education infrastructure. Effective partnerships should also be built and work closely with intra-agency coordination mechanisms, recognize the contribution that returning IDPs and especially youth can make to the process of basic education infrastructure reconstruction.

Anand (2005) determine the impact of reconstruction on basic education infrastructure against four strategies. The five strategies were: Poverty alleviation, Effective governance, State reconstruction, Conflict prevention, and Peace.

These are priority actions and performance objectives in reconstruction strategies impact.

Poverty alleviation in basic education infrastructure is in terms of human resources. Identify and recruit teachers and administrators, register school-aged population, create equal opportunity and basic education infrastructure policies in primary and secondary schools. Train administrators and teachers and strengthened continued education for teachers and administrators (Hawrylenko, 2010). Basic education infrastructure task includes the evaluation of the need for new primary and Junior Secondary Schools, repair the schools, obtain basic education materials, open new schools and maintain and enlarge new or restored primary and junior secondary schools. Develop a curriculum that respects diversity, distribute curriculum and supporting teaching materials (NEPAD,2005).

Effective governance of basic infrastructure will require improving buildings, library information systems and of fold equipment. Sustaining effective governance is very critical to the achievement of rapid physical infrastructure reconstruction. Protect and secure critical basic education infrastructure (Classrooms, Laboratories, Latrines, workshops, students hostels, and staff offices). Create indigenous capacity to protect such infrastructure (Hasic, 2004).

State reconstruction is the ability to restore services which were in place before the conflict and to provide limited new services in rural areas. The state must also be perceived as delivering more positive basic education infrastructure dividend benefits to the population in order to consolidate on the basic education infrastructure. Spoilers of basic education infrastructure reconstruction will take advantage of any failure to quickly restart services (Rwezuva, Mutasa & Dauda, 2012). In the most post-conflict environment, it is basic to rapidly restart state reconstruction service delivery in two areas; (i) basic educational services which were in place before the conflict and (ii) limited new basic education services in areas previously outside the reach of the state. It is important to keep in mind that the priority for the state is key to be associated with the delivery of state

reconstruction and not that the state necessary must deliver them itself (Cliffe & Manning, 2006).

Obeid (2011) identified six interlinked priority areas that constitute broad objectives for conflict prevention reconstruction strategies. These are (1) reforming institutions (2) environmental sustainability (3) economic development, social protection, and regional equity (4) peace development and citizenship (5) crises management and (6) security. These six priorities require the integration of economic, social and environmental objectives that can only be productively managed through good governance, hence the prioritization of reforming institutions (Brown, 2005). It is noteworthy as well that issues related to security and peace development need to be prioritized as they cross over all other priority areas and include human environmental and social elements(Buckland, 2005).

Peace involves intentional support for prioritizing basic education infrastructure while authorities are faced with the need to ensure balanced development of the education system and support the resumption and development of secondary education, technical and vocational education subsectors. A large number of young people who may have missed out on basic education because of the conflict or whose secondary education was disrupted, place additional pressure on the education system (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2005). The need to restart teacher education both in-service and pre-service presents additional challenges to post-conflict basic education authorities and calls for creative solutions in terms of infrastructure. Accelerated learning programs like "Catch up class and Summer Schools and transparent and clear system-wide development have helped authorities to respond to these pressures to a certain extent. However, progress in secondary, tertiary and non-formal education infrastructure almost always lags seriously behind basic education infrastructure". Caan (2005), reported that the authority enacts basic education infrastructure reconstruction strategies to be matched by the capacity to implement them and the need to implement project quickly in post-conflict reconstruction. Responsibility strategies that enhance peace-building are considered necessary in a reconstruction period, particularly marked by a violent crisis. According to Collier (2002), the key post-conflict priorities should be social strategies first, followed by sectoral strategies and macro strategies assessment of basic education infrastructure in the post-crisis period. Thus, the justification for the study on the impact of reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

1.1. Statement of the Problem:

Basic education infrastructure like buildings and equipment, supply and materials were destroyed and damaged during Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria. Poor reconstruction strategies create limited

management capacity, poor emphasis on manpower development and training and lack of established management or technical stands on basic education infrastructure. Its impact negatively on the conditions of human capital formation and replacement through destruction of the basic education infrastructure is the lost of educational personnel and reduced educational expenditures. Poor reconstruction strategies affect basic education infrastructure interns of lack of security provision and funding, lack of institutional capacity, corruption, conflict sensitivity and governance, problems of response strategy and basic education prioritization, the role of key stakeholders, short and long terms solutions, procurement and long term financing. As per the international humanitarian law, based on the Haque Regulations and General Convention of 1977 protocol I Clause 2 of Articles 54, it is illegal:

to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as buildings supplies, equipment, materials (Anand, 2005).

