Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma

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October 30, 2021

Abstract

Rebel regimes tend to survive for long periods of time. We propose that this stability is founded upon peaceful power sharing with military elites. These regimes typically transform the state military and elevate rebel commanders into top positions. These men are not sycophants, as they control guns and troops and possess legitimacy from the struggle. However, they are also men with whom the leader has a history of successful power sharing, which makes deal-making highly credible after the rebels take power. Using originally collected data on African regimes from 1960–2017, we establish that rebel regimes are significantly more stable than other authoritarian regimes, and experience fewer coups. Regarding the mechanism, rebel regimes more frequently share power with military elites by appointing a stable Minister of Defense. These Ministers are typically high-ranking members of the rebellion, and reflect the regime's replacement of the state military with their own.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Rebel regimes—those that gain power by winning a rebellion—are exceptionally durable. Prominent examples of rebel regimes include the MPLA regime in Angola, which has governed since winning a colonial liberation struggle against Portugal in 1975; and the RPF regime in Rwanda, which has governed since 1995 after winning a civil war against the government that perpetuated the Rwandan genocide. Using originally coded data that we detail below, we count 21 rebel regimes in Africa since independence. In any particular year, such regimes were *more than twice as likely to survive in power* compared with non-rebel regimes. In fact, 76% of post-independence rebel regimes in Africa are still in power today.

This empirical pattern is surprising in light of two existing literatures. First, the longevity of most rebel regimes in Africa cannot be explained by existing scholarship on the durability of revolutionary regimes (Huntington 1968, 1970; Levitsky and Way 2013; Lachapelle et al. 2020; Miller 2020). Despite Huntington's (1968) famous proclamation that "he who controls the countryside controls the country," most African rebel regimes failed to consolidate territorial control outside of the capital because of persistent difficulties in broadcasting power highlighted by Herbst (2000) and others. Moreover, many of these regimes continued to face prolonged civil wars and state weakness after coming into power (e.g., Angola). Many African rebel regimes also did not adopt a revolutionary ideology or attempt a radical transformation of state and society. In fact, 71% of rebel regimes in Africa do not meet Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) definition of a revolutionary regime. Yet, as we will demonstrate, these *non-revolutionary* rebel regimes nonetheless usually survived in power for a long time.

Second, the durability of rebel regimes is surprising in light of the canonical guardianship dilemma (Finer 1962; Roessler 2011; Greitens 2016; Harkness 2018; White 2020; Paine 2021*a*). All leaders confront the dreaded question of "who will guard the guards?" A military that is strong enough to protect the state against mass unrest and foreign threats is also strong enough to overthrow the regime. Given that military coups are the most common way in which autocratic leaders are

overthrown (Svolik 2012; Singh 2014), men with guns pose a very dangerous threat to leaders. We should expect the guardianship dilemma to be acute in rebel regimes because the leader came to power via the military and his inner circle is composed *entirely* of men with guns. Yet rebel regimes do not seem to fall prey to the guardianship dilemma. What explains the durability of rebel regimes?

We propose that the stability of African rebel regimes is founded upon peaceful power sharing with military elites. To mitigate the motives for high-ranking military officials to stage a coup, rulers can share power with military elites. The most consequential decision is whether to delegate control of the military by appointing an elite to the Minister of Defense position, as opposed to the leader personalizing control and naming himself his own Defense Minister or keeping the position vacant. Yet although appointing a Minister of Defense provides a means for distributing spoils to elites, this choice may fail to have the intended stabilizing effect. Delegating control enhances the opportunity for high-ranking officers to stage a coup, and the generic problem of credible commitments may provide a motive. When high-ranking military officials expect the ruler to renege on the power-sharing deal by revoking delegation of military control—thereby eliminating their access to spoils—they have incentives to leverage their position to stage a coup today, rather than wait and risk losing their privileges tomorrow.

We explain why commitments to share power with top military officials are more credible in rebel regimes. Long and intense periods of fighting provide opportunities for rebel leaders to gain experience with delegating control to top military commanders, given the need to do so to win battles. Fighting also serves as a screening mechanism by which leaders can weed out disloyalists, and rebel groups that ultimately succeed should tend to perform these tasks more effectively. After capturing the state, rebel leaders usually replace the existing state military with their own. High-ranking military officials are not mere sycophants; they control guns and troops and possess legitimacy from the struggle. Thus, the ruler must delegate control to secure their loyalty, and such power-sharing relationships should typically succeed because of these favorable preconditions for

establishing credible commitments with high-ranking military officials. By contrast, in many other regimes, power-sharing deals often break down because of mistrust and a persistent internal security dilemma. These arguments yield our theoretical expectations that rebel regimes are more durable, and that they frequently share power with high-ranking military officials.

We provide empirical support for our theory by analyzing original data from post-colonial Africa between 1960 and 2017. We define rebel regimes as those that came to power by winning a major civil war (at least 1,000 battle deaths), and we do not require the group to attempt a social revolution or have a strong ideology. Our sample includes ten regimes that gained independence by fighting against a colonizer (colonial liberation regimes), and eleven additional post-colonial rebel regime cases. We compare outcomes in rebel regimes to those in non-rebel regimes. We first establish the aggregate statistical pattern: both types of rebel regimes (colonial liberation and not) are significantly less likely to be overthrown, and these findings are unaltered under numerous robustness checks. In any particular year, our baseline models estimate that non-rebel regimes are more than twice as likely to be overthrown compared to rebel regimes. We estimate a similar relationship when accounting for a source of exogenous variation in rebel regimes: climatic factors that affected where Europeans could settle during the colonial period—the actors who precipitated most of the region's colonial liberation wars. We also examine successful coups specifically because of the centrality of this mode of exit to our theory. Consistent with our expectations, rebel regimes experience coups at significantly lower rates.

We then provide evidence for the power-sharing mechanism: rulers of rebel regimes more frequently delegate control over the military to the Ministry of Defense. We compiled original time-varying data on cabinet appointments, which shows that leaders in rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in 83% of years in office. We also compiled biographical information on these ministers: 87% of the Ministers of Defense were an important member of the rebellion. By contrast, non-rebel regimes appointed an independent Minister of Defense in only 56% of years. Presidents in non-rebel regimes commonly appointed *themselves* as Minister of Defense and, in

some cases, shut military elites out of the cabinet entirely. We also collected information on the composition of the state military after rebel takeover. In nineteen of the twenty-one cases (90%), rebel regimes either completely transformed and displaced the existing state military, or occupied top positions in an integrated military.

1.1 Contributions to Existing Research

Our new theory and findings contribute to literatures on (1) institutions and authoritarian survival, (2) power sharing in Africa and post-conflict settings, and (3) revolutionary regimes. First, we advance scholarship on institutions and authoritarian survival by highlighting an important informal channel through which leaders of rebel regimes can achieve stability: sharing power with coercive allies through cabinet appointments. This focus contrasts with much existing research on how *formal* institutions, such as ruling parties, legislatures, and elections, can sustain regime survival (Gandhi 2008; Boix and Svolik 2013). Not only are such institutions commonplace across autocracies, many nominally-democratic institutions are quite weak and do not stabilize the regime (Meng 2020). Furthermore, although most scholarship on autocratic legislatures and elections considers how regimes co-opt opposition parties (Gandhi 2008; Lust-Okar 2005; Malesky and Schuler 2010), autocratic leaders are most frequently overthrown by their *own* coalition members (Meng 2020). We therefore focus on how origins in conflict create ideal conditions that allow leaders to credibly share power with their co-conspirators. This minimizes the most pressing threat that autocrats face: coups by elites within the regime.

Our theory also illuminates how certain types of autocratic leaders—those that come to power with a rebel organization—can alleviate the much dreaded guardianship dilemma by offering to share power with their former co-combatants. In doing so, our argument unifies two surprisingly disparate literatures on power sharing. According to authoritarian regimes scholarship, leaders gain a security guarantee by sharing power with elites who can credibly threaten to unseat them, thus creating incentives for rulers to share power with military actors (Boix and Svolik 2013; Svolik 2012; Meng 2019). However, according to the conflict literature, leaders hesitate to share

power with coercive agents because bringing these elites into the inner circle empowers them and elevates their ability to depose the ruler (Roessler 2011; Paine 2021*c*). According to these studies, leaders should typically not want to share power with the military. Our study reconciles these two conflicting perspectives by highlighting the conditions under which power sharing with military elites alleviates, rather than exacerbates, the guardianship dilemma.

Second, while most existing studies examine power sharing *across* organizations, we focus on power sharing *within* organizations. Considerable scholarship on civil war settlements analyze cases in which a regime negotiates power sharing deals with other rebel groups to end a civil war (Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; Licklider 2014*b*). Such arrangements would constitute sharing power *across* distinct factions, in contrast to our emphasis on delegating control to subordinates within the victorious rebel group. Drawing on insights from studies of authoritarian stability, we emphasize that a leader's own ruling coalition poses the greatest threat of overthrow from within (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Svolik 2012; Meng 2020). Thus, rebel regime rulers must guard against coups attempts from members of his own rebel organization, even in conflict settings with multiple warring groups. We also depart from existing studies of power sharing in Africa that highlight the challenges of *ethnic* power sharing (Arriola 2009; Roessler 2011; Francois et al. 2015; Harkness 2018). Most rebel groups in our sample are multi-ethnic, and, overall, rebel regimes are characterized by neither broad ethnic power sharing nor ethnocratic domination. Our original data on cabinet appointments and on military composition provides alternative measures of power sharing that do not rely on ethnic composition (e.g., the widely used Ethnic Power Relations dataset), and also improves upon commonly used aggregate indicators of power sharing, such as Polity IV scores.

Third, this article rethinks several prominent ideas about revolutionary regimes (Huntington 1968, 1970; Levitsky and Way 2013; Lachapelle et al. 2020; Miller 2020). Perhaps most surprisingly, we show that the durability of revolutionary regimes is not unique. The majority of rebel regimes in our dataset were *not* revolutionary, yet they remained extraordinarily durable. Origins in violent

conflict produces conditions that allow for peaceful elite power sharing, and this applies widely to all rebel regimes. The radical transformation of state and society are simply not necessary for regime stability.

In particular, our study is in conversation with recent work by Lachapelle et al. (2020). We depart from their article in both our empirical findings and theoretical mechanisms. While Lachapelle et al. (2020) count only six revolutionary regimes in Africa, we identify twenty-one rebel regimes in the region and demonstrate that this broader category of rebel regimes are significantly more durable compared with regimes without origins in conflict.[1] Lachapelle et al. (2020) produce four mechanisms to explain the stability of revolutionary regimes. The first two are *elite-level* mechanisms: (1) a cohesive ruling elite, (2) a loyal military. The latter two are *mass-level* mechanisms: (3) a powerful coercive apparatus, (4) the destruction of rival organization and alternative centers of power in society. We first distinguish our elite power sharing argument before turning to mass-level mechanisms.

In Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) account, elite cohesion (including that of the military) is driven primarily by two factors: ideology and monitoring. They argue that revolutions create highly polarized settings which creates incentives for elites to "close ranks", therefore protecting the regime against elite defection. Similarly, the "fusion of revolutionary party and army structures enhances loyalty within the coercive apparatus" (569). Where loyalty and ideology are not enough, revolutionary regimes turn to oversight, control, and monitoring of elites to ensure continued allegiance (568-570). This argument echos existing studies of coup-proofing that focus on the use of coercive strategies such as the creation of counter-balancing units to monitor elite behavior (Svolik 2012; De Bruin 2020).

By contrast, we provide a "carrots", rather than a "sticks" approach to explain elite cohesion. Instead of preventing elite defection via coercion and monitoring, we argue that autocratic leaders maintain the support of military elites by credibly sharing power (and hence spoils) with them.

[1] In fact, this is even true when we limit our sample to non-revolutionary rebel regimes.

Importantly, we also stress that partisanship and ideological bonds alone are not sufficient to ensure stability. Dictators have no friends, and his trusted allies - men with guns - can still turn on him if excluded from the regime. Thus, co-conspirators from the rebellion pose a grave threat to the leader unless he credibly shares the spoils of the state with them via government appointments. While Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) study "highlights the role of ideology in fostering authoritarian durability" (591), we argue that ideology is neither necessary nor sufficient when it comes to regime stability.

Finally, we also depart from Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) emphasis on mass-level mechanisms, such as fundamental transformation of state and society. African rulers faced persistent challenges in consolidating territorial control outside of the capital due to factors such as low population density, legacies from colonial rule, and high ethnic fractionalization (Herbst 2000). Most rebel regimes in Africa therefore either failed to radically transform state and society, or never attempted broad-based reforms. Contra Samuel Huntington's famous aphorism, a regime does not need to control the countryside to control the country.

2 Theory

All leaders face a guardianship dilemma: a military that is strong enough to protect the regime is also strong enough to overthrow it (Greitens 2016; Harkness 2018; White 2020; Paine 2021*a*). To mitigate the guardianship dilemma, rulers contemplate whether to delegate control to high-ranking military officials, which is an effective means of distributing spoils. However, power-sharing arrangements will not breed stability if the ruler's promises to maintain the deal in the future are not credible. We explain why rebel regime leaders are better able to make credible commitments to their elite allies, compared with coup or civilian leaders.

2.1 The Guardianship Dilemma

In order to rule, a leader must sustain sufficient support from a "winning coalition," which varies in its size and composition across regimes (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). In any authoritarian

regime, high-ranking military officials are part of the winning coalition, and therefore securing their acquiescence is necessary for regime survival. The most immediate threat that military elites pose is to stage a coup and directly overthrow the ruler. The coup threat is not trivial: between 1950 to 2014, a total of 236 coups were successfully carried out worldwide, and 41% of those overthrows occurred within Africa.[2] Coups are the most common way in which autocratic leaders are deposed, thus military elites pose the greatest threat to the dictator's survival in office (Geddes et al. 2018, 179). Beyond their ability to carry out a coup, military elites are also crucial members of the winning coalition because of their role in defeating threats from outside the regime. Without their active support, the military may not defend the regime against popular uprisings or shirk at counterinsurgency. Overall, although authoritarian regime survival hinges on many factors, securing the cooperation of high-ranking military officials is paramount for shielding the regime against threats from above and below (Svolik 2012).

Our theoretical framework focuses specifically on the coup threat posed by military elites not only because of the empirical prevalence of coups, but also because the same factors that make militaries unlikely to stage coups also make them more likely to defend the regime against outsider threats (Paine 2021*b*). Successful coups require that soldiers have ample *motive* to remove the ruler and the *opportunity* to do so (Finer 1962). Rulers are often compelled to share power and distribute spoils to high-ranking military officials in order to maintain their support and therefore lessen the *motive* of staging a coup.

The most consequential power sharing decision is whether the leader delegates control of the military to an independent Ministry of Defense. The typical structure of command in African constitutions is for the president to sit atop the military hierarchy as the commander in chief of the armed forces, and the Minister of Defense sits between the president and the chiefs of staff for various branches (army, navy, air forces, sometimes militarized police), each of whom report directly to the Minister of Defense. For example, in Figure 1, we present an organization chart of the Angolan

[2]Authors' calculation using data from Powell and Thyne (2011).

Ministry of Defense. This case is typical; we are unaware of any examples in post-colonial Africa in which the Minister of Defense is subordinate to another military official. The Minister of Defense determines the creation and implementation of military policy, including the appointment, management, and mobilization of all security forces. When a leader appoints an elite to this post (as opposed to eliminating the position, keeping it vacant, or the ruler taking the post himself), the leader *delegates control* over the military, hence losing personal control.

Figure 1: Organization of the Angolan Ministry of Defense, 1988



Source: Smaldone (1991, 218).

The Minister of Defense also a cabinet-level position, and ministerial positions are a common method for rulers to allocate spoils to elites in Africa (Arriola 2009; Francois et al. 2015). Cabinet appointments provide elites with a steady stream of patronage: cabinet ministers are paid lucrative salaries, and often receive private luxury cars, houses, first-class travel, and control over government contracts that they can reward to family members.

Despite lowering motives for a coup by distributing spoils to high-ranking military elites, sharing power also *enhances their opportunity to successfully carry out a coup* (Roessler 2011; Paine 2021*a*). Empirically, high-level military appointees have the greatest rate of coup success (Singh 2014). In our sample of African countries from 1960–2017, coup attempts from high-level officers (e.g., generals, cabinet-level officers) succeeded 60% of the time. The success rate is even higher, at 83%, when we restrict the sample to the top three military positions: Minister of Defense,

Vice Minister of Defense, and Army Chief of Staff. For example, Juvenal Habyarimana, who ruled Rwanda from 1973 until 1994, seized power from his predecessor while serving as Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff. Similarly, the Defense Minister of Mauritania seized power from the leader in a coup in 1980, as did the Defense Minister of Burundi in a successful 1996 coup. By contrast, coup attempts by middle-ranking officers (e.g., majors, colonels) succeeded 49% of the time, and those from the bottom (e.g., low-level soldiers) succeeded only 14% of the time.

Thus, leaders are caught in a dangerous game. On the one hand, *not* sharing power and spoils with the military risks creating grievances among the top brass, which might result in coup attempts. On the other hand, however, *sharing power* with military elites makes it easier for top-ranking officers to stage a coup.

Why might high-ranking officers stage a coup even when the ruler delegates control of the military, rather than being satisfied with receiving lucrative spoils from their position? Why are the lower *motives* for a coup sometimes overshadowed by the enhanced *opportunity* to seize the state? A problem of credible commitment remains. Although the ruler might delegate the Defense portfolio today, he might renege on this promise tomorrow—either by shuffling the position or personalizing control over the military entirely (by leaving the Defense Minister position vacant or appointing themselves their own Defense Minister). Indeed, shuffling ministers is a common empirical phenomenon to prevent any one person from amassing too much power (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Hassan 2017). For example, Sangoule Lamizana, the second president of Burkina Faso, cycled through five different Defense Ministers in 12 years. Joseph Kabila, the president of the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2001 to 2019, cycled through seven different Ministers of Defense, allowing the average Defense Minister to remain in office just over two years. In such cases, short-lived Defense Ministers are not given ample time to consolidate their own control over the security sector. When Defense ministries experience temporary appointments and instability, it prevents the Minister of Defense from developing any independent authority from the ruler.

Leaders can also personalize control over the military by *not* appointing any distinct elite as Minister of Defense, instead leaving the post vacant—which occurred in 38% of the total country-years in our sample. For example, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire was commander-in-chief and Minister of Defense for all three decades of his reign. No military officer ever held a cabinet post and regional military commanders were subordinate to regional civilian leaders. Within the military, Mobutu routinely shuffled elites in key positions to prevent any officer from developing an independent base of support (Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

Given the threat of rotation or the complete removal of elite access to the post, Defense Ministers may perceive their time in office as short-lived. This provides incentives to capture their "moment in the sun" and launch a coup today, rather than waiting and risk being removed from the position tomorrow.[3] Mutual distrust between the leader and military elites creates an internal security dilemma, and rulers throughout post-colonial Africa "came to fear that their professed allies, especially those with a foothold in the army, police, or security services, might exploit their regime access and coercive capacity to seize power on their own" (Roessler 2011, 307). The internal security dilemma helps to explain the November 1966 coup in Burundi. In the months leading up to the coup, it had become increasingly apparent that King Ntare V would soon replace Michel Micombero, his then-Minister of Defense. That October, the leader accused Micombero of "incompetence" and "abuse of his authority," in addition to recruiting mercenary soldiers to replace existing army officers (McGowan 2003). The next month, while the king was out of the country, Micombero seized power in a bloodless coup.

How do rulers navigate the guardianship dilemma? Under what conditions can they delegate control over the military as a means to perpetuate, rather than undermine, their survival?

[3]Anticipation of future shifts in the distribution of power is a general mechanism to explain fighting in the formal conflict literature (Powell 2004). Sudduth (2017) applies this mechanism to explain motives for purges and coups.

