

# COVID-19: What to Tell Your Friends and Family

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January 27, 2021

**UAB** MEDICINE




# Financial Disclosures

I have no financial disclosures relevant to this presentation


# Outline

- **Epidemiology of COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2)**
- **Disease Transmission for COVID-19**
- **Myth Busting for COVID-19**
  - “If I test positive for COVID-19 but don’t have symptoms, then it’s likely a false negative test.”
  - “What’s the big deal, it’s no different than the flu.”
  - “There is a high survival rate, why should we care?”
  - “I don’t need to get a vaccine, I can rely on others getting it.”
  - “If I get my vaccine, I don’t have to wear a mask anymore”

# COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2) Epidemiology



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Global Cases

98,559,175


Cases by Country/Region/Sovereignty

- 24,950,008 US
- 10,639,684 India
- 8,753,920 Brazil
- 3,658,447 Russia
- 3,627,730 United Kingdom
- 3,093,619 France
- 2,499,560 Spain
- 2,455,185 Italy
- 2,424,328 Turkey
- 2,137,619 Germany
- 1,987,418 Colombia
- 1,853,830 Argentina
- 1,732,290 Mexico
- 1,470,879 Poland

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Cumulative Cases Active Cases Incidence Rate Case-Fatality Ratio Testing Rate

192 countries/regions

Lancet Inf Dis Article: [Here](#). Mobile Version: [Here](#). Data sources: [Full list](#). Downloadable database: [GitHub](#), [Feature Layer](#).  
 Lead by JHU CSSE. Technical Support: [Esri Living Atlas team](#) and [JHU APL](#). Financial Support: [JHU](#), [NSF](#), [Bloomberg Philanthropies](#) and [Stavros Niarchos Foundation](#). Resource support: [Slack](#), [Github](#) and [AWS](#).

Global Deaths

2,116,101

- 416,735 deaths US
- 215,243 deaths Brazil
- 153,184 deaths India
- 147,614 deaths Mexico
- 97,517 deaths United Kingdom
- 85,162 deaths Italy
- 73,018 deaths


Global Deaths


US State Level

Deaths, Recovered

- 42,134 deaths, 119,953 recovered New York US
- 36,405 deaths, recovered California US
- 34,720 deaths, 1,785,578 recovered Texas US
- 25,164 deaths, recovered Florida US
- 20,934 deaths, 64,466 recovered New Jersey US

US Deaths, Recovered





Updated January 23, 2021, 2:08 P.M. E.T.  
 Leer en español




|                     | TOTAL REPORTED | ON JAN. 22 | 14-DAY CHANGE |
|---------------------|----------------|------------|---------------|
| <b>Cases</b>        | 24.9 million+  | 191,912    | -30% ↘        |
| <b>Deaths</b>       | 415,686        | 3,734      | Flat →        |
| <b>Hospitalized</b> |                | 116,264    | -5% →         |

■ Day with reporting anomaly. Hospitalization data from the Covid Tracking Project; 14-day change trends use 7-day averages.


# Alabama Case Burden as of January 23, 2021

|   |   |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|
| <p><b>439,442</b></p> <p>348,017 Conf. + 91,425 Prob.</p> <p>Total Cases ⓘ</p>        | <p><b>6,657</b></p> <p>5,464 Conf. + 1,193 Prob.</p> <p>Total Deaths ⓘ</p>          | <p><b>+3,355</b></p> <p>2,340 Conf. + 1,015 Prob.</p> <p>Cases Yesterday ⓘ</p> | <p><b>233,211</b></p> <p>Recovered ⓘ</p>   |
| <p><b>2,078,488 Total</b></p> <p><b>+12,137 Yesterday</b></p> <p>Tests Reported ⓘ</p> | <p><b>0 Allotted →</b></p> <p><b>223,887 Administered</b></p> <p>Vaccinations ⓘ</p> | <p><b>44,597 Cases</b></p> <p><b>248,514 Tested</b></p> <p>Last 14 Days ⓘ</p>  | <p><b>40,514 Total</b></p> <p><b>2,258 Current →</b></p> <p>Hospitalizations ⓘ</p> |



