



IEC 61850 ...the Electrical SCADA Standard and Integration with DDCMIS






ISA DELHI 23/01/2015

Saroj Chelluri
AGM NTPC LTD, INDIA




- The Concept of IEC 61850
- IEC 62439 ...Standard For Ethernet Redundancy
- Network designing for SCADA And GOOSE Controls
- IEC 61850 Interface with DDCMIS ...OPC or UPC
- Conclusions





The Concept of IEC 61850



IEC 61850

Communication Networks and Systems in Substations


First Time Published in 2004, the IEC 61850 communication standard has gained more and more relevance in the field of Electrical Automation

IEC 61850 has not only taken over the drive of the communication technology of the office networking sector, but it has also adopted the best possible protocols and configurations for high functionality and reliable data transmission. Industrial Ethernet, which has been hardened for substation purposes and provides a speed of 1000 Mbit/s, offers enough bandwidth to ensure reliable information exchange between IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices), as well as reliable communication from an IED to a substation controller.

The definition of an effective process bus offers a standardized way to digitally connect conventional as well as intelligent CTs and VTs to relays.

More than just a protocol, IEC 61850 also provides benefits in the areas of engineering and maintenance, especially with respect to combining devices from different vendors.

Key features of IEC 61850



An object-oriented and application-specific data model focused on substation automation


This model includes object types representing nearly all existing equipment and functions in a substation – circuit breakers, protection functions, current and voltage transformers, waveform recordings, and many more Communication services providing multiple methods for information exchange and they cover reporting and logging of events, control of switches and functions, polling of data model information

Peer-to-peer communication for fast data exchange between the feeder level devices (protection devices and bay controller) is supported with GOOSE (Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event).

Support of sampled value exchange and file transfer for disturbance recordings

Communication services to connect primary equipment such as instrument transducers to relays

Key features of IEC 61850



Decoupling of data model and communication services from specific communication technologies.

This technology independence guarantees long-term stability for the data model and opens up the possibility to switch over to successor communication technologies.

Today, the standard uses Industrial Ethernet with the following significant features


- 100/1000 Mbit/s bandwidth
- Non-blocking switching technology
- Priority tagging for important messages
- Time synchronization of 1 ms

A common formal description code, which allows a standardized representation of a system's data model and its links to communication services. **This code, called SCL (Substation Configuration Description Language), covers all communication aspects according to IEC 61850.** Based on XML, this code is an ideal electronic interchange format for configuration data.

A standardized conformance test that ensures interoperability between devices. Devices must pass multiple test cases: positive tests for correctly responding to stimulation telegrams, plus several negative tests for ignoring incorrect information.


IEC 61850 offers a complete set of specifications covering all communication issues inside a substation.

IEC 61850 Standard




	Basic principles	Part 1
	Glossary	Part 2
	General Requirements	Part 3
	System and project management	Part 4
	Communication requirements	Part 5
	Substation Automation System Configuration	Part 6
	Basic Communication Structure	Part 7
Part 8	Mapping to MMS and Ethernet	
	Sampled Measured Values	Part 9
	Mapping to Ethernet	
	Conformance testing	Part 10

IEC61850 – Primary Parts



- **Part 6-1: Substation Configuration Language (SCL)**
- **Part 7-2: Abstract Communications Service Interface (ACSI) and base types**
- **Part 7-3: Common Data Classes (CDC)**
- **Part 7-4: Logical Nodes**
- **Part 8-1: Specific Communications Service Mappings (SCSM) MMS & Ethernet**
- **Part 9-2: SCSM - Sampled Values over Ethernet**
- **Part 10-1: Conformance Testing**



The nouns

The verbs



...





IEC 61850-7-2 some 20


...	...
TotNegVArh	<i>Reactive energy demand</i>
TotNegWh	<i>Real energy demand</i>
TotPosVArh	<i>Reactive energy supply</i>
TotPosWh	<i>Real energy supply</i>
TotVArh	<i>Reactive energy</i>
TotWh	<i>Real energy</i>
TCR	<i>tap changer raise (not low)</i>
PhsPhsV	<i>Phase to phase</i>
Pos	<i>Switch, S</i>
PosA	<i>Switch L1</i>
PosB	<i>Switch L2</i>
PosC	<i>Switch L3</i>
ARon	<i>XCBR on by AR</i>
LARon	<i>XCBR on by long-time AR</i>
HaA[n]	<i>Harmonics[n] of current</i>
HaV[n]	<i>Harmonics[n] of voltage</i>
HaVA[n]	<i>Harmonics[n] of apparent power</i>
...	...

IEC 61850-7-4
some 500


IEC 61850 Class Model



The idea behind IEC 61850: Logical Node




Concept of a Logical Node




- Functions still remain Vendor Specific
- Data Exchange becomes standardised


Logical Nodes



A named grouping of data and associated services that is logically related to some power system function.