2.2 Power Sharing and Credible Commitments in Rebel Regimes

Leaders in rebel regimes are better-positioned than typical dictators to neutralize the guardianship dilemma. This is surprising because the guardianship dilemma is most pressing for rulers who rely on the military to take and retain power (Svolik 2012), which is true almost by definition for rebel regimes. However, the launching organizations of rebel regimes are well-situated to facilitate credible commitments between the ruler and military elites. Long and intense periods of fighting necessitate sharing power and delegating control to military commanders to improve battlefield performance. Upon winning, victorious rebel groups can then replace the existing state military with their own. This mechanism differs from that in existing accounts of revolutionary regimes by stressing the need to share power, rather than partisan and ideological ties being sufficient to secure stability, as we discuss at the end of the article when assessing alternative explanations.

The wars that launched rebel regimes were intense struggles. We require a conflict to reach a high death total (1,000 battle deaths total) to count as a rebel regime. Furthermore, every case in our dataset met an even more stringent standard: at least one period of highly intense fighting (1,000 battle deaths in a single year). Thus, the rebel groups faced concerted external pressure from the governments they confronted. In general, such conditions should encourage a leader to prioritize military competence over loyalty (Talmadge 2015; Greitens 2016). Martin (Forthcoming) applies this logic to explain the organizational structure of rebel groups. When facing intense external pressure, leaders must delegate authority to their field commanders to maximize battlefield performance, as opposed to personally making all decisions about military affairs within a segregated leadership structure. "By integrating field commanders into top decision-making bodies, central leaders ensure that battlefield information is aggregated and absorbed in a timely manner, recommendations from field commanders are heard, and that orders from the top are quickly relayed down through the military chain of command" (15). This experience with delegating control during the rebellion, we argue, should facilitate credible commitments after taking power.

Typically, this experience with delegating control to military subordinates unfolded over long peri-

ods of time, as the average war to launch a rebel regime lasted 8.7 years. Lengthy fighting enables leaders to observe performance and learn about the loyalty of their subordinates, hence mitigating the general problem of unknown private motives that can trigger an internal security dilemma (Roessler 2011, 313). Two other, more difficult-to-measure factors, reinforce this information mechanism. First, a selection effect: a rebel movement is unlikely to defeat a government (or last long in the field) if they are unable to create dense information networks and weed out disloyalists (Lewis 2020). Second, many scholars argue that wartime collective action also facilitates high levels of trust (LeBas 2013; Levitsky and Way 2013; Lyons 2016; Lachapelle et al. 2020; Martin Forthcoming), which can reinforce expectations and trust about power-sharing deals.

For example, in Angola, the MPLA (which gained power at independence) struggled to put pressure on a relatively strong Portuguese army early on. Having first formed in 1956, many of its leaders were arrested, and a hit-and-run attack in January 1961 against white settlers' farms unleashed "wild repression by settlers, police and army" (Davidson 1984, 771). In December 1962, the formerly incarcerated Agostinho Neto was voted president at an MPLA party conference in response to discontent with party secretary Viriato da Cruz, who had held that post since 1956. Cruz "thwarted the principle of collective leadership and used his control over party machinery to amass political power at the expense of the president (Andrade) and his department of external affairs" (28). Neto instead governed collectively:

> "Operational authority was vested in the ten-member Steering Committee, six of whom were to constitute the supreme Political-Military Committee (PMC). As the unique retainer of the 'natural secrets of the Movement,' this committee of six was given exclusive jurisdiction over military and security matters, including control of the army (EPLA)" (30).

Similarly, in Zimbabwe, revamped offensive counterinsurgency efforts by the Rhodesian army in the 1970s led to military setbacks for ZANU and their armed wing ZANLA. In 1975, regional ZANLA commanders supported Robert Mugabe for the ZANU presidency. His predecessor, Ndabaningi Sithole, had previously excluded members of ZANLA from the governing ZANU War Council (when the Rhodesian army simply sought to contain ZANLA). By contrast, Mugabe

brought high-ranking ZANLA commanders in the ZANU Politburo and staffed the ZANLA High Command with individuals with military experience (Martin Forthcoming, 34-38).

Sharing power with the military also occurred in rebellions against sovereign African governments. After losing a rigged election in 1981, Yoweri Museveni (who took power in 1986 and remains in power today) gathered twenty-six allies and organized in the Luwero Triangle northwest of the capital Kampala, where the government had weak presence. To fend off government incursions, and to enable striking on the capital, the NRA engaged in extensive organizational effort at the village level and also shared power among movement leaders. As Museveni wrote in his memoir:

> "The Popular Resistance Army was headed by a High Command which dealt with both military and administrative matters. The High Command could be regarded as a subcommittee of a wider body known as the Army Council. Any commander of a unit, equivalent to a battalion, would be a member of the Army Council. The Army Council dealt with policy. In December 1981, we introduced into every unit an administrative committee consisting of all officers in the unit, plus the Regimental Sergeants-Major. The committee dealt with proposals to the High Command for promotions, appointments, and administrative matters in the units, such as buying food. There was also an operations committee in each unit comprised of the commanding officer, his second-in-command, the intelligence officer, and the officer for a specific operation who dealt with operational matters, such as actual battles. Any local fighting operations such as ambushes, repulsing enemy attacks, and mine-laying would be discussed collectively by this smaller group" (Museveni 1997, 133).

> "I preferred to lead the soldiers personally on these first operations in order to show them what to do. Thereafter, I did not have to accompany them because the commanders would have seen how to carry out an operation" (Museveni 1997, 136).

Similarly, in South Sudan, the SPLA suffered setbacks in the early 1990s amid a government offensive. In response, SPLA engaged in concerted reform of its military and civilian administration. One specific reform, which is common in many rebellions, was the creation of military zones with distinct commanders. In this case, the Zonal Commanders also dictated the civilian administration in their zones, including the collection of taxes. Restructuring its army "enabled the SPLA to recover from military setbacks and expand into new areas" (Johnson 1998, 72). By contrast, in a less successful rival SPLA faction that split off earlier in the 1990s, the leader "spent considerable

effort on reshuffling his local commanders, leading to charges of tribal preferment and fuelling the Nuer civil war which eventually tore his movement apart" (70).

Rebel organizations also come to power with their own military forces. Upon founding a new regime, rebel regime leaders can replace the state military with their own. We provide systematic evidence of this assertion later. Thus, the organization that they built and organized during the struggle continued to be the main basis of power for the new regime. By contrast, non-rebel regime leaders typically faced considerable difficulties in transforming the state military after taking power. As we discuss below, non-rebel rulers face a dreaded tradeoff between leaving in place security forces hostile to the new regime or risking countercoups if they attempt to purge members of the military.

2.3 Non-Rebel Regimes

The traits that enable credible commitment and peaceful military power sharing in rebel regimes typically are not replicated in regimes founded by coups or by civilians.

Coup regimes. Regimes founded by a military coup share one important similarity with rebel regimes: gaining power via force. Yet although coup leaders also depend on men with guns to gain power, they lack similarly favorable preconditions as rebel regimes to facilitate peaceful power sharing. As a result, coup leaders are often brought down by their own coercive agents.

When coup leaders take office, they often have limited experience with their co-conspirators, making it difficult to establish credible commitments to share power. Coups are generally carried out by a small handful of officers, in contrast to rebellions which involved large rebel organizations with many officers commanding local units. When coup regimes come to power, they therefore lack a large contingent of reliable co-conspirators who can staff the regime. Furthermore, most successful coups are conducted within days or even hours (Luttwak 2016). This limits the amount of time and experience co-conspirators have with each other before taking power, and they do not have a history of sharing power with each other.

To make matters worse, actions taken during a coup attempt *may not reflect true preferences*. Most high-ranking military officials care foremost about picking the winning side, and hence if they believe that the coup has been "made a fact," they might appear to go along simply because they perceive no other viable option (Singh 2014). Consequently, coup leaders have less information about the loyalty of other high-ranking officers, making it difficult to assess whether sharing power will solidify the regime or hasten its overthrow.

Coup leaders lack an easy opportunity to replace the officer corps upon taking power, as opposed to the typical process of military transformation in rebel regimes. Although coup leaders often engage in widespread purges of the military that they inherit, these actions generate a high risk of a countercoup, which also occurs when civilian leaders attempt to remake the existing military. Cases in which rulers succeed at restructuring the military to their advantage are rare.

Our theory therefore highlights the fact that *not all regimes born out of conflict are the same*. Yet many existing theories do not draw this distinction between rebel regimes and coup regimes. For example, Roessler (2011) instead highlights the general impediments to successful interethnic power sharing and the particular danger posed by any coercive co-conspirators—"the armed actors who led, organized, or executed the *coup d'état or rebellion* that deposed the old regime" (328; our emphasis). Similarly, Colgan and Weeks (2015) distinguish regimes by their revolutionary ideology but do not distinguish the type of coercive origins—"[r]evolutionary leaders are therefore a strict subset of all leaders that come to power as a result of the use of force—such as *coups, assassinations, and revolts*" (166; our emphasis). By contrast, we argue that rebel regime leaders and coup leaders should exhibit very different patterns of power sharing and survival in office.

Civilian regimes. Civilian leaders are particularly wary of the guardianship dilemma. Because they are not military leaders themselves, they are especially vulnerable to displacement by security officers. Although civilian leaders often have a large contingent of reliable party elites to delegate important government positions, party elites (who are themselves civilians) lack control and authority over the military. Even if secure against the threat of overthrow from their own party

members, civilian leaders face a dire threat of overthrow from the military.

Most post-independence civilian rulers in Africa inherited a military created by the outgoing colonial power, rather than setting up their own loyal forces (Harkness 2018). Faced with an existing military that was not necessarily devoted to the regime, civilian rulers are forced to choose between two ill-fated options. On the one hand, they can shut the military out of the government entirely and exclude them from high-ranking government positions, which creates the motives for a coup discussed above. On the other hand, some civilian leaders attempted to alter to composition of the inherited military by replacing existing officers with members of their own in-group (often co-ethnics). However, this tactic often triggered countercoups in which marginalized groups would leverage "whatever tactics and resources they have to fight against their declining status" (Harkness 2018; see also Sudduth 2017).

2.4 Observable Implications

Our theoretical discussion yields two observable implications. First, rebel regime leaders should share power with military elites more frequently than non-rebel regime leaders. Second, rebel regimes (and their leaders) should be overthrown less frequently compared to non-rebel regimes.

Our theoretical logic most directly anticipates that leaders in rebel regimes should suffer successful coups (as opposed to other methods of overthrow) less frequently than leaders in other authoritarian regimes. However, beyond preventing coups that remove individual leaders, a loyal military is also paramount for defending the regime against mass unrest, insurgent groups, or foreign threats. Therefore, we anticipate that peaceful power sharing between the leader and military elites should result in broader regime stability, in addition to preventing individual leaders from being overthrown via coups.

3 Evidence of Rebel Regime Durability

We first establish that, in Africa, rebel regimes are less likely to break down compared with non-rebel regimes. This is true even of rebel regimes that do not have revolutionary aims or attempt to

transform state and society. We also improve upon research designs from related studies by showing robustness to a source of exogenous variation in rebel regimes: climatic factors that affected where Europeans could settle during the colonial period, the actors who precipitated most of the region's colonial liberation wars.

3.1 DATA

Sample. Our sample consists of annual observations for authoritarian regimes in independent African countries between 1960 and 2017, excluding years with warlord or provisional regimes. Countries that gained independence after 1960 enter the dataset upon their first year of independence. We include all African countries with a population of at least 100,000 at independence, including North Africa and several islands. For South Africa, we exclude years before 1994; and, for Zimbabwe, years before 1980 because white-dominated, de facto colonial regimes are not viable counterfactual comparisons for African-ruled regimes.

We exclude all country-years with democratic regimes. We do not expect our mechanism to hold in democracies because the primary determinant of access to political power is winning elections, rather than commanding control of the military. To code a regime as democratic, we require not only that elections are free and fair, but also that at least one rotation in parties occurred after the first free and fair election. This resembles the rule used in Levitsky and Way (2010) to ensure that turnover does not occur only to be replaced by a competitive authoritarian regime.[4] In Africa since the Cold War, many countries with nominally democratic institutions pursue similar strategies as autocracies with regard to promoting members of the opposition to lucrative cabinet positions to mitigate the electoral threat (Arriola et al. 2021). We prefer a high threshold for democracy to avoid dropping theoretically relevant cases.[5] However, in Appendix Table B.2, we

[4]For example, in Burundi, the governing party lost the 2005 election which was deemed free and fair, but the same party has been in power since, and ran unopposed in 2010.

[5]We draw from the list of democracies in Cheibub et al. (2010) and Geddes et al. (2014), and consulted additional sources to assess party turnover after the first free and fair election. We code no democracies before the 1990s except Mauritius, and subsequently we count eleven countries

show that the results are qualitatively similar when using a less stringent standard for democratic (in which we exclude cases such as South Africa with free and fair elections that never experienced party turnover), or when we instead include *all* post-independence years (including transitional and warlord regimes).

Dependent variable. The dependent variable is an indicator for AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN, equaling 1 in any year an authoritarian regime loses power, and 0 otherwise. We coded this variable using regime breakdown data from Geddes et al. (2014), coup data from McGowan (2003) and Powell and Thyne (2011), and data on irregular leadership turnover from Goemans et al. (2009). Authoritarian regimes can break down either because the leader was deposed in a coup or was forced to step down after losing an election, or because the regime (and leader) were overthrown by a popular uprising, an insurgent group, or foreign intervention. Because our theory focuses primarily on how rebel regime leaders are able to peacefully share power with military elites, we present additional results using a narrower version of the dependent variable, SUCCESSFUL COUP.

Main explanatory variable. A REBEL REGIME comes to power by winning a rebellion that generated at least 1,000 battle deaths. By "rebellion," we mean a movement initiated by an outsider rebel group, i.e., people that are not part of the inner circle or coercive apparatus of the incumbent government when the movement begins. We distinguish outsider rebellions from insider coups (i.e., initiated by current members of the inner circle or coercive apparatus) that create a large death toll. In many cases, rebel leaders were former government insiders. However, in all such cases, they were excluded from the government when they initiated the rebellion and had to win battles to advance on the capital—distinct from a coup. By "winning," we mean that the rebel group gained control of the state (of an existing or a new country) either by defeating the incumbent government militarily or by compelling a negotiated settlement in which a member of the rebel group became

as experiencing a democratic spell: Benin, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia.

Table 1: List of Rebel Regimes

Colonial liberation		Civil war winner	
Algeria 62–92*,**,†	Namibia 90–NA†	Burundi 05–NA	Ivory Coast 11–NA
Angola 75–NA*,†	South Africa 94–NA†	Chad 82–90	Liberia 97–03
Eritrea 93–NA*,†	Tunisia 56–11	Chad 90–NA	Rwanda 94–NA*,†
Guinea-Bissau 74–80*,**,†	Zimbabwe 80–NA**,†	Congo-B 97–NA	South Sudan 11–NA†
Morocco 56–NA		DRC 97–NA†	Uganda 86–NA**,†
Mozambique 75–NA*,†		Ethiopia 91–NA**,†	

* Lachapelle et al. (2020) code as revolutionary.
** Colgan (2012) codes as revolutionary.
† Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as violent liberation.

head of state. To code this variable, we primarily combined information on conflicts from Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) with regimes from Geddes et al. (2014). Appendix A.1 provides detailed coding notes.

Some specifications additionally distinguish between COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES—those that emerged from a violent struggle to gain independence and/or majority rule—and CIVIL WAR WINNERS against sovereign domestic governments. We classify the struggles in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia as "colonial" because these wars established African majority rule, even though none were fought against a European power. We also apply this distinction to Eritrea's independence war because it became a colonial possession of Ethiopia after its forced annexation in 1962.

Table 1 lists all twenty-one rebel regimes in our dataset, and compares our measure to related variables in the literature on revolutionary or liberation regimes. Although this may seem equivalent to our focus on rebel regimes, the differences are stark. We do not incorporate considerations such as fundamentally transforming the state or initiating radical social change into our coding scheme. Hence, only 29% of our rebel regime cases meet Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) definition of a social revolution, 24% meet Colgan's (2012) definition of revolutionary regime, and 57% meet Roessler and Verhoeven's (2016) definition of a violent liberation regime.

Our coding scheme has two main advantages. First, it is more appropriate for testing our theory,

which stresses the importance of a violent struggle to gain power but not of other components of social revolutions. Second, our focus on whether the group came into power by fighting is easy to observe and measure, which reduces the subjectiveness of coding decisions by the researcher. Studies of revolutionary regimes require that the regime attempt to radically transform the state and to initiate radical social change. However, such indicators are inherently more subjective and difficult to code, especially when regimes differ greatly in existing levels of state capacity and on factors that would inhibit consolidating control over the countryside.

Covariates. We control for numerous alternative explanations for authoritarian regime breakdown from the existing literature. We draw in particular from Boix and Svolik (2013), who use widely used controls. Three covariates guard against alternative explanations about economic modernization or temporary economic decline: GDP per capita (logged), GDP growth, and oil and production per capita (logged). Others capture demographic and social differences across regimes: population (logged), ethnic fractionalization, and religious fractionalization. We also control for colonizer fixed effects (British, French, Portuguese) because the prospects for decolonization wars differed by colonizer. Finally, we control for year fixed effects to account for time-specific sources of heterogeneity (e.g., changes in the international system that affect prospects for regime stability).

3.2 RESULTS

Table 2 assesses our claim that rebel regimes should break down less frequently than non-rebel regimes. It presents estimates from linear regressions of the following form:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_R R_{it} + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_X + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{1}$$

where Y_{it} is AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN, R_{it} is an indicator for REBEL REGIMES in Columns 1–4 and is disaggregated into COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES and CIVIL WAR WINNERS in Columns 5–8, β_R is the main parameter of interest, $\boldsymbol{X}_{it}$ is a vector of covariates included in Columns 2–4 and 6–8, $\boldsymbol{T}_{it}$ is standard temporal dependence controls (years since last

regime change and cubic splines), and ϵ_{it} is a random error term. Every model in Table 2 clusters standard errors by country.

Table 2: Authoritarian Regime Breakdown

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0391***	-0.0353***	-0.0425***	-0.0422***				
	(0.00687)	(0.00711)	(0.00781)	(0.00798)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0322***	-0.0275***	-0.0335***	-0.0265**
					(0.00746)	(0.00914)	(0.0111)	(0.0117)
Civil war winner					-0.0483***	-0.0461***	-0.0528***	-0.0605***
					(0.00814)	(0.0105)	(0.0109)	(0.0123)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.00175		-0.0137***		-0.00221		-0.0162***
		(0.00416)		(0.00516)		(0.00432)		(0.00604)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0648**		-0.0606*		-0.0625**		-0.0553*
		(0.0315)		(0.0318)		(0.0314)		(0.0314)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000204		0.000175		-0.000235		0.000234
		(0.000567)		(0.000597)		(0.000568)		(0.000603)
ln(population)			0.00298	0.0146***			0.00211	0.0152***
			(0.00361)	(0.00530)			(0.00375)	(0.00519)
Ethnic frac.			0.00427	0.00463			0.00911	0.0136
			(0.0234)	(0.0224)			(0.0254)	(0.0250)
Religious frac.			0.0105	-0.00339			0.0130	-0.00148
			(0.0165)	(0.0173)			(0.0164)	(0.0171)
British colony			-0.00491	-0.00207			-0.00639	-0.00426
			(0.0116)	(0.0110)			(0.0117)	(0.0109)
French colony			0.00284	-0.000816			0.000979	-0.00478
			(0.00966)	(0.00937)			(0.0102)	(0.0101)
Portuguese colony			0.0117	0.00437			0.00526	-0.00862
			(0.0180)	(0.0196)			(0.0179)	(0.0203)
Regime-years	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.014	0.045	0.044	0.048	0.015	0.045	0.044	0.048
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 2 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates clustered by country in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last regime change and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Column 1 shows that rebel regimes are significantly correlated with a lower likelihood of regime breakdown. The predicted probability of regime breakdown in a particular year is more than twice as high for non-rebel regimes than for rebel regimes, 7.5% versus 3.6%. The discrepancies are similar when we disaggregate rebel regimes in Column 5: 4.4% for colonial liberation regimes and 2.8% for civil war winners. Columns 2 and 6 add the economic covariates to the respective

baseline specification, Columns 3 and 7 add the other covariates, and Columns 4 and 8 add every covariate. Comparing the columns with and without covariates shows not only that the covariates do not eliminate the statistically significant relationship between rebel regimes and regime breakdown, but also that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates changes minimally. Using information from these observed covariates shows that the magnitude of bias from unobserved covariates would need to be large in order to explain away the results, as Appendix Table B.1 shows more systematically.