Poor reconstruction strategies also affect basic education infrastructure in terms of building the sector. These can pose tremendous threats that can easily make Boko Haram insurgency to re-emerge in North East Nigeria. Appropriate reconstruction strategies should be put in place for recovery.

1.2. Purposes of the Study:

Purposes of the study were to assess the impact of reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria. Specifically, the study was to determine:-
1.  The poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.
2.  The effective governance reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency of service delivery in North East, Nigeria.
3.  The state reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.
4.  The conflict prevention reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.
5.  The peace reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.

1.3. Research Questions:

The following research questions guided the study:
1.  What is the extent of poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria?
2.  What is the extent of effective governance reconstruction strategies on basic education

infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency of service delivery in North East, Nigeria?

3. What is the extent of state reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria?

4. What is the extent of conflict prevention reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria?

5. What is the extent of peace reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria?

**1.4. Hypotheses:**

The following hypotheses were tested at 0.05 level of statistical significance for decision making.

1. There is no significant difference in the responses of education players and actors on poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.

2. There is no significant difference in the responses of education players and actors on effective governance reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.

3. There is no significant difference in the responses of education players and actors on state reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.

4. There is no significant difference in the responses of education players and actors on conflict prevention reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria

5. There is no significant difference in the responses of education players and actors on peace reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.

**2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review:**

The Centre for Strategies and International Studies (SCIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA, 2002) published a comprehensive framework of activities essential for successful post-conflict reconstruction. The CSIS Task Framework describes three phases of post-conflict reconstruction according to Abdulsalam, Akelli, and Lowolla (2012).

1. Initial response: This phase immediately follows the cessation of violence and is often characterized by the provision of emergency humanitarian services and military intervention to create basic security.

2. Transformation/transition:- During this time, legitimate local capabilities emerge and should be cultivated. Specific emphasis is placed on economic development, government reconstruction and the establishment of basic social welfare infrastructure.

3. Fostering sustaining: Cultivating sustainability is a long term process that consolidates/recovery efforts in order to prevent the resurgence of conflict.

Ideally, international military actors withdraw during this phase and society begins a process of normalization, moving the country from post-conflict recovery to peaceful economic development with clean government and civil society institutions fully functioning.

There are areas of activities that must be done in each of these three phases according to CSIS/AUSA (2001):

1. Security which addresses the establishment of a safe environment and development of stable security institutions. Individual and collective security are pre-conditions for achieving positive outcomes in other areas of activities.

2. Justice and reconciliation create an accountable legal system to deal with past abuses and emerging challenges. Key elements of the area of activities include effective law enforcement, an open judicial system and formal and informal mechanisms for resolving conflicts.

3. Social and economic wellbeing when deals with basic social and economic needs especially provision for emergency relief, the restoration of essential services, the creation of a foundation for a viable economy and the limitation of a sustainable development program.

4. Governance and participation on which focuses on creating effective political and administrative institutions particularly through establishing a representative constitutional structure strengthening public sector management and administration and ensuring active society involvement in governance

5. Roles played by general international actors including the United Nations (UN), World Bank, Other multilateral organizations, Bilateral donors, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and Contractors.

While it is generally understood that basic education infrastructure in post-conflict reconstruction takes place at various times during and after conflict. The framework places tasks between the cessation of violent conflict and the return to normalization for this purpose. Normalization is reached when extraordinary outside intervention is no longer needed. The processes of governance and economic activities largely function on a self-determined and self-sustaining basis and internal and external relations are conducted according to generally accepted norms of behavior (CSIS & AUSA, 2002).