IEC61850-7-4 Logical Nodes



Name	Description
Axxx	Automatic Control (4). ATCC (tap changer), AVCO (volt. ctrl.), etc.
Cxxx	Supervisory Control (5). CILO (Interlocking), CSWI (switch ctrl), etc.
Gxxx	Generic Functions (3). GGIO (generic I/O), etc.
Ixxx	Interfacing/Archiving (4). IARC (archive), IHMI (HMI), etc.
Lxxx	System Logical Nodes (2). LLN0 (common), LPHD (Physical Device)
Mxxx	Metering & Measurement (8). MMXU (meas.), MMTR (meter.), etc.
Pxxx	Protection (28). PDIF, PIOC, PDIS, PTOV, PTOH, PTOC, etc.
Rxxx	Protection Related (10). RREC (auto reclosing), RDRE (disturbance)..
Sxxx	Sensors, Monitoring (4). SARC (archs), SPDC (partial discharge), etc.
Txxx	Instrument Transformer (2). TCTR (current), TVTR (voltage)
Xxxx	Switchgear (2). XCBR (breaker), XCSW (switch)
Yxxx	Power Transformer (4). YPTR (transformer), YPSH (shunt), etc.
Zxxx	Other Equipment (15). ZCAP (cap ctrl), ZMOT (motor), etc.
Wxxx	Wind (Set aside for other standards)
Oxxx	Solar (Set aside for other standards)
Hxxx	Hydropower (Set aside for other standards)
Nxxx	Power Plant (Set aside for other standards)
Bxxx	Battery (Set aside for other standards)
Fxxx	Fuel Cells (Set aside for other standards)

Logical Node Description - XCBR



XCBR class				
Attribute Name	Attr. Type	Explanation	T	M/O
LNName		Shall be inherited from Logical-Node Class (see IEC 61850-7-2)		
Data				
<i>Common Logical Node Information</i>				
		LN shall inherit all Mandatory Data from Common Logical Node Class		M
Loc	SPS	Local operation (local means without substation automation communication, hardwired direct control)		M
EEHealth	INS	External equipment health		O
EEName	DPL	External equipment name plate		O
OpCnt	INS	Operation counter		M
Controls				
Pos	DPC	Switch position		M
BlkOpn	SPC	Block opening		M
BlkCls	SPC	Block closing		M
ChaMotEna	SPC	Charger motor enabled		O
Metered Values				
SumSwARs	BCR	Sum of Switched Amperes, resetable		O
Status Information				
CBOpCap	INS	Circuit breaker operating capability		M
POWCap	INS	Point On Wave switching capability		O
MaxOpCap	INS	Circuit breaker operating capability when fully charged		O


Data Name

Common Data Class

Description

Mandatory/Optional

Single Point Status (SPS) CDC



(see IEC 61850-7-2)

SPS class					
Attribute Name	Attribute Type	FC	TrgOp	Value/Value Range	M/O/C
DataName	Inherited from Data Class (see IEC 61850-7-2)				
DataAttribute					
<i>status</i>					
stVal	BOOLEAN	ST	dchg	TRUE FALSE	M
q	Quality	ST	qchg		M
t	TimeStamp	ST			M
<i>substitution</i>					
subEna	BOOLEAN	SV			PICS_SUBST
subVal	BOOLEAN	SV		TRUE FALSE	PICS_SUBST
subQ	Quality	SV			PICS_SUBST
subID	VISIBLE STRING64	SV			PICS_SUBST
<i>configuration, description and extension</i>					
d	VISIBLE STRING255	DC		Text	O
dU	UNICODE STRING255	DC			O
cdcNs	VISIBLE STRING255	EX			AC_DLNDA_M
cdcName	VISIBLE STRING255	EX			AC_DLNDA_M
dataNs	VISIBLE STRING255	EX			AC_DLN_M

Attribute
Name



Type

Functional
Constraint



Range of
Values

Mandatory/
Optional


Anatomy of an IEC61850 Object Name



Object Name Structure



ACSI Abstract Communications Service Interface




Defines a set of Objects

Defines a set of Services to manipulate and access those objects


Defines a base set of data types for describing objects

ACSI Objects




ACSI Object Class (7-2)	MMS Object (8-1)
SERVER class	Virtual Manufacturing Device (VMD)
LOGICAL DEVICE class	Domain
LOGICAL NODE class	Named Variable
DATA class	Named Variable
DATA-SET class	Named Variable List
SETTING-GROUP-CONTROL-BLOCK class	Named Variable
REPORT-CONTROL-BLOCK class	Named Variable
LOG class	Journal
LOG-CONTROL-BLOCK class	Named Variable
GOOSE-CONTROL-BLOCK class	Named Variable
GSSE-CONTROL-BLOCK class	Named Variable
CONTROL class	Named Variable
Files	Files

