

Gjesdal, Kristin

Herder's Hermeneutics: History, Poetry, Enlightenment

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This book is an astute and interesting extension to Gjesdal's preceding study, *Gadamer and the Legacy of German Idealism* from 2009. *Herder's Hermeneutics* offers a fresh reading of the early Herder,¹ casting him not as the Anti-Enlightenment irrationalist, but as working with basic enlightenment ideas (such as progress, humanity, perfectibility), reforming them, making them more dynamic, and relating them to the issue of understanding and interpretation: in short, of hermeneutics. Gjesdal's approach to reading Herder's early work on poetry and history as a consistent take on hermeneutics – which I read as an extension to Pross' monumental Herder edition which follows a similar line of understanding – is a perfect way to showcase Herder's importance both for his time, as well as for contemporary approaches to hermeneutics. To my mind (and obviously to Gjesdal's as well), a Herderian hermeneutics should figure as an alternative to Gadamer's ontological version.

Main topics for the 1760/70s for Herder are “the nature of interpretation, historical and cultural distance, the status of ancient and modern poetry, the ubiquity of prejudice, and the gains of intersubjective and intercultural understanding” (179, intro to chapter 7). Herder is presented as one of the few who really understood the “complexity of our cultural heritage” (208), even

¹ In line of the Herder revival in the last 15 years, see Zammito, Menges, Menze, “Johann Gottfried Herder Revisited,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 71, no 4 (October 2010), 661-84.

though he might not have always been able to grasp it fully, nor extricate himself completely from his own prejudices.²

I very much appreciate Gjesdal's work for two main reasons. First, Gjesdal sets out to make an argument for the possibility of combining historicity and normativity (see in particular the conclusion of chapter 3). Related to this, second, Gjesdal offers a very fruitful reading of Herder's continuous concern to capture relations—between individual and humanity, between the individual and her historical situation—thus stressing the importance of *intersubjectivity* as a hermeneutical virtue. To clarify these two aspects, the following remarks center around the issue of understanding and its prerequisites. Overall, I found myself agreeing with nearly all of what Gjesdal says. However, I do think that Gjesdal did not point out sufficiently how, in Herder's view, the agent and the object specifically relate to one another in order to spell out the concrete criteria for adequate understanding.

As Gjesdal interprets the *Essay on Taste* (1766), interpretation requires an awareness of our historicity, cultural situatedness, reliance on language, and of the juxtaposition between an individual and universal standpoint. There is no fixed essence of humanity (that “universal” I just mentioned), but we can view all expressions of humanity as the dynamic presence of a universal theme which exists only through “change and cultural variation” (90). Understanding is hence always a movement: we start the process by being confronted with an “other” that we necessarily approach from our stance to bridge the gap of temporal and cultural distance. But the continuing encounter in turn forces us to view our position as being temporally and culturally infused as well. That is why understanding is an opportunity of “growth and self-realization” (90) (and also a reason why our assessments of past events, ideas, or people says a lot about our own time as well).

² Gjesdal clearly seeks to understand his work without being bound to “accept every part of it” (181), as her critical assessment of some of Herder's own prejudices throughout the study makes clear. This counts in particular for chapter 7, which is very rich in its assessment of hermeneutics and prejudice in Herder, but does not shy away from clearly noting Herder's own shortcomings. “In Herder's early work, these standards are related to independent thought and an enlightened form of enlightenment [?], while in his later work, the more comprehensive standard of humanity plays a larger role and, with it, Herder also develops a discourse that, at times, is infused with the less progressive values of his own culture and period” (207).

Gjesdal calls this a “dialectics between understanding and self-understanding, critique and self-critique” (91). Accordingly, the criteria for proper or correct understanding are themselves dynamic. But I cannot help but ask – in particular having the ever-critical Herder in the back of my head – what are they? When can we claim to have understood something? I will try to reconstruct Gjesdal’s account by focusing on four points that I take to be central positions of her interpretation of Herder’s hermeneutics: culture/nature, *Selbstdenken*, historicity, and *Bildung*.

We live in culture

Reading Herder as a hermeneutician requires a reinterpretation of his naturalism.³ And indeed, Gjesdal spells out Herder’s naturalism in a very attractive way that encapsulates what is human in a wider, more dynamic net than a reductionist understanding of nature as a set of laws,⁴ or an undulating monism.

