The Complementarity Between Trust and Contract Enforcement

Trust and Contract Enforcement

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Agreements are rarely fully enforceable, exposing trading parties to the risk of exploitation. In such cases, trust—defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others—may be key to realizing gains from trade. This paper asks whether trust substitutes for or complements contract enforcement. While intuition may suggest trust matters more when enforcement is weak, our experiment, which exogenously varies both trust and enforcement, shows it can matter more when enforcement is strong. The mechanism is equilibrium selection: stronger enforcement allows more equilibria, and trust helps select efficient ones. This complementarity between trust and enforcement has important policy implications.

Keywords: Trust, contract enforcement, complementarity, equilibrium selection, causal effect, screening, belief distortions, institutions, laboratory experiment

JEL: C91, D02, D91, E02

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1. Introduction

Incomplete and imperfectly enforceable agreements are ubiquitous in economic life. One reason for this are informational constraints, which make it impossible in most cases to govern all conceivable contingencies in a contract, and which can sometimes also prevent the verification of all enforcement-relevant information. For example, it may be difficult or impossible to obtain accurate information about past behaviour, especially in settings where trading partners are often strangers, or where it is costly to observe and record performance. This can preclude key strategies for enforcing agreements, such as conditioning contract terms on past performance. Even if informational constraints do not bind, other types of enforcement limitations can exist, such as lack of commitment power. For example, weak judicial systems can limit the ability of trading parties to legally commit to the specified contract terms.

Given these imperfections, contracting parties are exposed to the risk of being cheated, and they may only be willing to interact and realise the associated gains from trade if they trust that the other party will not take advantage of them. Consequently, it has been argued that trust is of fundamental importance for achieving economic efficiency (see, e.g., Banfield, 1958; Arrow, 1972; Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995). The potential impact of trust on economic outcomes appears extensive, as it can affect individual-level economic interactions, organisational and market efficiency, and even economic development at the country level.

While there seems little doubt that trust is relevant when contracts are incomplete, this paper addresses a previously unstudied question: whether trust, defined in this paper as a belief about the trustworthiness of others, is a *substitute* for or a *complement* to the degree of contract enforcement opportunities. The ability to enforce contracts is arguably always imperfect, but the degree of imperfection varies substantially across time and space, due to factors such as

technology, geography, and institutions. Given this variation, one intuition might be that high trust is particularly important in environments with limited enforcement opportunities, as it can compensate for these limitations. In other words, trust and the strength of contract enforcement might be viewed as substitutes. Indeed, a perfectly enforceable contract is clearly a substitute for trust as there is no role for trust when contracts are complete.

In this paper, however, we demonstrate that trust and strength of contract enforcement can also be complements. We argue that the mechanism responsible for a complementary relation between trust and contract enforcement is equilibrium selection. Indeed, unless variation in trust, which is a variation in initial beliefs, is selecting different equilibria, it is difficult to understand how trust can have stable, lasting effects. If expanding contract enforcement opportunities simultaneously gives rise to a wider range of equilibria, then trust may be more important when contract enforcement is stronger, though not perfect. In such a scenario, initial high trust beliefs could select efficient equilibria confirming these beliefs, while initial low trust beliefs could select inefficient equilibria, again confirming the beliefs. Conversely, in weak contracting environments with only a narrow range of (presumably inefficient) equilibria, trust may have little impact.

Understanding whether trust and contract enforcement are substitutes or complements is important due to differing policy implications. If they are substitutes, policies aimed at enhancing economic performance might be effective if they focused solely on improving formal institutions, such as the judicial system, to enable better contract enforcement—even if levels of trust remain low. Likewise, policies aimed at moving a society out of a low-trust trap, like public awareness campaigns promoting codes of conduct or advertising role models of trustful business relations, could be effective—even if formal institutions remain weak and ensure only very imperfect contract enforcement. However, if trust and contract enforcement are complements, the above

policies might be ineffective if pursued in isolation. Effective policies would then need to simultaneously improve formal institutions, thereby allowing a wider range of more efficient equilibria, *and* raise trust levels, fostering the selection of efficient equilibria.

In this paper we report the results of controlled experiments showing that an independent improvement in contract enforcement opportunities at low levels of trust generates no or only small increases in gains from trade. In contrast, improvements in contract enforcement opportunities cause large increases in gains from trade if trust levels are high. Likewise, our data show that an increase in trust leads to no improvement in gains from trade if the environment is unfavourable for contract enforcement, but to large increases in gains from trade when the opportunities for contract enforcement are enriched. Our results are based on the exogenous variation of trust and the availability of different levers for contract enforcement in a laboratory experiment involving principals and agents facing profitable trading opportunities. The key advantage of this approach is that it allows for a clean separation of the effects of trust and strength of contract enforcement and their interaction on the realised gains from trade.

What economic and psychological mechanisms drive the complementarity between trust and contract enforcement? To provide deeper intuitions, we need to provide more detail about the experiment. The experiment involves principal-agent interactions where principals make contract offers in an experimental market by promising to pay wages and requesting effort levels from the agents, while agents choose their actual effort levels after accepting an offer. The gains from trade increase with effort, but there is a conflict of interest as higher effort benefits the principal while being costly for the agent. In all treatments, there is a baseline degree of imperfection in contract enforcement captured by allowing agents to choose any effort level, regardless of contract terms.

Subjects interact in markets of seven principals and ten agents over 15 periods. In a given period, a match occurs if an agent accepts a principal's offer.

We implemented variation in the favourability of the environment for contract enforcement by altering the availability of two enforcement levers. One lever is ability to condition contract terms on enforcement-relevant information, which we implement as the ability of principals to keep track of the past performances of the agents they have met. The other lever is commitment power, which we implement as the principals' ability to make the specified wage in the offered contract legally binding.

We consider three contracting environments, which progressively enrich the possibilities for contract enforcement.[1] In our *weak contracting environment*, neither lever is available. The principal can pay any wage to the agent, irrespective of the wage that was promised in the contract, so there is no commitment.[2] The principal and the agent simultaneously choose the actual wage and actual effort after the agent accepted the contract. In addition, the parties face an informational constraint that prevents them from making contracts contingent on signals of past behaviour. We implement this constraint by re-randomizing the identification numbers of principals and agents across periods such that interactions remain one-shot. In our *medium contracting environment*, we improve contract enforcement by adding the lever of commitment: the principals' wage promises

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[1] As an extension, we also consider a fourth contracting environment that further strengthens contract enforcement to explicitly demonstrate that sufficiently strong contract enforcement can substitute for trust, which is trivially true in the limit where contracts are complete.

[2] This contracting environment may reflect a weak or inefficient judicial system or rely on informal agreements, often based on verbal promises. Such conditions are frequently observed in developing countries, where a large proportion of workers, sometimes even the majority, are employed in the informal sector, often on a casual basis (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Djankov *et al*., 2008; La Porta and Shleifer, 2014; McCaig and Pavcnik, 2015). In this sector, written contracts are typically absent, the judicial system is highly inefficient or nonexistent, and contract enforcement is consequently very weak.

are legally enforceable, i.e., the principal must pay the promised wage. Our *strong contracting environment* adds, on top, the lever of being able to condition contract terms on past performance by keeping identification numbers constant across rounds. This allows principals to make their contract offers contingent on signals about a specific agents' previous effort choices.

We implement (and verify) exogenous variation in principals' initial trust about the agents' trustworthiness. We achieve this by showing the principals, before the start of the experiment, examples of real historical effort choices in experimental sessions in which the agents either exhibit trustworthy behaviour (shown in our high-trust treatments) or untrustworthy behaviour (shown in our low-trust treatments). This design allows us to study a possible causal effect of trust by comparing high-trust and low trust treatments.

How do we explain our finding that the impact of trust depends in a complementary manner on strength of contract enforcement, and vice versa? Our investigation of mechanisms suggests three key ingredients. (1) An important underlying mechanism for trustworthy behaviour is that some agents have a preference for reciprocity, rewarding high wages with high effort even in one-shot interactions, though this tendency is heterogeneous, with a sub-population of agents being selfish. (2) Commitment power is crucial for principals to elicit high efforts from reciprocal agents and distinguish them from selfish agents; if wage promises are not credible, reciprocal types will not reveal themselves by choosing high effort. (3) Information about past performance matters for the ability of principals to benefit from identifying reciprocal types. This allows them to selectively condition high wages on signals of past trustworthy behaviour and engage in reciprocal relationships with high gains from trade.

We argue, and verify empirically, that these ingredients can give rise to the observed complementarity. Intuitively, if both commitment power and information are available, high trust

can motivate principals to try a strategy of paying high wages and screening for reciprocal types. In contrast, low trust can cause principals to refrain from this strategy and pay only low wages. However, if commitment power or information is missing, even high trust among principals results in inefficient outcomes as there is no equilibrium allowing principals to both identify and benefit from reciprocal interactions with reciprocal types.

We begin our analysis of mechanisms with the weak contracting environment. In this setting, principals typically promise to pay high wages, but these promises are not contractually enforceable. As a result, principals rarely fulfill their promises and actually pay very low wages. Agents quickly realise that they cannot rely on the principals' promises, leading even reciprocal agents to show little willingness to respond to high offered wages with high effort. Principals have little reason to keep their promises since they experience no return from doing so. In other words, the lack of legal enforcement of wage promises undermines agents' reciprocal behaviour and generates a "low wage – low effort" equilibrium.

In the final part of the paper, we present a theoretical model that captures key features of our experimental game and the heterogeneity in agent types in a simplified way. The model explains the empirical regularities in our weak contracting environment. It shows that the "low wage – low effort" equilibrium is unique and predicts, in particular, that an exogenous shock to the principals' beliefs about the agents' trustworthiness has no effects on wages, effort and gains from trade, which aligns with our observations in this contracting environment.

The legal enforcement of the principals' wage promises in our medium contract environment constitutes a major improvement in contract enforcement by allowing the principals to credibly commit to high wages. Consequenty, the agents understand that a high wage promise indeed offers them a generous share of the surplus, prompting reciprocal agents to respond to

higher wages with higher effort levels. Our high-trust manipulation fosters optimistic beliefs about agents' trustworthiness, leading principals to expect that agents will reciprocate high wages with high effort. Conversely, in our low-trust environment, principals anticipate a weaker reciprocal response. Therefore, principals are inclined to offer higher wages in the high trust environment compared to the low-trust environment, as confirmed by the data. Reciprocally-motivated agents then respond with higher effort levels in the high-trust environment compared to the low-trust environment, which explains the positive average trust effect in the medium contracting environment.

Is the trust effect on the gains from trade in the medium contracting environment stable, i.e., an equilibrium phenomenon? Or is it due to a transitory effect of changing the principals' initial beliefs about the agents' trustworthiness? To answer this question, we need to examine whether principals benefitted on average from paying high wages in the high-trust environment. It turns out that they did not; the agents' average effort increase in response to a wage increase is insufficient to render the wage increase profitable on average. This modest average response reflects agent heterogeneity, with some agents exhibiting a strong response, while other choose minimal effort regardless of the wage. Consequently, paying higher wages in the high-trust environment is not profitable on average, but principals learn this only slowly over time. This learning process is indicated by the fact that wage offers in the high-trust environment decrease over time and eventually approach the levels in the low-trust environment.

Our theoretical model rationalizes the transitory nature of the increase in the gains from trade in the medium contracting environment. The model shows that if the agents' effort responses are too small on average (e.g., because the share of reciprocally motivated agents is too small) there is still a unique "low wage – low effort" equilibrium. However, the model also predicts that

initially false (i.e., too optimistic) beliefs of the principals about the agents' trustworthiness induce the principals to make initially too high wage offers.

Finally, we show that there is a large and stable trust effect on agent efforts, and thus the gains from trade, in our strong contracting environment. In this environment, principals can not only make credible wage promises but also condition their current contract offers on the agents' past performance signals. Principals can exploit this by making no offer, or an offer with a lower wage, to agents with low previous performance signals, while targeting high wage offers to agents with high previous performance signals. Empirically, principals in the high-trust environment indeed screen agents in this way and target their high wage offers to agents who previously signaled their trustworthiness. Consequently, the wage-effort relation is steeper in the strong contracting environment compared to the medium contracting environment. This implies that high wages can be profitable in the high-trust environment. In contrast, in the low-trust environment, the principals believe that the wage-effort relation is relatively flat and, therefore, make only low wage offers from the outset, choosing not to screen for reciprocal agents who respond to high wages with high efforts. These wage differences between the high- and the low-trust environments are large and stable over time, inducing large and stable effort differences based on the agents' reciprocal effort responses.[3]

Our theoretical model rationalizes these findings for the strong contracting environment. Specifically, the model shows that both a high-trust screening equilibrium and a low-trust pooling

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[3] However, we observe a pronounced endgame effect in the high-trust environment within the strong contracting context, which diminishes the differences in effort. Endgame effects, which we discuss in more detail later in the paper, are an artifact commonly found in many experimental gift-exchange games where the parties have opportunities for repeated interactions because, due to fixed identification numbers, they can identify each other and deliberately trade with the same previous partners.

equilibrium coexist in this environment. The initial variation in the principals' trust appears to cause stable variation in the realised gains from trade by selecting between these equilibria.

Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it documents experimentally that the effects of improvements in contract enforcement on gains from trade can be trust-dependent. To our knowledge, this is a novel empirical finding that may generally be interesting for the economics of contracts and institutions (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005; North, 1991) and, in particular, for behavioural contract theory that examines the effects of non-standard motives and social norms on the functioning of contracts and incentives (e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2005, 2008; Sliwka, 2007; Hart and Moore, 2008; Hart, 2009; Hart and Holmström, 2010; Herweg and Schmidt, 2015; Bierbrauer and Netzer 2016; Danilov and Sliwka, 2017; Sliwka and Werner, 2017). Our findings on the role of trust in our strong contracting environment are also of interest for the literature on relational contracting (e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson, 1998; MacLeod, 2007; Gibbons, 1998; Baker *et al*., 2002; Gibbons *et al*., 2023).

Second, our paper clarifies the conditions under which we can expect a causal effect of trust on gains from trade, and it shows the important role of the contracting environment in the transmission of initial trust differences on wages, efforts, and gains from trade. Our paper thus contributes to the debate on the effect of trust on economic outcomes (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta *et al*., 1997; Guiso *et al*., 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Bloom *et al*., 2012) by clarifying when we can expect no, only transitory, or stable effects of changes in trust.[4]

Third, by empirically showing conditions for the emergence of a stable and efficient reciprocal principal-agent interaction, our paper is also related to the literature on reciprocal gift

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[4] Our paper varies trust exogenously and examines the consequences of trust. There is also a literature that studies the individual and collective determinants of trust (e.g. Alesina and LaFerrara 2000 and 2005). For a review of the literature on the determinants of trust see Fehr (2009).

exchange and trust using laboratory experiments (Fehr *et al*., 1993; Berg *et al*., 1995; Brown *et al*., 2004; Charness, 2004). Previous papers in the gift-exchange literature, as well as more recent papers on the counterproductive effects of sanctions and other measures that constrain shirking by agents, suggest that trust might be self-confirming (e.g., Bohnet *et al*., 2001; Bohnet and Huck, 2004; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Bartling *et al*., 2012). However, this literature neither addresses the interaction of exogenous variations in trust and contract enforcement, nor identifies the conditions or mechanisms under which we should expect trust to affect trading efficiency.

Finally, our paper presents a simple theoretical model that captures the main empirical regularities observed in our experiment. The goal of the model is not to provide an exact image of the experimental game, but rather to provide a framework that facilitates a coherent interpretation of the data. The model rationalizes, in particular, why an exogenous increase in trust has no effect on gains from trade in the weak contracting environment, only a transitory effect in the medium contracting environment, and a stable effect in the strong contracting environment.

The theoretical literature has shown before that different levels of trust can arise in a given economic environment due to multiple equilibria (e.g., Tabellini, 2008; Aghion *et al*., 2010) or multiple stable long-run outcomes of dynamic learning processes (e.g., Bower *et al*., 1996). To the best of our knowledge, our experiment provides a first explicit test of the general idea that trust can play a role due to multiple equilibria: the empirical result that an exogenous increase in trust has no stable effect in a unique equilibrium environment but leads to stable effects in a multiple equilibrium environment demonstrates this point. Our theoretical model, however, differs from the existing literature in two important ways. First, we follow a standard game-theoretic approach with fixed preferences, while Tabellini (2008) and Aghion *et al*. (2010) study behaviour that is transmitted from generation to generation and coevolves slowly with external institutions. Our

theoretical and empirical results show that trust is malleable rather quickly and can have immediate and stable causal effects even with fixed preferences and institutions. Second, in models like Bower *et al*. (1996), where agents learn about a given population state, long-run levels of trust and economic efficiency cannot be manipulated by interventions that select between different equilibria. In contrast, we show that selecting the right equilibrium is a crucial factor in the design of organisations and mechanisms. This idea has also recently gained prominence in organisational economics where it has been argued that a deeper understanding of the forces that enable organisations to "build" a more efficient equilibrium is key in understanding why some organisations persistently perform better than others (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012; Gibbons, 2020; Gibbons *et al*., 2023).[5] Third and perhaps most important, our paper is the first to show that trust and contract enforcement can be complements because the strength of contract enforcement determines whether multiple equilibria exist.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains our experimental design and includes a manipulation check showing the effectiveness of our exogenous variation of trust. Section 3 presents our main empirical finding on the complementary of trust and contractual enforcement. Section 4 discusses behavioural mechanisms behind our main empirical finding by analyzing in detail how differences in the contractual environment shape the behaviour of principals and agents. Section 5 presents our theoretical analysis of the principal-agent game. Section 6 reports the results of a fourth contracting environment, demonstrating that contract enforcement can be sufficiently strong to serve as a substitute for trust. Section 7 concludes.

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[5] In this context, the complementarity between trust and contract enforcement (i.e., incentives) is also important. Our findings suggest that to reap the available gains from trade it sometimes needs a change in incentives *and* a change in trust.

2. Experimental Design

We study the impact of an exogenous variation in principals' beliefs about the trustworthiness of agents on wages, effort and gains from trade. To study the interaction between exogenous changes in principals' trust and the contract enforcement environment, we also vary the degree to which parties can enforce contracts. We adopt a typical principal-agent framework where a higher effort level by the agent increases the principal's expected payoff but providing higher effort is more costly for the agent. Principals and agents interact in an experimental market and we allow for 15 market periods, so that we can study how wages, effort and gains from trade evolve over time. This feature allows studying whether exogenous changes in trust or contract enforcement have stable or only transitory effects.

