Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma

Anne Meng* Jack Paine†

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Abstract

Regimes founded in rebellion are, typically, extremely durable. We propose that this stability is founded upon peaceful power sharing between the rebel regime leader and military elites. Amid long and intense fighting, rebel leaders must delegate control to top military commanders because doing so helps them to win battles. After seizing power, power-sharing deals between former combatants are highly credible due to their history of interactions, which mitigates the guardianship dilemma. Elsewhere, a persistent internal security dilemma often undermines power-sharing deals. Using originally collected data on African regimes from 1960–2017, we establish that rebel regimes break down less frequently than other authoritarian regimes, and experience fewer coups. Regarding the mechanism, rebel regimes more frequently share power with military elites by appointing a Minister of Defense. These Ministers are typically high-ranking members of the rebellion, which reflects the regime's replacement of the state military with their own.

*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Virginia, Email: ameng@virginia.edu
†Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, Email: jackpaine@rochester.edu

1 INTRODUCTION

All autocratic leaders confront a fundamental guardianship dilemma: a military that is strong enough to protect the regime against mass unrest and foreign threats is also strong enough to overthrow it via a coup d'etat (Greitens 2016; Harkness 2018; Paine 2021*b*). The coup threat is prevalent: 244 coups were successfully carried out worldwide between 1950–2021, and coups are the most common way in which autocratic leaders are deposed (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2018). Clearly, men with guns pose a dangerous threat to authoritarian leaders.

How do dictators mitigate this dilemma and avoid removal by their own military officers? We should expect the guardianship dilemma to be acute in regimes that gained power via the military, in which case men with guns dominate the winning coalition (Svolik 2012). Yet surprisingly, this is *not* the case. Rebel regimes, or those that gain power by winning a rebellion, are exceptionally durable, and are particularly immune from coups. Prominent examples of rebel regimes include the MPLA regime in Angola, which has governed since winning a colonial liberation struggle against Portugal in 1975; and the RPF regime in Rwanda, which has governed since 1995 after winning a civil war. Our originally coded dataset, which we detail below, includes 21 rebel regimes in Africa since independence. In any particular year, such regimes were more than twice as likely to survive in power compared with non-rebel regimes. In fact, 76% of post-independence rebel regimes in Africa are still in power today.

We propose that the stability of rebel regimes is founded upon *peaceful power sharing with military elites*. To mitigate the motives for high-ranking military officials to stage a coup, rulers can share power. A key power-sharing decision is whether the leader delegates control of the military to the Ministry of Defense. An important, and easily empirically observable, component of this choice is to appoint a distinct military elite as the Minister of Defense, as opposed to eliminating the position, keeping it vacant, or the ruler taking the post himself. Yet although delegating control provides a means for distributing spoils to military elites, this choice may fail to have the intended stabilizing effect. Relinquishing personal control enhances the opportunity for high-ranking officers to stage

a coup, and the generic problem of credible commitments provides a motive. Appointed elites may anticipate that the ruler will renege on the power-sharing deal in the future, which would eliminate their access to spoils. This creates incentives for high-ranking military officials to leverage their temporary control over the military and stage a coup today, rather than wait and risk losing their privileges tomorrow.

Commitments for leaders to share power with top military officials are, typically, highly credible in rebel regimes. Upon establishing their regime, these leaders have already interacted and shared power with their top subordinates—they did so during the struggle to gain power. When facing an intense armed struggle, leaders improve battlefield performance by delegating control to military commanders and incorporating them into the central decision-making bodies. Inclusive leadership bodies established during long struggles allow rebel leaders to develop trust and stable power-sharing relationships among their subordinates. After coming into power, rebel movements usually replace the existing state military with their own. Leaders maintain the support of their former co-combatants by appointing them to high-ranking government positions, and these power-sharing arrangements are highly credible due to a history of interactions during the war. By contrast, in many other regimes, power-sharing deals often break down because of mistrust and a persistent internal security dilemma. These arguments yield our theoretical expectations that rebel regimes are less likely to break down, and that they frequently share power with high-ranking military officials.

We provide empirical support for our theory by analyzing original data from post-colonial Africa between 1960 and 2017. We define rebel regimes as those that came to power by winning a major civil war (at least 1,000 battle deaths), and we do not require the group to attempt a social revolution or have a strong ideology. Our sample includes ten regimes that gained independence by fighting against a colonizer, and eleven additional post-colonial rebel regime cases. We compare outcomes in rebel regimes to those in non-rebel regimes. We first establish the aggregate statistical pattern: both types of rebel regimes (colonial liberation and not) are significantly less likely to break down,

and these findings are unaltered under numerous robustness checks. We also examine successful coups specifically because of the centrality of this mode of exit to our theory. Consistent with our expectations, rebel regimes experience successful coups at significantly lower rates.

We then provide empirical evidence for the power-sharing mechanism: rebel regimes derive their stability through delegating control of the military to the Ministry of Defense. We compiled original time-varying data on cabinet appointments, and we show that rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in 83% of years compared to 56% of years in non-rebel regimes. Presidents in non-rebel regimes commonly try to retain personal control over the military by appointing *themselves* as their own Ministers of Defense. We also show that rebel regimes that do *not* appoint a Minister of Defense are more susceptible to breakdown, which illustrates the centrality of the power-sharing mechanism: *rebel regimes cannot rely on partisan or ideological bonds alone to stay in power*.

We then provide systematic evidence for two related mechanisms in the theory. First, we compiled information on the composition of the state military after rebel takeover. In 19 of 21 cases, rebel regimes either completely transformed and displaced the existing state military, or occupied top positions in an integrated military. Second, we use biographical information to show that Ministers of Defense in rebel regimes were usually high-ranking rebel commanders who played an important role in the war.

Our article contributes to numerous literatures. Studies on authoritarian stability and civil wars rarely speak directly to each other, and we help to bridge this crucial gap. In existing research on power sharing and authoritarian stability, scholars focus on power sharing *across* organizations, such as co-opting opposition groups into a legislature (Gandhi 2008), offering cabinet positions to members of other ethnic groups (Arriola 2009), or integrating the military with a competing rebel group to settle a civil war (Toft 2009). By contrast, we focus on how rulers share power *within* the ruling coalition. Drawing on insights from studies of authoritarian stability, we emphasize that a leader's own ruling coalition poses the greatest threat of overthrow from within (Bueno de

Mesquita et al. 2005; Svolik 2012). We explain how the history of delegating power during the rebellion mitigates this central threat to authoritarian survival: coups by regime elites.

Our theory also illuminates how leaders of rebel regimes can alleviate the dreaded guardianship dilemma by offering to share power with their former co-combatants. In doing so, our argument unifies two surprisingly disparate literatures on power sharing. According to authoritarian regimes scholarship, leaders gain a security guarantee by sharing power with elites who can credibly threaten to unseat them, thus creating incentives for rulers to share power with military actors (Svolik 2012; Meng 2020). However, according to the conflict literature, leaders hesitate to share power with coercive agents because bringing these elites into the inner circle empowers them and elevates their ability to depose the ruler (Roessler 2011; Paine 2021*a*). According to these studies, leaders should typically not want to share power with the military. Our study reconciles these two conflicting perspectives by highlighting the conditions under which power sharing with military elites alleviates, rather than exacerbates, the guardianship dilemma.

We also challenge big ideas about the consequences of social revolutions for regime durability. Existing research advances two key mechanisms: (1) transforming society to control the *masses*, in contrast to our focus on *elites*; and (2) *ideological and partisan affinity* between civilian and military officials, in contrast to our focus on *sharing power* (Huntington 1968; Levitsky and Way 2013; Lachapelle et al. 2020; Miller 2020). These existing mechanisms do not offer a compelling explanation of the durability of African rebel regimes. First, most rebel regimes in Africa did not attempt a revolutionary transformation of society, as only six of the 21 rebel regimes in our dataset meet Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) definition of a revolutionary regime. Contrary to Huntington's (1968) often-quoted proclamation that "he who controls the countryside controls the country," most African rebel regimes failed to consolidate territorial control outside of the capital because of persistent difficulties in broadcasting power highlighted by Herbst (2000) and others. Moreover, many of these regimes continued to face prolonged civil wars and state weakness after coming into power. Our emphasis on elite institutions rather than mass-level mechanisms also distinguishes our

approach from the literature on rebel governance, which focuses mainly on local service provision (Weinstein 2006; Stewart 2021) or prospects for democratization (Huang 2016).

Second, we offer a distinct explanation for stability among elites. In Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) account, peaceful civilian-military interactions are driven by a shared ideology and fusion between the party and army, including using the party to monitor the army. By contrast, we provide a "carrots" rather than a "sticks" approach to explain peaceful civilian-military interactions. Instead of preventing elite defection via coercion and monitoring, we argue that autocratic leaders maintain the support of military elites by credibly sharing power (and hence spoils) with them. We also stress that *partisanship and ideological bonds alone are not sufficient to ensure stability*. Dictators have no friends, and his trusted allies—men with guns—can still turn on him if excluded from the regime. Thus, co-conspirators from the rebellion pose a grave threat to the leader unless he credibly shares the spoils of the state with them via government appointments. Whereas Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) article "highlights the role of ideology in fostering authoritarian durability" (591), we argue that shared ideology is neither necessary nor sufficient for regime stability.

2 THEORY

All leaders face a guardianship dilemma: a military that is strong enough to protect the regime is also strong enough to overthrow it. To mitigate the guardianship dilemma, rulers contemplate whether to delegate control to high-ranking military officials, which is an effective means of distributing spoils. However, power-sharing arrangements will not breed stability if the ruler's promises to maintain the deal in the future are not credible. We explain why rebel regime leaders are better able to make credible commitments to their elite allies, compared with coup or civilian leaders.

2.1 Solving the Guardianship Dilemma by Sharing Power?

In order to rule, a leader must sustain sufficient support from a winning coalition, which varies in its size and composition across regimes (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). In any authoritarian regime, high-ranking military officials are part of the winning coalition, and therefore securing their acquiescence is necessary for regime survival. Beyond their ability to carry out a coup, military elites are also crucial members of the winning coalition because of their role in defeating threats from outside the regime. Without their active support, the military may not defend the regime against popular uprisings or shirk at counterinsurgency (Paine 2021*b*). Overall, although authoritarian regime survival hinges on many factors, securing the cooperation of high-ranking military officials is paramount for shielding the regime against threats from above and below (Svolik 2012).

Successful coups require that soldiers have ample *motive* to remove the ruler and the *opportunity* to do so. Rulers are often compelled to share power and distribute spoils to high-ranking military officials in order to maintain their support and therefore lessen the motive of staging a coup.

A key power-sharing decision is whether the leader delegates control of the military to the Ministry of Defense. An important, and easily empirically observable, component of this choice is to appoint a distinct military elite as the Minister of Defense, as opposed to eliminating the position, keeping it vacant, or the ruler taking the post himself. In African autocracies, the Minister of Defense is the highest-ranking executive position that controls the military, including the creation and implementation of national security strategy and the appointment, management, and mobilization of all security forces. The typical structure of command is for the Minister of Defense to sit atop the military hierarchy, directly above the chiefs of staff of all branches of the armed forces (army, navy, air force, sometimes militarized police), each of whom report directly to the Defense Minister. While these other high-level officers also command operational control over the armed forces, the Defense Ministry oversees these other offices, and thus constitutes a key position on which we focus.

In addition to the Defense Minister's powerful position vis-à-vis other members of the military, the

stable appointment of a Minister of Defense is an important component of the choice to delegate control of the military to the Ministry of Defense. When an elite is appointed to the Minister of Defense position, the Ministry of Defense—rather than the president personally—has direct contacts with the highest-ranking officers that exercise operational control over troops. By creating an institutionalized link between the executive branch and the military, the president relinquishes personal control over the military. For example, in Figure 1, we present an organizational chart of the Angolan Ministry of Defense.[1] "Because defense and security matters were of extreme urgency, the *minister of defense was considered second in importance only to the president*. The minister was responsible for the entire defense establishment, including the army, air force, navy, and local militias" (Smaldone 1991, 214, emphasis added).

Figure 1: Organization of the Angolan Ministry of Defense, 1988



Source: Smaldone (1991, 218).

Sharing power with the military by inviting high-ranking officials to join the government is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it lessens the *motives* for military elites to stage a coup. Ministerial positions are a common method for rulers to allocate spoils to elites in Africa (Arriola 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015). Cabinet ministers are paid lucrative salaries, and often receive private luxury cars, houses, first-class travel, and control over government contracts that

[1]This case is typical; we are unaware of any examples in post-colonial Africa in which the Minister of Defense is subordinate to another military official.

they can reward to family members.

On the other hand, delegating control of the military to high-ranking officers enhances the *opportunity* to defy the ruler's wishes and stage a coup.[2] Rulers clearly believe this to be true—among all cabinet positions, the ruler is most likely to personally hold the Defense portfolio (Meng 2020, 110). This fear of overthrow by military officers in high-ranking government positions is born out in the data: empirically, high-level military appointees have the greatest rate of coup success (Singh 2014). In our sample of African countries from 1960–2017, coup attempts from high-level officers (e.g., generals, cabinet-level officers) succeeded 60% of the time. The success rate is even higher, at 83%, when we restrict the sample to the top three military positions: Minister of Defense, Vice Minister of Defense, and Army Chief of Staff. Juvenal Habyarimana, who ruled Rwanda from 1973 until 1994, seized power from his predecessor while serving as Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff. Similarly, the Defense Minister of Mauritania seized power from the leader in a coup in 1980, as did the Defense Minister of Burundi in a successful 1996 coup. By contrast, coup attempts by middle-ranking officers (e.g., majors, colonels) succeeded 49% of the time, and those from the bottom (e.g., low-level soldiers) succeeded only 14% of the time.

Thus, leaders are caught in a dangerous game. On the one hand, *not* sharing power and spoils with the military risks creating grievances among the top brass, which might result in coup attempts. On the other hand, however, *sharing power* with military elites makes it easier for top-ranking officers to stage a coup.

Why might high-ranking officers stage a coup even when the ruler delegates control of the military, rather than being satisfied with receiving lucrative spoils from their position? Why are the lower *motives* for a coup sometimes overshadowed by the enhanced *opportunity* to seize the state? A

[2]In nascent democracies, leaders fearful of a coup usually try to establish civilian control over the military by appointing a civilian Minister of Defense to interact with military chiefs of staff (Brooks 2019). By contrast, in authoritarian regimes, attempts at civilian control are often fraught—in particular in regimes where the head of state himself came from the military.

problem of credible commitment remains. Even if the ruler delegates the Defense portfolio today, he might renege on this promise tomorrow—either by shuffling the position or personalizing control over the military. Indeed, shuffling ministers is a common empirical phenomenon to prevent any one person from amassing too much power. Sangoule Lamizana, the second president of Burkina Faso, cycled through five different Defense Ministers in 12 years. Joseph Kabila, the president of the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2001 to 2019, cycled through seven different Ministers of Defense, allowing the average Defense Minister to remain in office just over two years. In such cases, short-lived Defense Ministers are not given ample time to consolidate their own control over the security sector.

Alternatively, leaders can personalize control over the military by not appointing *any* distinct elite as Minister of Defense. In 38% of the country-years in our sample, the leader left the post vacant, eliminated the position altogether, or named himself his own Defense Minister. For example, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire was commander-in-chief and Minister of Defense for all three decades of his reign. No military officer ever held a cabinet post and regional military commanders were subordinate to civilian leaders. Within the military, Mobutu routinely shuffled elites in key positions to prevent any officer from developing an independent base of support (Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

Given the threat of removal, Defense Ministers may perceive their time in office as short-lived. This provides incentives to capture their "moment in the sun" and launch a coup today, rather than waiting and risk being removed from the position tomorrow. Mutual distrust between the leader and military elites creates an internal security dilemma, and rulers throughout post-colonial Africa "came to fear that their professed allies, especially those with a foothold in the army, police, or security services, might exploit their regime access and coercive capacity to seize power on their own" (Roessler 2011, 307). The internal security dilemma helps to explain the November 1966 coup in Burundi. In the months leading up to the coup, it became apparent that King Ntare V would soon replace Michel Micombero, his then-Minister of Defense. That October, the leader accused

Micombero of "incompetence" and "abuse of his authority," in addition to recruiting mercenary soldiers to replace existing army officers (McGowan 2003). The next month, while the king was out of the country, Micombero seized power in a bloodless coup.

How do rulers navigate the guardianship dilemma? Under what conditions can they delegate control over the military as a means to perpetuate, rather than undermine, their survival?

2.2 Credible Commitments in Rebel Regimes

Leaders in rebel regimes are better-positioned than typical dictators to neutralize the guardianship dilemma. This is surprising because the guardianship dilemma is most pressing for rulers who rely on the military to take and retain power (Svolik 2012), which is true almost by definition for rebel regimes. However, the launching organization of a rebel regime is well-situated to facilitate credible commitments between the ruler and military elites. Staging a coup carries risks even for high-ranking military officials. Coup attempts may fail, and participants of failed coups face dire consequences. At best, they are purged from the regime, and at worst, they are jailed or executed. Thus, although the prize of capturing the state is large, we anticipate that military elites are content to accept power-sharing relationships when the arrangement is credible—given the sizable risks of a failed coup.

Upon establishing their regime, these leaders have already interacted and shared power with their top subordinates—they did so during the struggle to gain power. Leaders cannot win wars alone. During intense armed struggles,[3] leaders must delegate power and authority to subordinates to improve battlefield performance (Greitens 2016). As Martin argues, "intense security threats can spur winning rebels to create inclusive leadership bodies . . . To assemble and process military information as efficiently as possible, and feed this information into organizational decisionmaking, *central*

[3]We require a conflict to reach a high death total (1,000 battle deaths total) to count as a rebel regime. Furthermore, every case in our dataset met an even more stringent standard: at least one period of highly intense fighting (1,000 battle deaths in a single year).

leaders must lean heavily on their 'specialists in violence' deployed in the field" (Forthcoming, 15, emphasis added). Successful rebel organizations must adopt decentralized structures in which field commanders wield real authority and decision-making power. For example, in Mozambique, "The executive commanders [who directed operations in each guerrilla region], as well as FRELIMO's overall military commander (that is, the Minister of Defence), were represented in a national command council chaired by the President of FRELIMO . . . " (Seegers 1986, 140).

These power-sharing relationships are especially likely to facilitate credible commitments when they unfold over long periods. Lengthy fighting enables leaders to observe performance and learn about the loyalty of their subordinates, hence mitigating the general problem of unknown private motives that can trigger an internal security dilemma (Roessler 2011, 313).[4] This shared history of collective leadership during the rebellion is also reinforced by generally high levels of trust and solidarity facilitated by wartime collective action (Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014; Lyons 2016). These psychological effects further stabilize expectations and trust about power-sharing deals.

After achieving power, rebel movements usually replace the existing state military with their own. Thus, the organization that they built and organized during the struggle continued to be the main basis of power for the new regime. Leaders maintain the support of their former co-combatants by appointing them to high-ranking government positions, and these power-sharing arrangements are highly credible due to a history of interactions during the war. Later we provide systematic evidence about the post-seizure period in rebel regimes: the frequency of military transformation and of appointing leading combatants to the Minister of Defense position. Here, to make the proposed mechanisms more concrete, we provide motivating examples from Angola (a colonial liberation case) and Ethiopia (a civil war winner) of power sharing during and after the launching rebellion.[5]

[4]The average war to launch a rebel regime lasted 8.7 years.

[5]For additional examples of delegating power to local commanders during rebellions that launched rebel regimes, see Museveni (1997, 133) for Uganda, Martin (Forthcoming) for Zim-

In Angola, the MPLA adopted collective governance institutions to confront a stronger Portuguese army. The first leader of the rebel organization, which was founded in 1956, "thwarted the principle of collective leadership and used his control over party machinery to amass political power" (Davidson 1984, 28). This personalist approach weakened the MPLA as an effective organization, and in 1961, the Portuguese launched a devastating offensive that unleashed "wild repression by settlers, police and army" of the colonial state (771). In 1962, Agostinho Neto replaced the original MPLA leader and restructured the rebel group to instead govern collectively:

> "Operational authority was vested in the ten-member Steering Committee, six of whom were to constitute the supreme Political-Military Committee (PMC). As the unique retainer of the 'natural secrets of the Movement,' this committee of six was given exclusive jurisdiction over military and security matters, including control of the army (EPLA)" (30).