The appendix shows that the estimates are similar under various robustness checks. We performed a jackknife sample sensitivity analysis in which we iteratively drop all observations from one country at a time, which enables demonstrating that the results do not hinge on a single outlier. Nor are our results driven by cases coded as revolutionary in existing datasets. In Appendix Table B.3 we re-estimated Columns 1–4 of Table 2 in three different ways: iteratively dropping every case that Lachapelle et al. (2020), Colgan (2012) and Colgan and Weeks (2015), or Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as revolutionary. A significantly lower probability of breakdown for non-revolutionary rebel regimes also provides evidence that a strong revolutionary ideology is not the primary mechanism driving the results.

Appendix Table B.4 performs additional robustness checks. Panel A runs the models with a logit link. Panel B changes the sample to a cross-section of regimes and estimates Cox proportional hazard models. Finally, in our theory, we distinguished rebel regimes from coup regimes. Although both types of regimes achieve power by force, coup regimes generally lack similar sources of elite unity as rebel regimes. Panel C of this table shows evidence consistent with this argument. The sample consists only of regimes that gained power via force, therefore isolating the comparison of rebel regimes to coup regimes.

3.3 Instrumenting for Colonial Liberation Regimes

Assessing the causal effect of rebel regimes on regime breakdown poses difficult endogeneity problems. Despite controlling for commonly used covariates in the regimes literature and performing

various forms of sensitivity analysis, rebel regimes clearly do not emerge randomly. To address this concern, we exploit a source of plausible exogeneity in colonial liberation regimes: percentage of a country's territory that was suitable for colonial European settlement. The 2SLS results are qualitatively similar to the results found above, and hence more convincingly establish a negative causal relationship. We briefly summarize the justification for the instrument here, and present extensive supporting detail in Appendix B.2.

The presence of European settlers correlates strongly with decolonization wars in Africa. After World War II, officials in most imperial metropoles introduced decolonization reforms, but these reforms were blocked in colonies with large European settler populations (including in independent South Africa and quasi-independent Rhodesia). Europeans could create large settlements in which they replicated European agricultural practices only in specific areas of Africa. Thus, we can use climatic factors that influenced prospects for European settlement to provide an exogenous instrument for colonial liberation regimes. We use a variable from Paine (2019*b*) that combines GIS data for climate, rainfall, elevation, and tsetse fly prevalence. Each variable is measured "pre-treatment," thus addressing endogeneity concerns. Regarding the exclusion restriction, there are no clear channels—other than contested decolonization—through which these climatic factors would affect post-colonial regime stability, and sensitivity analysis shows that the results are robust to moderately large violations of the exclusion restriction.

3.4 COUPS

Among the various events that constitute an end to an authoritarian regime, our theory most directly applies to successful coups. In Table 3, we change the dependent variable in Equation 1 to SUCCESSFUL COUP, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a coup that successfully removed the incumbent occurred in a particular year, and 0 otherwise. The sequence of specifications is identical to those in Table 2. Only three of the twenty-one rebel regimes have ever experienced a successful coup, compared to half of the non-rebel regimes. Columns 1–4 show that rebel regimes are significantly less likely to experience successful coups, and this result is robust to includ-

ing controls. The results are similar when we disaggregate rebel regimes into colonial liberation regimes and civil war winners (Columns 5–8). The results are also similar under the same robustness checks as above: logit link, cross-section of regimes, or comparing rebel regimes only to coup regimes (Appendix Table B.7).

Table 3: Successful Coups

	DV: Successful Coup							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0295***	-0.0209***	-0.0294***	-0.0271***				
	(0.00683)	(0.00634)	(0.00673)	(0.00686)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0218***	-0.0175**	-0.0284***	-0.0218**
					(0.00774)	(0.00857)	(0.00905)	(0.0106)
Civil war winner					-0.0418***	-0.0265***	-0.0308***	-0.0343***
					(0.00523)	(0.00565)	(0.00634)	(0.00730)
Regime-years	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.010	0.041	0.040	0.043	0.011	0.041	0.040	0.043
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 3 presents a series of linear regression estimates with country-clustered standard error estimates in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last successful coup and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

4 Evidence of Military Power Sharing in Rebel Regimes

We now provide empirical evidence of our proposed mechanism: rebel regimes derive their stability through sharing power with military elites. First, we show that rebel regimes more frequently delegate control over the military via a stable appointment of a Minister of Defense. Second, we compiled information on the composition of the state military after rebel takeover to show that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, rebel leaders dominated the state military, which provided openings to appoint key allies to positions of power. Third, we use biographical information to show that elites who are appointed as the Minister of Defense in rebel regimes were indeed high-ranking rebel commanders who played an important role in the war.

4.1 Military Power Sharing

Rebel regimes are more likely than non-rebel regimes to delegate control of the military to the Ministry of Defense, as we demonstrate in Table 4. We measure this by whether a ruler appoints a Minister of Defense and did not shuffle the position within the past year. As discussed above, the Minister of Defense sits between the president and the chiefs of staff of different military branches, and coordinates key aspects of defense policy. By contrast, when there is no Minister of Defense (either because the ruler eliminates the post, keeps it vacant, or holds it himself), the president can personally make key decisions about the military, and hence does not share power with high-level military officials.

To code Minister of Defense appointments, we use the Europa World Year Book (1960-2005) and data from the Central Intelligence Agency (2006-2017). Collectively, these sources contain annual records of the names and positions of all ministerial posts for every African country between 1960 and 2017. From these records we created a dummy variable, DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT, that equals 1 if someone other than the ruler was appointed as the Minister of Defense; and 0 otherwise. We used this to then create our main variable, DEFENSE MINISTER SAME, that equals 1 if someone other than the ruler was appointed as the Minister of Defense *and* that same person held the defense portfolio in the previous year (and is set to missing in the first year of each regime). This variable takes a value of 0 if DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT equals 0, or if within the previous year the position had rotated to someone else. Accounting for the stability of these appointments is relevant in the context of elite politics in Africa. Leaders routinely practiced the "revolving door policy" of rotating cabinet ministers to try to prevent any one elite from consolidating power within a particular ministry (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Hassan 2017). Naming a Minister of Defense but frequently appointing new people to the position indicates a low degree of true power sharing. We therefore use DEFENSE MINISTER SAME for our main regressions in the body of the paper, but report results using DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT in the appendix.

Basic summary statistics highlight the stark discrepancy in military power sharing between rebel

regimes and others. Rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in 83% of regime-years. In fact, over half of all rebel regimes appointed a Defense Minister in *every* year. By contrast, non-rebel regimes appointed a Minister of Defense in only 56% of regime-years. Moreover, Minister of Defense appointments in rebel regimes were more stable, reflecting less frequent shuffling. Rebel regimes appointed the *same* Minister of Defense as the previous year in 65% of regime-years, compared to a corresponding figure of 34% for non-rebel regimes.

Mozambique, for instance, has had only five different Ministers of Defense since gaining independence in 1975, and the average tenure of a Defense Minister is 8.4 years. Ethiopia's post-1991 rebel regime has had only seven different Ministers of Defense. In both cases, the president has never personally held the Defense Minister portfolio or left the post vacant. Even Robert Mugabe, who had a reputation as a strongman dictator while ruling Zimbabwe from independence in 1980 until 2017, made stable Minister of Defense appointments: the country had only six different Ministers of Defense during his tenure.

By contrast, leaders of non-rebel regimes often prefer to keep the Defense portfolio for themselves. Dawada Jawara of Gambia, for instance, appointed himself as Defense Minister from 1965 until 1992. When leaders of non-rebel regimes do name a Minister of Defense, they tend to shuffle cabinet appointments frequently to prevent any one elite from gaining too much influence. Burkina Faso has had nineteen different Ministers of Defense since the country became independent in 1960, *and* in many years the incumbent president held the position himself. The average tenure of a Defense Minister was less than three years. In the Central African Republic, a Minister of Defense was appointed in only 36% of years between 1960 and 2017, with an average tenure of less than two years.

In Table 4, we assess this relationship statistically. We estimate the same linear regression models as in Equation 1 except we change the dependent variable. The sequence of specifications and covariates is identical to those in Table 2. The aggregate rebel regimes variable covaries positively and significantly with more stable Defense Minister appointments (Columns 1–4). The

Table 4: Military Power Sharing

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER SAME							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.301***	0.237***	0.186***	0.186***				
	(0.0546)	(0.0566)	(0.0576)	(0.0598)				
Col. liberation regime					0.307***	0.272***	0.247***	0.270***
					(0.0706)	(0.0649)	(0.0642)	(0.0757)
Civil war winner					0.290***	0.181**	0.101	0.0761
					(0.0748)	(0.0765)	(0.0743)	(0.0749)
Regime-years	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458
Regimes	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.065	0.121	0.160	0.163	0.065	0.122	0.164	0.168
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table 4 presents a series of linear regression estimates with country-clustered standard error estimates in parentheses. The sample here is smaller than that in Table 2 because we set DEFENSE MINISTER SAME to missing in each country's first year in the dataset $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}\ p < 0.05,^{*}\ p < 0.1$.

remaining columns disaggregate rebel regimes and show that the result is stronger for COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES, for which the coefficient estimates are larger in magnitude and statistically significant in every specification. Although CIVIL WAR WINNERS are significantly distinguished from non-rebel regimes in the most parsimonious specifications, this indicator loses statistical significance under different permutations of covariates.[6]

Numerous robustness checks yield similar findings. Appendix Table B.8 changes the dependent variable to DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT. Table B.9 performs the same three basic robustness checks as for Table 2: logit models, cross-section of regimes, and comparing rebel regimes only to coup regimes.

A possible reason for the discrepancy between rates of power sharing for COLONIAL LIBERATION REGIMES and CIVIL WAR WINNERS is differences in the length of the civil war to gain power. The average colonial liberation regime in our dataset fought for 12.6 years before gaining power, whereas post-independence civil war winners fought on average only for 5.8 years. Across the

[6]Because regime transition years usually produce cabinet shuffling, we also estimated these specifications from while setting the first year of each regime to missing. The results are qualitatively unchanged.

entire sample, longer conflicts covary with more power sharing, which we highlight in Figure 2. Among the six cases in which the president named the same Minister of Defense in less than half the years of the regime, all experienced struggles of seven years or shorter.

Figure 2: Length of Rebellion and Military Power Sharing in Rebel Regimes



Notes: The horizontal axis is number of years that the rebel group fought before gaining power, and the vertical axis is the same military power sharing dependent variable from Table 4. The regression line is in black, and the dashed gray line is the average value of the dependent variable among non-rebel regimes. The solid dots are the colonial liberation cases and the open dots are civil war winners.

4.2 Transforming the Military

We expect rebel regimes to facilitate peaceful power sharing with military elites because, upon taking power, victorious rebel groups enjoy a unique opportunity to transform the state military. Thus, rulers can delegate military authority to officials with whom they previously shared power during the rebellion. We assess this claim systematically by compiling information on the state military for every rebel regime after taking power. We coded each case into one of three categories: Complete Military Transformation, Military Integration, and No Military Transformation. Table 5 summarizes the cases, and Appendix A.2 provides detailed coding notes and citations.[7]

[7]Our coding exercise for military transformation complements that in Lachapelle et al. (2020), although—per our discussion above—our set of rebel regime overlaps minimally with their set of

Table 5: Military Transformation in Rebel Regimes

Complete Military Transformation		Military Integration	No Military Transformation
Algeria 62–92	Ivory Coast 11–NA	Burundi 06–NA	Morocco 56–NA
Angola 75–NA	Liberia 97–03	Chad 90–NA	Tunisia 56–11
Chad 82–90	Mozambique 75–NA	DRC 97–NA	
Congo-B 97–NA	Rwanda 94–NA	Namibia 90–NA	
Eritrea 93–NA	Uganda 86–NA	South Africa 94–NA	
Ethiopia 91–NA	Zimbabwe 80–NA	South Sudan 11–NA	
Guinea-Bissau 74–80			

In thirteen of the twenty-one rebel regime cases, the rebel military completely transformed the military by displacing the existing state armed forces and replacing them with their own members. Consequently, members of the victorious rebel group dominated the new military. In most cases, the national military disintegrated by the end of the conflict, whether because European colonial soldiers fled the country (leaving African colonial soldiers at the mercy of the rebels), or because of defeat on the battlefield. In Mozambique, the guerrilla forces that fought Portugal in the liberation war became the new national army upon independence. In fact, FRELIMO even refused to integrate into their ranks African soldiers who had previously fought for the Portuguese Army. Following the defeat of the military government in Ethiopia in 1991, the new regime disbanded the national army and replaced the armed forces with their own fighters. In Zimbabwe, the white colonial military remained intact, but military integration favored ZANU so blatantly that there was no pretense of sharing power with other organizations and we code it as complete military transformation.

These cases are also characterized by their lack of military integration *across* different rebel factions, even when multiple rebel groups participated in overthrowing the government. For example, in Zimbabwe, Mugabe used his ZANLA troops to subjugate ZIPRA forces. In Angola, MPLA monopolized control of political positions at independence and their armed wing FAPLA (formerly EPLA) became the state military while excluding rebel troops from UNITA and FNLA, who then fought against MPLA for decades.

revolutionary regimes in Africa.

In six cases, the rebel military was integrated with another armed force. In these cases, rebel groups were ascendant in the new military, but did not dominate it to the same extent as in cases of complete transformation. In South Africa, Namibia, and Burundi, the civil war settlement called for the rebel military to be integrated into the existing state military. Each regime began in the 1990s or later, as the Cold War ended and international actors intervened to try to end long-running civil wars. In South Africa, members of the ANC and other African groups joined officials from the white apartheid regime. Africans from uMkhonto we Sizwe (the military wing of the ANC) and other armed groups came to dominate the highest ranks as well as the rank and file, while white officers from the former SADF remained prominent among other officer positions. Chad and the DRC differ: although rebels in each case achieved outright military victory over the previous state military, their relative weakness upon winning compelled them to share power with other armed opposition groups. In South Sudan, despite creating a new country, the new state military amalgamated various rebel groups that had fought against the Sudanese government. In all cases, power sharing occurred *across* organizations, in contrast to our primary focus on sharing power between civilians and military officials *within* the same organization.

Rebel forces played a minimal role in the subsequent state military in only two cases, Morocco and Tunisia during their struggle to gain independence from France. In both cases, contrary to Algeria, guerrilla fighters were less important than peaceful nationalist organizations.

4.3 Minister of Defense Biographies

In Table 4, we use the stable appointment of a Minister of Defense to measure whether a ruler delegates control over the military to the Ministry of Defense. Yet our theory offers more specific expectations for rebel regimes. We posit that building a private army from scratch and fighting for power should facilitate peaceful power sharing specifically because the ruler builds relationships by delegating control to commanders during the rebellion. Thus, we expect that the Ministers of Defense in rebel regimes should tend to be important members of the founding rebellion, as opposed to family members, obscure actors lacking any power base, or members of the previous

state military or from other rebel groups that fought for power (i.e., distinct from the political organization to which the president belongs).

To assess this expectation, we compiled biographical details about the individuals that served as Ministers of Defense in rebel regimes.[8] We confirm that elites who served as the Minister of Defense were influential co-conspirators from the war that launched the regime. Among rebel regimes that completely transformed the military upon gaining power (see below), within the first twenty years of the regime, 87% of the Defense Ministers were important figures from the wars.[9] These actors amassed operational control over troops and gained legitimacy from the founding struggle, which enabled them to credibly threaten the leader if he attempted to personalize power.

Angola's first Minister of Defense, Iko Carreira, served as head of security during the liberation war against Portugal. During that time, Carreira built the the army that would become the state military force after independence. Pedro Sebastiao, who was the third Minister of Defense in Angola, was a commander of the armed wing of the MPLA. He led the MPLA forces in the Battle of Nto, which was decisive in Angola's path to independence. In Eritrea, Petros Solomon was appointed as the first Defense Minister following independence. Solomon was a leading figure during the armed struggle. He was one of three members of the party's military committee, the head of the military intelligence unit, and a member of the political bureau of the party's Central Committee. Guinea-Bissau's first Defense Minister, Joao Bernardo Vieira, a celebrated guerrilla commander, had been the police commissar and military chief in southern Guinea-Bissau during the war. In Mozambique, Tobias Joaquim Dai was the Minister of Defense from 2000 to 2008. He

[8]Appendix Table B.19 summarizes the biographical information for the Ministers of Defense in all rebel regimes. We exclude temporary or transitional appointments by restricting attention to Defense Ministers who remained in their position for at least three years.

[9]There are a small number of Defense Ministers for which we could not find biographical information, and we exclude these observations from the calculation. However, even if we impose the conservative assumption that *every* missing observation not an important figure from the war, this percentage is still 76%.

had been the Commander of the FRELIMO Army during the civil war.

Rebel rulers rarely named Defense Ministers from either the previous regime or from competing rebel factions. Above we noted the lack of military integration in Angola and Zimbabwe despite multiple rebel groups. The handful of exceptions come from the cases in which, despite gaining the presidency, the rebel military units were integrated into the existing state army without displacing it. For example, the civil war settlement in Burundi called for a 50-50 distribution of Hutu (rebels) and Tutsi (incumbent regime) in the military. Although a rebel leader became president, the first two Ministers of Defense following the settlement were high-ranking members of the extant state military. In Chad, Idriss Déby came to power in 1990 with a small rebel group. Although the existing military was unable to stop his advance, Déby was in a relatively weak position upon attaining power and pursued a policy of reconciliation with competing rebel factions. As we anticipate given the short rebellion to gain power (one year) and Déby's consequent impediments to placing allies in top positions, he frequently shuffled the Minister of Defense. The only person to hold the position for three years was Mahamat Nouri, a high-ranking official in the prior Hissène Habré regime who did not participate in Déby's rebellion. But not all military integration cases shared the top military post outside the rebel group. In both South Africa and Namibia, the Defense Minister has always been a member of the majority-rule rebels.

5 Alternative Explanations

Does sharing power with military elites account for the durability of rebel regimes, or are other factors more important? Here we present evidence consistent with our proposed mechanism, and show that various alternatives account for less covariation between rebel regimes and regime breakdown: authoritarian parties and subjugation of the military, revolutionary transformation of state and society, sharing power with civilians or across ethnic groups, and other alternatives suggested by the civil war literature.

5.1 Military Power Sharing Compared to Party Institutions

Many argue that authoritarian regimes with party institutions are less likely to break down than others (Gandhi 2008). Similarly, existing studies of revolutionary regimes posit that the revolution enables elites to build cohesive ruling parties that they use to subjugate the armed forces via partisan control (Lachapelle et al. 2020), which contrasts with our mechanism: delegating control and sharing power with military elites. We first compare the rival theories and then provide supporting empirical evidence for ours.