The framework follows closely Brown *et al.* (2004) with the main difference that, in our design, principals cannot directly observe effort levels but they receive an informative stochastic signal about the agents' effort choices, and higher effort levels are associated with an increase in the probability of observing a high signal. In many types of economic interactions it is not possible to precisely identify whether effort or (bad) luck is responsible for the observed output. The effort signal is observable by the principal and the agent, but it is not verifiable by third parties and thus not directly contractible. Contracts are therefore necessarily incomplete and the effort choice of an agent cannot be legally enforced. The principal's belief that an agent is trustworthy may then be relevant for the principal's willingness to enter into a transaction with an agent and for the contract terms the principal offers. We define agents to be trustworthy when they are willing to reciprocate a high wage offer with a high effort choice although high effort reduces their material payoff. Untrustworthy agents, by contrast, always choose low effort levels irrespective of the offered wages.

Our treatments vary the degree to which the parties can enforce their agreements. In all treatments, the principal proposes a contract that offers a wage and requests an effort level from the agent. In our weak contracting enforcement environment (WEAK), however, neither the offered wage nor the requested effort level is legally enforceable. This environment thus represents a situation with weak legal institutions. Furthermore, the identities of principals and agents are not observable, and thus contract terms cannot be conditioned on the agent's past performance signal. In our medium contracting enforcement environment (MEDIUM) we increase the scope for contract enforcement by making the principals' wage offers legally binding. However, the agent is still free to choose any effort level and it is still not possible to make contracts contingent on past performance signals. In our strong contracting enforcement environment (STRONG), principals' wage offers are again legally binding and agents are still free to choose any effort, but the subjects now have fixed identification numbers over the course of the experiment. Principals can therefore target their offers to specific agents contingent on their past performance signals, which is a further expansion of the set of contractible contingencies relative to the other treatments. Performance signals from past periods are only observed by the respective principals with whom the agent interacted in these periods.[6]

2.1 Stage Game Payoffs

If a principal and an agent agree to trade, then the principal pays a wage $w \in \{1, \dots, 100\}$ to the agent and the agent chooses an effort level $e \in \{1, \dots, 9\}$. The agent's effort choice stochastically determines the value of the interaction for the principal. There are only two possible value levels,

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[6] A fourth contracting environment, discussed as an extension in Section 6, allows principals to observe not only the performance signals of the agents they directly interacted with, but also the performance signals of all other agents in the market. We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting this additional treatment.

100 and 10. The probability that the principal receives the high value is given by $e/10$, while the principal receives the low value with probability $1 - e/10$. The (expected) material payoffs of principals and agents are thus given by

$$E[\Pi^{principal}] = \begin{cases} 100 \cdot \frac{e}{10} + 10 \cdot \left(1 - \frac{e}{10}\right) - w & \text{if principal and agent interact} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

$$\Pi^{agent} = \begin{cases} w - c(e) & \text{if principal and agent interact} \\ 5 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

where $c(e)$ denotes the agent's cost of providing effort. The outside option of an agent who does not interact with a principal is 5. Table 1 shows the cost function $c(e)$. The effort cost function is strictly increasing, with weakly increasing marginal costs. Given that the marginal cost of effort does not exceed 3, while the marginal expected benefit remains constant at 9, the efficient effort level is $e = 9$. The expected gains from trade are defined as the sum of the principal's and agent's (expected) payoffs minus the agent's opportunity cost of 5.

Table 1: Agents' Cost Function

Effort	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Cost	0	1	2	4	6	8	10	12	15

2.2 Contracting Environments

Principals can initiate trades by offering contracts to the agents. Agents can choose among the available contract offers but they cannot make offers to principals. There are 15 trading periods. Each period, a principal can interact with at most one agent, and an agent can accept at most one contract offer. A period has two stages. In stage one, the principals make contract offers and agents

decide whether or not to accept a contract. If a principal and an agent conclude a contract, they enter stage two, where the principal pays a wage and the agent chooses an effort level.

A contract offer includes a wage offer $w \in \{1, \ldots, 100\}$, a requested effort level $\tilde{e} \in \{1, \ldots, 9\}$, and the principal's identification number (ID). The wage offer w is third-party verifiable and thus contractible in treatments MEDIUM and STRONG, but not in treatment WEAK. The requested effort level $\tilde{e}$ is not binding. The principal can observe the realised value but not the agent's actual effort choice. Indeed, actual effort levels e are never third-party verifiable, which rules out that requested effort levels are legally enforceable in any of our contracting environments.

There are two types of offers, public and private. In private offers, a principal specifies the ID of the agent they wish to trade with, and only this agent is notified about the contract offer. In contrast, public offers are visible to all agents as well as the other principals, allowing any agent the opportunity to accept them. A principal may issue an unlimited number of both private and public offers in a given period. However, once an agent accepts an offer, the principal is matched with that agent, learns their ID (which is news in case of a public offer), and all remaining outstanding offers from that principal are withdrawn from the market.[7] At the start of each period, no contract exists, and no offers have been made. The market consistently consists of ten agents and seven principals, resulting in an excess supply of three agents.

At the conclusion of each period, every subject receives information about their own payoff and a reminder of the contract $(w, \tilde{e})$ they agreed to, along with the ID of their trading partner. Agents are also informed about the payoff of their respective principal. Principals are not informed about the payoff of their respective agent, because a principal does not observe the agent's effort

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[7] To ensure that principals do not extend private offers to agents who have already entered into a contract, they are continuously informed about which agents are still available in the market.

choice and thus the cost of providing this effort level. Subjects record this information on a form supplied alongside the experimental instructions. This procedure ensures that they can consistently reference their own trading history.

2.2.1 Contracting Environment WEAK

An agent can choose any actual effort level $e \in \{1, ... ,9\}$ after having accepted a contract offer in our contracting environment WEAK, irrespective of the requested effort level $\tilde{e}$. Likewise, the principal can pay any wage to the agent, irrespective of the offered wage. Actual wages and effort levels are chosen simultaneously at the second stage of a period. Moreover, the subjects' IDs are randomly reshuffled in each of the 15 periods of the experiment in contracting environment WEAK. Random IDs preclude the principals from conditioning future contract offers on past performance signals. Neither of the two contracting parties thus faces legal or economic incentives to stick to the terms of the contract in contracting environment WEAK, but intrinsic motivations could still induce them to honour their mutual promises.

2.2.2 Contracting Environment MEDIUM

A principal is obliged to pay the offered wage if an agent accepts his or her contract offer in our contracting environment MEDIUM. An agent, however, can still choose any actual effort level $e \in \{1, ... ,9\}$, irrespective of the requested effort level $\tilde{e}$. Principals must thus stick to the terms of the contract in contracting environment MEDIUM while agents face no legal or economic incentives to provide the requested effort level. Because IDs are randomly shuffled in every period, as in contracting environment WEAK, principals cannot condition hiring and contract terms on signals about the past performance of specific agents.

2.2.3 Contracting Environment STRONG

Contract enforcement is strengthened further in our contracting environment STRONG. The principal is obliged to pay the offered wage w if an agent accepts the contract, as in contracting environment MEDIUM. Moreover, while agents can still choose any actual effort level $e \in \{1, \dots, 9\}$, irrespective of the requested effort level $\tilde{e}$, IDs of all players are fixed in contracting environment STRONG. This feature provides principals with the opportunity to condition their contract offers on the identity of a specific agent and this agent's past performance signals. This provides principals with the ability to screen agents and selectively target high wages to those who have high past performance signals.[8]

2.2.4 Discussion of Contracting Environements

One may ask which real-world environments correspond to our three contracting environments. In our view, many developing countries exhibit characteristics of the contracting environments WEAK and MEDIUM, as a substantial portion of economic activity occurs in the informal sector. In this sector, written contracts are rare, legal enforcement is weak or nonexistent, population registries that facilitate the spatial identification of citizens, and reputational institutions, such as credit registries, are also lacking (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Djankov *et al*., 2008; La Porta and Shleifer, 2014; McCaig and Pavcnik, 2015). Consequently, contract enforcement is often fragile.

However, it is important to recognise that even in relatively advanced economies, contract enforcement can sometimes be very inefficient. For example, in the Unitied States, the absence of a population registry allows individuals to obscure their location, making it difficult to hold them

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[8] Wibral (2015) studies economic environments in which individuals can change their identities. The idea of inducing one shot play by re-randomizing IDs every period and enabling long-run relationships by (i) fixing IDs throughout the experiment and (ii) allowing for private offers to specific agents is taken from Brown *et al*. (2004).

accountable for contract breaches. Moreover, large segments of the population may not be covered by credit registries, and the legal system can also be very inefficient, as highlighted by Djankov *et al.* (2008).[9]

2.3 Inducing Variation in Principals' Trust

To induce exogenous variation in the principals' initial trust levels, we randomly assigned them to two different information conditions. In the high-trust treatments, the principals were informed about a historical example in which agents behaved in a trustworthy manner; in the low-trust treatments, they were shown an example in which agents displayed a low level of trustworthiness. More specifically, for our high-trust treatments we selected the market from Brown *et al.* (2004) that had the steepest wage-effort relation, and for the low-trust treatments we selected the market with the flattest wage-effort relation.

The example was provided at the end of the experimental instructions. Subjects were informed that the information provided was an "example," and that it showed how effort is related to wage levels "in a past session." Subjects were told that the information in the example was something that they "could use in their decisions today." The description of the source of the example was completely truthful but deliberately vague, and we did not claim that the information provided about a single past session was representative.

Figure 1 shows how we presented the examples in the experimental instructions. The top row was shown to the principals in the high-trust treatments, the bottom row to the principals in

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[9] Djankov *et al.* (2008) report, for instance, that for every dollar of credit issued in Germany, a lender recovers, on average, only 57 cents through the legal system when attempting to enforce repayment from an unwilling borrower. The corresponding recovery rates for Switzerland and Italy are 60.4 cents and 45.3 cents, respectively.

the low-trust treatments. On the left, the wage-effort relation is shown. The figure shows the average effort provided by the agents in the example for each of the given bins of offered wages. On the right, we show how this wage-effort relation translates into a wage-payoff relation, given the principals' payoff function in our experiment. The high trustworthiness example involved agents being trustworthy, in that those who are paid high wages also exert high effort levels. In the low trustworthiness example, agents were untrustworthy; they provided rather low effort for all wage levels.

Note that the examples contain no information about the historical frequency of wage choices by principals. They do indicate the range of wages that was used, but this was identical across the high and and low trustworthiness examples. This is deliberate because we wanted to rule out that the examples influence behaviour by conveying information about historical behaviour of principals. Rather, the differential information content across examples is solely about the trustworthiness of agents. Any impact should thus come through the beliefs of principals about trustworthiness. We will examine in Section 2.5 the extent to which our trust manipulation was effective in the sense that it differentially affected principals' beliefs.

Figure 1: The High and Low Trustworthiness Examples Shown to Principals.

Wage-Effort Relation

Wage-Payoff Relation

Notes: The top row shows the example provided to the principals in the high-trust treatments, the bottom row shows the example provided in the low-trust treatments. The wage-effort relation is shown on the left, the corresponding expected wage-payoff relation on the right.

Note also that a given trust example holds constant the information given to principals about how agents respond to wages, regardless of the different contract enforcement environments. This reflects our goal to implement the same initial beliefs, to compare how the same level of trust may have different ultimate effects depending on the environment. In our manipulation check in Section 2.5 we verified that a given trust example successfully implemented the same initial beliefs across contracting environments. Initial beliefs may then be updated in different ways depending

on the experiences of principals in the different contractual settings, which is one of the questions we want to study, as part of how initial trust and contract enforcement interact.

Subjects in the role of agents did not receive any example, nor were they informed that the subjects in the role of principals received such information. The instructions for agents did not differ in the high- and low-trust treatments, which rules out any direct impact on outcomes through an influence on agents. This illustrates the advantages of an experimental setting for varying only the principals' trust, defined as the principals' beliefs in the trustworthiness of the agents.

2.4 Factorial Design

We exposed all principals in a session to either the high-trust (HT) or the low-trust (LT) manipulation in the three contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG. We thus implemented a 3x2 factorial design, crossing contracting environment and trust manipulation. This is indicated in the labels that we use to refer to the treatments. WEAK-HT, for example, stands for the treatment in which we implemented the weak contracting environment and exposed the principals to the high trustworthiness example. We conducted five markets for each of our six main treatments, as shown in Table 2.

2.5 Additional Treatments

We conducted the additional treatment STRONG-HT-Long, which is identical to STRONG-HT, except that the game lasted 25 periods rather than 15 periods. The purpose of STRONG-HT-Long is to clarify the potential role of end-game effects.[10]

Table 2: Treatment Overview

Treatment	Principals' Wage Offers	ID Numbers	Trust-worthiness Example	Principals' Information on Agents' Performance	# Periods	# Markets
WEAK-LT	non-binding	random	low	own agents only	15	5
WEAK-HT	non-binding	random	high	own agents only	15	5
MEDIUM-LT	binding	random	low	own agents only	15	5
MEDIUM-HT	binding	random	high	own agents only	15	5
STRONG-LT	binding	fixed	low	own agents only	15	5
STRONG-HT	binding	fixed	high	own agents only	15	5
STRONG-HT-Long	binding	fixed	high	own agents only	25	2
TRANSPARENCY-LT	binding	fixed	low	all agents	15	5

We also conducted the additional treatment TRANSPARENCY-LT, which is identical to STRONG-LT with one key difference. In STRONG-LT, it is common knowledge that principals can observe only the realised values of the agents with whom they interacted. In TRANSPARENCY-LT, principals can observe the realised values of all agents who have a

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[10] Endgame effects reliably occur in finitely repeated cooperation games such as the prisoner's dilemma and can typically be shifted into the future with a longer finite horizon (Embray *et al*. 2019). Similar effects can be observed in finitely repeated gift exchange experiments (e.g., Brown *et al*. 2004). Thus, we conjectured that we will also observe an endgame effect in treatment STRONG-HT. Since we are interested in the stable effects of trust in STRONG-HT (i.e., in periods in which the endgame effect is not operative), we wanted to examine whether we can extend the effect of exogenous increases in trust by simply increasing the number of periods.

contract in a given period. Principals record this information on a printed form at the end of each period, exactly as in STRONG-LT. The only difference is that instead of recording a single value (10 or 100), they must note up to seven values for the up to seven agents who have a contract in a given period. The treatment TRANSPARENCY-LT captures situations where contract offers can condition on even more information, for example on reference letters from previous employers. We used TRANSPARENCY-LT to explicitly demonstrate that sufficiently strong contract enforcement can substitute for high levels of trust.

We conducted two markets under the STRONG-HT treatment and five markets under the TRANSPARENCY-LT treatment, as shown in Table 2.

2.6 Experimental Procedures

We implemented a between-subjects design, i.e., each subject participated in only one market in one treatment. Altogether we have 37 markets, with seven principals and ten agents each. Hence, 629 subjects participated in our experiment. Subjects were mainly students from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. Students majoring in economics or psychology were not eligible to participate.

All sessions were conducted in the computer laboratory of the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich in 2011 and 2012, except for the TRANSPARENCY-LT treatment, which took place in 2023. The study was computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and participant recruitment, except for TRANSPARENCY-LT, was conducted using the software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Before the subjects entered the lab, they randomly drew a place card that specified at which computer terminal to sit. The terminal number determined a subject's role as either principal or agent, which remained fixed throughout the experiment.

Subjects received written instructions including comprehension questions, which had to be answered correctly before a session could begin.[11] A summary of the instructions was read aloud by the experimenter to generate common knowledge of the instructions. To familiarize participants with the market procedures, two practice periods were conducted before the main experiment. During these practice rounds, subjects only completed the first stage of the experiment, meaning principals did not see payoffs and were unable to infer agents' actual effort decisions. Subjects did not earn any money during the practice periods.

Sessions lasted about 2.5 hours. Payoffs from the experiment, denominated in points, were converted into money at the rate of 10 points to CHF 1 at the end of a session. On average, subjects earned about CHF 48, which includes a show-up fee of CHF 20. The subjects received their payments privately.

2.6 Manipulation Check

Our experimental approach aims at inducing exogenous variation in the principals' beliefs about the agents' trustworthiness. Figure 2 provides a manipulation check for our six main treatments by showing the principals' expectations about the empirical relationship between offered wages and chosen effort. These expectations were elicited at the beginning of the experiment, after reading the instructions but before entering the trading periods. We asked principals to predict what they thought would be the average effort level chosen by agents, conditional on different possible offered wages.

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[11] We provide the experimental instructions in Section C of the Appendix. Since the terms "principal" and "agent" are not in common usage among student subjects, the experiment was framed in terms of "buyers" and "sellers," and we spoke about "price" and "quality" instead of "wage" and "effort."

Figure 2: Manipulation Check

Notes: The black lines show the wage-effort relation that principals expect in the three high-trust treatments WEAK-HT, MEDIUM-HT, and STRONG-HT. The grey lines show expectations in the three low-trust treatments WEAK-LT, MEDIUM-LT, and STRONG-LT.

The figure reveals exogenous belief variation in all contracting environments, WEAK-HT vs. WEAK-LT, MEDIUM-HT vs. MEDIUM-LT, and STRONG-HT vs. STRONG-LT. Principals expected significantly higher average effort levels across the range of wages when they had received the high trustworthiness example rather than the low trustworthiness example, and also expected significantly steeper relationships between wage and effort. Regressions confirm that the differences in average expected effort across the high and the low trustworthiness example were statistically significant at the 1-% level, as were the differences in slopes, in all three treatment pairs (see Appendix Tables A4 and A5). On the other hand, we cannot reject the hypotheses that the average expected effort, and the slopes of the wage-effort relations, are identical when comparing across treatments involving the low trustworthiness example, and across treatments involving the high trustworthiness example (see Appendix Tables A6 and A7).

Since the agents do not receive historical examples about agents' trustworthiness in a previous experiment, random assignment should result in no differences in agents' beliefs across treatments involving high versus low trustworthiness examples. Indeed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the agents' expectations about average effort, and the slope of the wage-effort relations, are identical within each of the treatment pairs (see Appendix Tables A8 and A9). Since the agents indicate their "homegrown" beliefs, we can compare these beliefs with the beliefs that the principals indicate. We find that the principals' beliefs in the high-trust treatments roughly correspond to the agents' homegrown beliefs. Principals who received the low trustworthiness example thus have beliefs that are more pessimistic than homegrown beliefs.

# 3. The Complementarity of Trust and Contract Enforcement

In this section, we present our main result on the complementarity between trust and contract enforcement for the expected gains from trade. Figure 3 shows the average expected gains from trade in our three contracting environments, comparing the high-trust and the low-trust environments.

First, Figure 3 reveals that an exogenous increase in trust has no significant effect on expected gains from trade in contracting environment WEAK, where principals are not obliged to pay the promised wage (Wilcoxon rank-sum test; $p < 0.92$). This is, in our view, an interesting finding because it suggests that under weak legal and economic contract enforcement institutions, higher trust alone might not increase trading efficiency.

