

The A Priori Without Magic: Notes, Typos, and Errata (Last Updated: January 2026)

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This document will be updated whenever new issues come to light.

The A Priori Without Magic

- CUP insisted on including punctuation within quotation marks, against my protests.
- There are a few other minor stylistic quirks of Elements volumes — e.g., swapping “this Element” for “this book” and the like, and calling chapters “sections”.
- The Elements volumes usually don’t allow a preface, but I insisted and they agreed to let me include one. But they also moved my acknowledgements and dedication to the very end of the book (page 70) to better conform to the standard style for Elements volumes.
- Page 13: I claimed here that the question of whether dreams were “experiences” was a verbal issue. And at the time of writing, I would have said the same thing about hallucinations. In both cases, this is probably too quick. Internalists about warrant will need to treat both as “experiences” to avoid having basic perceptual beliefs count as *a priori*. Externalists may disagree.

- Page 14: Related to the previous point, in a full theory of experience, the “relevant” qualification in the definition might end up carrying a lot of weight. I also suspect that the notion is somewhat context sensitive.
- Page 16: I had to be very brief with the imagination test, so it is easy to misunderstand. Here it is presented just as a test to apply when a warranted belief intuitively depends on an experience. As such, it is neutral on other cases. We could however, generalize the test to also work in reverse, swapping experiences for imaginative episodes.
- Page 17: Note that, quite generally, beliefs about extant sense-data or other purely qualitative features can come out *a priori* according to the imagination test if they aren’t included among the self-referential cases to be excluded. A case can be made for both ways of talking, but it is more in line with common usage to exclude them. The exclusion is probably under-discussed in the text, but I think there are plausible ways of motivating it. What is most important for my account is that the exception cases to the imagination test all fall under a small number of natural headings. If not, the account would risk becoming both over-complicated and *ad hoc*.

I discuss the imagination test, potential counterexamples, and the surrounding issues in more detail in my forthcoming paper, “Analyzing the *A Priori*”.

- Page 28: typo — “is a broader and more flexible than”
- Page 31: typo — “there are couple of”
- Page 34: typo — for some reason the “ ϕ ” in the tonk introduction rule is smaller than it should be.
- Page 35: I wrote “any collections of rules” to focus on pluralism, but “any collection of rules” probably would have read better and gotten the same idea across.

- Section 8: the reply to Williamson's argument is given in more detail in my paper, "Imagination and the *A Priori*".
- Page 53: typo — the second occurrence of "he generalizes to conclude (1)" should be "he generalizes to conclude (2)".
- Page 57: typo — "there is a ton indeterminacy here"
- One of my main goals in this Element was to write rigorous and crisp philosophy in a clear, accessible, convincing, and funny way. Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer mastered this, but the rest of us almost always fall short. If you want to become best friends with me, tell me (sincerely) that you think I did Russell and Ayer proud here.