

Shadows of Syntax: Notes, Typos, and Errata

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This document will be updated whenever new issues come to light.

Shadows of Syntax

- Page xiv: typo — “had became”.
- Page 34: typo — “that it is itself”.
- Page 42: There is one point in this discussion where the wording might be misleading in seeming to identify composite and singular dispositions. The intended sense was instead identifying a single composite disposition *plurally* with many singular dispositions.
- Page 47: “instead” is a bit awkward here, toward the top.
- Section 2.IX: Here I suggest that acceptance/rejection and inference need to be interdefined, but that neither of these notions need definition in terms of inference-rule-following. This is a claim about these notions, *as such*. Obviously, my inferentialist view itself entails that having beliefs with certain contents, such as certain logical beliefs, requires following certain inference rules. Some of the complexities surrounding this are discussed in section

4.VII. There is clearly a sense in which a global inferentialist metasemantics also requires inference-rule-following in order to have any literally understood “propositional” attitudes at all, but (a) in the book I generally avoid assuming global inferentialism at least in any load-bearing way and (b) this requirement is somewhat different from what I was denying. Some of this is explained more fully in my “Functionalism About Inference”, but there is much more to say.

My notion of (full) acceptance is a lot like Field’s notion of belief* from “Mental Representation”, in that it relates an agent to a sentence/sentence-analog. On this kind of factored approach, as Field there notes, a true propositional attitude of belief can be characterized as follows:

- X believes that p if and only if both (i) there is a sentence (or sentence-analog) S such that X believes* S and (ii) S means that p

The problem of naturalizing belief then reduces to naturalizing (ii) in a way that coheres with the already naturalistically acceptable (i). Even at the time, Field denied that we truly needed relations to *propositions* in (ii), arguing that a theory of truth conditions could do all of the needed explanatory work (later he rejected even the explanatory need for truth conditions).

The broadly inferentialist framework of Section 2.IX would, applied to the whole of language, suggest accounting for (ii) with the wide inferential role of S , indexed by similarity (to p). Presumably, belief ascriptions are relative to context-sensitive and interest-sensitive similarity relations between inferential roles (or, more broadly, conceptual roles or overall use patterns) such that some such roles are counted as p -roles in the given context of utterance, licensing the ascription. The contextual parameter here will, I think, allow this kind of account to handle Frege’s puzzle, Kripke’s puzzle, *de re* and *de dicto* puzzles, and more.

Further clarifications about this could be added. For instance, I do not think that the characterization above requires anything worth calling a “language of

thought”, despite (i). Of course, sorting *all* of this out fully will take a complete metasemantic theory for the whole of language. My full attempt at this will come in a large and eventually forthcoming book, *The Mystery of Meaning*.

- Page 55: typo — “philosophical motivation for view”.
- Page 57: “unnatural” would probably be better than “unwieldy” here.
- Page 64: The case where *c* occurs in *R* is that of being “directly” for an expression.
- Page 66: In the first “meaning-constituting” the dash is unneeded. Likewise in “narrow-holism” in the next paragraph (and the reverse for the following, “narrow holist (and non-holist) inferentialists”)
- Page 72: Toward the bottom I claim that the defense of unrestricted inferentialism against restricted inferentialism “will come in section V, and then at greater length in chapter 5”, but this should say “section VII”, not “section V”.
- Section 3.IV: I worry that talk of “meanings” of logical constants is apt to mislead. Perhaps it would have been better to talk instead of “semantics” or “semantic values”. As the content of this section hopefully makes clear, in this context “meaning” concerns only standard *structural* features — which truth functions are expressed, which functions on given domains. Nothing about things like translation or the general truth-conditions of sentences is entailed, save again for structural features.
- Page 81: Footnote 51 shouldn’t be read as ruling out the relevance of more complex, model-theoretic arguments to this issue.
- Page 96: typo — “the the canonical opponent”.
- Pages 96-97: On the most natural way of understanding Quine’s *Philosophy of Logic* definition of logical truth, it seems like too many truths might come

out as “logical” truths. For instance, true pure counting sentences. For the conventionalist argument I give to work, the Quinean definition must instead be understood in a way that avoids this and makes the notion co-extensional with the standard, model-theoretic definition of logical truth. This is already needed for the completeness theorem to hold on Quine’s definition. Quine makes some informal remarks meant to patch this and some other bugs in his approach in the 1986 second edition of *Philosophy of Logic*, and full details can be found in Berlinski and Gallin’s 1969 “Quine’s Definition of Logical Truth” and McKeon’s 2004 “On the Substitutional Characterization of First-Order Logical Truth”.