Second, the figure reveals that the effect of trust on expected gains from trade is positive under improved contract enforcement conditions. The causal effect of trust is positive and statistically significant in contracting environment MEDIUM, where the principals are

contractually obliged to pay the offered wage, and in environment STRONG, where contract terms can be conditioned on signals of past agent performance (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of market averages; p<0.02, p<0.01, respectively).[12]

Figure 3: Expected Gains from Trade

Notes: The black line shows the average expected gains from trade in the high-trust environment in treatments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG. The grey line shows the respective average expected gains from trade in the low-trust environment.

Third, the figure shows that the effect of trust on expected gains from trade is largest in contracting environment STRONG.[13] Corresponding regressions show that the differences in the impact of trust are significantly different across the institutional environments (for MEDIUM vs.

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[12] All Wilcoxon rank-sum tests reported in the paper are based on market averages, i.e., taking markets as the unit of independent observation, to allow for potential interdependence between observations from the same market.
[13] Figure 3 obscures the fact that the effect of trust on gains from trade is transitory in MEDIUM, an aspect to which we will return later in the paper.

STRONG this is true excluding an end-game effect in STRONG, which we discuss in more detail later in the paper).[14]

Viewed differently, Figure 3 also illustrates that the effect of exogenous improvements in the contracting environment are trust-dependent. While improvements in contract enforcement induce a large increase in expected gains from trade in the high-trust environment, much smaller effects, if any, are observed in the low-trust environment. This again indicates a complementarity between trust and the contract enforcement environment for trading efficiency. It is not sufficient to merely improve the contract enforcement environment or the actors' beliefs in the trustworthiness of their trading partners. The greatest increase in gains from trade emerges when both contract enforcement and trust are simultaneously enhanced. We summarize these observations in our first result.

> **Result 1:** *Trust and contract enforcement can be complements with regard to gains*
>
> *from trade. While an exogenous increase in trust has no effect on expected gains*
>
> *from trade in contracting environment WEAK, it induces higher expected gains from*
>
> *trade in MEDIUM and STRONG, with the increase being largest in STRONG.*
>
> *Likewise, while an exogenous improvement in contract enforcement causes no or*

---

[14] See the interaction terms HT×WEAK and HT×STRONG in column (5) in Table 3 where effort, being a sufficient statistic for expected gains from trade, is regressed on our contractual environments (WEAK, MEDIUM, STRONG), the trust level (HT, LT), and their interactions, with LT x MEDIUM as the omitted category. The positively significant coefficient of the interaction term HT×STRONG in regression (5) ($p<0.04$), which excludes the final five periods of STRONG, indicates that the positive impact of HT on effort is larger in STRONG than MEDIUM. The negatively significant coefficient of HT×WEAK ($p=0.011$) indicates that the impact of HT is smaller in WEAK than MEDIUM. Results are similar although less precise if we exclude the final five periods in all treatments, as shown in regression (6) of Table 3.

little increase in expected gains from trade in the low-trust environment, it induces

substantially higher expected gains from trade in the high-trust environment.

4. Mechanisms

The previous section established that trust and contract enforcement can be complementary for gains from trade between principals and agents. In this section, we study the mechanisms underlying this finding, by analyzing the behaviours of principals and agents in more detail.

4.1 Weak Contract Enforcement

Principals are not obliged to pay the offered wages, and agents are not obliged to choose the requested effort levels in contracting environment WEAK. Recall that interactions are one-shot, IDs are randomized across periods, and principals and agents, after agreeing on a contract, simultaneously choose their actual wages and effort levels, respectively.

Panel (A) of Figure 4 reveals that the principals, on average, do not honour their promises. The dashed lines show the average offered wages over the 15 periods of the experiment in the high-trust treatment WEAK-HT (black) and in the low-trust treatment WEAK-LT (hollow). The solid lines show the average actual wages in WEAK-HT (black) and WEAK-LT (hollow). While offered wages even increase over the course of the 15 periods, reaching values above 50 in WEAK-HT and above 40 in WEAK-LT, actual wages paid decrease to values below 10 in both treatments. Principals honoured the promised wages in only 13 and 11% of all transactions in WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT, respectively.

Actual wages are, on average, 11.6 in WEAK-HT and 8.5 in WEAK-LT (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.095). While there is a small and marginally significant effect of an exogenous increase in trust on the average actual wages paid, Panel (A) reveals that this effect is driven by the earlier periods only. Regression (1) in Appendix Table A1 confirms that the difference in actual wages paid between WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT diminishes over time (p<0.1). We summarize these observations in our next result.

> **Result 2:** *In contracting environment WEAK, the principals promise to pay high wages to the agents but rarely honour their promises, both in the high-trust and in the low-trust environment. Actual wages are low in both environments. While promised wages are always higher in the high-trust environment than in the low-trust environment, actual wages converge towards the same level in both environments.*

Result 2 shows that the agents have little reason to believe that the principals pay the promised high wages. As a consequence, the agents—regardless of whether they are reciprocal or selfish—have no reason to provide the effort levels requested by the principals in the contracts. Indeed, Panel (B) of Figure 4 shows that the agents in contracting environment WEAK do not deliver the effort levels that the principals requested. The two dashed lines show the average effort levels requested by the principals over the 15 periods in WEAK-HT (black) and WEAK-LT (hollow). The two solid lines show the average actual effort levels delivered by the agents in WEAK-HT (black) and WEAK-LT (hollow). While requested effort levels range between 7 and 8 in the high-trust environment and between 6 and 7 in the low-trust environment, delivered effort

levels decrease to values around 2 in both environments. Agents delivered the requested effort level only in 7 and 16% of all transactions in WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT, respectively.[15]

Figure 4: Promised and Actual Wages, Requested and Actual Effort, in Contracting Environment WEAK

Notes: In Panel (A) the black squares show offered (dashed line) and actual (solid line) wages in the high-trust environment. The hollow squares show offered (dashed line) and actual (solid line) wages in the low-trust environment. In Panel (B) the black squares show requested (dashed line) and actual (solid line) effort levels in the high-trust environment. The hollow squares show requested (dashed line) and actual (solid line) effort levels in the low-trust environment.

Panel (B) of Figure 4 shows that agents' effort is essentially identical in WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT. Effort levels in WEAK-HT tend to start at slightly higher levels than in WEAK-LT but also decline slightly more over time (see the small but significantly negative coefficient on HT x Period in regression (1) in Appendix Table A2; $p < 0.05$). No difference exists in average actual

---

[15] Of agents choosing less than the requested effort in the WEAK conditions, roughly 60% choose the minimum effort, but about 40% choose an effort level between the minimum and requested effort. This is consistent with agents not expecting to receive the offered wage, but some reciprocal agents choosing nonminimal efforts to reciprocate an anticipated actual wage that is below the offered wage but not the minimum possible wage.

effort levels in WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT (2.6 and 2.5, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.75). We summarize this finding next.

Result 3: *In contracting environment WEAK, the agents rarely deliver the requested effort level, both in the high-trust and in the low-trust environment. Actual effort levels are low and very similar in both trust environments.*

A key feature of contracting environement WEAK is that the principals cannot commit to paying high wages and, therefore, the agents may not consider high offered wages as a credible promise. Thus, for agents with a reciprocity motive, the desire to reciprocate to high wage offers with high effort choices is undermined. However, the agents may initially, i.e., during the early periods, not know the extent to which the principals' wage offers are credible. In fact, a closer look at the data reveals that traces of reciprocity exist, even in contracting environment WEAK. This holds, in particular, in early periods of the experiment, when reciprocal agents might not have fully realised that promised wages are rarely paid by the principals. Figure 5 shows actual effort levels as a function of *promised* wages. The left panel shows the relation for periods 1 to 5, while the right panel shows the relation for periods 6 to 15. The figure reveals that agents, on average, responded to high wage offers with somewhat higher effort levels in early periods, but that the relation is substantially flatter in later periods (the Spearman correlation is 0.27 in periods 1 to 5, compared to 0.08 in periods 6 to 15).[16] Thus, the lack of a legal commitment opportunity for the principals in contracting environment WEAK together with the agents' experience during the early

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[16] The difference in slopes is also statistically significant. This can be seen in a panel regression of effort on offered wage, a dummy variable for period>5, and an interaction term between this dummy and offered wage (with random effects for principals, and bootstrapped standard errors clustering on session); the interaction term is highly significant and negative (p<0.01).

periods that the principals rarely honour their promises appears to have weakened the reciprocal agents' responses to high promised wages, explaining the dynamic of falling actual effort levels over time.

Figure 5: Promised Wages and Actual Effort Levels in Contracting Environment WEAK

Notes: The left panel shows the relation between promised wages and actual effort levels in periods 1 to 5; the right panel shows the relations for periods 6 to 15. Data from WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT pooled.

4.2 Medium Contract Enforcement

Contract enforcement is strengthened in contracting environment MEDIUM relative to contracting environment WEAK because the principals are contractually obliged to pay the offered wages in contracting environment MEDIUM. Agents remain free to choose whatever effort they like. The credible commitments to higher wages, however, may induce reciprocal agents to provide higher effort levels when wages are higher.

We first examine the wage behaviour of the principals. The middle panel of Figure 6 shows actual wages in contracting environment MEDIUM. In contrast to contracting environment WEAK (shown again in the right panel for ease of comparison across treatments), the exogenous increase in trust is associated with a significant, though unstable, difference in actual wages. Wages are 33.9 on average in MEDIUM-HT and 16.5 in MEDIUM-LT. This difference of about 17 points is statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p<0.01). Regression analysis confirms that the impact of the exogenous increase in trust is significantly larger in MEDIUM than in WEAK, see the large negative coefficient on the interaction term HT x WEAK in regression (1) in Table 3. However, the effect of the exogenous trust increase in MEDIUM becomes smaller over time, showing that the initial impact of trust on actual wages is steadily declining (see the interaction term HT x Period in regression (2) in Appendix Table A1; p<0.03). We summarize this observation in our next result.

> **Result 4:** *In contracting environment MEDIUM, an exogenous increase in trust induces an initial increase in principals' wage payments, but the wage difference across trust environments declines over time.*

We now turn to the behaviour of agents. Figure 7 shows effort levels over time in our main treatments. The middle panel shows that average effort is significantly higher in MEDIUM-HT compared to MEDIUM-LT (3.7 and 2.3, respectively, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.02). Regression analysis confirms that the difference in effort levels between the high-trust and the low-trust environments is significantly larger in contracting environment MEDIUM than in contracting environment WEAK, see the negative coefficient of HT×WEAK in regression (4) of Table 3. However, the effect of the exogenous increase in trust is declining over time. This time trend is significant as indicated by regression analysis and is driven by the decline in average effort

levels in MEDIUM- HT (see the interaction term HT x Period in regression (2) in Appendix Table A2; p<0.01).[17] We summarize this finding in Result 5.

> ***Result 5:*** *In contracting environment MEDIUM, the higher wage payments in the high-trust environment are associated with higher average effort levels. However, the difference in effort levels between the high-trust and the low-trust environment declines over time.*

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[17] The small remaining difference in effort between HT and LT in MEDIUM is no longer significant in the final period (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.34), corroborating that the effect of the exogenous trust increase is merely transitory in the contracting environment MEDIUM.

Table 3: The Impact of Trust and Contractual Environments on Actual Wages and Effort Levels

|	Actual wage			Effort		
	All periods	No endgame	Periods<11	All periods	No endgame	Periods<11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
HT	17.40***	17.40***	18.75***	1.40***	1.40***	1.46***
	[3.03]	[3.03]	[2.38]	[0.44]	[0.44]	[0.48]
WEAK	-8.06***	-8.06***	-6.81***	0.23	0.23	0.33
	[1.22]	[1.22]	[1.60]	[0.24]	[0.24]	[0.28]
STRONG	1.10	0.94	0.48	1.03***	1.13***	1.03***
	[2.65]	[2.67]	[2.74]	[0.32]	[0.25]	[0.29]
HT x WEAK	-14.24***	-14.24***	-14.02***	-1.32**	-1.32**	-1.06*
	[3.35]	[3.35]	[3.12]	[0.52]	[0.52]	[0.59]
HT x STRONG	8.33*	8.89*	7.54*	0.75	1.11**	1.05*
	[5.02]	[4.91]	[4.55]	[0.58]	[0.55]	[0.59]
Constant	16.49***	16.49***	16.95***	2.28***	2.28***	2.38***
	[0.95]	[0.95]	[1.08]	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.24]
Observations	3119	2771	2083	3119	2771	2083

Notes: Panel regression estimates with random effects for principals. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on markets (30 clusters) shown in brackets. Columns (1) to (3) present regressions explaining actual wages as a function of contracting and trust environment. In columns (4) to (6) the dependent variable is actual effort levels. The estimations use data from all three contracting environments with LT x MEDIUM as the omitted category. HT is a dummy variable indicating the respective high-trust environment. Thus, HT measures the impact of the high-trust environment under medium contract enforcement. WEAK measures the impact of weak contract enforcement relative to MEDIUM in the low-trust environment and STRONG measures the effect of strong contract enforcement relative to MEDIUM in the low-trust environment. HT x WEAK and HT x STRONG give the differential effect of high trust in these respective contracting environments relative to the impact of high trust in MEDIUM. Columns (2) and (5) only use periods 1 to 10 for contracting environment STRONG to eliminate the end-game effect that is present in that environment. Columns (3) and (6) check robustness to only using periods 1 to 10 for all treatments. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Figure 6: Actual Wage Levels Over Time

STRONG MEDIUM WEAK

Notes: The black lines show average wages in sessions with the high trust treatments and the grey lines show average wages in sessions with the low trust treatments.

Figure 7: Actual Effort Levels Over Time

STRONG MEDIUM WEAK

Notes: The black lines show average effort in sessions with the high trust treatments and the grey lines show average effort in sessions with the low trust treatments.

We hypothesized that the lack of wage commitment among principals in contracting environment WEAK undermined the possibility to elicit high efforts from reciprocal agents by promising high wages. In contracting environment MEDIUM, by contrast, wage promises are credible. Therefore, we hypothesize that the higher effort levels observed in MEDIUM-HT may reflect the ability of principals to elicit reciprocal responses from some agents, although the randomly shuffled IDs prevent strategies of screening for reciprocal agents.[18] Indeed, Panel (A) of Figure 8 shows that the effort levels delivered by agents in MEDIUM-HT are, on average, responsive to the wages paid by principals. This is unlike in WEAK-HT, where the effort-wage relation is essentially flat. Corresponding regressions relating effort to actual wages confirm that this difference in slopes is statistically significant (see Appendix Table A3). In regression (1), the coefficient on actual wages is significantly positive (p<0.01), while the interaction term between actual wages and WEAK-HT is significantly negative and of a similar absolute size (p<0.01), indicating that the effort-wage relation is flat in WEAK-HT. The positive average effort response to wages in MEDIUM-HT is consistent with some agents being committed by their intrinsic preferences for reciprocal behaviour. However, since principals reduce their wage offers over time in MEDIUM-HT, the reciprocally motivated agents respond by reducing their effort levels over time. The next result summarizes these findings.

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[18] Screening requires endogenously choosing to interact with the same agent repeatedly. The frequency of interactions in which principals and agents continue to interact is very low in treatments with randomly re-shuffled IDs; about 9% of interactions involve the principal and agent having interacted in the previous period. Considering the most permissive definition of repeat interactions, based on whether the same principal and agent have ever interacted, we find that 47% of interactions involve the same principal and agent having met at any time previously. By contrast, in treatments with fixed IDs, about 33% of interactions are a continuation of an interaction in the previous period, and about 64% of interactions are a repeat of an interaction at some point in the past.

Result 6: *Unlike in contracting environment WEAK-HT, in contracting environment MEDIUM-HT, agents respond to higher actual wages with higher efforts on average. However, as principals reduce wages over time in MEDIUM-HT, effort levels also fall.*

The tendency for principals to reduce wages over time in MEDIUM-HT is understandable because the average effort response to wages (Panel (A) of Figure 8) is not strong enough to make high wages profitable for principals. As shown in Panel (B) of Figure 8, average profits for principals in MEDIUM-HT decline with actual wages. This decline is steep for wages above 50 but relatively flat for wages in the range 10 to 39, which may explain why principals only slowly learned that lowering wages in this range is more profitable. Corresponding regressions show that the relationship of profits to wages is negative in MEDIUM-HT (see the coefficient on Actual wage in regression (3) in Appendix Table A3, $p<0.01$). As expected, Panel (B) shows that paying non-minimal wages strongly reduces profits in WEAK-HT because there is no reciprocal response of effort to actual wages in this environment. Corresponding regressions show that the difference in slopes for WEAK versus MEDIUM is statistically significant (see the interaction term Actual wage x WEAK-HT in regression (3) in Appendix Table A3, $p<0.01$).

Figure 8: Effort-Wage and Profit-Wage Relations in High-Trust Environments

Notes: Panels (A) and (B) show the average effort levels, and average profits for the principal, respectively for different actual wage levels in the high trust conditions of contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG. Promised and actual wage payments coincide in MEDIUM and STRONG. The figure excludes the final five periods in contracting environment STRONG to show the relations absent the end-game effect. The figure also excludes categories of actual wages above 70 as there are too few observations for meaningful comparisons (e.g., only one observation in this range for WEAK).

Figure 9: Distributions of Agents' Effort Choices conditional on Wage Ranges in the High Trust Environments

A reason for the modest average response of effort to wages in MEDIUM-HT is heterogeneity in agent behaviour. Some agents exhibit a strong reciprocal response to high wages, while others behave selfishly, choosing low efforts even when wages are high. Indeed, as shown in the upper panels of Figure 9, for high (50+) and medium (25 to 50) wages, there is substantial heterogeneity in agent effort choices in MEDIUM-HT, with effort choices spanning the entire range. The effort distributions have modes at minimum effort and at relatively high effort (about 7), respectively.[19] This heterogeneity means that paying a high or even medium wage runs the risk of getting an agent who chooses low or minimum effort, thereby generating a large loss. As shown in Panel (B) of Figure 8, principals are better off paying relatively low wages, even though this results in low efforts from both reciprocal and selfish agents (see the upper left-hand panel of Figure 9). These findings are summarized in the next result:

Result 7: Paying high wages is not profitable in contracting environment MEDIUM-HT because the average effort response is too weak. The modest average response reflects underlying heterogeneity among agents, with some agents responding strongly, but many exhibiting a weak or zero response.

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[19] Another indication of heterogeneity is provided by Appendix Figure A1, which shows that principals in different market sessions of MEDIUM-HT experienced slightly steeper or flatter responses of effort to actual wage, consistent with some heterogeneity in the number and strength of reciprocal agent types across sessions. There is a clear tendency, however, for these relationships to be flatter in MEDIUM-HT than those observed in sessions of STRONG-HT, and steeper than those observed in sessions of WEAK-HT.