# Transmission Dynamics and COVID-19

# Proposed Routes of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission




# Airborne, aerosols, droplets, nuclei


Aerosols (an over-arching term)- includes a range of particles

Droplets: larger than 5-10 microns (a micron [ $\mu\text{m}$ ]; about 1/10 the width of a human hair) fall to the ground within seconds of impact on another surface without evaporating

Droplet nuclei: remain suspended in the air and evaporate quickly, leaving behind particles consisting of proteins, salts, and suspended viruses

- can remain airborne for hours
- It is only the droplet nuclei that are capable of riding the air currents through a hospital, etc





Size of particles and distance expelled is variable and depends on many factors:

- Size distribution
- Propulsive force generated by the individual
- Relative humidity
- Evaporation level
- Settling velocity
- Direction of airflow
- Air changes/hour
- Temperature
- crowding

Ian M Mackay, PhD  
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virologydownunder.com


# Concern: Is 6 feet enough?

**Viruses are released during exhalation, talking, and coughing in microdroplets small enough to remain in the air 1-2 M from an infected individual**

If SARS-CoV-2 primarily carried by aerosols that remain suspended in the air for prolonged periods of time, then:

- medical masks would be inadequate
- face shields would only provide partial protection
- 6 feet separation would not be enough

Figure. Multiphase Turbulent Gas Cloud From a Human Sneeze



# Outbreaks likely associated with Droplet transmission

- **25 close contacts sitting within 2m of symptomatic index case and presymptomatic case, multiple exposed flight members, 350 passengers on board the airplane during 15 hour flight**

- No evidence of transmission of SARS-CoV-2

Schwartz KL, Murti M, Finkelstein M, Leis J, Fitzgerald-Husek A, Bourns L, et al. Lack of COVID-19 transmission on an international flight. *CMAJ*. 2020;192(7):E171. Available from: <https://www.cmaj.ca/content/192/7/E171/tab-e-letters#lack-of-covid-19-transmission-on-an-international-flight>.

- **41 HCW exposed to aerosol generating procedures for at least 10 minutes, <2m from patient. 85% wore surgical masks, 15% wore N95s.**

- No transmission events of SARS-CoV-2 with repetitive testing of all HCW


Ng K, Poon BH, Kiat Puar TH, Shan Quah JL, Loh WJ, Wong YJ, et al. COVID-19 and the risk to health care workers: a case report. *Ann Intern Med*. 2020;172(11):766–767.

- **48 person nosocomial outbreak in pediatric dialysis unit**


- 7 HCW, 3 patients, 1 accompanying person infected – all had 15 minute direct contact or exposure within 2m without any PPE
- Remaining contacts who shared indoor environment without close contact or distance >2m but without any PPE, none tested positive for SARS-CoV-2

Schwierzeck V, Konig JC, Kuhn J, Mellmann A, Correa-Martinez CL, Omran H, et al. First reported nosocomial outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in a pediatric dialysis unit. *Clin Infect Dis*. 2020;ciaa491. [published online ahead of print, 2020 Apr 27].

# Concern: Shared environments may allow for airborne transmission




**Distribution of respiratory microdroplets in an indoor environment with inadequate and adequate ventilation**




# Super-spreader events

FIGURE. Confirmed\* and probable† cases of COVID-19 associated with two choir practices, by date of symptom onset (N = 53) — Skagit County, Washington, March 2020



2.5 hour practice; 6 rows of 20 chairs, spaced 6-10 inches apart. High noted secondary attack rate (53% confirmed, 87% confirmed and probably cases)

# Patient 31 in South Korea



**1,160 contacts through multiple venues by one patient**

# Airborne vs droplet

**Droplet and airborne transmission are not really a dichotomy, more like a continuum with many factors**

Droplet



Small Particle Aerosol Transmission

Spread when concentrated in poorly ventilated spaces or very large amounts

## **True Airborne pathogens:**

Measles:  $R_0 = 12-18$ , household attack rates  $>90\%$

Varicella:  $R_0 = 10$ , household attack rates =  $85\%$

TB:  $R_0 = 10$ , household attack rates =  $50\%$


COVID:

$R_0 = 2.3$ , household attack rates =  $10.5\%$


# Preventing COVID-19 Transmission

# Physical distancing, face masks, and face shields

|   | Studies and participants  | Relative effect (95% CI)  | Anticipated absolute effect (95% CI), eg, chance of viral infection or transmission |                                     | Difference (95% CI)     | Certainty* | What happens (standardised GRADE terminology) <sup>29</sup>   |
|---|---|---|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------|---|
|   |   |   | Comparison group  | Intervention group                  |                         |            |   |
| Physical distance ≥1 m vs <1 m                            | Nine adjusted studies (n=7782); 29 unadjusted studies (n=10736) | aOR 0.18 (0.09 to 0.38); unadjusted RR 0.30 (95% CI 0.20 to 0.44) | Shorter distance, 12.8%   | Further distance, 2.6% (1.3 to 5.3) | -10.2% (-11.5 to -7.5)  | Moderate†  | A physical distance of more than 1 m probably results in a large reduction in virus infection; for every 1 m further away in distancing, the relative effect might increase 2.02 times            |
| Face mask vs no face mask                                 | Ten adjusted studies (n=2647); 29 unadjusted studies (n=10170)  | aOR 0.15 (0.07 to 0.34); unadjusted RR 0.34 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.45) | No face mask, 17.4%   | Face mask, 3.1% (1.5 to 6.7)        | -14.3% (-15.9 to -10.7) | Low‡       | Medical or surgical face masks might result in a large reduction in virus infection; N95 respirators might be associated with a larger reduction in risk compared with surgical or similar masks§ |
| Eye protection (faceshield, goggles) vs no eye protection | 13 unadjusted studies (n=3713)                                  | Unadjusted RR 0.34 (0.22 to 0.52)¶                                | No eye protection, 16.0%  | Eye protection, 5.5% (3.6 to 8.5)   | -10.6% (-12.5 to -7.7)  | Low        | Eye protection might result in a large reduction in virus infection   |



# Current IDSA Recommendations for PPE in care of patients with COVID-19



## AGPs and COVID-19

Definition of aerosol generating procedure: procedures that are considered to have a greater likelihood of producing aerosols compared to coughing

*“a significant research gap exists in the epidemiology of the risk of transmission of acute respiratory infections from patients undergoing aerosol generating procedures to healthcare workers, and clinical studies should be carefully planned to address specific questions around the risks of transmission in these settings”*

Tran K, Cimon K, Severn M, Pessoa-Silva CL, Conly J. Aerosol generating procedures and risk of transmission of acute respiratory infections to healthcare workers: A systematic review. PLoS One 2012; 7: e35797.

# So, why N-95s for AGP?

No direct evidence on AGPs and rates of COVID-19 infection, based on observational studies for SARS

**Table 4. Risk of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Transmission to Healthcare Workers Exposed and Not Exposed to Aerosol-generating Procedure, and Aerosol-generating Procedures as Risk Factors for SARS Transmission**


| Type of Aerosol-generating Procedure                  | Odds Ratio | 95% Confidence Interval |
|---|------------|-------------------------|
| Tracheal intubation                                   | 6.6        | 2.3–18.9                |
| Manipulation of oxygen mask                           | 4.6        | .6–32.5                 |
| Tracheotomy   | 4.2        | 1.5–11.5                |
| Manipulation of bilevel positive airway pressure mask | 4.2        | .6–27.4                 |
| Suction before intubation                             | 3.5        | .5– 24.6                |
| Noninvasive ventilation                               | 3.1        | 1.4–7.2                 |
| Manual ventilation before intubation                  | 2.8        | 1.3–6.4                 |
| Collection of sputum sample                           | 2.7        | .9–8.2                  |
| Defibrillation  | 2.5        | .1–43.9                 |
| Bronchoscopy  | 1.9        | .2–14.2                 |
| Chest compressions                                    | 1.4        | .2–11.2                 |
| Insertion of nasogastric tube                         | 1.2        | .4–4.0                  |

Adapted from [32].

Abbreviation: SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.

