



**Hermes Institute of  
International Affairs,  
Security & Geoeconomy**

## **OCCASIONAL PAPER 1/2024**

# **The Institutional Reform of the Greek National Intelligence Service (NIS) and its First Historical 2023 Annual Report:**

Threats, Challenges and Future Considerations  
Regarding the National Security of the Hellenic  
Republic

**By**

**Georgios Koukakis**

Research Associate of “HERMES” I.I.A.S.GE

**January 2024**

“HERMES” Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy

[www.hermesresearch.eu](http://www.hermesresearch.eu)

Email: [info@hermesresearch.eu](mailto:info@hermesresearch.eu)

**PROVIDING KNOWLEDGE TO THOSE WHO SHAPE THE FUTURE**

## **“HERMES” I.I.A.S.GE**

“HERMES” Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy (“HERMES” I.I.A.S.GE) is an independent, non – governmental, non – profit organization, consisting of scholars dedicated in the research and analysis of international affairs in regional and global level. The Institute aims at providing objective, scientific, and reliable research analysis through a variety of studies contributing effectively and constructively in the public dialogue and the evolution of scientific knowledge.

Copyright © 2024

“HERMES” Institute for Foreign Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy

All rights reserved

“HERMES” Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy offers a forum for researchers to express their views freely, thoroughly and well-documented. The views expressed in this occasional paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the “HERMES” Institute. Occasional Papers aim to contribute constructively in public debate in a wide range of international politics, defense, security and geoeconomy topics.

**Georgios Koukakis**

Research Associate of “HERMES” I.I.A.S.GE

Georgios has graduated from the Hellenic Military Academy (2002), the Hellenic Army War College (2020) and the Hellenic Supreme Joint War College (2023), and holds a Master of Arts in “Governance, Development and Security in the Mediterranean” from the Department of Mediterranean Studies of the University of the Aegean (Rhodes, Greece). His dissertation focused on the prospects of establishing a National Security Council (NSC) in the Hellenic Republic (Greece).

He is also a Senior Analyst in the Center for International Strategic Analyses (KEDISA), and a member of the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies (HEL.I.S.S.), ALLILONnet the Global Network of Greeks and Friends of Greece for Solidarity in the Professional Field and the Mercury Negotiation Academy (MNA). He has participated as a speaker in several seminars and conferences regarding international relations in the fields of foreign policy, security and defense.

Many of his articles and research papers have been published in the “Global Security and Intelligence Notes” (GSIN) of the Buckingham Centre of Security & Intelligence Studies (BUCSIS), the “HAPSc Policy Briefs” Journal of the Hellenic Association of Political Scientists, the “NRDC-GR Herald” Journal of NRDC-GR, the “Military Review” Journal of the Hellenic Army General Staff (HAGS), the “Cultural Diplomacy Journal” of the Hellenic Institute of Cultural Diplomacy (HICD), a number of websites such as “Foreign Affairs - The Hellenic Edition”, “Policy Journal”, “Geopolitics & Daily News”, “HuffPost Greece” and “Liberal”.

He is the co-author of the book “National Security: Myths and Reality” (In Greek) that was published in April 2023. He speaks English at a professional level.

**Email:** [g\\_k\\_koukakis@yahoo.gr](mailto:g_k_koukakis@yahoo.gr)

**LinkedIn:** Georgios Koukakis

## Abstract

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) of Greece has been recently under the spotlight, due to a spyware and wiretapping scandal known as the Greek “*Watergate*” that broke out in 2022 and resulted in the resignation of its Director and a hearing organized by an EU committee on the use of spyware in Greece. This situation led to a number of major institutional changes as far as its structure, its operational procedures and its legal framework, in order to ensure the proper function of the Service, the protection of human rights of the Greek citizens and the restoration of the public trust in the Service.

One of the main changes that took place in 2023 as far as NIS’s function is concerned, is the issuance of an *Annual Report of Priorities and Fields of Action* concerning the time period from September 2022 to August 2023. The report describes the main threats for the Greek national security and their origin, the relation between (national) security and human rights, the most important reforms that took place, and the actions taken by the Service in order to be able to protect the Greek citizens and national interests from future threats to national security.

The aim of this paper is to present the institutional reforms of NIS, assess the effectiveness of the measures taken, and provide several considerations regarding the national security of the Hellenic Republic. Bibliography is based on books, academic papers, websites, and official documents, and the research method used is the qualitative method. It includes a brief presentation of NIS’s basic information (mission, objectives, historical background and organizational structure), the description of the context of its first 2023 Annual Report, a thorough analysis of the formentioned report, and finally some future considerations as far as the national security of the Hellenic Republic is concerned.

-----  
**Key Words:** Artificial Intelligence, Coercion, Cybersecurity, Espionage, Extremism, NIS, Greece, Human Rights, Intelligence, Migration, National Security, Organized Crime, Reform, Security Environment, Technology, Terrorism, Threats

## Table of Contents

Abstract .....	iii
Table of Abbreviations.....	v
1. Introduction .....	1
2. Emblem, Mission & Objective of NIS .....	1
3. Historical background.....	3
4. The organizational structure of NIS .....	4
5. The context of the first 2023 annual report and the reform of NIS .....	6
5.1 Foreword of the Commander .....	6
5.2 The Main Challenges and Evolutions, and the Basic Fields of Action of the National Intelligence Service during the Past Year .....	7
5.3 Epilogue of the Annual Report .....	11
6. Analysis of the 2023 Annual Report .....	11
7. Future considerations.....	18
8. Concluding Remarks .....	21
Bibliography.....	23
Annexes.....	29
A. Office of the Director of National Intelligence Organizational Chart .....	29
B. The Elements of the US Intelligence Community .....	30
C. The Seals of the Elements of the US Intelligence Community.....	31

## Table of Abbreviations

AI	Artificial Intelligence
ATA	Annual Threat Assessment
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCCM	Committee for the Coordination of Cybersecurity Matters
CIIS	Central Information and Investigation Service
CIS	Central Intelligence Service
CV	Curriculum Vitae
DG	Director General
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
NIS	Hellenic National Intelligence Service
GSS	General Security Service
HNDGS	Hellenic National Defence General Staff
HPSCI	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
IC	Intelligence Community
IRTPA	Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
ISC	Intelligence and Security Committee
KETYAK	Centre for Technological Support, Development and Innovation
KYSEA	Governmental National Security Council
MoDG	Ministry of Digital Governance
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MPS	Military Protection Service

NCSA	National Cyber Security Authority
NCSC	National Cyber Security Centre
NCS	National Cybersecurity Strategy
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NIS	National Intelligence Strategy
NSA	National Security Adviser
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
PASOK-KINAL	PanHellenic Socialist Movement - Movement for Change
PCO	Press and Communication Office
PM	Prime Minister
SG	Secretary General
SSCIAT	Special Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency
UK	United Kingdom
WSSS	War Special Services Section

## 1. Introduction

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) is the intelligence service of Greece, having a history of almost 100 years<sup>1</sup>. Unfortunately, its reputation was severely damaged in 2022 due to a spyware and wiretapping scandal known as the Greek “*Watergate*”<sup>2</sup> leading to the resignation of NIS’s Director and the Secretary General (SG) of the Prime Minister’s (PM) Office<sup>3</sup>, as well as a hearing organized by the PEGA Committee<sup>4</sup> of the European Union (EU) on the use of spyware in Greece<sup>5</sup>.

It must also be stressed that the Greek PM, Kyriakos Mitsotakis admitted that the leader of PASOK-KINAL<sup>6</sup>, Nikos Androulakis had been under surveillance by NIS without his knowledge, despite that one of his first actions after his election in 2019 was to issue the Law 4622<sup>7</sup>, which provided that NIS is placed under the direct control of the Greek PM<sup>8</sup>. The formentioned incidents resulted into the endorsement of several reform measures regarding the structure, competences, operational and legal procedures of the Service, in order to ensure its democratic function and restore the public trust of NIS.