4.3 Strong Contract Enforcement

4.3.1 Aggregate wages and effort levels

Contract enforcement opportunities are further enhanced in contracting environment STRONG. As in contracting environment MEDIUM, principals are obliged to pay the offered wages. However, enforcement is expanded further in STRONG because fixed IDs allow principals to condition their contract offers on signals about their agents' past effort choices.

The left panel of Figure 6 shows actual wages in STRONG. Unlike in MEDIUM, the exogenous increase in trust is associated not only with a significant but also with a stable increase in actual wages. Average wages are 43.3 in STRONG-HT and 17.7 in STRONG-LT, a difference that is highly significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, $p<0.01$). Regression analysis confirms that the treatment difference is stable over time, with no statistically significant time trend for the treatment difference in wages (see HT x Period in regressions (3) and (4) in Appendix Table A1).

Notably, wages are similar in the low-trust environments in STRONG and MEDIUM, whereas this is not the case in the high-trust environments. The average wages in STRONG-LT and MEDIUM-LT are not significantly different (17.7 vs. 16.5, Wilcoxon rank sum test, $p=0.84$) and remain similar throughout the 15 periods of the experiment. In contrast, while wages are initially only slightly lower in MEDIUM-HT than in STRONG-HT, the gap between these treatments strongly increases over time as wages in MEDIUM-HT steadily decline. Overall, average wages are marginally significantly lower in MEDIUM-HT than STRONG-HT (33.9 vs 43.3 respectively, Wilcoxon rank sum test, $p=0.095$). Regression analysis shows that the overall impact of the exogenous trust increase on wages is marginally significantly larger in STRONG than in MEDIUM (see the interaction term HT x STRONG in regressions (1) to (3) of Table 3, $p<0.1$).

Turning to agent behaviour, the left panel of Figure 7 shows the average effort levels over time in contracting environment STRONG. The figure reveals that effort is substantially higher in STRONG-HT than in STRONG-LT. Average effort is 5.5 in STRONG-HT and 3.3 in STRONG-LT, a difference that is significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p=0.016) and stable throughout the experiment, except for an end-game effect in the final periods.

To determine whether the decline in effort towards the end of the game (i.e., in periods 11-15) is indeed an effect tied to the end of the game, as opposed to a time trend in the effect of high trust that happens to start after 10 periods, we conducted two markets of a control treatment, labeled STRONG-HT-Long. Treatment STRONG-HT-Long is identical to treatment STRONG-HT, except that it lasted 25 periods rather than 15 periods. Figure 10 shows that effort remains high for 10 additional periods in STRONG-HT-Long, declining only as the longer game approaches its end. Extending the game thus prolongs the length of the stable effect of high trust, moving the decline in effort to the end of the longer game. The endgame effect is thus relatively unimportant economically because it influences behaviour only in the final periods of play, and its occurence can be shifted into the future by extending the duration of the game.

Note that treatment STRONG-HT-Long replicates the high level of gains from trade observed in STRONG-HT. Average effort in STRONG-HT-Long is 5.6, almost identical to (and not significantly different from) the average effort of 5.5 in STRONG-HT. Regression analysis confirms that, excluding the end-game effect for effort, there is no statistically significant time trend in STRONG-HT for the high- vs. low-trust treatment difference in effort levels (see the near-zero coefficient of HT x Period in regression (4) in Appendix Table A2). We summarize these effects of exogenous trust on wages and effort in the following result:

Result 8: *(a) In contracting environment STRONG, principals pay substantially higher wages in the high-trust environment compared to the low-trust environment. This wage difference is stable over time and, after the initial periods, significantly larger than the wage difference in contracting environment MEDIUM. Wage levels are similar over time in STRONG and MEDIUM when trust is low. (b) The large positive effect of the exogenous trust increase on wages is associated with a large increase in effort. Principals in STRONG-HT pay high wages and receive high effort on average. Conversely, principals in STRONG-LT pay low wages and receive low effort on average.*

Comparing the effect of the exogenous trust increase in contracting environment STRONG and MEDIUM, we find that the difference in average effort between STRONG-HT and STRONG-LT (2.1) is larger than the difference between MEDIUM-HT and MEDIUM-LT (1.4). Regression analysis confirms that the effect of trust is significantly larger in STRONG than in MEDIUM, see the interaction term HT x Strong in regression (5) of Table 3, which excludes the end-game effect in STRONG-HT.[20] This stronger impact of trust on effort levels explains the larger impact of trust on gains from trade in STRONG compared to MEDIUM.

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[20] Regression (6) in Table 3 checks robustness to also excluding the final five periods of MEDIUM-HT; we see a very similar point estimate for HTxSTRONG to that observed in regresion (5), and the coefficient is still marginally significant; the larger standard errors are understandable due to the reduction in sample size.

Figure 10: Robustness Check Verifying End-Game Effect in Final Periods of STRONG-HT

Notes: Average effort levels are more volatile over the course of the experiment in STRONG-HT-Long than in STRONG-HT because we conducted only two markets in STRONG-HT-Long, not five as in STRONG-HT.

4.3.2 Screening strategies

These findings raise the question: what is the mechanism underlying the higher wages and efforts in STRONG-HT compared to MEDIUM-HT? Additionally, why do principals in STRONG-LT behave similarly to those in MEDIUM-LT? We hypothesize that principals in STRONG-HT are optimistic about the prevalence of agents who reciprocate higher wages with higher effort and utilize the richer contracting environment to screen for such agents. For example, principals might pay medium wages in initial interactions with agents, and based on a positive signal, continue the relationship with similar or even higher wages. If this screening is successful, principals in STRONG-HT can selectively pay high wages only to agents who respond strongly, potentially making high wages profitable, unlike in MEDIUM-HT. In STRONG-LT, principals may be too pessimistic about the prevalence of agents who respond to high wages with high effort.

Consequently, they avoid screening and instead pay low wages and elicit low efforts, similar to the behaviour observed in MEDIUM-LT.

A precondition for screening to be a meaningful strategy is heterogeneity in how agents respond to a given wage. We saw in MEDIUM-HT how agents respond when wages are exogenous to agent type by construction: for low wages almost all agents respond with low effort, but for high and medium wages, there is substantial heterogeneity (top panels of Figure 9). This heterogeneity implies that there may be value to principals in STRONG-HT in screening and assigning wages endogenously based on signals about agent behaviour. Furthermore, the way to identify agents who will reciprocate is to pay medium or high wages, as almost all agents choose low effort at low wages. Notably, screening with high wages may be riskier than using medium wages.

Looking at the wage offers of principals in STRONG-HT in initial and in later interactions with agents, we find behaviour consistent with such screening strategies. Principals in STRONG-HT tend to choose medium wages right from the outset in initial interactions with agents, on average paying a wage of 41. If a principal seeks out the same agent again—a sign of a successful previous interaction—the average wage tends to be even higher, 50 on average, thus moving into the range of high wages.[21] Regressions confirm that in STRONG-HT, wages are significantly higher in later (private offer) interactions with an agent than in the initial interaction (p<0.01).[22] This pattern is consistent with principals moving to high wages once they have seen positive

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[21] Another sign of screening strategies in STONG-HT is shown in Appendix Figure A2. High (above median) first period effort is associated with higher future average wages in STRONG-HT, but does not lead to higher future wages in MEDIUM-HT or WEAK-HT. This provides further evidence that principals in STRONG-HT are screening agents based on their past effort levels, and giving high wage offers to those who performed well.

[22] We regress wages on a dummy variable for later interactions using a private offer, with the omitted category being initial interactions (with private or public offer). The dummy variable is statistically significant. Estimation method is panel regression with random effects on principals, and boostrapped standard errors clustering on session.

signals. In STRONG-LT, by contrast, principals start with low wages in initial interactions, 13 on average. If principals in STRONG-LT interact with the same agent again, the average wage is higher, at 27, but still not in the high range. The reluctance of principals in STRONG-LT to attempt screening is understandable if they hold a pessimistic view regarding the prevalence of agents who exhibit reciprocal behaviour.

The tendency for principals in STRONG-HT to pay medium wages in initial interactions, when they do not know anything about an agent, and high wages only after positive signals, is also apparent in the distributions of effort choices conditional on wage ranges. As shown in the middle bottom panel of Figure 9, there is substantial heterogeneity in agent effort choice when principals choose to pay medium wages in STRONG-HT (the figure excludes the end game periods, so this heterogeneity is not driven by end-game effects). Indeed, principals face a similar heterogeneity as observed for such wages in MEDIUM-HT. For high wages, however, there is a very different pattern in STRONG compared to MEDIUM (compare top and bottom right-hand panels of Figure 9). In STRONG-HT, when principals choose to pay high wages, efforts are almost uniformly high, with 88% of efforts being 6 or higher, and the unique mode at maximum effort of 9. This indicates that principals are successful in targeting their high wage offers to reciprocal agents, which contrasts with MEDIUM-HT, where principals who pay high wages without the possibility of screening face the full range of effort outcomes and frequently experience relatively low effort levels. Regressions confirm that effort levels are significantly higher for high wages in STRONG-HT versus MEDIUM-HT ($p<0.01$).[23] Turning to low wages in STRONG-HT, we see that effort

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[23] Results are based on regressing effort on a treatment dummy for STRONG-HT, conditioning on wage greater than 50 (random effects on principal with boostrapped standard errors clustering on market session). The coefficient on the treatment dummy is large and significant at the one-percent level whether or not we include periods 11 to 15 for STRONG-HT.

levels are almost always low (left-hand bottom panel of Figure 9). This is the main type of wage paid by principals in STRONG-LT, and in STRONG-LT the effort response is similarly low.[24] This helps explain why principals in STRONG-LT experience low effort levels and why outcomes are similar to MEDIUM-LT, where principals also mainly pay low wages.

There is also direct evidence that principals in STRONG-HT condition contract terms on past signals, consistent with screening for agents who choose high efforts in response to high wages. Specifically, if we regress the probability that an agent is "fired" (i.e., was hired last period but does not receive a private offer in the current period) on the previous period's effort signal (controlling for previous wage), we find that in STRONG-HT a negative effort signal increases the probability of "firing" by 28 percentage points ($p<0.01$).[25] Similarly, among those who are rehired deliberately (using a private offer) despite a negative effort signal (i.e., realization of the low value level) in t-1, the probability of a lower wage offer increases by 16 percentage points ($p<0.01$).[26]

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[24] For low wages average effort is approximately 2 in both STRONG-HT and STRONG-LT, and there is no statistically significant difference (regression of effort on a treatment dummy for HT, conditional on contract enforcement being strong and wage less than 25; random effects on principals with bootstrapped standard errors clustering on market).

[25] About 50% of offers are private in STRONG-HT. Of these, about 57% are first-time private offers, but the remaining involve re-hiring an agent who was hired in the previous period with a private offer. This shows the screening process at work. In MEDIUM-HT, we also see roughly 40% private offers, but only 7% of these end up directed to an agent who was hired in the previous period with a private offer (and of these, most are likely accidental). This is as expected, given that random shuffling of IDs in MEDIUM-HT made screening essentially impossible. The fact that principals use private offers at all in MEDIUM-HT can be understood as an attempt to elicit a more reciprocal response from agents, with agents potentially appreciating being made an offer that is only available to themselves. Suggestive of this mechanism, in a regression of effort on price and an indicator for private offer, the coefficient on private is positive and sizeable, indicating about half a point higher effort, albeit not statistically significant ($p<0.25$).

[26] These results are based on a linear probability model with random effects for the principals, clustering on sessions and bootstrapped standard errors. If we use, instead, a probit specification we find very similar effects.

A sign that these strategies allow principals in STRONG-HT to be successful in screening would be a stronger relationship of effort to wage offers in STRONG-HT compared to MEDIUM-HT. As seen in Panel (A) of Figure 8, the effort-wage relation is indeed steeper in STRONG-HT than in MEDIUM-HT, and corresponding regressions confirm that the difference is statistically significant (see the interaction term Actual wage x STRONG-HT in regressions (1) and (2) in Appendix Table A3; $p<0.05$). This again suggests that when principals pay high wages in STRONG-HT—typically in later interactions with an agent after receiving positive signals—they are successfully targeting agents who respond with high effort levels and avoiding those who choose low efforts.[27]

The stronger relationship between effort and wages in STRONG-HT implies that paying high wages could be profitable. As seen in Panel (B) of Figure 8, profits are indeed increasing with wages in STRONG-HT, while they decrease with wages in MEDIUM-HT. Corresponding regressions confirm that the profit response to wage increases is significantly better in STRONG-HT compared to MEDIUM-HT (see the interaction term Actual wage x STRONG-HT in regressions (3) and (4) in Appendix Table A3; $p<0.05$). Thus, unlike in MEDIUM-HT, principals in STRONG-HT can benefit from paying high wages, which generates high efforts and high gains from trade. We summarize these findings in our next result.

> **Result 9:** *(a) In contracting environment STRONG, high initial trust leads*
>
> *principals to engage in screening strategies to identify agents who respond*

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[27] Note that the end-game effect in STRONG-HT suggests that some agents who act reciprocal in pre-final periods start acting selfish at the end of the game. Thus, screening in pre-final periods may not be fully distinguishing agents with intrinsic reciprocity preferences from selfish agents who strategically imitate these types. Regardless, it can still be beneficial for principals to identify agents who act reciprocal in pre-final periods, as these are preferable to those who act selfish in pre-final periods.

strongly to high wages. These screening strategies are successful, resulting in a stronger relationship between effort and wages compared to contracting environment MEDIUM, making paying high wages more profitable. (b) With low initial trust, principals in contracting environment STRONG do not try to screen for agents who respond to high wages. Instead, they pay low wages and elicit low efforts similar to principals in contracting environment MEDIUM.

5. Theory

In this section, we summarize our theoretical analysis of the principal-agent market game. We aim at providing an explanation for our main experimental finding, i.e., for why exogenous increases in trust have no effect on the gains from trade in contracting environment WEAK, only a temporary effect in contracting environment MEDIUM and a stable effect in contracting environment STRONG. The formal analysis can be found in Section B of the Appendix.

To keep the analysis tractable, the game that we solve is a simplified version of the game used in the experiment. The model was constructed post hoc, and our paper does not aim to test the model. The goal of the theoretical analysis is simply to help organise and interpret the findings.

We model contracting environment WEAK as a one-shot simultaneous-move game between one principal, who chooses a wage, and one agent, who chooses an effort level. The game is further simplified by omitting the contract offer stage, which is pure cheap talk, and by assuming that all actions are binary. The principal is assumed to be profit-maximizing, while the agent can be either a selfish or a reciprocal type, but this type is unobservable to the principal.[28] Only reciprocal types

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[28] One could assume that there is also a positive fraction of reciprocal principals but because preferences for reciprocal behaviour matter mainly for second movers (i.e., agents) we assume selfish principals. Reciprocity may provide an additional reason for the principal to pay a high

would find it optimal to respond to a high wage with high effort in a one-shot interaction. However, since moves are simultaneous in contracting environment WEAK, there is a unique equilibrium in which wage and effort are always low. Importantly, this unique outcome is independent of the principal's belief about the share of reciprocal types in the agent population. Hence, even when our historical examples about the differential trustworthiness of agents in LT and HT changed a principal's belief about the share of reciprocal types, we predict that this has no effect on play, in line with our experimental finding that there is no difference between WEAK-LT and WEAK-HT.

We model contracting environment MEDIUM as a one-shot sequential-move game, where the principal first chooses a binding wage and the agent responds by choosing an effort after observing that wage. A reciprocal agent then indeed responds to a high wage with high effort, while a selfish type always responds with low effort. Since the agent's type is not observable to the principal when she makes her wage offer, her belief about the share of reciprocal types determines whether she wants to offer the low or the high wage. We impose the assumption that the share of reciprocal agents is not too large, so that offering the high wage is less profitable than offering a low wage – an assumption that is in line with the empirical evidence in MEDIUM.[29] Hence, there is again a unique equilibrium in contracting environment MEDIUM, in which wage and effort are always low, in line with what we observe in treatment MEDIUM-LT. Now assume that the historical example about high trustworthiness of the agents in treatment MEDIUM-HT initially renders the principals' beliefs about the share of reciprocal agents more optimistic. The principals may then find it optimal to offer the high wage, in expectation that it will be rewarded

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wage in the second period only if the stochastic signal indicates that the agent is a reciprocal type. However, we show below that this is also an equilibrium strategy for a selfish principal.
[29] The slope of the relationship between average effort and offered wages is not steep enough in this treatment to generate a positive slope between profits and offered wages. In fact, the relation between average profits and offered wages is negative in MEDIUM.

with high effort sufficiently often to be profitable. These principals would eventually end up with lower profits than expected according to their beliefs. Learning dynamics which move beliefs gradually towards the truth would then imply that the principals eventually switch to the low wage, exactly in line with the transient effect of the high-trust environment that we observe in contracting environment MEDIUM.

Finally, we model contracting environment STRONG as a repeated sequential-move game. An essential feature of the experimental setting is the finite repetition of the stage game, coupled with an excess supply of agents. This allows principals to rehire or fire agents conditional on the stochastic outcome of their earlier interaction. We capture the dynamic interaction with just two periods. The feature of excess supply of agents is modelled by having one principal and two agents. With repeated interaction, the game exhibits coexistence of a low-trust and a high-trust sequential equilibrium for a large range of parameters, including parameters that resemble the payoff structure in the experiment.

The low-trust equilibrium replicates the outcome of the one-shot interaction. If the principal believes that agents will provide only low effort, she initially offers the low wage to one of the agents, and both types of that agent respond with low effort. The subsequent stochastic realization of the value is therefore not informative about the agent's type. As a consequence, the principal again offers the low wage in the second period, and both types of the agent respond with low effort. A reciprocal agent cannot signal his type by a first-period deviation from equilibrium because the effort choice is not directly observable to the principal. Thus, the low-trust equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which gift-exchange between the principal and the reciprocal types does not materialize.

In the high-trust equilibrium, the principal initially trusts an agent of unknown type. That is, she pays the high wage. A selfish type responds with low effort but a reciprocal type responds with high effort. The principal's belief that the agent is a reciprocal type declines if she receives the low value. She will then not offer the high wage again in the second period. A realised high value, by contrast, constitutes a positive signal about the type of the agent. Given the positively updated belief, the principal's expected profit is maximised by offering the high wage again to the same agent. A selfish type has no incentive to mimic a reciprocal type because he does not obtain the additional intrinsic benefit from responding to a high wage with high effort. Thus, the high-trust equilibrium is a separating equilibrium, where the initial trusting behaviour of the principal serves to stochastically screen reciprocal types from selfish types.