In our theory, increased trust facilitates *credible power-sharing deals*, whereas existing scholarship highlights inherent affinity facilitated by partisan ties as a *stand-alone* mechanism. For example, Levitsky and Way (2013, 10) posit that revolutionary armies are "highly partisan and thoroughly committed to the regime" because "the army and other security forces are almost invariably commanded by cadres from the liberation struggle and imbued with a revolutionary ideology." Similarly, Lyons (2016, 170) argues that "the intense socialization and solidarity formed during armed struggle serve as the bases of collective identities that are vital to success on the battlefield and which are sustained during peacetime."[10] In these accounts, the military remains loyal due to ideological or partisan ties, which makes sharing power unnecessary. Why would the leader make a concession if he does not face a credible threat from high-ranking military officers? In fact, Colgan and Weeks (2015) make this precise argument: revolutionary leaders should tend to personalize rather than to share power.

By contrast, we contend that partisanship, ideological bonds, and other sources of inherent affinity are—by themselves—not sufficient. A dictator has no intrinsic friends. For any leader highly reliant on his military to gain and maintain power, we expect them to face internal challengers if he excludes high-ranking elites from power and spoils. Indeed, autocrats are commonly overthrown by co-ethnics and even their own family members. This problem is even more pressing in rebel

[10]Green (2018) proposes a similar mechanism to explain the distinct outcome of commanders' ability to control wartime atrocities by their soldiers.

regimes. Why would comrades with access to guns sit quietly if the ruler shuts them out of power and denies them the spoils of victory—even if they belong to a shared party? Military elites who held important posts during the war pose the most credible threats because of their positions in the military hierarchy and because they command key operational units. This leaves buying off military elites as the only viable option.

Overall, the experience of delegating control during the war and then replacing the state military with the rebel military provides the *latent foundations* for credible commitments. However, to truly commit, the ruler must then take the next step to *actually delegate control* to high-ranking military officials. Otherwise, we expect that inherent affinity alone will be insufficient to save the leader.

In Table 6, we re-run the specifications from our main regime breakdown regressions (Table 2) while controlling for various post-treatment mediators. At the bottom of the table, we report the percent decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient estimates for the rebel regimes variables when controlling for the specified mediating factor.[11]

The main takeaway from the table is that Minister of Defense appointments account for a greater fraction of the covariation between the rebel regime indicators and regime breakdown than the party-based alternative explanations. In Column 1, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate for rebel regimes diminishes by 43% when controlling for stable Minister of Defense appointments.[12] Column 2 shows that the magnitude of the decrease is similar for both types of rebel regimes, and that the colonial liberation indicator loses statistical significance when accounting for stable

[11]The sample differs across the columns because of missing data on the mediators, and the percent decreases are based on comparing the coefficient estimates shown in this table to unreported coefficient estimates in specifications that include only country-years with data on the mediator but omit the mediator as a covariate. Positive values for the percent decrease denote that the coefficient estimate for a given rebel regime indicator is larger when controlling for that mediator.

[12]For each regime, we calculate the fraction of years with a stable Minister of Defense appointment.

Military of Defense appointments. Chad's 1982–90 regime provides an example of a rebel regime breaking down because the ruler personalized power. President Hissène Habré delegated the same person as Minister of Defense for only one year of his short regime. In 1989, he purged his top three military officials. One was Idriss Déby, who organized the rebellion that overthrew Habre the next year.

The remaining columns consider alternative explanations (see Appendix C.1 for more information on each variable). An indicator for whether a regime has an inherited party is strongly correlated with both the outcome and with rebel regimes (Columns 3 and 4). The latter reflects the dual party and military wings in most rebellions, and only two of the twenty-one rebel regimes had not already created a party before gaining power. However, rebel regimes correlate strongly with regime breakdown even when compared only to regimes that lacked a party before gaining power (not reported), which accounts for the comparatively small decreases in the magnitude of the coefficient estimates for the rebel regime indicators shown in Table 6. The results are similar when controlling for Geddes et al.'s (2018) indicator for party regimes (Columns 5 and 6), which is based on the more subjective assessment of whether the party with the most important decision-making body within the regime.

We then assess specific ways in which parties might subjugate their militaries. Whether controlling for Geddes et al.'s (2018) ordinal variable for party control over the military or an indicator for a commissar system (the highest value of this variable), the coefficient estimates for rebel regimes change only minimally. The latter finding reflects the rarity of commissar systems in Africa, and the only exceptions are two rebel regimes (Angola, Mozambique) and three non-rebel regimes (Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia). Finally, we assess a different possibility inspired by cases such as the Soviet Union. Perhaps rebel regimes are typically able to construct strong counterbalancing security forces that enable them to overwhelm and subjugate a conventional military with experience in rebellion. However, rebel regimes do not significantly differ with regard to counterbalancing units, and this variable accounts for minimal covariation between rebel regimes and regime break-

down.[13]

[13]This variable is from De Bruin (2020). Her dataset includes five additional measures of counterbalancing; we verified in unreported regressions that the results are similar regardless of the measure used.

Table 6: Controlling for Mediators

DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Rebel regime	-0.0233**		-0.0322**		-0.0410***		-0.0385***		-0.0414***		-0.0453***	
	(0.0101)		(0.0120)		(0.0125)		(0.0101)		(0.00922)		(0.0129)	
Col. liberation		-0.0179		-0.0342**		-0.0310*		-0.0338***		-0.0319***		-0.0376***
		(0.0108)		(0.0150)		(0.0155)		(0.0117)		(0.00988)		(0.0121)
Civil war winner		-0.0317***		-0.0282*		-0.0583***		-0.0468***		-0.0548***		-0.0601***
		(0.0117)		(0.0141)		(0.0144)		(0.0136)		(0.0107)		(0.0181)
MoD same (avg.)	-0.0621***	-0.0614***										
	(0.0200)	(0.0200)										
Inherited party			-0.0397***	-0.0401***								
			(0.0144)	(0.0145)								
GWF party regime					-0.0426***	-0.0441***						
					(0.00999)	(0.0104)						
Party control of mil.							-0.00699**	-0.00729**				
							(0.00328)	(0.00323)				
Commissar system									-0.0211*	-0.0246**		
									(0.0122)	(0.0121)		
# paramilitaries											-0.00663	-0.00672
											(0.00623)	(0.00623)
Country-years	2,322	2,322	1,744	1,744	1,894	1,894	1,744	1,744	2,354	2,354	1,220	1,220
R-squared	0.020	0.020	0.021	0.021	0.024	0.025	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.017	0.022	0.023
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Percent decrease in coefficient estimate when controlling for mediator												
Rebel regime	-43%		-22%		-14%		-7%		-3%		-6%	
Col. liberation		-46%		-12%		-27%		-13%		-8%		-7%
Civil war winner		-39%		-39%		3%		2%		1%		-4%

Notes: Table 6 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates clustered by country in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last regime change and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

5.2 Other Alternative Explanations

We evaluate several additional alternative explanations in the appendix. First, existing accounts link revolutionary regimes to the transformation of society, following Huntington's (1968, 292) well-known aphorism, "He who controls the countryside controls the country." Levitsky and Way (2013) and Lachapelle et al. (2020) argue that gaining power through violence, unleashing a program of social revolution, and defeating counterrevolutionaries eliminates alternative centers of power that underpinned the previous regime. Even if true on average for the broader global sample of revolutionary regimes, this mechanism does not help to explain the durability of African rebel regimes, as we explain in Appendix C.2. Throughout history, rulers in Africa have typically failed to exercise effective control over extended territories (Herbst 2000). Even when rebel groups have captured the state, they have typically failed to implement successful land reform or otherwise uproot bases of societal opposition. Using various quantitative measures of state control over society, we demonstrate that rebel regimes in Africa are not distinguished on measures of societal control.

Another possibility is that delegating control to the military is not the only way in which rebel regimes share power, and that other forms of power sharing are more important for explaining regime survival. Our theory suggests this is unlikely because the aspects of the rebellion we highlight as facilitating credible power sharing apply to coercive dimensions only. In Appendix C.3, we show that rebel regimes are not more likely to name a vice president or prime minister (the highest-ranking civilian position in the cabinet) and they do not engage in broader ethnic power sharing. The converse possibility is that rebel regimes are mainly a front for a single ethnic group to dominate others, perhaps because this is easier to achieve by displacing ethnic rivals via a rebellion. By contrast, we demonstrate that the rebellions that launched most rebel regimes were multi-ethnic and that, like typical African regimes, their post-seizure cabinets usually contained multiple ethnic groups.

Finally, in Appendix C.4 we engage with several alternatives suggested by the broader literature

on civil wars. Lachapelle et al. (2020) suggest that counterrevolutions promote elite unity after revolutionary regimes gain power, and we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they fought an armed challenger within five years of the regime gaining power. We engage with research on how the mode of civil war termination affects prospects for recurrence (Toft 2009) in two ways: disaggregating rebel regimes by whether they were established by outright rebel victory or a settlement with the previous government, and disaggregating all regimes by the most recent way in which a civil war ended (outright rebel victory, outright government victory, settlement, no civil war or none ended). Research on civil war termination also highlights the sharp increase in negotiated settlements to end civil wars after the Cold War ended, and concomitant implication of security sector reform programs. To capture this idea, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they have their origins during the Cold War. We also control for other civil war factors that affect regime stability: ongoing civil war, refugees, and post-Cold War.

6 Conclusion

This article studied the tradeoff that dictators face when they contemplate sharing power with other elite actors, in particular military elites. We argue and show evidence that rulers of rebel regimes typically face advantages for solving this dilemma. To gain power, they need to build a private military. During the rebellion, they can move allies into high-ranking positions within the military hierarchy. Upon taking power, they typically supplant or dramatically overhaul the existing state military with their own forces. Then, to credibly commit to spoils, they usually share power with other military elites, which we proxy with data on the Ministry of Defense portfolio. These circumstances differentiate rulers of rebel regimes from those who inherit an existing military and whose officer corps view themselves as rivals to the new ruler. Such regimes are tenuous regardless of the ruler's power-sharing decision. Overall, we show the rebel regimes in Africa survive longer, share power more frequently, and face fewer successful coups than other regimes.

We also suggest the need to consider rebel regimes amid broader debates about causes of democratization in Africa. The stability created by sharing power between rulers and military elites

undermines long-run prospects for transitioning to multiparty democracy. Consequently, many exceptions to post-Cold War democratization in Africa had origins in violent conflict. Some of these cases were colonial liberation regimes, whereas civil war winners formed later (e.g., Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda). Civil war winners had elements of electoral competition after supplanting white minority rule, namely Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. In Zimbabwe, ZANU used its coercive advantage gained from fighting for power to displace competitors. South Africa and Namibia have each experienced less overt repression, although the party founded during the liberation struggle has won every election since taking power, and most experts deem electoral competition in Namibia in particular as unfair.

Finally, we situate African cases within a general framework for understanding power sharing and authoritarian durability. Despite the general weakness of formal institutions in the region, many African authoritarian regimes have survived for long periods. In some cases, weak formal institutions facilitated the survival of personalist regimes, as with Felix Houphouet-Boigny in Cote d'Ivoire or Mobutu Seso Seko in Zaire. However, we have identified a set of African regimes that have survived for long periods of time while sharing power with one of the gravest threats to the rulers: military elites. This general dilemma of sharing power with the military applies to any regime. Yet, in other regards, African rebel regimes are distinct from rebel regimes elsewhere. We discussed some historically rooted impediments to consolidating control over the countryside in most African countries. Existing hypotheses that revolutionary regimes typically establish firm control over society are more plausible elsewhere. Consider, for example, three classic cases in which social revolutions preceded long-lasting authoritarian regimes: China, Russia, and Vietnam. Each country experienced a long history of a state governed by members of the dominant ethnic group. Although these factors did not preordain that the revolutionary group would consolidate control over the countryside, they created more favorable conditions than in African states lacking a similar history. Understanding these similarities and differences will help to situate authoritarianism in Africa in a broader global context.

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Online Appendix

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A Data Appendix

A.1 Coding Rebel Regimes

To code civil wars in which the rebels were victorious, we primarily used the Correlates of War dataset and their associated coding books (COW; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Dixon and Sarkees 2015), while also consulting other widely used conflict datasets to verify questionable cases and to ensure we did not miss any (Fearon and Laitin 2003, or FL; Armed Conflict Database, or ACD, Gleditsch et al. 2002). We included both intra-state wars as well as extra-state wars between African rebel groups and European colonizers (in COW, an extra-state war is one in which a member of the inter-state system fights a non-state actor outside its borders). We then matched these conflicts with regimes from Geddes et al. (2014) (GWF).

The three conflict datasets each use slightly different coding procedures which, in addition to possible measurement error, lead to slightly different lists of wars. FL provide one entry for each distinct war, and their main operational criterion is that at least 1,000 battle deaths occur during the course of the war (the same standard that we use). This is less stringent than COW's standard of 1,000 *annual* battle deaths, although in their article FL state that they doubt all of COW's conflicts meet this standard (thus producing a list quite similar to FL's). ACD codes whether each year of a conflict produces at least 25 battle deaths or at least 1,000 battle deaths.

Both FL and COW explicitly code whether rebels won a civil war. One problem, which necessitates complementing the coding procedure with reading descriptions of each case, is that in a small number of conflicts, a regime change occurs in the middle of the conflict. These cases are usually easier to discern from COW because they code distinct episodes within conflicts that FL code as a single civil war. For example, FL code a single civil war in Congo-Brazzaville from 1997 to 2002 that ended with government victory. By contrast, COW codes one conflict in 1997 and a second from 1998–99 (the discrepancy in end years comes from low-level fighting in 2000–02). The bout of fighting in 1997 ended in *rebel* victory, and the second in government victory. Thus, FL's dataset do not list Congo-Brazzaville as a case involving rebel victory because they code the entire period of fighting as a single civil war. As another example, in Sierra Leone (see detailed notes below), rebel victory occurred in 1998 in a war that COW codes as lasting from 1998–2000.

Colonial liberation wars. COW codes outright rebel victory for the anti-colonial extra-state wars preceding the following regimes: Morocco 56–NA, Tunisia 56–11, Algeria 62–92, Mozambique 75–NA, and Namibia 90–NA. For Angola 75–NA, they code the liberation struggle as ending with Portugal withdrawing (indicating a clear rebel victory) and the conflict transforming to a non-state war among the different rebel factions, in which the MPLA gained control. COW states that Guinea-Bissau 74–80 does not meet their death threshold (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 534), although according to FL's dataset notes, the total death toll was 15,000, hence meeting our threshold of 1,000. Eritrea 93–NA is another case that COW codes as rebel victory, but in an intra-state war within Ethiopia. The wars for majority rule in both Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa are also intra-state wars. The war that yielded the Zimbabwe 80–NA regime ended with a negotiated settlement in 1979, but it meets our standard of rebel victory because one of the rebel groups, ZANU, won the subsequent elections and took power. For South Africa 94–NA, the only relevant entry from COW is an intercommunal war between the government-sponsored militia Inkatha and the African National Congress (ANC). However, other civil war datasets code a conflict as occurring

between the South African government and ANC (FL, ACD), which is also reflected in standard narratives of the struggle (e.g., Reno 2011, 105–18). Thus, this case is similar to Zimbabwe: the war ended in a negotiated settlement, and we code the subsequent regime as a rebel regime because ANC gained control of the government.

Civil war winners. COW codes outright rebel victory for the wars preceding the following regimes: Chad 82–90, Uganda 86–NA, Chad 90–NA, Ethiopia 91–NA, Rwanda 94–NA, Congo-Brazzaville 97–NA, DRC 97–NA, Ivory Coast 11–NA, South Sudan 11–NA. South Sudan is somewhat complicated because the war ended in 2002 with a scheduled referendum in 2006 for southern independence. The referendum passed, which enabled South Sudan to gain independence five years later. Despite the delay, the independence of South Sudan resulted unambiguously from the Second Sudanese War, hence our coding of a rebel regime. COW codes the war preceding Burundi 05–NA as ending in a compromise. We code this case as rebel regime for same reason as South Africa and Zimbabwe: the rebels' political party, CNDD-FDD, won the post-settlement elections. COW also codes the war preceding Liberia 97–03 as ending in a compromise, and Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Party won the post-settlement election (with Taylor becoming president).

Not coded as rebel regimes. There are four cases in which no regime follows a rebel victory because there is a warlord or transition period: Chad 79–82, Somalia 91–NA, Libya 2011–NA, and Central African Republic 2014–NA. The first two cases are in GWF's dataset, which goes through 2010. We do not include any GWF years with warlord or transition regimes in our dataset. To be consistent with this rule after 2010, we excluded all country-years in which either Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) codes a transition year for the regime or in which the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR; Vogt et al. 2015) codes it as a period of state collapse. Thus, we drop the Libya 2011–NA and Central African Republic 2014–NA cases.

Two cases that do not meet our standards for a rebel regime deserve additional comment. First, Guinea-Bissau's post-1999 regimes. For Guinea-Bissau, there is a "Military War" entry in COW for 1998–99. In this conflict, the incumbent president (João Bernardo Vieira) dismissed his military chief of staff, Ansumane Mané. When Vieira sent troops to arrest Mané, the army split into two; a year later, Mané's troops won. This case violates our requirement that the rebel leader is excluded from the government when the war begins. Instead, this case is a purge/coup (i.e., involving insiders) that generated war-level casualties, but unlike our rebel regime cases, Mané did not have to build a private military. An informative contrast is with the civil war in Chad from 1989–90, which brought to power the Chad 90–NA regime. In that case, the incumbent president Hissène Habré purged his senior advisor Idriss Déby, who fled the capital along with two other senior advisors and seventy-four soldiers into Sudan. After organizing there and in Libya, they built up a new army of 2,000 troops that defeated Habré's army in 1990. Thus, the key difference is that a *privately organized force* rather than existing units of the military defeated the incumbent ruler.

Second, Sierra Leone 97–98. Sierra Leone's first civil war ended in 1996 with a compromise, and the rebel group RUF lost in the subsequent elections. However, the democratically elected president was overthrown in a coup in 1997, and the coup leader invited RUF to join the government. This case fails our standard for a rebel regime for two reasons. First, RUF gained power in the central government because of a coup rather than from winning a civil war. Second, unlike the cases

listed above in which the war ended in a negotiated settlement (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Burundi), RUF did not win the subsequent elections nor did they control the presidency.

A.2 Coding Military Transformation in Rebel Regimes

A.2.1 Complete Military Transformation

Algeria 62–92. The main rebel group that fought for independence in Algeria was the National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale; FLN). Its armed wing was the National Liberation Army (Armee de Liberation Nationale; ALN), which was renamed the People's National Army (Armee Nationale Populaire; ANP) in 1962. "As the new Algerian national army grew out of the anti-colonial resistance organization, this organization is coded rather than the colonial army. In 1957, a brutal French counter-insurgency campaign broke down the organization of the Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN) . . . The military units inherited at independence combined units from the internal and external armies as well as the French colonial army" (Harkness 2018 appendix). Entelis (1994, 206) reiterates that the Algerian military consisted "primarily" of the ANP (formerly, ALN).