Human nature is not just the sum of human behavior, but the intricate net of human expression and human mutual recognition. Human nature cannot be studied per se, but only through its manifestations, which are the proper expression and consolidation of what it means to be human. The study of these manifestations should become the foundation for a philosophy in the new sense.⁵ Herder’s famous quip that philosophy should become anthropology⁶ I would

³ See also Rachel Zuckert in her review of *Herder: Philosophy and Anthropology*, ed. Anik Waldow and Nigel deSouza (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 12/11/2017. This is a counter-position to the naturalism as purported by John Zammito, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* (Chicago: UCP, 2002), 158.

⁴ Nature is then “not one of permanent laws or an unchanging essence, but, rather, is understood as developing, as ever growing and changing, calling not only for mechanical explanations, but also biological models of evolution and gradually unfolding cycles of life” (3.IV, 97). This goes well with Adler’s understanding: “Nature, the anthropological, and the history of humanity belong together for Herder” (Hans Adler, “Herder’s Concept of Humanity,” *Studies in 18th Century Culture* 23 (1994), 55-74, 63).

⁵ “Human existence manifests itself as nature as well as culture” (41) – and I take “culture” to be equivalent to the “second nature” that Gjesdal also mentions (41, see also Intro, p. 14) for chapter 4.

⁶ PW 29/W I 134/*Herder’s Hermeneutics*, 38.

hence read in the same vein as Gjesdal: philosophy should become the hermeneutics of humanity, delving into the heart of what it means to be human.

Herder also understands this naturalism as a negative term, or better, a *fighting term* against speculative metaphysics. He wants to be concerned with “what is,” not with speculations about the “hidden designs of fate” (PHM 393, *Herder’s Hermeneutics*, 205). But: what *is*? For Herder, this is the dynamic, ordering principle of life that is situated, self-concerned, and indeed similar to Heidegger’s notion of *Dasein*. Maybe to his disadvantage (and Gjesdal notes this, but does not critique it, as far as I can see), he is always more interested in the principle itself, less in capturing it in detail: for this reason, he is less interested in capturing the values of each culture, but rather “the dynamic structures that characterize all historical cultures” (97). But to know that, doesn’t one need to start off from the particular? I will get back to this question shortly, but only via a reformulation of it that will guide my subsequent discussion: how can Herder bring together historicity and normativity, the particular and the universal? That is, can a historical approach to the expressions of humanity be brought under a principle of unity that the interpreter brings to this mass of information, and how can such a principle be justified, if not through an incomplete empirical induction?

***Selbstdenken* – the critical potential of understanding**

According to Gjesdal’s analysis in chapter 1, Herder’s critical basis for his undertaking is his negative diagnosis of contemporaneous philosophical efforts, which, so he contends, have become estranged from themselves and their proper subject and basic interests (28). Hence, philosophy lost its ability to interact with human society and culture (29). Herder’s alternative to take on “[i]ndependent thought – *Selbstdenken* – [thus] requires a new philosophical agenda...” (31).⁷

His discussion and reflections on poetry, as Gjesdal shows, are an integral part of this direction within Herder’s philosophy, and, as Gjesdal convincingly argues throughout the book,

⁷ It should be noted that Herder is not alone in this assessment, and maybe a further look towards the more serious philosophers among the so-called *Schulphilosophie* and well as *Popularphilosophie* (I am thinking of Sulzer, but more of Garve, Mendelssohn, and Abbt) would have broadened the view. But this is a sideline I cannot follow here.

are important to actually understanding his historical work in the 1770s.⁸ His interest in taste and history forms a “comprehensive discourse of what it means for a human being to be situated in a historical field, i.e., in a given horizon of value and meaning” (75), engaging in an intersubjective discourse on (mainly artistic) artifacts.