We interpret the historical information about agents' trustworthiness used in the experiment as a device that selects between these multiple equilibria. The predictions of the high-trust and the low-trust equilibrium are indeed in line with the experimental findings of higher wages and higher effort in STRONG-HT compared to STRONG-LT.

More specifically, consider the low-trust equilibrium first. The offered wage and the returned effort are predicted to be low in both periods on the equilibrium path, as confirmed by the experimental results in STRONG-LT. Furthermore, if the principal trembled and offered the high wage in the first period, then both types of the agent would still respond with low effort in that equilibrium. This is sustained by the correct off-equilibrium belief that the principal subsequently reacts to a realised high value (which is uninformative because both types behave in the same way) by not rehiring the agent. The agent's off-equilibrium behaviour thus confirms the flat wage-effort reaction as induced by the historical example in STRONG-LT.

Consider the high-trust equilibrium next. The high first-period wage elicits an average effort strictly above the low level, as confirmed by our results in STRONG-HT. If the principal trembled and offered the low wage instead, both types of the agent would respond with low effort in this equilibrium. This confirms the principal's belief in a positive wage-effort reaction as induced by the historical example in STRONG-HT. A response of effort to wage can also be observed on the equilibrium path of the high-trust equilibrium. Depending on the stochastic realization of the value, the principal offers either the high or the low wage in the second period, and the induced expected effort is larger in the former case than in the latter.

6. Trust and Contract Enforcement as Substitutes

We have shown that trust and contract enforcement can be complements, over ranges of contractual incompleteness that appear plausible from a real-world perspective. Here, we explicitly demonstrate that trust and contract enforcement can also be substitutes, whenever contracts become sufficiently complete.

Specifically, in our contracting environment labeled TRANSPARENCY, principals observe not only the performance signals of agents they interacted with, as in our main contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG, but also the performance signals of all other agents in the market. This environment reflects scenarios such as the availability of reference letters from previous employers. Apart from this difference, TRANSPARENCY is identical to STRONG, that is, IDs of all players are fixed and wage offers are binding. The availability of additional information strengthens contract enforcement further because agents are aware that their performance signals are available to all principals, and principals can base their contract offers on the performance signals of agents they have not previously interacted with.

We implemented a single trust environment, LT, in combination with contracting environment TRANSPARENCY. Figure 11 presents the agents' average effort levels over the course of the experiment in TRANSPARENCY-LT and compares them to the average effort levels in STRONG-HT and STRONG-LT. The figure reveals that increasing contract enforcement while holding trust constant—moving from STRONG-LT to TRANSPARENCY-LT—produces the same gains from trade (with effort serving as a sufficient statistic for expected gains from trade) as increasing trust while holding contractual enforcement constant—moving from STRONG-LT to STRONG-HT. The data thus demonstrate that sufficiently high levels of contract enforcement can substitute for low levels of trust.

Figure 11: Sufficiently strong contract enforcement can substitute for high trust

In the limit with perfectly complete contracts, this is trivially the case. In our game-theoretic analysis, which has only a single principal so that we cannot explicitly model observing an agent working for another principal, we model the central feature of contracting environment TRANSPARENCY in reduced form by assuming that providing low effort in response to a high wage offer has an additional reputation cost for an agent. The idea is that information about low

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performance may spread and later hurt the agent in (unmodelled) interactions with other principals. Under assumptions that are compatible with the assumptions made previously, the modified game has a unique pure-strategy sequential equilibrium outcome whenever the reputation cost is large enough. This outcome involves high wages and high efforts in the first period and an endgame effect, in line with what we observe in TRANSPARENCY-LT.

7. Conclusions

This paper studies the interplay between trust and the strength of contract enforcement for the realization of gains from trade by systematically varying both factors independently. It is well-understood that informational constraints and weak judicial systems render contract enforcement imperfect. People may then only be willing to interact and realise gains from trade if they trust that their contract partner will not behave opportunistically. By contrast, little appears to be known about how trust affects the causal impact of contract enforcement on gains from trade and how contract enforcement shapes the causal impact of trust.

A better understanding of the interplay of trust and the strength of contract enforcement is important for designing policies aimed at improving economic performance. If trust and contract enforcement were substitutes, policies could be effective if they focused solely on, say, improving the judicial system in order to enable trading partners to better enforce their contracts—even if levels of trust remained low. Policies could be equally effective if they focused solely on, say, advertising role models of trustful business relations in order to move a society out of a low-trust trap—even if the judicial system remained weak. Our results suggest, however, that such independent improvements along only one dimension—either only trust or only contract enforcement—may not work. We find, in particular, that improvements in the strength of contract

enforcement have no or only limited effects on gains from trade when individuals are in our low-trust environment. Likewise, the results indicate that increases in exogenous trust have no or only a transitory impact on gains from trade in our weak and medium contract environment, respectively. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement trust increases have a large impact, and under high trust improvements in contract enforcement have also a large effect on the gains from trade. The complementarity between trust and the strength of contract enforcement indicates that simultaneous improvements along both dimensions may be the preferred policy tool.

By documenting empirically that trust and contract enforcement can be complements, and by identifying the mechanisms underlying this complementarity, we also contribute to a deeper understanding of the conditions under which trust and contract enforcement opportunities do and do not exert causal effects on the gains from trade.

As a general implication, research on the determinants of economic performance may benefit by focusing more on interactions between separate factors of influences. Controlling for trust and contract enforcement environments, but not for their interaction, might yield results that obfuscate the real effects. Similar issues may arise for the interaction between other institutional factors, such as legal frameworks or regulatory quality, and informal norms of behaviour, like cultural attitudes towards cooperation or social expectations around corruption. This raises a large range of novel questions for future research.

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The Complementarity Between Trust and Contract Enforcement

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Online Appendix

A. Additional Tables and Figures

Table A1: Actual Wage Levels as Function of Trust and Time Period in Contracting Environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG

	WEAK	MEDIUM	STRONG	
	All periods	All periods	All periods	Periods < 11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
HT	8.09**	23.06***	26.83***	25.19***
	[3.33]	[2.04]	[3.42]	[3.19]
Period	-0.64***	-0.02	-0.01	-0.19
	[0.18]	[0.06]	[0.18]	[0.28]
HT x Period	-0.61*	-0.71**	-0.14	0.21
	[0.32]	[0.32]	[0.25]	[0.36]
Constant	13.58***	16.66***	17.69***	18.44***
	[1.90]	[1.43]	[2.46]	[2.43]
Observations	1031	1046	1042	694

Notes: Panel regression estimates with random effects for principals. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on markets (30 clusters) shown in brackets. Columns (1) to (3) present regressions for the three contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG, respectively, using all periods. Column (4) shows results for STRONG excluding the final five periods to eliminate the end-game effect. The regression for each column only uses data from the respective contracting environment. The omitted category in each case is the respective low-trust environment. HT is a dummy variable indicating the respective high-trust environment. Period takes on values 1 to 15, or 1 to 10 in Colum (4) indicating the respective period. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table A2: Effort Levels as Function of Trust and Time Period in Contracting Environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG

	WEAK	MEDIUM	STRONG	
	All periods	All periods	All periods	Periods < 11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
HT	0.76	2.05***	3.07***	2.55***
	[0.50]	[0.50]	[0.37]	[0.42]
Period	-0.11***	-0.00	-0.04	0.01
	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.04]	[0.04]
HT x Period	-0.08**	-0.08***	-0.12**	-0.01
	[0.04]	[0.02]	[0.05]	[0.08]
Constant	3.42***	2.29***	3.59***	3.35***
	[0.21]	[0.30]	[0.20]	[0.23]
Observations	1031	1046	1042	694

Notes: Panel regression estimates with random effects for principals. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on markets (30 clusters) shown in brackets. Columns (1) to (3) present regressions for the three contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG, respectively, using all periods. Column (4) shows results for STRONG excluding the final five periods to eliminate the end-game effect. The regression for each column only uses data from the respective contracting environment. The omitted category in each case is the respective low-trust environment. HT is a dummy variable indicating the respective high-trust environment. Period takes on values 1 to 15, or 1 to 10 in Colum (4) indicating the respective period. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table A3: Relationships of Effort and Profits to Actual Wages in the High-Trust Environments

	Effort		Profit of principal	
	All periods	Periods < 11	All periods	Periods < 11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Actual wage	0.09***	0.09***	-0.25***	-0.25***
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.05]	[0.05]
WEAK-HT	1.66***	1.68***	14.74***	14.74***
	[0.30]	[0.30]	[2.24]	[2.26]
STRONG-HT	-0.02	0.09	-5.07	-5.21
	[0.31]	[0.50]	[6.55]	[8.98]
Actual wage x WEAK-HT	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.71***	-0.71***
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.11]	[0.11]
Actual wage x STRONG-HT	0.02**	0.03**	0.33***	0.42**
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.13]	[0.17]
Constant	0.80***	0.78***	17.95***	17.95***
	[0.15]	[0.16]	[1.76]	[1.77]
Observations	1551	1379	1551	1379

Notes: Panel regression estimates with random effects for principals. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on markets (15 clusters) shown in brackets. Columns (1) and (2) present regressions explaining effort levels as a function of actual wages and contracting environment. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is profit levels of principals. The estimations use data from the high trust environments of all three contracting environments with MEDIUM as the omitted category. WEAK is a dummy variable indicating the weak contracting environment, and STRONG indicates the strong contracting environment. Actual wage gives the relationship of the dependent variable to actual wages in MEDIUM. Actual wage x WEAK and Actual wage x STRONG give the differential relationship of the dependent variable to higher actual wages in these respective contracting environments relative to the relationship in MEDIUM. The sample excludes outlier wages above 70. Columns (2) and (4) only use periods 1 to 10 for contracting environment STRONG to check robustness to eliminating the end-game effect that is present in that environment. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table A4: Expectations of principals about effort choices as a function of trust condition

	Initial beliefs of principal		
	STRONG	MEDIUM	WEAK
	(1)	(2)	(3)
HT	1.76***	1.58***	1.40***
	[0.26]	[0.24]	[0.31]
Constant	2.69***	2.70***	2.72***
	[0.20]	[0.17]	[0.21]
Observations	420	420	420

Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered on principal. The dependent variable is the initial beliefs of principals about average agent effort choices. Columns (1) to (3) present regressions for the three contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG, respectively. The regression for each column only uses data from the respective contracting environment. The omitted category in each case is the respective low-trust environment. HT is a dummy variable indicating the respective high-trust environment. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table A5: Expectations of principals about effort choices as a function of trust condition and offered wage

	Initial belief of principal		
	STRONG	MEDIUM	WEAK
	(1)	(2)	(3)
HT	-0.59***	-0.29	-0.74***
	[0.21]	[0.21]	[0.22]
Offered wage	0.05***	0.06***	0.05***
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
HT x Offered wage	0.08***	0.06***	0.07***
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
Constant	1.07***	0.93***	1.22***
	[0.13]	[0.09]	[0.17]
Observations	420	420	420

Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered on principal. The dependent variable is the initial beliefs of principals about average agent effort choices. Columns (1) to (3) present regressions for the three contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG, respectively. The regression for each column only uses data from the respective contracting environment. The omitted category in each case is the respective low-trust environment. HT is a dummy variable indicating the respective high-trust environment. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table A6: Expectations of principals about effort choices as a function of contracting environment

	Initial belief of principal	
	HT	LT
	(1)	(2)
STRONG	0.18	-0.00
	[0.23]	[0.26]
WEAK	-0.15	0.02
	[0.28]	[0.27]
Constant	4.27***	2.70***
	[0.17]	[0.17]
Observations	630	630

Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered on principal. The dependent variable is the initial beliefs of principals about average agent effort choices. Columns (1) and (2) present regressions for the two trust conditions, HT and LT, respectively. The regression for each column only uses data from the respective trust condition. The omitted category in each case is the WEAK contracting environment. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table A7: Expectations of principals about effort choices as a function of contracting environment

	Initial belief of principal	
	HT	LT
	(1)	(2)
WEAK	-0.16	0.29
	[0.24]	[0.19]
STRONG	-0.16	0.14
	[0.25]	[0.16]
Offered wage	0.12***	0.06***
	[0.01]	[0.01]
STRONG x Offered wage	0.01	-0.00
	[0.01]	[0.01]
WEAK x Offered wage	0.00	-0.01
	[0.01]	[0.01]
Constant	0.64***	0.93***
	[0.19]	[0.09]
Observations	630	630

Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered on principal. The dependent variable is the initial beliefs of principals about average agent effort choices. Columns (1) and (2) present regressions for the two trust conditions, HT and LT, respectively. The regression for each column only uses data from the respective trust condition. The omitted category in each case is the WEAK contracting environment. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table A8: Expectations of agents about effort choices as a function of trust condition

| | Initial beliefs of agents | | |
| | STRONG | MEDIUM | WEAK |
	(1)	(2)	(3)
HT	-0.20	-0.10	0.06
	[0.23]	[0.30]	[0.29]
Constant	4.62***	4.10***	4.14***
	[0.16]	[0.21]	[0.20]
Observations	600	594	600

Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered on agent. The dependent variable is the initial beliefs of agents about average agent effort choices. Columns (1) to (3) present regressions for the three contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG, respectively. The regression for each column only uses data from the respective contracting environment. The omitted category in each case is the respective low-trust environment. HT is a dummy variable indicating the respective high-trust environment. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table A9: Expectations of agents about effort choices as a function of trust condition and offered wage

| | Initial beliefs of agents | | |
| | STRONG | MEDIUM | WEAK |
	(1)	(2)	(3)
HT	-0.12	-0.03	0.10
	[0.26]	[0.18]	[0.26]
Offered wage	0.12***	0.10***	0.11***
	[0.00]	[0.01]	[0.01]
HT x Offered wage	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
Constant	1.02***	0.95***	0.87***
	[0.15]	[0.11]	[0.18]
Observations	600	594	600

Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered on agent. The dependent variable is the initial beliefs of agents about average agent effort choices. Columns (1) to (3) present regressions for the three contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG, respectively. The regression for each column only uses data from the respective contracting environment. The omitted category in each case is the respective low-trust environment. HT is a dummy variable indicating the respective high-trust environment. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

**Figure A1**: Effort-Wage Relations by Market Session and High Trust Treatment

Figure A2: Average Wages by First Period Effort in High Trust Environments

B. Game-Theoretic Analysis

The games analyzed in this section are simpler than the games played in the experiment, but they capture their essential features. We model contracting environment WEAK as a one-shot simultaneous-move game between a principal, who chooses a wage, and an agent, who chooses an effort level. We model contracting environment MEDIUM as a one-shot sequential-move game where the principal first choses the wage, and the agent chooses the effort level after observing that wage. We model contracting environment STRONG as a simplified dynamic interaction with two periods, and we capture the excess supply of agents by considering one principal and two agents. Finally, we model contracting environment TRANSPARENCY in reduced form by assuming that an agent who receives a high wage but exerts low effort in the first period incurs an additional reputation cost. Throughout, we simplify the strategy spaces by assuming that all actions are binary. Furthermore, the principal is assumed to be profit-maximizing, while the agents can be either selfish types or reciprocal types. We work with sequential equilibrium as our solution concept.

Stage Game Payoffs

The principal chooses a wage $w \in \{w_L, w_H\}$, where $0 \leq w_L < w_H$. The agent exerts effort $e \in \{e_L, e_H\}$ where $0 < e_L < e_H < 1$, to produce a good of uncertain quality. The good is either valuable, in which case it generates a payoff of $v > 0$ for the principal, or it is useless and does not generate any value. Effort e is the probability that the good is valuable. Denote by $\omega \in \{0,1\}$ the state of the world describing whether the good is valuable ($\omega = 1$) or not ($\omega = 0$). The agent's cost of providing low effort is normalized to zero; the cost of providing high effort is $c > 0$. Given actions (w, e), the expected material payoffs of principal and agent are, respectively,

$$\pi^P(w, e) = ev - w \ \text{ and } \ \pi^A(w, e) = w - \left(\frac{e - e_L}{e_H - e_L}\right) c.$$

We assume that $0 < c < (e_H - e_L)v$, which implies that providing the high effort is efficient.

The principal is profit-oriented and maximizes $u^P(w, e) = \pi^P(w, e)$. The agent has a type $\alpha \in \{0, a\}$, where $0 < a < 1$, and maximizes

$$u^A(w, e, \alpha) = \pi^A(w, e) - \alpha|\pi^P(w, e) - \pi^A(w, e)|.$$

Type $\alpha = 0$ is selfish and cares only about own material payoff. Type $\alpha = a$ is inequity-averse, where the symmetric formulation of inequity-aversion is the simplest way of modelling a

reciprocal motive.[1] We assume that $u^A(w_L, e_L, a) \geq 0$ and $u^A(w_H, e_H, a) \geq 0$, which will imply that both types of the agent always participate voluntarily.

Let $e^*(w, \alpha) \in \text{argmax}_e \, u^A(w, e, \alpha)$ denote a best response of the α-type agent to wage w. For the selfish type, we obtain $e^*(w_L, 0) = e^*(w_H, 0) = e_L$. The following assumption makes sure that $e^*(w_L, a) = e_L$ and $e^*(w_H, a) = e_H$, so that the reciprocal type would indeed behave in a trustworthy way.

Assumption 1 (Trustworthiness)

$$u^A(w_L, e_L, a) > u^A(w_L, e_H, a) \text{ and } u^A(w_H, e_H, a) > u^A(w_H, e_L, a).$$

Suppose the prior probability of the agent being reciprocal is given by $0 < \lambda < 1$. We will be interested in environments where gift-exchange does not arise in the one-shot sequential-move game, when the principal's belief about the share of reciprocal types is given by the prior. However, gift-exchange should become possible in the dynamic sequential-move game, where the principal might be able to update her belief about the agent. Suppose there was an initial stage at which a selfish agent chooses e_L while an inequity-averse agent chooses e_H. Then, if the good turns out to be of high value, a simple application of Bayes' rule implies that the principal's posterior belief about the agent being a reciprocal type would increase to

$$\lambda \left(\frac{e_H}{\lambda \, e_H + (1 - \lambda)e_L} \right).$$

The following assumption implies that this increase would make the principal change her behavior.

Assumption 2 (Value of Information)

$$\lambda v < \frac{w_H - w_L}{e_H - e_L} < \lambda \left(\frac{e_H}{\lambda \, e_H + (1 - \lambda)e_L} \right) v.$$

---

[1] To keep the analysis simple and tractable, we use inquity averse preferences to generate reciprocal agent behavior. In principle, one could also model the motive for reciprocal effort choices with alternative social preference models (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) but this would typically render the analysis considerably more complicated. Note that our agent dislikes inequality in expected payoffs. One could also model aversion to the expectation of inequality in ex-post payoffs, after the stochastic value of the good has realized.