## 2. Emblem, Mission & Objective of NIS

The emblem of NIS consists of a blue shield, in the center of which there is a miniature of the globe and a hand holding a torch, symbolizing the search of truth all over the world. On top of the shield there is a white scroll with the name of the Service (ΕΘΝΙΚΗ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΑ ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΩΝ) in modern Greek, while on the sideways there is another white scroll containing the phrase “ΛΟΓΩΝ ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΩΝ ΕΚΦΟΡΑΝ ΜΗ ΠΟΙΟΥ” (in ancient Greek) of Periander of

<sup>1</sup> Further information is provided in the “Historical background & Organizational structure” part of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> European Parliament News, “Greek spyware and wiretapping scandal: MEPs to debate recent revelations”. [Briefing], 08 September 2022. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/agenda/briefing/2022-09-12/8/greek-spyware-and-wiretapping-scandal-meps-to-debate-recent-revelations> (17/12/2023).

<sup>3</sup> Samaras Georgios, “Greece’s ‘Watergate’ explained: why the European Parliament is investigating over a wiretapping scandal”. *The Conversation*, 08 November 2022. [https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/186983947/Greece\\_s\\_Watergate\\_explained\\_why\\_the\\_European\\_Parliament\\_is\\_investigating\\_over\\_a\\_wiretapping\\_scandal.pdf](https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/186983947/Greece_s_Watergate_explained_why_the_European_Parliament_is_investigating_over_a_wiretapping_scandal.pdf) (17/12/2023).

<sup>4</sup> Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware.

<sup>5</sup> European Parliament Committees, “PEGA: Hearing on ‘Use of spyware in Greece’”. 08 September 2022. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/pega-hearing-on-use-of-spyware-in-greece/product-details/20220912CHE10601> (17/12/2023).

<sup>6</sup> PASOK-KINAL is the Greek socialist (center-left) opposition party.

<sup>7</sup> Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Law 4622 (Paper 133A)” [Official Document (In Greek)]. 07 August 2019. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20190100133](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20190100133) (17/12/2023).

<sup>8</sup> Michalopoulos Sarantis, “Greek PM admits bugging socialist leader’s phone was wrong”. *Euractiv*, 11 May 2023. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/greek-pm-admits-bugging-socialist-leaders-phone-was-wrong/> (17/12/2023).

Corinth<sup>9</sup>, which means “*Do not reveal secrets*”, indicating that most of the activities of NIS (must) remain unknown to the public.



The emblem of the National Intelligence Service of Greece

(Source: [www.nis.gr](http://www.nis.gr))

As far as the role of NIS is concerned – according to NIS’s official website– the mission of the Service is to:

*“[...] collect, analyze and share information with the relevant authorities, with a view to preventing and countering espionage and terrorist threats, ensuring cyber-security, as well as countering activities that may pose threat to the democratic regime, fundamental human rights, our country’s territorial integrity and national security”<sup>10</sup>.*

The competences of NIS include being the INFOSEC<sup>11</sup> National Authority providing – among others – assistance to state’s agencies in matters of information security and communication<sup>12</sup>, the CRYPTO National Authority providing support to the state agencies and the

<sup>9</sup> Periander of Corinth (627 B.C.- 587 B.C.) was the second tyrant of Corinth, a patron of art and literature, and is considered to be one of the seven wise men of ancient Greece. He is known for his firm and effective governance and the development of commerce, leading to Corinth’s prosperity. He also established several colonies, a toll system, and promoted Corinth’s culture. For further information visit: The Editors of Encyclopedia, “Periander”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 12 February 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Periander> (17/12/2023).

<sup>10</sup> National Security Service, “Our Mission and Competences”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/agency/mission-and-responsibilities> (17/12/2023).

<sup>11</sup> Information Security.

<sup>12</sup> For further information visit: National Security Service, “INFOSEC”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/information-security/infosec> (17/12/2023).

Hellenic Armed Forces as far as the crypto security matters are concerned<sup>13</sup>, the TEMPEST<sup>14</sup> National Authority carrying out inspections in critical infrastructures to check the appliance of relevant measures<sup>15</sup>, and the National Authority against Cyber Attacks providing support as far as prevention, early-warning and countering cyber-attacks are concerned, through the National CERT<sup>16</sup>.

Moreover, in 2020 NIS defined cybersecurity as one of its main priorities<sup>17</sup>, and began its direct cooperation with the research community of the *Centre for Technological Support, Development and Innovation* (KETYAK),<sup>18</sup> which was established by the Presidential Decree 96.<sup>19</sup>

Finally, the objective of NIS – acting in a demanding and complex security environment with a plethora of external and internal threats – is to:

*“[...] prevent, avert, deter and neutralize espionage and terrorist threats, with the aim of shielding the country and defending the Greek national interests”.*<sup>20</sup>

### 3. Historical Background

In 1925 Greece founded the General Security Service (GSS) of the State having as a core mission the protection of its national security and in 1936 established the Defense Service of the Greek State. During World War II, the need to provide intelligence for the security of the Hellenic Armed Forces and the Greek Government in addition to the collaboration with allied counterpart Services led to the establishment of the War Special Services Section (WSSS), and in 1946 it was transformed into the Military Protection Service (MPS) under military command.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>13</sup> For further information visit: National Security Service, “CRYPTO”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/information-security/crypto> (17/12/2023).

<sup>14</sup> Telecommunication Electronics Material Protected from Emanating Spurious Transmissions.

<sup>15</sup> For further information visit: National Security Service, “TEMPEST”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/information-security/tempest> (17/12/2023).

<sup>16</sup> Computer Emergency Response Team. For further information visit: National Security Service, “National CERT”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/national-cert/> (17/12/2023).

<sup>17</sup> National Security Service, “Timeline”. Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> For further information regarding KETYAK visit: National Intelligence Service, “KETYAK”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/ketyak/> (16/12/2023).

<sup>19</sup> Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Presidential Decree 96 (Paper 232A)” [Official Document (In Greek)]. 20 November 2020. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20200100232](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20200100232) (17/12/2023).

<sup>20</sup> National Security Service, “Our Objective”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/agency/objective> (17/12/2023).

<sup>21</sup> National Security Service, “Timeline”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/agency/historical-background/timeline> (17/12/2023).

In 1952 the MPS was restructured into the Central Information and Investigation Service (CIIS) – dealing with the internal and external security of the Greek State – and in 1953 the CIIS was renamed into Central Intelligence Service (CIS) having as a mission to provide intelligence for national and public security, and the security of the Armed Forces as well. In 1974 the restoration of Democracy in Greece<sup>22</sup> resulted in the redefinition of the role of CIS, and in 1978 the Service was relocated to its present location.

In 1986 CIS was transformed into a separate civil organization according to international standards, being renamed into the current National Intelligence Service, and in 1999 it began to cooperate with other foreign Intelligence Services in order to address global asymmetric threats. In 2004 NIS contributed to security of the Athens Olympic Games, and in 2008 the Hellenic Government issued Law 3649, institutionalizing the transparency of its activity.<sup>23</sup>

As mentioned in the Introduction, in 2019 NIS was placed under the direct control of the Greek PM as part of the Presidency of the Hellenic Government. It is directed by a Director-General – responsible for the formulation of NIS’s strategic vision and the determination of the way it should be achieved in the light of national priorities<sup>24</sup> assisted by two Deputy Director-Generals; a Deputy Director-General for External Affairs and a Deputy Director-General for Domestic Security.

#### 4. The Organizational Structure of NIS

The initial organizational structure of NIS was established in 1986 by Law 1645, defining the Service comprised of a Central Service that included several Secretariats, Directorates, and independent Offices, as well as Regional Units (without defining the number or competences of any of them). In 2008 an Office of the Legal Adviser of the Legal Council of State and a Historic Archive Service were added to its structure, according to Law 3649/2008.<sup>25</sup>

The organizational structure of NIS was changed in 2017 – according to the Presidential Decree 1/2017<sup>26</sup> - to include Regional Support Units, Electronic Units, Liaison Officers assigned in various locations of Greece and abroad, and the following fourteen Directorates, Sections and Offices.

---

<sup>22</sup> A military dictatorship was imposed in Greece in 1967.

<sup>23</sup> Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Law 3649 (Paper 39A)” [Official Document (In Greek)]. 03 March 2008. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20080100039](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20080100039) (17/12/2023).

<sup>24</sup> National Security Service, “Director-General”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/agency/administration> (18/12/2023).

<sup>25</sup> Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Law 3649 (Paper 39A)” [Official Document (In Greek)]. 03 March 2008. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20080100039](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20080100039) (19/12/2023).

<sup>26</sup> Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Presidential Decree 1 (Paper 2A)” [Official Document (In Greek)]. 17 January 2017. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20170100002](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20170100002) (19/12/2023).