This is also reflected in the *Journal of my Voyage in the Year 1769*’s main claim that philosophy must be concerned with the *whole* human being (feeling and reason), and with *all* human beings (women, people of all classes, see *Herder’s Hermeneutics*, 39) through a fair regard of humanity’s “manifold expressions” (*Herder’s Hermeneutics*, 40). The mode of hermeneutical thought is encompassing and engaged in its subject matter: *Selbstdenken* does not put us outside of the sphere of human agency, but squarely within it (63), and is – at least in the case of understanding foreign texts or works – a reading with “participating concern” (*Theilnehmung*, 64)

Accordingly, as Gjesdal spells out in chapter 2 (and works out in the subsequent chapters), philosophy needs to engage with human expressions in art and history. However, philosophy, on this view, is not a mere abstract interpretation of these artifacts within a rational system (which would, again, prioritize the abstract over the concrete), but “realizes itself as a practice that is and should be immersed in its historical culture” (45). Hermeneutically, we are thus concerned with the relation between the abstract, which *captures* the meaning, and the concrete, which *manifests* the meaning. For Herder, the starting point is the work as a concrete realization of a universal idea that can never find its encompassing embodiment in just one particular object. Reductionism just does not make any sense in a Herderian universe.

But it seems to me that Herder put himself, if I read Gjesdal’s account correctly, in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, he relies on the aforementioned argument for the necessity of a kind of perspectivism. On the other, Herder does insinuate at points that he has captured the “true nature”⁹ of his object (e.g. Egypt, Greek and Roman culture, as he argues in

⁸ “His earlier turn to taste, however, demonstrates how his reflection on the history of art and philosophy itself calls for reflection on the historicity of our thinking, about art and beauty – and ultimately also a discussion of the historicity of human judgment, thought, and practice” (*Herder’s Hermeneutics*, 74).

⁹ See “This, Too...,” PW 283/W IV, 23, *Herder’s Hermeneutics*, 155: the goal of an adequate description of, say, Egyptian culture is a depiction of the past “according to *their own nature and manner*.”

This, Too, A Philosophy of History (1774), see *Herder's Hermeneutics*, 157-63). If, according to Herder's argumentation, there is no "objective understanding," since understanding is always dynamic, involving an interpreter and an object shaped by another, prior interpreter, then the claim of understanding a true nature of a past people becomes questionable. Maybe we can only hope for a more or less adequate understanding of something that is not *blinded* by prejudice (and hence does not put our presence into the past) while at the same time accepting the positive force of prejudice (as a *positioning of oneself*). In that case, true understanding can never be more than a regulative principle, and it works both ways: toward an understanding of the past and a new representation of the present. But, the question remains, what is the source of such a normative claim? In short, I am concerned with how Herder argues for the basis of the criteria of hermeneutics that yields reliable results, and hence, a "better" – if dynamic – reading of a historical text.

Let me try to spell out Herder's conception of the actual process of hermeneutic understanding in reference to Gjesdal's discussion of the *Fragments of a Treatise on the Ode* (1764), and the *Critical Forests* (chapter 2): in general, "[t]he ode is a *Gestalt* that appears as one and unified (and is, as such, recognizable), yet its oneness, envisioned in the form of a germ cell or a potentiality, is only realized across a roaster of shapes and appearances." (*Herder's Hermeneutics*, 51). Let us break up this process of understanding:

1. First, we take the historical realization of a poetic form – in this case the ode – dynamically as a "living essence:" a "germ cell" that changes and develops, but remains one form. But how do we know about this "germ cell" in the first place? Do we take one piece as paradigmatic and subsequently relate others to it, thereby constantly changing and enlarging the set of attributes?

2. After this analysis, we analyze the parts to better see the whole picture again (50).¹⁰ This allows us to envisage the “germ cell” in its more mature and complex manifestations, and appreciate its various formations.
3. From this activity emerges the “dynamical principles” (52) of understanding. They stem from an impression of “a certain general unity of sensibility, of expression, and of harmony, which makes possible the drawing of a parallel among all of them” (SEW 37, *Herder’s Hermeneutics*, 51). But how are they apprehended? By the philosopher who subjected herself to a manifold of these expressions, and comes to see the parallels by realizing, in a fit of genius, their *Gestalt*?

This process of understanding, all questions aside, clarifies how we come to formulate certain artistic categories. What is important for Herder is that to recognize something as a case of x, we need to take into account the historicity of human life and culture (57) and of our ways of reflecting on these (mostly: in language). However, as an important caveat (as developed in chapter 3): there can be no universal rule to mark a work as “art proper” (79), no rational deduction, nor a focus on historical origin (since that would beg the question, I assume). What is left, for now, is an awareness of art’s situatedness that needs to be painstakingly captured.