- Page 110: typo — should be “propositionalist” instead of “propositional” in footnote 28.
- Page 114: In denying logical connections between atomic facts, I am talking about *our* language, and our *logic*. I am also not accepting any Tractarian metaphysics. If we say that an atomic fact is expressed by an atomic sentence, then in a tonk language, the “atomic” facts will be, in the relevant sense, logically necessary. Similarly, “Jared is a bachelor” and “Jared is married” are atomic sentences, but accepting one requires rejecting the other, according to our rules. So there can also be non-logical conceptually necessary connections between so-called “atomic facts”. See also 12.V and 13.III for further relevant discussion.
- Page 115: It would have been worth citing Davidson’s discussion in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” to bolster my point here. It is trivial that “the cause of *E*” caused *E*, and thinking this does *not* involve a strange anti-realism about physical causation.
- Page 120: typo — “are themselves are”.
- Page 130: My comment that “...charity is nearly unlimited in logic but severely limited in both science and everyday life” could be misleading to some read-

ers. In this comment I am talking only about charity *to belief*, and the possibility of actual disagreement. In a broader sense, what we might call charity *to overall use* — including dispositions to retract acceptance and rejection in various circumstances — is a constitutive principle of metasemantics and is not restricted in any domain. The point here is that charity to overall use is compatible with ordinary disagreements because of causal feedback mechanisms that aren't relevant in the metasemantics of logic and mathematics.

- Page 136: At the bottom, the bit about instances of schematic rules not “explicitly” containing the expression means only that the schematic form of the rule doesn't contain it.
- Page 143: typo — “as similar story”.
- Page 144: typo — “said principle”, should be “principles”.
- Page 147: typo — in (1), “sentence” should be “sentences”.
- Page 153: typo — “modus ponens in valid”.
- Page 159: I've spelled Gauss's first name as “Karl” instead of “Carl”, which is often done in English sources, but “Carl” is now standard.
- Page 163: typo — “Boghossian call this”.
- Page 173: typo — “attributing the idea of Casimir Lewy”.
- Page 184: typo — “more in more detail”.
- Section 7.IV: This section is crucial in answering a motley of somewhat imprecise but related objections people continue to raise to conventionalism, even after abandoning the pointed arguments discussed in the first three sections of chapter 7. I think that most of these objections are somewhat confused, in a way that this section tries to explain. In particular, ambiguities of both “convention” and “true by” generate misunderstandings. Let me illustrate the first point with chess, which we are *all* conventionalists about. Is it “conventional”

that you can't mate a lone king with a knight and a king? Yes, in the sense that our chess conventions constitute a practice in which that cannot be done. No, in that this is a fact *about* the conventionally constituted game of chess, and is not itself something we merely stipulated directly. Obviously there are objective facts about conventionally determined practices. The same holds for our conventionally determined linguistic practices. Somewhat related confusions bedevil worries about logic being "true by" convention. Instances of the law of noncontradiction are conventional, not because they are derivable from our conventions, explicitly stated, but because they are derivable from nothing, *using* our conventions. Of course, these and other related points are stressed throughout the book, but I wanted to point those troubled by these worries to this section, in particular.

- Page 202: typo — "Sr. Anselm".
- Page 210: Footnote 3 uses "X" instead of "F", without comment.
- Page 213: typo — "say that language is", missing "a".
- Page 214: typo — "need go meta".
- Pages 216-217: These principles too are *explanatory*.
- Page 229: "quantifier deflationists" in footnote 54, should be "metadeflationists".
- Page 230: typo — "predicate-expressions", should be "predicate-like expressions".
- Page 231: typo — "does he" should be "he does" in footnote 61.
- Page 245: typo — "of the a".
- Page 262: typo — "impact" should be "impacts" in footnote 40.
- Page 264: typo — missing ":" in the lead-in to the Tarski quote.

- Page 268: Omega inconsistent theories aren't automatically inconsistent with their uniform reflection principles, as my comment here seems to suggest. They are inconsistent with uniform reflection plus the true theory of Π_2 -sentences in the language of arithmetic. See the notes to "Infinite Reasoning", in my paper notes and errata.
- Page 273: I think "set-models" and "class model results" should probably be "set models and "class-model results".
- Page 280: Carnap (1931) is cited in a footnote here, but the work doesn't appear in the bibliography, the reference is to Carnap's "The Logician Foundations of Mathematics".
- Section 11.II: The parenthetical at the start of this section is just for focus.
- Page 293: typo — "it likely that".
- Page 302: typo — "some intuitively some".
- Page 316: Footnote 37 is quite compressed. Originally there was a full section responding to Hauser and Woodin, but it was a late cut.
- Page 322: typo — "are are conceptual truths", in Slogan 2.
- Pages 331-332: My demonstration that Giannoni's dual truth definitions undercut conventionalism could have just used tonk, but I felt it was more rhetorically effective to use trivial cases to undercut conjunction elimination.
- Page 356: typo — "Dispensex" instead of "Dispense" in the title of Field's article.
- Page 366: typo — "Analysis" should be in italics, in the entry for Peregrin's "Is Inferentialism Circular?".
- Page 372: The publication dates for Tennant's *Anti-Realism in Logic* and *The Taming of the True* should be 1987 and 1997, respectively. Also, in the listing for the former there is a typo — "Tennnant".

- The typesetting of this book was quite vexed for several reasons. Often the typesetting team would make changes that I did not ask for, while at the same time failing to make the changes that I had asked for. From what I hear, these sorts of typesetting issues are becoming more and more common with academic publishers.