- ✓ Directorate of Operational Planning.
- ✓ Internal and International Relations Directorate.
- ✓ Directorate of Internal Security.
- ✓ Directorate for External Affairs.
- ✓ Directorate for Electronic Information.
- ✓ Directorate for Information Systems.
- ✓ Cyber Directorate.
- ✓ Directorate for Administrative Support and Human Resources.
- ✓ Directorate for Financial Management and Infrastructure.
- ✓ Security Directorate.
- ✓ Audit Office.
- ✓ Historical Archives Section.
- ✓ Historical Museum Section.
- ✓ Office of Systems Security.

In 2020 – according to the Presidential Decree 96/2020<sup>27</sup> - the Service was restructured again to comprise the Headquarters and the Regional Units, including the following ten Directorates, Sections and Offices:

- ✓ Directorate of Intelligence and Analysis A.
- ✓ Directorate of Intelligence and Analysis B.
- ✓ Cyberspace Directorate.
- ✓ Internal and International Relations Directorate.

---

<sup>27</sup> Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Presidential Decree 96 (Paper 232A)” [Official Document (In Greek)]. 20 November 2020. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20200100232](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20200100232) (19/12/2023).

- ✓ Directorate for Information Systems.
- ✓ Site Security & Surveillance Directorate.
- ✓ Directorate for Administrative Support and Human Resources.
- ✓ Directorate for Financial Services and Infrastructure.
- ✓ Financial Inspector Office.
- ✓ Historical Archives and Historical Museum Section.

Parts of NIS's structure are also the following two Offices and a Research Center located at the Service's facilities.

- ✓ Office of the Legal Adviser of the Legal Council of State.
- ✓ Office of the Public Prosecutor at the Athens Court of Appeal.<sup>28</sup>
- ✓ Centre for Technological Support, Development and Innovation (KETYAK).

## 5. The Context of the First 2023 Annual Report and the Reform of NIS

The first Annual Report of NIS was published on November 21<sup>st</sup>, 2023.<sup>29</sup> Its full title is “*Annual Report of Priorities and Fields of Action*”, having a length of 20 pages, and comprised of three parts; the Foreword of the Commander, a part entitled The Main Challenges and Evolutions, and the Basic Fields of Action of NIS during the Past Year, and the Epilogue.

### 5.1 Foreword of the Commander

In the foreword of the 2023 Annual Report (pages 3-5) entitled “*Message from the Commander*”,<sup>30</sup> Themistocles Demiris stresses that the main objective set in August 2022 – the time when he assumed the command of NIS – was to improve the operational capabilities of the Service along with the re-evaluation of its auditing framework, according to the Prime Minister's intend to establish a Service that would be more effective, use modern methods and equipment, be open to society, have better control mechanisms, and highly trained personnel.

<sup>28</sup> The Office of the Public Prosecutor is acting independently within the facilities of NIS.

<sup>29</sup> National Security Service, “Annual Report on Priorities and Fields of Action of the National Intelligence Service” [Press Release (In Greek)]. 21 November 2023. <https://www.nis.gr/el/news/3579> (17/12/2023).

<sup>30</sup> The Director of EYP is also referred as “Commander” in several documents.

He also points out that his main priorities were the enhancement of the Service's prestige and reliability and the assurance of maximum possible effectiveness, fully respecting the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Moreover, he highlights the main changes introduced by the Law 5002/2022,<sup>31</sup> the continuing reorganization and modernization process of the Service, the improved cooperation with other Intelligence Services in international level, several "success stories" of the Service, and the fact that its 2023 Annual Report is an act of innovation trying to shed light to the vital role of the Service.

Finally, he concludes by stating that – contrarily to other democratic states where their Intelligence Services are fully trusted by their citizens – the National Intelligence Service of Greece is treated by Greek citizens with cautiousness and disrespect. This is mainly the reason why the Service adopted the internationally applied practice of issuing an annual report that documents its priorities and selected actions in order to inform national security officials, experts, and the Greek citizens about the work of the Service.

## **5.2 The Main Challenges and Evolutions, and the Basic Fields of Action of the National Intelligence Service During the Past Year**

The main part of the 2023 Annual Report describes the conditions prevailing in the contemporary environment, the main challenges that NIS has been facing, the Service's most recent reforms and its basic fields of action from September 2022 to August 2023, consisting of the following five subparts.

### **5.2.1 A Complex Environment of Multilevel Crises**

The first subpart (pages 6-7) is entitled "*A complex environment of multilevel crises*". It points out that the contemporary security environment is full of challenges related to geostrategic factors, political, economic and social variables, religious and ideological rivalries, rapid technological evolutions, and environmental/climate parameters, characterizing our time as an era of multi-crisis in several fields such as domestic security. Thus, addressing hybrid threats is vital for every state – especially Greece – through international cooperation, adapting to new conditions, broadening the security agenda to include common global threats, and using multiple means.

---

<sup>31</sup> For further information visit: Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, "Law 5002 (Paper 228A)" [Official Document (In Greek)]. 09 December 2022. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20220100228\(17/12/2023\)](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20220100228(17/12/2023)).

### 5.2.2 The Main Threats and Their Origin

The second subpart (pages 7-14) entitled “*The main threats and their origin*”, identifies the following six categories of national security threats.

**External threats:** Addressing external threats in addition to diplomacy is necessary for Greece and a constant priority for NIS, especially in areas where foreign actors undermine Greece’s national interests. In this context the Service provided information and assessments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the National Defense General Staff (NDGS), the Hellenic Police, the Hellenic Fire Service, the Hellenic Coast Guard and several other state agencies, facilitating their decision making process. Moreover NIS contributed to tackling malicious activities, preventing political and economic coercion, and keeping critical national infrastructure safe.

**Espionage:** Espionage in addition to the actions of foreign agents are considered to be the main (national) security threat in European level, as it can undermine national sovereignty and state security. That is why NIS tackled these threats not only through its own network but also in cooperation with other European and global partners, without informing the public. On the contrary, other cases were given publicity such as the infiltration of a foreign agent into Greece, and a foreigner associated with foreign Intelligence Services that had illegally obtained the Hellenic citizenship.

**Terrorism and Violent extremism:** The 2023 Annual Report refers that regional terrorist groups related to ISIS have recently emerged in Greece, in addition to an increase in the number of “*lone wolfs*”.<sup>32</sup> Tackling terrorism remains one of the most important challenges in national and international level, as the use of the internet (dark web, social networks, etc.) facilitates the jihadist propaganda and the recruitment of future terrorists. Due to its location, Greece acts as a transit country for far-left and far-right violent extremists, a situation that demands not only preventive but suppressive measures as well. The excellent cooperation of NIS with the Hellenic Police led to the arrest of a large number of foreign terrorists and the prevention of numerous terrorist attacks. The Service also monitored closely several facilities in order to locate future radicalization phenomena in time.

---

<sup>32</sup> A terrorist is characterised as a ‘*lone wolf*’ when he operates individually without belonging to an organised terrorist group or network, though s/he may sympathize or share their ideology. Lone wolfs usually act in a solo basis, without receiving any command or direction from others. For further information visit: Cohen Katie, “Who will be a lone wolf terrorist? Mechanisms of self-radicalisation and the possibility of detecting lone offender threats on the Internet”. *FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency*, December 2012. <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--3531--SE> (18/12/2023).

**Illegal migration:** As stated in the 2023 Annual Report, illegal migration is one of the most severe challenges worldwide. As far as Greece is concerned, migration flows have increased during 2023, a phenomenon that poses several risks to national security. Moreover, the instrumentalization of migration by foreign actors demanded the close cooperation of the Service with several national institutions and agencies, mainly for countering disinformation campaigns targeting Greece and locating terrorists that had been recruiting migrants and/or using migrant flows to conceal their actions.<sup>33</sup>

**Organized crime:** Illegal trafficking of humans (women, children, migrants, etc.), drugs, weapons, and goods as well as actions related to organized crime groups, property crimes and corruption are reported as the most dangerous forms of organized crime in Greece. To this end, NIS provided intelligence to other Greek agencies and services, leading to the resolution of many cases that were also related to terrorism and interstate crime.

**Cybersecurity and New Technologies:** The last threat identified in the 2023 Annual Report is the rapid development of technology and the possession/use of advanced means by several actors, giving them the ability to harm critical systems and infrastructure. To effectively counter this threat, the report states that NIS aims to improve its cyber capabilities by establishing and operating a Security Operation Center (SOC) within its facilities.

