

DAVID ALEXANDER HUNTER

Department of Philosophy
Ryerson University
Jorgensen Hall
350 Victoria Street
Toronto, Ontario
CANADA M5B 2K3

Phone: 416.979.5000 x 1-2697
Fax: 416.979.5272
Email: david.hunter@ryerson.ca
Web: <http://www.davidalexanderhunter.ca/>

EMPLOYMENT

2016-present. Professor, Department of Philosophy, Ryerson University
2010-2014. Graduate Program Director, Philosophy MA, Ryerson University
2006-2016. Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Ryerson University
Summer 2005. Adjunct Instructor, University at Buffalo School of Management
2005-2006. Chair, Department of Philosophy and Humanities, Buffalo State College, SUNY, Buffalo, NY
2004 – 2006. Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Humanities, Buffalo State College, SUNY, Buffalo, NY
1997 – 2003. Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Buffalo State College, SUNY, Buffalo, NY
1996 – 1997. Limited Term Faculty Member, Concordia University, Montreal
1994 – 1996. Post-Doctoral Fellow, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 1994
B.A. Honours, Philosophy (University Scholar), McGill University, Montreal, 1988

RESEARCH

PUBLICATIONS

Textbook

2014. *A Practical Guide to Critical Thinking: Deciding What to Do and Believe*, Second Edition. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons. (First Edition: 2009)
Chinese translation, January 2018.

Journal Articles

Forthcoming. Lacking, Needing, and Wanting. *Analytic Philosophy*.
2018. The Metaphysics of Responsible Believing. *Manuscripta*. 41(4), 255-285.

2018. Manifesting Emotion. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 47(2), 507-511.
2017. Practical Reasoning and the First Person. *Philosophia*. 45(2), June 2017, 677-700
2015. Davidson on Practical Knowledge. *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*. 3(9), 1-19
2011. Alienated Belief. *dialectica*. 65, 221-240
2009. Demonstrative Belief and Dispositions. *Journal of Philosophical Research*, 34, 243-262
2008. Belief and Self-Consciousness. *International Journal for Philosophical Studies*, 16(5), 673-693
2007. Common Ground and Modal Disagreement. In H.V. Hansen et. al. (eds.) *Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground*, CD-ROM (pp. 1-7). Windsor, ON: OSSA
Reprinted: 2010. *Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*, 9, 134-144
2005. Soames and Widescopism. *Philosophical Studies*, 123, 231-241
2003. Is Thinking an Action? *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 2(2), 133-148
2002. On Representing Content. *Protosociology*, 17, 101-118
2001. Knowledge and Understanding. *Mind and Language*, 16(5), 542-546
2001. Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 79(3), 366-376
1998. Understanding and Belief. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63(3), 559-579
1997. Understanding, Justification and the A Priori. *Philosophical Studies*, 87(2), 119-141
1996. Definition in Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic*. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 77(2), 88-107

Book Chapters

- Forthcoming. Inference as a mental act. In M. Brent (ed.) *Mental Action*, Routledge.
2018. Directives for Knowledge and Belief. *Normativity: Epistemic and Practical*, D. Whiting, et. al. (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press
2009. Guidance and Belief. In (ed.) D. Hunter, *Belief and Agency*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 35, 63-90
2009. Contextualism, Skepticism and Objectivity. In R. Stainton and C. Viger (Eds.) *Compositionality, Context and Semantic Values*, New York: Springer, 105-128

Critical Notices

2003. Critical Notice of Gabriel Segal's *A Slim Book about Narrow Content*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), *Noûs*, 37(4), 724-745
2003. Consciousness and Conceivability: a Critical Notice of John Perry's *Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness* (MIT Press 2001), *The Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 33(2), 285-304

Book Reviews

2016. *Context*, by Robert Stalnaker, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). *Dialogue*, June 2016, 386-88
2008. *Self-Consciousness*, by Sebastian Rödl, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). *Philosophical Books*, 49(3), 272-274
1999. *Rule-Following and Realism*, by Gary Ebbs, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). *The Philosophical Review*, 108 (3), 425-427