Angola 75–NA. Three main rebel groups fought for independence in Angola: MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA. MPLA gained control of the capital at independence as the liberation struggle transformed into a civil war with FNLA and UNITA. MPLA's anti-colonial military became the state military upon independence. "In the early 1960s, the MPLA named its guerrilla forces the People's Army for the Liberation of Angola (Exercito Popular de Libertacao de Angola—EPLA) . . . [In 1974,] the MPLA announced the formation of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola—FAPLA), which replaced the EPLA. By 1976 FAPLA had been transformed from lightly armed guerrilla units into a national army capable of sustained field operations. This transformation was gradual until the Soviet-Cuban intervention and ensuing UNITA insurgency, when the sudden and large-scale inflow of heavy weapons and accompanying technicians and advisers quickened the pace of institutional change" (**?**, 210-11). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Chad 82–90. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Goukouni Oueddei was the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armees du Nord; FAN). There are three important antecedent events described in COW. (1) The Chadian government faced a rebellion by the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) that ended in 1971, although FROLINAT remained intact. It later split into two factions, FAN and the People's Armed Forces (Forces Armees Populaires; FAP). (2) FAP fought a rebellion against the government from 1977 to 1978, and the government allied with FAN to help end the rebellion. President Malloum named the leader of FAN, Hissène Habré, as prime minister, although the government's accord with FAN also called for military integration, which was not implemented. (3) In 1979, FAN (later joined by FAP) attacked government troops, leading to international mediation and the creation of a coalition government in which the leader of FAP, Oueddei, became president; the leader of the (former) government armed forces (Chadian Armed Forces/Forces Armees Tchadiennes/FAT), Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue, became vice president; and Habré became defense minister. This begins a three-year warlord period in GWF's dataset.

The rebellion that engendered the rebel regime of 1982–90 began in 1980, when Habré's troops

attacked FAT and FAP troops. Following FAN's overthrow of Oueddei in 1982, "After Habré consolidated his authority and assumed the presidency in 1982, his victorious army, the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armees du Nord—FAN), became the nucleus of a new national army. The force was officially constituted in January 1983, when the various pro-Habré contingents were merged and renamed FANT [Chadian National Armed Forces/Forces Armees Nationales Tchadiennes] ... At the time of its official establishment in 1983, FANT consisted primarily of FAN troops, the well-disciplined and hardened combat veterans who had been the original followers of Habré. FANT gradually expanded, recruiting members of the former national army, FAT, who were predominantly southerners of the Sara ethnic group. Later, additional southerners, the commandos or codos who had opened a guerrilla campaign against the government in 1983, were won over after two and one-half years of negotiations. Assigned to rehabilitation camps for retraining, the physically fit among them were also inducted into FANT. Finally, in the latter half of 1986, after FAP, the largest component of Goukouni's northern rebel army, had revolted against its Libyan ally, FAP soldiers were merged into FANT to join the campaign against the Libyan bases in Chad ... Only the Presidential Guard, a select force mostly drawn from Habré's own ethnic group, retained its separate identity" (Tartter 1990, 175, 179-80, 172).

Congo-Brazzaville 97–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Pascal Lissouba was the Cobra militia organized by ex-president Denis Sassou Nguesso (he lost an election in 1992). "Northern and Mbochi dominance in the postdemocratic Congolese army is somewhat hard to document but at the same time widely acknowledged. At the highest levels of army leadership, the pattern is clear. Upon his return to power, Sassou immediately brought back all of the northern officers who had been sidelined by Lissouba. Sassou put northern officers in charge of five of the country's eight military zones. He appointed General Yves Mutondo Mungonge, from Likouala, as his chief of staff soon after seizing power. In January 1999, shortly after the start of the 1998–1999 war, Sassou replaced him with Brigadier General Jacques Yvon Ndolou, another northerner who later became minister of defense. Although Sassou's military representatives have claimed that the integration of former militiamen into the army forces was neutral and open to all, no one takes this claim seriously. Virtually all southern Congolese aver that former Cobra militiamen were gradually integrated into the army, whereas militiamen from the other groups were not. A larger number of former Cobras were taken into the reorganized gendarmerie, as well as into the police forces of southern cities. Some junior officers who abstained from the fighting during the war of 1997 were allowed to retain their posts if they occupied technical posts and if the regime did not consider them a security risk. In these cases, however, they retained limited access to arms and intelligence. The army now appears to be much more uniformly northern than it was before 1991, though the claim would be impossible to document" (Clark 2008, 262-3).

Eritrea 93–NA. One of EPRDF/TPLF's allies in the struggle against the Mengistu regime (see the coding notes for Ethiopia) was the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Eritrea's post-independence military is the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF). "The EDF grew directly out of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which was reorganized to serve this function in the 1990s" (Connell 2019, 73). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Ethiopia 91–NA. The regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam faced numerous armed challengers. The main rebel group that defeated his regime in 1991 was the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Demo-

cratic Front (EPRDF), which was created in 1989 as a coalition of anti-Mengistu rebels, most importantly the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). "After the defeat of the military government in 1991, the provisional government disbanded the former national army and relied on its own guerrilla fighters for national security. In 1993, however, the Tigrayan-led government announced plans to create a multi-ethnic defense force. This process entailed the creation of a new professional army and officer class and the demobilization of many of the irregulars who had fought against the military government, although many Tigrayan officers remained in command positions" (Library of Congress 2005).

Guinea-Bissau 74–80. The main rebel group that fought for independence in Guinea-Bissau was the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano para a Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde; PAIGC), whose armed wing was the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (Forcas Armadas Revolucionarias do Povo; FARP). "What happened to the 'guerrilla army' after independence? The foundation and evolution of the state of Guinea-Bissau was strongly linked to the FARP. Consisting of former freedom fighters, the FARP was the political and military structure of the one-party state regime" (Embaló 2012, 259). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Ivory Coast 11–NA. The main rebel group that fought against the regime of Laurent Gbagbo was the New Forces of Ivory Coast (Forces Nouvelles de Cote d'Ivoire; FN). "On 17 March 2011, President Ouattara combined the former rebel Forces Nouvelles (FN) with cooperating elements of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS), the former government's security forces, into the Republic Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (FRCI - Force Republicaines de Cote d'Ivoire), the country's new official military" (GlobalSecurity.org n.d.). "Many headaches have been caused by attempts to amalgamate the two armies that were fighting each other a year ago—the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) from the Gbabgo camp and the former rebels from the north, the Forces Nouvelles (FN), who supported Ouattara—into a new army, the Forces Républicaines de CÃÂte d'Ivoire (FRCI), which was formed on 17 March. So far, the integration process is proving to be very difficult. One of the main stumbling blocks has been the lack of hierarchy and integration within the command structure of the FRCI. The former rebels of the Forces Nouvelles (FN), who made a significant contribution to Ouattara's military victory, are disproportionately represented and currently make up the bulk of the soldiers. This makes it more difficult to integrate the formerly hostile FDS soldiers. ...The decision to give so many top positions in the new armed forces to former rebel leaders has attracted widespread criticism" (Zandt 2012, 35-36).

Liberia 97–03. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the Liberian government was the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor. The NPFL began fighting in 1989 against President Samuel Doe, leading to his death in 1990 and the installation (via international involvement) of Amos Sawyer as president. The NPFL never disarmed, and large-scale fighting resumed in 1992. It ended in 1996 with a compromise peace accord that called for elections the next year, which Taylor's National Patriotic Party won. "The question of SSR [security sector reform] in Liberia first came up at the end of what Liberians call the 'first war.' In 1997, following a return to tentative peace, Charles Taylor was elected as president of Liberia. While some complained of electoral irregularities, many saw the victory of Taylor as the only means of preventing him from going back to war. A key component of the effort to ensure sustained peace and stability was the

reform of the security sector by ECOMOG [West African regional troops]. Unsurprisingly, Taylor prevented ECOMOG from carrying out the reforms. He instead transformed his NPFL into the national army and avoided creating a truly national force. Abusive forces fiercely loyal to him, such as the Anti-Terrorism Unit, dominated the security landscape as Taylor continued to pillage the country's resources." (Onoma 2014, 146).

Toure (2002, 20) provides additional detail: "The international community's preoccupation with the holding of elections as a means of peacefully resolving the Liberian civil war resulted in the neglect of the restructuring of the army—one of the most critical areas and pre-conditions to peace-building and in ensuring a stable post-war environment in Liberia. On being elected president in July 1997, Charles Taylor refused to allow ECOMOG to supervise the restructuring of his security services. The failure of the international community to give equal importance to the restructuring plan and to support the process gave Taylor overwhelming and unrestrained control and influence over the state security services. Taylor succeeded in creating a private army largely consisting of former fighters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). He appointed NPFL operatives to head key state security agencies. The domination of the state security apparatus by former NPFL fighters and the ruthlessness with which these agencies have operated, continue to pose a significant threat to peace in Liberia."

Mozambique 75–NA. The main rebel group that fought for independence in Mozambique was the Mozambique Liberation Front (Portuguese Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique; FRELIMO), whose armed wing was the People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (Forcas Populares de Libertacao de Mocambique; FPLM). "The new state had to create a new national army drawn from the guerrilla forces, and this had to be accomplished quickly. As a result the new Forcas Armadas de Mocambique/Forcas Populares de Libertacao de Mocambique (FAM/FPLM) had to resolve a number of fundamental issues: first, whether the transition would entail an incorporation of the thousands of Mozambicans who had served in the colonial forces; and second, whether the new army would follow either an essentially Western (Portuguese) institutional arrangement with "traditional' rank structure and administration, or the guerrilla administrative structures and command-and-control typologies. Following on this issue of operational doctrine—and as sub-themes—were issues regarding the new army's size and capabilities ... Some 30,000 Mozambicans (or three times Frelimo's guerrilla force) who had served in the colonial army were purposely marginalised. According to Paulino Macaringue: 'the records show that during the negotiations, the Portuguese delegation proposed that all Mozambicans within the colonial army should be integrated into the new post-independence army. Frelimo rejected the proposal on grounds that they were part of the colonial machinery which had to be dismantled"' (Malache et al. 2005, 161, 163). See also Harkness (2018 appendix).

Rwanda 94–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Juvénal Habyarimana/Théodore Sindikubwabo was the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Its armed wing was the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which it renamed the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) in 1999. Following its military victory, the RPA "assumed the role of a national army, and has reportedly accepted 4,000 ex-members of FAR [*Forces armées rwandaises*, the former state military]. But the overwhelming bulk of both the command and the rank-and-file remain affiliated with the RPF. Moreover, because virtually all members of the RPF had military experience, many of those taking

senior posts in the civil service are former members of the RPA" (Reed 1996, 498).

Prior to the RPF's military victory, there was a failed attempt at military integration (the Arusha Agreement of 1993) on which the government reneged. Despite military victory, the RPF implemented some aspects of the accord, including the integration of Hutu soldiers in the army to guard against both an internal security threat (Hutus were an overwhelming majority of the population) and external security threat (particularly the DRC, where Rwandan forces invaded in 1997 to overthrow Mobutu). "Once the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Army (RPF/RPA) took power, its leaders were determined to build a capable force that could defend the country from formidable guerrilla forces. The regime controlled the process so that recruits, including ancien régime soldiers from the FAR and rebel guerrillas, were integrated in waves over the span of a decade into the RPA and, after 1999, into the RDF" (Burgess 2014, 88). However, because the RPA replaced the existing state military and integrated Hutu troops from a clear position of strength, we code this as a case of complete military transformation rather than military integration.

Uganda 86–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regimes of Milton Obote/Tito Okello was the National Resistance Movement (NRM), whose armed wing was the National Resistance Army (NRA). "Upon taking power, the NRM controlled the civilian state apparatus and could also transform itself from a guerrilla movement to a government equipped with a defense force. All the leading personnel in the UPDF (Uganda People's Defense Force), the various police forces, and the presidential guard came from the Movement" (Makara et al. 2009, 191).

Zimbabwe 80–NA. The main armed groups that fought for liberation from white rule were the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Their respective political wings were the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Major fighting in the 1970s engendered a negotiated settlement with the white government (the Lancaster House Agreement). Elections with mass African participation occurred in 1980, which ZANU won. The settlement did not explicitly call for military integration, but this "was seen as a means of facilitating cooperation among all involved" (Jackson 2014, 49), in particular among ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the former Rhodesian state army, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). However, Mugabe deliberately undermined military integration and instead elevated ZANLA above the other organizations: "This case is one in which an initial integration was deliberately undermined for political reasons. The initial integration produced a superficially effective military, but real control lay with Mugabe" (61). Regarding the RSF, "Almost as soon as the election result was announced [in 1980], various units of the RSF began to melt away . . . The exodus of senior and middle-ranking white officers, along with many professional soldiers, weakened the ZNA (Zimbawean National Army)" (57). Regarding ZIPRA, new officers "were selected from within their own organizations and therefore had some internal credibility. There were, however, political considerations, and after a time it was noted that the minority ZIPRA was being underrepresented, even before ZANLA launched a purge of the security services and effectively took control . . . The new military had been created fairly successfully in a short period, although obvious problems remained. However, the Mugabe government soon took control of the institution, pushing out former ZIPRA personnel and bringing senior military officers into its political alliance in return for economic benefits . . . [I]n a departure from the initial aims of integrating the factions, but in keeping with his Marxist principles, Mugabe

established military units outside the integration structure. By 1983, Mugabe had arrested virtually all the senior military leadership of ZIPRA, and in March 1983 all the senior leadership of ZAPU, including Nkomo, went into exile. The unrelenting harassment of ZIPRA cadres led many to leave the APs [assembly points], which were still functioning. This led to widespread violence against former ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA, coupled with segregation, disarmament, disappearances, and an overall downplaying of ZIPRA's role in the liberation struggle that continues to date. These moves meant that of the initial triumvirate designated to share power in the 1980 agreement, only ZANLA senior officers remained. This effectively cleared the way for the creation of a ZANU-led, politicized security policy that, as in the Chinese model, emphasized the political role of the military. A number of new units then emerged, undermining much of the integration that had taken place. ... The creeping politicization coincided with the creation of two sets of security units outside the integration structure: the Fifth Brigade (5B) and the Zimbabwe People's Militia (ZPM)." (54, 57, 58).

A.2.2 Military Integration

Burundi 05–NA. The main (predominantly Hutu) rebel groups that fought to overthrow the Tutsi-dominated regime of Pierre Buyoya were the National Forces of Liberation (Force Nationale de Liberation; FNL) and Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). The war ended in a negotiated settlement, although this occurred in phases: FDD signed a ceasefire with the government in 2003, and FNL in 2006. The peace settlement called for military integration and a 50-50 balance rule between Hutus and Tutsis. Thus, Hutus did not *dominate* the officer corps of the revamped army, and post-war Ministers of Defense were Tutsi officers (see our Ministers biographies at the end of the appendix).

"The FDD forces were largely successful on the battlefield, although the FAB forces [i.e., the government military] were not defeated outright. Rebel successes are reflected in the agreements, whose provisions constitute a near-revolution in the country's distribution of power, including the creation of a new military integrating FAB and rebel forces. This outcome was consolidated when the CNDD-FDD (the party formed from the politico-military movement) won large majorities in the national assembly and local councils in the 2005 elections ... The accords provided extensive guidance on military reform. They established a rule of ethnic balance that posts would be allocated equally to Hutus and Tutsis; the overall composition of the security forces was to be balanced in this way 'in view of the need to achieve ethnic balance and to prevent acts of genocide and coups d'état' ... With the Arusha Accords in the background, the creation of an integrated military occurred through power sharing among the CNDD-FDD, the transitional government, and the high officer corps of FAB ... At the dawn of integration, ex-FAB officers constituted the bulk of the officership, although former CNDD-FDD members were placed in key positions and have been elevated over the years. The new military operates under the scrutiny of foreign officers temporarily reassigned from the Netherlands and Belgium to Burundi's Defense Ministry. The authority of these foreign officers is boosted by the substantial aid that their countries provide to Burundi. This balance of ex-FAB presence and CNDD-FDD presence, and of domestic presence and international presence, reduces the risk of any one political group's gaining what Huntington (1957) calls 'subjective' control of the military institutions" (Samii 2014, 215, 217, 218, 223).

Chad 90–NA. The main rebel groups that fought to overthrow the regime of Hissène Habré were

the April 1 Movement and the Patriotic Salvation Movement (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut; MPS), both led by Idriss Déby. (NB: he merged the April 1 Movement into the MPS during the rebellion.) Habré and Déby were former allies, and Déby served as commander-in-chief of the military until Habré purged him and two other senior advisors on April 1, 1989. "The three supposed rebels gathered a column of seventy-four loyal soldiers, fought their way out of the capital (N'Djamena), and fled toward Sudan, pursued by a contingent of Habré's troops" (Dixon and Sarkees 2015, 643). Déby's two other collaborators died, but he eventually amassed an army of about 2,000 people that captured various cities in Chad and, in December 1990, the capital city.

This case is unambiguously a rebellion because Déby needed to build a private army and win battles to capture the capital. However, his rebel group was relatively small. Upon taking power, he operated from a relatively weak bargaining position vis-a-vis other factions of the existing state army, which did not dissolve during the fighting despite Déby's outright victory. He also had to contend with various other rebel groups operating in the country. "Déby, taking a page from Habré's playbook, pursued a policy of reconciliation with rebel factions, and in the early 1990s, various groups abandoned their struggle and joined the Déby regime. His first cabinet was larger than Habré's last, with 33 ministers, including a few holdovers from the previous regime. Yet, particularly in the early years of his rule, Déby had problems with his own allies; ironically, the grievances against Déby were similar to those the April 1st Group had against Habré. Members of Déby's own Zaghawa tribal group also became resentful of Déby's power sharing. Even though he 'elevated many Zaghawa to key ministerial positions,' and the Zaghawa dominated Déby's rebel army at the time of the overthrow, they had since 'felt sidelined by the president, who had committed himself to introducing multiparty democracy,' even if at the expense of Zaghawan interests" (Atlas and Licklider 1999, 45-46).

Democratic Republic of the Congo 97–NA. The main rebel group that fought to overthrow the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko was the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (*Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire*; AFDL). The AFDL replaced Mobutu's former state military, the Armed Forces of Zaire (*Forces Armées Zaöroises*; FAZ), which largely disintegrated during the war. "[O]n May 17, 1997, all resistance collapsed. DSP [Special Presidential Division/*Division Spéciale Présidentielle*/Mobutu's elite security force] and FAZ troops took off their uniforms and tried to cross the Congo into Brazzaville or hide among the population. The Mobutist state finally received its formal obituary. The war of liberation was complete" (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016, 229).

Despite defeating the government, organizationally, the AFDL was very weak because of its heavy reliance on Rwandan military assistance and "[t]he speed with which the AFDL moved through the DRC also meant that it had little time to establish organizational structures to administer its new territory, relying instead on Mobutu-era officials. It did hold referenda to identify particularly corrupt officials, who were removed, but unlike other movements, the remaining officials had no organizational, ideological, or military links to either the AFDL or the RPA [the Rwandan military]" (Reed 1998, 20).

The new state military was the *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC; Armed Forces of the Congo). After gaining power and facing attacks from new foreign-sponsored rebel groups, the weakness of

the FAC "forced Kabila to eventually accept a political and military power-sharing deal," specifically, the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement in 1999 (Verweijen 2014, 140). Kabila repeatedly sought to undermine the military integration provisions, instead favoring his personally controlled presidential guard, which "constituted a parallel power network in the armed forces" (Verweijen 2014, 143).

Despite these heavily personalist elements of the state military, the weakly organized rebel group that launched the regime did not dominate the military. Neither of the two Ministers of Defense that served at least three years (see the table at the end of the appendix) came from the rebellion. Although not fully implemented, the quota system for personnel selection is also consistent with the non-domination by FAC: "The division key followed a quota system roughly based on the numbers of combatants that each faction had declared in Sun City, leading to the following division: 35 percent FAC, 17 percent MLC, 28 percent RCD-G, 8 percent Mai-Mai, and 12 percent other groups" (Verweijen 2014, 145). The partial nature of the military integration also enabled rival groups to avoid domination by the FAC. "[F]actions which agreed to dismantle their military structures did not necessarily abstain from militarized power politics. The ex-belligerents adopted two main strategies to offset the potential loss of influence caused by army integration: First, they tried to maintain economic and political control by building up power bases within the political and administrative institutions—for example, by entrenching themselves locally or provincially in unelected administrative positions or by forging alliances with factions that were likely to have good electoral results. Second, they attempted to maintain military spheres of influence by building up client networks both within and outside the military" (Verweijen 2014, 148-9).