### 5.2.3 Balance Between Security and Human Rights

The third subpart (pages 14-15) is entitled “*Balance between Security and Human Rights*”, points out that security and fundamental rights must be complementary, as the latter should be the basis of every security policy. To this end Law 5002/2022 introduced several changes regarding NIS, such as the prerequisites for the selection of its Director, the legal framework for lifting the secrecy of communications for operational (surveillance) reasons, the (indirect) definition of national security, and the prohibition of the use of surveillance software and devices.<sup>34</sup>

### 5.2.4 The Reform of the Service

The fourth subpart (pages 15-17) is entitled “*The reform of the Service*”, consisting of the following three sections.

---

<sup>33</sup> The 2023 Annual Report of EYP highlights three cases; one in the region of Evros (Greek-Turkish borders), and two in the Aegean Sea (islands of Lesbos and Kos).

<sup>34</sup> Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Law 5002 (Paper 228A)”. Ibid.

**The reorganization of structures and functions:** The main priority of the Service's Command for the timeframe covered by the 2023 Annual Report was to record the Service's weaknesses and to improve the respective sectors through modernization, new internal structures, innovative operating procedures, and cyber upgrade. The most important changes though, included:

- ✓ The appointment of two Deputy Director-Generals – instead of the preceding three – monitoring separately the External Affairs and Domestic Security.
- ✓ The establishment of Liaison Officers in several countries of interest.
- ✓ The relocation of several offices according to the contemporary security environment conditions.
- ✓ The enhancement of the Service's technological capacities and information systems through innovative methods.

**The qualitative upgrade of executive personnel:** The second section stresses the need for education according to the conditions of the domestic and foreign geopolitical, social and economic environment, as the personnel of the Service is the basic mean for its effective operation. The actions taken by NIS included joint training with foreign Intelligence Agencies – emphasizing in sectors such as hybrid threats, cyber-espionage, foreign influence, counter-terrorism – and the establishment of an Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Academy, providing training to executive personnel from other State Agencies and foreign countries.

**The openness to society and the improvement of the Security's image:** The final section of the fourth subpart outlines the relation between NIS and the Greek citizens. In fact, the recognition and realization of the importance of the mission of the Service by the Greek society was one of NIS's main goals during the set timeframe, resulting to the establishment of a Press and Communication Office (PCO) in order to promote the Service's work and inform the public. Moreover, NIS has planned the establishment of an Intelligence Museum<sup>35</sup> and an Internal Audit Unit, along with the exploitation of its archive.

### 5.2.5 Preparedness for Future Challenges

---

<sup>35</sup> National Security Service, "Museum of EYP". No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/agency/museum> (17/12/2023).

The fifth subpart (pages 18-19) is entitled Preparedness for future challenges, pointing out the Service's basic duty of preparing for and adjusting to future crises by integrating new technologies and financial tools through KETYAK. NIS also focuses on climate crisis – which can lead to several conflicts, affect tourism and agriculture, and destabilize certain areas – as well as critical infrastructures, cybersecurity, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, insider threats,<sup>36</sup> investment activities, and several other matters of political, economic, and social nature in the regional level.

### 5.3 Epilogue of the Annual Report

The epilogue of the 2023 Annual Report (page 20) stresses that the fields of action included in the report are indicative due to the nature and functioning of the Service, as well as that intelligence failures are usually spread out by media, while successes remain unknown to the public even if their consequences affect the majority of the citizens. That is why the Annual Report aims to highlight the importance of national security, the wide range of contemporary threats, and the need of applying effective countermeasures by the National Intelligence Service.

## 6. Analysis of the 2023 Annual Report

As far as the description of the contemporary *security environment* is concerned, its characterization as an environment of “*polycrises*” (multiple crises) could not be more precise. Indeed, our world has been facing a large number of regional and international crises in different fields (economic, health, food, climate, etc.) during the past decades, in addition to several conflicts (Russia-Ukraine, Azerbaijan-Armenia, Hamas-Israel, etc.). In fact, in the EU “*Strategic Foresight Report*” for 2023 our time is characterized not only as an era of “*polycrises*” but also as an era of “*permacrises*” (permanent crises).<sup>37</sup>

Regarding the national security threats identified in the 2023 Annual Report and their origin,<sup>38</sup> it must be outlined that the majority of them is identified by several regional and international actors

---

<sup>36</sup> According to CISA, an insider threat manifests in various ways and is defined as “[...] the threat that an insider will use their authorized access, intentionally or unintentionally, to do harm to the department’s mission, resources, personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, or systems”. For further information visit: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, “Defining Insider Threats”. No date. <https://www.cisa.gov/topics/physical-security/insider-threat-mitigation/defining-insider-threats> (19/12/2023).

<sup>37</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “The Strategic Foresight Report of the EU for 2023: The EU’s vision for strategic autonomy until 2050, the future challenges, the proposed fields of action, and the perspectives for Greece” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 21 July 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74240/georgios-koykakis/i-ekthesi-strategic-foresight-tis-ee-gia-to-2023> (18/12/2023).

<sup>38</sup> These include external threats, espionage, terrorism, violent extremism, illegal migration, organized crime, cybersecurity, and new technologies.

in their recent strategic documents as well, such as the 2022 *National Security Strategy* of Japan,<sup>39</sup> the 2022 *National Strategic Review* of the French Republic,<sup>40</sup> the 2023 *National Security Strategy* of the USA,<sup>41</sup> the 2023 *Concept of the Foreign Policy* of the Russian Federation,<sup>42</sup> the 2023 *Integrated Review Refresh* of the United Kingdom,<sup>43</sup> the 2023 *National Security Strategy* of Germany,<sup>44</sup> and the 2023 *Annual Risk Analysis* of FRONTEX.<sup>45</sup>

Moreover, the fact that espionage and illegal migration are considered to be two of the most severe security threats/challenges in national, regional, and international level, needs to be seen in relation to the geopolitical competition between “West” and “East”,<sup>46</sup> and the ongoing or emerging armed conflicts. Indeed, espionage can be used by several actors to identify the vulnerabilities of their rivals, while illegal migration can be characterized both as a preventive measure that can be used as a leverage of pressure against a certain state (instrumentalization of migration), and the result of an armed conflict, or (recently) the consequence of climate crisis.

As far as the issuance of an *Annual Report* is concerned, it must be stressed that it is only a small step towards regaining the Greek citizens’ trust, as in most cases the public opinion is affected by (dis)information spread by media or even action movies. The practice of issuing annual reports on various intelligence subjects is followed by several western Intelligence Services, such as the

---

<sup>39</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “The new National Security Strategy of Japan: Its role in the Indo-Pacific, the US support and China’s expected reaction” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 23 December 2022. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/73958/georgios-koykakis/i-nea-stratigiki-ethnikis-asfaleias-tis-iaponias> (18/12/2023).

<sup>40</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “The new National Strategic Review of France: The security challenges, the strategic objectives, and the estimated response of regional and international actors” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 12 December 2022. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/73942/georgios-koykakis/i-nea-ethniki-stratigiki-anatheorisi-tis-gallias> (18/12/2023).

<sup>41</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “The National Security Strategy of the USA: Background, Recent Developments and Future Considerations Regarding the International Security Environment” [In Greek]. *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series*, vol. 3, no. 2, December 2022, pp. 122-132, doi: <https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33792> (18/12/2023).

<sup>42</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “How Moscow sees the world: Russia’s new foreign policy doctrine” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 10 April 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74100/georgios-koykakis/pos-blepei-i-mosxa-ton-kosmo?page=show> (18/12/2023).

<sup>43</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “London’s national security and international policy strategy: How the UK views changes in the international environment” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 15 May 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74157/georgios-koykakis/i-stratigiki-ethnikis-asfaleias-kai-diethnoys-politikis-toy-lond?page=show> (18/12/2023).

<sup>44</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “Germany’s first ‘historic’ National Security Strategy: How Berlin sees itself in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and what it means for the world and Greece” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 18 June 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74201/georgios-koykakis/i-proti-%C2%ABistoriki%C2%BB-stratigiki-ethnikis-asfaleias-tis-germanias> (18/12/2023).

<sup>45</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “The Annual Risk Analysis of FRONTEX for 2023-2024: Lessons and challenges for the EU and Greece on migration flows and cross-border crime” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 25 September 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74304/georgios-koykakis/i-etisia-analysi-kindynoy-toy-frontex-gia-to-2023-2024> (18/12/2023).