Historicity as temporal and cultural dependence

In the same dynamic vein, Herder claims that aesthetics must always grow out of art, not be set up against its actual practice (52).¹¹ We can already sense, and Gjesdal explicates this in

¹⁰ Gjesdal does not quite note that this is purely taken from Mendelssohn’s 1755 *Letters on Sentiments*, where Theokles shows how the clear and distinct rational judgment concerning a particular aspect of an artwork can be made “confused” again by its re-integration into the artistic whole. This is just another way of bringing the rational, principled, “cold” understanding together with a more empirically driven, emotional involvement with the artwork. See Anne Pollok, *Facetten des Menschen* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2010), 167-78.

¹¹ Interesting here is Herder’s positive account on the *Litteraturbriefe* (*Herder’s Hermeneutics*, chapter 2.II) in the *Fragments*. These do not develop an artificial system, but grow organically – in a similar way as language does (*Herder’s Hermeneutics*, 57).

chapter 6, Herder's critical stance towards all attempts to de-temporalize¹² what is inherently a subject of history and its changes.

As you can see in my questions above, I am still unsure as to how we can actually close the gap between a unique work and a *Gestalt* other than instinctively feeling it. How can we reflect from an evolving, moving point (ourselves) on a constantly morphing shape (the artwork) drawn from an equally shifting point (the artist)?¹³ To get closer to an understanding of how this fluidity could be pinned down, I follow Gjesdal's interpretation of Herder's works on poetry, but also on taste (as a propaedeutic of historical philosophy, offered in chapters 3, 5,6). Thus, a list for possible criteria for adequate understanding grows as follows:

4. As discussed, the interpretation of human symbolic articulation (or expression) is always historically and culturally mediated. Hence, ideally, a work is neither measured by our standards or by allegedly universal standards, but by its potential to "express its^[14] own time." (146) With this, the potential foreignness of the artwork is stressed, and its function as a means to find entry to another time and culture is enabled.
5. Any work of art must be approached as being part of "a wider context of ethical culture" (76), and thus works with "a larger set of religious, ethical, and political ideas and sentiments" (77). However, over large portions of Gjesdal's study, the reader is quite unsure what all this actually amounts to, or, better put, how this indeed avoids in particular the last risk of inserting one's own concerns into a foreign work (or whether we are meant to take Herder's reading as "inspired," and hence opaque to technique).
6. Hence, I think we would need to explicate how exactly we must take areas other than purely aesthetic categories into consideration, such as contemporaneous political systems,

¹² "Herder's goal is not so much to provide a historical treatise as to show that historical consciousness is constantly driven by a temptation to go beyond its own mandate and construct narratives about the past that serve the interests of the present" (*Herder's Hermeneutics*, 152).

¹³ The risks are high: in particular, Gjesdal mentions the unholy trinity of misinterpretation due to (1) temporal distance, (2) cultural diversity, and (3) projecting one's own views onto the piece (or the time) in question. She also convincingly shows how Herder argues against the three possible ailments: the theory of divine origin, the perfection model, or the principle of the imitation of nature (see subchapter 2.III).

¹⁴ That "its time" refers to the actual time when the play was written becomes clearer in Gjesdal's discussion of prejudice (146-148). There, she also says that Herder does not quite say how we do this, but what we gain from doing this (148).

food supply, environmental conditions that shape how we secure what we deem important (use of other people as slaves, keeping food “kosher” to survive, etc.), pervasive family structures, etc. Is this covered under Gjesdal’s reference in chapter 3.I (77) as part of “moral, cultural, and political sensibilities”? The reader is unsure, and would wish for a few more words according to the critical potential and possible hierarchies among these other factors that Herder claims to have understood so well.

7. As Gjesdal shows in chapter 5, the *Shakespeare Essay* in its final form (1773) fulfills the move from the problem of general definitions (1st version) over the historicity of reason (2nd version) toward an outlook as to how these two shape the interpreter’s horizon and understanding. Hence, it is not only awareness of the historical circumstances of the object, but also of the interpreter that plays a crucial part in understanding.