After seizing power, the armed wing of the MPLA replaced the previous state military with their own FAPLA troops. As the first president of an independent Angola, Neto appointed key members of the liberation struggle as Ministers of Defense. Neto's first Minister of Defense was Iko Carreira, who founded and served as the commander-in-chief of FAPLA during the rebellion. The second Defense Minister, Pedro Maria Tonha, who remained in that position from 1981 to 1995, was also an important commander in the MPLA during the war, as was the third Defense Minister Pedro Sebastiao, who led the MPLA forces in the Battle of Nto, which was decisive in Portugal's withdrawal.

Similar patterns of intra-elite power sharing occurred in the case of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which defeated the government in 1991. EPRDF, and its predecessor the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), exhibited collective leadership during the rebellion. The three founding members rotated among the top positions (Young 1998, 38), and military commanders were integrated into the top decision-making bodies (Berhe 2017, 168). "By the time the war ended in 1991, many top leaders had fought together in extremely difficult conditions for 15 years. In part as a result of this historical process, the TPLF was a battle-hardened,

babwe, and Johnson (1998) for South Sudan.

highly disciplined organization . . . Decision-making within top leadership circles often involved lengthy debates" (Lyons 2021, 1052). After winning, the TPLF disbanded the former national army and replaced state security forces with their own troops. Furthermore, Meles Zenawi, the first leader of the rebel regime, appointed Siye Abraha—a fellow founding member of the TPLF and the commander of the rebel military—as his Defense Minister. Inclusive leadership bodies established during the war set the stage for stable power-sharing arrangements among former co-combatants after the rebel regime took power.

Our theoretical discussion relates to existing accounts of the durability of revolutionary regimes, but differs in a key way by stressing the need to continue *sharing power* with military elites after the war. Existing theories stress the importance of ideology or partisan ties as the primary mechanism behind regime stability. Levitsky and Way (2013, 10) posit that revolutionary armies are "highly partisan and thoroughly committed to the regime" because "the army and other security forces are almost invariably commanded by cadres from the liberation struggle and imbued with a revolutionary ideology." In this account, sharing power with military elites is not necessary for leadership survival because shared partisan and ideological ties should be sufficient to bind the military to the regime. In fact, Colgan and Weeks (2015) make this precise argument: revolutionary leaders should tend to personalize rather than to share power.

By contrast, we contend that partisanship, ideological bonds, and other sources of inherent affinity are—by themselves—not sufficient. A dictator has no intrinsic friends. For any leader highly reliant on his military to gain and maintain power, we expect them to face internal challengers if he excludes high-ranking elites from power and spoils. Indeed, autocrats are commonly overthrown by co-ethnics and even their own family members. This problem is even more pressing in rebel regimes. Why would comrades with access to guns sit quietly if the ruler shuts them out of power and denies them the spoils of victory? Military elites who held important posts during the war pose the most credible threats because of their positions in the military hierarchy and because they command key operational units. Besides some exceptional cases (e.g., the founding of the So-

viet Union), even rebel regimes are typically unable to construct strong counterbalancing security forces that enable them to overwhelm and subjugate a conventional military with experience in rebellion. These leaves buying off military elites as the only viable option.

Thus, the experience of delegating control during the war and then replacing the state military with the rebel military provides the *latent foundations* for credible commitments. However, to truly commit, the ruler must then take the next step to *actually delegate control* to high-ranking military officials once in power. Otherwise, we expect that inherent affinity alone will be insufficient to save the leader.

2.3 Non-Rebel Cases: Coup and Civilian Regimes

By contrast, elites in non-rebel regimes typically lack an experience with sharing power with military elites *prior* to taking control of the state. This makes them vulnerable to the guardianship dilemma.

Coup regimes. Regimes founded by a military coup share one important similarity with rebel regimes: gaining power via force. Yet although coup leaders also depend on men with guns to gain power, they lack similarly favorable preconditions as rebel regimes to facilitate peaceful power sharing. As a result, coup leaders are often brought down by their own coercive agents.

When coup leaders take office, they often have limited experience with their co-conspirators, making it difficult to establish credible commitments to share power. Coups are generally carried out by a handful of officers, in contrast to rebellions involving large rebel organizations with many officers commanding local units. Thus, when coup regimes come to power, they lack a large contingent of reliable co-conspirators who can staff the regime. Furthermore, most successful coups are conducted within days or hours. This limits the amount of time and experience co-conspirators have with each other before taking power, and they do not have a history of sharing power with each other.

To make matters worse, actions taken during a coup attempt *may not reflect true preferences*. Most

high-ranking military officials care foremost about picking the winning side, and hence if they believe that the coup has been "made a fact," they might appear to go along simply because they perceive no other viable option (Singh 2014). Consequently, coup leaders have less information about the loyalty of other high-ranking officers, making it difficult to assess whether sharing power will solidify the regime or hasten its overthrow.

Finally, coup leaders lack an easy opportunity to replace the officer corps upon taking power, as opposed to the typical process of military transformation in rebel regimes. Although coup leaders often engage in widespread purges of the military that they inherit, these actions generate a high risk of a countercoup, which also occurs when civilian leaders attempt to remake the existing military (Sudduth 2017).

These considerations underscore that *not all regimes born out of conflict are the same*. Many existing theories overlook this distinction between rebel regimes and coup regimes. For example, Roessler (2011) highlights dangers posed by *any* coercive co-conspirators—"the armed actors who led, organized, or executed the *coup d'état or rebellion* that deposed the old regime" (328; our emphasis). Similarly, Colgan and Weeks (2015) distinguish regimes by their revolutionary ideology but do not distinguish the type of coercive origins—"[r]evolutionary leaders are therefore a strict subset of all leaders that come to power as a result of the use of force—such as *coups, assassinations, and revolts*" (166; our emphasis). By contrast, we argue that rebel regime leaders and coup leaders should diverge in patterns of power sharing and survival in office.

Civilian regimes. Civilian leaders are particularly wary of the guardianship dilemma. Because they are not military leaders themselves, they are especially vulnerable to displacement by security officers. Although civilian leaders often have a large contingent of reliable party elites to delegate important government positions, party elites (who are themselves civilians) lack control and authority over the military. Even if secure against the threat of overthrow from their own party members, civilian leaders face a dire threat of overthrow from the military.

Most post-independence civilian rulers in Africa inherited a military created by the outgoing colo-

nial power, rather than setting up their own loyal forces (Harkness 2018). Faced with an existing military that was not necessarily devoted to the regime, civilian rulers are forced to choose between two ill-fated options. On the one hand, they can shut the military out of the government entirely and exclude them from high-ranking government positions, but this creates motives for a coup for reasons discussed earlier. On the other hand, some civilian leaders attempted to alter the composition of the inherited military by replacing existing officers with members of their own in-group (often co-ethnics). However, this tactic often triggered countercoups in which marginalized groups would leverage "whatever tactics and resources they have to fight against their declining status" (8).

2.4 Observable Implications

In sum, our theoretical discussion yields two main observable implications. First, our theoretical logic most directly anticipates that leaders in rebel regimes should suffer successful coups (as opposed to other methods of overthrow) less frequently than leaders in other authoritarian regimes. However, beyond preventing coups that remove individual leaders, a loyal military is also paramount for defending the regime against mass unrest, insurgent groups, or foreign threats. The same foundations in rebel regimes that make them largely immune to coup risk should also tend to make them less susceptible to other modes of breakdown. Therefore, *rebel regimes should break down less frequency than regimes established by other means*. Second, our theory highlights the importance of sharing power with the military and explains why promises between former co-combatants are highly credible. Therefore, *rebel regime leaders should share power with military elites more frequently than non-rebel regime leaders.*

3 Evidence of Rebel Regime Durability

We establish evidence for the first main implication: rebel regimes are less likely to break down compared with non-rebel regimes.

3.1 DATA

Sample. Our sample consists of annual observations for authoritarian regimes in 50 independent African countries between 1960 and 2017, excluding years with warlord or provisional regimes. Countries that gained independence after 1960 enter the dataset upon their first year of independence. We include all African countries with a population of at least 100,000 at independence, including North Africa and several islands. For South Africa, we exclude years before 1994; and, for Zimbabwe, years before 1980 because white-dominated, de facto colonial regimes are not viable counterfactual comparisons for African-ruled regimes.

We exclude all country-years with democratic regimes. We do not expect our mechanism to hold in democracies because the primary determinant of access to political power is winning elections, rather than commanding control of the military. To code a regime as democratic, we require that elections are free and fair, and also that at least one rotation in parties occurred after the first free and fair election.[6] This resembles the rule used in Levitsky and Way (2010) to ensure that party turnover does not occur only to be replaced by a competitive authoritarian regime. In Africa since the Cold War, many countries have adopted nominally democratic institutions on paper, while managing to thwart true electoral competition by using a combination of opposition cooptation and coercion (Arriola, Devaro and Meng 2021). We therefore prefer a high threshold for democracy and include a requirement for party turnover, in order to avoid dropping cases of electoral authoritarianism. However, in Appendix Table B.2, we show that the results are qualitatively similar when using a less stringent standard for democracy (in which we exclude cases such as South

[6]We draw from the list of democracies in Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) and Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), and consulted additional sources to assess party turnover after the first free and fair election. We code no democracies before the 1990s except Mauritius, and subsequently identify eleven countries that democratized and therefore drop out of the sample: Benin, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia.

Africa with free and fair elections that never experienced party turnover), or when we instead include *all* post-independence years (including transitional and warlord regimes).

Dependent variable. The dependent variable is an indicator for AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN, equaling 1 in any year an authoritarian regime loses power, and 0 otherwise. We coded this variable using regime breakdown data from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), coup data from McGowan (2003) and Powell and Thyne (2011), and data on irregular leadership turnover from Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009). Authoritarian regimes can break down either because the leader was deposed in a coup or was forced to step down after losing an election, or because the regime (and leader) were overthrown by a popular uprising, an insurgent group, or foreign intervention. Because our theory focuses primarily on how rebel regime leaders are able to peacefully share power with military elites, we present additional results using a narrower version of the dependent variable, SUCCESSFUL COUP.

Main explanatory variable. A REBEL REGIME comes to power by winning a rebellion that generated at least 1,000 battle deaths. By "rebellion," we mean a movement initiated by an outsider rebel group, i.e., people that are not part of the inner circle or coercive apparatus of the incumbent government when the movement begins. We distinguish outsider rebellions from insider coups (i.e., initiated by current members of the inner circle or coercive apparatus) that create a large death toll. In many cases, rebel leaders were former government insiders. However, in all such cases, they were excluded from the government when they initiated the rebellion and had to win battles to advance on the capital—distinct from a coup. By "winning," we mean that the rebel group gained control of the state (of an existing or a new country) either by defeating the incumbent government militarily or by compelling a negotiated settlement in which a member of the rebel group became head of state. To code this variable, we primarily combined information on conflicts from Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) with regimes from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). Appendix A.1 provides detailed coding notes.

Some specifications additionally distinguish between COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES—those

Table 1: List of Rebel Regimes

Colonial liberation		Civil war winner	
Algeria 62–92*,**,†	Namibia 90–NA†	Burundi 05–NA	Ivory Coast 11–NA
Angola 75–NA*,†	South Africa 94–NA†	Chad 82–90	Liberia 97–03
Eritrea 93–NA*,†	Tunisia 56–11	Chad 90–NA	Rwanda 94–NA*,†
Guinea-Bissau 74–80*,**,†	Zimbabwe 80–NA**,†	Congo-B 97–NA	South Sudan 11–NA†
Morocco 56–NA		DRC 97–NA†	Uganda 86–NA**,†
Mozambique 75–NA*,†		Ethiopia 91–NA**,†	

* Lachapelle et al. (2020) code as revolutionary.
** Colgan (2012) codes as revolutionary.
† Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as violent liberation.

that emerged from a violent struggle to gain independence and/or majority rule—and CIVIL WAR WINNERS against sovereign domestic governments. We classify the struggles in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia as "colonial" because these wars established African majority rule, even though none were fought against a European power. We also apply this distinction to Eritrea's independence war because it became a colonial possession of Ethiopia after its forced annexation in 1962.

Table 1 lists the 21 rebel regimes in our dataset, and compares our measure to related variables in the literature on revolutionary or liberation regimes. Although this may seem equivalent to our focus on rebel regimes, the differences are stark. We do not incorporate considerations such as fundamentally transforming the state or initiating radical social change into our coding scheme. Hence, only 29% of our rebel regime cases meet Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) definition of a social revolution, 24% meet Colgan's (2012) definition of revolutionary regime, and 57% meet Roessler and Verhoeven's (2016) definition of a violent liberation regime.

Our coding scheme has two main advantages. First, it is more appropriate for testing our theory, which stresses the importance of a violent struggle to gain power but not of other components of social revolutions. Second, our focus on whether the group came into power by fighting is easy to observe and measure, which reduces the subjectiveness of coding decisions. Studies of revolutionary regimes require that the regime attempt to radically transform the state and to initiate

radical social change. However, such indicators are inherently more subjective and difficult to code, especially when regimes differ greatly in existing levels of state capacity and on factors that would inhibit consolidating control over the countryside.

Covariates. We control for numerous alternative explanations for authoritarian regime breakdown from the existing literature that encompass the broader economic and social contexts of these regimes. We draw in particular from Boix and Svolik (2013), who use widely used controls. Three covariates guard against alternative explanations about economic modernization or temporary economic decline: GDP per capita (logged), GDP growth, and oil and production per capita (logged). Others capture demographic and social differences across regimes: population (logged), ethnic fractionalization, and religious fractionalization. We also control for colonizer fixed effects (British, French, Portuguese) because the prospects for decolonization wars differed by colonizer. Finally, we control for year fixed effects to account for time-specific sources of heterogeneity (e.g., changes in the international system that affect prospects for regime stability).

3.2 Authoritarian Regime Breakdown

Table 2 assesses our claim that rebel regimes should break down less frequently than non-rebel regimes. It presents estimates from linear regressions of the following form:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_R R_{it} + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_X + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{1}$$

where Y_{it} is AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN, R_{it} is an indicator for REBEL REGIMES in Columns 1–4 and is disaggregated into COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES and CIVIL WAR WINNERS in Columns 5–8, β_R is the main parameter of interest, $\boldsymbol{X}_{it}$ is a vector of covariates included in Columns 2–4 and 6–8, $\boldsymbol{T}_{it}$ is standard temporal dependence controls (years since last regime change and cubic splines), and ϵ_{it} is a random error term. Every model in Table 2 clusters standard errors by country.

Column 1 shows that rebel regimes are significantly correlated with a lower likelihood of regime

Table 2: Authoritarian Regime Breakdown

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0481***	-0.0477***	-0.0574***	-0.0528***				
	(0.00918)	(0.0110)	(0.0113)	(0.0115)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0448***	-0.0459***	-0.0511***	-0.0395***
					(0.00970)	(0.0124)	(0.0131)	(0.0147)
Civil war winner					-0.0540***	-0.0515***	-0.0679***	-0.0737***
					(0.0110)	(0.0121)	(0.0125)	(0.0129)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.00203		-0.0151**		0.00193		-0.0184**
		(0.00516)		(0.00592)		(0.00524)		(0.00736)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0885**		-0.0828**		-0.0877**		-0.0767**
		(0.0363)		(0.0376)		(0.0363)		(0.0378)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000192		0.000463		-0.000197		0.000575
		(0.000718)		(0.000722)		(0.000719)		(0.000744)
ln(population)			0.00878**	0.0205***			0.00839*	0.0223***
			(0.00432)	(0.00496)			(0.00438)	(0.00534)
Ethnic frac.			-0.00972	-0.00798			-0.00545	0.00168
			(0.0248)	(0.0240)			(0.0265)	(0.0267)
Religious frac.			0.0112	-0.00419			0.0132	-0.00368
			(0.0194)	(0.0208)			(0.0196)	(0.0210)
British colony			-0.00220	0.00100			-0.00376	-0.00168
			(0.0132)	(0.0132)			(0.0134)	(0.0132)
French colony			0.00884	0.00303			0.00740	-0.00109
			(0.0103)	(0.0110)			(0.0107)	(0.0118)
Portuguese colony			-0.00157	-0.0108			-0.00710	-0.0244
			(0.0145)	(0.0166)			(0.0151)	(0.0193)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.013	0.042	0.043	0.047	0.013	0.042	0.043	0.048
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 2 presents linear regression estimates with standard error estimates clustered by country in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last regime change and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

breakdown. The predicted probability of regime breakdown in a particular year is more than twice as high for non-rebel regimes than for rebel regimes, 7.5% versus 3.6%. The predicted probability of breakdown is low for both types of rebel regimes (Column 5): 4.4% for colonial liberation regimes and 2.8% for civil war winners. Columns 2 and 6 add the economic covariates to the respective baseline specification, Columns 3 and 7 add the other covariates, and Columns 4 and 8 add every covariate. Comparing the columns shows not only that the covariates do not eliminate the statistically significant relationship between rebel regimes and regime breakdown, but also that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates changes minimally. Appendix Table B.1 demonstrates that the magnitude of bias from unobserved covariates would need to be large in order to explain

away the results.

The appendix shows that the estimates are similar under various robustness checks. We performed a jackknife sample sensitivity analysis in which we iteratively drop all observations from one country at a time, which demonstrates that the results do not hinge on a single outlier.

Nor are our results driven by cases coded as revolutionary in existing datasets. In Appendix Table B.3, we re-estimated Columns 1–4 of Table 2 in three different ways: iteratively dropping every case that Lachapelle et al. (2020), Colgan (2012) and Colgan and Weeks (2015), or Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as revolutionary. A significantly lower probability of breakdown for non-revolutionary rebel regimes also provides evidence that a strong revolutionary ideology is not the primary mechanism driving the results.

Appendix Table B.4 performs additional robustness checks. In Panel A, we re-estimate the models with a logit link. In Panel B, we restrict the sample to regimes that gained power via force, and demonstrate that rebel regimes are significantly less likely to break down than coup regimes. This confirms our theoretical expectation that although both types of regimes achieve power by force, coup regimes lack similarly strong foundations for survival.

3.3 Instrumenting for Colonial Liberation Regimes

Assessing the causal effect of rebel regimes on regime breakdown poses difficult endogeneity problems. Despite controlling for commonly used covariates in the regimes literature and performing various forms of sensitivity analysis, rebel regimes clearly do not emerge randomly. Selection effects could cut in either direction. On the one hand, the success of rebel groups is predicated on many strategic decisions and succeeding at dimensions such as delegating power, forming alliances, and disseminating information (Christia 2012; Lewis 2020); and only successful rebellions enter our dataset as rebel regimes. On the other hand, rebel regimes only arise when the state is so weak that it is vulnerable to rebel overthrow—which should mitigate against the next regime being durable.

To address this concern, we exploit a source of plausible exogeneity in colonial liberation regimes: percentage of a country's territory that was suitable for colonial European settlement. The 2SLS results are qualitatively similar to the results found above, and hence more convincingly establish a negative causal relationship. We briefly summarize the justification for the instrument here, and present extensive supporting detail in Appendix B.2.

The presence of European settlers correlates strongly with decolonization wars in Africa. After World War II, officials in most imperial metropoles introduced decolonization reforms, but these reforms were blocked in colonies with large European settler populations (including in independent South Africa and quasi-independent Rhodesia). Europeans could create large settlements in which they replicated European agricultural practices only in specific areas of Africa. Thus, we can use climatic factors that influenced prospects for European settlement to provide an exogenous instrument for colonial liberation regimes. We combine GIS data for climate, rainfall, elevation, and tsetse fly prevalence. Each variable is measured "pre-treatment," thus addressing endogeneity concerns. Regarding the exclusion restriction, there are no clear channels—other than contested decolonization—through which these climatic factors would affect post-colonial regime stability, and sensitivity analysis shows that the results are robust to moderately large violations of the exclusion restriction.