Contracting Environment WEAK

Suppose the principal and the agent interact only once and choose their actions simultaneously. It is straightforward to see that this game has a unique equilibrium in which wage and effort are low. For the principal, paying the low wage is a dominant strategy when choices are simultaneous, because her wage offer cannot affect the effort chosen by the agent. Both types of the agent then find it optimal to choose low effort, under Assumption 1. We summarize this in the following proposition, the formal proof of which is left to the reader.

> **Proposition 1.** *Under Assumption 1, the one-shot simultaneous-move game has a unique sequential equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the principal pays the low wage and both types of the agent respond with low effort.*

Contracting Environment MEDIUM

Now suppose the principal and the agent interact once but choose their actions sequentially. The wage offered by the principal becomes observable before the agent makes a choice, so that the principal could affect the effort chosen by the agent. Under Assumption 2, the principal will still not find it optimal to offer the high wage. This is summarized in the following proposition, the proof of which is again left to the reader.

> **Proposition 2.** *Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the one-shot sequential-move game has a unique sequential equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the principal pays the low wage and both types of the agent respond with low effort.*

Note, however, that this result depends on the prior belief of the principal about the agent's type being pessimistic enough, as embodied by Assumption 2. Suppose an intervention like the high trustworthiness example in our experiment initially distorts upwards the beliefs of some principals about the share λ of trustworthy types. With sequential moves, we could then expect some principals to offer high wages initially. It takes some time for them to learn that the high wage is not reciprocated frequently enough to be profitable, generating a slow learning dynamics towards the actual equilibrium, in line with our observation in treatment MEDIUM-HT.

Contracting Environment STRONG

Now suppose the interaction is repeated and the principal can adjust her contract offer over time. We consider the following simplified dynamic game between the principal and two agents:

1. The principal chooses wage w^1.
2. Nature determines agent 1's type α_1 ($\alpha_1 = a$ with independent probability λ).
3. Agent 1 chooses effort e^1.
4. Nature determines the state ω^1 ($\omega^1 = 1$ with independent probability e^1).
5. The principal chooses whether to keep agent 1 ($k = 1$) or to fire her and hire agent 2 instead ($k = 0$). The principal also chooses wage w^2 for the second period.
6. Nature determines agent 2's type α_2 ($\alpha_2 = a$ with independent probability λ).
7. The hired agent chooses effort e^2.
8. Nature determines the state ω^2 ($\omega^2 = 1$ with independent probability e^2).

For notational simplicity, we assume that nature determines agent 2's type α_2 even if the agent is not hired in the second period. The terminal nodes of the dynamic game are then given by $t = (w^1, \alpha_1, e^1, \omega^1, k, w^2, \alpha_2, e^2, \omega^2)$. The players' payoffs are

$$U^P(t) = u^P(w^1, \omega^1) + u^P(w^2, \omega^2),$$

$$U_1^A(t) = u^A(w^1, e^1, \alpha_1) + k u^A(w^2, e^2, \alpha_1),$$

$$U_2^A(t) = (1 - k) u^A(w^2, e^2, \alpha_2).$$

Note that we assume here that the inequity-averse agents compare themselves only with the principal, separately period by period, whenever they interact.

Concerning the information structure, we assume that an agent's type and effort choice is observable only to the agent herself, while everything else is observable to all players.[2] A (pure) strategy of the principal prescribes the wage to be chosen in the root of the game, $s^P(\emptyset) \in \{w_L, w_H\}$, as well as for each observed history (w^1, ω^1) a hiring decision and the wage offered in the second period, $s^P(w^1, \omega^1) \in \{0,1\} \times \{w_L, w_H\}$. A strategy of agent 1 prescribes an effort to be chosen in the first period for each observed wage-type combination, $s_1^A(w^1, \alpha_1) \in \{e_L, e_H\}$, and

---

[2] We could also assume that wage offers are only observable to the currently hired agent, and/or that the realized value of the good is observable only to the principal. This would complicate the notation of beliefs, but we would still obtain the equilibrium outcomes derived below.

an effort to be chosen conditional on all observables in case she is hired again in the second period, $s_1^A(w^1, \alpha_1, e^1, \omega^1, 1, w^2) \in \{e_L, e_H\}$. Finally, a strategy of agent 2 prescribes an effort to be chosen conditional on all observables in case she is hired in the second period, $s_2^A(w^1, \omega^1, 0, w^2, \alpha_2) \in \{e_L, e_H\}$. For each of the observable histories at which a player acts, she maintains a probabilistic belief over the nodes in the corresponding information set, i.e., a belief about the earlier unobservable actions that led to this information set.

In a first step, we describe conditions under which the game admits a sequential equilibrium that replicates the one-shot equilibrium outcome: The principal initially pays the low wage and both types of the first agent respond with low effort; the principal then always fires the first agent and offers the low wage to the second agent, who responds with low effort. We refer to such an equilibrium as a *low-trust equilibrium*. It can exist if the principal correctly believes that a high wage would not elicit high effort from any type of the first agent, and hence would also not facilitate learning about that agent's type. It will turn out that the binding constraint for this construction is the reciprocal first agent's incentive not to respond to a high wage with high effort. The following assumption makes sure that this constraint can be satisfied.

Assumption 3 (Low-Trust Incentive-Compatibility)
$$(e_H - e_L)u^A(w_L, e_L, a) > u^A(w_H, e_H, a) - u^A(w_H, e_L, a).$$

We can now state the following result.

> **Proposition 3.** *Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 the dynamic game has a low-trust sequential equilibrium.*

Proof: We first characterize agent 2's strategy in any sequential equilibrium. After observing any history $(w^1, \omega^1, 0, w^2, \alpha_2)$ she entertains a belief about (α_1, e^1), which must be consistent with the requirements imposed by sequential equilibrium. However, her optimal behavior does not depend on these beliefs. Under Assumption 1, we always obtain the unique sequentially rational choice $s_2^A(w^1, \omega^1, 0, w^2, \alpha_2) = e^*(w^2, \alpha_2)$. We next characterize agent 1's second-period strategy in any sequential equilibrium. After observing any history $(w^1, \alpha_1, e^1, \omega^1, 1, w^2)$ she entertains a belief about α_2, which must be consistent with the requirements imposed by sequential equilibrium.

However, her optimal behavior does not depend on these beliefs. Under Assumption 1, we obtain the unique sequentially rational choice $s_1^A(w^1, \alpha_1, e^1, \omega^1, 1, w^2) = e^*(w^2, \alpha_1)$.

We now subsume these choices directly into the players' payoff functions and treat the game as a reduced game between the principal and agent 1. It ends in the terminal nodes $\hat{t} = (w^1, \alpha_1, e^1, \omega^1, k, w^2)$ with payoffs

$$U^P(\hat{t}) = u^P(w^1, \omega^1) + k u^P(w^2, e^*(w^2, \alpha_1))$$
$$+ (1-k)[\lambda u^P(w^2, e^*(w^2, a)) + (1-\lambda)u^P(w^2, e^*(w^2, 0))],$$

$$U_1^A(\hat{t}) = u^A(w^1, e^1, \alpha_1) + k u^A(w^2, e^*(w^2, \alpha_1), \alpha_1).$$

This reduced game has two proper subgames, one starting after each possible first period wage offer. In each of these subgames, the only non-singleton information sets are those of the principal when observing (w^1, ω^1), where she entertains beliefs about (α_1, e^1). Since $e_L > 0$ and $e_H < 1$, these beliefs can always be determined by Bayes' rule when we start from the root of the respective subgame. This uniquely pins down the consistent beliefs in any sequential equilibrium.

Consider first the subgame starting after $w^1 = w_L$. Let the strategies in this subgame be given by

$$s_1^A(w_L, 0) = s_1^A(w_L, a) = e_L \text{ and } s^P(w_L, 0) = s^P(w_L, 1) = (0, w_L),$$

i.e., both types of the first agent respond with low effort, and, irrespective of the realized value of the good, the principal then hires the second agent and pays the low wage. Given any observation of (w_L, ω^1), the principal entertains a probabilistic belief about (α_1, e^1), but only the marginal distribution of α_1 matters for her sequentially rational choices (since e^1 is not payoff relevant conditional on ω^1, and later behavior also does not depend on e^1). Denoting the probability attached to $\alpha_1 = a$ by $\beta^P(w_L, \omega^1)$, we obtain $\beta^P(w_L, 0) = \beta^P(w_L, 1) = \lambda$ from Bayes' rule. It then follows immediately from Assumptions 1 and 2 that the principal's strategy is indeed sequentially rational. As for the agent, observe that deviations cannot affect the principal's second period behavior. It then follows from Assumption 1 that the agent's strategy is also sequentially rational. The resulting expected payoff of the principal in the root of this subgame is $U_L^P = 2u^P(w_L, e_L)$.

Consider now the subgame starting after $w^1 = w_H$. Let the strategies in this subgame be given by

$$s_1^A(w_H, 0) = s_1^A(w_H, a) = e_L \text{ and } s^P(w_H, 0) = (1, w_L), s^P(w_H, 1) = (0, w_L),$$

i.e., both types of the first agent respond with low effort and the principal always pays the low wage in the second period, keeping the first agent if and only if the good is of low value. We obtain the beliefs $\beta^P(w_H, 0) = \beta^P(w_H, 1) = \lambda$. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the principal thus wants to pay the low wage in the second period and is indifferent between keeping and firing the agent, which makes her strategy sequentially rational. As for the agent, consider type $\alpha_1 = 0$ first. Assumption 1 implies that e_L maximizes her first-period payoff. Moreover, $u^A(w_L, e^*(w_L, 0), 0) = w_L \geq 0$ implies that the selfish agent (weakly) benefits from a larger probability of being hired again in the second period, which implies that her strategy is sequentially rational. Consider next type $\alpha_1 = a$, who faces a trade-off between her payoff-maximizing response in the first period and the probability of being hired again in the second period. The condition for $s_1^A(w_H, a) = e_L$ to be sequentially rational is

$$u^A(w_H, e_L, a) + (1 - e_L)u^A(w_L, e^*(w_L, a), a)$$
$$\geq u^A(w_H, e_H, a) + (1 - e_H)u^A(w_L, e^*(w_L, a), a),$$

which is satisfied under Assumptions 1 and 3. The resulting expected payoff of the principal in the root of this subgame is $U_H^P = u^P(w_H, e_L) + u^P(w_L, e_L)$.

Given the strategies and payoffs in the two subgames, it follows that $s^P(\emptyset) = w_L$ is the sequentially rational first-period wage for the principal.   ∎

Next, we describe conditions under which the game admits an equilibrium in which gift-exchange occurs. The principal initially pays the high wage, to which a selfish agent responds with low effort and a reciprocal agent responds with high effort. The principal then always keeps the agent but offers the high wage in the second period if and only if the good turns out to be valuable. Thus, the principal tries to screen the reciprocal types from the selfish types. We refer to such an equilibrium as a *high-trust equilibrium*. Several constraints have to be satisfied for this equilibrium to exist, which we summarize in the following.

Assumption 4 (High-Trust Incentive-Compatibility)

(i) $u^A(w_H, e_L, 0) - u^A(w_H, e_H, 0) > (e_H - e_L)[u^A(w_H, e_L, 0) - u^A(w_L, e_L, 0)],$

(ii) $u^A(w_H, e_H, a) - u^A(w_H, e_L, a) > (e_H - e_L)[u^A(w_L, e_L, a) - u^A(w_H, e_H, a)],$

(iii) $u^P(w_H, \lambda e_H + (1 - \lambda)e_L) + \lambda e_H u^P(w_H, e_H) + (1 - \lambda)e_L u^P(w_H, e_L)$
$$> [2 - \lambda(1 - e_H) - (1 - \lambda)(1 - e_L)] \, u^P(w_L, e_L).$$

We can now state the following result.

> **Proposition 4:** *Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 4, the dynamic game has a high-trust sequential equilibrium.*

Proof: Consider again the reduced game between the principal and agent 1 constructed in the proof of Proposition 3. Also, let the strategies and beliefs in the subgame starting after $w^1 = w_L$ be the same as in the proof of Proposition 3, i.e.,

$$s_1^A(w_L, 0) = s_1^A(w_L, a) = e_L \text{ and } s^P(w_L, 0) = s^P(w_L, 1) = (0, w_L),$$

where $\beta^P(w_L, 0) = \beta^P(w_L, 1) = \lambda$, with a resulting expected payoff for the principal in the root of this subgame of $U_L^P = 2u^P(w_L, e_L)$.

Consider now the subgame starting after $w^1 = w_H$. Let the strategies be given by

$$s_1^A(w_H, 0) = e_L, \ s_1^A(w_H, a) = e_H \text{ and } s^P(w_H, 0) = (1, w_L), \ s^P(w_H, 1) = (1, w_H),$$

i.e., the selfish agent responds with low effort and the trustworthy agent responds with high effort, while the principal always keeps the agent but pays the high wage in the second period only if the good turns out to be valuable. Given these strategies, an application of Bayes' rule yields the following consistent beliefs:

$$\beta^P(w_H, 0) = \frac{\lambda (1 - e_H)}{\lambda (1 - e_H) + (1 - \lambda)(1 - e_L)} < \lambda,$$

$$\beta^P(w_H, 1) = \frac{\lambda e_H}{\lambda e_H + (1 - \lambda)e_L} > \lambda.$$

Assumptions 1 and 2 now immediately imply that the principal's strategy is sequentially rational. As for the agent, consider type $\alpha_1 = 0$ first. The condition for $s_1^A(w_H, 0) = e_L$ to be sequentially rational is

$$u^A(w_H, e_L, 0) + e_L u^A(w_H, e^*(w_H, 0), 0) + (1 - e_L)u^A(w_L, e^*(w_L, 0), 0)$$

$$\geq u^A(w_H, e_H, 0) + e_H u^A(w_H, e^*(w_H, 0), 0) + (1 - e_H)u^A(w_L, e^*(w_L, 0), 0),$$

which is satisfied under Assumptions 1 and 4(i). Now consider type $\alpha_1 = a$. The condition for $s_1^A(w_H, a) = e_H$ to be sequentially rational is

$$u^A(w_H, e_H, a) + e_H u^A(w_H, e^*(w_H, a), a) + (1 - e_H)u^A(w_L, e^*(w_L, a), a)$$

$$\geq u^A(w_H, e_L, a) + e_L u^A(w_H, e^*(w_H, a), a) + (1 - e_L)u^A(w_L, e^*(w_L, a), a),$$

which is satisfied under Assumptions 1 and 4(ii). The resulting expected payoff of the principal in the root of this subgame is

$$\begin{aligned}
U_H^P = {} & \lambda e_H[u^P(w_H, 1) + u^P(w_H, e_H)] \\
& + \lambda(1 - e_H)[u^P(w_H, 0) + u^P(w_L, e_L)] \\
& + (1 - \lambda)e_L[u^P(w_H, 1) + u^P(w_H, e_L)] \\
& + (1 - \lambda)(1 - e_L)[u^P(w_H, 0) + u^P(w_L, e_L)].
\end{aligned}$$

Now consider the principal's choice of the first-period wage. The condition $U_H^P \geq U_L^P$ is satisfied under Assumption 4(iii), which implies that $s^P(\emptyset) = w_H$ is sequentially rational for the principal. ∎

We will show below that Assumptions 1 – 4 can be satisfied simultaneously, so that the low-trust and the high-trust equilibrium coexist. We interpret the historical examples about agent trustworthiness in our experiment as an equilibrium selection device, so that the high-trust equilibrium corresponds to treatment STRONG-HT and the low-trust equilibrium corresponds to treatment STRONG-LT.

Consider the low-trust equilibrium first. The offered wage and the returned effort are always low on the equilibrium path, in both periods. If the principal actually trembled and mistakenly offered the high wage in the first period, both agent types would still respond with low effort. The off-equilibrium behavior thus confirms the pattern shown in the low trustworthiness example.

Now consider the high-trust equilibrium. On the equilibrium path, the first-period wage is always high, w_H, while the average second-period wage (across many independent repetitions of the game) is given by

$$[\lambda e_H + (1 - \lambda)e_L]\,w_H + [\lambda(1 - e_H) + (1 - \lambda)(1 - e_L)]w_L,$$

reflecting that the principal offers the high wage only if the first-period good turns out to be valuable. Hence, we predict some endgame effect in wages. As for effort, the average first-period effort is $\lambda e_H + (1 - \lambda)e_L$ in equilibrium. The average second-period effort is $(\lambda e_H)e_H + (1 - \lambda e_H)e_L$, reflecting that only trustworthy agents who produced a good of high value are induced to provide the high effort again in the second period. Hence, there should also be some endgame effect in effort. Notice that a response of effort to wage can be observed on the equilibrium path in the high-trust equilibrium. The high wage is associated with an average effort of $\lambda e_H + (1 - \lambda)e_L$ in the first period and with an even larger average effort of $\bar{\beta}e_H + (1 - \bar{\beta})e_L$ in the second period, where

$$\bar{\beta} = \lambda\left(\frac{e_H}{\lambda\,e_H + (1 - \lambda)e_L}\right).$$

By contrast, the low wage in the second period is always associated with the low effort. Similarly, if the principal trembled and offered the low wage in the first period, both agent types would respond with low effort. This confirms the responsive pattern where agents choose higher average effort when wages are higher, as shown in the high trustworthiness example.

Contracting Environment TRANSPARENCY

We model contracting environment TRANSPARENCY by assuming that an agent who in the first period receives the high wage but exerts the low effort incurs an additional, exogenous reputation cost of size $\kappa \geq 0$. Formally, the agent's payoff in the first period becomes

$$\tilde{u}^A(w, e, \alpha) = u^A(w, e, \alpha) - \mathbb{1}(w = w_H, e = e_L)\kappa\,.$$

The cost captures in reduced form that shirking is in expectation more costly for the agent in a situation with increased transparency, because there is an increased probability that information about low performance may eventually spread and later hurt the agent in (unmodelled) interactions with other principals.

Under the following assumption, which rules out that the principal can screen the agent's types when paying the low wage, the dynamic game will have a unique pure-strategy sequential equilibrium outcome (in wages and efforts) whenever the reputation cost is large enough.

Assumption 5 (No Cheap Screening)

    (i) $u^A(w_L, e_L, a) - u^A(w_L, e_H, a) > (e_H - e_L)u^A(w_H, e_H, a)$,

    (ii) $u^A(w_L, e_L, 0) - u^A(w_L, e_H, 0) > (e_H - e_L)u^A(w_L, e_L, 0)$.

We can now state the following result.

> **Proposition 5:** *Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 5, the dynamic game has a unique pure-strategy sequential equilibrium outcome* $(w^1, e^1) = (w_H, e_H)$, $(w^2, e^2) = (w_L, e_L)$ *whenever κ is large enough.*

Proof: Observe first that the additional cost κ does not affect behavior in the second stage, and hence the (unique) reduction to a game between the principal and agent 1 remains valid for any value of κ.