Encyclopedia and Dictionary Entries

- Forthcoming. Epistemic Agency. In L. Ferraro (ed.), *Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Agency*.
2013. Practical Knowledge. *Oxford Bibliographies Online*
2011. Belief Ascription and Context Dependence. *Philosophy Compass*. 6(12), 902-911
2006. Communication, understanding, and interpretation: philosophical aspects, *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, 2nd. Ed., Elsevier, 654-658
2006. Biographical entries on Robert Stalnaker and George Boolos, *The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*, Ernie Lepore (ed.), Thoemmes Press

Edited Special Issues of Journal

2019. *Transparency and Apperception*. Co-edited with Thomas Land and Boris Hennig. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 7-8.
2013. *Propositions: their nature and grasp or understanding*. Co-edited with Gurpreet Rattan., *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 5-6.
2009. *Belief and Agency*. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, University of Calgary Press.

Work in Progress

- On Believing: Ontology, Limit, and Norm*. Monograph, currently approximately 100,000 words.

PRESENTATIONS

Peer-Reviewed Conference Presentations

2018. Are Beliefs True? *Canadian Philosophical Association*. Montreal, June. (Full-paper review.)
2017. Ryle on Inference. *Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy*, Calgary, May. (Abstract blind reviewed.)

2015. Practical Reasoning and the First Person. *The First Person Perspective*, University of Dublin, Ireland, October. (Abstract blind reviewed)
2015. Virtuous Inference, Virtuous Thinker. *Normativity: Epistemic and Practical*, University of Southampton, September. (Abstract blind reviewed) (For family reasons I was not able to attend.)
2014. Davidson on Practical Knowledge. Annual meeting of the *Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy*. Montreal, May. (Abstract blind review)
2013. Reasons for Belief and Practical Obligations. *Reasons and Reasoning*, Saarbrücken, October. (Full-paper blind review)
2011. Action and the Norms of Belief. *Canadian Society for Epistemology*. Sherbrooke, Canada, October (Abstract blind review)
2009. Intention and Practical Belief. *First Annual Dutch Conference on Practical Philosophy*. Doorn, The Netherlands, October. (Abstract blind review)
2009. Practical Belief, Action and Self-Location. *First Latin American Analytic Philosophy Conference*. Merida, Mexico, April. (Full-paper blind review)
2008. Intentional Belief. *The Place of Epistemic Agency*. Madrid, July. (Full-paper blind review)
2008. Belief Revision and Self-Consciousness. *Epistemic Agency*. Geneva, April. (Full-paper blind review)
2008. Belief, Intention and Alienation. *American Philosophical Association*, Pacific Division, Pasadena, March. (Full-paper blind review)
2007. Common Ground and Modal Disagreement. *Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation*, Windsor, June. (Full-paper blind review)
2002. Qualia, Multiple Realizability, and the Identity Thesis. *Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness*, Barcelona, Spain, June. (Full-paper blind review)
2002. Soames and Widescopism. *Canadian Philosophical Association*, Toronto, May. (Full-paper blind review)
2002. Soames and Widescopism. *Ontario Philosophical Society*, Toronto, February. (Full-paper blind review)
2001. Descriptive Reference Fixing and Singular Propositions. *Canadian Philosophical Association*, Quebec City, May. (Full-paper blind review)
2001. Descriptive Reference Fixing and De Re Beliefs. *American Philosophical Association*, Pacific Division, San Francisco, March. (Full-paper blind review)
1999. Do Functional States Need Realizers? *Ontario Philosophical Society*, University of Guelph, Ontario, October. (Full-paper blind review)
1999. Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States' Poster presentation, *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Stanford University, June. (Full-paper blind review)
1995. Analyticity and Implication, *Canadian Philosophical Association*, Montreal, June. (Full-paper blind review)

Invited Keynote Addresses

2012. Varieties of Disagreement. *Canadian Society for Epistemology*. Sherbrooke, Quebec. November. (A death in my family prevented me at the last minute from giving this keynote.)