3.4 Successful Coups

Next, we focus on regime breakdown as a result of a successful coup because the implications of our theory apply most directly to this mode of overthrow. In Table 3, we change the dependent variable in Equation 1 to SUCCESSFUL COUP, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a coup successfully removed the incumbent in that year, and 0 otherwise. The sequence of specifications is identical to those in Table 2. We find that rebel regimes are significantly less likely to experience successful coups. The findings are similar when we disaggregate rebel regimes into colonial liberation regimes and civil war winners, and when we include the full set of controls. The results are also similar under the same robustness checks as above: logit link, or comparing rebel regimes

only to coup regimes (Appendix Table B.7).

Table 3: Successful Coups

	DV: Successful Coup							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0284***	-0.0216***	-0.0308***	-0.0279***				
	(0.00702)	(0.00710)	(0.00771)	(0.00770)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0261***	-0.0215**	-0.0320***	-0.0248**
					(0.00797)	(0.00886)	(0.00955)	(0.0111)
Civil war winner					-0.0329***	-0.0219***	-0.0290***	-0.0325***
					(0.00764)	(0.00751)	(0.00815)	(0.00893)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.000666		-0.00728*		0.000657		-0.00811
		(0.00376)		(0.00408)		(0.00388)		(0.00524)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0513*		-0.0487		-0.0512*		-0.0474
		(0.0294)		(0.0302)		(0.0295)		(0.0305)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000499		-0.000282		-0.000499		-0.000259
		(0.000490)		(0.000520)		(0.000490)		(0.000522)
ln(population)			0.00491	0.0116***			0.00499	0.0121***
			(0.00310)	(0.00374)			(0.00314)	(0.00416)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0183	-0.0186			-0.0191	-0.0164
			(0.0179)	(0.0169)			(0.0188)	(0.0190)
Religious frac.			0.0101	0.000907			0.00971	0.000962
			(0.0164)	(0.0175)			(0.0167)	(0.0176)
British colony			-0.00260	-0.00267			-0.00229	-0.00333
			(0.0107)	(0.0111)			(0.0107)	(0.0113)
French colony			0.00739	0.00493			0.00767	0.00391
			(0.00822)	(0.00820)			(0.00829)	(0.00868)
Portuguese colony			0.00528	0.00120			0.00631	-0.00198
			(0.0180)	(0.0189)			(0.0186)	(0.0207)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.011	0.038	0.038	0.040	0.011	0.038	0.038	0.040
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 3 presents linear regression estimates with country-clustered standard error estimates in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last successful coup and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

4 Evidence of Military Power Sharing

We establish evidence for the second main implication: rebel regimes more frequently delegate control over the military via a stable appointment of a Minister of Defense. Moreover, within the set of rebel regimes, those that share power more frequently are less likely to break down; and differences in the length of rebellion helps to explain variance in power sharing. We then provide systematic evidence for two related mechanisms in the theory. (a) We compiled information on

the composition of the state military after rebel takeover. In 19 of 21 cases, rebel regimes either completely transformed and displaced the existing state military, or occupied top positions in an integrated military. (b) We use biographical information to show that Ministers of Defense in rebel regimes were usually high-ranking rebel commanders who played an important role in the war.

4.1 Minister of Defense Appointments

A key power-sharing decision is whether the leader delegates control of the military to the Ministry of Defense, as discussed above. We operationalize this concept by examining whether the ruler appoints a Minister of Defense and did not shuffle the position within the past year. In African autocracies, the Minister of Defense is the highest position controlling the security sector (chiefs of staff of all military branches report directly to him), and the Defense Minister coordinates key aspects of defense policy. By contrast, when there is no Minister of Defense (either because the ruler eliminates the post, keeps it vacant, or holds it himself), the president can personally make key decisions about the military. This undermines institutional links between the executive branch and the military, and reflects an absence of power sharing with high-level military officials.

To code Minister of Defense appointments, we use the Europa World Year Book (1960-2005) and data from the Central Intelligence Agency (2006-2017). These sources contain annual records of the names and positions of all ministerial posts for every African country between 1960 and 2017. From these records we created a dummy variable, DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT, that equals 1 if someone other than the ruler was appointed as the Minister of Defense; and 0 otherwise. We then used this to create our main variable, DEFENSE MINISTER SAME, which equals 1 if someone other than the ruler was appointed as the Minister of Defense *and* that same person held the position in the previous year (this value is set to missing in the first year for each country). This variable takes a value of 0 if DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT equals 0, or if within the previous year the position had rotated to someone else. Naming a Minister of Defense but frequently appointing new people to the position indicates elite shuffling rather than true power sharing. We therefore use DEFENSE

MINISTER SAME for our main regressions, but report results using DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT in the appendix.

Basic summary statistics highlight the stark discrepancy in military power sharing between rebel regimes and others. Rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in 83% of country-years. In fact, over half of all rebel regimes appointed a Defense Minister in *every* year. By contrast, non-rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in only 56% of country-years. Moreover, Minister of Defense appointments in rebel regimes were more stable, reflecting less frequent shuffling. Rebel regimes appointed the *same* Minister of Defense as the previous year in 65% of country-years, compared to a corresponding figure of 34% for non-rebel regimes.

Mozambique, for instance, has had only five different Ministers of Defense since gaining independence in 1975, and the average tenure of a Defense Minister is 8.4 years. Ethiopia's post-1991 rebel regime has had only seven different Ministers of Defense. In both cases, the president has never personally held the Defense Minister portfolio or left the post vacant. Even Robert Mugabe, who had a reputation as a strongman dictator while ruling Zimbabwe from 1980 until 2017, made stable Minister of Defense appointments: the country had only six different Ministers of Defense during his tenure.

By contrast, leaders of non-rebel regimes often prefer to keep the Defense portfolio for themselves. Dawada Jawara of Gambia, for instance, appointed himself as Defense Minister from 1965 until 1992. When leaders of non-rebel regimes do name a Minister of Defense, they tend to shuffle cabinet appointments frequently to prevent any one elite from gaining too much influence. Burkina Faso has had 19 different Ministers of Defense since the country became independent in 1960, and in many years the incumbent president held the position himself. The average tenure of a Defense Minister was less than three years. In the Central African Republic, a Minister of Defense was appointed in only 36% of years between 1960 and 2017, with an average tenure of less than two years.

In Table 4, we assess this relationship statistically. We estimate the same linear regression models

Table 4: Minister of Defense Appointments

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER SAME							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.315***	0.252***	0.206***	0.206***				
	(0.0574)	(0.0599)	(0.0608)	(0.0646)				
Col. liberation regime					0.320***	0.280***	0.259***	0.278***
					(0.0707)	(0.0657)	(0.0631)	(0.0761)
Civil war winner					0.306***	0.200**	0.122	0.0994
					(0.0812)	(0.0826)	(0.0841)	(0.0848)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0119		0.00849		0.0101		-0.0119
		(0.0231)		(0.0365)		(0.0236)		(0.0392)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		0.121		0.156*		0.130		0.188**
		(0.0888)		(0.0849)		(0.0909)		(0.0861)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.00140		-0.00300		-0.00154		-0.00244
		(0.00270)		(0.00254)		(0.00273)		(0.00245)
ln(population)			0.0287	0.0274			0.0254	0.0395
			(0.0254)	(0.0347)			(0.0251)	(0.0347)
Ethnic frac.			0.187	0.190			0.227	0.249
			(0.153)	(0.152)			(0.155)	(0.151)
Religious frac.			0.0461	0.0470			0.0600	0.0431
			(0.139)	(0.126)			(0.140)	(0.129)
British colony			-0.147	-0.159*			-0.164*	-0.177**
			(0.0902)	(0.0857)			(0.0907)	(0.0843)
French colony			-0.0443	-0.0375			-0.0587	-0.0625
			(0.0921)	(0.0884)			(0.0926)	(0.0862)
Portuguese colony			0.151	0.157			0.104	0.0813
			(0.125)	(0.123)			(0.143)	(0.150)
Country-years	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263
R-squared	0.074	0.124	0.158	0.161	0.074	0.125	0.161	0.165
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 4 presents linear regression estimates with standard error estimates clustered by country in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$.

as in Equation 1 except we change the dependent variable. The sequence of specifications and covariates is identical to those in Table 2. The analysis shows that rebel regimes are significantly more likely to make stable Defense Minister appointments. Although the results are mostly similar across the specifications, the correlation for civil war winners is less robust, which we address below. We present various robustness checks in the appendix: Table B.8 changes the dependent variable to DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT, and Table B.9 performs the same basic robustness checks as for Table 2 (logit models, or comparing rebel regimes only to coup regimes).

4.2 Comparisons within Rebel Regimes

To demonstrate the centrality of power sharing for regime durability, in Table 5 we conduct an analysis among rebel regimes only. The dependent variable is authoritarian regime breakdown, as in Table 2. The main explanatory variable is the average years for which the rebel regime appointed a Defense Minister. This variable was calculated by dividing the sum of DEFENSE MINISTER SAME by the number of years the rebel regime was in power. We use an average measure, rather than the annual measure of Defense Minister appointments, because it more accurately represents the overall stability of power sharing agreements. For regimes that rarely appoint a Defense Minister, we would in fact expect coups to occur in the years in which a Minister of Defense was appointed. In such cases, the ruler has temporarily relinquished direct control over the military, but with low assurances of future power sharing. By contrast, the average rate of Defense Minister appointments picks up the low propensity for such regimes to share power, and the consequent low credibility of promises.

Table 5 establishes that rebel regimes with stable Defense Minister appointments are less likely to break down compared with rebel regimes *without* stable Defense Minister appointments. We illustrate the statistical findings with an example from Chad's rebel regime from 1982–1990. The leader, Hissène Habré, kept the Defense Minister position vacant most of the time he was in power. The two times he appointed a Defense Minister, they were shuffled almost immediately. Eight years after taking power, Habré was overthrown in a rebellion that was organized by a military official, Idriss Déby, who he had purged from the regime in the previous year.

This analysis emphasizes the need for rebel regime leaders to share power with military elites in order to avoid overthrow. It highlights the contrast between our power-sharing mechanism and other accounts of revolutionary durability. Whereas existing studies of revolutionary regimes highlights ideology and partisanship ties as a stand-alone mechanism, the *within*-rebel regimes analysis demonstrate that relying on personal ties alone is not sufficient to promote regime durability. *Rebel regimes that do not share power are more susceptible to breakdown.*

Table 5: Effect of Military Power Sharing within Rebel Regimes

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MoD same (average)	-0.0600**	-0.0702**	-0.103**	-0.0937*
	(0.0271)	(0.0273)	(0.0468)	(0.0538)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.00988		-0.00933
		(0.00599)		(0.0102)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0506		-0.0437
		(0.0442)		(0.0494)
ln(oil & gas income)		0.000513		0.000793
		(0.000619)		(0.000760)
ln(population)			-0.00926	-0.00477
			(0.00738)	(0.00731)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0280	-0.0212
			(0.0426)	(0.0472)
Religious frac.			-0.00732	-0.0183
			(0.0535)	(0.0658)
British colony			-0.0108	-0.00458
			(0.0208)	(0.0255)
French colony			-0.0120	-0.0202
			(0.0149)	(0.0184)
Portuguese colony			0.0131	-0.00152
			(0.0228)	(0.0290)
Country-years	534	534	534	534
R-squared	0.026	0.119	0.121	0.124
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 5 presents linear regression estimates with country-clustered standard error estimates in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last regime change and cubic splines. The sample includes rebel regimes only. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Why do some rebel regime leaders *not* share power with military elites? Our theory suggests the importance of the length of the launching rebellion. In cases in which the war was short, leaders and military commanders had briefer interactions and limited experience delegating power. Because we posit repeated wartime interactions as the key to facilitating peaceful power sharing after gaining power, we expect rebel regimes that experienced longer conflicts to have higher rates of power sharing. A positive relationship between conflict duration and rates of Defense Minister appointments is born out in the data, which we highlight in Figure 2. Among the six cases in which the president named the same Minister of Defense in less than half the years of the regime, all experienced struggles of seven years or shorter. This relationship also helps to account for why the correlation between colonial liberation regimes and stable Minister of Defense appointments

is stronger than that for civil war winners (see Table 4): the average length of their launching struggles were 12.6 and 6.5 years, respectively.

Figure 2: Length of Rebellion and Military Power Sharing in Rebel Regimes



Notes: The horizontal axis is number of years that the rebel group fought before gaining power, and the vertical axis is the military power-sharing variable from Table 5. The regression line is in black, and the dashed gray line is the average value of the dependent variable among non-rebel regimes. The solid dots are the colonial liberation cases and the open dots are civil war winners.

4.3 Transforming the Military

We expect rebel regimes to facilitate peaceful power sharing with military elites because, upon taking power, victorious rebel groups enjoy a unique opportunity to transform the state military. Thus, rulers can delegate military authority to officials with whom they previously shared power during the rebellion. We assess this claim systematically by compiling information on the state military for every rebel regime after taking power. We coded each case into one of three categories: Complete Military Transformation, Military Integration, and No Military Transformation. Table 6 summarizes the cases, and Appendix A.2 provides detailed coding notes and citations.

In 13 of the 21 rebel regime cases, the rebel military completely transformed the military by dis-

Table 6: Military Transformation in Rebel Regimes

Complete Military Transformation		Military Integration	No Military Transformation
Algeria 62–92	Ivory Coast 11–NA	Burundi 06–NA	Morocco 56–NA
Angola 75–NA	Liberia 97–03	Chad 90–NA	Tunisia 56–11
Chad 82–90	Mozambique 75–NA	DRC 97–NA	
Congo-B 97–NA	Rwanda 94–NA	Namibia 90–NA	
Eritrea 93–NA	Uganda 86–NA	South Africa 94–NA	
Ethiopia 91–NA	Zimbabwe 80–NA	South Sudan 11–NA	
Guinea-Bissau 74–80			

placing the existing state armed forces and replacing them with their own members. Consequently, members of the victorious rebel group dominated the new military. In most cases, the national military disintegrated by the end of the conflict, whether because European colonial soldiers fled the country (leaving African colonial soldiers at the mercy of the rebels), or because of defeat on the battlefield. In Mozambique, the guerrilla forces that fought Portugal in the liberation war became the new national army upon independence. In fact, FRELIMO even refused to integrate into their ranks African soldiers who had previously fought for the Portuguese Army. In Zimbabwe, the white colonial military remained intact, but military integration favored ZANU so blatantly that there was no pretense of sharing power with other organizations.

These cases are also characterized by their lack of military integration *across* different rebel factions, even when multiple rebel groups participated in overthrowing the government. For example, in Zimbabwe, Mugabe used his ZANLA troops to subjugate rival ZIPRA forces. In Angola, MPLA monopolized control of political positions at independence and their armed wing FAPLA (formerly EPLA) became the state military while excluding rebel troops from UNITA and FNLA, who then fought against MPLA for decades.

In six cases, the rebel military was integrated with another armed force (rather than completely replacing the existing military), although even in cases of integration, the rebel group usually controlled the highest-ranking military positions. In South Africa, Namibia, and Burundi, the civil war settlement called for the rebel military to be integrated into the existing state military. After the Cold War ended, international actors intervened to try to end long-running civil wars and supported

security-sector reform programs. In South Africa, members of the ANC and other African groups joined officials from the white apartheid regime. Africans from uMkhonto we Sizwe (the military wing of the ANC) and other armed groups came to dominate the highest ranks as well as the rank and file, while white officers from the former SADF remained prominent among other officer positions. The arrangement was similar in Namibia. The other military integration cases were more heterogeneous. In Chad 90–NA and the DRC, rebels achieved outright military victory over the previous state military but their relative weakness upon winning compelled them to share power with other armed opposition groups. In South Sudan, despite creating a new country, the new state military amalgamated various rebel groups that had fought against the Sudanese government.

Rebel forces played a minimal role in the subsequent state military in only two cases, Morocco and Tunisia, during their struggle to gain independence from France. In both cases guerrilla fighters were less important than peaceful nationalist organizations.

4.4 Minister of Defense Biographies

In Table 4, we use the stable appointment of a Minister of Defense to measure whether a ruler delegates control over the military to the Ministry of Defense. Yet our theory offers more specific expectations for rebel regimes. We posit that building a private army from scratch and fighting for power should facilitate peaceful power sharing specifically because the ruler builds relationships with commanders during the rebellion. Thus, we expect that the Ministers of Defense in rebel regimes should tend to be important members of the founding rebellion, as opposed to family members, obscure actors lacking any power base, or members of the previous state military or from other rebel groups that fought for power (i.e., distinct from the political organization to which the president belongs).

To assess this expectation, we compiled biographical details about the individuals that served as Ministers of Defense in rebel regimes.[7] We confirm that the elites who served as the Minister of Defense were largely influential co-conspirators from the war that launched the regime. Within

[7]Appendix Table B.10 summarizes the biographical information for the Ministers of Defense

the first twenty years of the regime, 70% of Defense Ministers were high-level commanders from the war. These actors amassed operational control over troops and gained legitimacy from the founding struggle, which enabled them to credibly threaten the leader if he attempted to personalize power.

In Eritrea, Petros Solomon was appointed as the first Defense Minister following independence. Solomon was a leading figure during the armed struggle. He was one of three members of the party's military committee, the head of the military intelligence unit, and a member of the political bureau of the party's Central Committee. Guinea-Bissau's first Defense Minister, Joao Bernardo Vieira, a celebrated guerrilla commander, was the military chief in southern Guinea-Bissau during the war. In Mozambique, the first Defense Minister was Alberto Joachim Chipande, who was a leading member of FRELIMO during the liberation war and allegedly fired the first shot against the Portuguese colonial forces. Tobias Joaquim Dai served as Minister of Defense from 2000 to 2008. He commanded the FRELIMO Army during the launching rebellion.

Rebel rulers rarely named Defense Ministers from either the previous regime or from competing rebel factions. Above we noted the lack of military integration in Angola and Zimbabwe despite multiple rebel groups. In both South Africa and Namibia, the Defense Minister has always been a member of the majority-rule rebels even though the rebel army was integrated into the state military. The handful of exceptions come from other cases of military integration. For example, the civil war settlement in Burundi called for a 50-50 distribution of Hutu (rebels) and Tutsi (incumbent regime) in the military. Although a rebel leader became president, the first two Ministers of Defense following the settlement were high-ranking members of the extant state military.

5 Alternative Explanations

The previous section demonstrated that sharing power with military elites is an important contributor to the durability of rebel regimes. Here we show evidence against four alternative explanations:

in all rebel regimes.

(1) revolutionary transformation of state and society, (2) ruling parties and subjugation of the military, (3) sharing power with civilians or across ethnic groups, and (4) other alternatives proposed by the civil war termination literature.

Controlling the countryside. Existing accounts link revolutionary regimes to the transformation of society, following Huntington's (1968, 292) well-known aphorism, "He who controls the countryside controls the country." Levitsky and Way (2013) and Lachapelle et al. (2020) argue that gaining power through violence, unleashing a program of social revolution, and defeating counter-revolutionaries eliminates alternative centers of power that underpinned the previous regime. Even if true on average for the broader global sample of revolutionary regimes, this mechanism does not help to explain the durability of African rebel regimes, as we explain in Appendix C.1. Throughout history, rulers in Africa have typically failed to exercise effective control over extended territories (Herbst 2000). Even when rebel groups have captured the state, they have typically failed to implement successful land reform or otherwise uproot bases of societal opposition. Using various quantitative measures of state control over society, in Appendix Table C.1 we demonstrate that rebel regimes in Africa are not distinguished on measures of societal control.

Ruling parties and subjugation of the military. Many argue that party institutions facilitate authoritarian survival. A common operationalization is that strong parties are ones in which the ruling party predates the regime (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2018; Miller 2020). Rebel regimes almost always have inherited parties (19 of 21 cases in our dataset), as they form an armed wing and political wing (i.e., party) amid their fight for power. Thus, rebel regimes are highly correlated with inherited parties, but this provides no specific information about the *strength* of the party, in contrast to the more specific mechanisms from our theory. Rather than model a control variable for strong parties for which our rebel regimes variable is nearly a strict subset, we instead subset on regimes that inherited a party upon gaining power in Appendix Table C.2. Within this sample, rebel regimes are *still* significantly more durable.