Namibia 90–NA. The main armed group that fought for independence was the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), and the political wing of the movement was the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). "Since Namibia had no army at independence, one of the priorities of the new government was the establishment of an integrated Namibian Defense Force (NDF)" (Dzinesa 2012, 279). Indicating PLAN's ascendancy in the new military, "The overall commander of the Namibian Defence Force is the former PLAN leader, Dimo Hamaambo" (Grotpeter 1994, 405), and every post-independence Minister of Defense was a member of SWAPO during the rebellion (see the table at the end of the appendix). However, unlike most other colonial liberation cases, PLAN did not directly transition to become the national military upon independence. Instead, the 10,000-strong PLAN army and the 8,000-strong SWATF army were each demobilized before creating the new NDF, overseen by a British Military Advisory and Training Team (Mills 1992). Harkness (2018 appendix, 103) reiterates: "On independence, the new national army was formed by integrating the armed wing of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) with the colonial South West African Territorial Force (SWATF)." The integration of these two military forces into the new state military leads us to code this case as military integration.

South Africa 94–NA. The main armed group that fought for liberation against white rule was uMkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation; MK), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC). Other armed African groups were the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the military arm of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and the Kwa Zulu Self Protection Force (KZSPF) of the Inkatha Freedom Party. The war ended in a negotiated settlement that called for elections with mass African participation and military integration. There were eight separate forces in total

to integrate: the state military (South African Defence Force; SADF), separate militaries for the four "homelands," MK, APLA, and KZSPF (Licklider 2014*a*, 122). Whereas SADF and the homeland forces were organized for conventional warfare, the three African groups were organized for guerrilla warfare. The absence of outright rebel victory was important for shaping the negotiations. "The NSF troops [those from MK/ALPA/KZSPF] saw themselves as having won the war against the SADF and the homeland forces, so it was not obvious to them why they should adapt to the SADF model. SADF personnel, conversely, felt that they had never been defeated and resented the insertion of former enemies whom they regarded as unprepared . . . Over time, agreement began to emerge. The new military would be modern, which in practice meant that it would adopt the SADF model in many ways . . . Some MK leaders would be given high-level positions, and its rank and file would be given training and fair opportunities for promotion. . . . The initial results of the negotiations suggest that the SADF had definitely done better than its opponent, but this impression is deceptive because the inevitable political victory of the African National Congress meant that many of the subsidiary agreements were simply overridden later. The SADF was compelled to accept the full integration of forces and such programs as affirmative action and the fast-tracking of members of the NSF. The NSF were compelled to accept a new SANDF initially led and very much controlled by members of the old SADF . . . The four homeland armies were all small and composed of SADF ethnic units, usually led by white South African officers. These groups played no significant role in the negotiations and were fairly easy to integrate into the new military. The Pan-Africanist Congress stayed out of the negotiations until the end but finally agreed to be integrated; the KZSPF Party militias were not brought into the process until 1996, and then only as new recruits. Interestingly enough, the PAC cadres, although fewer in numbers and with less combat experience, fared somewhat better in the integration process proportionately than those from MK" (122, 123, 126).

Over the next decade as the merger occurred: "the proportion of Africans in the SANDF went from about 40 percent to almost 70 percent, while the white proportion dropped from 47 percent to 18 percent. However, these figures conceal important differences. Blacks dominate both the enlisted personnel (of whom only about 2 percent are white) and the highest ranks (brigadier general and up), where a majority are MK veterans; whites still occupy more than half the officer and noncommissioned officer positions, the so-called operational positions. That most lower-level officers and noncommissioned officers are white in part reflects major educational differences resulting from the apartheid educational system . . . There is also some concern that the current military is becoming increasingly politicized, because it is closely linked to the ANC" (128, 129). As our biographical data show, the first Minister of Defense was a former MK fighter, indicating ANC's ascendancy in the military. Williams (2002) provides details about a shift in the balance of power that occurred among the top generals in 1998 following the forced resignation of the white chief-of-staff of the SANDF (he had disseminated unsubstantiated rumors of a coup plot by senior MK officers). This shift "signalled the demise of the so-called 'old guard' within the new SANDF" and created a transition to more liberal white officers and a "grouping consist[ing] mainly of former MK officers located largely in the SANDF" (23, 24).

South Sudan 11–NA. The main rebel group that fought against the northern-dominated Sudanese regime was the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (in particular the faction led by John Garang after a split in 1991; SPLM-Garang), whose armed wing was the Sudan People's Liberation Army

(SPLA). Following a ceasefire in 2002 and a referendum in 2006, South Sudan gained independence in 2011. Despite creating a new country with no incumbent state military, the new South Sudan People's Defence Forces amalgamated various rebel groups and factions of SPLM that emerged during the war. "South Sudan's current defense force is composed of the SPLA, the rebel movement that liberated the country; various militia forces that had opposed the SPLA during the war but were absorbed into it after the 2005 peace agreement; and a large number of military personnel that were part of the northern Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), but who were also absorbed into the SPLA. This composition has made for a very volatile relationship among the senior command officers" (Jok 2011, 11).

A.2.3 No Military Transformation

Morocco 56–NA. The main rebel group that fought for independence was the Army of Liberation (Jaish-al-tahrir). However, neither the monarch Muhammad V nor the Istiqlal party (who led the broader independence movement) controlled these forces. "The main body of the Moroccan army was recruited by French officers among Berber-speaking mountain tribes in a country that is predominantly Arab in language and culture. After independence in 1956, this army, though still largely commanded by French-trained Berber officers, was enlarged from 20,000 to 30,000 men by the addition of guerrilla fighters of the Moroccan Army of Liberation. It is under the control of the King instead of being responsible to a civilian cabinet" (Halpern 1963, 269). "With the establishment of the Royal Army, however, the Liberation Army became an anomaly to the new Moroccan administration as well as an obstacle to negotiation with the French on conventions for economic aid, etc. The absorption of the irregular army also posed peculiar problems for the Istiqlal. Many of the officers and non-commissioned officers were Moroccans of French Army background who had had little or no connection with the party before independence. Those coming from the urban resistance were very likely cell members of the Istiqlal, but none were acknowledged party leaders prior to independence. The troops were recruited mostly from local tribes, who had never been in contact with the Istiqlal for the most part and who recognized only the King as their leader" (Ashford 1959, 16).

Tunisia 56–11. The main rebel group that fought for independence was the *fellagha* guerrillas. However, the guerrillas "were not organized by Neo-Destour [the main independence movement], which claimed it did not approve of violence" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 315). Instead, in 1954, leaders of Neo-Destour used "all their influence" to induce the *fellagha* to lay down their arms in 1954 (Perkins 2014, 131). Ben Youssef led the *fellagha*; he had earlier developed a rivalry with Habib Bourguiba, the leader of Neo-Destour. Prior to the first independence elections, Bourguiba engineered the electoral rules to deny seats to supporters of Youssef (136), who "opposed the agreement with the French and French actions in Algeria [and] continued guerrilla activities in southern Tunisia in 1956" (Dixon and Sarkees 2015, 316). "Because the Tunisian army consisted of only a few thousand men, many of them former guerrillas lacking adequate training, ending the rebellion required the assistance of the former colonizer. With some reluctance, the French army and police cooperated with the Bourguiba government . . . and by June 1956 the last of the *fellagha* were killed or captured" (Perkins 2014, 136).

B Supporting Information for Main Regressions

B.1 Regime Breakdown (Table 2)

Sensitivity to unobserved covariates. Table B.1 shows that the coefficient estimates are relatively insensitive to unobserved covariates. Therefore, although it is impossible to control for every possible confounder, if the covariates included Table 2 are substantively relevant, then there is less reason to believe that covariates not included in any of the specifications would overturn the results. Specifically, Altonji et al. (2005) present a commonly used metric that estimates how large the bias from unobserved covariates would need to be for the true coefficient to be 0 in a statistical model, given information from how much adding observable covariates changes the estimates. To compute this measure, Table B.1 compares the coefficient estimates for the rebel regimes indicators in specifications with and without covariates. Specifically, it compares the coefficient estimate for all rebel regimes in each of Columns 2-4 to that in Column 1, and the coefficient estimates for colonial liberation regimes and civil war winners in each of Columns 6-8 to those in Column 5. Negative numbers in Table B.1 imply that the coefficient estimate in the specification with covariates exceeds in magnitude the coefficient estimate in the restricted specification. This indicates an estimate highly robust to omitted covariates because the magnitude of the bias of unobserved covariates would need to go in the opposite direction as the bias from omitting observables to drive the coefficient estimate to 0. This is the case for five of the nine estimates in Table B.1. In other specifications, the estimates are positive but large in magnitude. For example, in Column 2, the bias from unobservables would need to be 9.2 times larger than the bias from omitting the covariates contained in this specification to overturn the positive coefficient estimate. This reflects the fact that adding covariates only minimally affects the baseline coefficient estimates. For comparison, Altonji et al. (2005) calculate a corresponding figure of 3.55 for their own analysis, which they interpret as large in magnitude.

Table B.1: Sensitivity to Unobserved Covariates for Table 2

Column in Table 2:	(2)	(3)	(4)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	9.2	-12.4	-13.4			
Colonial liberation regime				5.8	-26.7	4.7
Civil war winner				21.7	-11.7	-4.9

Jackknife sample sensitivity analysis. We assessed the robustness of the estimates in Table 2 to jackknife sample alterations. For each column in Table 2, we iteratively dropped each country (that is, every year for that country). In all 204 regressions (51×4) with the aggregate rebel regimes indicator, the negative coefficient estimate is statistically significant at 1%. This is also true for the civil war winners indicator. For colonial liberation regimes, in 153 of the 204 (76%) sensitivity regressions, the coefficient estimate is significant at 1%; and all are significant at 5%.

Table B.2: Alternative Samples

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN							
	Panel A. Smaller sample (lower threshold for democracy)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0436***	-0.0423***	-0.0539***	-0.0500***				
	(0.00899)	(0.0114)	(0.0116)	(0.0120)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0406***	-0.0398***	-0.0477***	-0.0372**
					(0.00970)	(0.0124)	(0.0131)	(0.0144)
Civil war winner					-0.0489***	-0.0476***	-0.0639***	-0.0701***
					(0.0109)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)	(0.0139)
Country-years	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203
R-squared	0.011	0.041	0.043	0.046	0.011	0.041	0.043	0.046
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Larger sample (all post-independence years)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0464***	-0.0418***	-0.0517***	-0.0481***				
	(0.00861)	(0.00958)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0430***	-0.0408***	-0.0484***	-0.0354**
					(0.00913)	(0.0113)	(0.0127)	(0.0138)
Civil war winner					-0.0509***	-0.0434***	-0.0557***	-0.0641***
					(0.0106)	(0.0117)	(0.0124)	(0.0139)
Country-years	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614
R-squared	0.016	0.044	0.045	0.049	0.016	0.044	0.045	0.049
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.2 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates clustered by country in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last regime change and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

Table B.3: Sample without Revolutionary Regimes

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel A. Lachapelle et al. (2020)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no LLWC cases)	-0.0517***	-0.0479***	-0.0606***	-0.0550***
	(0.00906)	(0.0117)	(0.0106)	(0.0111)
Regime-years	2,189	2,125	2,189	2,125
Countries	48	48	48	48
R-squared	0.013	0.051	0.045	0.055
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Colgan and Weeks (2015)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no CW cases)	-0.0525***	-0.0482***	-0.0600***	-0.0517***
	(0.00856)	(0.0111)	(0.0113)	(0.0121)
Regime-years	2,228	2,163	2,228	2,163
Countries	50	50	50	50
R-squared	0.014	0.051	0.046	0.056
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel C. Roessler and Verhoeven (2016)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no RV cases)	-0.0459***	-0.0398***	-0.0506***	-0.0420***
	(0.0101)	(0.0127)	(0.0133)	(0.0135)
Regime-years	2,044	1,988	2,044	1,988
Countries	41	41	41	41
R-squared	0.009	0.051	0.045	0.056
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.3 re-runs Columns 1–4 in Table 2 while dropping all observations from regimes that we code as REBEL REGIME=1 and that an existing dataset codes as revolutionary. Panel A drops six rebel regimes that Lachapelle et al. (2020) code as revolutionary. Panel B drops five rebel regimes that Colgan and Weeks (2015) code as revolutionary. Panel C drops twelve rebel regimes that Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as violent liberation regimes. Table 1 denotes which regimes are dropped in each panel. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.4: Robustness Checks for Table 2: Logit, Cross Section, Coercive-Origins Regimes

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN							
Panel A. DV: Logit models								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.846***	-1.791***	-1.948***	-1.984***				
	(0.466)	(0.480)	(0.466)	(0.465)				
Col. liberation regime					-1.799***	-1.654**	-1.819**	-1.685**
					(0.685)	(0.751)	(0.758)	(0.804)
Civil war winner					-1.889***	-1.913***	-2.057***	-2.210***
					(0.618)	(0.641)	(0.641)	(0.669)
Regime-years	2,563	2,272	2,272	2,272	2,563	2,272	2,272	2,272
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Pseudo R-Squared	0.0568	0.117	0.114	0.127	0.0568	0.117	0.114	0.127
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Cross-section of regimes								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.977***	-1.657***	-1.925***	-1.754***				
	(0.475)	(0.513)	(0.482)	(0.475)				
Col. liberation regime					-2.118***	-1.812**	-2.002***	-1.679**
					(0.698)	(0.752)	(0.711)	(0.735)
Civil war winner					-1.813***	-1.478**	-1.847***	-1.819***
					(0.612)	(0.596)	(0.602)	(0.599)
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Panel C. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0621***	-0.0584***	-0.0677***	-0.0656***				
	(0.0128)	(0.0150)	(0.0181)	(0.0179)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0563***	-0.0369**	-0.0517*	-0.0387
					(0.0157)	(0.0185)	(0.0270)	(0.0268)
Civil war winner					-0.0674***	-0.0843***	-0.0847***	-0.0939***
					(0.0109)	(0.0189)	(0.0247)	(0.0244)
Regime-years	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354
Regimes	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89
Countries	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
R-squared	0.031	0.088	0.089	0.094	0.031	0.090	0.090	0.096
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: The series of regression specifications in Table B.4 are identical to those in Table 2 except for the following changes in each panel (for expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates). In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4 and 6–8. The missing values are from years in which no successful coups occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. In Panel B, we summarize a series of Cox proportional hazards models, estimated with robust standard errors clustered by country. For the time-varying covariates, we computed the average value for each regime. In Panel C, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates for the rebel regimes indicators are consistently larger than those in Table 2, although due to the smaller sample size here (excluding civilian regimes drops 46% of the sample), the coefficients are less precisely estimated. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.2 Instrumental Variable Results

B.2.1 Historical Background on African Colonialism

Following decades of relatively peaceful European rule in Africa, the colonial project fell into crisis after World War II. Greater mobilization ability by Africans, weakened European powers with domestic populations more skeptical of overseas rule, and a shift to a bipolar international system with two superpowers hostile to overseas colonialism forced new choices onto European colonists (Young 1994). In most cases, it was clear to both metropolitan officials and major producers that the economic costs of retaining colonial rule outweighed the benefits (Fieldhouse 1986), especially when factoring in the higher likelihood that Africans (or, in North Africa, Arabs) would revolt without reforms. Consequently, in the two decades following World War II, most of the continent peacefully transitioned to African majority rule and independence.

The main exceptions were territories with sizable European populations. Wherever they settled in large numbers, European settlers usually composed a politically influential interest group—and, in independent South Africa and semi-independent Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), they directly controlled the state. White settlers had considerable vested interests in their domination of the best land, a non-mobile asset they expected to lose under African majority rule. Their control of land also created a cheap and mobile labor supply of Africans that they could exploit (Mosley 1983). Consequently, European settlers fiercely resisted delegating control to the African or Arab majority, which frequently engendered decolonization violence. Data from Paine (2019*b*) shows that:

- Among the seven territories with the largest European population shares around World War II, every one experienced a major colonial liberation war.
- Among the next ten-highest, four did.
- Among the 25 lowest, only one did.
- (The highest category contains cases with colonial European population shares between 2.7% and 20.1%, the middle category between 0.4% and 2.5%, and the lowest category no greater than 0.4%.)

Although African rebel groups did not gain control of the post-colonial state in all cases with a major decolonization war, the European population percentage was high in every case we code as a colonial liberation regime, except two. Guinea-Bissau's decolonization war was essentially a spillover of Portugal's wars in Angola and Mozambique. Both these colonies, in particular Angola, had significant settler populations. (Paine 2019*b* discusses how white settler influence over the colonial regime was lesser but still considerable in the Portuguese cases.) Additionally, Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia rather than from a European country.

B.2.2 Justification for Instrumental Variable

Climatic factors that influenced prospects for European settlement provide a plausible instrumental variable for colonial liberation regimes. Historians have discussed conditions required for replicating large-scale European agricultural settlements in Africa (Mosley 1983, 5; Lutzelschwab 2013, 145). Temperate climate, found at the northern and southern tips of the continent, enabled large-scale European-style farming settlements. The remainder of the continent contains tropical climate,

which obviates most temperate farming practices. However, Europeans could cultivate similar cereal crops as at home in tropical areas that met three conditions. First, they needed high enough rainfall to grow crops. Second, high enough elevation created moderate temperatures. Third, Europeans needed land without the tsetse fly, which causes sleeping sickness in humans.

We use a variable from Paine (2019*b*) that combines GIS data for climate, rainfall, elevation, and tsetse fly prevalence. For each country, the variable measures the logged percentage of its territory that had either:

- Mediterranean climate, or
- All three of:
  - Rainfall of at least 20 inches per year, and
  - 3,000 feet in elevation (Mosley 1983, 5 proposes both of these thresholds), and
  - the lowest quartile on Alsan's (2015) tsetse fly suitability index.

Figure B.1 depicts these conditions. The variable used below takes the natural log to prevent a handful of cases with extreme values of the instrument from driving the results. Our variable for the area of each country does not include desert and semi-desert area to eliminate territory where very few people, European or not, would settle.

Figure B.1: African Territory Suitable for Large-Scale European Settlement

Three main considerations motivate why this is a reasonable instrument for studying the effects of colonial liberation regimes. First, all components of the instrument are exogenous in the sense that they are not caused by political factors that could affect regime durability. Importantly, the tsetse

fly data comes from Alsan's (2015) tsetse fly suitability index—which is derived from historical climate data—rather than from colonial or post-colonial maps of tsetse fly prevalence, which may be affected by climate change or by stronger states better able to control the fly (389). We also estimate models with various pre-independence covariates (logged population density in 1800, whether any ethnic groups in the country had a precolonial state, index of rugged terrain, colonizer fixed effects) to account for additional sources of heterogeneity. We use these rather than the more standard (relative to the literature) set of covariates used in Table 2, which are mostly post-independence and therefore inappropriate "post-treatment" controls relative to our instrument. Of course, factors such as historical population density might have also been influenced by the instrument, which is why we also estimate specifications without the covariates.

Second, Panel B of Table B.5 demonstrates that the instrumental variable is strongly correlated with rebel regimes. We prefer estimating 2SLS estimates of colonial liberation regimes directly on land suitability rather than a 3SLS specification with an intermediate stage that controls for European population percentage given the difficulty of satisfying and assessing the additional exclusion restrictions.