ACSI Services




**Enable
Self
Describing
Devices**



ACSI Services (7-2)	MMS Services (8-1)
LogicalDeviceDirectory	GetNameList
GetAllDataValues	Read
GetDataValues	Read
SetDataValues	Write
GetDataDirectory	GetNameList
GetDataDefinition	GetVariableAccessAttributes
GetDataSetValues	Read
DataSetValues	Write
CreateDataSet	CreateNamedVariableList
DeleteDataSet	DeleteNamedVariableList
GetDataSetDirectory	GetNameList
Report (Buffered and Unbuffered)	InformationReport
GetBRCBValues/GetURCBValues	Read
SetBRCBValues/SetURCBValues	Write
GetLCBValues	Read
SetLCBValues	Write
QueryLogByTime	ReadJournal
QueryLogAfter	ReadJournal
GetLogStatusValues	GetJournalStatus
Select	Read/Write
SelectWithValue	Read/Write
Cancel	Write
Operate	Write
Command-Termination	Write

Reporting Features




Unbuffered Reporting

Buffered reporting enables the server to retain data if associations are lost enabling the client to retrieve ALL data.




Relay-Relay Messaging





GOOSE:


**Generic Object Oriented
Substation Event**



**Published to all devices
subscribed to data on multi-
cast address**

GOOSE/GSSE is Reliable Multicast






Description language for communication in electrical substations related to the IEDs

XML based language that allows a formal description of

Substation automation system and the switchyard and the relation between them

IED configuration

SCL File Types



SSD: System Specification Description.

XML description of the entire system

SCD: Substation Configuration Description

XML description of a single substation


ICD: IED Capability Description

XML description of items supported by an IED

CID: Configured IED Description

XML configuration for a specific IED

Sampled Measured Values (SMV)



A method for transmitting sampled measurements from transducers such as CTs, VTs, and digital I/O.



Enables sharing of I/O signals among IEDs

Supports 2 transmission methods:


- Multicast service (MSVC) over Ethernet
- Unicast (point-to-point) service (USVC) over serial links.



SMV Application



IEC61850 Controls





Four Control Models:


- Direct Control with normal security
- SBO Control with normal security
- Direct Control with enhanced security
- SBO Control with enhanced security

Enhanced Security provides validation and supervision of the control action and reporting of status

IEC61850 Profiles



IEC61850 is Unique



Not a recast serial RTU protocol

Designed specifically for LANs to lower life cycle cost to use a device:


- Cost to install, configure, and maintain

Real object-oriented approach for SA:

- Supports standardized device models using names instead of object/register numbers and indexes.

- Standardized configuration language (SCL).

- Feature rich with support for functions difficult to implement otherwise.



IEC61850 Network Architecture


Data from IEDs available to all applications via network.

Communications unaffected when adding devices or applications.

Standard net. gear provides high perf. & flexibility with environmental protection.



Applications and IEDs share common:

- Protocols
- Data Format and Context
- Data Addressing/naming Conventions
- Configuration Language




IEC61850 View of Devices

- Only network addressing requires configuration in the remote client.
- Point names portray the meaning and hierarchy of the data.
- Point names can be retrieved from the device automatically without manual intervention.
- All devices share a common naming convention.
- Device configurations can be exchanged using IEC61850-6-1 (SCL) files




Advent of GOOSE with IEC 61850

GOOSE WITH IEC 61850




IEC 61850 Ethernet Communication networking has four types of communication modes

- ❑ TCP/IP MMS (Client – Server based on connection)
- ❑ NTP, SNMP, HTML (Non time critical basic services)
- ❑ GOOSE (Multicast, repetition mechanism on Layer 2)
- ❑ Sampled Values (Multicast, data stream directly on Layer 2)




GOOSE





- Generic Object Oriented Substation Event
 - User-defined Dataset (Status / Value)
 - Peer-to-Peer Communication
 - Publisher – Subscriber Model
 - Based on Device MAC Address
 - Message initiated on Change of state
 - Periodical Repetition
 - High Speed Data Exchange – Faster Than Hardwired Signals
-

IEC 61850 Communication Services






- Un buffered Reports
 - Buffered Reports
 - Control Operations
 - Logging
 - Time Synchronization
 - File Transfer
 - GOOSE
 - Sampled Values
-

GOOSE – Mapping to Communication Stack & Performances




Type	Application	Performance Class	Requirement (Transmission Time)
1 A	Fast Messages (Trip)	P1 P2/P3	10 ms 3 ms
1 B	Fast Messages (others)	P1 P2/P3	100 ms 20 ms
2	Medium Speed		100 ms
3	Low Speed		500 ms
4	Raw Data	P1 P2/P3	10 ms 3 ms
5	File Transfer		> 1000 ms
6	Time Synchronization		(Accuracy)

Hardwired Vs GOOSE




IEC 61850 Ed. 2



- **Communication Networks & Systems for Power Utility Automation**
 - **Broader Scope**
 - **Clarifications about gray areas in Edition 1**
 - **Improved Interoperability of Devices & Tools**
 - **Redundancy in Communication Networks**
 - **IEC 62439**
-

Benefits of IEC61850



High-level services enable self-describing devices & automatic object discovery saving \$\$\$\$ in configuration, setup and maintenance.