Art (that I keep treating as the epitome of a historical artifact)¹⁵ is hence not something in the ideal realm of atemporality. But it is firmly situated in our lives, a fruit of our particular developments. As Herder holds in the *Fragments on the Latest German Literature*, such ideas of what a proper artistic object is are “mostly a composition of those features that made an impression on us as our taste was formed and developed” (SWA 26/*Herder’s Hermeneutics*, 82). We can come to an agreement, and that agreement [or just “that”] will tell us about the object (ideally, as situated in its particular temporal niche), as well as about ourselves as observers. Herder even develops a tentative hierarchy for instances of such tastes. A lower taste will turn towards “color and major expressive modes and features,” higher spirits will look for “regularity of the finer features,” “and, finally, an advanced kind of judgment that is attuned to spiritual beauty (*geistige Schönheit*), as it is expressed through the eyes and other bodily expressions” (SWA 36, but I cite Gjesdal’s reformulation, *Herder’s Hermeneutics*, 82-83). Apparently, these are indeed universal – if merely formal – aspects of appreciation. Note, however, that the ranking from “lowest” to “highest” does indicate a somewhat ahistorical

¹⁵ I am aware that this is an oversimplification, but one that could, I hope, spur some more fruitful discussion.

universal development of human taste (that mirrors the genetic thesis of *This, Too, A Philosophy of History*).¹⁶

In *On the Change of Taste* (1766) Herder asks “how human thought and judgment are conditioned by the cultural and historical context in which they emerge” (85-86). His idea is not, however, to equate philosophy with history, but he argues – according to Gjesdal’s reading – that historicity emerges as a necessary condition of philosophical understanding. Any philosopher who tries to put himself above culture ultimately bases his conclusions “on unsustainable premises” (86). Herder ultimately makes a normative claim that includes historicity as a condition of “education and growth”, and embraces diversity as a “fundamental condition of human existence” (89). His philosophy offers a take on how value judgments “ought to proceed in order to escape the provincialism he criticizes within his own Enlightenment culture” (89). And thus emerges the concept of a “shared humanity” as the normative center of Herder’s hermeneutics.

Intersubjectivity as a mode of understanding and a mode of being¹⁷: *Bildung*

As Gjesdal summarizes in chapter 3 (but this also belongs to her assessment of *Bildung* in chapter 6):

The human being cannot be pinned down in terms of an ahistorical and transcultural essence, but exists in and through historical change and cultural variation. Yet, in the diversity of taste, value, and practice, it still remains that creatures of our kind realize their nature through culture in a way that can be studied in general, philosophical terms. (90)

What are these terms? Those that “analyze the conditions for, and possibility of, such growth and self-realization in culture” (90)? It seems that this does not mean that Herder could just descriptively assess all such phenomena, but that he has to pose *a universal ‘nature’ that is only*

¹⁶ I leave it as an open question how this teleological reading of history can be reconciled with the more radically naturalist claims in *On Cognition and Sensation*.

¹⁷ I agree with Zammito et al, *Herder Revisited*, 673, that Herder is never concerned with being as Sein, but as Dasein: being immersed, being there.

visible through realizations (containing the universal in the particular). With this, all understanding becomes a double-sided approximation. On the one hand, the object is seen as an expression of humanity as situated in its time and place. On the other, through such an analysis the interpreter gains a means to understand herself *as situated* as well. This is my interpretation of Gjesdal's result that Herder's "early work is rooted in the concept of a human nature that gains reality in and through our engagement with a variety of different cultures and historical periods" (90-91), which is only visible through a human being that can *sympathize* with these conditions without getting lost in them.

We encounter this awareness of natural lawful dynamics *on the symbolic level*. This encounter is profoundly different from the natural world of the first order, since it rests on understanding and mutual recognition. As Gjesdal states in reference to the *Preisschrift* from 1773, "humanity in us is brought forth and realized through our relationship to the humanity in others" (100). This is not only an issue of language (an area I have completely left out here for the sake of time),¹⁸ but of understanding as a means of self-delineation through an active relation to the other.

In chapter 4, Gjesdal shows how Herder develops a hermeneutics concerned with "an organic relationship between the individual and humanity [...] and between an individual and his or her concrete historical context" (103). For such a hermeneutics, *sympathy* is a basic technique by the interpreter to "form a basic hypothesis about the meaning of an expression" (103). What Gjesdal shows here – even though she does not state this explicitly – is that thus a *conceptual* unity within humanity emerges: "All nature is characterized by a diversity of life-forms. Yet, unlike other parts of nature, human beings, precisely in their diversity, should also be attuned to a shared humanity and ability to reason" (204). However, as Gjesdal stresses – rightfully so, for Herder's philosophy – this conceptual basis must be realized in language and culture, and can only be discerned in this way, through *Bildung*: the hermeneutically gained predisposition of an interpreter to subject her prejudices to a critical review.