We also provide evidence against the possibility that military elites are subjugated or repressed by

a strong party in rebel regimes. In Appendix Table C.3, we show that rebel regimes are not significantly more likely to have strong party oversight of the military, nor have a commissar system (data from Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2018). The latter finding reflects the rarity of commissar systems among African regimes. The only exceptions are two rebel regimes (Angola, Mozambique) and three non-rebel regimes (Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia). We also show that rebel regimes are not significantly more likely to have counterbalancing military organizations (data from De Bruin 2020).

Sharing power with civilians or across ethnic groups. Another possibility is that delegating control to the military is not the only way in which rebel regimes share power, and that other forms of power sharing are more important for explaining regime survival. Our theory suggests this is unlikely because the aspects of the rebellion we highlight as facilitating credible power sharing apply to coercive dimensions only. In Appendix C.3, we show that rebel regimes are not more likely to name a vice president or prime minister (the highest-ranking civilian position in the cabinet) and they do not engage in broader ethnic power sharing. The converse possibility is that rebel regimes are mainly a front for a single ethnic group to dominate others, perhaps because this is easier to achieve by displacing ethnic rivals via a rebellion. By contrast, we demonstrate that the rebellions that launched most rebel regimes were multi-ethnic and that, like typical African regimes, their post-seizure cabinets usually contained multiple ethnic groups.

Civil war termination literature. Finally, in Appendix C.4 we engage with several alternatives suggested by the broader literature on civil wars and show that our results are unchanged. Lachapelle et al. (2020) suggest that counterrevolutions promote elite unity after revolutionary regimes gain power. We show evidence against this alternative by disaggregating rebel regimes by whether they fought an armed challenger within five years of the regime gaining power.

We then engage with research on how the mode of civil war termination affects prospects for recurrence and changes since the Cold War ended. We disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they were established by outright rebel victory or a settlement with the previous government, which captures

a key distinction from Toft (2009). Only four rebel regimes gained power via negotiated settlements: Burundi, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. In all cases, they followed a pattern that has become common since the Cold War ended of implementing security-sector reform programs. However, all other rebel regimes were founded by outright rebel victory, in which the rebels typically replaced the existing state military with their own and did not undergo security-sector reform initiatives. To account for these differences, we conduct three additional robustness checks. First, we disaggregate all regimes by the most recent way in which a civil war ended (outright rebel victory, outright government victory, settlement, no civil war or none ended). Second, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they have their origins during the Cold War. Third, we control for other conflict factors that affect regime stability: ongoing civil war, refugees, foreign-imposed regimes, and a post-Cold War fixed effect.

6 Conclusion

In this article, we establish an important source of authoritarian durability. Rebel regimes are able to survive for long periods because the experience of gaining power via a rebellion enables the ruler to credibly share power with military elites after gaining power. Although our theory is general, our empirical evidence draws solely from Africa. One scope condition that we discuss for the region is the historically rooted impediments to consolidating control over the countryside. Existing hypotheses that revolutionary regimes typically establish firm control over society are more plausible elsewhere. Consider, for example, three classic cases in which social revolutions preceded long-lasting authoritarian regimes: China, Russia, and Vietnam. Each country experienced a long history of a state governed by members of the dominant ethnic group. Although these factors did not preordain that the revolutionary group would consolidate control over the countryside, they created more favorable conditions than in African states lacking a similar history. Understanding these similarities and differences will help to situate authoritarianism in Africa in a broader global context.

Another question that remains is whether our theory of peaceful power sharing within rebel regimes should last beyond the wartime generation. From a theoretical perspective, it is unclear. On one hand, perhaps the foundations for credible power sharing should not extend beyond the wartime generation because subsequent elites do not share the experience of winning a rebellion to gain power. On the other hand, it is possible that peaceful power sharing can become institutionalized over time: once the wartime generation stabilizes expectations regarding military appointments, these arrangements become the norm. Empirically, we cannot yet answer this question conclusively because most African rebel regimes are still in their wartime generation. Tentatively, the durability of rebel regimes does seem to extend beyond the initial generation. Of the six rebel regimes in our sample that endured at least 30 years, five are still in power today (Angola, Morocco, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). Ultimately, we leave this as a question for future research, along with the broader theoretical considerations we raise about power sharing, the guardianship dilemma, and rebel regimes.

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A Data Appendix

A.1 Coding Rebel Regimes

To code civil wars in which the rebels were victorious, we primarily used the Correlates of War dataset and their associated coding books (COW; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Dixon and Sarkees 2015), while also consulting other widely used conflict datasets to verify questionable cases and to ensure we did not miss any (Fearon and Laitin 2003, or FL; Armed Conflict Database, or ACD, Gleditsch et al. 2002). We included both intra-state wars as well as extra-state wars between African rebel groups and European colonizers (in COW, an extra-state war is one in which a member of the inter-state system fights a non-state actor outside its borders). We then matched these conflicts with regimes from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014*a*), or GWF.

The three conflict datasets each use slightly different coding procedures which, in addition to possible measurement error, lead to slightly different lists of wars. FL provide one entry for each distinct war, and their main operational criterion is that at least 1,000 battle deaths occur during the course of the war (the same standard that we use). This is less stringent than COW's standard of 1,000 *annual* battle deaths. (However, FL assert that they doubt all of COW's conflicts meet this high standard, and hence the COW and FL list of conflicts are quite similar.) ACD codes whether each year of a conflict produces at least 25 battle deaths or at least 1,000 battle deaths.

Both FL and COW explicitly code whether rebels won a civil war. One problem, which necessitates complementing the coding procedure with reading descriptions of each case, is that in a small number of conflicts, a regime change occurs in the middle of the conflict. These cases are usually easier to discern from COW because they code distinct episodes within conflicts that FL code as a single civil war. For example, FL code a single civil war in Congo-Brazzaville from 1997 to 2002 that ended with government victory. By contrast, COW codes one conflict in 1997 and a second from 1998–99 (the discrepancy in end years comes from low-level fighting in 2000–02). The bout of fighting in 1997 ended in *rebel* victory, and the second in government victory. Thus, FL's dataset do not list Congo-Brazzaville as a case involving rebel victory because they code the entire period of fighting as a single civil war.

Colonial liberation wars:

- Morocco 56–NA, Tunisia 56–11, Algeria 62–92, Mozambique 75–NA, Namibia 90–NA: COW codes outright rebel victory for the anti-colonial extra-state wars that preceded each regime.
- Angola 75–NA: COW codes the liberation struggle as ending with Portugal withdrawing (indicating a clear rebel victory) and the conflict transforming to a non-state war among the different rebel factions, in which the MPLA gained control.
- Guinea-Bissau 74–80: Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 534) assert that the launching rebellion for the regime does not meet the COW death threshold. However, according to the notes in FL's dataset, the total death toll was 15,000, hence meeting our threshold of 1,000.
- Eritrea 93–NA: COW codes outright rebel victory in an intra-state war within Ethiopia.

- South Africa 94–NA and Zimbabwe 80–NA: COW classifies the wars for majority rule as intra-state wars. The war that yielded the Zimbabwe 80–NA regime ended with a negotiated settlement in 1979, but it meets our standard of rebel victory because one of the rebel groups, ZANU, won the subsequent elections and took power. For South Africa 94–NA, the only relevant entry from COW is an intercommunal war between the government-sponsored militia Inkatha and the African National Congress (ANC). However, other civil war datasets code a conflict as occurring between the South African government and ANC (FL, ACD), which is also reflected in standard narratives of the struggle (e.g., Reno 2011, 105–18). Thus, this case is similar to Zimbabwe: the war ended in a negotiated settlement, and we code the subsequent regime as a rebel regime because ANC gained control of the government.

Civil war winners:

- Chad 82–90, Uganda 86–NA, Chad 90–NA, Ethiopia 91–NA, Rwanda 94–NA, Congo-Brazzaville 97–NA, DRC 97–NA, Ivory Coast 11–NA, South Sudan 11–NA: COW codes outright rebel victory for the rebellions that launched each regime.
- South Sudan is a complicated case because the war ended in 2002 with a scheduled referendum in 2006 for southern independence. The referendum passed, which enabled South Sudan to gain independence five years later. Despite the delay, the independence of South Sudan resulted unambiguously from the Second Sudanese War, hence our coding of a rebel regime.
- Burundi 05–NA: COW codes the launching rebellion as ending in a compromise. We code this case as rebel regime for same reason as South Africa and Zimbabwe: the rebels' political party, CNDD-FDD, won the post-settlement elections.
- Liberia 97–03: COW codes the launching rebellion as ending in a compromise. Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Party won the post-settlement election (with Taylor becoming president).

Not coded as rebel regimes. Two cases that do not meet our standards for a rebel regime deserve additional comment. First, Guinea-Bissau's post-1999 regimes. For Guinea-Bissau, there is a "Military War" entry in COW for 1998–99. In this conflict, the incumbent president (João Bernardo Vieira) dismissed his military chief of staff, Ansumane Mané. When Vieira sent troops to arrest Mané, the army split into two; a year later, Mané's troops won. This case violates our requirement that the rebel leader is excluded from the government when the war begins. Instead, this case is a purge/coup (i.e., involving insiders) that generated war-level casualties, but unlike our rebel regime cases, Mané did not have to build a private military.

An informative contrast for Guinea-Bissau is the civil war in Chad from 1989–90, which brought to power the Chad 90–NA regime. In that case, the incumbent president Hissène Habré purged his senior advisor Idriss Déby, who fled the capital along with two other senior advisors and seventy-four soldiers into Sudan. After organizing there and in Libya, they built up a new army of 2,000 troops that defeated Habré's army in 1990. Thus, the key difference is that a *privately organized force* rather than existing units of the military defeated the incumbent ruler.

Second, Sierra Leone 97–98. Sierra Leone's first civil war ended in 1996 with a compromise, and

the rebel group RUF lost in the subsequent elections. However, the democratically elected president was overthrown in a coup in 1997, and the coup leader invited RUF to join the government. This case fails our standard for a rebel regime for two reasons. First, RUF gained power in the central government because of a coup rather than from winning a civil war. Second, unlike the cases listed above in which the war ended in a negotiated settlement (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Burundi), RUF did not win the subsequent elections nor did they control the presidency.

Cases outside our sample. The scope conditions for our sample are to exclude years with democracies, warlord regimes, or transitional regimes. These restrictions enable us to analyze cases that are homogeneous in the sense that the ruling organization presides over a state that actually exists and that elections are not the main mode by which leaders gain power. In such circumstances, we explain how delegating control to high-ranking military elites can stabilize the regime. However, these scope conditions exclude several cases in which a government fell to rebels. As we show in Table B.2, when we expand the sample to include these additional rebel regimes, the core findings are qualitatively unchanged.

In two cases, Liberia 05–NA and Sierra Leone 02–NA, the regime following rebel victory was democratic (free and fair elections with turnover among parties). In six cases, a warlord or transition period followed the initial state collapse according to various sources (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014*b*; Polity IV, Marshall and Jaggers 2002; Ethnic Power Relations, Vogt et al. 2015): Chad 79–82, Uganda 85–86, Liberia 90–97, Somalia 91–NA, Libya 2011–NA, and Central African Republic 2014–NA. We consulted Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009) and other sources to determine the length of regime survival in each case to code the dependent variable for Table B.2, with the caveat that it is difficult to measure this concept in circumstances where the basic scope condition of having a state is not met.

A.2 Coding Military Transformation in Rebel Regimes

A.2.1 Complete Military Transformation

Algeria 62–92. The main rebel group that fought for independence in Algeria was the National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale; FLN). Its armed wing was the National Liberation Army (Armee de Liberation Nationale; ALN), which was renamed the People's National Army (Armee Nationale Populaire; ANP) in 1962. "As the new Algerian national army grew out of the anti-colonial resistance organization, this organization is coded rather than the colonial army. In 1957, a brutal French counter-insurgency campaign broke down the organization of the Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN) . . . The military units inherited at independence combined units from the internal and external armies as well as the French colonial army" (Harkness 2018 appendix). Entelis (1994, 206) reiterates that the Algerian military consisted "primarily" of the ANP (formerly, ALN).

Angola 75–NA. Three main rebel groups fought for independence in Angola: MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA. MPLA gained control of the capital at independence as the liberation struggle transformed into a civil war with FNLA and UNITA. MPLA's anti-colonial military became the state military upon independence. "In the early 1960s, the MPLA named its guerrilla forces the People's Army for the Liberation of Angola (Exercito Popular de Libertacao de Angola—EPLA) . . . [In 1974,]

the MPLA announced the formation of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola—FAPLA), which replaced the EPLA. By 1976 FAPLA had been transformed from lightly armed guerrilla units into a national army capable of sustained field operations. This transformation was gradual until the Soviet-Cuban intervention and ensuing UNITA insurgency, when the sudden and large-scale inflow of heavy weapons and accompanying technicians and advisers quickened the pace of institutional change" (Smaldone 1991, 210-11). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Chad 82–90. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Goukouni Oueddei was the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armees du Nord; FAN). There are three important antecedent events described in COW. (1) The Chadian government faced a rebellion by the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) that ended in 1971, although FROLINAT remained intact. It later split into two factions, FAN and the People's Armed Forces (Forces Armees Populaires; FAP). (2) FAP fought a rebellion against the government from 1977 to 1978, and the government allied with FAN to help end the rebellion. President Malloum named the leader of FAN, Hissène Habré, as prime minister, although the government's accord with FAN also called for military integration, which was not implemented. (3) In 1979, FAN (later joined by FAP) attacked government troops, leading to international mediation and the creation of a coalition government in which the leader of FAP, Oueddei, became president; the leader of the (former) government armed forces (Chadian Armed Forces/Forces Armees Tchadiennes/FAT), Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue, became vice president; and Habré became defense minister. This begins a three-year warlord period in GWF's dataset.

The rebellion that engendered the rebel regime of 1982–90 began in 1980, when Habré's troops attacked FAT and FAP troops. Following FAN's overthrow of Oueddei in 1982, "After Habré consolidated his authority and assumed the presidency in 1982, his victorious army, the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armees du Nord—FAN), became the nucleus of a new national army. The force was officially constituted in January 1983, when the various pro-Habré contingents were merged and renamed FANT [Chadian National Armed Forces/Forces Armees Nationales Tchadiennes] . . . At the time of its official establishment in 1983, FANT consisted primarily of FAN troops, the well-disciplined and hardened combat veterans who had been the original followers of Habré. FANT gradually expanded, recruiting members of the former national army, FAT, who were predominantly southerners of the Sara ethnic group. Later, additional southerners, the commandos or codos who had opened a guerrilla campaign against the government in 1983, were won over after two and one-half years of negotiations. Assigned to rehabilitation camps for retraining, the physically fit among them were also inducted into FANT. Finally, in the latter half of 1986, after FAP, the largest component of Goukouni's northern rebel army, had revolted against its Libyan ally, FAP soldiers were merged into FANT to join the campaign against the Libyan bases in Chad . . . Only the Presidential Guard, a select force mostly drawn from Habré's own ethnic group, retained its separate identity" (Tartter 1990, 175, 179-80, 172).

Congo-Brazzaville 97–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Pascal Lissouba was the Cobra militia organized by ex-president Denis Sassou Nguesso (he lost an election in 1992). "Northern and Mbochi dominance in the postdemocratic Congolese army is somewhat hard to document but at the same time widely acknowledged. At the highest levels of army

leadership, the pattern is clear. Upon his return to power, Sassou immediately brought back all of the northern officers who had been sidelined by Lissouba. Sassou put northern officers in charge of five of the country's eight military zones. He appointed General Yves Mutondo Mungonge, from Likouala, as his chief of staff soon after seizing power. In January 1999, shortly after the start of the 1998–1999 war, Sassou replaced him with Brigadier General Jacques Yvon Ndolou, another northerner who later became minister of defense. Although Sassou's military representatives have claimed that the integration of former militiamen into the army forces was neutral and open to all, no one takes this claim seriously. Virtually all southern Congolese aver that former Cobra militiamen were gradually integrated into the army, whereas militiamen from the other groups were not. A larger number of former Cobras were taken into the reorganized gendarmerie, as well as into the police forces of southern cities. Some junior officers who abstained from the fighting during the war of 1997 were allowed to retain their posts if they occupied technical posts and if the regime did not consider them a security risk. In these cases, however, they retained limited access to arms and intelligence. The army now appears to be much more uniformly northern than it was before 1991, though the claim would be impossible to document" (Clark 2008, 262-3).

Eritrea 93–NA. One of EPRDF/TPLF's allies in the struggle against the Mengistu regime (see the coding notes for Ethiopia) was the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Eritrea's post-independence military is the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF). "The EDF grew directly out of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which was reorganized to serve this function in the 1990s" (Connell 2019, 73). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Ethiopia 91–NA. The regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam faced numerous armed challengers. The main rebel group that defeated his regime in 1991 was the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which was created in 1989 as a coalition of anti-Mengistu rebels, most importantly the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). "After the defeat of the military government in 1991, the provisional government disbanded the former national army and relied on its own guerrilla fighters for national security. In 1993, however, the Tigrayan-led government announced plans to create a multi-ethnic defense force. This process entailed the creation of a new professional army and officer class and the demobilization of many of the irregulars who had fought against the military government, although many Tigrayan officers remained in command positions" (Library of Congress 2005).

Guinea-Bissau 74–80. The main rebel group that fought for independence in Guinea-Bissau was the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano para a Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde; PAIGC), whose armed wing was the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (Forcas Armadas Revolucionarias do Povo; FARP). "What happened to the 'guerrilla army' after independence? The foundation and evolution of the state of Guinea-Bissau was strongly linked to the FARP. Consisting of former freedom fighters, the FARP was the political and military structure of the one-party state regime" (Embaló 2012, 259). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Ivory Coast 11–NA. The main rebel group that fought against the regime of Laurent Gbagbo was the New Forces of Ivory Coast (Forces Nouvelles de Cote d'Ivoire; FN). "On 17 March 2011, President Ouattara combined the former rebel Forces Nouvelles (FN) with cooperating elements of

the Defense and Security Forces (FDS), the former government's security forces, into the Republic Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (FRCI - Force Republicaines de Cote d'Ivoire), the country's new official military" (GlobalSecurity.org n.d.). "Many headaches have been caused by attempts to amalgamate the two armies that were fighting each other a year ago—the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) from the Gbabgo camp and the former rebels from the north, the Forces Nouvelles (FN), who supported Ouattara—into a new army, the Forces Républicaines de Cte d'Ivoire (FRCI), which was formed on 17 March. So far, the integration process is proving to be very difficult. One of the main stumbling blocks has been the lack of hierarchy and integration within the command structure of the FRCI. The former rebels of the Forces Nouvelles (FN), who made a significant contribution to Ouattara's military victory, are disproportionately represented and currently make up the bulk of the soldiers. This makes it more difficult to integrate the formerly hostile FDS soldiers. . . . The decision to give so many top positions in the new armed forces to former rebel leaders has attracted widespread criticism" (Zandt 2012, 35-36).

Liberia 97–03. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the Liberian government was the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor. The NPFL began fighting in 1989 against President Samuel Doe, leading to his death in 1990 and the installation (via international involvement) of Amos Sawyer as president. The NPFL never disarmed, and large-scale fighting resumed in 1992. It ended in 1996 with a compromise peace accord that called for elections the next year, which Taylor's National Patriotic Party won. "The question of SSR [security sector reform] in Liberia first came up at the end of what Liberians call the 'first war.' In 1997, following a return to tentative peace, Charles Taylor was elected as president of Liberia. While some complained of electoral irregularities, many saw the victory of Taylor as the only means of preventing him from going back to war. A key component of the effort to ensure sustained peace and stability was the reform of the security sector by ECOMOG [West African regional troops]. Unsurprisingly, Taylor prevented ECOMOG from carrying out the reforms. He instead transformed his NPFL into the national army and avoided creating a truly national force. Abusive forces fiercely loyal to him, such as the Anti-Terrorism Unit, dominated the security landscape as Taylor continued to pillage the country's resources." (Onoma 2014, 146).

Toure (2002, 20) provides additional detail: "The international community's preoccupation with the holding of elections as a means of peacefully resolving the Liberian civil war resulted in the neglect of the restructuring of the army—one of the most critical areas and pre-conditions to peacebuilding and in ensuring a stable post-war environment in Liberia. On being elected president in July 1997, Charles Taylor refused to allow ECOMOG to supervise the restructuring of his security services. The failure of the international community to give equal importance to the restructuring plan and to support the process gave Taylor overwhelming and unrestrained control and influence over the state security services. Taylor succeeded in creating a private army largely consisting of former fighters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). He appointed NPFL operatives to head key state security agencies. The domination of the state security apparatus by former NPFL fighters and the ruthlessness with which these agencies have operated, continue to pose a significant threat to peace in Liberia."