<sup>46</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “The geopolitical competition of West-East through the official strategic documents of international and regional actors” [In Greek]. Center for International Strategic Analyses, 20 December 2023. <https://kedisa.gr/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ergasia-no-102-Koukakis.pdf> (18/12/2023).

*Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community*<sup>47</sup> and the *Annual Threat Assessment of the United States Intelligence Community*<sup>48</sup> issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the *Annual Review* of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) of the UK.<sup>49</sup>

The timeframe (September 2022 - August 2023) covered by the 2023 Annual Report, also indicates that NIS has most likely endorsed the procedures used by the *Intelligence Service of the UK*, as the formentioned Annual Review of the NCSC covers the same timeframe. This assumption is also enhanced by the fact that – according to the Greek newspaper “H KAΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ” – that the Greek Prime Minister held a meeting with a former Executive of the British MI5 in September 2022,<sup>50</sup> in order to be advised regarding NIS’s reform in the following sectors:

- ✓ Strengthening the accountability of NIS and the Hellenic Parliament's oversight through the Special Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency (SSCIAT).<sup>51</sup>
- ✓ Upgrading the role of the National Security Council (NSC) to make better use of intelligence.
- ✓ Strengthening the framework of legal surveillance for politicians.
- ✓ Strengthen NIS’s internal control, transparency, outreach and training of its personnel.

In October 2022 , the same newspaper published an interview of former Director of MI5 (Lord Jonathan Evans) revealing the identity of the British Executive that acted as an unofficial

<sup>47</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “The 2006 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community”. February 2007. <https://www.odni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2006AnnualReporttoCongress.pdf> (18/12/2023).

<sup>48</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “The Annual Threat Assessment of the USA for 2023: Providing guidance for US foreign policy officials against the rivals of the United States” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 14 March 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74058/georgios-koykakis/i-etisia-ektimisi-apeilis-kata-ton-ipa-gia-to-2023> (18/12/2023).

<sup>49</sup> Koukakis Georgios, “The Annual Cybersecurity Review of the United Kingdom: Lessons learned, current situation in Greece, and challenges regarding the critical national infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and cyber resilience” [In Greek]. *Policy Journal*, 04 December 2023. <https://policyjournal.gr/world/%ce%b7-%ce%b5%cf%84%ce%ae%cf%83%ce%b9%ce%b1-%ce%b1%ce%bd%ce%b1%cf%83%ce%ba%cf%8c%cf%80%ce%b7%cf%83%ce%b7-%ce%ba%cf%85%ce%b2%ce%b5%cf%81%ce%bd%ce%bf%ce%b1%cf%83%cf%86%ce%ac%ce%bb%ce%b5%ce%b9%ce%b1> (18/12/2023).

<sup>50</sup> Nedos Vasilis, “Using MI5 as a model for the reform of the new EYP: The Prime Minister’s connections with former executive of the Security Service (MI5) and the reform plan” [In Greek]. *H KAΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ*, 12 September 2022. <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/562036990/me-montelo-mi5-o-schediasmos-tis-neas-eyf/> (18/12/2023).

<sup>51</sup> Hellenic Parliament. “Special Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency (SPECIAL STANDING COMMITTEES)” [In Greek]. No date. <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Koinovoulefikes-Epitopes/CommitteeDetailView?CommitteeId=2b188390-2f24-4d95-b867-912d485fa8cf> (23/12/2023).

adviser of the Greek Government as far as the reform of NIS is concerned.<sup>52</sup> Some of the most important intelligence problems in Greece that were stressed by Lord Evans were the following:

- ✓ The exchange of information, as far as security and intelligence matters are concerned, between the Ministries of the Hellenic Republic and the Government is limited.
- ✓ There is no institutional distinction between the Security Service (domestic intelligence) and the Secret Intelligence Service (foreign intelligence). The Greek model of managing both in a single Organisation is unusual.
- ✓ The procedures for the authorization for the conduction of surveillance for national security reasons are not clear.
- ✓ The main reasons for the public's disrespect of NIS lies in its historical background<sup>53</sup> in addition to the lack of (national) security culture in Greece.

As far as the Director-General duties are concerned, in order for him/her to be able to determine the way NIS's strategic vision should be achieved in the light of national priorities, there must be a *National Security Strategy* (NSS) issued by the Governmental National Security Council (KYSEA) of the Hellenic Republic. The NSS prioritizes the Greek national interests and sets the framework in which NIS (and every other State Agency, Service or Department) will operate. Afterwards, NIS can issue its own *National Intelligence Strategy* (NIS) just like the NIS of the United States issued by the ODNI.<sup>54</sup>

In addition to that, the fact that article 18 of the issued Law 5002/2022 determines that the Director of NIS must be an active senior diplomat or a retired general/flag officer of the Hellenic Armed Forces/Police/Coast Guard/Fire Service is a positive change, since it ensures that the person appointed as a Director has a minimum experience in foreign and security policy matters, unlike some past Directors whose professional background was limited in the public sector. It must also be stressed that several media reported that the Greek "*Watergate*" scandal was a result of the actions

---

<sup>52</sup> Nedos Vasilis, "The former director of MI5 talks in 'K': Two EYPs with more transparency. The unofficial advisor of the Government proposes Domestic and External Affairs Service, and communication with citizens" [In Greek]. H KATHIMERINI, 03 October 2022. <https://www.kathimerini.gr/opinion/interviews/562071325/o-proin-dieythytis-tis-mi5-stin-k-dyo-eyp-me-perissoteri-diafaneia/> (18/12/2023).

<sup>53</sup> The Service was related to the 1967-1974 dictatorship.

<sup>54</sup> Koukakis Georgios, "The new National Intelligence Strategy of the USA for the next four years: The role of technology, the need for cooperation with other actors, the emphasis on the personnel, and the new environment of interstate challenges" [In Greek]. Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition, 16 August 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74265/georgios-koykakis/i-nea-stratigiki-pliroforion-ton-ipa-gia-tin-epomeni-tetraetia> (18/12/2023).

of NIS's Director at the time (Panayiotis Kontoleon) whose professional background was mostly in the private sector.<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, according to article 4 of Law 5002/2022, a request for lifting the secrecy of communications can only be submitted by either NIS or the Hellenic Police (Directorate for Countering Special Crimes of Violence) to the respective Public Prosecutor, who in turn must within 24 hours either reject the request or submit it to the Assistant District Attorney of the Supreme Court or a Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal.<sup>56</sup> The latter must (again) within 24 hours reject or approve the request, and return the file without maintaining a copy. If the request is for persons that belong to the political field, the request can only be submitted by the Director of NIS himself to the President of the Parliament, and if it is (politically) approved by him/her within 24 hours the procedure continues as mentioned previously.

After three years from the termination of the lifting of the secrecy, the person concerned can be notified for the imposition of the measure, provided that the purpose for which it was imposed is not jeopardized. Any request for lifting the secrecy of communications must include the following:

- ✓ The reasons that constitute risk to national security,
- ✓ The necessity of lifting the secrecy to address the risk,
- ✓ The means of response or communication for which the lifting is requested,
- ✓ The subject matter of the lifting, i.e. the external elements of the communication and/or its content, and finally
- ✓ The territorial extent of application and the strictly necessary duration of the lifting.

The formentioned procedure seems to be similar with the British model as, according to the formentioned interview given by the former MI5 Director, the Service submits a request to the Minister of Interior – who is responsible (through his/her legal advisers) for ensuring the request is

---

<sup>55</sup> Newsroom, “Panayiotis Kontoleon: The commander of the NIS resigned for wrong actions” [In Greek]. *CNN Greece*, 05 August 2022. <https://www.cnn.gr/politiki/story/323495/paraitithike-kai-o-dioikitis-tis-eyyp-meta-ton-grigori-dimitriadi> (20/12/2023), Editorial Team, “The Commander of EYP Panagiotis Kontoleon also resigned” [In Greek]. *Capital*, 05 August 2022. <https://www.capital.gr/epikairotiata/3651455/paraitithike-kai-o-dioikitis-tis-eup-panagiotis-kontoleon/> (20/12/2023), Editorial Team, “Panayiotis Kontoleon: the commander of the NSA resigned” [In Greek]. *EΘΝΟΣ*. 05 August 2022. <https://www.ethnos.gr/Politics/article/219079/panagiothskontoleon-paraitithhkeodioikthsthsseyp> (20/12/2023).