There are several cross-cutting tasks inherent in post-conflict basic education infrastructure that do not appear in the framework. Policy-makers need to gather and analyze information to make an assessment of the requirements of basic education infrastructure. Planning coordination and must establish objectives, develop

strategy, determine appropriate divisions of labor, mobilize the necessary resources and managing competing demands of multiple actors working together. Training is essential both for the development and maintenance of sustainable efforts. Finally, appropriate funding mechanisms and levels are integral to short term and long term reconstruction (CSIS & AUSA, 2002).

Post-conflict reconstruction is a cycle of four years of repatriating, reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. It starts when conflicts end, typically in the form of the peace agreement, it requires a coherent and coordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of internal and external actors including federal, state and local governments, civil society, the private sector and international agencies (National Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2016). These various actors undertake a range of interrelated programs that span the security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of society and that collectively and cumulatively addresses both the causes and consequences of the conflict and in the long run establishes the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace and development (NEPAD, 2005).

According to Tzifakis (2018), the primary goals of post-conflict reconstruction are building acceptable, accountable and transparent institutions to generate self-sustaining economic growth and to create civil organizations and a general climate in which people once again begin to trust each other and are reconciled with their troubled past and willing to live together peacefully. Reconstruction strategies are laid down to rigidly guide response in the post-conflict period. It explores how international legal issues that arise in the post-conflict period relate to number of strands of the policy debate including government creation, contribution making, gender policy, provision of security, justice for past atrocities, rule of law, development, economic recovery, returning displaced persons and responsibilities of international actors (Saula & Sweeney, 2015). How reconstruction strategies are sequenced in the post-conflict reconstruction environment is non-clear context and dependent on basic education infrastructure. Nevertheless, the top priority in early reconstruction policy efforts should generate rapid and visible results in basic education infrastructure (Timilsina, 2007). Post-conflict reconstruction strategies involve a number of different types of activities in basic education infrastructure sector project. It is possible to stretch projects to cover a diverse range of objectives. Some of these may contribute to basic education infrastructural reconstruction (Anand, 2005).

It is important that assessments evaluate first the reconstruction strategies in place at the national level before analyzing various aspects that influence and contribute to the post-conflict response. Without the political will to develop, implement and derive policy for an effective response to basic education infrastructure reconstruction impact or interventions is limited. Timely

formulation of responsive reconstruction policies is essential to attain national coverage of recovery, efforts, upscale the mobilization of resources and coordinate various responses and stakeholders so as to examine the impact (Coles, 2011).

Different basic education staff and stakeholders implement various reconstruction strategies when tackling post-conflict situations. However, the overall responsibility for coordination of response efforts lies with government through its national policies but for many countries especially that early stage of development, progress depends on support from international donors and the community (Rwezula, Multasa & Sibanda, 2012).

Aderlini & Rushuwa (2006), reported that basic education infrastructure reconstruction strategies are usually guided by the following principles:

a. Enhancing peace and security for basic education infrastructure
b. Revitalizing the economy for financing basic education infrastructure
c. Rebuilding basic education infrastructure
d. Basic education infrastructure service provision
e. Strengthening governance on basic education infrastructure
f. Rules of law

In post-crisis situations, government reconstruction strategies are influenced by external players such as civil society groups, donors and international communities. Donors reconstruction policies are largely influenced by overriding security, poverty agenda coupled with the need to manage fiduciary risk from a top-down approach. Often donor country reconstruction policies are influenced by the nature of response policies. Donor responses can be guided by reconstruction strategies which influence at the macro level that is structure strengthening government systems and capacity building(Cliffe & Manninng,2006).

Yahaya, Lynch, Wehrey, Brown & Ghanian, (2018) discuss a framework to assess various basic education infrastructure sector in reconstruction strategies. Basic education sector infrastructure is examined against four reconstruction strategy objectives and whether a wide sector provided approach has been used or not for planning basic education infrastructure sector. The impact made on basic education sector infrastructure is assessed against the four objectives. The framework assessed the impact of reconstruction strategies focusing mainly on basic education infrastructure. The four objectives considered were;

1) Poverty alleviation
2) Effective governance
3) State reconstruction
4) Conflict prevention
5) Peace

Literacy campaign is key to basic education infrastructure reconstruction strategies. Survey literacy levels and linguistic groups and develop literacy campaign

and conduct literacy campaign and institutionalize opportunities for education to sustain efforts of literacy campaign (Collier, 2004).