Mozambique 75–NA. The main rebel group that fought for independence in Mozambique was the Mozambique Liberation Front (Portuguese Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique; FRELIMO),

whose armed wing was the People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (Forcas Populares de Libertacao de Mocambique; FPLM). "The new state had to create a new national army drawn from the guerrilla forces, and this had to be accomplished quickly. As a result the new Forcas Armadas de Mocambique/Forcas Populares de Libertacao de Mocambique (FAM/FPLM) had to resolve a number of fundamental issues: first, whether the transition would entail an incorporation of the thousands of Mozambicans who had served in the colonial forces; and second, whether the new army would follow either an essentially Western (Portuguese) institutional arrangement with "traditional' rank structure and administration, or the guerrilla administrative structures and command-and-control typologies. Following on this issue of operational doctrine—and as subthemes—were issues regarding the new army's size and capabilities ... Some 30,000 Mozambicans (or three times Frelimo's guerrilla force) who had served in the colonial army were purposely marginalised. According to Paulino Macaringue: 'the records show that during the negotiations, the Portuguese delegation proposed that all Mozambicans within the colonial army should be integrated into the new post-independence army. Frelimo rejected the proposal on grounds that they were part of the colonial machinery which had to be dismantled"' (Malache, Macaringue and Coelho 2005, 161, 163). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Rwanda 94–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Juvénal Habyarimana/Théodore Sindikubwabo was the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Its armed wing was the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which it renamed the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) in 1999. Following its military victory, the RPA "assumed the role of a national army, and has reportedly accepted 4,000 ex-members of FAR [*Forces armées rwandaises*, the former state military]. But the overwhelming bulk of both the command and the rank-and-file remain affiliated with the RPF. Moreover, because virtually all members of the RPF had military experience, many of those taking senior posts in the civil service are former members of the RPA" (Reed 1996, 498).

Prior to the RPF's military victory, there was a failed attempt at military integration (the Arusha Agreement of 1993) on which the government reneged. Despite military victory, the RPF implemented some aspects of the accord, including the integration of Hutu soldiers in the army to guard against both an internal security threat (Hutus were an overwhelming majority of the population) and external security threat (particularly the DRC, where Rwandan forces invaded in 1997 to overthrow Mobutu). "Once the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Army (RPF/RPA) took power, its leaders were determined to build a capable force that could defend the country from formidable guerrilla forces. The regime controlled the process so that recruits, including ancien régime soldiers from the FAR and rebel guerrillas, were integrated in waves over the span of a decade into the RPA and, after 1999, into the RDF" (Burgess 2014, 88). However, because the RPA replaced the existing state military and integrated Hutu troops from a clear position of strength, we code this as a case of complete military transformation rather than military integration.

Uganda 86–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regimes of Milton Obote/Tito Okello was the National Resistance Movement (NRM), whose armed wing was the National Resistance Army (NRA). "Upon taking power, the NRM controlled the civilian state apparatus and could also transform itself from a guerrilla movement to a government equipped with a defense force. All the leading personnel in the UPDF (Uganda People's Defense Force), the various police forces, and the presidential guard came from the Movement" (Makara, Rakner and Svåsand 2009,

191).

Zimbabwe 80–NA. The main armed groups that fought for liberation from white rule were the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Their respective political wings were the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Major fighting in the 1970s engendered a negotiated settlement with the white government (the Lancaster House Agreement). Elections with mass African participation occurred in 1980, which ZANU won. The settlement did not explicitly call for military integration, but this "was seen as a means of facilitating cooperation among all involved" (Jackson 2014, 49), in particular among ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the former Rhodesian state army, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). However, Mugabe deliberately undermined military integration and instead elevated ZANLA above the other organizations: "This case is one in which an initial integration was deliberately undermined for political reasons. The initial integration produced a superficially effective military, but real control lay with Mugabe" (61). Thus, we code this as a code of complete military transformation, rather than military integration.

More details on the RSF: "Almost as soon as the election result was announced [in 1980], various units of the RSF began to melt away ... The exodus of senior and middle-ranking white officers, along with many professional soldiers, weakened the ZNA (Zimbawean National Army)" (57).

More detail on ZIPRA: new officers "were selected from within their own organizations and therefore had some internal credibility. There were, however, political considerations, and after a time it was noted that the minority ZIPRA was being underrepresented, even before ZANLA launched a purge of the security services and effectively took control ... The new military had been created fairly successfully in a short period, although obvious problems remained. However, the Mugabe government soon took control of the institution, pushing out former ZIPRA personnel and bringing senior military officers into its political alliance in return for economic benefits ... [I]n a departure from the initial aims of integrating the factions, but in keeping with his Marxist principles, Mugabe established military units outside the integration structure. By 1983, Mugabe had arrested virtually all the senior military leadership of ZIPRA, and in March 1983 all the senior leadership of ZAPU, including Nkomo, went into exile. The unrelenting harassment of ZIPRA cadres led many to leave the APs [assembly points], which were still functioning. This led to widespread violence against former ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA, coupled with segregation, disarmament, disappearances, and an overall downplaying of ZIPRA's role in the liberation struggle that continues to date. These moves meant that of the initial triumvirate designated to share power in the 1980 agreement, only ZANLA senior officers remained. This effectively cleared the way for the creation of a ZANU-led, politicized security policy that, as in the Chinese model, emphasized the political role of the military. A number of new units then emerged, undermining much of the integration that had taken place. ... The creeping politicization coincided with the creation of two sets of security units outside the integration structure: the Fifth Brigade (5B) and the Zimbabwe People's Militia (ZPM)." (54, 57, 58).

A.2.2 Military Integration

Burundi 05–NA. The main (predominantly Hutu) rebel groups that fought to overthrow the Tutsi-dominated regime of Pierre Buyoya were the National Forces of Liberation (Force Nationale de Liberation; FNL) and Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). The war ended in a negotiated settlement, although this occurred in phases: FDD signed a ceasefire with the government in 2003, and FNL in 2006. The peace settlement called for military integration and a 50-50 balance rule between Hutus and Tutsis. Thus, Hutus did not *dominate* the officer corps of the revamped army, and post-war Ministers of Defense were Tutsi officers (see our Ministers biographies at the end of the appendix).

"The FDD forces were largely successful on the battlefield, although the FAB forces [i.e., the government military] were not defeated outright. Rebel successes are reflected in the agreements, whose provisions constitute a near-revolution in the country's distribution of power, including the creation of a new military integrating FAB and rebel forces. This outcome was consolidated when the CNDD-FDD (the party formed from the politico-military movement) won large majorities in the national assembly and local councils in the 2005 elections . . . The accords provided extensive guidance on military reform. They established a rule of ethnic balance that posts would be allocated equally to Hutus and Tutsis; the overall composition of the security forces was to be balanced in this way 'in view of the need to achieve ethnic balance and to prevent acts of genocide and coups d'état' . . . With the Arusha Accords in the background, the creation of an integrated military occurred through power sharing among the CNDD-FDD, the transitional government, and the high officer corps of FAB . . . At the dawn of integration, ex-FAB officers constituted the bulk of the officership, although former CNDD-FDD members were placed in key positions and have been elevated over the years. The new military operates under the scrutiny of foreign officers temporarily reassigned from the Netherlands and Belgium to Burundi's Defense Ministry. The authority of these foreign officers is boosted by the substantial aid that their countries provide to Burundi. This balance of ex-FAB presence and CNDD-FDD presence, and of domestic presence and international presence, reduces the risk of any one political group's gaining what Huntington (1957) calls 'subjective' control of the military institutions" (Samii 2014, 215, 217, 218, 223).

Chad 90–NA. The main rebel groups that fought to overthrow the regime of Hissène Habré were the April 1 Movement and the Patriotic Salvation Movement (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut; MPS), both led by Idriss Déby. (NB: he merged the April 1 Movement into the MPS during the rebellion.) Habré and Déby were former allies, and Déby served as army chief of staff until Habré purged him and two other senior advisors on April 1, 1989. "The three supposed rebels gathered a column of seventy-four loyal soldiers, fought their way out of the capital (N'Djamena), and fled toward Sudan, pursued by a contingent of Habré's troops" (Dixon and Sarkees 2015, 643). Déby's two other collaborators died, but he eventually amassed an army of about 2,000 people that captured various cities in Chad and, in December 1990, the capital city.

This case is unambiguously a rebellion because Déby needed to build a private army and win battles to capture the capital. However, his rebel group was relatively small. Upon taking power, he operated from a relatively weak bargaining position vis-a-vis other factions of the existing state army, which did not dissolve during the fighting despite Déby's outright victory. He also had to contend with various other rebel groups operating in the country. "Déby, taking a page from

Habré's playbook, pursued a policy of reconciliation with rebel factions, and in the early 1990s, various groups abandoned their struggle and joined the Déby regime. His first cabinet was larger than Habré's last, with 33 ministers, including a few holdovers from the previous regime. Yet, particularly in the early years of his rule, Déby had problems with his own allies; ironically, the grievances against Déby were similar to those the April 1st Group had against Habré. Members of Déby's own Zaghawa tribal group also became resentful of Déby's power sharing. Even though he 'elevated many Zaghawa to key ministerial positions,' and the Zaghawa dominated Déby's rebel army at the time of the overthrow, they had since 'felt sidelined by the president, who had committed himself to introducing multiparty democracy,' even if at the expense of Zaghawan interests" (Atlas and Licklider 1999, 45-46).

Democratic Republic of the Congo 97–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko was the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (*Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire*; AFDL). The AFDL replaced Mobutu's former state military, the Armed Forces of Zaire (*Forces Armées Zaöroises*; FAZ), which largely disintegrated during the war. "[O]n May 17, 1997, all resistance collapsed. DSP [Special Presidential Division/*Division Spéciale Présidentielle*/Mobutu's elite security force] and FAZ troops took off their uniforms and tried to cross the Congo into Brazzaville or hide among the population. The Mobutist state finally received its formal obituary. The war of liberation was complete" (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 229).

Despite defeating the government, organizationally, the AFDL was very weak because of its heavy reliance on Rwandan military assistance and "[t]he speed with which the AFDL moved through the DRC also meant that it had little time to establish organizational structures to administer its new territory, relying instead on Mobutu-era officials. It did hold referenda to identify particularly corrupt officials, who were removed, but unlike other movements, the remaining officials had no organizational, ideological, or military links to either the AFDL or the RPA [the Rwandan military]" (Reed 1998, 20).

The new state military was the *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC; Armed Forces of the Congo). After gaining power and facing attacks from new foreign-sponsored rebel groups, the weakness of the FAC "forced Kabila to eventually accept a political and military power-sharing deal," specifically, the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement in 1999 (Verweijen 2014, 140). Kabila repeatedly sought to undermine the military integration provisions, instead favoring his personally controlled presidential guard, which "constituted a parallel power network in the armed forces" (Verweijen 2014, 143).

Despite these heavily personalist elements of the state military, the weakly organized rebel group that launched the regime did not dominate the military. Neither of the two Ministers of Defense that served at least three years (see the table at the end of the appendix) came from the rebellion. Although not fully implemented, the quota system for personnel selection is also consistent with the non-domination by FAC: "The division key followed a quota system roughly based on the numbers of combatants that each faction had declared in Sun City, leading to the following division: 35 percent FAC, 17 percent MLC, 28 percent RCD-G, 8 percent Mai-Mai, and 12 percent other groups" (Verweijen 2014, 145). The partial nature of the military integration also enabled rival groups to avoid domination by the FAC. "[F]actions which agreed to dismantle their military

structures did not necessarily abstain from militarized power politics. The ex-belligerents adopted two main strategies to offset the potential loss of influence caused by army integration: First, they tried to maintain economic and political control by building up power bases within the political and administrative institutions—for example, by entrenching themselves locally or provincially in unelected administrative positions or by forging alliances with factions that were likely to have good electoral results. Second, they attempted to maintain military spheres of influence by building up client networks both within and outside the military" (Verweijen 2014, 148-9).

Namibia 90–NA. The main armed group that fought for independence was the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), and the political wing of the movement was the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). "Since Namibia had no army at independence, one of the priorities of the new government was the establishment of an integrated Namibian Defense Force (NDF)" (Dzinesa 2012, 279). Indicating PLAN's ascendancy in the new military, "The overall commander of the Namibian Defence Force is the former PLAN leader, Dimo Hamaambo" (Grotpeter 1994, 405), and every post-independence Minister of Defense was a member of SWAPO during the rebellion (see the table at the end of the appendix). However, unlike most other colonial liberation cases, PLAN did not directly transition to become the national military upon independence. Instead, the 10,000-strong PLAN army and the 8,000-strong SWATF army were each demobilized before creating the new NDF, overseen by a British Military Advisory and Training Team (Mills 1992). Harkness (2018 appendix, 103) reiterates: "On independence, the new national army was formed by integrating the armed wing of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) with the colonial South West African Territorial Force (SWATF)." The integration of these two military forces into the new state military leads us to code this case as military integration.

South Africa 94–NA. The main armed group that fought for liberation against white rule was uMkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation; MK), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC). Other armed African groups were the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the military arm of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and the Kwa Zulu Self Protection Force (KZSPF) of the Inkatha Freedom Party. The war ended in a negotiated settlement that called for elections with mass African participation and military integration. There were eight separate forces in total to integrate: the state military (South African Defence Force; SADF), separate militaries for the four "homelands," MK, APLA, and KZSPF (Licklider 2014, 122). Whereas SADF and the homeland forces were organized for conventional warfare, the three African groups were organized for guerrilla warfare. The absence of outright rebel victory was important for shaping the negotiations. "The NSF troops [those from MK/ALPA/KZSPF] saw themselves as having won the war against the SADF and the homeland forces, so it was not obvious to them why they should adapt to the SADF model. SADF personnel, conversely, felt that they had never been defeated and resented the insertion of former enemies whom they regarded as unprepared . . . Over time, agreement began to emerge. The new military would be modern, which in practice meant that it would adopt the SADF model in many ways . . . Some MK leaders would be given high-level positions, and its rank and file would be given training and fair opportunities for promotion. . . . The initial results of the negotiations suggest that the SADF had definitely done better than its opponent, but this impression is deceptive because the inevitable political victory of the African National Congress meant that many of the subsidiary agreements were simply overridden later. The SADF was compelled to accept the full integration of forces and such programs as affirmative action and the fast-tracking

of members of the NSF. The NSF were compelled to accept a new SANDF initially led and very much controlled by members of the old SADF ... The four homeland armies were all small and composed of SADF ethnic units, usually led by white South African officers. These groups played no significant role in the negotiations and were fairly easy to integrate into the new military. The Pan-Africanist Congress stayed out of the negotiations until the end but finally agreed to be integrated; the KZSPF Party militias were not brought into the process until 1996, and then only as new recruits. Interestingly enough, the PAC cadres, although fewer in numbers and with less combat experience, fared somewhat better in the integration process proportionately than those from MK" (122, 123, 126).

Over the next decade as the merger occurred: "the proportion of Africans in the SANDF went from about 40 percent to almost 70 percent, while the white proportion dropped from 47 percent to 18 percent. However, these figures conceal important differences. Blacks dominate both the enlisted personnel (of whom only about 2 percent are white) and the highest ranks (brigadier general and up), where a majority are MK veterans; whites still occupy more than half the officer and noncommissioned officer positions, the so-called operational positions. That most lower-level officers and noncommissioned officers are white in part reflects major educational differences resulting from the apartheid educational system ... There is also some concern that the current military is becoming increasingly politicized, because it is closely linked to the ANC" (128, 129). As our biographical data show, the first Minister of Defense was a former MK fighter, indicating ANC's ascendancy in the military. Williams (2002) provides details about a shift in the balance of power that occurred among the top generals in 1998 following the forced resignation of the white chief-of-staff of the SANDF (he had disseminated unsubstantiated rumors of a coup plot by senior MK officers). This shift "signalled the demise of the so-called 'old guard' within the new SANDF" and created a transition to more liberal white officers and a "grouping consist[ing] mainly of former MK officers located largely in the SANDF" (23, 24).

South Sudan 11–NA. The main rebel group that fought against the northern-dominated Sudanese regime was the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (in particular the faction led by John Garang after a split in 1991; SPLM-Garang), whose armed wing was the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Following a ceasefire in 2002 and a referendum in 2006, South Sudan gained independence in 2011. Despite creating a new country with no incumbent state military, the new South Sudan People's Defence Forces amalgamated various rebel groups and factions of SPLM that emerged during the war. "South Sudan's current defense force is composed of the SPLA, the rebel movement that liberated the country; various militia forces that had opposed the SPLA during the war but were absorbed into it after the 2005 peace agreement; and a large number of military personnel that were part of the northern Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), but who were also absorbed into the SPLA. This composition has made for a very volatile relationship among the senior command officers" (Jok 2011, 11).

A.2.3 No Military Transformation

Morocco 56–NA. The main rebel group that fought for independence was the Army of Liberation (Jaish-al-tahrir). However, neither the monarch Muhammad V nor the Istiqlal party (who led the broader independence movement) controlled these forces. "The main body of the Moroccan

army was recruited by French officers among Berber-speaking mountain tribes in a country that is predominantly Arab in language and culture. After independence in 1956, this army, though still largely commanded by French-trained Berber officers, was enlarged from 20,000 to 30,000 men by the addition of guerrilla fighters of the Moroccan Army of Liberation. It is under the control of the King instead of being responsible to a civilian cabinet" (Halpern 1963, 269). "With the establishment of the Royal Army, however, the Liberation Army became an anomaly to the new Moroccan administration as well as an obstacle to negotiation with the French on conventions for economic aid, etc. The absorption of the irregular army also posed peculiar problems for the Istiqlal. Many of the officers and non-commissioned officers were Moroccans of French Army background who had had little or no connection with the party before independence. Those coming from the urban resistance were very likely cell members of the Istiqlal, but none were acknowledged party leaders prior to independence. The troops were recruited mostly from local tribes, who had never been in contact with the Istiqlal for the most part and who recognized only the King as their leader" (Ashford 1959, 16).

Tunisia 56–11. The main rebel group that fought for independence was the *fellagha* guerrillas. However, the guerrillas "were not organized by Neo-Destour [the main independence movement], which claimed it did not approve of violence" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 315). Instead, in 1954, leaders of Neo-Destour used "all their influence" to induce the *fellagha* to lay down their arms in 1954 (Perkins 2014, 131). Ben Youssef led the *fellagha*; he had earlier developed a rivalry with Habib Bourguiba, the leader of Neo-Destour. Prior to the first independence elections, Bourguiba engineered the electoral rules to deny seats to supporters of Youssef (136), who "opposed the agreement with the French and French actions in Algeria [and] continued guerrilla activities in southern Tunisia in 1956" (Dixon and Sarkees 2015, 316). "Because the Tunisian army consisted of only a few thousand men, many of them former guerrillas lacking adequate training, ending the rebellion required the assistance of the former colonizer. With some reluctance, the French army and police cooperated with the Bourguiba government . . . and by June 1956 the last of the *fellagha* were killed or captured" (Perkins 2014, 136).

B Supporting Information for Main Regressions

B.1 Authoritarian Regime Breakdown (Table 2)

Sensitivity to unobserved covariates. Table B.1 shows that the coefficient estimates are relatively insensitive to unobserved covariates. Therefore, although it is impossible to control for every possible confounder, if the covariates included Table 2 are substantively relevant, then there is less reason to believe that covariates not included in any of the specifications would overturn the results. Specifically, Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) present a commonly used metric that estimates how large the bias from unobserved covariates would need to be for the true coefficient to be 0 in a statistical model, given information from how much adding observable covariates changes the estimates. To compute this measure, Table B.1 compares the coefficient estimates for the rebel regimes indicators in specifications with and without covariates. Specifically, it compares the coefficient estimate for all rebel regimes in each of Columns 2-4 to that in Column 1, and the coefficient estimates for colonial liberation regimes and civil war winners in each of Columns 6-8 to those in Column 5. Negative numbers in Table B.1 imply that the coefficient estimate in the specification with covariates exceeds in magnitude the coefficient estimate in the restricted specification. This indicates an estimate highly robust to omitted covariates because the magnitude of the bias of unobserved covariates would need to go in the opposite direction as the bias from omitting observables to drive the coefficient estimate to 0. This is the case for six of the nine estimates in Table B.1. In other specifications, the estimates are positive but large in magnitude. For example, the coefficient estimate in Column 2 is almost identical to that in Column 1 despite adding covariates, and table shows that the bias from unobservables would need to be 129 times larger than the bias from omitting the covariates contained in this specification to overturn the positive coefficient estimate. For comparison, Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) calculate a corresponding figure of 3.55 for their own analysis, which they interpret as large in magnitude.