Third, the exclusion restriction is plausible. One would have to construct an alternative explanation for how particular climatic conditions affected regime durability independent of their effect on rebel regimes. Paine (2019*b*) examines how these climatic conditions—by affecting the size of the European settler population—generated decolonization violence. However, this is not an independent channel from our main explanatory factor, because this violence generated the colonial liberation regimes. In addition to the lack of existing theory that supports such a connection, Table B.6 demonstrates that only reasonably large violations of the exclusion restriction would make the main coefficient estimates insignificant at conventional levels.

B.2.3 Results

Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table B.5 present findings from two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions that estimate simultaneous equation models composed of the linear analog of Equation 1 and:

$$R_{it} = \beta_{0,Z} + \beta_Z \ln Z_i + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_{X,Z} + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{Z,it}, \tag{B.1}$$

where Z_i is the instrument. In Columns 3 and 4, the first-stage equation is:

$$CL_{it} = \beta_{0,Z} + \beta_Z \ln Z_i + \beta_{OR} OR_{it} + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_{X,Z} + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{Z,it}, \tag{B.2}$$

where CL_{it} indicates colonial liberation regimes and OR_{it} indicates civil war winners. We use the instrument only for colonial liberation regimes given the theoretical justification that climatic factors affected rebel regimes by triggering decolonization conflicts. Although the dependent variable is binary, it is standard to estimate such instrumental variable regressions with 2SLS (Angrist 2001). Additionally, the discreteness of the endogenous regressor—colonial liberation regimes—causes particular problems for nonlinear endogenous regressor models by violating the assumption of additive, independent errors (Wooldridge 2014, 227). Furthermore, linear and nonlinear models tend to produce similar results for non-extreme values of the explanatory variable (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 107) and, as noted, logging the climate instrument guards against horizontal outliers.

The estimates in Panel A of Table B.5 reaffirm those in Table 2. In fact, the magnitude of the estimates in Table B.5 are more than twice as large as the corresponding estimates in (unreported) OLS models with the sample sample and set of covariates. Panel B presents the first-stage regressions using Equation B.1 only. It shows that in each specification, the partial F-test for the instrument exceeds the conventional standard of 10 for a weak instrument (Staiger and Stock 1997).

Table B.5: Instrumental Variable Regressions

	Panel A. 2SLS. DV: Regime breakdown			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0849**	-0.102**		
(IV=land suitability)	(0.0355)	(0.0417)		
Col. liberation regime			-0.0871**	-0.101**
(IV=land suitability)			(0.0377)	(0.0397)
Civil war winner			-0.0566***	-0.0594***
			(0.00890)	(0.0135)
ln(pop dens. in 1800)		0.00134*		0.00114
		(0.000803)		(0.000769)
Precolonial state		0.0223		0.0207
		(0.0149)		(0.0134)
Rugged terrain		-0.00562		-0.00526
		(0.00497)		(0.00486)
British colony		0.00289		0.00712
		(0.0233)		(0.0208)
French colony		0.00698		0.0110
		(0.0234)		(0.0218)
Portuguese colony		0.0636*		0.0685*
		(0.0346)		(0.0367)
Regime-years	2,210	2,210	2,210	2,210
Regimes	142	142	142	142
Countries	42	42	42	42
R-squared	0.009	0.039	0.009	0.041
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. First stage. DV: Col. liberation regime			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(% area suitable for Eu. agri.)	0.0523***	0.0647***	0.0489***	0.0687***
	(0.0155)	(0.0190)	(0.0141)	(0.0184)
Civil war winner			-0.116*	-0.0540
			(0.0619)	(0.0494)
R-squared	0.196	0.320	0.315	0.518
Covariates?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
F-test for IV	11.4	11.6	12.0	14.0
	Panel C. Reduced form. DV: Regime breakdown			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(% area suitable for Eu. agri.)	-0.00444***	-0.00654***	-0.00426***	-0.00679***
	(0.00141)	(0.00168)	(0.00141)	(0.00174)
Civil war winner			-0.0465***	-0.0582***
			(0.00834)	(0.00991)
R-squared	0.013	0.017	0.017	0.023
Covariates?	NO	YES	NO	YES
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table B.5 presents a series of 2SLS estimates with Equation B.1 as the first stage. The sample differs from that in Table 2 because island countries (except Madagascar) and countries that did not gain independence from a European country (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia) are missing data on the climate instrument. Panel B presents the first-stage estimates and Panel C presents the reduced-form estimates. In the latter two panels, for expositional clarity, we omit the coefficient estimates for the covariates, and the samples in those panels are identical to those in the corresponding columns in Panel A. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the exclusion restriction. Because the exclusion restriction is unlikely to be perfectly satisfied in any social scientific research, it is important to assess how badly it would have to be violated to invalidate our results. Conley et al. (2012) provide a suitable method with the stated purpose: "Often the instrument exclusion restriction that underlies the validity of the usual IV inference is suspect; that is, instruments are only plausibly exogenous. We present practical methods for performing inference while relaxing the exclusion restriction" (260). They assume that instead of the linear link for Equation 1, the dependent variable is generated by:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_R R_{it} + \gamma \ln Z_i + \boldsymbol{X}'_{it}\beta_X + \boldsymbol{T}'_{it}\beta_T + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{B.3}$$

If $\gamma \neq 0$, then the instrument directly affects the outcome, i.e., the exclusion restriction is not perfectly satisfied. Although it is likely that $\gamma \neq 0$ in any applied research situation, this is only problematic for the present 2SLS estimates of the rebel regime coefficients if γ is large in magnitude. Because γ is unobservable, we can examine how the results would change for different hypothetical values of γ. Table B.6 states for each specification in Table B.5 the value of γ for which the p-value of the 2SLS estimated effect of rebel regimes (or the disaggregated indicators) would equal either 0.05 or 0.10. If the true γ is negative and smaller in magnitude than the amount stated in the table, then the coefficient estimate for rebel regimes from the stated column in Table B.5 is statistically significant at the stated threshold. If instead the true γ is positive, then the magnitude of the coefficient estimate from the regression table is *downwardly* biased. The numbers in parentheses in Table B.6 state the γ thresholds as a percentage of the reduced form estimated effect of the instrument on regime breakdown.

Table B.6: Assessing Sensitivity to Exclusion Restriction Violations

Column in Table B.5:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Stat. sig. at 5% if $\gamma \geq$	-.0011	-.0023	-.0009	-.0024
(% of reduced-form estimate)	(25%)	(35%)	(21%)	(35%)
Stat. sig. at 10% if $\gamma \geq$	-.0018	-.003	-.0016	-.003
(% of reduced-form estimate)	(41%)	(46%)	(38%)	(44%)

Table B.6 demonstrates that the 2SLS estimates are insensitive to moderately large violations of the exclusion restriction. Approximately 29% of the reduced form effect of the instrument on regime breakdown must occur through channels other than colonial liberation regimes for the liberation regimes coefficient estimate not to be significant at least at the 5% level. The corresponding figure is 42% for the 10% significance level. We lack an alternative hypothesis suggesting an unmodeled channel of this magnitude.

B.3 SUCCESSFUL COUPS (TABLE 3)

Table B.7: Robustness Checks for Table 3: Logit, Cross Section, Coercive-Origins Regimes

	DV: SUCCESSFUL COUPS							
Panel A. DV: Logit models								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.484***	-1.239**	-1.677***	-1.569***				
	(0.503)	(0.495)	(0.490)	(0.502)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.928**	-0.818*	-1.287**	-1.083*
					(0.460)	(0.480)	(0.533)	(0.601)
Regime-years	2,563	1,949	1,949	1,949	2,351	1,801	1,801	1,801
Regimes	165	165	165	165	152	152	152	152
Countries	51	51	51	51	40	40	40	40
Pseudo R-Squared	0.0406	0.0925	0.0920	0.103	0.0281	0.0799	0.0776	0.0899
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. Cross-section of regimes								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.121***	-0.0957***	-0.104***	-0.0924***				
	(0.0211)	(0.0203)	(0.0239)	(0.0266)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.109***	-0.0761***	-0.0851***	-0.0643*
					(0.0235)	(0.0222)	(0.0282)	(0.0366)
Civil war winner					-0.131***	-0.111***	-0.118***	-0.114***
					(0.0209)	(0.0215)	(0.0301)	(0.0318)
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.035	0.065	0.058	0.069	0.036	0.066	0.059	0.070
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Panel C. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0437***	-0.0341***	-0.0418***	-0.0397***				
	(0.00999)	(0.00966)	(0.0109)	(0.0109)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0374***	-0.0328***	-0.0491***	-0.0469***
					(0.0114)	(0.0108)	(0.0128)	(0.0138)
Civil war winner					-0.0528***	-0.0365***	-0.0311**	-0.0304**
					(0.00837)	(0.0108)	(0.0145)	(0.0150)
Regime-years	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354	1,354
Regimes	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89
Countries	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
R-squared	0.023	0.081	0.086	0.090	0.023	0.081	0.086	0.090
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: This table follows the same structure as Tables B.4 and B.9. The series of regression specifications in Table B.7 are identical to those in Table 3 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4. The missing values are from years in which no successful coups occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. For Columns 5–8, no CIVIL WAR WINNER ever experienced a successful coup, and therefore every observation for these regimes are dropped in these columns (in addition to the dropped observations in Columns 6–8 for years with no successful coups). In Panel B, we estimate linear models on a cross-section of regimes. The dependent variable is the percentage of years for each regime in which SUCCESSFUL COUP=1. For the time-varying covariates, we computed the average value for each regime. In Panel C, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.4 MILITARY POWER SHARING (TABLE 4)

Table B.8: Defense Minister Appointment

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.268***	0.187***	0.113*	0.115				
	(0.0636)	(0.0655)	(0.0686)	(0.0715)				
Col. liberation regime					0.263***	0.214***	0.162*	0.191*
					(0.0865)	(0.0800)	(0.0869)	(0.103)
Civil war winner					0.276***	0.143*	0.0456	0.0162
					(0.0693)	(0.0787)	(0.0752)	(0.0752)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0192		0.00320		0.0170		-0.0171
		(0.0308)		(0.0438)		(0.0316)		(0.0496)
Growth in ln(GDP p.c.)		0.154		0.203**		0.162		0.234**
		(0.101)		(0.0926)		(0.104)		(0.0969)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000958		-0.00373		-0.00110		-0.00320
		(0.00359)		(0.00331)		(0.00355)		(0.00325)
ln(population)			0.0584*	0.0628*			0.0547*	0.0730**
			(0.0322)	(0.0365)			(0.0322)	(0.0362)
Ethnic frac.			0.241	0.241			0.280	0.300
			(0.212)	(0.211)			(0.215)	(0.214)
Religious frac.			0.0182	0.0134			0.0274	0.00944
			(0.177)	(0.162)			(0.178)	(0.165)
British colony			-0.206*	-0.220**			-0.219**	-0.233**
			(0.110)	(0.109)			(0.111)	(0.107)
French colony			-0.0161	-0.00910			-0.0291	-0.0334
			(0.111)	(0.104)			(0.113)	(0.103)
Portuguese colony			0.219*	0.223*			0.177	0.147
			(0.132)	(0.122)			(0.156)	(0.159)
Regime-years	2,470	2,470	2,470	2,470	2,470	2,470	2,470	2,470
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.054	0.131	0.207	0.212	0.054	0.132	0.209	0.217
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.8 is identical to Table 4 except it changes the dependent variable to DEFENSE MINISTER APPOINT. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.9: Robustness Checks for Table 4: Logit, Cross Section, Coercive-Origins Regimes

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER SAME							
	Panel A. DV: Logit models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	1.241***	1.027***	0.832***	0.830***				
	(0.240)	(0.248)	(0.258)	(0.269)				
Col. liberation regime					1.270***	1.199***	1.168***	1.283***
					(0.311)	(0.297)	(0.290)	(0.352)
Civil war winner					1.196***	0.762**	0.398	0.276
					(0.324)	(0.328)	(0.326)	(0.330)
Regime-years	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458	2,458
Regimes	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Pseudo R-Squared	0.0475	0.0929	0.127	0.129	0.0476	0.0944	0.131	0.134
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Cross-section of regimes							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.385***	0.337***	0.295***	0.277***				
	(0.0587)	(0.0658)	(0.0626)	(0.0665)				
Col. liberation regime					0.384***	0.319***	0.296***	0.297***
					(0.0683)	(0.0739)	(0.0821)	(0.0911)
Civil war winner					0.385***	0.351***	0.294***	0.262***
					(0.0873)	(0.0982)	(0.0838)	(0.0899)
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.184	0.234	0.296	0.307	0.184	0.235	0.296	0.307
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
	Panel C. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.398***	0.303***	0.245***	0.248***				
	(0.0565)	(0.0681)	(0.0617)	(0.0672)				
Col. liberation regime					0.397***	0.355***	0.310***	0.359***
					(0.0710)	(0.0673)	(0.0527)	(0.0712)
Civil war winner					0.400***	0.198**	0.151*	0.107
					(0.0742)	(0.0863)	(0.0797)	(0.0858)
Regime-years	1,337	1,337	1,337	1,337	1,337	1,337	1,337	1,337
Regimes	87	87	87	87	87	87	87	87
Countries	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38
R-squared	0.157	0.248	0.258	0.269	0.157	0.256	0.264	0.281
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: This table follows the same structure as Table B.4. The series of regression specifications in Table B.9 are identical to those in Table 4 except for the following changes in each panel (for expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates). In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. In Panel B, we estimate linear models on a cross-section of regimes, with robust standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable is the percentage of years for each regime in which DEFENSE MINISTER SAME=1. For the time-varying covariates, we computed the average value for each regime. In Panel C, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates for the rebel regimes indicators is consistently larger than in Table 4, although due to the smaller sample size here (excluding civilian regimes drops 46% of the sample), the coefficients are less precisely estimated. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

C Supporting Information for Alternative Explanations

C.1 Authoritarian Parties

The following describes the party institution variables used in Table 6:

- Inherited party: Indicator variable from Geddes et al. (2018) for whether the founders of the regime had established a ruling party prior to gaining power. Existing studies show that such regimes are more durable than authoritarian regimes that found parties after gaining power (Miller 2020).
- GWF party regime: Indicator variable from Geddes et al. (2014) for whether a party is the, or one of the, most important decision-making organization in the regime.
- Party control of military: Five-point scale from Geddes et al. (2018) that assesses "Does the Party Exercise Control over the Military?" (among regimes that have a support party). This is the *partymilit* variable in their dataset.
- Commissar system. The highest value of the previous variable is: "Coded 5 if the party imposes commissars, party advisers, or some kind of party committee on military units or garrisons. The task of these commissars is to insure ideological correctness and loyalty in the officer corps and to report dissenting views. Code as 5 any party organization that carries out these tasks at the battalion, unit, or garrison level." The highest value for African countries is 4, for which they code Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Tanzania, and Zambia. Although the coding of 4 explicitly states that it does not include a commissar system, we verified ourselves for these five cases that there indeed was one.
- Number of paramilitaries: From De Bruin (2020), number of counterbalancing forces operating in each country year. As she describes, she restricts her count of paramilitaries to those that serve counterbalancing forces against a coup, including that they are officially sanctioned by the regime and are stationed within 60 miles of the capital. Her dataset contains five other measures of counterbalancing as well, and we verified (not reported) that the null results hold up for almost all combinations of these variables and specifications.

C.2 Revolutionary Transformation of State and Society

"He who controls the countryside controls the country" (Huntington 1968, 292). This well-known aphorism linking revolutionary regimes to the transformation of society (see also Huntington 1970) is the leading explanation in the literature for why revolutionary regimes endure. Levitsky and Way (2013) and Lachapelle et al. (2020) argue that gaining power through violence, unleashing a program of social revolution, and defeating counterrevolutionaries eliminates alternative centers of power that underpinned the previous regime. Even if true on average for the broader global sample of revolutionary regimes, this mechanism does not help to explain the durability of African rebel regimes.

Many African countries have inauspicious conditions for rebel regimes to fundamentally transform society, even in cases where they do attempt social revolution. Herbst (2000) discusses the generic problem that rulers in Africa throughout history—precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial—have

faced to consolidating territorial control. A high land-to-population ratio has typically created incentives for residents to move rather than to submit to the will of an encroaching state. Before European colonialism began, states typically aimed to control people rather than specific tracts of territory, given the scarcity of the former. Despite superior military technology, European colonizers failed to solve this problem. They usually sought to impose "hegemony on a shoestring" and invested only enough to balance the budgets within the colonies. (Berry 1992). In fact, by carving up the continent into territorially delineated spheres of influence—which later engendered the international borders for postcolonial African states—European rule likely exacerbated the problem of establishing effective territorial control. At independence, African rulers typically faced considerable difficulties to broadcasting power across their entire territory. Most countries were considerably larger than were historical African states, and (Herbst 2000; Green 2012), European rule typically failed to develop effective tax systems (Gardner 2012). These conditions have posed daunting challenges for would-be revolutionaries to create an effective state that could transform society.

Thus, we do not expect existing hypotheses about rebel regimes—revolutionary or otherwise—controlling the countryside to apply to Africa. This argument is difficult to test systematically, but available evidence suggests that African rebel regimes do not exhibit greater control over society than do other regimes. In Table C.1 (Panel A), we assess Lachapelle et al.'s (2020) preferred proxy for the destruction of alternative centers of power, and show that rebel regimes are not statistically discernible on this dependent variable. Panel B of this table shows that the estimates are also null when comparing rebel to non-rebel regimes on a measure of "stateness."

Providing more detail on the variables, measuring a regime's control over society is particularly difficult. As noted in the text, we follow Lachapelle et al. (2020) by using V-Dem's Core Civil Society Index (Panel A of Table C.1). Another relevant measure is the Bertelsmann Transformation Index's (BTI) "stateness" variable, which equals the average of scores on four categories: (1) monopoly on the use of force, (2) state identity, (3) no interference in religious dogmas, and (4) basic administration. Since the third category is irrelevant for our purposes, we computed the average among the other three. The main drawback of this variable is its limited temporal coverage, since it begins in 2006. Panel B uses the average value of our adjusted stateness variable for 2006, 2008, and 2010, and shows null correlations for a cross-section of countries in 2006 (i.e., for each country, REBEL REGIME takes its value from 2006).

Table C.1: Controlling the Countryside

	Panel A. DV: V-Dem Core civil society index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0124	-0.0699	-0.0533	-0.0472				
	(0.0569)	(0.0499)	(0.0481)	(0.0459)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.119*	-0.0855	-0.111	-0.0838
					(0.0699)	(0.0678)	(0.0769)	(0.0770)
Civil war winner					0.143**	-0.0448	0.0264	0.00129
					(0.0640)	(0.0611)	(0.0552)	(0.0535)
Regime-years	2,562	2,562	2,562	2,562	2,562	2,562	2,562	2,562
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.000	0.387	0.484	0.511	0.083	0.388	0.495	0.515
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: Adjusted BTI stateness							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.108	0.0491	-0.177	0.137				
	(0.501)	(0.483)	(0.482)	(0.415)				
Col. liberation regime					0.852*	0.879	0.591	0.141
					(0.495)	(0.541)	(0.628)	(0.536)
Civil war winner					-0.961*	-0.740	-0.797	0.133
					(0.558)	(0.574)	(0.477)	(0.619)
Countries	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
R-squared	0.001	0.193	0.244	0.493	0.136	0.286	0.300	0.493
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006

Notes: Table C.1 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates (double-clustered by regime and country) in parentheses. The sequence of specifications is identical to those in the main tables. For expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates. Higher values for the coefficient estimates in Panel A indicate a stronger and more autonomous civil society. Higher values for the coefficient estimates in Panel B indicate greater stateness. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

The colonial liberation case of Angola exemplifies a regime that has endured for a long period despite exerting weak control over society. Following a lengthy liberation war with Portugal, the government (MPLA) faced a high-intensity center-seeking challenge from UNITA between 1975 and 2002, which had also participated in the liberation struggle. By the time the post-independence period began, UNITA had become a counterrevolutionary movement funded by South Africa and the United States to counter the Marxist orientation of MPLA, who received military backing from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Angola is a typical rebel regime with regard to the military power-sharing mechanisms: MPLA created the state military during the liberation struggle, and it has been immune to coups while consistently sharing power with military elites.