Transparency and anti-corruption policy is an aspect of governance in reconstructing basic education infrastructure. Developed laws, promoting anti-corruption, accountability, and transparency within government and private sector on basic education infrastructure, create a mechanism to curtail corruption, including special prosecutors witness and judge protection design and implement anti-corruption campaign including education. This includes enforcing anti-corruption laws by removing corrupt officials. Dismantle organize crime networks and empower legal and civil society mechanisms to monitor government behavior, foster transparent governing practices in the public and private sectors. The provision of basic education infrastructure prosecutes violators and enforce standards, seek international cooperation to combat corruption(Hawrylenko,2003).

According to Buckland (2005), early investment in repairing basic educational infrastructure in countries emerging from the crisis is often seen as a vital prerequisite for sustainable peace. O'Malley (2007), asserts that during the conflict, basic educational facilities are usually destroyed or targeted, resulting in school closures and even the collapse of entire education systems. In some instance, basic education facilities are used as training bases for rebel fighters, making it impossible to have regular classes. Kagawa (2005) points out that in a post-conflict society, basic educational physical structures play a vital role as contributors to the reintegration processes of returning refugees. Machel (2010) demonstrate that primary and junior secondary schools often offer a sense of normality and greatly contribute to the psychosocial well-being and development of children. While functional primary and junior secondary schools may play an essential role in keeping children affected by crisis off the streets and away from possible recruitment into rebel movements. It is unclear how exactly such a strategy might engender within children particularly peaceful attitudes and behavior (Vouhm, 2015).

Ernest and Dickie (2012) assert that due to the absence of federal and state institutions in a post-conflict society, there is limited management capacity, poor emphasis on manpower development and training and lack of established management or technical standards. The situation is made more complicated by bureaucratic systems that cause a delay in implementing basic education infrastructure projects and programs (Brown, 2005). Due to a lack of coordination and information exchange between agency, very often projects are duplicated. Furthermore, organizations take over basic education infrastructure projects when they do not have adequate competences or adequate training (Biggs & Smith, 2003).

Education policy and data centre and systems service centre AED (2010) reported that despite the relatively rapid construction of classrooms, there remain enormous demands for classrooms and particularly more permanent classrooms of brick fired clays, or mortar in the reconstruction of primary education in African Countries. Semi-permanent classrooms and roof-only and open-air learning spaces make up more than 50% of all learning spaces. These often do not meet the standard of a safe learning environment.

## 3. Methodology:

This study adopted a descriptive survey design with North East Nigeria as the area of study. The population of the study was 400 with 200 basic education players and 200 actors from Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states of North East Nigeria. All the education sector staff and stakeholders were utilized for the study. Data was collected using researcher developed questionnaire tagged "Reconstruction strategies on Basic Education Infrastructure Determination Questionnaire" with a Likert response scale of "very significant impact", "Significant Impact", "Moderate Impact", "Low impact", "No impact". The instrument was validated by two experts from the education management Unit of Physical Sciences Education Department, Modibbo Adama University of Technology Yola. The reliability of the instrument was also determined through Cronbach coefficient alpha using data from a pilot study. Data was collected through research assistant from the three states of Adamawa Borno and Yobe. The data was analyzed using mean and standard deviation to answer research questions and z-test for testing the hypotheses at 0.05 level of significance. A decision rule of above 3.5 is a high extent, 3.5 as a moderate extent and below 3.5 as low extent used for answering research questions. When z-calculated is higher than z-critical, the hypothesis is rejected, while if it is lower than z-critical, it is accepted.

## 4. Results:

Result of data analysis followed the order in which research questions and hypotheses were raised.

Research Question 1: what is the impact of poverty alleviation reconstruction strategy on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria?

The data in table 1 shows that the overall mean indicate low impact by respondents. This means that poverty alleviation reconstruction strategy had a low impact on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

Research Question 2: What is the impact of effective governance reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria? The data in table 2 indicate that the overall mean is to a low impact (2.57) by respondents. This means that effective governance reconstruction strategies had a low impact on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram Insurgency in North East Nigeria.