Invited Lectures

2020. On the Ethics of Belief. University of Western Ontario.

2020. On the Ethics of Belief. Queens' University, ON. March.

2019. On the Ethics of Belief. Union College, NY. October.

2018. A Metaphysics for Responsible Believing. *Agency and Rationality*. University of Campinas, Brazil, June 2018.

2017. Davidson on the Logical Connection Argument. Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo, November. (Invited).

2017. Inference as a Mental Act. *Mental Action*, London, November. (Invited)

2017. Understanding Disordered Belief. Department of Philosophy. University of Graz, March

2015. Virtuous Inference, Virtuous Thinker. University of Montreal, November

2015. Practical Reasoning and the First Person. *Interactions Conference*. University of Leipzig, July

2015. Broome on Inference. Department of Philosophy, Erlangen University, Germany, May

2015. Directives for Belief. University of Southampton, January

2011. Belief Revision and the First Person Perspective. *De Se Indexicality and Content*, Institut Jean Nicod/CSMN Paris. March

2006. Belief and Subjectivity. Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, March

2002. What is a Singular Proposition? Philosophy Colloquium, University at Buffalo, February

2001. Possible Worlds and Singular Propositions. Philosophy Colloquium, Queens' University, November

2001. The Stipulation Method and the Contingent A Priori. Philosophy Department Colloquium, University of Rochester, February

1998. States and Identity. Cognitive Science Colloquium, University at Buffalo SUNY, October.

1998. Definition in Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic. Department of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, SUNY, February

1997. Can Ontology be A Priori? McGill University, Montreal, March

1995. Understanding and Necessity. Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, March 1995

Symposium Presentations

2016. Virtuous Inferences, and Virtuous Thinkers. *Israeli Philosophical Association*, Jerusalem, February. A panel discussion with Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto) and David Horst (Jerusalem University).
2011. Wherein is Action Causal? *Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Meeting*, Fredericton, NB. June. Other participants: Matthias Haase (Basel); Fred Schueler (Delaware) Sarah Stroud (McGill.) Organizer: David Hunter
2008. Belief and Intention. *Canadian Philosophical Association*, Annual Meeting, Vancouver, June The other participants were Sergio Tenenbaum (The University of Toronto) and Michael Thompson (University of Pittsburgh). Organizer: David Hunter
2007. First Person Belief and Psychological Explanation. *Canadian Philosophical Association*, Annual Meeting, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, June. The other participants were Gurpreet Rattan (The University of Toronto) and Robin Jeshion (University of California, Riverside). Henry Jackman (York University) chaired. Organizer: David Hunter
2006. Belief and Subjectivity. Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the *American Philosophical Association*, San Francisco, March. The other participants were Ruth Millikan and Jose Bermudez. Robin Jeshion chaired. Organizer: Eric Schwitzgebel
2005. Dispositionalism about Belief and Frege's Problem. *Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Meeting*, London Ontario, May. The other participants were Eric Schwitzgebel and Charles Travis. Organizer: David Hunter
2004. Externalism and Conceivability. *International Society for Value Inquiry*, in conjunction with the American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago, April 2004.

Author-Meets-Critics Session

On my monograph manuscript *On Believing*,

University of Erlangen, July 2019

University of Montreal, November 2019

(University of Warwick, March 2020; canceled because of the pandemic)

Conference Comments

2019. Comments on 'The Myth of a State of Intending: Coordination without Statism', by Devlin Russell. *Anscombe's Legacy*, York University, May.
2019. Comments on 'Practical Reasoning and Davidsonian Judgment-Sensitive Attitudes', by Alexander Feferman, American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, NY, January.