Standardized naming conventions with power system context eliminates device dependencies and tag mapping saving \$\$\$\$ in config., setup, and maintenance.

Standardized configuration file formats enables exchange of device configuration saving \$\$\$\$ in design, specification, config., setup, and maint.

Higher performance multi-cast messaging for inter-relay communications enables functions not possible with hard wires and save \$\$\$\$ in wiring and maintenance.

Multi-cast messaging enables sharing of transducer (CT/PT) signals saving \$\$\$\$ by reducing transducers and calibration costs.

To Summarize IEC 61850



IEC 61850 is a global standard for

“Communication Networks and Systems in Substations”

It specifies an expandable **data model and services**

It does not block future development of functions

It specifies **no protection or control functions**

It supports free allocation of functions to devices

It is open for different system philosophies

It provides the Substation Configuration description Language (SCL)


It supports comprehensive consistent system definition and engineering

It uses Ethernet and TCP/IP for communication

Provides the broad range of features of mainstream communication

It is open for future new communication concepts

To Summarize IEC 61850





IEC 61850 standard separates the domain related model for both data and communication services from the protocols, ie, the [ISO/OSI seven-layer stack used to code and decode information into bit strings for communication over a serial link](#)

This approach not only accommodates state-of-the-art communication technology, but it also safeguards investments in applications and engineering (based on the object and command communication service model)

Therefore, the [standard is future-proof](#). The mapping of the data model to the communication stack is also standardized in IEC 61850 to ensure interoperable communication

All application functions, including the data interfaces to the primary equipment, are broken down into the smallest feasible pieces, which may communicate with each other and be implemented separately in dedicated IEDs.




IEC 62439 Standard For Ethernet Redundancy

IEC 62439 “High Availability Automation Networks”



- Specifies relevant principles for high availability Ethernet networks that basically meet requirements for industrial automation networks
- Application Protocol Independent
- Can be used for both industrial and energy automation applications
- Therefore perfectly applicable to IEC 61850




Redundancy Methods

Table 2 — Examples of redundancy methods

Protocol	Solution	Frame loss	End node attachment	End node drivers	Network Topology	Recovery time		
						Fault	Repair	Reinstatement
IP	IP routing	yes	single	standard	single meshed	>30s not deterministic		
STP	IEEE 802.1D-1998	yes	single	standard	single meshed	>10s not deterministic		
RSTP	IEEE 802.1D-2004	yes	single	standard	single meshed	>2s not deterministic	>2 s	>20 s for switch, 0 for link
MRP	IEC 62439, Clause 5	yes	single	standard	ring	500ms-200ms for 50 switches		
CRP	IEC 62439, Clause 7	yes	double	specific	connected double meshed	1-2 s for 512 end nodes		
PRP	IEC62439, Clause 6	no	double	specific	isolated double meshed	0	0	0

- **** according IEC 62439 (CDV – Committee Draft for Voting) : Digital data communication for measurement and control – High availability automation networks**

Redundancy solutions retained for IEC 61850



- With “zero” switchover time (seamless)

- PRP (Parallel Redundancy Protocol)


IEC 62439-3 Clause 4

- HSR (High-availability Seamless Redundancy)

IEC 62439-3 Clause 5

- The recommended application domain of each protocol is explained in IEC 61850-90-4 (Network Engineering Guidelines), to be published.

PRP Principle



Two Ethernet networks (LANs) of similar topology operate in parallel.

The LANs shall not be connected to each other to ensure fail-independence.



Each node is a doubly attached node with PRP (=DANP) which has an interface for each LAN and sends a frame simultaneously on both LANs.

A receiver receives in normal operation both frames and discards the duplicate.



In case of failure, a receiver keeps on with the frames it receives from the healthy port.

When traffic is reestablished, the receiver resumes processing frames from both channels.


PRP Normal Operations



PRP operation with fault





HSR principle (Multicast)







Nodes are arranged as a ring, each node has two identical interfaces, port A and port B. For each frame to send ("C"-frame), the source node sends two copies over port A and B. Each node relays a frame it receives from port A to port B and vice-versa, except if it already forv it. The destination nodes consumes the first frame of a pair and discards the duplicate. In case of interruption of the ring, frames still continue to be received over the intact path.