Table 1: *Mean and Standard Deviation of education sector players and actors responses on impact of poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.*

| S/No | Reconstruction strategies | $\overline{X}$ | X₁ N=200 A | X₂ N=200 $\overline{X}$ | α | μ | Remark |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Identifying ad recruitment of teachers | 2.76 | 1.13 | 2.68 | 1.01 | 2.72 | Low |
| 2 | Identification and recruitment of administrators | 3.46 | 0.99 | 3.00 | 0.90 | 3.23 | low |
| 3 | Training of teachers and administrators | 0.33 | 0.50 | 3.28 | 0.93 | 1.05 | low |
| 4 | Register school age population | 1.87 | 0.99 | 2.65 | 1.07 | 2.26 | low |
| 5 | Creation of equal opportunity for all | 1.62 | 0.35 | 2.44 | 1.08 | 2.03 | low |
| | Overall mean | | | | | 2.26 | low |

X1 = Education Sector players
X2 = Education Sector actors

Table 2: *Mean and standard deviation of Education sector players and actors on the impact of effective governance reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.*

| S/No | Reconstruction strategies | $\overline{X}$ | X₁ N=200 A | X₂ N=200 $\overline{X}$ | α | μ | Remark |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Improvement of infrastructure | 3.11 | 1.08 | 2.84 | 0.88 | 3.00 | low |
| 2 | Sustaining infrastructure | 2.49 | 1.11 | 2.66 | 0.97 | 2.58 | low |
| 3 | Securing of infrastructures | 2.30 | 1.06 | 2.78 | 0.96 | 2.54 | low |
| 4 | Protection of infrastructure | 2.16 | 0.51 | 2.62 | 0.93 | 2.39 | low |
| 5 | Creation of capacity to protect infrastructure | 2.31 | 0.25 | 2.37 | 0.92 | 2.34 | low |
| | Overall mean | | | | | 2.57 | low |

X1 = Education Sector players
X2 = Education Sector actors

Research Question 3: what is the impact of state reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure for post-Boko Haram Insurgency in North East Nigeria?

In Table 3, the overall mean is to a low impact (2.73) by the respondents. This means that the impact of state reconstruction strategies was low on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

Research Question 4: What is the impact of conflict prevention reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure for post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria

The overall mean in table 4 show low impact (2.73). This means that conflict prevention reconstruction strategies had a low impact on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

Table 3: *Mean and standard deviation of education sector staff and stakeholders on the impact of state reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.*

| S/No | Reconstruction strategies | $\overline{X}$ | $X_1$ N=200 A | $X_2$ N=200 $\overline{X}$ | Y α | μ | Remark |
|------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------|------|--------|
| 1 | Restarting of service | 2.30 | 1.11 | 2.78 | 1.29 | 2.54 | low |
| 2 | Provision of limited new services | 3.35 | 0.99 | 2.65 | 1.07 | 3.00 | low |
| 3 | Delivery of more positive dividend benefit | 2.76 | 1.07 | 2.68 | 1.01 | 2.72 | low |
| 4 | Delivery of basic education service in place | 2.76 | 1.07 | 3.04 | 0.98 | 2.90 | low |
| 5 | Delivery of limited new basic education service | 2.39 | 0.87 | 3.00 | 0.85 | 2.78 | low |
| | Overall mean | | | | | 2.78 | low |

X1 = Education Sector players
X2 = Education Sector actors

Table 4: *Mean and standard deviation of Education sector players and actors on the impact of conflict prevention reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure for post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.*

| S/No | Reconstruction strategies | $\overline{X}$ | $X_1$ N=200 A | $X_2$ N=200 $\overline{X}$ | A | μ | Remark |
|------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------|------|--------|
| 1 | Reforming institutions | 2.76 | 1.11 | 2.68 | 1.29 | 2.72 | low |
| 2 | Environmental sustainability | 2.49 | 1.37 | 2.78 | 1.01 | 2.64 | low |
| 3 | Economic development | 2.76 | 0.99 | 2.65 | 1.07 | 2.63 | low |
| 4 | Peace development | 3.00 | 0.85 | 3.04 | 0.98 | 3.02 | low |
| 5 | Crisis management | 2.77 | 1.12 | 2.50 | 1.08 | 2.64 | low |
| | Overall mean | | | | | 2.73 | low |

X1 = Education Sector players
X2 = Education Sector actors

Research Question 5: what is the impact of peace reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria?