2017. Comments on *Evidence and Agency*, by Berislav Marušić, part of an author-meets-critics panel I organized at the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, Toronto, May
2016. Comments on *Emotions, Values and Agency*, by Christine Tappolet, part of an author-meets-critics panel at the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, Calgary, May
2016. Comments on ‘Differences of taste,’ by Rachel Rudolph, *Les Visages du Désaccord/Faces of Disagreement*, Montreal, May.
2014. Comments on ‘Akratic action under the guise of the good,’ by Eugene Chislenko, Central Meeting of the *American Philosophical Association*, February
2013. Symposium Comments on ‘Iteration and fragmentation,’ by Daniel Greco, Eastern Meeting of the *American Philosophical Association*, December
2011. Comments on Bart Streumer, ‘Belief for no Reason’. *Norms and Belief*, University of Southampton, England, September
2011. Comments on Brad Cokelet, ‘A Responsible Moral Constructivism’, *St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality*, June
2011. Comments on Anton Ford ‘Reasoning as the form of intentional action’. *St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality*, June
2008. Comments on John Brunero “Consistency in Belief and Intention”. *Central Division of American Philosophical Association*. Chicago, February
2004. Comments on Jim Pryor’s paper ‘Acquaintance and *de re* belief’. *De Re Belief*, Queen’s University, Kingston, September
2005. Comments on Alex Barber’s paper ‘What refers? How?’. *Canadian Philosophical Association*, May
2001. Comments on Maite Ezcurdia’s paper ‘Occurrences Revisted’. *Contexts*, Institute for Philosophical Investigation, UNAM, Mexico, October
2001. Comments on Noa Latham’s ‘Can Psychophysical Identity Save Mental Causation?’, *American Philosophical Association*, Central Division, Minneapolis, MN, May
2001. Comments on Anandi Hattiangadi’s ‘Dispositions and Correctness’, *Canadian Philosophical Association*, Quebec City, May
1999. Comments on Michel Desy’s ‘Is Anti-Individualism a Form of Collectivism?’, *Canadian Philosophical Association*, Sherbrooke, June
1999. Comments on Paul Raymond’s ‘Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant?’, *Canadian Philosophical Association*, Sherbrooke, June
1998. Comments on Bernard Linsky’s ‘Placing Intentional Objects in Naturalism’, *Canadian Philosophical Association*, Ottawa, May

Other Conference Participation (selected)

2012. Session Chair, *Norms and Action*, a conference hosted at the University of Southampton, England, January
2010. Session Chair, *Practical Knowledge II*, a conference organized by University of Basel, Basel, July
2009. Session Chair, *The Aim of Belief*, a conference organized by the *Center for the Study of Mind in Nature*, Oslo, June

Pedagogical Presentations

2008. On Critical Thinking Assessment. University of Arkansas, Little Rock. I was invited to give presentations to the members of the department of philosophy and to the college community on the assessment of critical thinking and on the assessment of undergraduate programs. February
2006. Critical Thinking: the power of effective decision making. Annual meeting of the *American Society for Training and Development*, Houston, June
2005. Critical Thinking Rubrics, *Program-Level Assessment*. SUNY Training Center at the University at Buffalo, November
2005. Critical Thinking and Evidence-Based Decision Making. *HealthCare Executives Forum*, Buffalo, September 2005