The Angolan regime nearly fell in the 1990s due to the collapse of the state in much of the country. "Cumulatively, four decades of fighting have unmade and reshaped Angola, socially and physically. Most of the conflict took place in the countryside, depopulating rural areas and crippling a once vibrant rural economy. The country, which in 1975 was the world's fourth largest exporter of coffee, had few commercial coffee farms at all by 2002. Roads and bridges were systematically destroyed and the soil sown indiscriminately with landmines," and state weakness also created an opening for rebels in Cabinda to attempt to secede (Le Billon 2007, 104-5). UNITA held territory and mined diamonds outside the government's stronghold in Luanda. In 1992, as part of a ceasefire, MPLA participated in elections judged free and fair by the international community, thus creating an alternative channel through which UNITA might have gained power. However, MPLA won and UNITA rejected the results, leading to renewed fighting (Fituni 1995, 152).

The inability of MPLA to gain control over the national territory until twenty-seven years after independence is unsurprising when considering factors stressed by Africanists. Herbst (2000) scores Angola as among the African countries with the most difficult political geographies given its large size and scattered population centers, and specifically asserts that "[t]he large territory of Angola has made it extremely difficult for the government to find a military solution to the civil war that began at independence in 1975" (151). The country's borders are a product of negotiations between Portugal and Britain in the late nineteenth century, and include significant territory beyond the historical Mbundu kingdoms of Kasanje and Matamba. These borders contain several medium-sized and regionally segmented ethnic groups whose historical rivalries ultimately undermined the initial promise in the 1960s that the liberation movement would develop a unified nationalist identity, as opposed to distinct ethnic organizations (Fituni 1995, 149; Le Billon 2007, 102; Reno 2011, 64-78). For MPLA, the main ethnic constituency is the Mbundu, who are primarily located near the capital city of Luanda and comprise 20% of the population. For UNITA, it is the Ovimbundu, located in the central highlands and composing 35% of the population. The third major anti-colonial rebel group (defeated several years after independence) was FNLA, represented by Bakongo in the northwest of the country with 15% of the population. Cabindan Mayombe, of the separatist rebel group FLEC, are 2% of the population. As in many countries with similar histories, members of an ethnic group that was organized as a state prior to colonization (Mbundu in MPLA) gained control of the government at independence and did not share power with members of other ethnic groups (Paine 2019*a*). Overall, Angola exemplifies that regime durability and state weakness are not mutually exclusive.

C.3 Civilian and Ethnic Power Sharing

Rebel regimes are not distinct in the extent to which they share power with other civilian actors or ethnic groups. Our theory highlights the importance in rebel regimes of sharing power with military elites. Although these elites pose a grave threat to the ruler, they also tend to be allies of the ruler, and hence can be bought off if offered perks such as the Ministry of Defense. However, we do not expect rulers in rebel regimes to necessarily face heightened incentives to share civilian positions. Any ruler can achieve survival benefits by distributing spoils more widely among civilian elites (Arriola 2009; Francois et al. 2015), but it is unclear why these benefits would systematically differ in rebel regimes—in which *military* elites pose the gravest threat. Thus, we expect that differences in power sharing between rebel regimes and non-rebel regimes are restricted to *coercive dimensions only*.

Two pieces of evidence reject broader power sharing. First, we collected original data on the appointment of a Vice President or Prime Minister—the highest civilian position in the cabinet. Appointing a Vice President/Prime Minister is an important indicator of overall regime institutionalization, and this position is often the constitutional successor to the president (Meng 2020; **?**). The Vice President and Prime Minister are functionally equivalent positions; the countries in our sample have *either* a Vice President or a Prime Minster, but not both. The Vice President/Prime Minister variable is coded similarly as the Defense Minister variable. We create a dummy variable called VP/PM APPOINT that equals 1 if an elite was appointed as the Vice President/Prime Minister, and 0 if the position was left vacant, eliminated from the cabinet, or the president named himself the head of that office. VP/PM SAME equals 1 if an elite was appointed as the Vice President/Prime Minister *and* that elite also held the position in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Appendix Table C.2 shows null coefficient estimates in almost every specification.

Second, in Appendix Table C.3 we examine data on the ethnic makeup of cabinets. We examine ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, the percentage of the country's population with some membership in cabinet or other high-ranking positions in the central government; and ETHNOCRACY, an indicator for whether a single ethnic group either controls all important political positions. The estimates are null, suggesting that rebel regimes also do not rely on a strategy of broad ethnic power sharing for their survival more than other non-rebel regimes, nor do they more narrowly concentrate power among the leading group.

This evidence also rules out an alternative mechanism that rebel regimes—rather than having advantages in military power sharing—are instead proxying for regimes in which one ethnic group successfully marginalizes all others. Appendix Table C.4 demonstrates this point even more clearly by summarizing the ethnic composition of every rebel group and rebel regime. The *majority* of rebel groups in our sample are multi-ethnic: in only 30% of cases did a single ethnic group organize an insurgency around aims for and recruitment of that ethnic group only. Furthermore, most rebel regimes are multi-ethnic after coming into power: in only 26% of cases did one ethnic group dominate the government within the first five years of the rebel regime's existence. Cases of complete ethnic exclusion are in fact quite rare in our sample. In only 17% of cases (i.e., four) was the foundational rebel group *and* the subsequent rebel regime organized around a single ethnic group. To sum, the fact that most rebel groups and most rebel regimes are multi-ethnic suggests that ethnic ties are not the primary factor for explaining the durability of these regimes.

Table C.2: Civilian Power Sharing

	Panel A. DV: VP/PM SAME							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0899	-0.0293	-0.0165	-0.0221				
	(0.0765)	(0.0704)	(0.0724)	(0.0712)				
Col. liberation regime					0.0512	-0.0388	-0.0354	-0.0699
					(0.0978)	(0.0941)	(0.136)	(0.135)
Civil war winner					0.133	-0.0186	0.000865	0.0208
					(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.0847)	(0.0883)
Regime-years	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,850
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.004	0.079	0.122	0.127	0.005	0.079	0.122	0.128
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. DV: VP/PM APPOINT							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0456	-0.136**	-0.128	-0.130*				
	(0.0838)	(0.0693)	(0.0833)	(0.0785)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0467	-0.184*	-0.203	-0.218
					(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.155)	(0.144)
Civil war winner					0.152*	-0.0787	-0.0569	-0.0474
					(0.0807)	(0.0704)	(0.0784)	(0.0830)
Regime-years	1,893	1,893	1,893	1,893	1,893	1,893	1,893	1,893
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.001	0.195	0.259	0.260	0.009	0.197	0.262	0.264
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.2 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates (double-clustered by regime and country) in parentheses. The sequence of specifications is identical to those in the main tables. For expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

Table C.3: Ethnic Power Sharing

Panel A. DV: ETHNIC REPRESENTATION								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0204	-0.0760	0.0205	0.00895				
	(0.0932)	(0.0905)	(0.0900)	(0.0867)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0228	-0.0750	0.106	0.0621
					(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.110)	(0.113)
Civil war winner					-0.0164	-0.0777	-0.0972	-0.0614
					(0.0962)	(0.101)	(0.0994)	(0.112)
Regime-years	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.001	0.035	0.075	0.100	0.001	0.035	0.087	0.103
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Panel B. DV: ETHNOCRACY								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0107	0.0223	-0.0839	-0.0838				
	(0.128)	(0.115)	(0.0978)	(0.0969)				
Col. liberation regime					0.103	0.0788	-0.0100	0.0153
					(0.172)	(0.161)	(0.143)	(0.145)
Civil war winner					-0.198*	-0.0691	-0.186	-0.215*
					(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.114)
Regime-years	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563	2,563
Regimes	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Countries	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	0.000	0.092	0.201	0.213	0.021	0.097	0.206	0.220
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.3 presents a series of linear regression estimates with standard error estimates (double-clustered by regime and country) in parentheses. The sequence of specifications is identical to those in the main tables. For expositional clarity, we omit coefficient estimates for the covariates. Data on the ethnic makeup of cabinets is from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR; Vogt et al. 2015). In Panel A, the dependent variable is ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, the percentage of the country's population with some membership in cabinet or other high-ranking positions in the central government (i.e., "junior partner" or higher in the EPR scheme). In Panel B, the dependent variable is ETHNOCRACY, an indicator for whether a single ethnic group has a status of either "monopoly" or "dominant," hence shutting out members of any other ethnic group from influential cabinet positions. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table C.4: Ethnic Composition of Rebel Regimes

Case	Main rebel group	First five years of regime
Algeria 62–92	Arabs	Arabs
Angola 75–NA	Mbundu-Mestico	Mbundu-Mestico
Burundi 06–NA	Hutu	Hutu, Tutsi
Chad 82–90	Toubou	Toubou, Hadjerai, Sara, Zaghawa/Bideyat
Chad 90–NA	Hadjerai, Zaghawa/Bideyat	Hadjerai, Zaghawa/Bideyat, Sara, Toubou
Congo-B 97–NA	Mbochi	Mbochi, Batéké, Kouyou
DRC 97–NA	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	Tutsi-Banyamulenge, Luba Shaba, Lunda-Yeke
Eritrea 93–NA	Christian Eritreans, Muslim Eritreans	Christians, Other Muslims
Ethiopia 91–NA	Tigry, Amhara, Oroma	Tigry, Amhara, Oroma
Guinea-Bissau 74–80	Cape Verdean, Balanta	Cape Verdean
Ivory Coast 11–NA	Non-ethnic	Northerners, Baule, Other Akans, Southern Mande
Liberia 97–03	Gio, Mano	Americo-Liberians, Gio, Mano
Morocco 56–NA	Arabs, Berbers	Arabs
Mozambique 75–NA	Makonde-Yao, Tsonga-Chopi	Makonde-Yao, Tsonga-Chopi
Namibia 90–NA	Non-ethnic	Ovambos, 7 others
Rwanda 94–NA	Tutsi	Tutsi
South Africa 94–NA	Africans (esp. Xhosa), Coloreds, Asians	Xhosa, 12 others
South Sudan 11–NA	Dinka, Nuer, others	Dinka, Nuer
Tunisia 56–11	Non-ethnic	Non-ethnic
Uganda 86–NA	South-Westerners, Baganda	South-Westerners, Baganda, Basoga
Zimbabwe 80–NA	Shona, Ndebele	Shona, Whites
% ethnically exclusive	33%	24%

Notes: The column "Main rebel group" lists every ethnic group that participated in the main rebel group that launched each rebel regime (Section A.2 states these rebel groups). To code this, we use ACD2EPR for every rebel group contained in their dataset; as the name suggests, this dataset matches rebel groups from the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) with ethnic groups from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR). "Non-ethnic" means that ACD2EPR codes the main rebel group as not proclaiming aims for and recruiting mainly from any particular ethnic groups. For cases that ACD2EPR does not contain (note that every such case is colonial liberation), we used the coding notes from EPR to determine the ethnic composition of the rebel group.

The column "First five years of regime" lists every ethnic group whose power status EPR codes as junior partner or higher within the first five years of the start of the rebel regime, with the group with the highest power status listed first. "Non-ethnic" means that EPR codes ethnicity as not politically relevant in that country at that time.

We highlight in gray every case in which a single ethnic group dominated both the rebellion to gain power and the first five years of the regime.

C.4 Alternative Civil War Factors

The broader literature on civil wars suggests several alternative explanations that we address here. As we show in Table C.5, none of these alternatives can account for the durability of rebel regimes. In each of the five panels in the table, we assess the same four specifications as in the preceding tables.

First, some argue that counterrevolutionary threats engender stable authoritarian regimes because elites need to band together in order to mitigate the counterrevolutionary threat. Slater (2010) develops this logic to explain durable (non-revolutionary) regimes in Southeast Asia, and more recently, Lachapelle et al. (2020) have applied the mechanism as one reason that revolutionary regimes survive so long (see also Paine 2021*a* for a formal statement of this mechanism). Thus, one possibility is that the challenges faced *after rebel regimes take power* are more important than the challenges they face *during the struggle to gain power*. To assess this, in Panel A, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they faced a major armed challenger within their first five years of gaining power (coded using data from Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Dixon and Sarkees 2015); eleven faced challengers, and ten did not. This is the appropriate operationalization of this mechanism because of the argument that facing an armed challenger early on creates the glue for elite unity, even if the threat diminishes in the future. Both types of rebel regimes (those that faced counterrevolutionary challengers and not) are significantly less likely to break down than non-rebel regimes, and the magnitude of the coefficient estimates is similar. This of course does not rule out that facing counterrevolutionary challengers facilitated regime stability in some cases, but does show that it cannot explain generally why rebel regimes tend to survive for such long periods. Furthermore, in several cases, the armed challengers clearly either weakened the regime (Angola, Chad 90–NA, DRC 97–NA) or overthrew it (Chad 82–90).

Our analysis of rebel regimes also relates to research on civil war termination. For example, Toft (2009) connects the mode of civil war termination to civil war recurrence, and more recent research considers related factors such as how the security forces are reconfigured after the war (Berg 2020). Toft provides statistical evidence that civil wars are less likely to recur when they end by outright victory (and the correlation is stronger if it is outright rebel victory) as opposed to a peace settlement. In Panel B, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they gained power via outright victory (seventeen cases) or a negotiated settlement (South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Burundi). Recall that in cases of negotiated settlements, our coding requirement for a rebel regime is that they gain the presidency (in all cases, this was via an election); and in Table 5, we show that in all four cases, the military integration was biased toward leaders of the rebellion. Thus we expect that rebel regimes formed by negotiated settlement should also be significantly more durable than non-rebel regimes, which we demonstrate in Panel B. We also show there that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates are similar in magnitude for outright victory rebel regimes and negotiated settlement rebel regimes.

In Panel C, we assess a related consideration. Rather than distinguish rebel regimes from others, we distinguish each regime-year by the most recent way in which a civil war ended under the incumbent regime: outright rebel victory, outright government victory, and negotiated settlement (as coded by Toft 2009). Given the "most recent" stipulation, for example, Angola 75–NA is coded as outright rebel victory from 1975 through 1994, and then negotiated settlement afterwards because of their peace deal with UNITA (which subsequently failed and led to renewed civil war).

The omitted basis category is regimes that have never faced an armed challenger, a civil war is ongoing, or there is no active fighting but the civil war never "ended" in the sense of any of the three aforementioned endings. We show that regime-years in which the most recent civil war ending was outright rebel victory or a negotiated settlement are significantly less likely to experience regime breakdown, whereas the coefficient estimate for government victory is positive and not significant. Importantly, the coefficient estimate for negotiated settlements is driven *entirely* by rebel regimes. In addition to the four cases mentioned above in which a rebel regime was founded by a negotiated settlement, all but one of the additional cases in this category are rebel regimes (established by outright rebel victory) that concluded a peace settlement with an armed challenger (such as the Angola example mentioned above). These findings also demonstrate that our findings for rebel regimes are specific to *rebel* military victory, and do not extend to government military victory (which, despite eliminating an armed challenger, does not engender the conditions for peaceful power sharing described in our theory).

Research on civil war termination also highlights the sharp increase in negotiated settlements to end civil wars after the Cold War ended, and concomitant implication of security sector reform programs (Toft 2009). To capture this idea, we disaggregate rebel regimes by whether they have their origins during the Cold War. We do not expect rebel regimes with origins during versus after the Cold War to matter because, as noted, most such regimes were founded by outright rebel victory. Furthermore, although three of the four rebel regimes founded by negotiated settlement began post-Cold War, we already demonstrated that they persist at the same frequency as rebel regimes founded by outright rebel victory. In Panel D, we show that the twelve post-Cold War rebel regimes and the nine Cold War rebel regimes are significantly less likely to break down than non-rebel regimes (and note that the year fixed effects account for baseline differences in the probability of breakdown at different periods of time).

Finally, in Panel E, we control for other civil war factors that could affect regime stability. Contrary to the core idea about counterrevolutions, an ongoing rebellion can destabilize a regime for numerous reasons. Most directly, the rebels can defeat the government militarily—as occurred in the establishment of the rebel regimes in our dataset. An ongoing civil war can also make the ruler more reliant on the military and hence likely to face a coup (Bell and Sudduth 2017). Civil wars are also destabilizing by creating refugee flows (Salehyan 2011), which we directly control for with the logged number of total refugees inside a country. Finally, given the specific considerations about the Cold War versus post-Cold War period described above, we replace the year fixed effects with a Cold War fixed effect in every specification.

Table C.5: Alternative Civil War Factors

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel A. Counterrevolutions			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (counterrevolution)	-0.0460***	-0.0446***	-0.0568***	-0.0586***
	(0.0111)	(0.0130)	(0.0153)	(0.0167)
Rebel regime (no counterrevolution)	-0.0439***	-0.0440***	-0.0485***	-0.0412***
	(0.00961)	(0.0107)	(0.0121)	(0.0126)
Country-years	2,404	2,404	2,404	2,404
R-squared	0.013	0.041	0.041	0.046
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Mode of victory for rebel regimes			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (outright victory)	-0.0447***	-0.0433***	-0.0534***	-0.0519***
	(0.00964)	(0.0118)	(0.0123)	(0.0124)
Rebel regime (settlement)	-0.0463***	-0.0480***	-0.0492***	-0.0416***
	(0.0106)	(0.0113)	(0.0140)	(0.0148)
Country-years	2,404	2,404	2,404	2,404
R-squared	0.013	0.041	0.041	0.046
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel C. General civil war termination			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel victory	-0.0399***	-0.0392***	-0.0473***	-0.0447***
	(0.0108)	(0.0125)	(0.0129)	(0.0128)
Government victory	0.0388	0.0333	0.0288	0.0204
	(0.0313)	(0.0299)	(0.0351)	(0.0349)
Settlement	-0.0452***	-0.0433***	-0.0465***	-0.0461***
	(0.00945)	(0.0104)	(0.0141)	(0.0151)
Country-years	2,404	2,404	2,404	2,404
R-squared	0.014	0.042	0.042	0.046
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

$^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}\, p < 0.05,^{*}\, p < 0.1.$

Table C.5, continued

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel D. Origins in Cold War vs. Post			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (Cold War)	-0.0376***	-0.0365***	-0.0377**	-0.0371**
	(0.0103)	(0.0121)	(0.0164)	(0.0172)
Rebel regime (Post-Cold War)	-0.0553***	-0.0572***	-0.0710***	-0.0650***
	(0.00994)	(0.0115)	(0.0145)	(0.0153)
Country-years	2,404	2,404	2,404	2,404
R-squared	0.013	0.042	0.042	0.047
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES
	Panel E. Additional civil war covariates			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0598***	-0.0568***	-0.0615***	-0.0582***
	(0.0137)	(0.0147)	(0.0152)	(0.0151)
Cold War FE	-0.0167	-0.0177	-0.0183	-0.0211
	(0.0135)	(0.0131)	(0.0136)	(0.0137)
ln(Refugees)	-0.000369	-0.000232	-0.000723	-0.00133
	(0.00109)	(0.00106)	(0.00122)	(0.00117)
Ongoing civil war	0.0523**	0.0527**	0.0518**	0.0480**
	(0.0200)	(0.0203)	(0.0217)	(0.0214)
Country-years	2,404	2,404	2,404	2,404
R-squared	0.020	0.023	0.021	0.026
Covariates?	None	Economic	Other	All
Year FE?	NO	NO	NO	NO

$^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}\ p < 0.05,^{*}\ p < 0.1.$