HSR normal operation





HSR operation with fault







Network Design For SCADA and GOOSE Controls


Auxiliary Power Supply for a 3 x 800 MW Power Station



GLP with FO Loops



CONTROL SYSTEMS IN A POWER PLANT




Circuit breakers of auxiliary power supply system can be functionally classified into the following categories


- Incomers / Bus-couplers / Ties (MV)
- Outgoing Transformer Feeders (MV)
- Outgoing Motor Feeders (MV)
- Incomers / Bus-couplers / Ties (LV)

Conventionally, controls, i.e. switching on and off of circuit breakers / contactors, are done by the DDCMIS (Plant Distributed Control and management Information Systems) through hardwired signals

CONTROL SYSTEMS IN A POWER PLANT




- ❑ Motor feeders, being part of the process, are controlled by DDCMIS through various functional groups according to the process requirement
- ❑ Other breakers, viz. Incomers, Bus-couplers, Ties, Outgoing and Transformer feeders are controlled by dedicated separate functional group
- ❑ The control logic for each individual breaker is split into two parts, one built in the DDCMIS and the other in the IED (Intelligent Electronic Device) of that breaker as below
 - Interlocks related to external systems like upstream and other units' breakers are built in the DDCMIS
 - Interlocks related to the breaker being controlled like synchronism check, No electrical fault (86), Reverse Blocking and breaker schematics are built inside the breaker's IED.
 - Bus transfer logics are also a combination of DDCMIS logics and hardwired interlock
 - Breaker on / off status and electrical fault (86) are the signals that are hardwired to DDCMIS and other important signals are provided to DDCMIS for process displays through OPC



What is SCADA ?

SCADA is...




SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

SCADA generally refers to an industrial computer system that monitors and controls a process

In the case of the transmission and distribution elements of electrical utilities, SCADA will monitor substations, transformers, switchgears and other electrical assets

SCADA systems are typically used to control geographically dispersed assets that are often scattered over thousands of square kilometres

Functions Of SCADA



Functions of SCADA systems into four major categories


Data Acquisition

Data Communication

Data Presentation

Control

Controls From SCADA




IED's are versatile devices with

- Protection, Metering, Monitoring and Control functions
- High speed and Reliability
- Conform to IEC61850 - internationally accepted standard for substation communication based on high speed Ethernet and Data transmission speeds of up to 1Gbps

The Switchgear SCADA systems are

- Highly advanced systems capable of controlling large substations
- Can very be utilized for performing all controls of circuit breakers excluding those of motor feeders
- Faster command processing

CB Controls From SCADA



Control logic for each individual breaker to be built in the SCADA and the IED of that breaker

Interlocks related to external systems like upstream and other units' breakers to be built in the IED



Interlocks related to the breaker being controlled like synchro-check, no electrical fault (86), Reverse Blocking and breaker schematics to be built inside the breaker's IED

Bus transfer logics to be built with separate special-purpose IED with hardwired interlocks


No need of hard wiring Breaker on / off status and electrical fault (86) are the signals to DDCMIS

Other important signals (about 15 per breaker) to be provided to DDCMIS for process displays through OPC (OLE for Process Control) link – *Only for Motor feeders*


Migration to SCADA Controls




CB Controls From SCADA



Control Philosophy - Incomer / Bus-coupler / Tie (MV)



Advantages Of Electrical SCADA



No / Negligible Additional Hardware

- Numerical Relays (IEDs) already part of Switchgears

- Communication Network already there

 - Network Redundancy to be added

- Servers with Redundancy already being specified

No / Minimal Hard-wiring

- Control commands through Network (FO)


- No Hardwired feedback

IEC61850 Platform

- Ease of Engineering

- Better coordination

- Flexibility



SCADA Network Configurations

System Design Drivers



Driven by main requirements as ...

- Functionality
- Performance
- Availability
- Single Point of Failure
- Cost

From logical architecture to physical architecture

Logical architecture provides


- Functionality
- Relation between the functions

Physical architecture provides



- Assigns functions to devices
- Real communication technology / network

For the design of the communication system, the geography or geometry of the site has to be known e.g.



- Decentralized kiosk
- Centralized rooms



BASIC SAS





Typical Ethernet Substation



The Substation LAN provides a high-speed communications bus between a variety of IEDs (e.g. Relays, RTUs, Meters, etc...)


IEC 61850 Substation





The "Digital Substation": both power system data and control over the LAN.




Substation Network



Substation Network recovery





Design Philosophy





- Decentralized System
 - All Automatic Logics built inside the Relays / BCUs
 - Network-independent Logics
 - HMI for Manual Control & Data Acquisition
 - Main Unit Bus transfers through Fast Bus Transfer Device
 - Critical Interlocks Hardwired


Overall Architecture



Architecture with Redundancy




Hardware Implementation





- Distributed system
- Data concentrators Geographically distributed
 - 2Nos per unit placed in CER
 - 1No each in Water System, Coal & Ash Handling areas (Engineering)
- Numerical Relays & BCUs (wherever required) in Switchgears
- Ethernet Switches with Copper & Fibre ports mounted in Switchgears
- Fibre Optic cable
 - Rings of each data concentrator
 - Station LAN
 - Interconnection with DDCMIS