# Viability of SARS-CoV-2 in the Air



- Experimental conditions: use of a collision nebulizer and drum to create an aerosolized environment



# Airborne contamination within hospitals

## 13 individuals with COVID-19

- **163 samples** from a variety of sources
  - 121 (72%) had positive PCR
  - 63% of air samples were positive by PCR
  - Key point: viral cultivation could not be confirmed due to low concentrations of virus



# Viability SARS-CoV-2 in the air




Table 3. Estimate of viable virus counts based on TCID<sub>50</sub> tests.

| Sample ID          | Virus genome equivalents/L of air <sup>a</sup> | TCID <sub>50</sub> /100 µl | Viable virus count/L air |
|--------------------|--|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1-1 BioSpot        | 94   | 2.68E+04                   | 74                       |
| 1-2 BioSpot + HEPA | -  | 0                          | 0                        |
| 1-3 BioSpot        | 30   | 6.31E+03                   | 18                       |
| 2-1 VIVAS          | 44   | 1.00E+04                   | 27                       |
| 2-2 VIVA S+ HEPA   | -  | 0                          | 0                        |
| 2-3 VIVAS          | 16   | 2.15E+03                   | 6                        |

<sup>a</sup>From Table 2.

Air samples were collected in the room of two COVID-19 patients

By using VIVAS air samplers that operate on a gentle water-vapor condensation principle, material was collected from room air and subjected to RT-qPCR and virus culture.

Viable virus was isolated from air samples collected 2 to 4.8m away from the patients.

The genome sequence of the SARS-CoV-2 strain isolated from the material collected by the air samplers was identical to that isolated from the NP swab from the patient

# Conclusions about transmission of COVID-19

**There is clear documented disease transmission through droplet particles**


**Aerosol transmission can occur in certain environments and are particularly dependent upon the viral load of the patient, air flow, and potentially created through certain procedures performed in the healthcare setting.**

The relative importance of indirect transmission compared with direct is unknown, even under lockdown conditions. The World Health Organization (WHO) reports there is no conclusive evidence for fomite transmission.


WHO cautions that the consistent presence of fomites in the environment of infected cases suggests fomite transmission is an active means of transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, as it is for other coronaviruses.

**Myth 1: “If I test positive for COVID-19 but don’t have symptoms, then it’s likely a false negative test.”**

# Temporal Considerations for Diagnosis of COVID-19



# Antigen testing




# PCR vs culture


upper respiratory samples from a sample of severely ill patients, including some post -solid organ or -bone marrow transplant.

**Black boxes represent samples that yielded replication-competent virus**

**Median duration of culturable virus = 8 days**




# Viral CT values and Viral Culture




**183 PCR samples were set up for culture, 129 led to virus isolation. No culture was positive if CT value was > 34**

**CT values should be interpreted with caution as they do not reflect a true viral load**


### Days from positive COVID test to first negative test






**Myth #2: “What’s the big deal, it’s no different than the flu.”**

# Presentation of COVID-19



- Fever (83–99%)
- Cough (59–82%)
- Fatigue (44–70%)
- Anorexia (40–84%)
- Shortness of breath (31–40%)
- Sputum production (28–33%)
- Myalgia (11–35%)

# Flu vs. Allergies vs. COVID



**These are COMMON SYMPTOMS,  
which may vary from person to person.  
Only a doctor can give you a diagnosis.**

[uab.edu/coronavirus](https://uab.edu/coronavirus)

# Flu vs COVID-19

- While symptoms are similar between cold and flu, COVID-19 spreads easily because very few people have immunity
- Few treatment options, unlike influenza
- The long term effects of COVID-19 are more significant than influenza:
  - 76% of >1700 COVID-19 patients from a hospital in Wuhan, China, were still not symptom-free at a 6-month follow-up
    - fatigue or muscle weakness
    - sleep difficulties
    - anxiety or depression

**Myth 3: “There is a high survival rate, why should we care?”**

# Case Fatality Ratio vs deaths/100,000




For the twenty countries currently most affected by COVID-19 worldwide, the charts show the number of deaths either per 100 confirmed cases (observed case-fatality ratio) or per 100,000 population (this represents a country's general population, with both confirmed cases and healthy people).