Table B.1: Sensitivity to Unobserved Covariates for Table 2

Column in Table 2:	(2)	(3)	(4)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	129.2	-6.2	-11.2			
Colonial liberation regime				-44.7	-8.1	7.4
Civil war winner				20.6	-4.9	-3.8

Jackknife sample sensitivity analysis. We assessed the robustness of the estimates in Table 2 to jackknife sample alterations. For each column in Table 2, we iteratively dropped each country (that is, every year for that country). In every jackknife regression, either the aggregate rebel regime indicator or both disaggregated regime indicators (colonial liberation and civil war winners) are statistically significant at 1%.

Table B.2: Alternative Samples

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN							
	Panel A. Smaller sample (lower threshold for democracy)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0436***	-0.0423***	-0.0539***	-0.0500***				
	(0.00899)	(0.0114)	(0.0116)	(0.0120)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0406***	-0.0398***	-0.0477***	-0.0372**
					(0.00970)	(0.0124)	(0.0131)	(0.0144)
Civil war winner					-0.0489***	-0.0476***	-0.0639***	-0.0701***
					(0.0109)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)	(0.0139)
Country-years	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203
R-squared	0.011	0.041	0.043	0.046	0.011	0.041	0.043	0.046
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Larger sample (all post-independence years)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0464***	-0.0418***	-0.0517***	-0.0481***				
	(0.00861)	(0.00958)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0430***	-0.0408***	-0.0484***	-0.0354**
					(0.00913)	(0.0113)	(0.0127)	(0.0138)
Civil war winner					-0.0509***	-0.0434***	-0.0557***	-0.0641***
					(0.0106)	(0.0117)	(0.0124)	(0.0139)
Country-years	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614
R-squared	0.016	0.044	0.045	0.049	0.016	0.044	0.045	0.049
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.2 is identical to Table 2 except here we alter the sample. In Panel A, the sample is smaller than our core sample. We continue to exclude all democracies, but use a less stringent standard for coding a country as democratic. Specifically, we use Geddes, Wright and Frantz's (2014*a*) coding of democracy, which unlike our core measure does not require rotation in office. In Panel B, we expand the sample from our core sample. We include *all* post-independence years, including democracies, transitional regimes, and warlord regimes (all of which are excluded from the core sample). $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.3: Sample without Revolutionary Regimes

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel A. Lachapelle et al. (2020)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no LLWC cases)	-0.0486***	-0.0479***	-0.0599***	-0.0562***
	(0.00924)	(0.0108)	(0.0111)	(0.0107)
Country-years	2,180	2,180	2,180	2,180
R-squared	0.011	0.043	0.043	0.048
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Colgan and Weeks (2015)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no CW cases)	-0.0519***	-0.0512***	-0.0604***	-0.0549***
	(0.00859)	(0.0106)	(0.0113)	(0.0114)
Country-years	2,219	2,219	2,219	2,219
R-squared	0.013	0.045	0.045	0.050
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel C. Roessler and Verhoeven (2016)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no RV cases)	-0.0453***	-0.0427***	-0.0523***	-0.0475***
	(0.0102)	(0.0121)	(0.0139)	(0.0137)
Country-years	2,035	2,035	2,035	2,035
R-squared	0.009	0.044	0.044	0.049
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.2 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we alter the sample by dropping all observations from regimes that we code as REBEL REGIME=1 and that an existing dataset codes as revolutionary. Panel A drops six rebel regimes that Lachapelle et al. (2020) code as revolutionary. Panel B drops five rebel regimes that Colgan and Weeks (2015) code as revolutionary. Panel C drops twelve rebel regimes that Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as violent liberation regimes. Table 1 denotes which regimes are dropped in each panel. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.4: Robustness Checks for Table 2

DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN								
Panel A. Logit models								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.399***	-1.430***	-1.551***	-1.477***				
	(0.356)	(0.391)	(0.378)	(0.376)				
Col. liberation					-1.318***	-1.380***	-1.413***	-1.213**
					(0.438)	(0.486)	(0.486)	(0.530)
Civil war winner					-1.542***	-1.525***	-1.770***	-1.834***
					(0.519)	(0.512)	(0.506)	(0.491)
Country-years	2,352	2,172	2,172	2,172	2,352	2,172	2,172	2,172
Pseudo R2	0.0372	0.0873	0.0874	0.0981	0.0373	0.0874	0.0877	0.0987
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0695***	-0.0622***	-0.0703***	-0.0636***				
	(0.0139)	(0.0153)	(0.0186)	(0.0189)				
Col. liberation					-0.0668***	-0.0619***	-0.0728***	-0.0598**
					(0.0151)	(0.0170)	(0.0209)	(0.0231)
Civil war winner					-0.0738***	-0.0630***	-0.0664***	-0.0686***
					(0.0140)	(0.0166)	(0.0222)	(0.0209)
Country-years	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333
R-squared	0.029	0.085	0.088	0.093	0.029	0.085	0.088	0.093
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.4 is identical to Table 2 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4 and 6–8. The missing values are from years in which no regime breakdown occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$.

B.2 Instrumenting for Colonial Liberation Regimes

B.2.1 Historical Background on African Colonialism

Following decades of relatively peaceful European rule in Africa, the colonial project fell into crisis after World War II. Greater mobilization ability by Africans, weakened European powers with domestic populations more skeptical of overseas rule, and a shift to a bipolar international system with two superpowers hostile to overseas colonialism forced new choices onto European colonists (Young 1994). In most cases, it was clear to both metropolitan officials and major producers that the economic costs of retaining colonial rule outweighed the benefits (Fieldhouse 1986), especially when factoring in the higher likelihood that Africans (or, in North Africa, Arabs) would revolt without reforms. Consequently, in the two decades following World War II, most of the continent peacefully transitioned to African majority rule and independence.

The main exceptions were territories with sizable European populations. Wherever they settled in large numbers, European settlers usually composed a politically influential interest group—and, in independent South Africa and semi-independent Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), they directly controlled the state. White settlers had considerable vested interests in their domination of the best land, a non-mobile asset they expected to lose under African majority rule. Their control of land also created a cheap and mobile labor supply of Africans that they could exploit (Mosley 1983). Consequently, European settlers fiercely resisted delegating control to the African or Arab majority, which frequently engendered decolonization violence. Data from Paine (2019*b*) shows that:

- Among the seven territories with the largest European population shares around World War II, every one experienced a major colonial liberation war.
- Among the next ten-highest, four did.
- Among the 25 lowest, only one did.
- (The highest category contains cases with colonial European population shares between 2.7% and 20.1%, the middle category between 0.4% and 2.5%, and the lowest category no greater than 0.4%.)

B.2.2 Justification for Instrumental Variable

Climatic factors that influenced prospects for European settlement provide a plausible instrumental variable for colonial liberation regimes. Historians have discussed conditions required for replicating large-scale European agricultural settlements in Africa (Mosley 1983, 5; Lutzelschwab 2013, 145). Temperate climate, found at the northern and southern tips of the continent, enabled large-scale European-style farming settlements. The remainder of the continent contains tropical climate, which obviates most temperate farming practices. However, Europeans could cultivate similar cereal crops as at home in tropical areas that met three conditions. First, they needed high enough rainfall to grow crops. Second, high enough elevation created moderate temperatures. Third, Europeans needed land without the tsetse fly, which causes sleeping sickness in humans.

We use a variable from Paine (2019*b*) that combines GIS data for climate, rainfall, elevation, and

tsetse fly prevalence. For each country, the variable measures the logged percentage of its territory that had either:

- Mediterranean climate, or
- All three of:
  - Rainfall of at least 20 inches per year, and
  - 3,000 feet in elevation (Mosley 1983, 5 proposes both of these thresholds), and
  - the lowest quartile on Alsan's (2015) tsetse fly suitability index.

Figure B.1 depicts these conditions. The variable used below takes the natural log to prevent a handful of cases with extreme values of the instrument from driving the results. Our variable for the area of each country does not include desert and semi-desert area to eliminate territory where very few people, European or not, would settle.

Figure B.1: African Territory Suitable for Large-Scale European Settlement



Three main considerations motivate why this is a reasonable instrument for studying the effects of colonial liberation regimes. First, all components of the instrument are exogenous because they are not caused by political factors that could affect regime durability. Importantly, the tsetse fly data comes from Alsan's (2015) tsetse fly suitability index—which is derived from historical climate data—rather than from colonial or post-colonial maps of tsetse fly prevalence, which may be affected by climate change or by stronger states better able to control the fly (389). We also estimate models with various pre-independence covariates (logged population density in 1800, whether any ethnic groups in the country had a precolonial state, index of rugged terrain, colonizer fixed effects)

to account for additional sources of heterogeneity. We use these rather than the more standard (relative to the literature) set of covariates used in Table 2, which are mostly post-independence and therefore inappropriate "post-treatment" controls relative to our instrument. Of course, factors such as historical population density might have also been influenced by the instrument, which is why we also estimate specifications without the covariates.

Second, Panel B of Table B.5 demonstrates that the instrumental variable is strongly correlated with rebel regimes. We prefer estimating 2SLS estimates of colonial liberation regimes directly on land suitability rather than a 3SLS specification with an intermediate stage that controls for European population percentage given the difficulty of satisfying and assessing the additional exclusion restrictions.

Third, the exclusion restriction is plausible. One would have to construct an alternative explanation for how particular climatic conditions affected regime durability independent of their effect on rebel regimes. Paine (2019*b*) examines how these climatic conditions—by affecting the size of the European settler population—generated decolonization violence. However, this is not an independent channel from our main explanatory factor, because this violence generated the colonial liberation regimes. In addition to the lack of existing theory that supports such a connection, Table B.6 demonstrates that fairly large violations of the exclusion restriction would be necessary to make the main coefficient estimates insignificant at conventional levels.

B.2.3 Results

Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table B.5 present findings from two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions that estimate simultaneous equation models composed of Equation 1 (the second stage) and the first-stage regression:

$$R_{it} = \beta_{0,Z} + \beta_Z \ln Z_i + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_{X,Z} + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{Z,it}, \tag{B.1}$$

where Z_i is the instrument. In Columns 3 and 4, the first-stage equation is:

$$CL_{it} = \beta_{0,Z} + \beta_Z \ln Z_i + \beta_{WIN} WIN_{it} + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_{X,Z} + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{Z,it}, \tag{B.2}$$

where CL_{it} indicates colonial liberation regimes and WIN_{it} indicates civil war winners. We use the instrument only for colonial liberation regimes given the theoretical justification that climatic factors affected rebel regimes by triggering decolonization conflicts.

The estimates in Panel A of Table B.5 reaffirm those in Table 2. In fact, the magnitude of the estimates in Table B.5 are more than twice as large as the corresponding estimates in (unreported) OLS models with the sample sample and set of covariates. Panel B presents the first-stage regressions using Equation B.1 only. It shows that in each specification, the partial F-test for the instrument exceeds the conventional standard of 10 for a weak instrument (Staiger and Stock 1997).

Table B.5: Instrumental Variable Regressions

	Panel A. 2SLS. DV: REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0940**	-0.0805**		
(IV=land suitability)	(0.0356)	(0.0310)		
Col. liberation regime			-0.0961**	-0.0806**
(IV=land suitability)			(0.0375)	(0.0316)
Civil war winner			-0.0647***	-0.0782***
			(0.0127)	(0.0149)
British colony		0.0132		0.0134
		(0.0194)		(0.0186)
French colony		0.0206		0.0206
		(0.0187)		(0.0185)
Portuguese colony		0.0325		0.0328
		(0.0223)		(0.0247)
ln(pop dens. in 1800)		0.00164**		0.00163**
		(0.000707)		(0.000747)
Precolonial state		0.0194		0.0192
		(0.0151)		(0.0154)
Rugged terrain		-0.00922*		-0.00918
		(0.00542)		(0.00557)
Country-years	2,055	2,055	2,055	2,055
R-squared	0.008	0.044	0.009	0.044
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. First stage. DV: COL. LIBERATION REGIME			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(% area suitable for Eu. agri.)	0.0615***	0.0833***	0.0581***	0.0838***
	(0.0168)	(0.0190)	(0.0171)	(0.0187)
Civil war winner			-0.191**	-0.0835*
			(0.0782)	(0.0417)
Country-years	2,055	2,055	2,055	2,055
R-squared	0.203	0.359	0.262	0.522
Covariates?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
F-test for IV	13.3	19.2	11.5	20.1
	Panel C. Reduced form. DV: REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(% area suitable for Eu. agri.)	-0.00575***	-0.00713***	-0.00557***	-0.00716***
	(0.00171)	(0.00171)	(0.00178)	(0.00173)
Civil war winner			-0.0447***	-0.0622***
			(0.00716)	(0.0109)
Country-years	2,055	2,055	2,055	2,055
R-squared	0.013	0.020	0.016	0.025
Covariates?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table B.5 presents 2SLS estimates with standard errors clustered by country. Equation B.1 is the first stage in Columns 1 and 2, Equation B.2 is the first stage in Columns 3 and 4, and Equation 1 is the second stage in all columns. The sample differs from that in Table 2 because island countries (except Madagascar) and countries that did not gain independence from a European country (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia) are missing data on the climate instrument. Panel B presents the first-stage estimates and Panel C presents the reduced-form estimates. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the exclusion restriction. Because the exclusion restriction is unlikely to be perfectly satisfied in any social scientific research, it is important to assess how badly it would have to be violated to invalidate our results. Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) provide a suitable method with the stated purpose: "Often the instrument exclusion restriction that underlies the validity of the usual IV inference is suspect; that is, instruments are only plausibly exogenous. We present practical methods for performing inference while relaxing the exclusion restriction" (260). They assume that instead of Equation 1, the instrument is a covariate in the second-stage regression:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_R R_{it} + \gamma \ln Z_i + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_X + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{B.3}$$

If $\gamma \neq 0$, then the instrument directly affects the outcome, i.e., the exclusion restriction is not perfectly satisfied. Although it is likely that $\gamma \neq 0$ in any applied research situation, this is only problematic for the present 2SLS estimates of the rebel regime coefficients if γ is large in magnitude. Because γ is unobservable, we can examine how the results would change for different hypothetical values of γ. Table B.6 states for each specification in Table B.5 the value of γ for which the p-value of the 2SLS estimated effect of rebel regimes (or the disaggregated indicators) would equal either 0.05 or 0.10. If the true γ is negative and smaller in magnitude than the amount stated in the table, then the coefficient estimate for rebel regimes from the stated column in Table B.5 is statistically significant at the stated threshold. (If instead the true γ is positive, then the magnitude of the coefficient estimate from the regression table is *downwardly* biased.) The numbers in parentheses in Table B.6 state the γ thresholds as a percentage of the reduced form estimated effect of the instrument on regime breakdown.

Table B.6: Assessing Sensitivity to Exclusion Restriction Violations

Column in Table B.5:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Stat. sig. at 5% if $\gamma \geq$	-.0018	-.0020	-.0016	-.0019
(% of reduced-form estimate)	(31%)	(29%)	(29%)	(28%)
Stat. sig. at 10% if $\gamma \geq$	-.0026	-.0030	-.0024	-.0029
(% of reduced-form estimate)	(45%)	(44%)	(43%)	(42%)

Table B.6 demonstrates that the 2SLS estimates are insensitive to fairly large violations of the exclusion restriction. Approximately 31% of the reduced form effect of the instrument on regime breakdown must occur through channels other than colonial liberation regimes for the liberation regimes coefficient estimate not to be significant at least at the 5% level. The corresponding figure is 45% for the 10% significance level. We lack an alternative hypothesis suggesting an unmodeled channel of this magnitude.

B.3 SUCCESSFUL COUPS (TABLE 3)

Table B.7: Robustness Checks for Table 3

	DV: SUCCESSFUL COUPS							
	Panel A. Logit models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.269***	-1.103**	-1.452***	-1.350***				
	(0.432)	(0.451)	(0.477)	(0.486)				
Col. liberation regime					-1.053**	-0.955*	-1.351**	-1.155**
					(0.460)	(0.488)	(0.535)	(0.588)
Civil war winner					-1.952**	-1.640*	-1.771*	-1.865*
					(0.965)	(0.994)	(0.962)	(0.968)
Country-years	2,352	1,804	1,804	1,804	2,352	1,804	1,804	1,804
Pseudo R2	0.0441	0.0827	0.0815	0.0923	0.0452	0.0833	0.0817	0.0928
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0358***	-0.0288***	-0.0374***	-0.0348***				
	(0.0106)	(0.0101)	(0.0120)	(0.0126)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0332***	-0.0278**	-0.0444***	-0.0403**
					(0.0114)	(0.0109)	(0.0135)	(0.0151)
Civil war winner					-0.0409***	-0.0309**	-0.0272*	-0.0281*
					(0.0111)	(0.0124)	(0.0158)	(0.0155)
Country-years	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333
R-squared	0.019	0.077	0.081	0.084	0.019	0.077	0.081	0.085
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.7 follows the same structure as Table B.4; the present table is identical to Table B.7 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4. The missing values are from years in which no successful coups occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.4 MINISTER OF DEFENSE APPOINTMENTS (TABLE 4)

Table B.8: Defense Minister Appointment

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.287***	0.210***	0.146*	0.148*				
	(0.0682)	(0.0710)	(0.0732)	(0.0784)				
Col. liberation regime					0.275***	0.225***	0.182**	0.207*
					(0.0875)	(0.0828)	(0.0868)	(0.105)
Civil war winner					0.311***	0.179**	0.0863	0.0595
					(0.0765)	(0.0849)	(0.0850)	(0.0852)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0143		0.00570		0.0133		-0.0110
		(0.0315)		(0.0460)		(0.0321)		(0.0522)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		0.152		0.193**		0.158		0.220**
		(0.102)		(0.0951)		(0.104)		(0.0996)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.00188		-0.00426		-0.00197		-0.00382
		(0.00357)		(0.00343)		(0.00354)		(0.00343)
ln(population)			0.0441	0.0475			0.0419	0.0573
			(0.0340)	(0.0374)			(0.0338)	(0.0384)
Ethnic frac.			0.241	0.245			0.269	0.294
			(0.216)	(0.216)			(0.218)	(0.219)
Religious frac.			0.0374	0.0322			0.0469	0.0292
			(0.185)	(0.167)			(0.185)	(0.170)
British colony			-0.185	-0.200*			-0.196*	-0.214*
			(0.114)	(0.112)			(0.116)	(0.110)
French colony			-0.0229	-0.0135			-0.0328	-0.0335
			(0.112)	(0.105)			(0.113)	(0.104)
Portuguese colony			0.206	0.211*			0.173	0.149
			(0.131)	(0.123)			(0.153)	(0.158)
Country-years	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251
R-squared	0.063	0.127	0.186	0.193	0.063	0.128	0.188	0.196
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.8 is identical to Table 4 except here we change the dependent variable to DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT.
$^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.9: Robustness Checks for Table 4