The data in table 5 shows that the overall mean (2.21) indicates low impact by respondents. This means that the impact of peace reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure was low in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

Hypothesis 1: there is no significant difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on the impact of poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

The data in table 6 shows that Z-test calculated (2.10) was greater than the Z-critical or table value. Therefore, this hypothesis which states that there is no significant difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure has been rejected.

Hypothesis 2: there is no significant difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on effective governance reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

In the table, the z-test calculated was (1.315) while Z-critical value was 0.345. Since z-calculated was greater than Z-critical value, the null hypothesis was rejected.

Table 5: *Mean and Standard Deviation of education sector players and actors the impact of peace reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.*

| S/No | Reconstruction strategies | $\overline{X}$ | $X_1$ N=200 A | $X_2$ N=200 $\overline{X}$ | α | μ | Remark |
|------|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|
| 1 | Prioritization of basic education infrastructure | 2.84 | 0.83 | 2.04 | 0.87 | 2.44 | low |
| 2 | Balanced development of the education system | 1.70 | 0.62 | 2.37 | 0.94 | 2.04 | low |
| 3 | Resumption of other types of education infrastructure | 1.80 | 1.03 | 2.22 | 1.02 | 2.01 | low |
| 4 | Development of other types of education infrastructure | 1.99 | 0.89 | 1.99 | 0.78 | 1.99 | low |
| 5 | Restarting teacher education | 2.86 | 0.90 | 2.38 | 0.71 | 2.62 | Low |
| | Overall mean | | | | | 2.21 | Low |

X1 = Education Sector players
X2 = Education Sector actors

Table 6: *Z-test difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on the impact of poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.*

| S/No | Respondents | $\overline{X}$ | SD | N | df. | Std. Error | T.cal | T.cri | Remark |
|------|-------------|------|------|-----|-----|-----------|-------|-------|--------|
| 1 | Education sector staff | 2.40 | 1.025 | 200 | | | | | |
| 2 | Education sector stakeholders | 1.05 | 0.335 | 200 | 28 | 0.283 | 2.10 | 1.11 | S |

Table 7: *Z-test difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on effective governance reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.*

| S/No | Respondents | $\overline{X}$ | SD | N | Df | Std.error | T.cal | T.cri | Remark |
|------|-------------|------|------|-----|-----|-----------|-------|-------|--------|
| 1 | Education sector staff | 30.20 | 68.61 | 200 | | | | | |
| | | | | | 28 | 15.128 | 1.315 | 0.345 | S |
| 2 | Education sector stakeholders | 10.60 | 40.407 | 200 | | | | | |

Hypothesis 3: there is no significant difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on state reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

The z-calculated in table 8, showed a value of 14.321, while Z-critical value was 1.92. thus, the z-calculated was far above the Z-critical value, which rejected the null hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: there is no significant difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on conflict prevention reconstruction strategies for basic

education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

In table 9, the z-calculated was 0.184, while Z-critical value was 2.608. Since the z-calculated was lower than the Z-critical value, the null hypothesis was accepted.

Hypothesis 5: there is no significant difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on peace reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram Insurgency in North East Nigeria.

The data in table 10 showed that z-calculated (3.10) was greater than the Z-critical value. The null hypothesis was therefore accepted.

Table 8: *Z-test difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on state reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.*

| S/No | Respondents | $\bar{X}$ | SD | N | Df | Std Error | T.cal | T.cri | Remark |
|------|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------|-------|-------|--------|
| 1 | Education sector staff | 22.14 | 58.431 | 200 | | | | | |
| | | | | | 28 | 13.142 | 14.321 | 1.92 | S |
| 2 | Education sector stakeholders | 6.80 | 20.120 | 200 | | | | | |