Consider then the subgame starting after $w^1 = w_L$. This subgame is also unaffected by the additional reputation cost. In particular, the pure-strategy equilibrium constructed in the proof of Proposition 3, which results in an expected payoff for the principal of size $U_L^P = 2u^P(w_L, e_L)$, exists for any κ.

We first show that, under Assumption 5, there cannot exist any other pure-strategy equilibrium in this subgame which generates a higher payoff for the principal. Obviously, any other equilibrium candidate that also has

$$s_1^A(w_L, 0) = s_1^A(w_L, a) = e_L$$

must yield the same payoff of $2u^P(w_L, e_L)$, as it does not facilitate learning about the agent's type. Consider then any candidate where

$$s_1^A(w_L, 0) = e_L, \; s_1^A(w_L, a) = e_H.$$

Given these strategies, an application of Bayes' rule as before yields the consistent beliefs

$$\beta^P(w_L, 0) = \frac{\lambda(1 - e_H)}{\lambda(1 - e_H) + (1 - \lambda)(1 - e_L)} < \lambda,$$

$$\beta^P(w_L, 1) = \frac{\lambda e_H}{\lambda e_H + (1 - \lambda)e_L} > \lambda.$$

Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the principal's sequentially rational response must thus be

$$s^P(w_L, 0) = (k, w_L), \; s^P(w_L, 1) = (1, w_H),$$

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where only the hiring decision $k \in \{0,1\}$ when the good is of low value is indeterminate. For the agent of type $\alpha_1 = a$, since $u^A(w_L, e_L, a) \geq 0$ the incentive to deviate from high effort is weakest when $k = 0$, in which case the deviation is profitable whenever

$$u^A(w_L, e_L, a) + e_L u^A(w_H, e^*(w_H, a), a) > u^A(w_L, e_H, a) + e_H u^A(w_H, e^*(w_H, a), a),$$

which is true under Assumption 5*(i)*. These strategies therefore cannot be part of an equilibrium.

Consider next any candidate where

$$s_1^A(w_L, 0) = e_H, \ s_1^A(w_L, a) = e_L.$$

It follows from Bayes' rule that $\beta^P(w_L, 0) > \lambda$ and $\beta^P(w_L, 1) < \lambda$. Any sequential equilibrium must then have $s^P(w_L, 1) = (1, w_L)$, where the low wage follows from sequential rationality of the principal under Assumptions 1 and 2, and the decision to keep the agent follows because otherwise the selfish agent would have an immediate incentive to deviate to e_L. Furthermore, any sequential equilibrium must then have $s^P(w_L, 0) = (0, w_L)$, where the decision to fire the agent follows because otherwise the selfish agent would have an immediate incentive to deviate to e_L, and this requires that $\beta^P(w_L, 0)$ is small enough so that the low wage is optimal for the principal. The condition under which the agent of type $\alpha_1 = 0$ now has an incentive to deviate to low effort is

$$u^A(w_L, e_L, 0) + e_L u^A(w_L, e^*(w_L, 0), 0) > u^A(w_L, e_H, 0) + e_H u^A(w_L, e^*(w_L, 0), 0),$$

which is true under Assumption 5*(ii)*. These strategies therefore cannot be part of an equilibrium.

Consider finally any candidate where

$$s_1^A(w_L, 0) = \ s_1^A(w_L, a) = e_H.$$

It follows from Bayes' rule that $\beta^P(w_L, 0) = \beta^P(w_L, 1) = \lambda$. Any sequential equilibrium must then have $s^P(w_L, 0) = (0, w_L)$ and $s^P(w_L, 1) = (1, w_L)$, where the low wage follows from sequential rationality of the principal under Assumption 1 and 2, and the decisions to fire and keep the agent, respectively, follow because otherwise the selfish agent would have an immediate incentive to deviate to e_L. But Assumption 5*(ii)* again implies that the selfish agent has an incentive to deviate even in that case, which shows that these strategies cannot be part of an equilibrium either. The best possible payoff that the principal can achieve in any pure-strategy equilibrium in the subgame after $w^1 = w_L$ is thus $U_L^P = 2u^P(w_L, e_L)$.

Now consider the subgame starting after $w^1 = w_H$. An agent of type α_1 who plays $s_1^A(w_H, \alpha_1) = e_L$ achieves a subgame payoff

$$U_H^A(e_L, \alpha_1) \leq u^A(w_H, e_L, \alpha_1) - \kappa + \bar{\delta},$$

where $\bar{\delta} > 0$ is any finite number that is larger than all payoffs that any type of the agent can possibly achieve in the second period (which are independent of κ). An agent of type α_1 who plays $s_1^A(w_H, \alpha_1) = e_H$ achieves a subgame payoff

$$U_H^A(e_H, \alpha_1) \geq u^A(w_H, e_H, \alpha_1),$$

because second-period payoffs are non-negative for both types (and again independent of κ). It follows that $s_1^A(w_H, \alpha_1) = e_H$ is the unique sequentially rational behavior for both $\alpha_1 \in \{0, a\}$ whenever

$$\kappa > \bar{\kappa} := \max_{\alpha_1 \in \{0, a\}} \left[u^A(w_H, e_L, \alpha_1) - u^A(w_H, e_H, \alpha_1) + \bar{\delta} \right].$$

It then follows from Bayes' rule that $\beta^P(w_H, 0) = \beta^P(w_H, 1) = \lambda$ and from sequential rationality under Assumptions 1 and 2 that $s^P(w_H, 0) = (k_0, w_L)$ and $s^P(w_H, 1) = (k_1, w_L)$, where only the hiring decisions $k_0, k_1 \in \{0, 1\}$ are indeterminate. Whenever $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$, any configuration of hiring decisions is in fact part of an equilibrium, and the principal's payoff in the subgame after $w^1 = w_H$ is therefore $U_H^P = u^P(w_H, e_H) + u^P(w_L, e_L)$ in any pure-strategy sequential equilibrium.

Since $u^P(w_H, e_H) > u^P(w_L, e_L)$ under Assumption 2, it follows that $s^P(\emptyset) = w_H$ is the principal's first-period wage in any pure-strategy sequential equilibrium when $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$. ∎

The unique outcome involves high wages and high efforts in the first period and an endgame effect, in line with what we observe in treatment TRANSPARENCY-LT.

Coexistence

It remains to be shown that Assumptions 1 − 5 can all be satisfied simultaneously. In fact, it can be shown that they are jointly satisfied by a large range of values of the underlying parameters, including values that resemble the payoff structure in the experiment. For instance, let $v = 100$, $c = 15$, $w_L = 20$, $w_H = 40$, $e_L = 1/3$ and $e_H = 2/3$. Also choose $a = 0.4$ and $\lambda = 0.55$. It is easy to show that all assumptions are satisfied by these parameters.

C. Experimental Instructions

In this section, we provide an English translation of the original German instructions for the treatment pairs STRONG-HT and STRONG-LT, as well as MEDIUM-HT and MEDIUM-LT. Comments in square brackets indicate where the instructions differ between treatments. The instructions for the treatment pair WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT are identical to those for MEDIUM-HT and MEDIUM-LT, except that they specify that (i) buyers are not obliged to pay the offered wage and (ii) actual wages and effort levels are chosen simultaneously. The instructions for the treatment STRONG-HT-Long are identical to those for STRONG-HT, except that they specify that the game lasts for 25 periods and include a slightly different exchange rate between points to account for the fact that subjects were paid for 10 additional periods. The instructions for the treatment TRANSPARENCY-LT are identical to those for STRONG-LT, except that they state that principals are informed about the realized values of all agents who have a contract in a given period. The original German instructions for all treatments are included in the replication package.

C.1 Buyer Instructions

Instructions for buyers

You are now participating in an economic study. Please read the following instructions carefully. Here you will learn everything you need to know to participate in the study. Please raise your hand if you do not understand something. We will answer your question at your desk.

You will receive an initial endowment of **20 Swiss francs** at the beginning of the study. You can earn additional income during the study by earning **points**. The number of points you earn during the study depends on your choices and on those of the other participants.

All the points you earn during the course of the study will be converted to Swiss francs at the end of the study. The following conversion rate applies:

10 points = 1 Swiss franc

You will receive the monetary amount you earned during the study plus the 20 Swiss francs initial endowment in cash at the end of the study.

The study is divided into individual periods. You must make decisions each period which you enter into the computer. There are a total of 15 periods.

Please note that communication is strictly forbidden during the study. Furthermore, we inform you that you may only use those functions on the computer that are necessary for completing the study. Communication or playing with the computer lead to exclusion from the study. We remain at your disposal to answer any questions you might have.

The 34 participants were divided into two completely independent groups of 17 participants each before the beginning of the study. **You will only interact within your group of 17 participants during the study.** The participants in each group of 17 are then divided into 10 sellers and 7 buyers each.

You are a buyer during the entire study. *[Treatments STRONG-HT/ STRONG-LT:]* All participants have an identification number that they retain for the entire duration of the study. Your identification number is on the documentation sheet in front of you.
[Treatments MEDIUM-HT/MEDIUM-LT:] All participants have an identification number **that changes randomly in each period**. *[Identical instructions from here onwards.]*

Short summary of the procedure of the study

Each buyer can trade a product with a seller in each period of the study. The seller realizes a profit if he/she obtains a sales wage that exceeds his/her production costs. The production costs depend on the effort of the product. The higher the effort of the product that the seller chooses, the higher are his/her production costs. The buyer realizes a profit if he/she pays less for the product than its value to him/her. The value of a product is either 100 points (the product is exceptionally good) or 10 points (the product just fulfills its objective). The higher the effort that the seller selects, the higher the probability that the value of the product for the buyer is 100 points.

The study lasts a total of 15 periods. The procedure in an individual period is organized as follows:

1. Each period begins with a **negotiation phase** that lasts for three minutes. Buyers can make purchase offers that sellers can accept during this time.

    When making a purchase offer, a buyer must determine **three things**:

    - the wage he/she offers;
    - the effort he/she desires;
    - and finally to which seller he/she is directing the purchase offer. Buyers can make two types of purchase offers: private and public. **Private purchase offers** are **only directed to one seller** and can only be accepted by this seller. **Public purchase offers** are directed to **all sellers** and can thus be accepted by any seller.

    As a buyer, you can make as many purchase offers as you want in each period. An offer which is made can be accepted at any time. **Each seller and each buyer can only conclude a maximum of one trade in each period.** As there are a total of ten sellers and seven buyers, some sellers will not be able to participate in each period.

2. After the negotiation phase, all sellers who have concluded a trade must determine the product effort that they want to deliver to their buyer. **The seller must not respect the buyer's requested effort.** After all of the sellers have selected their product effort, it will be determined whether the value for each buyer is 100 points or 10 points. The higher the seller's selected effort, the higher the probability that the value for the buyer is 100 points. Once these values have been determined, the earnings for this period are settled for this period. Then the next period begins.

The income from all 15 periods will be added together at the end of the study, converted to Swiss francs, and paid out together with the initial endowment in cash.

Detailed procedure of the study

There are 7 buyers and 10 sellers in your group of 17. You are a **buyer** for the entire study. You will enter your decisions on the computer during the study. The information below shows you in detail how you make your decisions in each period.

1. The negotiation phase

Each period of the study begins with a negotiation phase. Each buyer can conclude a trade with one seller in the negotiation phase. **Each buyer can make as many purchase offers as he/she wants to** during this phase. You will see the following decision screen during each negotiation phase:

[Text on screen: Period 1 of 15 / remaining time / public purchase offers buyer wage requested effort / your private offers wage requested effort to seller / your identification number / you make your offers here / public / private / if private, to which seller? / your wage / requested effort / OK / your seller / your wage / your requested effort]

- You see which period you are in at the upper left corner of the screen. The remaining time in this negotiation phase appears at the upper right corner. **The negotiation phase lasts three minutes** (=180 seconds) in each negotiation phase. Once the time has expired, the negotiation phase is over. Further purchase offers may neither be made nor accepted in this period.

[Only treatments MEDIUM-HT/MEDIUM-LT, but not STRONG-HT/STRONG-LT, include the following bullet point:]

- The next item you see is your identification number. **This identification number is randomly redetermined in each period.** This applies to all study participants, i.e. for all sellers and for all buyers.

- As soon as you see the screen above, the negotiation phase is opened. You as a buyer now have the opportunity to make purchase offers to the sellers. To do this you must determine three things on the right side of the screen:

  a) You first must determine if you want to make a public or private purchase offer:

    - **Public purchase offers**
      Public purchase offers are notified to all participants in the market. All sellers see all public purchase offers on their screens. **Each seller** can thus accept a public purchase offer. You as buyer also see all public purchase offers from the other buyers.
      If you want to make a public purchase offer, click on the field "public" with your mouse.

    - **Private purchase offers**
      Private purchase offers are only directed towards **one seller**. Only this seller learns of the offer, and only this seller may accept the purchase offer. No other sellers and buyers in the market will learn about this offer.
      If you want to make a private purchase offer, click on the field "private" with the mouse. Then indicate in the field below to which seller you direct the purchase offer. All ten sellers have an identification number (seller 1, seller 2, …, seller 10). *[Treatments STRONG-HT/STRONG-LT:]* The sellers retain this number for the duration of the study. *[Treatments HT-R/LT-R:]* **This identification number varies randomly in each period of the study.** *[Identical instructions from here onwards.]* To direct an offer to a specific seller, enter the seller's number (e.g. "4" for seller 4).

  b) After you have determined to whom you want to direct your purchase offer, you must determine your **purchase offer**. Enter this in the field "your wage". The purchase offer may neither be less than 0 nor greater than 100.

$$0 \leq \textbf{purchase offer} \leq 100$$

  c) Finally, you must then enter the product effort you desire. Enter this in the field "requested effort". The **requested product effort** may neither be less than 1 nor higher than 9:

$$1 \leq \textbf{requested product effort} \leq 9$$

- After you have completely determined your purchase offer, you must click on the "OK" button to publicize the offer. You may revise your offer until you click the "OK" button. After you click on the "OK" button, your purchase offer will appear to all sellers to whom it was directed.

- You see the heading "public offers" on the left side of your screen. All public offers in the current negotiation phase appear here. Both your own offers as well as the public offers from the other buyers appear here. You can see which buyer made the offer, the wage he/she offers, and the effort he/she desires. *[Treatments STRONG-HT/STRONG-LT:]* All buyers also have an identification number in the study that applies for the entire duration of the study (buyer 1, buyer 2, … buyer 7). *[Treatments MEDIUM-HT/MEDIUM-LT:]* All buyers in the study also have an identification number between one and seven in each period of the study (buyer 1, buyer 2, … buyer 7). **The buyers' identification number is also randomly redetermined in every period of the study.** *[Identical instructions from here onwards.]*

- The private offers you made in the current negotiation phase are listed under the heading "your private offers" in the middle of the screen. Here you see to which sellers you made offers, which wages you offered in each case, and which effort you requested.

- **Each buyer can make as many private and public offers as he/she wants in each period.** Every purchase offer you make can be accepted at any time during the negotiation phase.

- **Each buyer can only conclude one trade in each period.** As soon as one of your purchase offers is accepted, you will be informed which seller accepted your offer. The number of the seller who accepted the offer, your wage offer and your requested effort appear in the lower right corner of your screen. As you can only conclude one trade per period, your other purchase offers will be automatically deleted at this time. Furthermore, you cannot make any other purchase offers in this period.

- **Each seller can only conclude one trade at most in each period.** You will be continuously informed about which sellers have not yet concluded a trade. You see ten fields at the lower corner of your screen. Once a seller has accepted a purchase agreement, an "X" appears in the box before his/her identification number. You can no longer make a private offer to those sellers who have already accepted an offer.

- The negotiation period is over as soon as all seven buyers have concluded a trade or the three minutes are up.

- No buyer is forced to make a purchase offer, and no seller is forced to accept an offer.

2. Determination of the actual product effort

Once the negotiation phase is over, all sellers who have concluded a trade must decide which product effort they want to deliver to their buyer. **The product effort that you requested in your offer is not binding for your seller.** Your seller can select exactly the product effort you requested, but can also choose a higher or lower product effort. The effort your seller selects must be an integer between 1 and 9.

$$1 \leq \text{actual product effort} \leq 9$$

While your seller selects the actual product effort, we ask that you indicate on a separate screen the actual product effort that you expect. We also ask you to state how confident you are about your estimate.

How are the incomes calculated?

Your income:

- If you do not conclude a trade during the period in question, you will earn an income of 0 points in the period.

- If one of your offers was accepted, your income depends on the wage you offer and whether a product value of 10 or 100 points is determined. **The higher the effort the seller selects, the higher is the probability that the value of your product will be 100.** Your income is calculated as follows:

Your income = 100 – wage, if the high product value is determined
Your income = 10 – wage if the low product value is determined

---

Your expected income is thus higher, if the product effort your seller delivers is high. At the same time, your income is higher, if the wage that you must pay for the product is lower.

The probability for a value of 100 points depends on the selected effort as follows:

Effort	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Probability of a value of 100	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%

If the seller selects a effort of 1, the probability that the product will have a value of 100 for the buyer is 10%. The probability is 20% for a effort of 2, and so on. The probability is 90% for the maximum effort of 9.

Your seller's income:

- If a seller does not conclude a trade in the negotiation phase, he/she earns the income of 5 points in the corresponding period.

- If a seller accepts a purchase offer, his/her income equals his/her earned wage less the production costs he/she incurs. Your seller's income is calculated as follows:

Your seller's income = wage less production costs

The higher the seller's selected effort, the higher are his/her production costs. The production costs for each product effort are listed in the following table:

Effort	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Production costs	0	1	2	4	6	8	10	12	15

The higher the wage, the higher is your seller's income. Furthermore, the lower the product effort he delivers, the higher his/her income.

The sellers' and buyers' incomes are all calculated in the same manner. **Each seller learns whether the realized value of a product is 10 or 100 points, and can thus calculate his/her seller's income. However, a buyer can only guess his seller's income, since he/she <u>cannot</u> observer the selected effort. A buyer can only see which product value is realized.** *[The following sentence is included in treatments STRONG-HT/STRONG-LT only.]* In each period, both buyers and sellers will learn of their trade partner's identification number (ID).

Please note that buyers and sellers can also incur a loss in any period. This must be paid from your initial endowment or from income earned in other periods.

You will learn of your income in a **profit screen** (see next page). The following information will be notified to you there:
  - The seller with whom you concluded a trade.
  - The wage you offered.
  - The effort you requested.
  - Whether a product value of 10 or 100 was determined.
  - The income you earned in this period.
  - You only know that your seller's income results from the wage less production costs. Since you cannot see which effort was actually chosen, you do not know your seller's production costs.