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER SAME							
	Panel A. Logit models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	1.305***	1.091***	0.915***	0.910***				
	(0.254)	(0.263)	(0.273)	(0.294)				
Col. liberation regime					1.325***	1.227***	1.203***	1.304***
					(0.313)	(0.299)	(0.283)	(0.356)
Civil war winner					1.267***	0.842**	0.476	0.372
					(0.353)	(0.354)	(0.367)	(0.369)
Country-years	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263
Pseudo R2	0.0540	0.0955	0.124	0.127	0.0540	0.0966	0.128	0.131
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.315***	0.252***	0.206***	0.206***				
	(0.0574)	(0.0599)	(0.0608)	(0.0646)				
Col. liberation regime					0.320***	0.280***	0.259***	0.278***
					(0.0707)	(0.0657)	(0.0631)	(0.0761)
Civil war winner					0.306***	0.200**	0.122	0.0994
					(0.0812)	(0.0826)	(0.0841)	(0.0848)
Country-years	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263
R-squared	0.074	0.124	0.158	0.161	0.074	0.125	0.161	0.165
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.9 follows the same structure as Tables B.4 and B.7; the present table is identical to Table 4 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.10: Minister of Defense Biographical Information

Country	Defense Minister	Important war figure?	Biography
Algeria	Houari Boumediene (1962–65)	Yes	Served as a colonel during the war, the highest rank in the FLN forces. He was also the chief of staff of the ALN, the FLN's military wing. Served as the second president of Algeria after his MoD appointment.
	Khaled Nezzar (1990–92)	No	Went to military school in Algiers and received training in Moscow, but was too young to fight in the independence war. Was appointed within the MoD in 1965 upon finishing his training.
Angola	Iko Carreira (1976–80)	Yes	Served as head of security in the MPLA during the liberation war. Was in charge of transitioning the military wing of the MPLA into the Angola state army.
	Pedro Maria Tonha (1981–95)	Yes	Was a high-level commander within the MPLA during the war. After independence in 1975, he became governor of central Huambo province. He became defense minister in 1981.
	Pedro Sebastiao (1996–98)	Yes	Was a commander of the FAPLA squadron (armed wing of the MPLA), led the Battle of Ntó—an important operation in the war.
	Kundy Paihama (1999–2010)	No	Kundy Paihama served as governor of Cunene, Benguela, Huila, and Luanda provinces before being MoD.
	Candido van Dunem (2010–14)	No	Officer in the Angolan armed forces. Served as a military advisor to Angola's Permanent Mission to the UN from 2000-2004.
	Joao Manuel Gonalves Lourenco (2015–17)		Fought with the MPLA in the liberation war, including having received training in the Soviet Union. Was appointed as a provincial governor in 1984 before being MoD.
Burundi	Germain Niyoyankana (2005–10)	No	Was a lieutenant general in the army, and before that, he was the army chief of staff. During the 1993-2005 civil war, he was a top army commander in the state military.
	Pontien Gaciyubwenge (2011–14)	No	Was also part of the extant state military. During the war he was promoted from battalion commander, to group commander, military region commander, and finally brigadier general. He was the Director General of Planning and Studies within the MoD before his appointment.
	Emannuel Ntahomvukiye (2015–17)	No	First civilian to hold the MoD position, he has a legal background.
Chad	Mahamat Nouri (2001–04)	No	Was a commander of Habre's forces, led the Northern forces. He held several portfolios under Habre, including Minister of the Interior. After Habre was ousted by Deby, Nouri became a close ally of Deby and held several portfolios, including Minister of the Interior in addition to the Minister of Defense.
	Wadel Abdelkader Kamogue (2008–12)	No	Played a key role in the 1975 coup that overthrew Tombalbaye. Controlled southern Chad during the subsequent Habre regime, was appointed as Minister of Agriculture. After Deby came to power in 1990, he was appointed as the Minister of Civil Service and Labor from 1993-1994. Deby named him the president of the national assembly in 1997, and then MoD in 2008.
	Bichara Issa Djadallah (2013–15)		

Country	Defense Minister	Important war figure?	Biography
Congo - B	Itihi Ossetoumba (1999–2001)	Yes	Founding member of the PCT and was on the five-member executive committee of the National Revolutionary Council. In 1989, he was appointed as the number-two position in the regime, in charge of the PCT Political Bureau.
	Jacques Yvon Ndolou (2002-09)		
	Charles Richard Mondjo (2012–17)	Yes	Served as an army officer during the war, and was the Director of Lessons and Studies at the Military Academy from 1987-1993. Served as the Chief of Staff of the Congolese Armed Forces for ten years before his MoD appointment.
DRC	Charles Mwando Simba (2009–12)	No	Led an anti-Tutsi militia separate from the ADFL.
	Crispin Atama Tabe (2015–17)	No	Background in law and career in civil services. Past posts include the National Intelligence Agency and Minister of the Interior of the Eastern Province.
Eritrea	Petros Solomon (1993)	Yes	During the war he was one of the three members of the front's Military Committee in 1975, and from 1977-1978, he was responsible for all logistics on the Eastern Front around Massawa and headed the EPLF's military intelligence unit. In 1977, he was placed on the Political Bureau of the front's Central Committee and served on the Military Committee and General Staff through liberation.
	Mesfin Hagos (1994)	Yes	One of the original leaders of the EPLF and the EPRP, which controlled the EPLF. Underwent military training in Syria with Isaias Afwerki. Was part of the 5 man EPLF founding leadership, serving on its Central Committee and its political committee. Was appointed as chief of staff of the Eritrean Defense Force in 1992 before becoming MoD.
	Gen. Sebhat Ephrem (1995–2017)	Yes	Had various high-level appointments during the war: In 1977, he was placed on the front's Political Committee and appointment head of the Department of Public Administration. In 1986, he joined the General Staff, and was in charge of leading strategy for the war. In 1992 he was appointed the major of Asmara and later became Eritrea's first full general.
Ethiopia	Siye Abraha (1991–94)	Yes	Abraha was one of the founders of the TPLF and served as a commander during the war.
	Tefera Walwa (1997–2000)		
	Abedula Gemeda (2002–05)	No	Received military training after the war. Reached the rank of Major General of the National Defense Force in 1998.
	Kuma Demekesa (2006–08)	Yes	Was a founding member of the TPLF and spent several years as a prisoner of war during the war. Served as the Minister of Internal Affairs before his MoD appointment.
	Siraj Fergesa (2009–17)	No	Joined the party as a civil servant focused on economic development in the early 1990s.
Guinea Bissau	Joao Bernardo Vieira (1974–78)	Yes	Was a police commissar and military chief in southern Guinea-Bissau in the 1960s. Was named vice president of the War Council in 1965.
	Commandant Umaru Djalo (1979–80)		

Country	Defense Minister	Important war figure?	Biography
Ivory Coast	N'Guessan Michel Amani (2011-2017)	No	Background in teaching and was appointed as the Minister of National Education from 2000-2007.
Liberia	Daniel Chea (1997–2003)		
Morocco	Mahjoubi Aherdane (1961–65)	Yes	Founding member of the Moroccan Liberation Army.
	Abderrahmane Sbai (1997–2009)	No	Background in civil service before MoD appointment.
	Abdellatif Loudiyi (2010–17)	No	Career civil servant who served in the Ministry of Finance before MoD appointment.
Mozambique	Alberto Joachim Chipande (1976–94)	Yes	Served on the Political Bureau and Central Committee of FRELIMO during the war.
	Aguiar Jonassane Reginaldo Real Mazula (1995–99)	No	Was the first civilian Minister of Defense in Mozambique. He was Minister of Labor and Minister of State Administration before he was named Minister of Defense.
	Gen (retd) Tobias Joaquim Dai (2000–08)	Yes	Was Commander of the Army during the war.
	Filipe Nyussi (2008–14)	No	Nyussi was too young to be involved in the war, although both his parent were veterans of the liberation war as FRELIMO members.
	Agostinho Mondlane (2015–17)		
Namibia	Peter Mueshihange (1990–94)	Yes	Was one of the founders of the OPC (which became SWAPO) in 1958. During the war, he was the secretary for foreign affairs of SWAPO.
	Phillemon Malima (1995–97)	Yes	Served as the SWAPO Representative to the USSR from 1987 to 1989 during the war. Before becoming Defense Minister in 1995, he was the Deputy Minister of Defense under Mueshihange.
	Erikki Nghimtina (1998–2004)	Yes	Was the Director of Communications for the armed wing of SWAPO during the war from 1983-1989. Was Deputy Minister of Defense from 1995 to 1997, before he became the head Minister of Defense.
	Charles Namoloh (2007–12)	Yes	Was chief of staff to the second in command of the army during the war from 1979-1989. Was a member of the 18 person SWAPO Politburo.
	Nahas Angula (2013–15)	No	Was in exile during the war.
Rwanda	Paul Kagame (1994–1999)	Yes	Became a top commander of the RPF troops after the first leader (Rwigema) was shot and killed in in 1990.
	Emmanuel Habyarimana (2000–02)	No	Was a former member of the Rwandan Armed Forces under President Juvenal Habyarimana. Following the successful attacks of the RPF, he joined the newly constituted Rwanda Defense Forces as a colonel.
	Marcel Gatsinzi (2003–09)	No	Was a second lieutenant in the Rwanda Army prior to the civil war.
	James Kabarebe (2010–17)	Yes	During the war, he was a high-ranking commander of the RPF. His unit later became the Republican Guard for Kagame.

Country	Defense Minister	Important war figure?	Biography
South Africa	Joe Modise (1994–98)	Yes	Served as high command in Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's armed faction, after the party was banned in 1960. He was asked to take over command of the armed faction from 1965 to 1984 while Mandela was imprisoned. He was elected to the ANC's national executive committee during this time.
	Mosiuoa Patrick Lekota (1999–2008)	Yes	Was an early organizer of the SASO and was jailed for six years on Robben Island. After his release, he became the head of publicity for the UDF. In 1990, he was elected to the ANC's executive committee, and in 1991, he was appointed as the ANC's Chief of Intelligence.
	Charles Nqakula (2008–09)	Yes	Served as commander of the armed wing of the ANC for the Western Cape from 1988 to 1991. Was elected as Deputy General Secretary in 1991 and subsequently as the party's General Secretary in 1993. Was the Minister of Safety and Security before becoming the MoD.
	Lindiwe Sisulu (2009–12)	Yes	Joined the military wing of the ANC in 1977, specialized in Intelligence. In 1990, became a top official of the intelligence wing, along with Jacob Zuma.
	Nosiviwe Mapisa Nqakula (2013–17)	Yes	In the 1980s, she served as the head of the commission that investigated ANC deserters. Before her MoD appointment, she was the Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Correctional Services.
South Sudan	John Kong Nyuon (2011-12)		
Tunisia	Bahi Ladgham (1960–66)	Yes	One of the founders of the rebel army. Was a key member of the Franco-Tunisian negotiations for independence.
	Abdallah Farhat (1977–79)	No	Background in civil service.
	Slaheddine Baly (1981–88)		
	Abdallah Kallel (1989–91)	No	Background in civil service.
	Abdelaziz Ben Dhia (1992–96)		
	Dali Jazi (2002–05)		
	Kamel Morjane (2006–10)	No	Too young to fight in the independence war. Background in civil service.
	Farhat Jorchani (2015–17)	No	Too young to fight in the independence war. Background in law.
Uganda	Amama Mbabazi (2001–06)	Yes	Was a founding member of the NRM. From 1986-1992, he was the head of the External Security Organization.
	Crispus Kiyonga (2007–16)	No	Prior to 1981, Kiyonga competed in elections as a UPM candidate. During the war, he joined the NRM. Was the Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Health before becoming MoD.

Country	Defense Minister	Important war figure?	Biography
Zimbabwe	Enos Nkala (1988)	Yes	One of the four founders of ZANU, along with Robert Mugabe. Served on ZANU high command during the war.
	Richard Chemist Hove (1990–92)	Yes	From 1971-1973, he was a member of Dare Rechimurenga, the war council of the rebel group. He was the head of broadcasting services in the Department of Information and Publicity in 1973. He then became deputy secretary for external affairs for ZANU in 1978. Before becoming MoD, he was a member of the Politburo and Central Committee of ZANU, in addition to several other cabinet positions.
	Moven Enock Mahachi (1992–2000)		
	Sydney Sekeramayi (2001–08, 13-17)	No	Served as the party's representative to Sweden during the war.
	Emmerson Mnangagwa (2009–13)	Yes	Was a member of ZANU's Central Committee during the war. In 1980 Mugabe named him minister of state in the prime minister's office, with responsibilities for state security. In that position, Mnangagwa was responsible for integrating the two liberation armies, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, with the remnants of the former Rhodesian security forces, into the Zimbabwe National Army.

C Supporting Information for Alternative Explanations

C.1 Controlling the Countryside

"He who controls the countryside controls the country" (Huntington 1968, 292). This well-known aphorism linking revolutionary regimes to the transformation of society is the leading explanation in the literature for why revolutionary regimes endure. Levitsky and Way (2013) and Lachapelle et al. (2020) argue that gaining power through violence, unleashing a program of social revolution, and defeating counterrevolutionaries eliminates alternative centers of power that underpinned the previous regime. Even if true on average for the broader global sample of revolutionary regimes, this mechanism does not help to explain the durability of African rebel regimes.

Many African countries have inauspicious conditions for rebel regimes to fundamentally transform society, even in cases where they do attempt social revolution. Herbst (2000) discusses the generic problem that rulers in Africa throughout history—precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial—have faced to consolidating territorial control. A high land-to-population ratio has typically created incentives for residents to move rather than to submit to the will of an encroaching state. Before European colonialism began, states typically aimed to control people rather than specific tracts of territory, given the scarcity of the former. Despite superior military technology, European colonizers failed to solve this problem. They usually sought to impose "hegemony on a shoestring" and invested only enough to balance the budgets within the colonies (Berry 1992). In fact, by carving up the continent into territorially delineated spheres of influence—which later engendered the international borders for postcolonial African states—European rule likely exacerbated the problem of establishing effective territorial control. At independence, African rulers typically faced considerable difficulties to broadcasting power across their entire territory. Most countries were large compared to historical African states (Herbst 2000; Green 2012), and European rule failed to develop effective tax systems (Gardner 2012). These conditions have posed daunting challenges for would-be revolutionaries to create an effective state that could transform society.

Thus, we do not expect existing hypotheses about rebel regimes—revolutionary or otherwise—controlling the countryside to apply to Africa. This argument is difficult to test systematically, but available evidence suggests that African rebel regimes do not exhibit greater control over society than other regimes. In both panels of Table C.1, rebel regimes are not statistically discernible. In Panel A, we assess Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) preferred proxy for the destruction of alternative centers of power: V-Dem's Core Civil Society Index (Coppedge 2018). Rebel regimes are not statistically discernible on this dependent variable. In Panel B, the dependent variable draws from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index's (BTI) "stateness" variable, which equals the average of scores on four categories: (1) monopoly on the use of force, (2) state identity, (3) no interference in religious dogmas, and (4) basic administration. Because the third category is irrelevant for our purposes, we computed the average among the other three. The main drawback of this variable is its limited temporal coverage (begins in 2006). Panel B uses the average value of the adjusted stateness variable for 2006, 2008, and 2010; and each regressor takes its value from 2006.

Table C.1: Controlling the Countryside

	Panel A. DV: V-Dem Core civil society index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0227	-0.0602	-0.0585	-0.0502				
	(0.0544)	(0.0528)	(0.0511)	(0.0492)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0217	-0.0624	-0.0998	-0.0733
					(0.0653)	(0.0683)	(0.0787)	(0.0782)
Civil war winner					0.106*	-0.0560	0.00878	-0.0154
					(0.0607)	(0.0620)	(0.0549)	(0.0525)
Country-years	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351
R-squared	0.002	0.343	0.456	0.481	0.016	0.343	0.464	0.483
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Adjusted BTI stateness							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.380	0.430	0.302	0.451				
	(0.619)	(0.579)	(0.618)	(0.488)				
Col. liberation regime					1.285**	1.217*	0.930	0.429
					(0.595)	(0.621)	(0.714)	(0.583)
Civil war winner					-0.654	-0.448	-0.449	0.476
					(0.712)	(0.663)	(0.686)	(0.701)
Countries	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
R-squared	0.013	0.252	0.290	0.578	0.172	0.359	0.347	0.578
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006

Notes: Table C.1 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. In Panel A, the DV is V-Dem's Core civil society index. Higher values for the coefficient estimates indicate a stronger and more autonomous civil society. In Panel B, the DV is Adjusted BTI stateness. Higher values for the coefficient estimates indicate greater stateness. For reasons stated in the text, we use a cross-section of countries in 2006 in Panel B. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

The colonial liberation case of Angola exemplifies a regime that has endured for a long period despite exerting weak control over society. Following a lengthy liberation war with Portugal, the government (MPLA) faced a high-intensity center-seeking challenge from UNITA between 1975 and 2002, which had also participated in the liberation struggle. By the time the post-independence period began, UNITA had become a counterrevolutionary movement funded by South Africa and the United States to counter the Marxist orientation of MPLA, who received military backing from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Angola is a typical rebel regime with regard to the military power-sharing mechanisms: MPLA created the state military during the liberation struggle, and it has been immune to coups while consistently sharing power with military elites.

The Angolan regime nearly fell in the 1990s due to the collapse of the state in much of the country. "Cumulatively, four decades of fighting have unmade and reshaped Angola, socially and physically. Most of the conflict took place in the countryside, depopulating rural areas and crippling a once vibrant rural economy. The country, which in 1975 was the world's fourth largest exporter of coffee, had few commercial coffee farms at all by 2002. Roads and bridges were systematically destroyed and the soil sown indiscriminately with landmines," and state weakness also created an opening for rebels in Cabinda to attempt to secede (Le Billon 2007, 104-5). UNITA held territory and mined diamonds outside the government's stronghold in Luanda. In 1992, as part of a ceasefire, MPLA participated in elections judged free and fair by the international community, thus creating an alternative channel through which UNITA might have gained power. However, MPLA won and UNITA rejected the results, leading to renewed fighting (Fituni 1995, 152).

The inability of MPLA to gain control over the national territory until twenty-seven years after independence is unsurprising when considering factors stressed by Africanists. Herbst (2000) scores Angola as among the African countries with the most difficult political geographies given its large size and scattered population centers, and specifically asserts that "[t]he large territory of Angola has made it extremely difficult for the government to find a military solution to the civil war that began at independence in 1975" (151). The country's borders are a product of negotiations between Portugal and Britain in the late nineteenth century, and include significant territory beyond the historical Mbundu kingdoms of Kasanje and Matamba. These borders contain several medium-sized and regionally segmented ethnic groups whose historical rivalries ultimately undermined the initial promise in the 1960s that the liberation movement would develop a unified nationalist identity, as opposed to distinct ethnic organizations (Fituni 1995, 149; Le Billon 2007, 102; Reno 2011, 64-78). For MPLA, the main ethnic constituency is the Mbundu, who are primarily located near the capital city of Luanda and comprise 20% of the population. For UNITA, it is the Ovimbundu, located in the central highlands and composing 35% of the population. The third major anti-colonial rebel group (defeated several years after independence) was FNLA, represented by Bakongo in the northwest of the country with 15% of the population. Cabindan Mayombe, of the separatist rebel group FLEC, are 2% of the population. As in many countries with similar histories, members of an ethnic group that was organized as a state prior to colonization (Mbundu in MPLA) gained control of the government at independence and did not share power with members of other ethnic groups (Paine 2019*a*). Overall, Angola exemplifies that regime durability and state weakness are not mutually exclusive.

C.2 Authoritarian Parties

The following describes the party institution variables used in Table C.2:

- Inherited party: Indicator variable from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018) for whether the founders of the regime had established a ruling party prior to gaining power. Existing studies show that such regimes are more durable than authoritarian regimes that found parties after gaining power (Miller 2020).
- Party control of military: Five-point scale from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018) that assesses "Does the Party Exercise Control over the Military?" (among regimes that have a support party). This is the *partymilit* variable in their dataset.
- Commissar system. The highest value of the previous variable is: "the party imposes commissars, party advisers, or some kind of party committee on military units or garrisons. The task of these commissars is to insure ideological correctness and loyalty in the officer corps and to report dissenting views."
- Number of paramilitaries: From De Bruin (2020), number of counterbalancing forces operating in each country-year. As she describes, she restricts her count of paramilitaries to those that serve counterbalancing forces against a coup, including that they are officially sanctioned by the regime and are stationed within 60 miles of the capital. Her dataset contains five other measures of counterbalancing as well, and we verified (not reported) that the null results hold up for almost every combination of these variables and specifications.