<sup>56</sup> The second Prosecutor is defined by of the Supreme Court for a term of office of one year, that can be extended for another year.

suitable, legal and necessary – before submitting it to the Investigative Powers Tribunal for final approval, while political sensitive cases require extra approval. Another matter of consideration is that the British model requires the lifting of the secrecy of communications to be renewed every three months, while Law 5002/2022 does not specify the duration of the lifting.

The formentioned observation leads to another matter of concern, the fact that Greece – unlike other States – has not established an Intelligence Community (IC) in order to integrate all intelligence in support of its national security interests. The United States for example – under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004<sup>57</sup>- established the ODNI (Annex A), creating the United States IC that comprises 18 Intelligence Organizations (Annex B and C).<sup>58</sup> According to the official website of the ODNI:

*“The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community, overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security. The President appoints the DNI with the advice and consent of the Senate”.*<sup>59</sup>

Moreover, the fact that the Director-General of NIS is assisted by two Deputy Director-Generals in charge of External Affairs and Domestic Security, in addition to the clarification of the prerequisites for the selection of its Director by Law 5002/2022 can be assessed as an important reform that can improve the effectiveness of the Service. Taking into consideration though the opinion expressed by the former Director of MI5 who clearly states the need for two separate Services according to worldwide intelligence practice, it must be pointed out that the next reform that should be made is the establishment of a National Security Service for domestic intelligence matters and a National Intelligence Service for foreign intelligence.

As far as joint training with foreign Intelligence Agencies in several sectors and the establishment of an Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Academy are concerned, it is estimated that these activities will not only enhance the skills of NIS’s personnel, but also facilitate the

---

<sup>57</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “History”. No date. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/history> (18/12/2023).

<sup>58</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Members of the IC”. No date. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic> (18/12/2023).

<sup>59</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Who we are”. No date. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are> (18/12/2023).

enhancement of the (national) security culture among the Service, which – according to the formentioned interview of the former Director of the British Security Service (MI5) in the Greek newspaper “H KATHMERINH” – is not as much developed as it should be.

The establishment of a Press and Communication Office, an Intelligence Museum, and an Internal Audit Unit, in addition to the exploitation of NIS’s archive should also be viewed as a milestone in the Service’s history, as the outreach of every Intelligence Service to society is considered to be the foundation of trust-building and realization of the importance of its role from citizens. The introduction of a strict legal framework for lifting the secrecy of communications for operational (surveillance) reasons, and the prohibition of surveillance software and devices by Law 5002/2022 is estimated that will also have a positive effect in the NIS-society relationship.

As far as the improvement of NIS’s cyber capabilities and the integration of new technologies are concerned, it must be stressed that cybersecurity is becoming more important than ever as the cyber domain is widely used by various hostile actors for the conduction of malicious activities such as hybrid war, disinformation campaigns, information warfare, etc. Moreover, the integration of new technologies is considered a necessity for every Intelligence Service, as it contributes greatly to countering new and emerging threats. To this end, the establishment of KETYAK will most likely facilitate the integration as the respective research is closely related to the development of new technologies.

Special attention must also be given to Artificial Intelligence (AI) as it can be applied to several fields enhancing the capabilities of an actor, increasing the effectiveness of its early warning system and filling in possible gaps by identifying patterns. As far as the influence that AI is going to have in the formentioned systemic rivalry between the “West” and the “East”, the Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in 2017 that:

*“Artificial intelligence is the future not only of Russia but of all of mankind [...] There are huge opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to foresee today. [...] Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world [...]”*<sup>60</sup>

*NIS’s focus on CBRN threats, climate crisis, insider threats, critical infrastructure and investment activities, in order to be better prepared for future challenges needs to be viewed as a*

---

<sup>60</sup> Radina Gigova, “Who Vladimir Putin thinks will rule the world”. *CNN World*, 02 September 2017. <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/01/world/putin-artificial-intelligence-will-rule-world/index.html> (18/12/2023).

positive development, because the role of every Intelligence Service includes – besides the application of countermeasures against existing threats – the application of preventive measures and the establishment of an efficient early warning system that can provide the necessary information to decision makers in order to manage an emerging (national) security situation.

Finally, the fact that NIS –according to article 21 of the Law 4622/2019– was put under the direct control of the Greek Prime Minister is considered to be a practice used by most modern States (such as the formentioned ODNI of the USA) as Intelligence Services are strategic assets that must be controlled by the highest possible level of a State’s hierarchy. As far as the definition of national security reasons provided by Law 5002/2022 is concerned, it must be stressed that it includes only a few of the basic components of national security, as the respective article 3 defines that:

*“National security reasons are the reasons that are relevant to the protection of the basic functions of the State and the fundamental interests of the Greek citizens, such as, in particular, reasons related to national defense, foreign policy, energy security and cyber security”.*<sup>61</sup>

To be more precise, national security is comprised of national defense, economic security, energy security, public health, food security, cyber security, climate security, environmental security, cultural security, information security, protection of national critical infrastructure, social cohesion, public order, etc.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, neither the basic functions of the State nor the fundamental interests of the Greek citizens are clarified in the document, which means that the article can be ‘interpreted’ at will in order to justify the use of lifting the secrecy of communications or apply other methods that could violate basic human rights. It must also be reminded that the Hellenic Republic hasn’t issued a National Security Strategy, the predominant Grand Strategy official document of each modern State that defines (and prioritizes) the fundamental interests of the State and/or the Greek citizens.

## 7. Future Considerations

Keeping in mind the facts provided so far, the paper proceeds to the presentation of some future considerations regarding several aspects of the Service’s organizational structure and

---

<sup>61</sup> Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Law 4622 (Paper 133A)” [Official Document (In Greek)], 07 August 2019. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20190100133](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20190100133) (17/12/2023).

<sup>62</sup> Pikramenos Kostas & Koukakis Georgios, *National Security: Myths and Reality* [In Greek]. Infognomon, Athens, 2023. p. 32.

operational functioning. First of all, the Hellenic Republic needs to establish an Intelligence Community (IC), in order to establish an integrated early warning system that is going to identify existing and emerging threats/risks on time. This will allow decision makers to apply relevant preventive measures to deter them in a holistic way, or – in case these measures fail – apply effective counter-measures to eliminate the threats/risks or minimize their impact on national security.

Second of all, NIS must be divided into two separate Services; a National Security Service having as its field of actions domestic intelligence and a National Intelligence Service for foreign intelligence. In order for these two Services to effectively conduct their mission, the formentioned division should be made when the NIS's Director is positive that the personnel assigned in each Service – currently under the control of one of the two Deputy DGs – has developed the necessary skills and is familiar with all relevant procedures but no later than five years from now, setting 2028 as a time limit. Having two independent Services will also result in different budgets, which means that the Hellenic Government can allocate money in each budget according to its priorities.

Another factor that should be considered is defining NIS's Director as a regular member of KYSEA – the fundamental institutional national security body of the Hellenic Republic that was established by Law 4622/2019 – since s/he is the advisor of the Prime Minister on intelligence matters. Moreover, having the Director of NIS as a regular member of the NSC is a practice used by most modern States. Unfortunately, although the Director of the Service is usually invited to most of the KYSEA meetings, the current legal framework doesn't include him in the composition of the Council,<sup>63</sup> which comprises the following regular members:

- ✓ Prime Minister (President of KYSEA).
- ✓ Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- ✓ Minister for National Defense.
- ✓ Minister for Interior.
- ✓ Minister for Migration and Asylum.
- ✓ Minister for Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy.

---

<sup>63</sup> Pikramenos Kostas & Koukakis Georgios, *National Security: Myths and Reality* [In Greek]. Infognomon, Athens, 2023. pp. 98-99.

- ✓ Minister for Climate Crisis and Civil Protection.
- ✓ Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS).

The fact that KYSEA has not published a National Security Strategy yet – despite the statement that was made by the Greek National Security Adviser (NSA) Thanos Dokos in 2021 that the strategy was in the preparation stage,<sup>64</sup> and that – according to Greek media – the strategy was presented by the NSA to KYSEA during its meeting on October 12<sup>th</sup>, 2022<sup>65</sup> is another major consideration that needs to be taken seriously. The particular official Grand Strategy document is fundamental for ensuring the State’s national security by providing the framework and basic guidelines to the decision makers in order to protect the Greek national interests, and the basis for other departments, agencies, and services (such as NIS) for issuing their own strategies.