CONFERENCE AND SYMPOSIUM ORGANIZING

2019. *Reason, Action, and Mind*. Speakers: Maria Alvarez (KCL), Anton Ford (Chicago), Robert Myers (York). Toronto, April.
2018. *Inference and Action*. Co-organized with Sergio Tenenbaum, Monika Betzler, Olav Gjelsvik, and Erasmus Mayr. Speakers: Sergio Tenenbaum (Toronto), Monika Betzler (Munich), Erasmus Mayr (Erlangen), Lillian O'Brien (Cork), Olav Gjelsvik (Oslo), Maria Alvarez (KCL), Ulf Hlobil (Concordia). Munich, October.
2018. *Transparency and Apperception*. Speakers: Alexandra Newton (Illinois); Huston Smit (Arizona), Sarah Paul (Wisconsin), Jonathan Way (Southampton), Eric Marcus (Auburn), Thomas Khuarana (Essex), Yoon Choi (Marquette), Wolfgang Barz (Berlin). Ryerson University, May.
2012. *Anscombe on Practical Knowledge*. Speakers: Matthias Haase (Basel), Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck College, London), Sebastian Rodl (Leipzig). University of London, June. I co-organized this with Adrian Haddock (Stirling).
2011. *Action and Causal Explanation*. Symposium. Canadian Philosophical Association, Annual Meeting, Fredericton, NB. Speakers: Matthias Haase (Basel), David Hunter (Ryerson), Fred Schueler (Delaware) Sarah Stroud (McGill.) Fredericton, NB. June
2010. *Belief and Agency*. Speakers: Matt Boyle (Harvard), David Checkland (Ryerson), Pamela Hieronymi (UCLA), David Hunter (Ryerson), Lucy O'Brien (UCL), Nishi Shah (Amherst), Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside), Robert Stalnaker (MIT), Sergio Tenenbaum (UoT). Ryerson University, October

2008. *Belief and Intention: reflections on Anscombe*. Symposium. Canadian Philosophical Association annual meeting. Speakers: David Hunter, Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto) and Michael Thompson (University of Pittsburgh). Chair: Patricia Marino (University of Waterloo). Vancouver, June
2007. *Ryle at Ryerson: a conference inspired by Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind*. Speakers: Laird Addis (Iowa), Rocky Jacobsen (Laurier), Sonia Sedivy (Toronto), Robert Stalnaker (MIT), Brian Weatherston (Cornell). Ryerson University, October. I co-organized this conference with Andrew Hunter (Ryerson).
2007. *First-Person Belief and Psychological Explanation*. Symposium. Canadian Philosophical Association, Annual Meeting. Speakers: Gurpreet Rattan (The University of Toronto) and Robin Jeshion (University of California, Riverside). Chair: Henry Jackman (York University). Saskatoon, Saskatchewan June 2007.

RESEARCH GROUP MEMBERSHIP

- 2014-present. GRIN (*Inter-University Research Group on Normativity*). This is a research group based in Montreal.
- 2012-present. DFG Netzwerk *Praktisches Denken und Gutes Handeln (Practical Thought and Good Action)*. This is a research group based at the University of Leipzig, Germany. It meets twice a year. Associate Member
- 2001-2005. Rutgers Semantics Workshops, Cognitive Science Centre, Rutgers University.
- 2000-present. *Ontario Area Roundtable in the Philosophy of Language*. (I am a founding member and have attended many of its semi-annual meetings from 2000 to present.)

GRANTS AND LEAVES

Major Research Grants

- 2018-21. *Belief as a Rational Capacity*. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Insight Grant. Principal Investigator. \$33,150
- 2008-2011. *Belief and Intention*. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Standard Research Grant. \$54,200

Major Workshop Grants

2019. *Reasons and Rational Capacities*. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Connections Grant; principal applicant; application currently under review.
2018. *Transparency and Apperception*. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Connections Grant; principal applicant, \$12,375
2011. *Practical Knowledge*. Institute of Philosophy (London) Workshop Grant (co-applicant with Adrian Haddock) £2000

2011. *Practical Knowledge*. Mind Association Minor Workshop Grant (co-applicant with Adrian Haddock) £800

2010. *Belief and Agency*. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Aid to Workshops, principal applicant; \$9450