Reliability Considerations




- ❑ Numerical Relays – Highly reliable
- ❑ Replacement and Restoration is very fast
- ❑ All network components are tried, tested & certified for harsh environments
- ❑ Redundancy at all Levels
 - Server – Hot Standby
 - Ethernet Network – Redundant Rings with PRP
 - IED – Dual Communication Ports with PRP
 - Redundant DC / UPS Power Supply to All Devices
- ❑ Separate LV Panels at Extreme ends of MV Switchgears to keep Ethernet Switches & Power Supplies

Implementation of GOOSE Controls ..VLAN






- Use of Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN)
- Group of Ports that form a Broadcast Domain
- Separation of Traffic – Better Bandwidth Usage
- Each Ring having 100 Numerical relays
- VLANS defined as per requirement for optimized Goose Traffic

Implementation of GOOSE Controls..QoS



- Use of Quality of Service (QoS)
- Priority attached to each Message
- Priority processing of Message inside the Ethernet Switch
- 8 Levels available








IEC 61850 Interface with DDCMIS



OPC Interface with DDCMIS







INPUT/OUTPUT SIGNALS for Motor Feeder (Feeder Type - DAX)				
Sr. No.	Input Description	Status Signals		Signal for DDCIMS
		ON State Description	OFF State Description	
Status Signals				
1	Breaker Close Position	Close	Open	✓
2	Breaker Service Position	ON	OFF	✓
3	Breaker Test Position	ON	OFF	✓
4	Reverse Block	Operated	Reset	✓
5	86 Trip	Operated	Reset	✓
6	Under Voltage trip	Operated	Reset	✓
7	Trip Circuit Healthy	Healthy	Unhealthy	✓
8	Numerical Relay	Healthy	Unhealthy	✓
9	Thermal Overload Alarm/Warning Element	Operated	Reset	✓
10	Thermal Overload Trip Element	Operated	Reset	✓
Analog Inputs				
12	Current R (Ir)			✓
13	Current Y (Iy)			✓
14	Current B (Ib)			✓
15	Current N (In)			✓
16	Active Power (P)			✓
17	Reactive Power (Q)			✓
18	Energy Kwh			✓

INPUT/OUTPUT SIGNALS for LT Incomer Feeder (Feeder Type - DAI)				
Sr. No.	Input Description	Status Signals		Signal for DDCIMS
		ON State Description	OFF State Description	
Status Signals				
1	Breaker Status	Close	Open	✓
2	Breaker In Service	ON	OFF	✓
3	Breaker In Test	ON	OFF	✓
4	Realy 86 Opearted (LED-1)	Operated	Reset	✓
5	Trip Circuit Healthy(LED-13)	Operated	Reset	✓
6	25° in Sync Prem to DDCMIS(LED-14)	Operated	Reset	✓
7	Numerical Relay Healthy	Healthy	UnHealthy	✓
Analog Inputs				
8	Voltage R-Y (Vry)			✓
9	Voltage Y-B (Vyb)			✓
10	Voltage B-R (Vbr)			✓
11	Current R (Ir)			✓
12	Current Y (Iy)			✓
13	Current B (Ib)			✓
14	Current N (In)			✓
15	Active Power (P)			✓
16	Reactive Power (Q)			✓
17	Power Factor (Pf)			✓
18	Frequency (Hz)			✓
19	Energy Kwh			✓

INPUT/OUTPUT SIGNALS for Transformer Feeder with Diff (Feeder Type - DBF)				
Sr. No.	Input Description	Status Signals		Signal for DDCIMS
		ON State Description	OFF State Description	
Status Signals				
1	Breaker Status	Close	Open	✓
2	Breaker in Service Position	ON	OFF	✓
3	Breaker in Test Position	ON	OFF	✓
4	Bucholz Trip	Operated	Reset	✓
5	Winding Temp High Trip	Operated	Reset	✓
6	Oil Temp High Trip	Operated	Reset	✓
7	PRV Trip	Operated	Reset	✓
8	(86 Trip (LED-1)	Operated	Reset	✓
9	Numerical Relay Healthy	Healthy	Unhealthy	✓
10	TRF DIFF(87T)	Operated	Reset	✓
Analog Inputs				
11	Current R (Ir)			✓
12	Current Y (Iy)			✓
13	Current B (Ib)			✓
14	Current N (In)			✓
15	Active Power (P)			✓
16	Reactive Power (Q)			✓
17	Energy Kwh			✓