Ihre Identifikationsnummer

Sie haben folgenden Handel abgeschlossen

ID Ihres Verkäufers

Preis

gewünschte Qualität

realisierter Wert des Produkts

Ihr Einkommen =

weiter

[Text on screen: Period 1 of 15 / Remaining time [sec] / Your identification number / You concluded the following trade / Your seller's ID / Wage / Requested effort / Realized value of the product / Your income = / Continue]

Please enter all the information in the enclosed documentation sheet. Once the profit screen disappears, the period is over. The negotiation phase of the next period then begins. *[The following sentence is included in treatments MEDIUM-HT/MEDIUM-LT only.]* You will receive a new, randomly determined identification number for the next period, as will all other participants in the study. Once you have finished looking at the profit screen, please press the "continue" button.

The sellers also have a profit screen where they are also informed about the information above. The sellers see their buyers' ID, the wage, the requested and actual product effort, whether the realized product value is 10 or 100 points, and the income for the seller and buyer that results.

The study does not begin until all participants are completely informed about the study procedure. In order to confirm this, we ask that you solve a few practice questions.

Furthermore, we will conduct two **test periods of the negotiation phase** so that you can become more familiar with the computer. These test periods will not be included in the final result and will not be paid out. After the test periods, the study will begin, lasting for a total of 15 periods.

Example

Before the present study begins, we would like to inform you of the study results that we observed in a past session. You can use this information when you make your decisions today.

The **bars** in the left chart show the average **effort** that the sellers chose for the various wages.

The left diagram shows that a seller on average selected an actual effort of 1.1 for a wage offer up to 9. By offers from 10 up to and including 19, effort of 2.6 was selected, for the range from 20 to 29 a effort of 3.6, and for wages from 30 to 39 a effort of 5.3. An average effort of 8.2 was selected for wages of 40 or higher. You can clearly see that the selected effort increases on average if the wage increases.

Sellers' effort selection	Buyers' income

Sellers' effort selection   **Buyers' income**

The **line** in the graph on the right emphasizes the correlation between wage and **income** that is realized with these effort values.

For wages up to 9, the effort is only 1.1, but a lower wage is also paid. On average, a buyer's income is approximately 13 points. If wages from 20 to 29 are paid and the average effort is 3.6, an income of 19 results. Although the wage paid is considerably higher, a total higher income results since the average effort is also considerably higher. For wages of 40 or more, a buyer realizes an average income of 34 points.

Example

Before the present study begins, we would like to inform you of the study results that we observed in a past session. You can use this information when you make your decisions today.

The **bars** in the left chart show the average **effort** that the sellers chose for the various wages.

The left diagram shows that a seller on average selected an actual effort of 1.4 for a wage offer up to 9. By offers from 10 up to and including 19, effort of 1.6 was selected, for the range from 20 to 29 a effort of 2.8, and for wages from 30 to 39 a effort of 3.1. An average effort of 1 was selected for wages of 40 or higher. You can see that the selected effort barely increases on average if the wage increases.

Sellers' effort selection   **Buyers' income**

The **line** in the graph on the right emphasizes the correlation between wage and **income** that is realized with these effort values.

For wages up to 9, the effort is only 1.4, but a lower wage is also paid. On average, a buyer's income is approximately 14 points. If, for example, wages from 20 to 29 are paid and the average effort is 2.8, an income of 12 results. Although the wage paid is somewhat higher, a total lower income results since the wage paid is considerably higher. For wages of 40 or more, a buyer incurs a loss in excess of 20 points.

Practice questions

Please solve these questions completely and **show how you reached your answer**. If you have questions, please raise your hand. False answers have no consequence for your payment at the end of the study.

Question 1

You did not make a purchase offer in a period. How high is your income in the period?

    Your income =

Question 2:

Your purchase offer with a wage of 30 and a requested effort of 9 is accepted.

    Your income when the value of the product is 100 equals =

    Your income when the value of the product is 10 equals =

    Your seller's income =

    How great is the probability that the value of the product for you is 100 points if the seller selects an actual effort of 8?

    How high is your seller's income in this case?

Question 3:

Your purchase offer with a wage of 60 and a requested effort of 9 is accepted.

    Your income when the value of the product is 100 equals =

    Your income when the value of the product is 10 equals =

    How great is the probability that the value of the product for you is 100 points if the seller selects an actual effort of 6?

    How high is your seller's income in this case?

Question 4:
Your purchase offer with a wage of 10 and a requested effort of 2 is accepted.

Your income when the value of the product is 100 equals =

Your income when the value of the product is 10 equals =

How great is the probability that the value of the product for you is 100 points if the seller selects an actual effort of 5?

How high is your seller's income in this case?

Question 5:
Your purchase offer with a wage of 10 and a requested effort of 6 is accepted.

Your income when the value of the product is 100 equals =

Your income when the value of the product is 10 equals =

How great is the probability that the value of the product for you is 100 points if the seller selects an actual effort of 2?

How high is your seller's income in this case?

Question 6
A seller did not accept a purchase offer in a negotiation phase. How high is this seller's income in this period?

Seller's income =

Question 7
You made several purchase offers in a negotiation phase. None of these offers were accepted by a seller. How high is your income in this period?

Your income =

Question 8:
Look at the example on page 9 of these instructions that provides information about a past session of this study.

How did the seller's income change when the offered wage increased?

☐ The income increased.

☐ The income decreased

Explain briefly the reason for this correlation between a buyer's income and the wage offered.

Please raise your hand when you have solved these practice questions. We will then come to your seat and check your answers.

C.2 Seller Instructions

<div style="border:1px solid black">

Instructions for sellers

</div>

You are now participating in an economic study. Please read the following instructions carefully. Here you will learn everything you need to know to participate in the study. Please raise your hand if you do not understand something. We will answer your question at your desk.

You will receive an initial endowment of **20 Swiss francs** at the beginning of the study. You can earn additional income during the study by earning **points**. The number of points you earn during the study depends on your choices and on those of the other participants.

All the points you earn during the course of the study will be converted to Swiss francs at the end of the study. The following conversion rate applies:

10 points = 1 Swiss franc

You will receive the monetary amount you earned during the study plus the 20 Swiss francs initial endowment in cash at the end of the study.

The study is divided into individual periods. You must make decisions each period which you enter into the computer. There are a total of 15 periods.

Please note that communication is strictly forbidden during the study. Furthermore, we inform you that you may only use those functions on the computer that are necessary for completing the study. Communication or playing with the computer lead to exclusion from the study. We remain at your disposal to answer any questions you might have.

The 34 participants were divided into two completely independent groups of 17 participants each before the beginning of the study. **You will only interact within your group of 17 participants during the study.** The participants in each group of 17 are then divided into 10 sellers and 7 buyers each.

You are a seller during the entire study. *[Treatments STRONG-HT/STRONG-LT:]* All participants have an identification number that they retain for the entire duration of the study. Your identification number is on the documentation sheet in front of you.
[Treatments MEDIUM-HT/MEDIUM-LT:] All participants have an identification number **that changes randomly in each period**. *[Identical instructions from here onwards.]*

Short summary of the procedure of the study

Each buyer can trade a product with a seller in each period of the study. The seller realizes a profit if he/she obtains a sales wage that exceeds his/her production costs. The production costs depend on the effort of the product. The higher the effort of the product that the seller chooses, the higher are his/her production costs. The buyer realizes a profit if he/she pays less for the product than its value to him/her. The value of a product is either 100 points (the product is exceptionally good) or 10 points (the product just fulfills its objective). The higher the effort that the seller selects, the higher the probability that the value of the product for the buyer is 100 points.

The study lasts a total of 15 periods. The procedure in an individual period is organized as follows:

1. Each period begins with a **negotiation phase** that lasts for three minutes. Buyers can make purchase offers that sellers can accept during this time.

   When making a purchase offer, a buyer must determine **three things**:

   - the wage he/she offers;
   - the effort he/she desires;
   - and finally to which seller he/she is directing the purchase offer. Buyers can make two types of purchase offers: private and public. **Private purchase offers** are **only directed to one seller** and can only be accepted by this seller. **Public purchase offers** are directed to **all sellers** and can thus be accepted by any seller.

   A buyer can make as many purchase offers as he/she wants in each period. **You as a seller can only accept one purchase offer at most per period.** If you accept a seller's offer, you conclude a trade with this seller for this period. **Buyers, too, can only conclude one trade at most in a period.** As there are a total of ten sellers and seven buyers, some sellers will not be able to participate in each period.

2. After the negotiation phase, all sellers who have concluded a trade must determine the product effort that they want to deliver to their buyer. **As a seller, you must not respect the buyer's requested effort.** After all of the sellers have selected their product effort, it will be determined whether the value for each buyer is 100 points or 10 points. The higher the seller's selected effort, the higher the probability that the value for the buyer is 100 points. Once these values have been determined, the earnings for this period are settled for this period. Then the next period begins.

The income from all 15 periods will be added together at the end of the study, converted to Swiss francs, and paid out together with the initial endowment in cash.

Detailed procedure of the study

There are 7 buyers and 10 sellers in your group of 17. You are a **seller** for the entire study. You will enter your decisions on the computer during the study. The information below shows you in detail how you make your decisions in each period.

1. The negotiation phase

Each period of the study begins with a negotiation phase. Each buyer can conclude a trade with one seller in the negotiation phase. To do this, buyers can make purchase offers to sellers. As a seller, you can accept one of the offers made to you in each period. You will see the following decision screen during each negotiation phase:

[Text on screen: Period 1 of 15 / remaining time / your identification number / private offers to you / from seller / wage / requested effort / public offers / from seller / wage / requested effort / accept / your seller / your wage / requested effort]

- You see which period you are in at the upper left corner of the screen. The remaining time in this negotiation phase appears in seconds at the upper right corner. **The negotiation phase lasts three minutes** (=180 seconds) in each negotiation phase. Once the time has expired, the negotiation phase is over. Further purchase offers may neither be made nor accepted in this period.

[Only treatments MEDIUM-HT/MEDIUM-LT, but not STRONG-HT/STRONG-LT, include the following bullet point:]

- The next item you see is your identification number. **This identification number is randomly redetermined in each period.** This applies to all study participants, i.e. for all sellers and for all buyers.

- As soon as you see the screen above, the negotiation phase is opened. You as a seller now have the opportunity to accept purchase offers the sellers make to you. There are two types of purchase offers that you can accept:

  - **Private purchase offers to you**

    Each buyer may offer you private purchase offers. These offers **are only made to you**, and **only you can accept them**. No other sellers or buyers will learn about this offer. If you receive private offers, they appear on the left side of your screen under the title "private offers to you". The buyer's offer contains the following information: the identification number of the buyer who is making the offer, the wage he/she offers for the product, and the effort he/she desires. If you want to accept a private offer, first click on the line where the private offer is entered with the mouse. The corresponding offer will then be marked. If you want to definitely accept the offer, click on the "accept" button at the lower right corner. You can change your selection up until you click on the "accept" button.

  - **Public purchase offers**

    Each buyer can make public purchase offers. Public purchase offers are notified to all sellers. All sellers see all public purchase offers on their screens. **Each seller can thus accept a public purchase offer.** If a seller makes a public offer, it appears on the right side of your screen under the title "public offers". The offer again consists of the identification number of the buyer who is making the offer, the wage he/she offers for the product, and the effort he/she desires. All other sellers and buyers receive this information. If you want to accept a public offer, the same procedure as for the private offers applies. First click on the line where the offer is entered. If you want to accept the offer definitely, click on the "accept" button on the lower right side. You can change your selection up until you click on the "accept" button.

- As soon as you click on the "accept" button, you will see which offer you accepted on the bottom line of your screen.

- **Each seller can only conclude one trade in a period.** Once you have accepted a purchase offer, you cannot accept any more offers.

All buyers must accept the following rules for their purchase offers:

- The buyer's offer may not be less than 0 and may not be greater than 100:

0 ≤ purchase offer ≤ 100

- A buyer's **requested product effort** cannot be less than 1 and cannot be greater than 9.

1 ≤ requested product effort ≤ 9

- **Each buyer can make as many private and public purchase offers in each period as he/she wants to.** Each purchase offer a buyer makes in a period can be accepted during the negotiation phase.

- **Each buyer can only conclude one trade in each period.** As soon as a buyer's purchase order is accepted, he/she will learn which seller accepted this offer. Since each buyer can only conclude one trade in each period, his/her remaining purchase offers are automatically deleted. He/She also cannot make any other purchase offers.

- The negotiation period is over as soon as all seven buyers have concluded a trade or the three minutes are up.

- No buyer is forced to make a purchase offer, and no seller is forced to accept an offer.

2. Determination of the actual product effort

Once the negotiation phase is over, all sellers who have concluded a trade must decide which product effort they want to deliver to their buyers. **The product effort that your buyer requested in your offer is not binding for you as seller.** You can select exactly the product effort your buyer requested, but you can also choose a higher or lower product effort. If you concluded a trade in a negotiation phase, the entry of the product effort appears on the following screen:

Sie haben folgendes Angebot akzeptiert

von Käufer

Preis

gewünschte Qualität

Bestimmen Sie die tatsächliche Qualität

OK

[Text on screen: Period 1 of 15 / remaining time [sec] / You accepted the following offer / from buyer / wage / requested effort / determine the actual effort / OK]

- In order to select your actual product effort, enter the value for the effort in the field "determine the actual effort" and click on the "OK" button. You can change your selection until you click on the "OK" button.

    The effort you select must be an integer between one and nine.

1 ≤ actual product effort ≤ 9

How are the incomes calculated?

Your income:

- If you **do not conclude a trade** in the negotiation phase, you will earn an income of **5 points** in the corresponding period.

- If you accept a purchase offer, your income depends on the accepted purchase and the product effort you select. Your income is calculated as follows:

> *Your income = wage less production costs*

- The higher your effort, the higher are your production costs. The production costs for each product effort are listed in the following table:

Effort	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Production costs	0	1	2	4	6	8	10	12	15

- The lower your selected effort, the higher is your income. Furthermore, the higher your buyer's offered wage, the higher is your income.

Your buyer's income:

- If a buyer does not conclude a trade during the period in question, he/she will earn an income of 0 points in the period.

- If one of his/her offers was accepted, his/her income depends on the wage he/she offers and whether a product value of 10 or 100 points is determined. **The higher the effort the seller selects, the higher is the probability that the value of the product will be 100.** Your buyer's income is calculated as follows:

> *Your income = 100 – wage, if the high product value is determined*
> *Your income = 10 – wage if the low product value is determined*

Your buyer's expected income is thus higher, if the product effort you deliver is high, as a higher effort increases the probability that the product value will be 100. At the same time, his/her income is higher, if the wage that he/she must pay for the product is lower.

The probability for a value of 100 points depends on the selected effort as follows:

Effort	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Probability of a value of 100	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%

If a effort of 1 is selected, the probability that the product will have a value of 100 for the buyer is 10%. The probability is 20% for a effort of 2, and so on. The probability is 90% for the maximum effort of 9.

The sellers' and buyers' incomes are all calculated in the same manner. **Each seller learns whether the realized value of a product is 10 or 100 points, and can thus calculate his/her realized income. However, a buyer can only guess his seller's income, since he/she <u>cannot</u> observer the selected effort. A buyer can only see which product value is realized.** *[The following sentence is included in treatments STRONG-HT/STRONG-LT only.]* In each period, both buyers and sellers will learn of their trade partner's identification number (ID).

Please note that buyers and sellers can also incur a loss in any period. This must be paid from your initial endowment or from income earned in other periods.

You will learn of your income in a **profit screen** (see next page). The following information will be notified to you there:

- The buyer with whom you concluded a trade.
- The wage the buyer offered.
- The effort the buyer requested.
- The actual effort that you selected.
- Whether a product value of 10 or 100 was determined.
- The income your buyer earned in this period.
- The income you earned in this period.

Ihre Identifikationsnummer

Sie haben folgenden Handel abgeschlossen
ID Ihres Käufers
Preis
gewünschte Qualität
tatsächlich gewählte Qualität

realisierter Wert des Produkts

Einkommen Ihres Käufers =
Ihr Einkommen =

weiter

[Text on screen: Period 1 of 15 / remaining time / your identification number / You concluded the following trade / your buyer's ID / wage/ requested effort / actually selected effort / realized value of the product / your buyer's income / your income / continue]

Please enter all the information in the enclosed documentation sheet. Once the profit screen disappears, the period is over. The negotiation phase of the next period then begins. *[The following sentence is included in treatments MEDIUM-HT/MEDIUM-LT only.]* You will receive a new, randomly determined identification number for the next period, as will all other participants in the study. Once you have finished looking at the profit screen, please press the "continue" button.

The buyers also have a profit screen where they are also informed about the information past period. The buyers see their seller's ID, the wage, and the requested product effort. However, the buyers cannot observe the product effort that was actually chosen. The buyers only see if a product value of 10 or 100 was realized.

The study will not begin until all participants are completely informed about the study procedure. In order to confirm this, we ask that you solve a few practice questions.

Furthermore, we will conduct two **test periods of the negotiation phase** so that you can become more familiar with the computer. These test periods will not be included in the final result and will not be paid out. After the test periods, the study will begin, lasting for a total of 15 periods.

Practice questions

Please solve these questions completely and **show how you reached your answer**. If you have questions, please raise your hand. False answers have no consequence for your payment at the end of the study.

Question 1

You did not accept a purchase offer in a period. How high is your income in the period?

      Your income =

Question 2:

You accepted a purchase offer with a wage of 60 and a requested effort of 9. You select the actual effort of 9.

      Your income =

      Your buyer's income when the value of the product is 100 equals =

      Your buyer's income when the value of the product is 10 equals =

      How great is the probability that the value of the product for you is 100 points if the seller selects an actual effort of 9?

Question 3:

You have accepted purchase offer with a wage of 60 and a requested effort of 9. You choose an actual effort of 4.

      Your income =

      Your buyer's income when the value of the product is 100 equals =

      Your buyer's income when the value of the product is 10 equals =

      How great is the probability that the value of the product for you is 100 points if the seller selects an actual effort of 4?

Question 4:
You have accepted purchase offer with a wage of 40 and a requested effort of 2. You choose an actual effort of 5.

Your income =

Your buyer's income when the value of the product is 100 equals =

Your buyer's income when the value of the product is 10 equals =

How great is the probability that the value of the product for you is 100 points if the seller selects an actual effort of 5?

Question 5:
You have accepted purchase offer with a wage of 30 and a requested effort of 6. You choose an actual effort of 6.

Your income =

Your buyer's income when the value of the product is 100 equals =

Your buyer's income when the value of the product is 10 equals =

How great is the probability that the value of the product for you is 100 points if the seller selects an actual effort of 6?

Question 6
A buyer made several purchase offers in a negotiation phase. None of these offers were accepted by a seller. How high is the buyer's income in the period in question?

Buyer's income =

Please raise your hand when you have solved these practice questions. We will then come to your seat and check your answers.