Leaves and Minor Grants

2019. Sabbatical Leave, winter

2015. Sabbatical Leave, winter

2011. Sabbatical Leave, winter

2008. Ryerson Faculty of Arts SRC Fund Research Grant, *Belief and Intention*, \$5,000

2007. Ryerson Faculty of Arts SRC Fund Research Grant, *Two-Conceptions of Belief*, \$5,000

2007. Ryerson University Faculty of Arts SRC Fund Travel Grant. \$1,000

2007-2008. Ryerson Research Assistant Support Grant. \$2,000

2005. Buffalo State College Travel Grant. \$1,000

2004. Sabbatical Leave, fall

2002. Buffalo State College Travel Grant. \$1,000

2001. Buffalo State College Travel Grant. \$1,000

GRADUATE STUDENT SUPERVISION

Supervisor, MA Major Research Papers

In progress. Joshua Brecka, TBD. Ryerson university

In progress. Natalie Martin, TBD. Ryerson university

In progress. Jessica Sitko, TBD. Ryerson university

2017. Britten, Corey. *Marušić on the Sartrean Response*. Ryerson University

2016. Kim, Jae Hong. *The Nature of Practical Reasoning* (tentative title), Ryerson University

2015. Teeninga, Luke. *The Puzzle of Assertion*. Ryerson University

2014. Brienza, Mike. *Panpsychism and the Subject Combination Problem*. Ryerson University

2014. Roberts, Ebony. *Perspective-Centered Relativism and Faultless Disagreement*. Ryerson University

2013. Wilkinson, Kris. *Two-Way Powers and the Attribution of Agency*. Ryerson University

2013. Dos Santos, Antonio. *Psychopaths and Practical Knowledge*. Ryerson University

2013. Derksen, Elena. *Reasons to Believe*. Ryerson University

2012. Levy, Christopher. *Can we Live with Cohabitation? An Analysis of the Commonsense View of Identity and 'Ordinary Concern'*. Ryerson University

Second Reader, MA Theses

2015. Blackburn, Adam. *Challenging the 'Hidden' Assumption in J.L. Schellenberg's Hiddenness Argument: an exploration into the nature of divine love*. Ryerson University

Second Reader, MA Major Research Papers

2014. Blank, Timothy. *The Open Theistic Multiverse*. Ryerson University

2014. Lougheed, Kirk. *Disagreement and the Rationality of Religious Belief*. Ryerson University

2014. Poettcker, Jason. *Defending the Purpose Theory of Meaning in Life*. Ryerson University

2013. Chantler, Aylish. *Modal Metaphysics and Dogmas of Philosophical Theology: a response to Almeida*. Ryerson University

2013. Nogas, Benjamin. *Enactive Perception*. Ryerson University

2013. Beck, Amber. *Finding Identity Through Trauma*. Ryerson University

2012. Dragos, Chris. *Reconciling Realism and the Strong Programme*. Ryerson University

External Examiner on Ph.D. Theses

2016. Lehan, Vanessa. *Justification for a Probabilistic Account of Conditionals*. Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, Canada.

2016. Allen, Jared. *Bayesian Investigations: Integrating Actuarial and Expert Models*. Department of Psychology, Ryerson University.

2001. Chi, Chienchih. *The Problem of Intentionality*, submitted at the University at Buffalo, spring 2004 Richard Main's *Negative Facts and the Correspondence Theory of Truth*, submitted at the University at Buffalo

2000. Arenas, Jaime Ramos. *A Critical Study of the Language of Thought Hypothesis*, submitted at the University at Buffalo

1999. Vega, Ivonne Victoria Pallares. *On Mathematical Abstraction*, submitted to the University at Buffalo

OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Service

2013-present. Editorial Board Coordinator & President, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*

2007-2013. Editorial Board Member, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*

2005. Chair, SUNY General Education Discipline Panel on Critical Thinking, Buffalo State

2004-2006. Member of Curriculum Committee, *American Philosophical Association*

Referee Work (selected)

Journals: *Mind and Language*, *Erkenntnis*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Dialogue*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*

Conferences: The Canadian Philosophical Association, the Ontario Philosophical Society, Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Presses: McGill-Queen's University Press, Oxford University Press