Table 9: *Z-test difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on the impact of conflict prevention for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.*

| S/No | Respondents | $\bar{X}$ | SD | N | Df | Std. error | T.cal | T.cri | Remark |
|------|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------|-------|-------|--------|
| 1 | Education sector staff | 5.40 | 3.028 | 200 | | | | | |
| | | | | | 28 | 11.912 | 0.184 | 2.608 | S |
| 2 | Education sector stakeholders | 1.29 | 1.195 | 200 | | | | | |

Table 10: *Z-test difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on peace reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.*

| S/No | Respondents | X | SD | N | Df | Std. error | T.cal | T.cri | Remark |
|------|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------|-------|-------|--------|
| 1 | Education sector staff | 1.29 | 1.195 | 200 | | | | | |
| | | | | | 28 | 16.104 | 3.10 | 1.113 | S |
| 2 | Education sector stakeholders | 14.321 | 1.93 | 200 | | | | | |

4.1. Findings of the Study:

The findings of the study indicated that:

1. Poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies had a low impact on basic education infrastructure in North East Nigeria.
2. Effective governance reconstruction strategies had a low impact on basic education infrastructure.
3. The impact of state reconstruction strategies on basic education infrastructure was low.
4. Conflict prevention reconstruction strategies impact on basic education infrastructure was low
5. Peace reconstruction strategies impact on basic education infrastructure was low.

## 5. Discussion of Findings:

The findings of the study were discussed in relation to the five reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure as raised in the purpose of the study. The findings in table 6, hypothesis 1 showed that a null hypothesis was rejected. This means that the impact of poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure was low in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria. These findings were not consistent with current observations and responses of education sector players and actors as expressed by the literature of the subject. Hawrylenko (2010) reported that poverty alleviation is in terms of human resources through identification, recruitment, and training of teachers and

administrators and registration of the school-age population.

The findings of table 7, hypothesis 2 indicated that there was a significant difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on effective governance reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure. This is not consistent with Hasic (2004) who emphasized on the importance of improving buildings, libraries information systems, and office equipment. Therefore, the need for effective governance reconstruction strategy for basic education is not far from reality.

The significance difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on state reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure as indicated by findings in hypothesis 3, table 8, did not concur with Cliffe and Manning (2006) who reported the importance of state reconstruction strategies which were in place before the conflict and new basic education infrastructure service in areas  previously outside the reach of  the state. This is corroborated by Rwezuwa, Mudasa & Sibanda (2012) who expressed that the state must also be perceived to be delivering more positive dividend benefits to the population to consolidate basic education infrastructure.

The findings in respect of hypothesis 4, table 9 showed that a significant difference exists in the responses of education sector players and actors on conflict prevention reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure. This disagreed with the assertion of Obeid (2011) who identified six interlinked priority areas that constitute objectives for conflict prevention strategies. This was also supported by Brown (2005) who opined that the priorities required integration of economic, social and environmental objectives that can only be productively managed through good governance, hence, prioritization of reforming institutions.

The significant difference in the responses of education sector players and actors on peace reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure as indicated by hypothesis 4, table 10 is not consistent with The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, (2005) which stated that insurance of peace for balanced development of the education system and support the resumption and development of secondary education, technical  and vocational education, adult and non-formal education and tertiary education as key to basic education infrastructure reconstruction..

## 6. Conclusion:

It can be concluded that key players and actors like the federal ministry of education, the state ministry of education, civil societies NGOs, donors, and international aid agencies reconstruction strategies had no impact on basic education infrastructure except peace reconstruction strategies in North East Nigeria.

## 7. Recommendations:

The following recommendations came out of the findings of the study;

1.  The federal ministry of education, state ministries of education, local government education authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil societies, donors and international aid agencies should put down sound poverty alleviation reconstruction strategies for basic education infrastructure in post-Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.
2.  A committed leadership with strong anti-corruption strategies for effective governance should be developed for basic education infrastructure in North East Nigeria.
3.  A project cycle management technique should be utilized on state reconstruction for basic education infrastructure reconstruction in North East Nigeria.
4.  Conflict prevention should not focus on a single basic education sector to create a positive impact on infrastructure. It is necessary to establish sustainable strategies for the whole education sector in a strategic manner in North East Nigeria.
5.  A holistic education sector-wide peace planning process involving formal, informal, non-formal and technical and vocational education should be implemented to balance basic education infrastructure in North East Nigeria.

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