Table C.2: Authoritarian Parties

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Sample: Ruling party predates regime			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0247**	-0.0113	-0.0407**	-0.0267*
	(0.0122)	(0.0152)	(0.0157)	(0.0142)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0142*		-0.0318***
		(0.00757)		(0.00924)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0133		0.000449
		(0.0366)		(0.0365)
ln(oil & gas income)		0.000359		0.000453
		(0.000970)		(0.00111)
ln(population)			0.00135	0.0219***
			(0.00676)	(0.00784)
Ethnic frac.			-0.00150	-0.00831
			(0.0229)	(0.0214)
Religious frac.			-0.0233	-0.0367
			(0.0303)	(0.0322)
British colony			-0.0457**	-0.0356**
			(0.0192)	(0.0162)
French colony			-0.0283	-0.0159
			(0.0181)	(0.0179)
Portuguese colony			-0.0144	-0.0267
			(0.0291)	(0.0317)
Country-years	1,081	1,081	1,081	1,081
R-squared	0.008	0.058	0.059	0.069
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.2 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we alter the sample by dropping all observations from regimes for which a ruling party predated the regime. Given the restricted sample, we do not estimate separate coefficients for colonial liberation regimes and civil war winners. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table C.3: Other Party Explanations

Panel A. DV: Party control of military								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.565	0.706	0.364	0.381				
	(0.405)	(0.422)	(0.359)	(0.348)				
Col. liberation regime					0.907*	1.082**	0.686	0.730
					(0.526)	(0.500)	(0.476)	(0.485)
Civil war winner					-0.224	-0.222	-0.0936	-0.109
					(0.328)	(0.340)	(0.418)	(0.429)
Country-years	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.034	0.081	0.225	0.242	0.072	0.126	0.237	0.254
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. DV: Commissar system								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0601	0.0800	0.0343	0.0373				
	(0.0663)	(0.0748)	(0.0322)	(0.0333)				
Col. liberation regime					0.110	0.122	0.0565	0.0646
					(0.0960)	(0.107)	(0.0478)	(0.0556)
Civil war winner					-0.0336*	0.000474	-0.00190	-0.00362
					(0.0191)	(0.0157)	(0.0230)	(0.0264)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.064	0.183	0.189	0.038	0.079	0.186	0.193
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel C. DV: Paramilitaries								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.487	0.249	0.0286	0.0370				
	(0.293)	(0.371)	(0.437)	(0.433)				
Col. liberation regime					0.561*	0.196	-0.0758	-0.231
					(0.278)	(0.395)	(0.534)	(0.492)
Civil war winner					0.322	0.354	0.138	0.320
					(0.641)	(0.680)	(0.563)	(0.557)
Country-years	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220
R-squared	0.031	0.128	0.274	0.284	0.034	0.129	0.274	0.290
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.3 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. In Panel A, the DV is Geddes, Wright and Frantz's (2018) ordinal variable for party control over the military. In Panel B, the DV indicates the presence of a commissar system. In Panel C, the DV is the total number of counterbalancing units. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.3 Civilian and Ethnic Power Sharing

Rebel regimes are not distinct in the extent to which they share power with other civilian actors or ethnic groups. Our theory highlights the importance in rebel regimes of sharing power with military elites. Although these elites pose a grave threat to the ruler, they also tend to be allies of the ruler, and hence can be bought off if offered perks such as the Ministry of Defense. However, we do not expect rulers in rebel regimes to necessarily face heightened incentives to share civilian positions. Any ruler can achieve survival benefits by distributing spoils more widely among civilian elites (Arriola 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015), but it is unclear why these benefits would systematically differ in rebel regimes—in which *military* elites pose the gravest threat. Thus, we expect that differences in power sharing between rebel regimes and non-rebel regimes are restricted to *coercive dimensions only*.

Two pieces of evidence reject broader power sharing. First, we collected original data on the appointment of a Vice President or Prime Minister—the highest civilian position in the cabinet. Appointing a Vice President/Prime Minister is an important indicator of overall regime institutionalization, and this position is often the constitutional successor to the president (Meng 2020, 2021). The Vice President and Prime Minister are functionally equivalent positions; the countries in our sample have *either* a Vice President or a Prime Minster, but not both. The Vice President/Prime Minister variable is coded similarly as the Defense Minister variable. We create a dummy variable called VP/PM APPOINT that equals 1 if an elite was appointed as the Vice President/Prime Minister, and 0 if the position was left vacant, eliminated from the cabinet, or the president named himself the head of that office. VP/PM SAME equals 1 if an elite was appointed as the Vice President/Prime Minister *and* that elite also held the position in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Appendix Table C.4 shows null coefficient estimates in almost every specification.

Second, in Appendix Table C.5 we examine data on the ethnic makeup of cabinets. We examine ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, the percentage of the country's population with some membership in cabinet or other high-ranking positions in the central government; and ETHNOCRACY, an indicator for whether a single ethnic group either controls all important political positions. The estimates are null, suggesting that rebel regimes also do not rely on a strategy of broad ethnic power sharing for their survival more than other non-rebel regimes, nor do they more narrowly concentrate power among the leading group.

This evidence also rules out an alternative mechanism that rebel regimes—rather than having advantages in military power sharing—are instead proxying for regimes in which one ethnic group successfully marginalizes all others. Appendix Table C.6 demonstrates this point even more clearly by summarizing the ethnic composition of every rebel group and subsequent rebel regime. The *majority* of rebel groups in our sample are multi-ethnic: in only 30% of cases did a single ethnic group organize an insurgency around aims for and recruitment of that ethnic group only. Furthermore, most rebel regimes are multi-ethnic after coming into power: in only 26% of cases did one ethnic group dominate the government within the first five years of the rebel regime's existence. Cases of complete ethnic exclusion are in fact quite rare in our sample. In only 3 of 21 cases were the foundational rebel group *and* the subsequent rebel regime organized around a single ethnic group. To sum, demonstrating that most rebel groups and most rebel regimes are multi-ethnic suggests that ethnic ties are not the primary factor for explaining the durability of these regimes.

Table C.4: Civilian Power Sharing

Panel A. DV: VP/PM SAME								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0746	-0.0584	-0.0266	-0.0384				
	(0.0800)	(0.0721)	(0.0779)	(0.0754)				
Col. liberation regime					0.0555	-0.0545	-0.0464	-0.102
					(0.0977)	(0.0936)	(0.135)	(0.135)
Civil war winner					0.133	-0.0635	-0.00564	0.0249
					(0.101)	(0.111)	(0.0940)	(0.0950)
Country-years	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,882	1,701	1,701	1,701
R-squared	0.003	0.080	0.127	0.133	0.006	0.080	0.127	0.135
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. DV: VP/PM APPOINT								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0354	-0.165**	-0.143	-0.146*				
	(0.0891)	(0.0688)	(0.0883)	(0.0799)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0421	-0.202*	-0.220	-0.244*
					(0.117)	(0.109)	(0.154)	(0.142)
Civil war winner					0.137	-0.115	-0.0577	-0.0460
					(0.0907)	(0.0742)	(0.0822)	(0.0851)
Country-years	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742
R-squared	0.001	0.199	0.265	0.266	0.007	0.201	0.269	0.271
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.4 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. In Panel A, the DV is the stable appointment of a VP/PM. In Panel B, the DV is the appointment of a VP/PM. These follow the differences between the Minister of Defense variables in Tables 4 and B.8, respectively. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table C.5: Ethnic Power Sharing

	Panel A. DV: ETHNIC REPRESENTATION							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.00442	-0.0599	0.0416	0.0218				
	(0.0978)	(0.101)	(0.0997)	(0.0954)				
Col. liberation regime					0.00306	-0.0530	0.119	0.0702
					(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.118)	(0.123)
Civil war winner					-0.0184	-0.0728	-0.0847	-0.0507
					(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.118)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.000	0.027	0.066	0.093	0.000	0.027	0.078	0.097
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: ETHNOCRACY							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0384	-0.0185	-0.129	-0.125				
	(0.134)	(0.125)	(0.104)	(0.104)				
Col. liberation regime					0.0667	0.0412	-0.0493	-0.0194
					(0.175)	(0.165)	(0.146)	(0.148)
Civil war winner					-0.235*	-0.131	-0.258**	-0.284**
					(0.125)	(0.138)	(0.123)	(0.121)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.001	0.077	0.190	0.201	0.022	0.083	0.198	0.211
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.5 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. Data on the ethnic makeup of cabinets is from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR; Vogt et al. 2015). In Panel A, the dependent variable is ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, the percentage of the country's population with some membership in cabinet or other high-ranking positions in the central government (i.e., "junior partner" or higher in the EPR scheme). In Panel B, the dependent variable is ETHNOCRACY, an indicator for whether a single ethnic group has a status of either "monopoly" or "dominant," hence shutting out members of any other ethnic group from influential cabinet positions. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table C.6: Ethnic Composition of Rebel Regimes

Case	Main rebel group	First five years of regime
Algeria 62–92	Arabs	Arabs
Angola 75–NA	Mbundu-Mestico	Mbundu-Mestico
Burundi 06–NA	Hutu	Hutu, Tutsi
Chad 82–90	Toubou	Toubou, Hadjerai, Sara, Zaghawa/Bideyat
Chad 90–NA	Hadjerai, Zaghawa/Bideyat	Hadjerai, Zaghawa/Bideyat, Sara, Toubou
Congo-B 97–NA	Mbochi	Mbochi, Batéké, Kouyou
DRC 97–NA	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	Tutsi-Banyamulenge, Luba Shaba, Lunda-Yeke
Eritrea 93–NA	Christian Eritreans, Muslim Eritreans	Christians, Other Muslims
Ethiopia 91–NA	Tigry, Amhara, Oroma	Tigry, Amhara, Oroma
Guinea-Bissau 74–80	Cape Verdean, Balanta	Cape Verdean
Ivory Coast 11–NA	Non-ethnic	Northerners, Baule, Other Akans, Southern Mande
Liberia 97–03	Gio, Mano	Americo-Liberians, Gio, Mano
Morocco 56–NA	Arabs, Berbers	Arabs
Mozambique 75–NA	Makonde-Yao, Tsonga-Chopi	Makonde-Yao, Tsonga-Chopi
Namibia 90–NA	Non-ethnic	Ovambos, 7 others
Rwanda 94–NA	Tutsi	Tutsi
South Africa 94–NA	Africans (esp. Xhosa), Coloreds, Asians	Xhosa, 12 others
South Sudan 11–NA	Dinka, Nuer, others	Dinka, Nuer
Tunisia 56–11	Non-ethnic	Non-ethnic
Uganda 86–NA	South-Westerners, Baganda	South-Westerners, Baganda, Basoga
Zimbabwe 80–NA	Shona, Ndebele	Shona, Whites
% ethnically exclusive	33%	24%

Notes: The column "Main rebel group" lists every ethnic group that participated in the main rebel group that launched each rebel regime (Appendix A.2 states these rebel groups). To code this, we use ACD2EPR for every rebel group contained in their dataset; as the name suggests, this dataset matches rebel groups from the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) with ethnic groups from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR). "Non-ethnic" means that ACD2EPR codes the main rebel group as not proclaiming aims for and recruiting mainly from any particular ethnic groups. For cases that ACD2EPR does not contain (note that every such case is colonial liberation), we used the coding notes from EPR to determine the ethnic composition of the rebel group.

The column "First five years of regime" lists every ethnic group whose power status EPR codes as junior partner or higher within the first five years of the start of the rebel regime, with the group with the highest power status listed first. "Non-ethnic" means that EPR codes ethnicity as not politically relevant in that country at that time.

We highlight in gray every case in which a single ethnic group dominated both the rebellion to gain power and the first five years of the regime. This demonstrates the rarity of ethnocratic regimes.

C.4 Alternative Civil War Factors

The broader literature on civil wars suggests several alternative explanations that we address here. As we show in Table C.7, none of these alternatives can account for the durability of rebel regimes. In each of the five panels in the table, we consider a distinct way to disaggregate the rebel regime variable, or include alternative control variables; and we assess the same four combinations of additional covariates as in all the other tables.

First, some argue that counterrevolutionary threats engender stable authoritarian regimes because elites need to band together in order to mitigate the counterrevolutionary threat. Slater (2010) develops this logic to explain durable (non-revolutionary) regimes in Southeast Asia, and more recently, Lachapelle et al. (2020) have applied the mechanism as one reason that revolutionary regimes survive so long (see also Paine 2021 for a formal statement of this mechanism). Thus, one possibility is that the challenges faced *after rebel regimes take power* are more important than the challenges they face *during the struggle to gain power*. To assess this, in Panel A, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they faced a major armed challenger within their first five years of gaining power (coded using data from Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Dixon and Sarkees 2015); eleven faced challengers, and ten did not. This is the appropriate operationalization of this mechanism because of the argument that facing an armed challenger early on creates the glue for elite unity, even if the threat diminishes in the future. Both types of rebel regimes (those that faced counterrevolutionary challengers and not) are significantly less likely to break down than non-rebel regimes, and the magnitude of the coefficient estimates is similar. This, of course, does not rule out that facing counterrevolutionary challengers facilitated regime stability in some cases. However, it demonstrates that this alternative mechanism cannot account for why rebel regimes tend to survive for such long periods across the entire sample. Furthermore, in several cases, the armed challengers clearly either weakened the regime (Angola, Chad 90–NA, DRC 97–NA) or overthrew it (Chad 82–90).

Our analysis of rebel regimes also relates to research on civil war termination. Toft (2009) connects the mode of civil war termination to civil war recurrence, and more recent research considers related factors such as how the security forces are reconfigured after the war (Berg 2020). Toft provides statistical evidence that civil wars are less likely to recur when they end by outright victory (and the correlation is stronger if it is outright rebel victory) as opposed to a peace settlement. In Panel B, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they gained power via outright victory (seventeen cases) or a negotiated settlement (South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Burundi). Recall that in cases of negotiated settlements, our coding requirement for a rebel regime is that they gain the presidency (in all cases, this was via an election); and in Table 6, we show that in all four cases, the military integration was biased toward leaders of the rebellion. Thus we expect that rebel regimes formed by negotiated settlement should also be significantly more durable than non-rebel regimes, which we demonstrate in Panel B. We also show there that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates are similar in magnitude for outright victory rebel regimes and negotiated settlement rebel regimes.

In Panel C, we assess a related consideration. Rather than distinguish rebel regimes from others, we distinguish each regime-year by the most recent way in which a civil war ended under the incumbent regime: outright rebel victory, outright government victory, and negotiated settlement (as coded by Toft 2009). Given the "most recent" stipulation, for example, Angola 75–NA is

coded as outright rebel victory from 1975 through 1994, and then negotiated settlement afterwards because of their peace deal with UNITA (which subsequently failed and led to renewed civil war). The omitted basis category is regimes that have never faced an armed challenger, a civil war is ongoing, or there is no active fighting but the civil war never "ended" in the sense of any of the three aforementioned modes of termination. We show that regime-years in which the most recent civil war ending was outright rebel victory or a negotiated settlement are significantly less likely to experience regime breakdown, whereas the coefficient estimate for government victory is positive and not significant. Importantly, the coefficient estimate for negotiated settlements is driven *entirely* by rebel regimes. In addition to the four cases mentioned above in which a rebel regime was founded by a negotiated settlement, all but one of the additional cases in this category are rebel regimes (established by outright rebel victory) that concluded a peace settlement with an armed challenger (such as the Angola example mentioned above). These findings also demonstrate that our findings for rebel regimes are specific to *rebel* military victory, and do not extend to government military victory (which, despite eliminating an armed challenger, does not engender the conditions for peaceful power sharing described in our theory).

Research on civil war termination also highlights the sharp increase in negotiated settlements to end civil wars after the Cold War ended, and concomitant implication of security-sector reform programs (Toft 2009). To capture this idea, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they have their origins during the Cold War. We do not expect rebel regimes with origins during versus after the Cold War to matter for two reasons. First, as discussed for Panel B, most rebel regimes were founded by outright rebel victory. According to Toft's (2009) data, no cases of outright rebel victory underwent security-sector reform, which was confined to the few rebel regimes with negotiated settlements. More broadly, scholars consider post-Cold War security-sector reform interventions to be largely ineffective at securing peace (Sedra 2016, 1). Second, although three of the four rebel regimes founded by negotiated settlement began post-Cold War, we already demonstrated that they have persisted at the same frequency as rebel regimes founded by outright rebel victory. In Panel D, we show that the twelve post-Cold War rebel regimes and the nine Cold War rebel regimes are each significantly less likely to break down than non-rebel regimes (and note that the year fixed effects account for baseline differences in the probability of breakdown at different periods of time). Related, Matanock (2017) argues that post-conflict elections can help enforce peace agreements in rebel regimes. However, we do not include a separate indicator for post-conflict elections because all post-Cold War rebel regimes (except Eritrea) held post-conflict elections.

Finally, in Panel E, we control for other conflict factors that could affect regime stability. Contrary to the core idea about stability engendered by counterrevolutions (see the discussion for Panel A), an ongoing rebellion can destabilize a regime for numerous reasons. Most directly, the rebels can defeat the government militarily—as occurred in the establishment of the rebel regimes in our dataset. An ongoing civil war can also make the ruler more reliant on the military and hence likely to face a coup (Bell and Sudduth 2017). Civil wars are also destabilizing by creating refugee flows (Salehyan 2011), which we directly control for with the logged number of total refugees inside a country. Existing research also debates whether externally imposed democracies (which sometimes occurs via conflict) are more durable, which we address using an indicator for this variable from Enterline and Greig (2005, 2008). Finally, given the specific considerations about the Cold War versus post-Cold War period described above, we replace the year fixed effects with

a Cold War fixed effect in every specification.

Table C.7: Alternative Civil War Factors

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel A. Counterrevolutions			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (counterrevolution)	-0.0481***	-0.0466***	-0.0600***	-0.0600***
	(0.0113)	(0.0130)	(0.0151)	(0.0164)
Rebel regime (no counterrevolution)	-0.0482***	-0.0490***	-0.0551***	-0.0460***
	(0.00955)	(0.0114)	(0.0120)	(0.0123)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.013	0.042	0.043	0.047
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Mode of victory for rebel regimes			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (outright victory)	-0.0462***	-0.0452***	-0.0558***	-0.0532***
	(0.00966)	(0.0117)	(0.0122)	(0.0123)
Rebel regime (settlement)	-0.0563***	-0.0592***	-0.0632***	-0.0515***
	(0.0117)	(0.0131)	(0.0147)	(0.0152)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.013	0.042	0.043	0.047
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel C. General civil war termination			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel victory	-0.0412***	-0.0412***	-0.0499***	-0.0465***
	(0.0107)	(0.0125)	(0.0130)	(0.0130)
Government victory	0.0372	0.0305	0.0241	0.0183
	(0.0317)	(0.0305)	(0.0358)	(0.0353)
Settlement	-0.0514***	-0.0497***	-0.0567***	-0.0527***
	(0.00952)	(0.0114)	(0.0149)	(0.0155)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.043	0.043	0.047
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Table C.7, continued

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel D. Origins in Cold War vs. Post			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (Cold War)	-0.0391***	-0.0387***	-0.0410**	-0.0382**
	(0.0104)	(0.0126)	(0.0171)	(0.0182)
Rebel regime (Post-Cold War)	-0.0604***	-0.0629***	-0.0784***	-0.0715***
	(0.00967)	(0.0120)	(0.0145)	(0.0147)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.043	0.043	0.047
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel E. Additional conflict covariates			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0641***	-0.0620***	-0.0673***	-0.0627***
	(0.0143)	(0.0158)	(0.0161)	(0.0162)
Cold War FE	-0.0167	-0.0180	-0.0180	-0.0211
	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0142)	(0.0144)
ln(Refugees)	-0.000763	-0.000725	-0.00149	-0.00179
	(0.00107)	(0.00104)	(0.00120)	(0.00119)
Ongoing civil war	0.0565***	0.0558***	0.0563**	0.0517**
	(0.0204)	(0.0205)	(0.0219)	(0.0218)
Foreign-imposed democracy	-0.0127	-0.0119	-0.0201	-0.0171
	(0.0201)	(0.0194)	(0.0226)	(0.0219)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.021	0.023	0.023	0.027
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	NO	NO	NO

Table C.7 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we either disaggregate the rebel regime variable in various ways, or include alternative control variables. See above for a description of each specification. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

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