Sr. No.	Input Description	Status Signals		Signal for DDCIMS
		ON State Description	OFF State Description	
Status Signals				
1	Breaker Status	Close	Open	✓
2	CB in Service Position	ON	OFF	✓
3	CB in Test Position	ON	OFF	✓
4	3 Ph Inst O/C (LED-2)	Operated	Reset	✓
5	Under Voltage (LED-9)	Operated	Reset	✓
6	Time Between Starts (LED-12)	Operated	Reset	✓
7	Trip Coil Healthy(LED-13)	Healthy	Unhealthy	✓
8	Major Relay Failure (LED-23)	Operated	Reset	✓
9	Thermal Over load alarm/warning element	Operated	Reset	✓
10	Thermal Over load Trip element	Operated	Reset	✓
Analog Inputs				
11	Current R (Ir)			✓
12	Current Y (Iy)			✓
13	Current B (Ib)			✓
14	Current N (In)			✓
15	Active Power (P)			✓
16	Reactive Power (Q)			✓
17	Energy Kwh			✓



Data connectivity testing during FAT done to ensure the two systems i.e. the electrical SCADA on IEC 61850 and OPC DA and DCS systems are communicating

The ZD OPC ZP OPC client installed in SCADA server acts as a tunneller which feeds the data from the ABB OPC Server and passes it to EDS server through a fire wall

The test results show data connections between ABB 800 XA system and Emerson EDS server



Archestra System Management Console (KCT-L-30) [DA Server Manager] [Default Group] [Local] [Archestra.FSGateway.1] [Diagnostics] [Structure] [DC1] [STA]

Matrikon Data Manager Configuration [C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\My Documents\piktag23_03_10.csv]

Archestra System Management Console (KCT-L-30)

- DA Server Manager
 - Default Group
 - Local
 - Archestra.FSGateway.1
 - Configuration
 - Diagnostics
 - Client Groups
 - Structure
 - DC1
 - MET
 - PRO
 - STA

- Log Viewer


Name	Items	Errors	R/W S...	Value	Time	Quality	Messages	De
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_IN001_S			R/W	FALSE	7:14:58 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_IN002_S			R/W	TRUE	6:57:43 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_IN003_S			R/W	FALSE	7:12:17 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_IN004_S			R/W	FALSE	6:59:24 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED01_S			R/W	TRUE	7:01:14 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED02_S			R/W	TRUE	7:02:10 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED03_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED04_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED05_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED06_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED07_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED08_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_OT102_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_OT103_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED1_S			R/W	FALSE	7:01:03 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED2_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED3_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED4_S			R/W	TRUE	7:02:10 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED5_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED6_S			R/W	TRUE	7:02:27 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED7_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		
■ HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED8_S			R/W	FALSE	6:29:57 AM	00C0		

Matrikon Data Manager Configuration [C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\My Documents\piktag23_03_10.csv]

- localhost
 - KEPware.KEPServeEx.V4
 - Matrikon.OPC.DataManager.1
 - Matrikon.OPC.Simulation.1
 - Tunneler.192.168.10.10.Matrikon.OPC.Simulation.1
 - Tunneler.HIS0447.KEPware.KEPServeEx.V4
 - Tunneler.HIS0447.Matrikon.OPC.DataManager.1
 - Tunneler.HIS0447.Matrikon.OPC.Simulation.1
 - Tunneler.HIS0447.Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.1
 - Tunneler.HDA.192.168.10.10.Matrikon.OPC.Simulation.1
 - Tunneler.HDA.HIS0447.Matrikon.OPC.Simulation.1
 - Yokogawa.CS1000.OPC
 - Yokogawa.CS1000.OPCAuto
 - Yokogawa.CSHIS.AE
 - Yokogawa.CSHIS.BATCH
 - Yokogawa.CSHIS.BATCHAuto
 - Yokogawa.CSHIS.DCOM
 - Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC
 - Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPCAuto
 - Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPCDA1
 - Yokogawa.CSHIS.AE.1
 - Matrikon.OPC.Simulation.1
- Network Neighborhood
 - VHIS0447
 - VKCT-L-30
 - Archestra.FSGateway.1
 - SISCO.AVS4MMS.5
 - OPCSample.OpcD.a20Server.1
 - SISCO.AVS4GOOSE.1

Data Manager Groups	Tag	Master (Input)	Slave (Output)	Acc.	Type	Master's Value	Quality
■ n_relay_pic1	relay_tag01	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:MET:HUAK_P02_710X_A_MET_V60X.V	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	1	VT_R4	124	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag10	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:PRO:HUAK_P02_710X_A_PRO_CBRKP.S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	10	VT_I4	1	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag11	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_IN001_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	11	VT_BOOL	FALSE	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag12	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_IN003_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	12	VT_BOOL	FALSE	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag14	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_IN002_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	13	VT_BOOL	TRUE	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag15	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_IN004_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	14	VT_BOOL	TRUE	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag16	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED01_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	15	VT_BOOL	TRUE	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag17	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED02_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	16	VT_BOOL	TRUE	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag18	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED03_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	17	VT_BOOL	FALSE	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag19	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED04_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	18	VT_BOOL	TRUE	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag20	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED05_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	19	VT_BOOL	FALSE	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag21	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED06_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	2	VT_R4	125	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag22	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED07_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	3	VT_R4	126	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag23	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_LED08_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	4	VT_R4	10	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag24	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_OT102_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	5	VT_R4	20	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag25	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_OT103_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	6	VT_R4	30	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag26	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED1_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	7	VT_R4	100	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag27	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED2_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	8	VT_R4	50	Good, Non-Specific
	relay_tag28	VKCT-L-30:Archestra.FSGateway.1:DC1:STA:HUAK_P02_710X_A_STA_PLED3_S	localhost:Yokogawa.CSHIS.OPC.FCS02190C01.1:BRXK1_DT	9	VT_BOOL	TRUE	Good, Non-Specific