Nevertheless, NIS should issue a National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) – or at least an interim one until the Greek NSS is published – similar to the NIS of the United States, that will include the Director’s vision, NIS’s mission, fundamental principles, and the set goals, in addition to the necessary means and ways of achieving them, over a maximum period of five years. NIS should also begin issuing an Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) in order to provide a reliable evaluation of threats/risks as far as the Greek national security is concerned, so that all State policies can be adjusted according to the level of threat and relevant (counter) measures can be applied.

As far as cybersecurity is concerned, it must be stressed that although NIS is the National Authority against Cyber Attacks, Greece’s National Cybersecurity Strategy<sup>66</sup> (NCS) is issued by the Ministry of Digital Governance (MoDG) which has been defined as the National Cyber Security Authority (NCSA) of the Hellenic Republic. Although article 20 of Law 5002/2022 provides for the establishment of a Committee for the Coordination of Cybersecurity Matters (CCCM), the existence of two separate institutions (in different locations) with similar competences is assessed that does not facilitate the work of the Committee. To this end, the establishment of a National Cyber Security Centre that will act as a single point of contact for all cybersecurity matters, assume the responsibility of issuing the NCS and integrate NIS’s National CERT –and perhaps the respective

---

<sup>64</sup> Dokos Thanos, “Thanos Dokos: Greek national security: An assessment and challenges”. *Ekathimerini*, 25 January 2021. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/261588/thanos-dokos-greek-national-security-an-assessment-and-challenges/> (19/12/2023).

<sup>65</sup> Newsroom. “KYSEA discusses Turkey, Evros border wall, arms procurement”. *Ekathimerini*, 12 October 2022. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1195458/kysea-discusses-turkey-evros-border-wall-arms-procurement/> (19/12/2023).

<sup>66</sup> Ministry of Digital Governance. “National Cybersecurity Strategy 2020-2025”. December 2020. [https://mindigital.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/E%CE%9D-NATIONAL-CYBER-SECURITY-STRATEGY-2020\\_2025.pdf](https://mindigital.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/E%CE%9D-NATIONAL-CYBER-SECURITY-STRATEGY-2020_2025.pdf) (20/12/2023).

department of the MoDG – will increase the coordination between State Services and help avoid conflicts of jurisdiction.

NIS's oversight through the Special Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency of the Hellenic Parliament's in order to strengthening its accountability is assessed as a non-effective measure, since the members of the Committee usually don't the necessary experience in intelligence and security matters. Establishing a *Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security* on the basis of the *Intelligence and Security Committee* of Parliament of the United Kingdom or the *House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence* (HPSCI) of the United States,<sup>67</sup> seems to be the most suitable solution, as it will also ensure the democratic function of the Service and the safeguarding of the human rights of Greek citizens, in order to prevent the securitization of several issues.<sup>68</sup>

## 8. Concluding Remarks

Due to the “secret nature” of the Intelligence and Security Services, great attention must be given to proper information of the public about the intelligence and security activities in order to deter hostile actions directed against the State and/or its citizens, and prevent the latter from becoming victims of misinformation (fake news) and/or disinformation (propaganda), as according to the former Director of the British Security Service “[...] if you don't tell your own story, then someone else will tell it for you”.<sup>69</sup> Thus, the development of the necessary trust of the citizens in the Intelligence Community will be enabled, as they will understand that the effective execution of its mission ensures the common well being of the public.

To conclude, in order for the Intelligence and Security Services to effectively execute their mission, they need to adjust their structure, means, and methods to their security environment conditions, taking advantage of new technologies and best practices used in other States. The effective functioning of these Services is vital for a State's national security, as the early warning and intelligence assessments provided by them facilitate not only the application of preventive measures against external and domestic threats/risks, but also their tackling in case the formentioned measures prove to be inefficient. It must be stressed though, that:

---

<sup>67</sup> House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “History and Jurisdiction”. No date. <https://intelligence.house.gov/about/history-and-jurisdiction.htm> (19/12/2023).

<sup>68</sup> According to Clara Eroukhmanoff “*An issue becomes securitised when an audience collectively agrees on the nature of the threat and supports taking extraordinary measures*”. For further information visit: Eroukhmanoff Clara, “Securitisation Theory: An Introduction”. *E-International Relations*, 14 January 2018. <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisation-theory-an-introduction/> (20/12/2023).

<sup>69</sup> Nedos Vasilis, “The former director of MI5 talks in ‘K’: Two EYPs with more transparency. The unofficial advisor of the Government proposes Domestic and External Affairs Service, and communication with citizens” [In Greek]. Ibid.

*“Intelligence does not claim infallibility for its prophecies. Intelligence merely holds that the answer which it gives is the most deeply and objectively based and carefully considered estimate”.*<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup> The phrase belongs to Sherman Kent, Founder of the Office of National Estimates. Bλ. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Global Trends 2040: A more contested world (Introduction)”. March 2021. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/introduction> (23/12/2023).

## **Bibliography**

### **Books**

Pikramenos Kostas & Koukakis Georgios, *National Security: Myths and Reality [In Greek]*. Infognomon, Athens, 2023.

### **Research Papers - Scientific Journals**

Cohen Katie, “Who will be a lone wolf terrorist? Mechanisms of self-radicalisation and the possibility of detecting lone offender threats on the Internet”. *FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency*, December 2012. <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--3531--SE>

Eroukhmanoff Clara, “Securitisation Theory: An Introduction”. *E-International Relations*, 14 January 2018. <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisation-theory-an-introduction/>

Koukakis Georgios, “Germany's first ‘historic’ National Security Strategy: How Berlin sees itself in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and what it means for the world and Greece” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 18 June 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74201/georgios-koykakis/i-proti-%C2%ABistoriki%C2%BB-stratigiki-ethnikis-asfaleias-tis-germanias>

Koukakis Georgios, “How Moscow sees the world: Russia's new foreign policy doctrine” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 10 April 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74100/georgios-koykakis/pos-blepei-i-mosxa-ton-kosmo?page=show>

Koukakis Georgios, “London's national security and international policy strategy: How the UK views changes in the international environment” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 15 May 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74157/georgios-koykakis/i-stratigiki-ethnikis-asfaleias-kai-diethnoys-politikis-toy-lond?page=show>

Koukakis Georgios, “The Annual Cyberssecurity Review of the United Kingdom: Lessons learned, current situation in Greece, and challenges regarding the critical national infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and cyber resilience” [In Greek]. *Policy Journal*, 04 December 2023. <https://policyjournal.gr/world/%ce%b7-%ce%b5%cf%84%ce%ae%cf%83%ce%b9%ce%b1-%ce%b1%ce%bd%ce%b1%cf%83%ce%ba%cf%8c%cf%80%ce%b7%cf%83%ce%b7->

%ce%ba%cf%85%ce%b2%ce%b5%cf%81%ce%bd%ce%bf%ce%b1%cf%83%cf%86%ce%ac%ce%bb%ce%b5%ce%b9%ce%b1

Koukakis Georgios, “The Annual Risk Analysis of FRONTEX for 2023-2024: Lessons and challenges for the EU and Greece on migration flows and cross-border crime” [**In Greek**]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 25 September 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74304/georgios-koykakis/i-etisia-analysi-kindynoy-toy-frontex-gia-to-2023-2024>

Koukakis Georgios, “The Annual Threat Assessment of the USA for 2023: Providing guidance for US foreign policy officials against the rivals of the United States” [**In Greek**]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 14 March 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74058/georgios-koykakis/i-etisia-ektimisi-apeilis-kata-ton-ipa-gia-to-2023>

Koukakis Georgios, “The geopolitical competition of West-East through the official strategic documents of international and regional actors” [**In Greek**]. Center for International Strategic Analyses, 20 December 2023. <https://kedisa.gr/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ergasia-no-102-Koukakis.pdf>

Koukakis Georgios, “The National Security Strategy of the USA: Background, Recent Developments and Future Considerations Regarding the International Security Environment” [**In Greek**]. *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series*, vol. 3, no. 2, December 2022, pp. 122-132, doi: <https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33792>

Koukakis Georgios, “The new National Intelligence Strategy of the USA for the next four years: The role of technology, the need for cooperation with other actors, the emphasis on the personnel, and the new environment of interstate challenges” [**In Greek**]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 16 August 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74265/georgios-koykakis/i-nea-stratigiki-pli-roforion-ton-ipa-gia-tin-epomeni-tetraetia>

Koukakis Georgios, “The new National Security Strategy of Japan: Its role in the Indo-Pacific, the US support and China's expected reaction” [**In Greek**]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 23 December 2022. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/73958/georgios-koykakis/i-nea-stratigiki-ethnikis-asfaleias-tis-iaponias>

Koukakis Georgios, “The new National Strategic Review of France: The security challenges, the strategic objectives, and the estimated response of regional and international actors” [**In Greek**].

*Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 12 December 2022. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/73942/georgios-koykakis/i-nea-ethniki-stratigiki-anatheoristis-gallias>

Koukakis Georgios, “The Strategic Foresight Report of the EU for 2023: The EU’s vision for strategic autonomy until 2050, the future challenges, the proposed fields of action, and the perspectives for Greece” [In Greek]. *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 21 July 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74240/georgios-koykakis/i-ekthesi-strategic-foresight-tis-ee-gia-to-2023>

### Newspaper Articles – Websites

Dokos Thanos, “Thanos Dokos: Greek national security: An assessment and challenges”. *Ekathimerini*, 25 January 2021. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/261588/thanos-dokos-greek-national-security-an-assessment-and-challenges/>

Editorial Team, “Panayiotis Kontoleon: the commander of the NSA resigned” [In Greek]. *EΘΝΟΣ*. 05 August 2022. <https://www.ethnos.gr/Politics/article/219079/panagiothskontoleonparaitithhkeodioikthsthsNIS>

Editorial Team, “The Commander of NIS Panagiotis Kontoleon also resigned” [In Greek]. *Capital*, 05 August 2022. <https://www.capital.gr/epikairota/3651455/paraitithike-kai-o-dioikitis-tis-eup-panagiotis-kontoleon/>

Michalopoulos Sarantis, “Greek PM admits bugging socialist leader’s phone was wrong”. *Euractiv*, 11 May 2023. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/greek-pm-admits-bugging-socialist-leaders-phone-was-wrong/>

Nedos Vasilis, “The former director of MI5 talks in ‘K’: Two NISs with more transparency. The unofficial advisor of the Government proposes Domestic and External Affairs Service, and communication with citizens” [In Greek]. *H KAΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ*, 03 October 2022. <https://www.kathimerini.gr/opinion/interviews/562071325/o-proin-dieythytis-tis-mi5-stin-k-dyo-NIS-me-perissoteri-diafaneia/>

Nedos Vasilis, “Using MI5 as a model for the reform of the new NIS: The Prime Minister’s connections with former executive of the Security Service (MI5) and the reform plan” [In Greek].

*H KATHIMERINI*, 12 September 2022. <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/562036990/montelo-mi5-o-schediasmos-tis-neas-NIS/>

Newsroom. “KYSEA discusses Turkey, Evros border wall, arms procurement”. *Ekathimerini*, 12 October 2022. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1195458/kysea-discusses-turkey-evros-border-wall-arms-procurement/>

Newsroom, “Panayiotis Kontoleon: The commander of the NIS resigned for wrong actions” [In Greek]. *CNN Greece*, 05 August 2022. <https://www.cnn.gr/politiki/story/323495/paraitithike-kai-o-dioikitis-tis-NIS-meta-ton-grigori-dimitriadi>

Radina Gigova, “Who Vladimir Putin thinks will rule the world”. *CNN World*, 02 September 2017. <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/01/world/putin-artificial-intelligence-will-rule-world/index.html>

Samaras Georgios, “Greece’s ‘Watergate’ explained: why the European Parliament is investigating over a wiretapping scandal”. *The Conversation*, 08 November 2022. [https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/186983947/Greece\\_s\\_Watergate\\_explained\\_why\\_the\\_European\\_Parliament\\_is\\_investigating\\_over\\_a\\_wiretapping\\_scandal.pdf](https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/186983947/Greece_s_Watergate_explained_why_the_European_Parliament_is_investigating_over_a_wiretapping_scandal.pdf)

The Editors of Encyclopedia, "Periander". *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 12 February 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Periander>

### **Press Releases – Official Websites**

European Parliament Committees, “PEGA: Hearing on 'Use of spyware in Greece’”. 08 September 2022. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/pega-hearing-on-use-of-spyware-in-greece/product-details/20220912CHE10601>

European Parliament News, “Greek spyware and wiretapping scandal: MEPs to debate recent revelations”. [Briefing], 08 September 2022. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/agenda/briefing/2022-09-12/8/greek-spyware-and-wiretapping-scandal-meps-to-debate-recent-revelations>

Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, “Defining Insider Threats”. No date. <https://www.cisa.gov/topics/physical-security/insider-threat-mitigation/defining-insider-threats>

Hellenic Parliament. “Special Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency ( SPECIAL STANDING COMMITTEES)” [In Greek]. No date.

<https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/KoinovouleftikesEpitropes/CommitteeDetailView?CommitteeId=2b188390-2f24-4d95-b867-912d485fa8cf>

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “History and Jurisdiction”. No date. <https://intelligence.house.gov/about/history-and-jurisdiction.htm>

Ministry of Digital Governance. “National Cybersecurity Strategy 2020-2025”. December 2020. [https://mindigital.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/E%CE%9D-NATIONAL-CYBER-SECURITY-STRATEGY-2020\\_2025.pdf](https://mindigital.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/E%CE%9D-NATIONAL-CYBER-SECURITY-STRATEGY-2020_2025.pdf)

National Security Service, “Annual Report on Priorities and Fields of Action of the National Intelligence Service”. [Press Release (In Greek)], 21 November 2023. <https://www.nis.gr/el/news/3579>

National Security Service, “CRYPTO”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/information-security/crypto>

National Security Service, “Director-General”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/agency/administration>

National Security Service, “INFOSEC”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/information-security/infosec>

National Intelligence Service, “KETYAK”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/ketyak/>

National Security Service, “Museum of NIS”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/agency/museum>

National Security Service, “National CERT”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/national-cert/>

National Security Service, “Our Mission and Competences”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/agency/mission-and-responsibilities>

National Security Service, “Our Objective”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/agency/objective>

National Security Service, “TEMPEST”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/information-security/tempest>

National Security Service, “Timeline”. No date. <https://www.nis.gr/en/agency/historical-background/timeline>

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Global Trends 20240: A more contested world (Introduction)”. March 2021. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/introduction>

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “History”. No date. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/history>

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Members of the IC”. No date. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic>

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “The 2006 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community”. February 2007. <https://www.odni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2006AnnualReporttoCongress.pdf>

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Who we are”. No date. <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are>

### **Official Documents**

Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Law 3649 (Paper 39A)” [**In Greek**]. 03 March 2008. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20080100039](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20080100039)

Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Law 4622 (Paper 133A)” [**In Greek**]. 07 August 2019. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20190100133](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20190100133)

Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Law 5002 (Paper 228A)” [**In Greek**]. 09 December 2022. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20220100228](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20220100228)

Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Presidential Decree 1 (Paper 2A)” [**In Greek**]. 17 January 2017. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20170100002](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20170100002)

Newspaper of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, “Presidential Decree 96 (Paper 232A)” [**In Greek**]. 20 November 2020. [https://www.et.gr/api/Download\\_Small/?fek\\_pdf=20200100232](https://www.et.gr/api/Download_Small/?fek_pdf=20200100232)

# Annexes


## A. Office of the Director of National Intelligence Organizational Chart



UNCLASSIFIED

### OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

as of 20 Oct 2022



\*This chart reflects the organizational structure as authorized by the Fiscal Year 2022 appropriation.

UNCLASSIFIED

Source: [www.dni.gov](http://www.dni.gov)

## B. The Elements of the US Intelligence Community

### TWO INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

1. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
2. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

### NINE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ELEMENTS

The following elements also receive guidance and oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD I&S)—

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
2. The National Security Agency (NSA)
3. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
4. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
5. U.S. Air Force Intelligence
6. U.S. Navy Intelligence
7. U.S. Army Intelligence
8. U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence
9. U.S. Space Force Intelligence

### SEVEN ELEMENTS OF OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

1. The Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
2. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis and
3. The intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Coast Guard
4. The Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation and
5. The Drug Enforcement Administration's Office of National Security Intelligence
6. The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research
7. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Source: [www.odni.gov](http://www.odni.gov)