¹⁸ See on this, for instance, Jürgen Trabant's work, such as "Herder's Discovery of the Ear," *Herder Today: Contributions from the International Herder Conference*, ed. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990), 345-66, and *Mithridates im Paradies. Kleine Geschichte des Sprachdenkens* (München: Beck, 2003).

A philosophy of humankind must pay attention to these forms, since these, as expressions of humanity, form the fundamental human practice of mutual encounter and mutual shaping. With this, as Gjesdal discusses in chapter 6.5, Herder transforms enlightenment philosophy from *within* by showcasing the hermeneutic potential of *Bildung*: “Enlightenment” seeks the universal mold, but overlooks that we as reasonable beings are situated within a culture and tradition. The kind of universal that we seek is never ‘pure’ – and why should it be? (171) Instead, “humanity is actualized in and through a complex web of symbolic, epistemic, and moral practices and their implicit conceptions of normativity” (212). *Bildung* does not happen by a shaping of everything or even others according to our picture, but endorses diversity as its fundamental norm (see also 8).

This is akin to Herder’s anti-perfectionist argumentation in the letters with Mendelssohn in 1768 concerning the human vocation and immortality (that Gjesdal does not discuss). There, Herder argues against an unlimited development or gain in *perfection* of the soul in the afterlife with reference to the context-sensitivity of perfection.¹⁹ Nothing is “perfect” in and of itself, but only in relation to a particular goal, or functional background. “Bildung,” in the same vein, does not amount to our becoming more perfect *per se*, but references our *adaptability*.²⁰ What most enlightenment thinkers overlook is that this means a dynamic, open ended understanding of *Bildung* – we will not at some point realize the highest rational point and then have it (we will never, in other words, be perfect), but we will rise to it again and again, according to our particular situation in history.

Concluding Remark: Herder’s Style

One issue that I do not remember being discussed extensively in Gjesdal’s study, but that I think is important, is Herder’s *style*. I think that his often breathless, imprecise, allusive,

¹⁹ See Frederick C. Beiser, “Mendelssohn Versus Herder on the Vocation of Man,” *Moses Mendelssohn’s Metaphysics and Aesthetics*, ed. Reinier Munk (New York: Springer, 2011), 235-44, here 242, and my reply in “How to dry our tears? Abbt, Mendelssohn, and Herder on the Immortality of the Soul”, *Interdisziplinäres Jahrbuch Aufklärung*. Ed. Gideon Stiening, Udo Thiel (Hamburg: Meiner, 2018), 67-81, 76-78.

²⁰ Herder’s *Hermeneutics*, 173/PW 323: “all formation [*Bildung*] rose out of the most particular *individual* need and returned back to it.”

metaphorical, etc., way of writing is meant as a living comment on his believe in inspiration as the source of true understanding. For Herder, there is one aspect that cannot be learned or abstracted in understanding, and that is *Einfühlung*, the immediate immersion into the other person's horizon, a more intuitive, almost spiritual connection that goes beyond the mere deciphering of unfamiliar words or symbolic systems. As he argues in the *Torso*, this connection between human beings can be forged by words. However, these words are open, multi-dimensional, and cannot easily be narrowed down to *the one* true meaning. Truly understanding someone means more than knowing all about this person (as he claims, he did not really need to know Abbt personally). Rather, it means that there is a connection that words can start, but only an intuition (here of the non-Kantian variety) can fulfill. Just as we do not have one fixed, objective reality to relate to, the final building block of understanding is not open to philosophical reflection and has to be given poetically.

I am aware that this leads away from the possibility of an objective understanding, and that it opens, again, the door for 'personal,' 'opaque' interpretation via divination, a "living reading," as Herder also calls it in *On the Cognition and Sensation of the Human Soul* (123). I do, however, think that we read Herder all too charitably if we do not include this caveat – and I am very curious what Gjesdal's further thoughts on this issue are.

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