No Redundancy. Ready. 17 item(s) loaded.




Standards for Integration and Data connectivity for Unified Data Models

In the energy sector the core standards emerging for standardization are

- **TR 62357: Reference Architecture**
- **IEC 61968/61970: Common Information Model for EMS and DMS**
- **IEC 61850: Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) Communications at Substation level and DER**
- **IEC 62351: Vertical security for the TR 62357**
- **IEC 60870: Telecontrol protocols**
- **IEC 62541: OPC UA – OPC Unified Architecture, Automation Standard**
- **IEC 62325: Market Communications using CIM**


OPC CLASSIC OR OPC UA



Until now, the data interface between plant DCS system and Electrical SCADA through Classic OPC was considered and implemented only for data exchange of soft data. OPC UA throws a very bigger possibility for automation & electrical engineers to explore & benefit from direct integration with IEC 61850. The mapping of the OPC UA with the IEC 61850 is promising and will open new vistas of collaboration between the plant automation & electrical systems.

Many standardization efforts are going on for creating harmonization and enabling interoperability of systems in terms of communications. IEC TC 57 has identified IEC 61850 and CIM models as core standards which shall play key roles in the seamless integration for smart electrical systems. OPC Unified Architecture, which is also a core standard specifying a server-client-architecture, is also used to harmonize the two mentioned data models based on a common access layer for higher interoperability of Power plant electrical and DCS systems and also for the management of SCADA systems.

Concept of OPC UA




Unified Access: OPC UA integrates existing OPC specifications DA, A&E, HDA, commands, Complex data, and Object Types in one specification and Access via Firewalls and across the Internet OPC UA uses message based security which means messages can be relayed through HTTP, UA TCP port or any other single port available

Reliability: OPC UA implements a configurable timeouts, error detection, and communication failure recovery. OPC UA allows redundancy between applications from different vendors to be deployed

Security OPC UA is Secure-by-default, encryption enabled, and uses advanced certificate handling

Platform neutrality OPC UA is designed to be independent of the platform. Using SOAP/XML over HTTP, OPC UA can be deployed on Linux, Windows XP Embedded, Vx Works, Mac, Windows 7, and Classical Windows platforms


OPC Unified Architecture extends the highly successful OPC communication protocol, enabling data acquisition and information modelling and communication between the plant floor and the enterprise reliably and securely



Future-ready and Legacy-friendly: OPC UA uses binary encoded data; hence the response issue in Classic OPC is expected to be addressed. The scalability offered is tremendous; OPC UA can work on embedded devices which also will address the response issue

Easy configuration and maintenance: As it does not use DCOM, it is fire wall friendly. The OPC client design in case of UA is much simplified since the entire information modelling is done in the UA server





Higher Performance: Being platform independent, it is the niche solution as many DCS vendors are also expected to go non-Windows platforms. OPC UA supports redundancy although many of the implementations are yet to add this feature. In addition, mechanisms like failover & heartbeat will make the communication more robust than its classic counterparts.





The development of the OPC Unified Architecture (UA) enables a new and very promising opportunity to harmonize data models

The UA specifies an abstract server-client-architecture based on a defined information model and services


The architecture provides that a domain specific information model is used to represent certain objects and hence , a UA-server can be run with an IEC 61850-based model.




Mapping IEC 61850 data structures onto OPC UA address space



NATIONAL TRANSMISSION ASSET MANAGEMENT CENTRE



MAIN NATIONAL TRANSMISSION ASSET MANAGEMENT CONTROL CENTRE



Remote
Operation and
Monitoring of
192 Substations
of POWERGRID

To Have
Unmanned
Substations
through
Automation and
SCADA Networks

Paradigm Shift In Controls and Information Flow




Fig: 1-1 :Load Despatch Center Hierarchy







Fig 1-2 : NTAMC Hierarchical Control





- ❑ Standardisation of Protocols ...the key for Integrated Controls in Plants and Process Industry
- ❑ As Automation levels and complexity are increasing, concept of universal platform for all type of controls shall emerge
- ❑ Standardisation of Network configuration a key to Reliable networks and reliable operations



Thank You



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