# Case Fatality Rate is affected by stress to healthcare system


## Case fatality rate of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic

The Case Fatality Rate (CFR) is the ratio between confirmed deaths and confirmed cases. During an outbreak of a pandemic the CFR is a poor measure of the mortality risk of the disease. We explain this in detail at [OurWorldInData.org/Coronavirus](https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus)

Our World  
in Data




● New Deaths ● 7-day Average



# Excess mortality

- + indicates observed count above threshold
- Predicted number of deaths from all causes
- threshold for excess deaths

Weekly number of deaths (from all causes)



# COVID-19 HOSPITALIZATION AND DEATH BY AGE

## FACTORS THAT INCREASE COMMUNITY SPREAD AND INDIVIDUAL RISK



CROWDED SITUATIONS



CLOSE / PHYSICAL CONTACT



ENCLOSED SPACE



DURATION OF EXPOSURE

Rate ratios compared to 18-29 year olds

0-4 years

5-17 years

18-29 years

30-39 years

40-49 years

50-64 years

65-74 years

75-84 years

85+ years

HOSPITALIZATION<sup>1</sup>

4x lower

9x lower

Comparison Group

2x higher

3x higher

4x higher

5x higher

8x higher

13x higher

DEATH<sup>2</sup>

9x lower

16x lower

Comparison Group

4x higher

10x higher

30x higher

90x higher

220x higher

630x higher

## ACTIONS TO REDUCE RISK OF COVID-19



WEARING A MASK



SOCIAL DISTANCING (6 FT GOAL)



HAND HYGIENE



CLEANING AND DISINFECTION



<sup>1</sup> Data source: COVID-NET (<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covidview/index.html>, accessed 08/06/20). Numbers are unadjusted rate ratios.

<sup>2</sup> Data source: NCHS Provisional Death Counts (<https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/COVID19/index.htm>, accessed 08/06/20). Numbers are unadjusted rate ratios.

[cdc.gov/coronavirus](https://cdc.gov/coronavirus)

CS319360-A 08/10/2020

**Myth 4: “I don’t need to get a vaccine, I can rely on others getting it.”**


# Herd Immunity

The most important factor for herd immunity is the  $R_0$

$R_0$ -The average # secondary infections from single infected source

Herd Immunity Threshold =


$1 - 1/R_0$  (ex.  $R_0 = 4$ , HIT is 75%)



# Herd immunity hurdle is dependent on reproduction number

| Infection  | Basic Reproduction Number ( $R_0$ ) | Crude Herd Immunity Threshold (%) |
|------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Diphtheria | 6-7                                 | 85                                |
| Influenza  | 1.4-4                               | 30-75                             |
| Measles    | 12-18                               | 92-94                             |
| Mumps      | 4-7                                 | 75-86                             |
| Pertussis  | 12-17                               | 92-94                             |
| Polio      | 2-15                                | 50-93                             |
| Rubella    | 6-7                                 | 83-85                             |
| Smallpox   | 5-7                                 | 80-85                             |
| SARS-CoV-2 | 2-3                                 | 60-70%                            |


# Vaccine Candidates in Development for SARS-Cov-2




Funk. Frontiers in Pharmacology. 2020;[Epub].

Slide credit: [clinicaloptions.com](http://clinicaloptions.com)

# Design of mRNA COVID-19 Vaccine



# Efficacy of Pfizer mRNA vaccine



95% effective after two shots

**Myth 5: “If I get my vaccine, I don’t have to wear a mask anymore”**

# Vaccine Rollout

Vaccine effectiveness is based on patients receiving a safe vaccine, not on the development of a safe vaccine

Distribution is a key issue currently, which delays others in getting vaccinated



While the vaccine is 95% effective, it is not 100% and you can still spread COVID-19 to others, even though your symptoms may be mild.



IN SUPPORTING THE DISTRIBUTION & ADMINISTRATION OF COVID-19 VACCINES, OWS HAS FOUR KEY GOALS, TENETS, AND ARCHITECTURE




### DISTRIBUTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF A COVID-19 VACCINE FOUR KEY TENETS



# Preventing COVID-19

## Multiple Layers Improve Success

The Swiss Cheese Respiratory Pandemic Defense recognizes that no single intervention is perfect at preventing the spread of the coronavirus. Each intervention (layer) has holes.



Source: Adapted from Ian M. Mackay (virologydownunder.com) and James T. Reason. Illustration by Rose Wong

# Conclusions

- **SARS-CoV-2 continues to surge in parts of US with continued outbreaks**
- **While droplets are likely the largest mode of transmission, airborne spread through small particle aerosol transmission may occur in the right context**
- **Although case fatality rates are low, our high case numbers is the reason for the United States high rate of death/100,000**
- **A multi-faceted approach of masking, distancing, and vaccination is necessary for stopping the pandemic**

# Questions?